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Rational Intuition: Bealer on Its Nature and Epistemic StatusAuthor(s): Ernest SosaSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 81, No. 2/3, Papers Presented at the American Philosophical Association PacificDivision Meeting 1995 (Mar., 1996), pp. 151-162Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320646 .

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ERNESTOSA

RATIONALNTUITION:EALERON ITSNATUREANDEPISTEMICTATUS(Received August1995)

Thereis a lot I findagreeablen GeorgeBealer'soverallviewof philosophical nowledge.Thedisagreemento come is indeedmostlya surfacephenomenon, ith extensiveanddeepagreementbelowthe surface.Thedevilis saidto be in thedetails,however, ndtodayI playthe devil'sadvocate.Iwillfocusmainlyonintellectualntuition, nderhreeheads:

A. Thephenomenologyf intellectualntuition.B. Thestatusof such ntuition s abasicsourceof evidence,and heexplanationf whatgivesit thatstatus.C. Thedefenseof intuition gainsthosewhowouldrejecttandexclude tonprinciplerom heset ofvalidsources fevidence.

AWhat s ostensiblentuition? irstof all,ostensiblentuitions likeostensible erception:hequalifierervesocancel hesuccessmpli-cation;whatremainss mostly hephenomenology.nwhat ollowswe focus on thephenomenology,nd'intuition'will be short or'ostensiblentuition'.Theintuitions f interestherearea priori ntellectualeemings,which present themselves as necessary:when "... we have an apriori intuition,ay,that f P thennotnot P ... it seemsthat hingscouldnotbeotherwise."(6)1Suchintuitings re to be distinguishedromimaginings.As intheexampleof doublenegation,ntellectualntuitions aconsciouspositive pisodebut tneednot nvolveanything icturablerimag-PhilosophicalStudies 81: 151-162, 1996.? 1996KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printedin theNetherlands.

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152 ERNESTSOSAinablein any sensoryterms.Thedataprovidedby suchintuitionare"dataof reason,"not"dataof experience."Such intuitingsare also to be distinguishedfrom beliefs. Fourarguments are advancedin supportof this proposed distinction.Before considering he arguments,et's distinguish wo quitediffer-ent distinctions hat mightbe at issue. Firstthe claimmightamountto the following, relativelyweak,distinction:

(WD) Not everybelief thatp is necessarilyan intuition hatp.Secondwe have themuchstrongerdistinction:

(SD) Thereis no sort of belief, a, such thatto be an intuitionthatp is to be a belief of sorta.As we considereachof the fourarguments Al throughA4 below)designed to enforce a distinction between belief and intuition,wemust wonderwhether he aim is to establishonly the weakerdistinc-tion WD or also the strongerSD.Al. "Belief is highly plastic.... Not so for intuitions."6-7)

Re Al: Since surelynot all sorts of beliefs areso plastic, this couldestablishat mostaweakdistinction uchasWD, andnotthestrongerSD.A2. Thereare "... significantrestrictionson the propositionsconcerningwhich one can have intuitions; by contrasttherearevirtuallyno restrictionson thepropositionscon-cerningwhich onecanmakeajudgmentor aguessorhavea hunch." 7)

Re A2: However, not all sortsof beliefs are thus unrestricted.Forexample,"beliefwhosecontent s a simple necessarytruth" s a sortof belief with a significantrestrictionon the propositionsthat canconstitute its content. So, again, this argumentcould establish atmost a weak distinctionsuch as WD.

A3. "Intuitionmustbedistinguished rombelief:belief is not aseeming;intuition s. For examplethereare many mathe-

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THE NATUREAND EPISTEMICSTATUSOF INTUITION 153maticaltheoremsthatI believe (becauseI have seen theproofs) but thatdo not seem to me to be true andthatdonotseem to me to be false ... ." (6)

Re A3: It is compatiblewiththis,however,that intuitionbe a certainsort of belief: e.g., a noninferentialbelief thatdoes not just derivefrommemory,perception,or introspection or the like. Again,onlya weakdistinctionsuch as WD is establishedby A3.A4. ".. I have an intuition- it still seems to me - that thenaivecomprehensionaxiom of set theory s true; his is so

despitethe factthatI do not believethat t is true(becauseI know of the set theoreticalparadoxes)."6)Re A4: Here we do clearlyhave an argument or the strongerdis-tinction SD. If one accepts its premiss, then there is no avoidingtheconclusion that to be an intuitioncannot ustbe tantamount o beinga certainsort of belief. Thepremissheredoes insurethat one couldhave an intuition hatp withouthavingany sort of belief thatp.

We may conclude from the foregoing reflectionsthat belief isindeed to be distinguished rom intuitionbothin the weak sense ofWD andin the strongsense of SD. Buthow are we morepositivelyto thinkof intuition.We are told that".... there is a rathersimilarphenomenonin sensory (vs. intellectual)seeming. In the Muller-Lyer llusion, it still seems to me thatone of the two arrows s longerthan the other;this is so despite the fact that I do not believe thatone of the two arrows s longer(because I havemeasured hem). Ineach case, the seeming (intellectualor sensory)persistsin spite ofthecountervailingbelief."(6)Compatiblywiththeforegoing,nevertheless,seemings(intellec-tual or sensory) might be definable in terms of what one does orwould believe in certaincircumstances.Thus, in the Muller-Lyerillusion,in the absence of measuringand in the absenceof memoryaboutthe alreadyestablishedmisleadingnessof the situation, f onereliedjust on perception,one wouldbelievethatone line was longerthanthe other.Similarly,most of us wouldnaturallybelieve the naive compre-hension axiom in the absence of the reasoninginvolving the set-


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154 ERNESTSOSAtheoreticalparadoxes,if one reliedjust on one's understanding fwhatthe axiom itself says.Seemingsthen,whethersensoryor intellectual,mightbe viewedas inclinations o believe on the basis of directexperience(sensory)or understanding(intellectual) and regardless of any collateralreasoning,memory,or introspection where the objects of intel-lectualseemingalso present hemselvesas necessary.What is more,that one at a certaintime has such a "direct" ncli-nation- such an inclination ndependentof inference, ntrospection,perception,or memory seems the sort of thing one can be awareof in turn,and awareof with"introspective" irectness.Thatis, onecan be awareof this in turn withoutrelying for this awarenessoninference,perception,or memory.Considerfor comparisona casewhereyou think:"if he says that one more time I'll be angry,"oreven:"ifhe had said thatone more time I wouldhave been angry."Hereyou may well be right,you may also knowyou areright, youmayknowyour own stateof mind well enough forthat, andyetyourbelief here seems not derived from perceptionor memory,or eveninference in anyrelevantsense).Onemightperhapshold outfor a moresubstantial onceptionofseemingas involving a morepositive experientialcomponent, n abroadenoughsense of "experiential"o coversuigenerisintellectualexperienceas well as the more ordinarysensoryexperience.Let'ssuppose that real intellectualintuitionrequiresthatthe propositionintuitedhave a special "glow" underthe light of reason, a special"luster."Again, I do notmyself see sufficientneed to postulateanysuchglow,except as a metaphor or theproperties, xplicatedabove,that a propositioncan have of being such thatwe wouldbelieve itin theabsence of inference,etc. However, for the sake of argument,in what follows I will suppressthatdissent of mine, puttingasidemy propensityof deflatethe glow intojust an inclination o believeabsent inference,etc. However we view intuition, our remainingquestionsbeckon.2

BIntuition,however,we conceiveof it, is, we aretold,abasicsourceofevidence,andis treatedas suchinourstandardustificatorypractice.Whatmakes ntuition husabasicsourceof evidence?Whatexplains


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THE NATUREAND EPISTEMICSTATUSOFINTUITION 155its being so? What is it in virtueof which it is so? Two mainpossi-bilitiesareconsideredas theonly likely contenders.Otherrivalsarediscussedelsewhere,but we aretold that none of these is success-ful. Anyhow, the two possibilitiesconsideredhere are:contingentreliabilismandmodalreliabilism.According to contingent reliabilism, something counts as a basic source ofevidence iff thereis a nomologicallynecessary,but neverthelesscontingent,tiebetween its deliverancesandthe truth. 23)Against this sort of view, threecounterexamplesare proposed,allcases of creatureswho,eitherby telepathicmanipulation rthroughhardwiring, rereliablyright ntheirbeliefsconcerning omefield ofpropositions:eithera field of contingentpropositionsaboutremotestates of affairs to which the creaturehas no other access, or amotley set of necessarypropositionsthat the creaturehas no wayof establishingby ordinarymodes of reason,wherethepropositionsaboutwhich the creature s thus reliable do not even fit into anytheoreticalsystematizationknown to anyone, and where perhapsno-oneis even intelligentenough to be able to establishanyof thesepropositions hroughordinary easoning.For a more specific example, take again a motley set of neces-sary propositionsbelief in which is fixed by hardwiring.Let theset includethe propositionthat there is no largest prime. One justfinds oneself believing this, even thoughthis propositionfits intono theoreticalsystematizationknown to anyone, and even thoughno-one is even intelligentenoughto be able to establishthisthroughnormalreasoning,or to establishanyotherpropositionn themotleyset.Contingently,becauseof thecontingent actthatone fortunatelyis hardwiredso as to believe just these propositions,one is boundto be right in one's belief that there is no largestprime. But it ishardly a belief thatcan thus count as basically evident for one insuchcircumstances.The conclusion is clear: as it stands,contingentreliabilismfails as an accountof what it takes for somethingto be a basic source of evidence. In each of thecounterexamples, he tie to the truthwas only contingent.A naturalway of rulingout such counterexampleswould thereforebe to require hat the tie be some sortof strongmodaltie - that is, to abandoncontingentreliabilism n favorof someformof modalreliabilism,as I favor.(25)

The alternatives thusmodalreliabilism,wherebythere is somemodal tie to the truth: .e., some modal tie thatconnects the basic


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156 ERNESTSOSAsourceof evidence withthetruth. t is proposed hatwe make .. . thestrong modal tie to the truth dialectical and holistic ratherthanlocal [so as to avoid any local infallibilism of intuitions,which isunacceptablen lightof paradoxesor aporeia,whereby ocal reasonindictsitselfl:For suitably good cognitive conditions, it is necessary that, if while in suchconditions a subject goes throughthe whole procedureof a priori justifica-tion ..., then most of the propositionsderivable from the resulting compre-hensive theoreticalsystematizationof the subject's intuitionswould have to betrue." 33)

The 'procedure f apriorijustification'had beenexplainedearlierasbeing one "... thatsuitablyapproximateshefollowing idealization:(1) canvassingintuitions;(2) subjectingthose intuitions to dialec-ticalcritique; 3) constructingheories hatsystematize hesurvivingintuitions;(4) testing those theories againstfurther ntuitions;(5)repeating heprocess untilequilibriums approached."5)So much for the critiqueof contingentreliabilismandthe shift tomodalreliabilism.A problem or thatshift nowappears:namely, hatthecounterexampleso contingentreliabilismseemno less effectiveagainstmodalreliabilism.Considerthe subjectwho, throughtele-pathy or throughhardwiring,happens to believe the propositionthatthere is no largestprime.He just finds himself believing thisproposition.Now isn't it truethatany belief of thatsort, thatis tosay, any belief that there is no largestprime, is boundto be rightwith modal force? Being the sort of belief it is, a belief with thatcontent,it is a necessarilytruebelief. So, do we not satisfyheretherequirements f modal reliabilism?That is to say, do we not havea sortof belief thatis not just contingentlyreliablebutnecessarilyreliable?Isn'tanyonewiththatsort of belief necessarilyright?Itmightbe argued hatthis is justpartof thefearsome"generalityproblem"besettingforms of reliabilismgenerally.Once we have abetterconceptionof the allowablesortsof "processes" r"faculties"or "psychologicalmodes,"we can just rely on that result to ruleout such problematicmodes as acquiringa belief that there is nolargestprime.And here the more positive and rich conceptionofintellectual"seeming"may actually be of some use. Therightwayto thinkof therelevant aculty, t maybe suggested, s as thefacultythatdeterminesbelief on the basisof whetherornottheright"glow'


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THENATUREAND EPISTEMICSTATUSOF INTUITION 157or"luster"s foundin thepropositionunderconsideration.However,two problemsattach o this suggestion.Firstof all, it is notreallyclearexactlywhat theglow has to offerthat makes it betterthan the specificcontent.Takeagain the beliefthat there is no largestprime.If one is so hardwired hat this amongothernecessarytruths s a truthone is bound to believe; if, being sobound, one is also necessarilybound to be right in the beliefs thatone is thus led to accept;and if one can even tell by introspectionwhat therespect s thatmakes one's belief so worthyand so reliablytrue,thenexactlyhow is this mode of belief acquisition ackingbycomparisonwiththeuse of theglow as one's guideto belief?It'snotas thoughwe donot know whatcontentour belief haswhen ithasthecontent hat here s no largestprime.Thisaspectof one's belief is noless internallyaccessible than s thepresenceof absence of theglow.Moreover, t is a modally reliableguide to truth.Exactly whereinlies its shortcoming, hen,as a source of evidence, and indeed as abasic source of evidence,if it is justhardwired nd notderivedfrommore basicfaculties.A secondproblempertains o the use of theglow itself,and s moreof aninternalproblem.Suppose,again,we grant hat there is such athingas a positiveexperienceof intellectualseeming,a sort of glowirreducible o any mere propensityor inclination to believe. Evenso, whatexplanation s offeredby modal reliabilismof how such apositiveexperiencecouldserve as a basic sourceof evidence? Afterall, we aregiven no assurance hatit is so much as nomologicallypossiblefor us to reachconditionswithin whichsuch anexperiencewouldlikelylead us to the truth,andnecessarilyso. It's as if we weretold:Whatexplainsthe factthatvisualappearances re abasicsourceof evidence is thatin suitableconditions openeyes, good light, noobstructions,clearmedium,operative aws of optics, etc. - visualappearancesare necessarily truthconducive.However,none of ushassufficientreasonto believe thatanyof us haseverbeen orwouldeverbe (nomologically) n suchfavorableconditions.Theconditionswe areactuallyin may doom us with nomologicalnecessity to ourvisual appearancesbeing highly unreliableandmisleading.It may be replied that all I have done is to remindus of thepossibility that one might be in an evil-demon, brain-in-a-vatorothersuchskepticalscenario.And, afterall, in suchscenariosvisual


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158 ERNESTSOSAexperiencedoes still appear o constitutea basic sourceof evidence.Knowledgeis one thing, evidence quiteanother.Nevertheless,I am not convincedthat the modal reliabilist hasearneda rightto thatresponse.Thismaybe seen moreclearlyif weview the problem- essentially the sameproblem,I believe - fromanotherangle,as follows.Takesomething hatis normallynot taken to be a basic source ofevidence about a certainsubject matter:say, a pain in one's jointsas a source of evidence aboutcomingrain.Aren'tthereconceivablecircumstances uch that as a matterof nomological necessity if oneis in those circumstances hen one's aching joints arequitereliableaboutcoming rain?Andcan't we nowjust include the relevant awsin the circumstances,so that it becomes metaphysicallynecessarythatin those broadercircumstances,one's aching joints are neces-sarily mostly reliable aboutthecomingrain?Whatis thedifferencebetweentheplaceof therelevantachesinthismeteorological acultyand theplaceof the relevantglows in the modalfaculty,or theplaceof visual appearancesn the facultyof vision?

It may berepliedthatthe relevant ntellectualseemings orexperi-ences aredescribedashaving theappropriate ontent,acceptanceofwhich theyjustify,in virtue largelyof theirappropriate ispositionto occuronly incircumstanceswherethe content nquestion s likelyto be true.If a seemingorexperiencewerenot so related o thetruthof its content,then it would not be properlydescribableas a visualappearanceor as an intellectual ntuition with such a content.Butit seems equally possible to findcorrespondingdescriptionsof theaches in question so-that hey wouldbe describableas "rain ndicat-ing"achesonly if theywereappropriately elated o coming rain.Sowe still lack aconvincingexplanationof any fundamental ifferencebetween theepistemicrole of theaches and the epistemic roleof theglows.In this section we have asked what gives intellectualintuitionits ability to serve as a source, a basic source, of evidence. Wehave consideredthe proposalthat the answer is some sort of modalreliabilism.And we have founddoubts about thatproposal.


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THE NATUREAND EPISTEMICSTATUSOF INTUITION 159C

Nevertheless,Bealerarguesthat intuitioncannotproperlybe deniedas a source of evidence - even if we might falter in our positiveexplanationof what makes it a source of evidence.Forexample,heargues hatradicalempiricism ails in itsattempt o excludeintuitionas a sourceof evidence. Whatis the argument?The argument ependsessentiallyon severalconceptsthatarenotyet as clear as can be desired,and will presumablyreceive furtherclarificationdialecticallyandina fullertreatment. o let thedialecticbegin.

Amongconceptscrucialto the proffereddefense of intuitionarethese: intuition tself, of course;evidence;sourceof evidence;basicsourceof evidence;psychologicalmode;and,most of all, standardjustificatoryprocedure.The defense proposedin behalf of intellectual ntuitionmay beputlargelyin theformof the following argument.1. Intuition s a psychologicalmodethatfunctionsas a basicsourceof evidence,according o thestandardustificatoryprocedure.2. Accordingto the standardustificatoryprocedure,a basicsource of evidence is not impugned simply because itis not sufficientlydefensible as a source of evidence byreliance merely on the other basic sources of evidence

recognizedby thatstandardustificatoryprocedure. Thisdistinguishesbasic sources fromderivedsources.)3. Accordingto the standardustificatoryprocedure, here-fore, there is no way to reject intuition as a source ofevidenceexcept arbitrarily, y just stipulativelydroppingit.4. But"... intuitionsurvives as a genuinesourceof evidencewhen one applies the standard ustificatoryprocedure'smechanismfor self-criticism."We areunable"... to finda relevantdifferencebetweenradicalempiricism,whichexcludesintuitionas a sourceof evidence, andvariouspre-posterous heories(e.g., visualism)thatarbitrarilyxcludestandardources of evidence (e.g., touch). But, surely,


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160 ERNESTSOSAthese preposterous heoriesare not justified. So [radical]empiricism s notjustified,either." 18)

5. "Ourepistemicsituation s in this sense "hermeneutical":when one makes an arbitrarydeparture orm it, reason-able doubts are generated,and there is in principlenoway to overcome them. This is the fate of radicalempiri-cism. Only the standard ustificatoryprocedureescapesthisproblem;because it conforms o- and,indeed,consti-tutes- the epistemicnorm,there s no prima acie reasonto doubt that the theories it yields are justified, so theproblemnever arises."(19)So far the defenseof intellectual ntuitionproposedfor ourconsid-eration.Severalquestionsarise.First we mustconsider this:"standard"or whom?What is stan-dardamongastronomersmaynot be so amongastrologists.And soon. Andif we are told:"standardor us,"thenwho are"we"?But let that pass. Suppose we can settle on some appropriateactualgroup.Whatthen is it thatmakes the standardustificatoryprocedure"standard"?hatit is widely andfirmlyenoughacceptedamongus, atleastin practice? f so, is itjustthe act of "our" irmlyandwidely enoughacceptinga sourcethatmakes it a source?Andis it ourfirmlyandwidely enoughaccepting t as basicthatmakesitbasic?Recall,however,the earlierproposal:whatmakesabasicsourceabasicsourcewas supposedto be ratherts modalreliabilist ie to thetruth.There s clearlynomodalreliabilist iebetweenourwidelyandfirmlyacceptinga sourceasbasicand ts deliveringmostlytruths.Onthe otherhand,if it is not its being firmlyandwidely enoughacceptedamongus thatmakes our standardprocedure"standard,"thenone wonderswhat it might be instead.So we have a problemof coherencehere.If we defend ntellectualintuitionby appealto ourwidely andfirmlyenoughacceptedprac-tices the questionarises:What is it aboutsuch practicesthatgivesthemthe requiredstatus in this defense, as a courtof appeal,if notof last appeal?Is it theirbeing standard hatgives themthatstatus?Butwhy shouldthatbe, if beingthusstandard if beingwidely and


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THENATUREAND EPISTEMICSTATUSOFINTUITION 161firmlyacceptedamongus - has no necessaryconnectionwith thetruth?It might be replied that there is such a connectionbetween ouracceptanceof a source in ideal conditions,after we havefolloweda procedureof a priorijustification,on one hand,and the source'sdeliveringmostly truths,on the other.But thatactuallyseems irrel-evant to our currentconcern. For we are now trying to fend offradicalempiricists Quinians,say, in actual,20thCenturyAmerica)inconditionswhere we cannoteven be surethatwe could everarriveat such ideal conditions,in any nomologically possible world:andwhere much less can we be sure that we have alreadyarrived.

There is also an internaldifficultythatI have so far suppressed.Foralongtheway it is argued hatvision, forexample,is morebasicthana certain"politicalauthority,"nd this is arguedby appeal o an"intuition"hatwe are saidtohave, to thateffect. But"intuitions" resupposed o beour windowontonecessarytruths.So then howcan itbe that what is a more basic sourcethansomethingelse, andindeedwhat is a sourceat all, dependson the presumablycontingentfactof "our" irmlyandwidely enoughaccepting s as such?Moreover,the issue is complicated even furtherby the fact that the defenseis not just by directappealto a bareintuitionof relativebasicness.The defense is ratherby appealto the supposedfact thataccordingto the standardprocedure we can rejecta source as insufficientlysupportedby the remaining sources if and only if intuitivelytherejectedmethod is "less basic"thanthe othermethods. All of thissuggests to me some vacillation in Bealer's defense by appeal tothe standardprocedure.It is an appealto the standardprocedurebut perhapsit is meant as an appeal, not to the standardnessofthatprocedure,butrather o the substantive onsiderationsappealtowhichis allowed by thatprocedurewhich is in fact standard mongus. If this is the strategy,however, thenthe problemwe face is oneof relativeemptiness, of insufficientcontent. If the referenceviastandardnesss entirelyaccidental andplaysno moresignificantarole thanmightbe playedby "mentioned n the list thatappearsonp. n of suchandsucha book"- then,until the substantivecharacterof theprocedures n question s revealed,we cannotassess the largeclaimsmadein theirbehalf.


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162 ERNESTSOSAMoreover, t is thenhard to understandhe stressplacedon our"hermeneutical"predicamentwhen we departform our standardprocedure, tc., forthis seemsessentiallya function of the standard-ness of the procedure,and notjust of theparticular ontentthat the

proceduren questionhappensto have.D

I haveraisedproblemsunder hreeheads:(A) What is ostensible intuition?(B) What gives it its statusas a basic sourceof evidence?(C) Is it defensible against those who would reject it andexclude it on principle?

Returning o my opening theme,let me expressthe hope for somegoodresolutions ormy problems,orat least thehope that, ndefaultof suchresolutions,other answers can be found, perhapsby appro-priatemodificationsof the answersalreadyproposed. For it is partof my underlyingagreementwith Bealer that these are,all three ofthem, good and importantquestions; and, what is more, that therearepositive answers to be found, even if we have not found themjust yet.

NOTES1 Parenthetical eferenceshere and laterare to GeorgeBealer's "On the Possi-bility of PhilosophicalKnowledge."2 Letme re-emphasize hattheforegoingdiscussionis aboutostensibleintuition,by analogywith ostensibleperception: intuition'here has thereforeabbreviated'ostensibleintuition'.In fairness,moreover,I shouldalso stress,aboutthe postu-lationof a "glow"that is morethanjust an inclination o believe, thatit is in anycase metaphorical.Thosewho appealto a distinctiveexperience orpsychologicalmode of intuitionobviously arenot appealing o any literallyvisual experience,as wouldbe required or perceptionof anything hatis literally a glow.Departmentof PhilosophyBrownUniversityProvidence,RI02912-1918USA

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