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Heaven Is High and the Emperor Is Far Away Legitimacy and Structure in the Chinese StateAuthor(s): Gary G. Hamilton, Ben-Ray Jai and Hsien-Heng Lu

Source: Revue europenne des sciences sociales, T. 27, No. 84, Sociologie de la Chine etSociologie chinoise (1989), pp. 141-167Published by: Librairie DrozStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40369817 .

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GARY G. HAMILTONWiththe Assistance ofBEN-RAY JAI AND HSIEN-HENG LU

HEAVEN IS HIGH AND THE EMPEROR IS FAR AWAYLEGITIMACYAND STRUCTURE N THE CHINESE STATE1

In his analysis f Negara, hetheater tate in nineteenth-centuryBali,Cliffordeertz hallengesmodern ocial sciencetheory.2Hischallengerides on his penetratingccountof the Balinese state,ofa political rder hathe says s so differentromWesterntatesthatthevery oncepts f "power," authority,"ven"state"do notapply n the same way thattheydo in theWest. In nineteenth-century ali,powerdidnot emanate rom xercising ill; authorityhad nothingo do withchains ofcommand; nd thepolitical om-munityi.e.,the state) was not a delineated, rotected erritorialunit. Instead, ower rose from erformance,uthorityrom irtue,and the state from ceremonynd prestige."3UsingBali almostas a metaphororwhattheWest s not,Geertz oeson to questiondirectly he validity f Western ocial scienceand to accuse itspractitionersf universalizing estern ultural ssumptionsn thename of science.Although idely cclaimedGeertz's nalysis, s well as his criti-cisms,havenot beentaken s seriouslys they houldbe.4 He has,ofcourse,nothelpedhis cause; he has marginalizedis ownobser-

i Althoughblamenooneelsefor heresultsfthis ssay, must cknow-ledge hat havenotdone his lone. LiuKwang-ching'sesearchn thenatureofChineserthodoxywhich term, ollowingeber,he rinciplesf egitimacy)inspired e,gavemekey nsightshat havebeen xploitingver ince,ndasit turns ut,broughtme back intoChina tudies, fter eing bsentfor anumberfyears. Equallymportantor hepresentaperhasbeenmy tudentsin a seminarlass that taughtn this opic n 1985while was at TunghaiUniversitynTaiwan.These dvanced raduatetudents,nparticularaiBen-rayand Lu Hsien-heng,old me where hey hought was right nd wherewrong,ndcontributedo many ftheirwn deasto thegeneralheoryf theChinesetate hat considerhem o-authors.2 Clifford eertz,Negara,The Theatre tate inNineteenth-Centuryah (Prin-ceton: PrincetonUniversity ress, 1980).3 Geertz,Negara, p. 16.4 For a comprehensivend oftencriticalevaluationof Geertz'swork,seePaul Shankman,The Thickand the Thin:On theInterpretive heoretical ro-gram of Clifford eertz, CurrentAnthopology"5 (June, 984): 61-279.Also seeRonaldG. Walters, igns of theTimes: CliffordGeertz nd Historians, SocialResearch" 7 Autumn, 980): 37-556.

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142 G.G. HAMILTONvations,by making themapply only to Bali. He straightforwardlyrejects, as being too positivist,many theoretical and comparativeanalyses. He extols, instead, an extreme form of relativism, ndprefersa literarystyle that incorporatesand frames his culturallydense "thickdescriptions."5Geertz's view thatWestern and non-Western ocietiesmay differintrinsicallynd thatusingWestern-derivedoncepts to analyzenon-Westernsocieties 'mayhave pernicious results is interesting nd, Ibelieve, fundamentallyound. That these observationsthen lead tothe conclusion that all comparisons are useless and invalid is,however, quite mistaken. Indeed, systematic comparisons in linewith this theoretical vision become all the more necessary andespecially illuminating, or it is only throughcomparisons that onecan achieve a perspective on what is unique. Moreover,as Geertzseems unwillingto acknowledge,thismethodology f systematicallyanalyzinguniqueness is already part of a developed theoreticalper-spective that can be turned to the study of non-Western ocieties*This is, of course,theWeberianperspective,which has been used soprofoundlyn analyzingthe distinctivefeatures of the West. It ismy contention in this paper that, in a reconstructedform, theWeberian perspectivecan also be used to extend Geertz's insightson non-Westernpolitical order beyond Negara. In this paper, Idevelop a comparative analysis of the political institutions n lateimperial China that incorporates Geertz's important theoreticalinsightswithina Weberian perspective.

IThe place to begin is with the claim that Western concepts ofpolitical structure re inappropriatefor the analysis of late imperialChina. Why this should be the case involves a basic theoreticalpoint about the nature of social science explanations.Until recently,many thoughtof sooial science concepts as beinguniversal tools of analysis, as being analytic,abstract, and neutralwith regard to the societies being studied. These qualities derivedfromtheirdeduction fromwhat was believed to be general sociol-ogical propertiesof all societies. The reasoningwas clear: All soci-eties, by definition, ave certain functional or processual features.Kinship and political systems,socialization processes, stratificationstructures these and many others featureswere thoughtto benecessary requisites for the very existence of society.6 Different5 For Geertz'sown explanations o his approach, ee The InterpretationfCultures New York: Basic Books, 1973)and Distinguished ecture: AntiAnti-Relativism,AmericanAnthropologist"6 (1984):263-278.o It shouldbe noted thatthere s a Marxist quivalent o thisfunctionalistargument, hich n effectrguesthat each societies, y definition,as a funda-mental conomic tructurehatnecessarilyonsists fspecific, unctionallynter-relatedprocesses, ontradictions,nd class positionsthatchange n predictable


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LEGITIMACYAND STRUCTURE 143societieshave different aysto satisfy herequirements fsocial order,but they all have to satisfythem nonetheless. Therefore, f oneaccepts this line of reasoning,to have good social science conceptsmeans to abstract these requisites beyond the peculiaritiesof anyone society. Arriving t this level of abstraction,these conceptswere thoughtto be equally applicable to all groups that could bedefined s societies, and hence theiruse in analysis of any one so-cietywas considered to be neutral with regard to the conclusionsobtained. In principle,then, the concepts themselves bias neitherthe process nor the results of analysis.This confidence n the neutralityof social science concepts, aswell as in the universality f their application,has now wanned.In the wake of this skepticism,a more self-conscious, elf-criticaltheory faction,as well as of social science explanations,has becomecommonplace. Central to these new concernsis a perceptionthatsubjective understandings, ction, and structures are inseparable,even identical,elements of social worlds these social worlds orlived in realities, as some would phrase it - are created fromneitherthe actors' understanding f societynor the structures'con-straintson actors. Ratherboth actor understanding nd structuralreality re simultaneously roduced and reproducedthrough ctions.In otherwords, a context of ongoingaction creates in participantsboth an understandingof what is happening and a "reality" or"social firmness" o the structures hathave been createdpreviouslyand are being recreatedpresentlythroughtheir mutuallydirectedactions. Most recently,Giddens calls thisprocess "structuration."But earlier thinkers, speciallyWeber and the great pragmatistphi-losophers,James,Dewey and Mead, saw with equal claritythe si-multaneityof structure's firmness and of actors' understanding,withouteitherbeing analytically eparate from or causally prior tothe other.9An acceptance of this simultaneity f meaningand structurehasdirectand profound ffects pon fashioning atisfactoryocial scienceexplanations. The direction of most modern thinkinghas been torequire that sophisticatedconcepts of culture and meaning patternsbe incorporated nto social explanations. How this incorporation sways. Nowadays,however,manyscholarswould argue thatmerely lassifyinga society ccording o its economic tructuree.g.,feudalsociety)does, in fact,bias theresults f analysis.7 For a survey f and a contributiono thisarea, see RichardJ. Bernsteinrecent ooks: TheRestructuringfSocial and PoliticalTheory Philadelphia:Uni-versity f Pennsylvania ress, 1978)and Beyond Objectivism nd Relativism:Science,Hermeneuticsnd Praxis Philadelphia:UniversityfPennsylvaniaress,1983). Gidden discussionof structurations found n mostof his books andmostrecentlyn The Constitutionf Society Berkeley:Universityf CaliforniaPress,1984), p. 1-40.* For discussions of these thinkers n lightof these issues, see RichardBernstein,raxis ndActionPhiladelphia, niversityfPennsylvaniaress,1971);Hans Joas,G.H. Mead, A Contemporary e-examinationf his Thought Cam-bridge,Mass.: MIT Press,1985);JurgenHabermas,The Theoryof Communica-tiveAction, volumes Boston:Beacon Press,1984).


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144 G.G. HAMILTONto

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LEGITIMACYAND STRUCTURE 145the historicalvariability f that which he was attempting o explainand the analytic precision of inductive,but unreal concepts used inthe explanation. At the conceptual level,Weber always constructedhis typologiesof action on what he saw as the "affinity" etweennormativemeaning patternsand social structure, relationshipputinto non-causal but intrinsic erms. His typology f domination, orinstance, specifies three historically significant ets of politicallydirected actions designed to control subject populations. Each setshows theaffinityetween, ndeed,the simultaneity f,a prescriptive"principle" of legitimation nd an explicit organizational structureforthe state.14

Weber formulatedhis idea types based on his knowledge ofEurope, and he generallyused them to demonstratethe distinctive-ness of Westernpatterns. At times,Weber certainly vergeneralizedhis concepts; but, even so, because of his consistentfocus on ex-plainingtheWest,he was generally ble to maintainthe explanatorydialectic the ongoing inkagebetween the historicalphenomena tobe explained and the concepts used to clarifythem that formedthe foundationof his comparativemethodology.Weber's concepts,however,have had a life of theirown beyondhow Weber used them himself. His typologiesof religion,of law,and particularlyof the economyand of politics have had great in-fluence,not only in the studyof the West,but also in the studyofnon-Western ocieties, China being one of these. If one carefullyconsiders the methodologicalfoundationsof these ideal types,how-ever,there are obvious difficultiesn using these concepts to under-stand non-Western ocieties in their own terms. This is exactlyGeertz's quarrel with Weberian concepts.16 Gertz maintains thatgood explanationsmust encompass patterns of embedded meaningin order to understand surface actions and apparent structures. Hestates, "To describe [a structureof action] is to describe a constel-lation of enshrine ideas."16 Being Eurocentric,however,Weber'sconcept,when rudelyapplied to non-Westernettings, reak the dia-lectic between the internal bindedness of a social world and anobserver'sexplanationof thingsthathappen in thatworld.This brokendialectic is exactlywhat happens whenWeber's ownconceptsare used to describethepoliticalstructure fimperialChina.Also see myarticlesPatriarchalism n ImperialChina and Western urope: ARevisionofWeber'sSociologyof Domination,Theory nd Society"13,3 (May,1984):393-426;nd Patriarchy,atrimonialismnd Filial iPety:A Comparison fChinaand Western urope, Forthcoming)BritishJournal f Sociology".

!4 Weber, conomy nd Society New York: Bedminster ress.1968), p. 941-955.! Geertzexplicitlymentions he inappropriatenessf Weber'spoliticalcon-cepts onlyonce Negara. p. 62),but in otherplaceshe criticizesWeberian ormu-lations without ringingWeber nto thepicture Negara, pp. 121-2. 34-136).ie Geertz.p. 135.10


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146 G.G. HAMILTON

IIPatriarchy, atrimonialism,rientaldespotism, atrimonial u-reaucracy,mperial ureaucracy,dministrativefficials thesearejust a few of themajor concepts hat Weber and otherWesternwriters aveapplied o theanalysis fChina. Weberwas,ofcourse,not the first o apply manyof theseconcepts, ut his influence,together iththatof Marx,has been thegreatest.Now strippedbareoftheir ocuson theWest,WeberianndMarxian oncepts reconsistentlysed by sinologists,s well as by comparativists,oorient heir nalysis f China. In fact,no seriousanalysis f lateimperialChinahas been undertaken ithout singtheseconceptsderived rom he West.What consequences low fromusingtheseconceptsthatwerefirstformulated rom Westernhistorical xperience?Using thetheoreticalosition utlined bove,one would have to argue,withGeertz,hat he use ofWesternoncepts ctually lters heanalysts'perceptionsf late imperialChina. The bias is introducedecauseit sets up implicit,nvidious omparisons etweenChinaand theWest. Western-derivedoncepts, uch as "bureaucracy"r even"class," have specificmeaningsn the context f Westernhistory.Typically,hesemeaningre notfully efined,ecausethey o beyonda simpledelineation f traits o tap significantymbolic imensionsthat vadesimpledefinition. s a consequence,mostconcepts arrywiththemconsiderableulturalbaggage, nd whenthey re usedwithout ffloadinghatbaggage, r at least without xposing heculturalmeaningshrough xplicit ontrasts,hey end to highlightcertain raitsmportantn theWest, ut whichmaynotbe culturallyor historicallyignificantlsewhere.Those conceptssurroundingnd supportingWesternpoliticalinstitutionsre amongthe most important,s well as the mostinvidious,onceptsused to analyzeChina. Therefore,n ordertodefine hepoliticalorder n late imperialChina, t is usefulto es-tablish,fonly n summaryorm, Western ontrastmodel,whichcanbe used to distinguishheChinesemodelthat willdevelop nin thefollowingections. This contrastmodelgivesthe Westernderived erminologyhat s frequentlysedto describe hina moresubstantial, istoricallyooteddefinition,husallowing he differ-encesto emerge.What re thedistinguishingeatures f Western tates? To sim-plify he matter reatly, e can characterizeWestern olitical truc-tures n terms fthree eatures: irst, centristonceptionflegiti-mate power; second,a "top down" administrativeonception fpoliticalorganization;nd third, territorial nit in which thecenter's uthorityas legitimateurisdiction.In theWest, ven n antiquity,Western olitical tructureixeduponsymbolicallyrticulatedenters,withpolitical owerradiating


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LEGITIMACY NDSTRUCTURE 147out from here. One can debatetheorigins fthiscentristoncep-tion fpower, ut themost onvincingxplanation,ndtheonemostscholarsuse, is simplythat politicalauthorities,romheads ofhouseholds o headsof state, egitimatedheir xercise f authoritythroughheirexclusive ccess to divine, ranscendentalowers. 7They uledbecausetheyhad a personal ight o rule, right eriveddirectlyromGod or fromHis personalemissaries n earthor,aswas also commonlyhe case in aristocraticurope, rom harismaticparentage.Rulers themselvesometimes laimeddivinity,s didCeasar, or, in the absolutist ra, divineright, s did England'sJames .

This centristonception as secularizedn politicalphilosophiesand legalized s a partof legitimatetate structure.Aristotle,nPolitics, escribed uchpolitical enters s werefound n Greek itystates polis,kings, ristocracies and their ffectsponthehap-pinessoftherespectiveolitical ommunities. he RomanRepublicand latertheEmpirefurtherystematizedhestate as a commandstructure.The center,which was first he Senate and later theEmperor, ecame symbolicallyhe sourceof all commands.Obe-dience o thecenter's ower "Render ntoCeasarwhat s Ceasar's"),as well as the degreesof freedom or Romancitizensfrom hatpowerwas codified nto Roman law. With this furtherystem-atization,he state and its characterizations a centerbecame anirreductibleegal principle. Withthis legal foundation,Westernstateshavedevelopedn manyways, s PerryAnderson as shownso well. 8 But in all its variousforms,Western tate structures,founded pon this centrist onception, epresented,s Weber de-pictedthem, organizedystems f domination."9In his analysisof Western tates,Weber s quite right o des-cribesuchorganizedystems fdominations administrativetruc-tures nd territorialnits. 0 Conceptually,arthly owers, angingfromkingsto heads of householdshave urisdictions.Such juris-dictions re explicitly elimited y social and usuallyterritorialunits,withinwhich heperson t thecenter theking, hepope, hejudge,thefather can legitimatelyxercisehis or, less frequently,her will. In the arger nits, n administrativetructures createdto linkthe center o theboundaries f the center'surisdiction,norderto enforce he center'scommands nd to collect revenuesnecessary o sustainthe apparatus. The administrativetructureis legitimizedy a politicalcenterthatclaims a monopoly ponthe ultimate ight f command nd upon therightfulse of forcewithints territorialurisdiction.This descriptionf ithepolitical

17See RobertBellah'sdiscussion f thispoint n Fatherand Son in Christia-nity nd Confucianism,n "BeyondBelief" New York: Harper and Row, 1970).is PerryAnderson, assages fromAntiquityo Feudalism London:NLB, 1974)and Lineagesof theAbsolutist tate (London:NLB, 1974).I* weoer, economyana society,pp. y*u-od.2su ee Weber discussionor this pointin Politics as a Vocation,m rromMax Weber"New York: OxfordUniversity ress,1948).


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148 G.G. HAMILTON

state is Weber'ssociological onclusion, nd Weber'stypologyfdominations hishistoricalummaryfthe three onceptually ostimportant aysthatrulers n theWesthave egitimatednd institu-tionalized he administrativeinkages etween hemselvesnd theirsubjects.For the sake of thisessay, et us conceive f thiscentrist on-ceptionof power,the correspondingdministrativetructure,ndthe territorialnitas a line and blockchart. Such a diagramsthemost common epresentationn Western ocietiesof organiza-tionalstructures f all types. Let us furtherharacterizeheprin-cipleof dominationn suchan organizations beingbaseduponthewill,and concomitantly,pon the commands f thepersonat thetopofthe ine ndblock hart,hepresident,hemanager,hedirector,the leader n charge. Leadersmaybe good or bad, maygiveap-propriate r inappropriateommands, ut however heywieldthepoweroftheir osition,hecommands iven t thetop, nprinciple,shouldeffect he actionofindividualsocated n lowerranks, fallwho are located within he boundaries f the organization.Oneknows, fcourse, hat n organizationsfanysize it is problematicthatcommandsgivenat the top will be obeyedby those at thebottom,ut we viewthis, s didWeber, s an aspectof theongoingstruggle etweencompeting owersfor centralizationnd decen-tralization.FromthisconceptionftheWesterntatecomesthemeaningftheconceptsmostoften sed to describe heChinese tate:bureau-cracy, atrimonial ureaucracy,ureaucrat,fficial,uler, mperor,empire,ventheterm state" tself. Allof theseare derived romand, n theChinese ontext,mplicitlyested gainst centriston-ceptionofpoliticalorganizationnd state egitimacy, conception,I suggest,hat swithout oundationnChinese olitical rganization.

IllWhymight ne expect heChinese olitical rder o differromtheWesternmodel? Themainreasononeshould xpect heChineseand Western tatestructures o differramaticallys that,fromWeberian ointofview, heprinciplesfdomination,ndhencetheideasbeing nstitutionalizedn structure,ifferramaticallyetweenthe two locations. In theWest, egimitationtrategies ad theirstructuralriginsnChristianosmology. n China,however,herewere no transcendentaleities,no godson high, romwhomearthboundpeoplewouldclaimthey btained heright o rule. Hence,no centrist onception f powerdeveloped. In China,rulersdidclaim theyhad the "mandateof heaven" tianming),ut the dif-ferences etween heamorphous Heaven"of theChinese nd theanthropomorphicGod" of the West are manyand large indeed.Heavenwas notan explicit lace,was not a willed,directed orce,andcouldnotbe supplicatedo ormade tochangets mind. Instead,


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LEGITIMACYAND STRUCTURE 149heaven was the sun and moon, theplanets in theirmotion,thenightand day, the natural ways of life beyond earth (di) and beyondearth's most importantinhabitants,mankind (ren).These three heaven, earth,and mankind formedthe key trin-ity in Chinese cosmology. Each had their own roles to play, theirown natures to follow; for one to deviate from ts nature,even insmall ways, would be to throw the entire systemout of balance.There is no centristconception in China, no "uncaused cause," no"unmoved mover,11o one place fromwhich all the forces of lifeemanated. As Joseph Needham put it, the Chinese knew of nobilliard ball conceptionof causation,no God-centered iew thatpro-vided the West with such a basic cosmological foundation.21 In-stead, for the Chinese, the distinct,functionally ifferent orces oflife oined in a dance of harmony, dance that had no cosmologicalbeginnings, o absolute law-likemotions,and no predictedendings.Everything nd everyonewere implicated,and so all were involvedin thiscooperativedance of life, venthedead,22 o thattheresultingimagewas of "an extremely nd preciselyordereduniverse, n whichthings fitted' so exactly that you could not insert a hair betweenthem."'23 In contrastto the West's billiard ball conceptionof cau-sation, Needham called the Chinese model, "associative thinking,"thereby verything as mutual influence n everythinglse. In thisdance of distinct,but complementaryparts, order does not comefromthe personal will of a leader in charge or fromany exteriorsource, but rather only comes fromeach knowingand voluntarilyfulfillingne's own part, even the emperor,who was called to hisduties by 'means of a subordinatekinship term,tianzi, the Son ofHeaven.Althoughthese cosmological differences etween China and theWest are well known,their mplicationsforpolitical structurehavebarelybeen explored. For thepurpose of this essay, let me mentionthree of the most important mplications and some empirical evi-dence to support them.First, and most significant,Western and Chinese political prin-ciples dramaticallydiffer. In the West, at both ideal and materiallevels,political philosophy s concernedwith power,with the willedcapacity of one person to determinethe actions of anotherperson.The relative measure of that capacity for power, the jurisdictionwithinwhich that capacity can appropriately perate,and the legiti-macy of the person's will are issues central to Westernconceptionsof power and corresponding social action. Equally, this over-whelmingconcern with commands and dominationdraws out thedialectical emphasis on freedom,contract, and individualism all

21JosephNeedham.Science and Civilisation n China,Vol. 2, (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityress,1956), p. 279-291.22By means of ancestorworship,the Chinese involved the dead in theirquest forharmony.23Needham, cience and Civilization,, p. 286.


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150 G.G. HAMILTON

concepts hathave been used to counterbalancehelegitimacyndauthorityf hierarchicalommand tructures.In China,however,heemphasis s not on the exercise fwill,but ather pon tsopposite, pon"subduingelf-willedctions ndconformingo socialexpectations"he ji fuZi).24Concern otwithpowerand authorityut ratherwithobedience xiao) givesChinesepoliticalthinkingts substance. Actionhad to be justified unc-tionally,n termsof its consequences o thegroup. Such an im-manent, on-ranscendentalustificationemoves n theory,houghnotalways n fact, ppeals to thecharismaticualitiesof the indi-vidual,whichwas so importanto rulershipn theWest. Therefore,obediencewasconceptuallyot seen as simplyubmissiono anotherperson, s wouldbe impliedn charismaticule. Instead, bedience(xiao) called for each personto submit o thedutiesofone's ownhuman oles for he sontobe a son,for hewife obe slwife, ndfortheofficialguari) o be an official.25 ubmissions a requiredaspectofeachroleand submissions certainlyirectedo a specificperson, husrequiringome elements fpersonal oyalty.But,non-etheless, he act of submissions rule-bound,s rigidly ormative.Differentulesofsubmission,mplyingdistinctiveontentoaction,applyto differentelationships,nd,hence, heduty o obey s onlylocated nspecificocialrelationships,nd is nota functionf sociallocations,s would be impliedby theterritorialrganizationse.g.,households,manors,cities and kingdoms)n the West. In thissense,obedience s embeddedwithin elationshipsnd not withinjurisdictions.Second,without centrist onception f power,and henceofcompetingenters,herewouldbe noprincipledationale ormarkingsocial andphysical oundaries o locatesubjects n relation o cen-ters. In a context fcompeting ills e.g.,kings s popes,headsofhouseholdvs heads of state),theWesternine-and-blockentalityrequires hat urisdictionse defined,hat hecontent fcommandsbe clarified,nd thatthe extent f "self-determination"e spelledout. ButinChina,without conceptionfconflictingills, fthosehuman illiard allsbouncingo andfro, heres no sensethat ocialboundariesneeded to be drawn.The Chinesedrewboundaries orpracticalreasons to aid thecollection ftaxes, o determinehe"ownership"fland butsuchboundarieswereprovisionalnd weregenerallyagreedupon" bythe people involved.26Westerners,owever, rawboundaries or

24This Confucian hrase ConfucianAnalects, ook 12, Chapter1) is usuallytranslated s "Subdue the selfand return o propriety."25This is a paraphraseof a passage from heConfucianAnalects Book 12,Chapter11, Paragraph2). The exact quotation s "There s government,hentheprince s prince, nd theminister s minister;when thefather s father,ndthe son is son."26Some discussionot customaryaw is round n ru-meiChangChen anaRamon H. Myers, ustomaryaw and theEconomicGrowth fChinaduring heCh'ingPeriod, Ch'ing-shih enti"3 (November1976):1-32 nd (December1978):4-27.


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LEGITIMACYAND STRUCTURE 151

ideological easons inorder o locateego in a physicalnd, hence,a political pace. Space connotes roperty,wnership,rerogative,and hencethe right f command, nd so Westerners re obessedwithlocationbecause the selfhas no meaningwithout ts beinglocatedin space. Accordingly,uch a mentality illsspace withpeople and theirpossessions, nd requiresthat the geographicallines separating eoplebe precise. Disputed ines result n argu-mentsamongneighbors, eudsamongfamilies, nd wars amongnations.By contrast, owever,xactboundaries or mperialChina wereneverdrawnuntilthe nineteenthentury,whenWesternpowersbeganto markoff nd claimterritory. s Lattimorend Fairbankhave variously xplained, hina's relationships ithits neighborswerenot definedyboundaries,utrather y tributaryelationships(i.e.,thewillingnessf the ruler fperipheralreasto submit o theChinese mperor).27 hina's nternationaloundarieswerefrontierswithoutines, nd identifiedelationshipsalliesandenemies) atherthanspace. What would have been a border n Europe,theGreatWall,was in Chinaonlythebeginningf the Chinesefrontier;tnever erved s theborderof theEmpire. Equally, nternal dmi-nistrativeoundaries ere ess thanprecise,wererepeatedlyhangedthroughouthedynastic eriod,nd were n fact ifferentor ifferentsetsof officials.Likewise,lthoughandboundaries,ndhence andownership,ere upposedlyetbyofficialurveys,nfact fficials idnotmonitorherights o land and did notofficiallyetboundaries.This insteadwas controlled n a more nformal ay by local resi-dents. 8Third, neshould xpect hat,without centeristegitimationorpolitical ower ndwithouturisdictions ithinwhich pecificutho-rityprevailed, he Chinesepoliticalorderwould not developaWesterntyle dministrativeommand tructure.Without strongcentristustification,uch as thatsuppliedby the Western ods,Chineserulerswouldfind t difficulto supply he rationale or arationalizedystem f dominationthat s, an administrativetop-down" ommandtructure)hatwouldradiate ut from heemperorand thatwouldconnect veryone,ogically,within geographicallydefinedmatrixf commandndcompliance,s occurredn theWest.We know,of course,thatthe Chinesegovernmentevelopedcomplex olitical rganization,utwhatevidence s there hatChinacreatedan administrativetructureike thatwhichformedn the

27JohnKingFairbank, n theCh'ing ributaryystem,nJohnKingFairbankand Ssu-juTeng,Ch'ingAdministration:hreeStudies Cambridge:HarvardUni-versityPress, 1960),107-218.Owen Lattimore,nner Asian Frontiers f China(New York:AmericanGeographical ociety,1951).28Chen ndMyers, ustomaryaw and theEconomicGrowth fChinaduringthe Ch'ingPeriod, "Ch'ing-shih en-ti" (November1976):1-32 nd (December1978): -27.


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152 G.G. HAMILTON

West?29 I believe there are several reasons from the outset toquestion an assumption that the structureswere similar.The first eason is that thenumbersdo notbear out thisequation.The Da Qing Huidian of 1899 lists 20,000officialsservingin civilserviceposts.30 The populationforthatperiod is usually calculatedat 450,000,000. That works out to be a ratio of .000044 to 1, orapproximately ne half of an official oreveryten thousandpersonsor 5 officials oreveryone hundredthousandpersons. It is known,of course,that n imperialChina the civil service was verysmall andthat the unofficial sub-bureaucracy"was much larger. But even ifthe sub^bureaucracywere added, the total number of officials sstill very modest. Bastid, using the calculations of a number ofpeople, estimatesthe total size of the sub-bureaucracyt 1.5million.That figure ncludes servants,runners, secretaries,everybody. Ad-ding this figure o the 20,000officialsbrings the total up to 3 gov-ernmentrelated workers out of every ten thousand persons, butthat still does not approach European standards.What were the comparable figuresfor Europe? Though hardlyan administrative tate then, France in 1665 still had 46,000 stateofficials n a population of 20,000,000. This makes 2 officialsforeverythousandpeople. In the late 1700s,on the eve of the FrenchRevolution, here were 300,000bureaucrats n France,which ncludedminor city scribes and gate keepers, in a population of around40,000,000.1 That makes a ratio of 7.5 state paid workersforeverythousand persons. France had the highestratio, but in the sameperiod England's ratio was 1.5, Prussia's was 2, and Spain's was 3officials er thousand. 2 In thenineteenth entury hepercentageofstate workersbegan rapidlyto increase, so that by the turnof thetwentieth entury, ll the European states averagedbetween 20 and30 state workers for everythousand persons, the same period thatChina had 3 officialsforeveryten thousand persons.Theirverynumberswould indicate thatthe Chineseofficialswerenot administrators n the same sense that Western officialswere.But a second reason is even more to the point. Although countedthe so-called "sub^bureaucracy"in the calculations that I made

2 There is, of course,a long and developed iterature n Chinese"bureau-cracy" nd on Chinese bureaucrats,"nd I certainly o notwish to argueherethatthis iteratures inaccurate.The point am makinghere s similar o thatmade by S.R. Schram and his collaborators,who have forcefullyrguedthatthediscussions f theChinese tate "is in partdistorted,"nd that thosedistor-tions arise from misunderstandingsf whichthe causes lie in ourselves."KarlBunger, orward:The ChineseState betweenYesterday nd Tomorrow,n S.R.Schram(ed.), The Scope of State Power in China, (Hong Kong: The ChineseUniversityfHong Kong Press, 1985), . xviii.30MarianneBastid,The Structure f the Financial nstitutionsf the State inthe Late Qing, n Schram,The Scope of State Power,p. 70.31Fischer and Lundgreen, he Recruitmentnd Trainingof AdministrativePersonnel, n CharlesTilly ed.)fThe Formation f National States in WesternEurooe. Princeton: rincetonUniversitv ress.32The ratios are calculatedfrom hefigures ivenbyFischer nd Lundgreen,"The Recruitmentnd Training f Administrativeersonnel."


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LEGITIMACY ND STRUCTURE 153above, in fact the sub-bureaucracywas not a part of an officialadministrative rganizationpaid for by the state.33 Like propertyboundaries among landowners,the sub-bureaucracywas customaryand pragmatic; t was outside of the "normal" apparatus and wasstaffed y people who did not have any of the quantifications f themagistrates. This unofficial pparatus developed gradually and in-formally o assist themagistrate n accomplishinghis tasks,but wasnever strictly peaking a part of the state apparatus. In fact, ithandledwhatwould be considered n theWest as the most importantaspects ofbureaucratic administration: ax collection,recordkeeping,and local pacification. The central government id not pay peopleto do thesetasks,but ratherthemagistratehimselfpaid people to dothem out of his own pocket,from the unauthorizedsurplus gainedthroughtax collection. This sort of informalarrangement omple-telyruns counter to the logic of Westernpolitical structure. It isthe veryantithesis of "rational administration,"f by that term wemean the developmentof systematic op-downcommand structures.Is the Chinese political structurea "failed bureaucracy?" Is itan illogically rrangeddistortion f what developedin a pristinewayin theWest,a corruption aused by,as Weber saw it,thepresenceofan exaggeratedcase of patriarchalism? 4 Or do we need to under-stand Chinese political structure in light of different oncepts?Afterall, Chinese imperial organization,the longest lived politicalsystem in history, s hardly a failure from the point of view oflongevity.

IVIf one grants,then,a certainvalidityto the argumentthat oneshould expect there to be large conceptual, as well as empirical,differences etween Western and Chinese political structure,thenwhat concepts are suitable for analyzingthe Chinese case?The place to begin is with Chinese instead of Westernconcepts,and no concept is more important n determining he content ofsocial action than xiao. Xiao is, in fact, the phenomenologicalcounterpartto the Western concept of power.35 Xiao should bedefinedbroadly,as the obligationto obey the duties of one's "role"as that role is definedwithin explicit sets of dyadic roles.36 In33For detailed nformationn thesub-bureaucracy,ee T'ung-tsu h'u,LocalGovernmentn China under theCh'ing Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1962) nd JohnR. Watt.The DistrictMagistraten Late ImperialChina(New York: ColumbiaUniversity ress, 1972).34This is described n detail n Hamilton, Patriarchalismn ImperialChinaand WesternEurope: A Revisionof Weber'sSociologyof Domination."35For more detail, ee Hamilton, d. at., dd. 410418.36One of themosttroublesome,nd indeedquestionable, spectof thisessayis myuse of theWestern onceptsof role theory. I suspect,by merelyusingtheterminology,hat am misinterpretingheChinese ase somewhat, ut roletheory eems as generaland as nearly omparableto the Chinese situation sanytheoreticalerminologyhat am aware of. Nonetheless wordofwarningis in order.


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154 G.G. HAMILTON

Chineseclassicalpoliticalthought,he legitimacyf the role sets,such as theparent/childelationship,s 'beyond uestion. Everyperson s morally equired o submit o thesenaturalroles;refusalto do so threatenshe entiremoral rder.This logic s generalizedo political tructures a whole. Polit-ical rolesare defined,argelyn dyadic erms,nd are embeddednlargernetworks f complementary,utually upportive oles. Ac-cordingly,s I willdescribe elow,Chinesepolitical rganizationsbest characterizeds a series of institutionalizedoles arrangedhierarchically.One can betterunderstand his sort of hierarchyconceptuallyysettingtinoppositiono theWesternine andblockmodeloftheadministrativetate, nd a wayto do that s compareit to a structurallyimilar ypeof organizationound n theWest,the organizationf universities.Such a comparison etweentheorganizationfWesternchools nd the Chinese tate s notwithoutsomefoundation,ecausetheideology feducationies at theverycoreofConfucianism.Students, aculty,nd administratorsormdistinctategories findividuals,nd differentulesand regulationspplyto individualsineachcategory.Within niversities,here s, n theory,o distinctchainofcommandmanatingrom headministratorn charge ownto everystudent. Instead,each personin each category ulfillstheirownduties,whichare separate, istinct,ut complementary.The focus n theuniversitys supposedlyhestudents nd nottheadministrators,nd the educational ystemdeallyworks for theoverallbenefitfstudents nd ofsocietyn general; nd theadmin-istratorsnd facultiesdeally erve thegoal of student ducation.There s, of course, system fdominationresentwithin chools.Administratorsertainlynfluencehefacultymembers,nd facultymembers ertainlynfluencetudents,ut thesystem f dominationis not,strictlypeaking, manifestationf thewill of theadmin-istratorn charge, ut rather rows utofneedsofthosebeing du-cated, hestudentshemselvesnd theorderly rocess f education.This so-called serviceorientation"e-emphasizes centrist truc-ture and places, instead,considerablenfluencen the hands ofeducators offaculties nWestern niversitiesnd of thescholar/managershi/guan)n imperial hina.I willcall thistype fpolitical rganization "statushierarchy."Thisorganizationonsistsof a hierarchicallyrranged et of rolesthat re largelyelf-containednd that re not inked yan explicitcommand tructure. t is importanto notethatthe Chinesehavemanysymbolic epresentationsf this typeof organization:hecarved vory all thatcontains ree-floatingalls within ree-floatingballs; thenesting oxes,which s a box within boxwithin box.The outerone containsthe inner ones without eingdirectly rphysicallyttached.In a simplifiedorm,s illustratedn FigureOne,thissystemffunctional,utonomous esting oxes or innerspheres ymbolizes


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the Chinesepolitical ytem. This conceptionf a statushierarchycorrespondso theFIGUREOHK DEPICTION FCHINESEMPEBIALSTATE IBUCTtflB

EnPEROBMRNNIZESmUA jOFFICIALS HABHQNIZE ZMQHGfiJQ

PARENTS AND HUSBANDS IHABffONlZE AHILIES *

IConfucian lassificationf the composition f the politicalcom-munity uring he ate imperial eriod. There re fourmainstatuspositions, nlythreeof whichfittogethero form henesting oxconceptionf theChinese olitical ommunity. he fourpositionsare theemperorhuangdi, ianzi), fficialsguan), ommonersbai-xing), nd outsiderswaireri).What follows s an attempt, singgenerallywell-knownnfor-mation, o reconceptualizehinesepoliticalstructure ased uponthisconceptionf statushierarchy. willbrieflyescribe ach ofthe four statuspositions, s representedn FigureTwo,and thenanalyze he nstitutionalizationfthisnesting oxsystemfpoliticalorganization.

CommonersAt thesymbolicenter f the Chinese olitical rganizations notthe ruler,but rather he people. The classificationorthe com-

moner tatusposition s usuallyregarded s a depiction f strat-ification,ut t s better egardeds a division fthehuman ommu-nitynto distinct ccupation olesnecessaryorthe maintenancefan orderly ociety. These roles are scholar,peasant,artisan, ndmerchant.


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156 G.G.HAMILTONFIGURETUO SlimftRS r STATUSHIEBABCH*N LATE flKSlftLCHI

STATUS OSITION RITUfiL UT1 AUTHORTf STATUS NTE!EDIARIES

QtPEROll*L *' 3ERME CORRECT QJNUCHES,LAUES,* ' HEMPEN OFnCIALS RONDSERWAHTS,-c. x. * ESTARUS* MO RELATIUESiffwionfSTATUSGAP

omciAiavrTrT*i4 *s

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behavior fpeople in those roles. In imeprialChina, ommonerscould, n theorynd in fact,move from ole to role,but to be ascholar, peasant, r anyof the other oleswas,morally,o act inparticularwaysand,normatively,o do particular hings.Each of theseroleswas furtherpecified,o that he behavior fa peasant,forinstance,ncludedon-goingpeculation bout howpeasantsoughtto live. In whatever ole theyoccupied,however,commonerswere expected o remaindutiful o the fundamentalprinciplesf life,mostbasic ofwhich oncernedbligations ithinthefamily,speciallyo one'sparents nd, n thecase ofwomen, oone's husband. Not to obeythesedutieswas to put intoquestionone's veryhumanity.In Europe,the king'scourt had jurisdiction verboth noblesand commoners,ut in China each statusgroupwas, in theory,self-maintaining,itheach acting ccording o the moralitympliedby theirrespective oles. Only n seriousdisturbancesould offi-cials or theemperor imselfegitimaletyntervenen theaffairs fcommoners.All commoners eredirectlyontrollednd couldbelegitimately unished by theirown parentsand senior lineagemembers,whomayreachtheir decision n a lineagecouncil. (AChinese ayingputs it like this: "All nationshave laws, all clansregulations.")n addition o control ykinship roups, ommonersin differentoles weresubjectto control y dispute-solvingecha-nismsnternal othat ole. Peasantshadtheir illage ouncils,whichin southern hina often verlappedwith kinship roup. Artisansandmerchantsrganizedntoguilds nd regional ssociations,rga-nizationswhich ouldcreateregulationsndpunish ffenders. nlywhendisputes ouldnotbe resolvednternallyid cases go to theofficials orresolution. Officials ould normally esolve ivil dis-putesand perhaps ssigncriminal lame on thebasis of themoralprinciplesreached n thecase. If the case involved family,ffi-cials would invokekinshipprinciples nd lineage regulations;fthe case involvedmerchantctivities,heymight heckthe specificguildregulationshathad been broken.An mportant,ecurringuestionnphilosophic iscussionsllus-trates he relation etween ommonernd officialtatuses nd thenature of status roles in general. The questionconcernswhichcomesfirst,n official'sbligation o theemperor, hich s basedupon oyaltyzhong), r hisobligationo hisparents, hich s baseduponfilialityxiao). Which oleandroleprinciple akesprecedenceis not importanto this discussion, lthough should note thatscholars nd statesmen amedownonboth ides ofthe ssue. Whatis importantere s that hevery ssueemphasizes hegapbetweenstatuspositions nd thedistinctive,eparatemoralnatureof eachrole. In imperial imes, he Chinesepartially esolved he official'srole conflict etween amilynd stateby requiringhat an officialresignhis post upon the deathof a parent, o thathe, a sa com-moner, ould perform is family bligations. n the end,beinga


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158 G.G.HAMILTONcommoner as themostbasic status, he sine qua nonof civilizedsociety, he centeraroundwhichthe rest of the politicalorderrevolved.OfficialsTheofficialsccupied he econd tatus osition,hemoral pherelocated between hatof the emperor nd thatof commoners. nthis phere, hinese fficials erenot administratorsn theWesternsenseofthat erm, ut ratherwereeducatorsnd udges, xemplarsparexcellence.This fact s clearlyuggestedytheir mallnumbersand bythe factthatthesenumbers idnot increase s theydid inthe West.Theirverynumberswould indicate that the Chineseofficialswerenotadministratorshoseresponsibilityas to implementheemperor's rders. Indeed,the official ationale orhaving fficialsin the first lacewas notto servetheemperor y carryinguthiscommands, ut instead, o servethe emperorby setting moralexample ndby educatinghepeople. There re lengthyiscussionsin the Confucian lassics and later commentariesbout how tobecomeworthyfbeing uch a scholar/managernd howtoperformtheduties ftherole. The mportantointhere s tounderstandhat,intheChinese onception,hefunctionalityfthe official oletlowedfrom ts profound thicaland moral content. Officialdomas astatus positionthat,in principle,demanded of individuals hehighestevel of moralcommitment. t was not a groupof func-tionaries, eoplewith technicalduties, s it was in the Westernsenseof bureaucrat.37As with the commoner'sphere, he official'spherewas alsoseparatefromotherspheresand was, in theory,elf-maintaining.It was farremovedrom heposition fcommoners,ho nfacthadvery imitedmobilitynto thisstatusposition, ut it was even fur-therremoved rom hat of theemperor.Officials ad no mobilitywhatsoeverntothatposition, ot evenin thecase of an emperorwhohadlostthemandate fheaven. Commonersouldconceivablybecomean official y proving heirmoralqualifications;heyhadto pass througheveral evels of examinationsnd onlythenwerethey onsidered orapointmento servetheemperorn an officialcapacity.Afterheexaminationsndappointment,heofficial ouldgo through "rite ofpassage"whichwouldnormallyulminate nan audiencewith, nd a pledgeof loyaltyo,theemperor.Besidesbeingseparated rom ther tatuses, herole of officialshad, n theory, distinctiveelf-maintainingarttoplay n attainingharmonynd order. The responsibilityf theofficials as not togovern hecommoners,s would be thecase in a Europeanstate.Instead, hedefininguality ftheir olewas loyaltyzhong) o the

37For the originsof the Western onceptof bureaucrat, ee Bendix'sessayon "Bureaucracy"nReinhardBendixand Guenther oth. Scholarship nd Parti-sanship Berkeley:UniversityfCalifornia ress.1971).


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emperor,nd in the Chinese ystem his meant thattheywere tobe exemplars, etting he moral standardsto whichcommonersshouldaspire. Thiswas fundamentallyhe dutiesof an educator,notan administrator.If oneexamines heregulatorypparatus stablishedmong heofficials,ne discovers systemdesigned o control the officialsthemselves,o holdthem o their esponsibilitiesnd to keepthemvirtuous nd honest. Only great mount fimaginationan makeit nto a systemwhosepurposewas to extend he ruler's ower ntolocalsociety.For nstance,y repute hemostdespotic ulers f ateimperial imes,MingTaizi and Yongzheng,oth established heirreputationsy divisingmethods o regulate he activities f highranking fficials,ot by attemptingo control ommoners t all.MingTaizi even went so far as confinehis districtmagistratesto thecounty eat,forbiddinghemfrom oing nto thecountrysideand "disturbinghepeople." Yongzhengmprovednd extensivelyused the palace memorial ystem, o that officials ould secretlyreport hecorruptionfother fficials.As Silas Wuconcludes, IntheQing mperial overnment,hekeyfacetofpolitical ontrolwascontrol ver thehigh-rankingureaucrats," hichwas designed npartto meet theChinese eople'svaluedemand hat hegovernmentfulfillts responsibilities."38 oreover,s ThomasMetzger hows,theregulatory echanism hatcontrolledhe behavior f officialswas restricted o peopleof that status.39 It was nota partof ageneralegal frameworkpplicable o all,but ratherwas aimed atthisspecifictatusgroup. In short, hestateapparatus, o famousin the West as a first ttempt t creatingn administrativetate,is perhapsbetter een as a frameworkf ranks,procedures,ndregulationsreating self-contained,elf-regulatingtatusgroup.Therevenues ainedfrom andtaxationmade the officialsargelyself-sustaining.s ndividualsheywerenotdependentpon tipendsbestowedupon themby the emperor. Instead,the entiresalaryand supportystems or fficials erehandled yofficials.Aproposof theirduty o provide orpeace in theempire, heofficials lsoused ricegainedfrom axation orthestategranaryystem, hichprovided eoplewithfoodduringuchnaturaldisasters s droughtsand floods.Emperor"Tiangao huangdi uan" Heaven s high nd theemperors faraway) is a commonexpression hat symbolicallydentifies heposition fthe mperorntheChinese olitical ystem.Theemperoris called the "son of heaven," nd as emperor e had earned the"mandate f heaven." In relationto othergroups, he emperor

3 Silas H.L. Wu.Communicationnd ImperialControl n China Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityress, 1970), . 117.39Thomas A.Metzger, he InternalOrganizationf CKingBureaucracyCam-bridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity ress,1973).


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160 G.G.HAMILTON"holds up heaven/' nd his sphereof responsibilityas tianxia,everythingeneathheaven. The emperor's xplicitduties ncludedmostprominentlyis personalritualworship fheaven,whichhealoneperformedwice ach yearat theAltarof Heaven. The em-peror s, then, heclosestto heaven, erformsuties n relation oheaven, nd occupiestherole of the outermostphere omprisingthe Chinesepoliticalcommunity.There re a numberfconcretemanifestationsfthispositioning.Theemperor ad theresponsibilityor ll relationswithnon-Chineseoutsiders.One aspectof this was thetribute ystem,nd anothertheemperors'ontrol fforeignolicy,ncludinghewaging fwarson the frontier.Anothermanifestationould be seen in spatialterms. In relation o otherpeople, heemperorwas alwaysup. Incourthis seat was physicallylevated n a dais,and officialsn anaudiencewererequired o remain n theirknees. Even anyrefer-enceto theemperorrhis desires was always eparated rom,ndelevated bove (taitou), he rest of the lines of anydocumentnwhich t appeared."40Theemperor's pherewas notoccupied yhim lone. In theory,at least,his sphere, ike the others,was autonomous nd self-maintaining.He was sustained y imperialhousehold states andby revenuesgainedfromforeign rade,some typesof domestictrade e.g., icensingaltmerchants)nd particular ousehold nter-prises,such as themanufacturef porcelain. He was servedbyparticularypes fhousehold ersonnele.g., unuchs, ondservants,and disstaffelatives)who provided dvice,clericalhelp,and allmanner fpersonal ervice orhim and the entiremperial amily.The emperor,n residencewithin heimperialhousehold,was phy-sically eparated rom ll contactwithcommoners,s well as offi-cials, except n the performancef ritualtasks at predeterminedsites.In theory,heemperor armonizedhe relations etween eaven,earth,ndmankind. n fulfillinghese bligations,e servedheaven.Fromtheaffairs feverydayife,he was faraway, s far as heavenis high. UnlikeWestern ulers, uch as Louis XIV, theSun King,theChinese mperorwas not thecenter ut ofwhich heflow ndmeaning f life radiated. Instead,he was the outersphere, heprotectiveovering,o to speak, hatensured hattheflow f otherpeoples'liveswouldbe orderlynd peaceful.41

40RichardJ.Smith,China'sCulturalHeritage,The Ch'ingDynasty, 644-1912(Boulder.Colorado:Westview ress. 1983V . 33.41As JamesL. Watsonshows,however, ommoners ompletelycceptedthenotion hat theemperorwas faraway,but thisalso suggested o themthattheemperorwas "a remoteand dangerous ntity, utside the normsof ordinaryhumancompassion." ("Wakingthe Dragon: Visions of the Chinese ImperialState in Local Myth,"n HughBaker (ed.). Maurice FreedmanMemorial ssue,Journalof the Anthropological ociety of Oxford. Forthcoming,988). This"normative"ommoners's iewof theemperor ccordsperfectly iththenotionthat the emperoroccupies a distinctive,tatus positionthat is distantfromordinaryifeand thatnormally as nothing o do withthat ife;this is a viewquite differenthat"normative" iewof Europeancommoners.


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LEGITIMACY AND STRUCTURE 161

OutsidersThe last statuspositionis that of the outsider. This is the statusof individuals who, although theylive withinboundaries of China,were not regardedas fullmembers of the political community, ndthus had no legitimateplace within t. Lacking an exact role, andthus not needing to act according to precise, predeterminedmoralprinciplesmade this an extremelyuseful categoryof people in apolitical order in which there are large gaps between rigorouslydefined status groups. Outsiders in China had served the very im-portant nside role of being status intermediaries zhongjianreri), ybridgingthe gaps between status positions. Using people that hadno standing within the political communityfacilitated such com-municationbetweenstatus roles as would otherwise result in a lossof "face" for both parties.Outsider were sub-classified nto people who are not ethnicallyChinese (non-Han) or who, for a number of reasons, were notethicallyChinese. This last group, the not-ethically hinese,werethe ones most often used as status intermediaries, ut not exclu-sivelyso, as a longline offoreigners romMarco Polo on can testify.These people were categorized as "mean people" (jianmiri),whichis a classificationthat implies some formof heterodoxyor funda-mental disreputability. Examples of these people include slaves,eunuchs, prostitutes, nd a number of semi-hereditaryccupations,including bandits, revolutionaries, nd yamen runners. People inthis group were ineligible to sit for the civil service examinations,as all commonerswere able to do regardlessof theiroccupation orcondition n life. Like non-Hanpeople,mean people did not conformto a Chinese way of life or were excused from acting in a fullyChinesemanner,both of whichwere sufficient o push thembeyondthe bounds of reputability,nd hence made them useful when pro-cedures of decorumwould not work.

VHow did these four status positions function n regard to theoperation of the state? In this final section, I want to examinebriefly ne dimensionregardingthe institutionalizationf power inthe Chinese imperialstate,namelythe justification nd transmissionof orders. In order to highlight he distinctiveness f the Chinesepolitical system, will begin with a contrastwith Western statestructure.Were the Chinese systembased on a centrist onceptionof polit-ical power,then one would expectthe emperorto be in chargeof anadministrative tructure, he officialdom, hich in turngovernscom-monerson behalf of the emperorand in relation to his commands.Let us call thismannerof organizing uthority elationships "com-

11


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162 G.G. HAMILTON

mandstructure,"nd thetypeof organizationrising rom uchacommand tructuren "administrativeureaucracy."This interpretation,hich s theone usually ppliedto politicalorganaizationn imperialChina, s, I believe, misapplicationfWestern heory.Chinesepoliticalorganizations best viewed s astatushierarchy. t represents "status structure"ather hanacommand tructure. n theWest,power s embeddedn commandStructuresnd is definedn relation o administrativeurisdictionsand to individuals ho have command esponsibilitiesithin hosejurisdictions.Accordingly,ndividualsn positionsof powerhavethe right o transmit heirwill (as qualified y a particular ost)to otherswithin heir urisdictions.In China, n contrast, nlycorrectionf inappropriateehaviors allowed.In China, hiskey dea of correctiononveyshe egitimateasisbywhich ndividualsn various ocations n the system an directsomeone lse's action. This dea is foundn themostobviousplace,in theverywordforgovernmenttself. "Zhengzhi"s always implytranslated s "government,"ut the charactersmlpya differentmeaning hantheone withwhichwe are familiar orgovernment.Therootradicalofzhengmeans correct r appropriateehavior: obe upright,o be trueto form. The otherpartof thecharactermeansto follow. "Zhi," hesecondcharacterf theterm,meanstoheal,to cure. Thisterm,hengzhi, recisely escribes hesystemfgovernmentn China: The powersare to followcorrectbehaviorthemselvesnd to set right hatwhich s incorrect.Power,notherwords, oesnot ssuefrom ommands,utratherfrom onformity. acquesGernet nd Bastidarguethat forChina'"To govern s to regulate,maintain armonynd equilibrium,otto command nd compel.' We are led to think f theoppositionbetweenthe power of constraintkratos)whichdefines oliticalpower nGreece, nd the Chinesenotion fgovernment:hi,to gov-ern,signifiesiterallyo regulate,specially o regulate he flow fwater, o treat nd toheal." 2 TheEmperor overned ycorrectingand byhealing, otby issuingpositiveaws in theEuropean ense.Thoughnot a law maker, heChinese mperor id issue instruc-tions. LeonVandermeerschivesa classificationf imperial dits,which,n theWestern ensewould eemto be commands. n China,however,hesecategoriesf sovereign ecisions in no waydenotespositiveaws; (they) efer o thefundamentalawsofnaturensofaras these re modelsfortheright onduct fgovernment."he de-velopmentnduse ofmodels nd standards,otthe ssuing flaws,is at the centerof imperialdecisions. In a keypassage,Vander-meerschontrastsheWestern otion f aw with heChinesenotionofritual rder.The principlef theritual rder s altogetherifferentocialrelations,nthat rder,remodeledponforms rites whichre42Schram ed.), The Scope of State Power,p. xxxi.


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LEGITIMACY AND STRUCTURE 163the reasons li,principles) f things. Only n conformityith thosereasons can the world function armoniously.Once the riteshavebeen respected, nd harmonyhas therebybeen introduced ntosociety, ach individual pontaneouslyehavesas is mostfitting orall and for himself...People re persuadedto subject themselves othe ritesbytheprestigend the mposing orms f thegreatest ere-monies, nd bytheascendancy,nd theexample, f thehighest er-sonages fthe ocialhierarchy. his s why hemost mportantdictsare thosewhich oncern reat iturgicalelebrations nd thosewhichinvolvegreatdignitaries.The sovereign, eing n possessionof theWay,has onlyto determine,n each occasion,theconductof thosewho are togive heexample. his s decided nthebasis oftheir lacein thehierarchy,nd the restfollows f tself. TheChinese, fter ll,havealwaysupheld s theirmodel theadministrator honever nter-venes n the affairs f thosewhomhe administers,he atter cting,under he nfluence fhis virtue,n spontaneous onformityiththenormsof the social order. Lu, the Chinesetermfor aw, properlydenotes he aws ofmusicalharmony constants fthesocial order,just as certainproportionalitiesf pitchare constants f the har-monicorder.43

The political system n China was foundedupon correctionandhealing,as opposed to commands and administration f commands.How was such a system nstitutionalized?As described above eachgrouphas institutionalizedwithin t a self-regulatingapacity. Par-ents had the responsibility n regard to their children,and hencehave legitimatepower over them when theyact inappropriately. Inlate imperial times a parent could even put theirchild to death ifhe or she violated the behaviorrequired by xiao (filiality). Districtofficials,which were knowncolloquiallyas "parentalofficials" fumuguari),had a similar relationshipwith commonerswithintheir dis-tricts. If parentsor officials ailed to act and if theirsubordinate'smisbehaviorcaused a public disorder,then higherranked personscould become involved. A lineage council imaybe called to dis-cipline the child,and the officialwould likelybe removedand pun-ishedby higherranking fficials r theemperorhimself. As disorderspreads, more and higher ranked people become involved in res-toring rder,whileothersmay be punishedforallowingthe disorderto continue.This type of political systemrests on a presumptionof clear,well definedroles in which authority,n principle, s invokedonlywhenrole incumbents o notfulfillheirduties. As can be recognizedimmediately,hisarrangementmightbe veryeffectiven maintaining,literally, hestatus quo, but would be very neffective hen decisionsmade at the top need to be carried out quickly and efficientlyypeople in other status groups.

It is in this regardthat we can understand the informal ystemsof decision-makingnd of transmission f ordersthatdevelopedover43Schram ed.), The Scope of State Power,p. 13.


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164 G.G. HAMILTONtime in the Chinese state. These oftencomplex informalsystemscircumvented he two major status gaps thatexisted in the Chinesestatus hierarchy, he firstbetween the emperorand officials nd thesecond between officials nd commoners. In each informal ystemtwo channels of communicationand transmissiondevelop, a directone allowingformal ommunication etweenunequals,and an indirectone allowinginformal ommunication hrough tatus intermediaries.I will brieflydescribe each of these systems.In late imperial times,but particularlyduringthe Qing period,the last dynasty,the emperors Gangxi and Yongzheng desired amethod of direct communicationwith high ranking officials thatallowed a measure ofconfidentiallyetweentheemperorand official.Before that time audiences and memorials to the emperor wereritualisticand were handled largely by officialsfor theirown pur-poses. Gangxi began to develop a secret memorial system,whichallowed the top officials to write to him without other officialsknowingof the communication. The documents,which were sup-posedly formal greetingsto the emperor,were read only by theemperorand a few household officials. During the reignof Yong-zheng,who followed Gangxi,the secret memorial systemwas rou-tinized,and a special group of household officials,who were "innergrand secretaries,"were established as the Grand Council to readthe secret memorials, then to advise the emperor about possiblecourses of action,and to transmitdocumentssignedby the emperorto the appropriate ocation in the status apparatus of officialdom.The second aspect of this informal ystembetween the emperorand officialswas the indirectmeans of communicatingwithofficialsand of transmitting ocuments. Since very early times, and withgreat consistency n the last two dynasties,the standard means ofcommunicatingbetween the emperor and official was by a "mes-senger" from the imperial household. Most of these messengerswere eunuchs,and sometimes n the Qing,bondservants. Especiallyduring the Ming dynasty, hese status intermediariesmanaged allaspects of the indirectcontacts between the emperorand officials.For example, accordingto Robert Crawford,From 1471to 1497,Hsien-tsung1465-1488)nd Hsiao-tsung1488-1506) eldno audienceswith heirministers.Wu-tsung1506-1522)eldno audiences s he was morefrequentlyngaged n wanderingboutin disguise. For forty-fiveearsof his reign, hih-tsung1522-1567)held onlyone audience. From 1589 to 1602, hen-tsung1573-1620)met his ministers nlyonce and thisbecause of an attempt n theHeirApparent'sife.44Without audiences, however, the governmentdid not cease, as itwould have in Europe, because status intermediaries the infamousMing eunuches advised the emperor,draftenand delivered cor-

44RobertB. Crawford,unuchPowerin theMing Dynasty,T'oungPao" 49(1961-62),. 115.


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LEGITIMACYAND STRUCTURE 165respondenceto officials,erved as theemperors'guardsand doormen,managed the imperialestates, watched over the emperors' fiscal in-terests in foreignand domestic trade, administered the imperialtreasury,and sometimes led the emperors' armies and navies.45Throughoutthe imperial period, these officiallydisreputable indi-viduals served as eyes, ears, and hands of the emperor in all hisindirectcontactswith the world outside of the imperial household.In so doing,thesego-betweens arned theundying nmity f officials,whose writingsconsistently amn theirpresence.This typeof informal ystemused to circumvent he status gapbetween emperor and official s repeated for the relationsbetweenofficials nd commoners. As Fei Xiaotongwrites,the officeof themagistrate was as high as the sky so high, ndeed, that no ordi-naryperson could reach up to it! 46 Magistrates,nonetheless,rou-tinelymade direct,but informalcontact with commonersthroughinformaldiscussions held with the group of commonerswho heldthe role of scholar. These individualswere degree-holdersshenshi),people who had passed one of the levels of examinations,but whoheld no appointment n officialdom. Both being cultivated (in theChinesemeaningof thatterm),official nd local scholars could meeton common ground. Though certainlynot on the same level, theycould nonetheless informally ircumventthe gap that lie betweenthemby virtueof theircommontraining. Moreover,scholars werethe only groupof commonersthatcould freely nter the site of themagistrate'sofficeand, as Ch'u T'ung-tsuwrites, "it was the onlygroup that could legitimately epresentthe local communityn dis-cussing local affairswith the officials and in participating n thegoverningprocess."47 The exchange of informationwas informalbut was decisive nonetheless,because there was no other directchannel by which desires on either side could be communicated.The indirectmeans of communicationbetween officials nd com-monershandled by far most of the contactbetween the two groups.As with the indirectcontact between the emperorand officials, heindirect ontactat this evel was made through tatus intermediaries.In the words of Fei Xiaotong,

Those who made the actual contactbetween the yamen (themagistrate's ffice) nd the people,the ruler and the ruled,werethe servants f the officials.Theseofficials ervantsyayi)occupiedone of the lowestpositions n the Chinesesocial scale; theyweredeprived f mostof their ivilrights,nd their onswere notallowedto take the examinations. t is significantoint n the Chinese ower45Crawford,p. cit.; also see Jung-pango, PolicyFormulationnd Decision-Making n Issues Respecting eace ana War. n CharlesO. Hucker ed.), ChineseGovernmentnMingTimes NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityress,1969), p.41-72.46Fei Xiaotong.China'sGentry Chicago:Universityf ChicagoPress, 1953).p. 80.47Chu, Local Government,. 168.


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166 G.G. HAMILTON

structurehat hesemenwho were n theposition fmost asilyabused ower hould avebeenheld o low. 8Indicative f such intermediariesn Chinese ociety, hosehavingthemostcontactwithnon-scholarommoners erethe owestran-ked. "Lictors, orsemen,ootmessengers,.., oroners,ailers,door-men, rchers" nd others imilarly mployedwererankedvery ow,but "thepolicemen ccupiedthe mostinferior osition f all thegovernmentunners."9 That policemenwere so lowlyranked,stigma hatextended o their hildren s well, s a clear ndicationof the status-violatingasks theyperformedn a politicalsystemorganized s a statushierarchy.Were theChinese tateorganizedas an administrativeystemwith an explicit ommand tructure,those uncions andled ysuchpeople s eunuchs ndyamen unnerswouldbe in the handsof those honored mong ll others.

VIMax Weber'spolitical sociology ontainsdeeplyseated Euro-centricbiases,but Weber'sequally deep insightsnto the natureofpolitical rganizationsf all types rovides theoreticalasis bywhichCliffordeertz's otion f non-Westernolitical rdercanbereconceptualizednd extended. Geertz's nalysisof the Balinesetheatre tate,Negara, lso can be appliedto China. The Chinesestate s fully non-Westerntate; ikeNegara, heChinese tate sbaseduponprinciplesuitedistinctrom hoseundergridingesternpolitical ystems,nd to use onlyWestern oncepts o understandthesepolitical rders s to misunderstandhem ntirely.But,havingaid that, ne must lso emphasizehat here s muchtodistinguishetweenheChinese ndBalinese tate tructure. hepolitical lites nNegara rearistocratsyvirtue fbirth;nimperialChina, hey re scholarsby virtue f passingthe examination. nNegara, heemperorwas an "exemplaryenter" heverymodelofgood behavior. But in China,thisrole fellto the scholars,whiletheemperorwas distant nd active n creating rder n theworld.While herewascertainlyompandceremonyt court,he mperor'spresencedidnotcome frommereprestige.He had theobligationto correct isordern theworld, nd in thisrole he and his forcescouldbe terrible, ierce,nd cruel. Through is intermediaries,heemperor ad his personal rmies, ould claim vast imperialands,and had his own sourcesof revenues nd supplies. The emperorwas not a passiveobserver r a royalrecluse. To commoners, ewas dragon hathad bestbe left sleep. 0^8 Fei. China'sGentry, . 80.49Ch'u,Local Government,. 62.so Watson, "Waking the Dragon."


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There s also much to distinguishetweenGeertz's nd Weber'sapproachesto comparativenalysis. Geertz too oftensubstitutesdramaforconcepts, eep descriptionsorprobing ontrasts. HemakesNegara nto a metaphor hatsymbolizeswhat theWest isnot. But such a metaphoricalrameworks not, t thesametime,a comparativeramework. eertz trips isanalysis fconcepts hatwould allow the East and West to be juxtaposed, o that thedif-ferences an be explored nd explainedmorefully. In this senseNegara, s an intellectualroduct,s really "theatre"tate;howeverbrilliant, eertz's haracterizationontainsmuchtheatrical erfor-mance and too little ntellectual ubstance. Webercan be justlycriticizedor eaving ut too muchhistoryrom isanalysis, ornotdiggingdeeply enoughinto culturalmeaningpatterns. Indeed,Geertz's and Foucault'swritings dd depth to Weber's insights.AlthoughWeber's rameworkoesnot substituteordeepstructuralanalysis,t does,however,dentifyhoseareas of theoretical ndsubstantiveignificanceponwhicha deep structuralnalysis anproceed. Withoutcareful theoretical reparation ased upon acomparativenalysis, ulturalanalysis s oftendirectionless ndstrangely mpty. That is because theoretical econstructionsndhistorical evisions re not separateexercises, ut rather re bothaspectsof thesingular ct of understandinghehumancondition.In thisregard, istorical,omparative nalysishas a largeparttoplay in analyzinghe theatre tateof Bali, as well as the distantemperorn imperialChina.Departmentf SociologyUniversityf California, aviset Graduate nstitute f SociologyTunghaiUniversity

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