4. EVIDENCE RULES plus 6-29-18 - Maine CourtsJun 29, 2018 · With Advisory Notes The Maine Rules...

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LastreviewedandeditedJune29,2018IncludesamendmenteffectiveAugust1,2018

MAINERULESOFEVIDENCE

WithAdvisoryNotes

TheMaineRulesofEvidence,theMaineRestylingNotes,theFederalAdvisoryandRestylingCommitteeNotes,andAdvisoryNotessubsequenttothe

Restylingappearinblacktype;AdvisoryNotestotheformerMaineRulesofEvidenceappearinredtype.

[EffectiveJanuary1,2015,theMaineRulesofEvidencehavebeenrestyledand completely replace the Maine Rules of Evidence in effect prior toJanuary1,2015. Includedbelowareageneral note regarding the restyling, atable of the new Rules, the restyledMaine Rules of Evidence, Maine RestylingNotes,FederalAdvisoryandRestylingCommitteeNotes,andAdvisoryNotes tothe formerMaine Rules of Evidence. Footnotes and bracketed notations havebeenaddedtosomeoftheAdvisoryNotestotheformerMaineRulesofEvidencetobetter identifychangesandupdatesover theyearsand indicatedistinctionsfrom the restyled Rules. When statutes referenced in Advisory Notes to theformer Rules have been repealed, that fact is noted, though replacementstatutes, ifany,areoftennot indicated,asthereplacementstatute, ifany,mayhave a different purpose or context than the repealed statute. The footnotesprovideinformationthatiscurrentasoftheeffectivedateoftherestyledrules:January1, 2015. Changes subsequent to January1, 2015will beaddressed inAdvisoryNotesfortheparticularrulethatischanged.]

AdvisoryCommitteeontheMaineRulesofEvidence

Note:ProposedRestyledRulesofEvidence TheMaineAdvisoryCommitteeonRulesofEvidenceproposedthattheMaineRulesofEvidenceberestyledassetforthbelow.Therestylingproject,whichhastakenplaceoverthelasttwoyears,followsasimilarprojectbytheFederal Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence to restyle the FederalcounterpartstoourevidencerulesandsimilarprojectsfortheFederalRulesofCivilandCriminalProcedure. Thepurposeoftherestylingistomaketherules clearer and easier of application by adoption of simple and consistentlanguage, style, and format conventions and elimination of ambiguous or

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obsolete terminology. The recommendations for restyling are intended topreservethesubstanceoftherespectiveruleswithoutchange,butpresenttherespective Maine rules in the language and format consistent with theirrestyled counterparts in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Each rule isaccompanied by a “Maine Restyling Note” and many also have the FederalAdvisoryCommitteenoteontheFederalrestyling. In reviewing the work of the Maine Advisory Committee on Rules ofEvidenceinpreparingtopublishtheRestyledRulesofEvidence,theCourthasmade some minor clarifications to improve language, and, as the AdvisoryCommitteeinvitedthecourttoconsider,theCourthaselectedtocontinuetheexistingexemptionofproceedingsregardingprobation,parole,administrativerelease,anddeferreddispositions fromtherequirementsof theMaineRulesofEvidence. Thoseproceedings remain subject to fundamentaldueprocessrequirements.SeeStatev.James,2002ME86,¶¶13-15,797A.2d732.

****** TheBiennialReporttotheCourtfromProfessorDeirdreSmith,Chairofthe Advisory Committee on the Maine Rules of Evidence, datedOctober14,2014,includedthefollowingnoteregardingtheRestylingProject:RestylingProject

The Committee’s primary project during the past two years was thecompleteredraftingoftheMaineRulesofEvidence(MREs)toconformtotherestylingformatincorporatedintotheFederalRulesofEvidencein2011.AsIexplainedinthememorandumIsubmittedtotheCourtthispastsummerwiththe Committee’s complete set of proposed restyled rules, the entireCommitteetookpartinthisproject. TheCommittee’sConsultant,Prof.PeterMurray, assisted by our excellent Student Liaisons, Margaret Machiaek(2012-2013)andKevinDecker(2013-2014),tooktheleadindraftingrestyledversionsofeachrule.Weworkedthroughtheproposedrestyledrulesinthree“batches,”eachofwhichwascarefullyreviewedbyasubcommitteeassignedto that “batch.” Our Judicial Liaison, Justice Donald Alexander, was closelyinvolvedwitheachstepoftheprojectandattendedmostofthesubcommitteemeetings. Once the subcommittee completed its review and revision of theproposed rules, that batchwas distributed to the full Committee for reviewanddiscussion.WesubmittedthecompletesetofproposedrulestotheCourt

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on June 17, 2014. The Court made some minor revisions to the proposedrulesandpostedthemforpubliccomment.NocommentswerereceivedotherthansomeveryhelpfulonesbyMatthewPollack,ClerkoftheMaineSupremeJudicial Court. My understanding is that those comments have beenincorporated, and the rules are now ready for final approval by the Court.Although thiswas a lengthy and labor-intensive process, I think that itwasone well worth undertaking. The revised rules are written with morecontemporarylanguageandarebetterformattedandthereforeeasiertolearnandtouse.

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MAINERULESOFEVIDENCETABLEOFRULES

ARTICLEI.GENERALPROVISIONSRULE101. APPLICABILITY;DEFINITIONS;TITLERULE102. PURPOSE.RULE103. RULINGSONEVIDENCERULE104. PRELIMINARYQUESTIONS.RULE105. LIMITING EVIDENCE THAT IS NOT ADMISSIBLE AGAINST

OTHERPARTIESORFOROTHERPURPOSESRULE106. REMAINDER OF OR RELATED WRITINGS OR RECORDED

STATEMENTSARTICLEII.JUDICIALNOTICERULE201. JUDICIALNOTICEOFADJUDICATIVEFACTSARTICLEIII.PRESUMPTIONSRULE301. PRESUMPTIONSINCIVILCASESGENERALLY RULE302. PRESUMPTIONOFLEGITIMACYRULE303. PRESUMPTIONSINCRIMINALCASESARTICLEIV.RELEVANCEANDITSLIMITSRULE401. TESTFORRELEVANTEVIDENCERULE402. GENERALADMISSIBILITYOFRELEVANTEVIDENCERULE403. EXCLUDING RELEVANT EVIDENCE FOR PREJUDICE,

CONFUSION,WASTEOFTIME,OROTHERREASONS

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RULE404. CHARACTEREVIDENCE;CRIMESOROTHERACTSRULE405. METHODSOFPROVINGCHARACTERRULE406. HABIT;ROUTINEPRACTICERULE407. SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES; NOTIFICATION OF

DEFECTRULE408. COMPROMISEOFFERSANDNEGOTIATIONSRULE409. OFFERSTOPAYMEDICALANDSIMILAREXPENSESRULE410. PLEAS,PLEADISCUSSIONS,ANDRELATEDSTATEMENTSRULE411. LIABILITYINSURANCE.RULE412. SEX-OFFENSE CASES: THE VICTIM’S SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OR

PREDISPOSITION.RULE413. PROTECTIONOFPRIVACYINCOURTPROCEEDINGS.ARTICLEV.PRIVILEGESRULE501. PRIVILEGESRECOGNIZEDONLYASPROVIDEDBYLAWRULE502. LAWYER-CLIENTPRIVILEGERULE503. HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL–, MENTAL HEALTH

PROFESSIONAL–, AND LICENSED COUNSELINGPROFESSIONAL-PATIENTPRIVILEGE

RULE504. SPOUSALPRIVILEGERULE505. RELIGIOUSPRIVILEGERULE506. POLITICALVOTE

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RULE507. TRADESECRETSRULE508. SECRETS OF STATE AND OTHER OFFICIAL INFORMATION;

GOVERNMENTALPRIVILEGESRULE509. IDENTITYOFINFORMANTRULE510. WAIVEROFPRIVILEGEBYVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURERULE511. PRIVILEGED MATTER DISCLOSED UNDER COMPULSION OR

WITHOUTOPPORTUNITYTOCLAIMTHEPRIVILEGERULE512. COMMENTUPONORINFERENCEFROMCLAIMOFPRIVILEGE

INCRIMINALCASES;INSTRUCTIONRULE513. CLAIMOFPRIVILEGEINCIVILCASESRULE514. MEDIATOR’SPRIVILEGEARTICLEVI.WITNESSESRULE601. COMPETENCYTOTESTIFYINGENERALRULE602. NEEDFORPERSONALKNOWLEDGERULE603. OATHORAFFIRMATIONTOTESTIFYTRUTHFULLYRULE604. INTERPRETERSRULE605. JUDGE’SCOMPETENCYASAWITNESSRULE606. JUROR’SCOMPETENCYASAWITNESSRULE607. WHOMAYIMPEACHAWITNESSRULE608. A WITNESS’S CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS OR

UNTRUTHFULNESSRULE609. IMPEACHMENTBYEVIDENCEOFACRIMINALCONVICTION

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RULE610. RELIGIOUSBELIEFSOROPINIONSRULE611. MODE AND ORDER OF EXAMINING WITNESSES AND

PRESENTINGEVIDENCERULE612. WRITINGUSEDTOREFRESHAWITNESS’SMEMORYRULE613. WITNESS’SPRIORSTATEMENTSRULE614. COURT’SCALLINGOREXAMININGAWITNESSRULE615. EXCLUDINGWITNESSESRULE616. ILLUSTRATIVEAIDSARTICLEVII.OPINIONSANDEXPERTTESTIMONYRULE701. OPINIONTESTIMONYBYLAYWITNESSESRULE702. TESTIMONYBYEXPERTWITNESSESRULE703. BASISOFANEXPERT’SOPINIONTESTIMONYRULE704. OPINIONONANULTIMATEISSUERULE705. DISCLOSINGTHEFACTSORDATAUNDERLYINGANEXPERT’S

OPINIONRULE706. COURT-APPOINTEDEXPERTWITNESSESARTICLEVIII.HEARSAYRULE801. DEFINITIONS THAT APPLY TO THIS ARTICLE; EXCLUSIONS

FROMHEARSAYRULE802. THERULEAGAINSTHEARSAY

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RULE803. EXCEPTIONSTOTHERULEAGAINSTHEARSAY—REGARDLESSOFWHETHERTHEDECLARANTISAVAILABLEASAWITNESS

RULE804. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY—WHEN THE

DECLARANTISUNAVAILABLEASAWITNESSRULE805. HEARSAYWITHINHEARSAYRULE806. ATTACKING AND SUPPORTING THE DECLARANT’S

CREDIBILITYARTICLEIX.AUTHENTICATIONANDIDENTIFICATIONRULE901. AUTHENTICATINGORIDENTIFYINGEVIDENCERULE902. EVIDENCETHATISSELF-AUTHENTICATINGRULE903. SUBSCRIBINGWITNESS’TESTIMONYUNNECESSARYARTICLEX. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, AND

PHOTOGRAPHSRULE1001. DEFINITIONSTHATAPPLYTOTHISARTICLERULE1002. REQUIREMENTOFTHEORIGINALRULE1003. RESERVEDRULE1004. ADMISSIBILITYOFOTHEREVIDENCEOFCONTENTRULE1005. COPIESOFPUBLICRECORDSTOPROVECONTENTRULE1006. SUMMARIESTOPROVECONTENTRULE1007. TESTIMONY OR STATEMENT OF A PARTY TO PROVE

CONTENTRULE1008. FUNCTIONSOFCOURTANDJURY

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ARTICLEXI.MISCELLANEOUSRULES

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MAINERULESOFEVIDENCEWithAdvisoryNotes

TheMaineRulesofEvidence,theMaineRestylingNotes,andtheFederal

AdvisoryandRestylingCommitteeNotesappearinblacktype;AdvisoryNotestotheformerMaineRulesofEvidenceappearinredtype.

ARTICLEI.GENERALPROVISIONS

RULE101.APPLICABILITY;DEFINITIONS;TITLE(a) Rulesapplicable.Exceptasotherwiseprovidedin(b),theserules

applytoallactionsandproceedingsbefore:

(1) TheSupremeJudicialCourtwhennotsittingastheLawCourt;(2) TheSuperiorCourt;(3) TheDistrictCourt;and(4) TheProbateCourt.

(b) Rulesinapplicable.Theserules—exceptforthosegoverning

privilege—donotapplytothefollowing:

(1) Thecourt’sdeterminationunderRule104(a)ofapreliminaryquestionoffactgoverningadmissibility;

(2) Grandjuryproceedings;(3) JuvenileproceedingsundertheMaineJuvenileCodeotherthan

(A) Probablecausedeterminationsinbindoverhearings;or(B) Adjudicatoryhearings;

(4) StatutorysmallclaimsintheDistrictCourt;

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(5) Proceedingsonapplicationsforwarrants;(6) Sentencingproceedings;(7) Proceedingsregardingrevocation,modification,orterminationof

probation,parole,administrativereleaseordeferreddisposition;(8) Bailproceedings;(9) Proceedingstodetermineprobablecause;(10) Contemptproceedingsinwhichthecourtmayactsummarily;and(11) ProceedingsexemptfromapplicabilityoftheRulesofEvidenceby

statute.(c) Definitions.Intheserules:

(1) “Civilcase”meansacivilactionorproceeding;(2) “Criminalcase”includesacriminalproceeding;(3) “Publicoffice”includesapublicagency;(4) “Record”includesamemorandum,report,ordatacompilation;(5) A“ruleprescribedbytheSupremeJudicialCourt”meansarule

adoptedbytheMaineSupremeJudicialCourtunderstatutoryorinherentauthority;and

(6) Areferencetoanykindofwrittenmaterialoranyothermedium

includeselectronicallystoredinformation.(d) Title.TheserulesmaybeknownandcitedastheMaineRulesofEvidence.

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MaineRestylingNote[November2014] TheMaineRulesofEvidenceRestylingProjectfollowsasimilarprojectbytheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeonRulesofEvidencetorestylethefederalcounterpartstoourevidencerulesaswellassimilarprojectsfortheFederalRulesofCivilandCriminalProcedure.Thepurposeoftherestylingistomakethe rules clearer and easier to apply by adoption of simple and consistentlanguage, style, and format conventions and elimination of ambiguous orobsolete terminology. Where the Maine Rule of Evidence is substantiallyidentical in substance to the corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence, theAdvisoryCommitteerecommends that theCourt adopt language identical tothat in the Federal Rules, and we have included the Federal AdvisoryCommittee’srestylingnotewiththeproposedamendedRule.WhereaMaineRule departs in substance from the corresponding Federal Rule, we haverecommendedrevisionsthatfollowthesamerestylingformatas intheotherRules,asdescribedin“TheStyleProject” intheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeNotetoRule101. ThelanguageofMaineRule101(c)closelytracksexistingFederalRule101(b)intermsofthedefinitions(theproposedMainerestylingchangesthereferences to Maine references and adds a reference to “or inherent” to“statutoryauthority” for rule-making). Otherwise, the proposedMaineRule101differssignificantlyfromtheFederalRulebysettingforth,insections(a)and(b),acompletedescriptionoftheapplicabilityoftheRulestoproceedingsin Maine courts. As part of the Restyling Project, the Advisory Committeerecommends that the Court consolidate all references to applicability in theRules, including those presently in Rules 104(a) and 1101, into onecomprehensive provision in Rule 101. The Committee recommends addingreferences to deferred dispositions and administrative release in Rule101(b)(7)assuchdispositionsarenowcommonincriminalproceedingsandare sufficiently analogous to probation proceedings to warrant consistenttreatment. TheCommitteefurtherrecommendsthattheCourteliminatethefinalsentenceofcurrentMaineRule104(a)andrepealRule1101entirelyaspart of this consolidation. Finally, the Committee has proposed that thereferencetothetitleoftheRulesbemovedfromRule1102toanewsection101(d),eliminatingtheneedforRule1102aswell. The restyled Rule does not make specific reference to hearings on“motionstosuppressevidenceandthelike,”whicharereferredtoincurrent

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MaineRule104(a)asnotexceptedfromapplicabilityoftheRulesofEvidence.By failing to include an express “exception to the exception” the Committeedoesnot intendtochangeMainelawtotheeffectthattheRulesofEvidencedoapplytohearingsinproceedingsaddressingthesuppressionofevidence.

FederalAdvisoryCommitteeNote

ThelanguageofRule101hasbeenamended,anddefinitionshavebeenadded, as part of the general restyling of the Evidence Rules tomake themmore easily understood and to make style and terminology consistentthroughouttherules.Thesechangesareintendedtobestylisticonly.Thereisnointenttochangeanyresultinanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility. The reference to electronically stored information is intended to trackthelanguageofFed.R.Civ.P.34. TheStyleProject TheEvidenceRulesarethefourthsetofnationalproceduralrulestoberestyled.TherestyledRulesofAppellateProceduretookeffectin1998.TherestyledRulesofCriminalProceduretookeffect in2002. TherestyledRulesofCivilProcedure tookeffect in2007. TherestyledRulesofEvidenceapplythe same general drafting guidelines and principles used in restyling theAppellate,Criminal,andCivilRules.

1. GeneralGuidelines. Guidance in drafting, usage, and style was provided by Bryan Garner,Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Court Rules, Administrative Office of theUnited States Courts (1969) and Bryan Garner,Dictionary of Modern LegalUsage(2ded.1995). Seealso JosephKimble,GuidingPrinciples forRestylingthe Civil Rules, inPreliminaryDraft of Proposed Style Revision of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, at page x (Feb. 2005) (available athttp://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Prelim_draft_proposed_pt1.pdf); Joseph Kimble, Lessons in Drafting from the New FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 12 Scribes J. Legal Writing 25 (2008-2009). Forspecific commentary on the Evidence restyling project, see Joseph Kimble,DraftingExamplesfromtheProposedNewFederalRulesofEvidence,88Mich.

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B.J.52(Aug.2009);88Mich.B.J.46(Sept.2009);88Mich.B.J.54(Oct.2009);88Mich.B.J.50(Nov.2009).

2. FormattingChanges. Many of the changes in the restyled EvidenceRules result fromusingformat to achieve clearer presentations. The rules are broken down intoconstituentparts,usingprogressivelyindentedsubparagraphswithheadingsand substituting vertical for horizontal lists. “Hanging indents” are usedthroughout.Theseformattingchangesmakethestructureoftherulesgraphicand make the restyled rules easier to read and understand even when thewords are not changed. Rules 103, 404(b), 606(b), and 612 illustrate thebenefitsofformattingchanges. 3. ChangestoReduceInconsistent,Ambiguous,Redundant,Repetitive,or

ArchaicWords. The restyled rules reduce the use of inconsistent terms that say thesamethingindifferentways.Becausedifferentwordsarepresumedtohavedifferentmeanings,suchinconsistenciescanresultinconfusion.Therestyledrules reduce inconsistencies by using the same words to express the samemeaning. For example, consistent expression is achieved by not switchingbetween “accused” and “defendant” or between “party opponent” and“opposing party” or between the various formulations of civil and criminalaction/case/proceeding. The restyled rules minimize the use of inherently ambiguous words.For example, the word “shall” can mean “must,” “may,” or something else,dependingoncontext. Thepotential forconfusionisexacerbatedbythefactthe word “shall” is no longer generally used in spoken or clearly writtenEnglish. The restyled rules replace “shall” with “must,” “may,” or “should,”depending on which one the context and established interpretation makecorrectineachrule. Therestyledrulesminimizetheuseofredundant“intensifiers.” Theseare expressions that attempt to addemphasis, but instead state theobviousandcreatenegativeimplicationsforotherrules.Theabsenceofintensifiersintherestyledrulesdoesnotchange theirsubstantivemeaning. See,e.g.,Rule

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104(c) (omitting “in all cases”); Rule 602 (omitting “but need not”); Rule611(b)(omitting“intheexerciseofdiscretion”). Therestyledrulesalsoremovewordsandconceptsthatareoutdatedorredundant. 4. RuleNumbers. The restyled rules keep the same numbers to minimize the effect onresearch. Subdivisions have been rearranged within some rules to achievegreaterclarityandsimplicity. 5. NoSubstantiveChange. The Committee made special efforts to reject any purported styleimprovementthatmightresultinasubstantivechangeintheapplicationofarule. The Committee considered a change to be “substantive” if any of thefollowingconditionsweremet:

a. Undertheexistingpracticeinanycircuit,thechangecouldleadtoadifferentresultonaquestionofadmissibility(e.g.,achangethatrequiresacourttoprovideeithera lessormorestringentstandardinevaluatingtheadmissibilityofparticularevidence);

b. Under the existing practice in any circuit, it could lead to achangeintheprocedurebywhichanadmissibilitydecisionismade(e.g.,achangeinthetime inwhichanobjectionmustbemade,orachange inwhether a courtmust hold a hearing on an admissibilityquestion);

c. The changewould restructure a rule in away thatwould altertheapproachthatcourtsandlitigantshaveusedtothinkabout,andargue about, questions of admissibility (e.g., merging Rules 104(a)and104(b)intoasinglesubdivision);or

d. Theamendmentwouldchangea“sacredphrase”—onethathasbecome so familiar in practice that to alter it would be undulydisruptive to practice and expectations. Examples in the EvidenceRulesinclude“unfairprejudice”and“truthofthematterasserted.”

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Advisers’NotetoFormerM.R.Evid.11011(February2,1976)

Subdivision (a) makes these rules applicable to all actions andproceedingsinthenamedcourtswiththeexceptionsprovidedin(b).TheydonotapplyintermstotheAdministrativeCourt,whichcameintobeingunderthatnamebyP.L.1973,c.303.PreviouslytheAdministrativeCode,5M.R.S.A.§2301-52,hadused the terms“AdministrativeHearingOffice”and“HearingCommissioner’’, which were changed to Administrative Court andAdministrativeCourtJudge.Thepurposewastodignifytheofficewithmoreappropriate titles. Thematter is not of great practical importance because§2405providesthat“therulesofevidenceasappliedinthetrialofcivilcasesintheStateshallbeobservedwheneverpracticable.’’Thiswouldincorporatetheserulesbyreference.Thepermittedrelaxationasto“factsnotreasonablysusceptible of proof under these rules’’ seems reasonable for this type ofproceeding.2 Subdivision (b) lists the exceptions from the applicability other thanthose with respect to privilege. Subsection (1) excludes determination ofpreliminary questions of fact except as otherwise provided in Rule 104,3whichmakestherulesapplicabletohearingsonmotionstosuppressevidenceandthelike.

1 The formerAdvisers’Note toRule101 isnow irrelevantbecause theRule it referenceshas

beenremovedbytherestyling,soitstextisnotincluded.TheAdvisers’NotestoformerRule1101arenowapplicabletoRule101,however,sotheAdvisers’NotestotheformerRule1101havebeenincludedat thispoint. Caution:thesubsectionsreferenceddonotalwaysmatchup to thenewlyrestyledsubsectionsofRule101;somechangeshavebeennoted.2TheAdministrativeCodereferencedinthefirstparagraphwasrepealedandreplacedbyP.L.

1977, ch. 551 (effective July1, 1978), creating theMaineAdministrativeProcedureAct, 5M.R.S.§§8001-11008(2014).Thestandardsofevidencetobeappliedinadministrativeproceedingsareaddressed in 5 M.R.S. 9057 (2014). The Administrative Court was abolished and its functionstransferredtotheDistrictCourtbyP.L.1999,ch.547,§B-12(effectiveMarch15,2001).SeeM.R.Civ.P.80G.3Rule104(a).

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Subsection (2) concerns proceedings before grand juries. This is inaccordwithMainelaw.Statev.Douglas,150Me.442,114A.2d253(1955). Subsection(3)4excludesvariousmiscellaneousproceedings.Itclarifiesbut does not appear to change Maine law. The rules do not apply toproceedingsonprobationorparoleviolations. TheSupremeCourthasheldthat due process must be observed on hearings to determine whether aconditionofprobationorparolehasbeenviolated. Gagnonv.Scarpelli,411U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (1973). Due process does not, however, mandateobservation of the rules of evidence. The same principles apply toadjudicationsofjuveniledelinquency.5 Subsection(4)6excludescontemptproceedingsinwhichthecourtmayactsummarily.Thispowerisconfinedtocaseswherethejudgecertifiesthathe saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it wascommittedintheactualpresenceofthecourt.M.R.Crim.P.42(a).7 TheserulesdonotapplytoproceedingsbeforetheIndustrialAccidentCommission.8ItwouldbebeyondtheauthorityoftheSupremeJudicialCourtto prescribe rules for hearings before the Commission. The Court inexercisingitsreviewingfunctionshascommenteduponthenecessityoftherebeing “competent evidence towarrant theCommissions’ findings.” See, e.g.,Larrabee’s Case, 120 Me. 242, 113 A. 268 (1921); Goldthwaite v. SheratonRestaurant,154Me.214,145A.2d362(1958).Someofthecasesspeakofitsbeingbadpracticetoadmithearsaybutthatwhenadmittedwithoutobjectionitcanbegivencorroboratingweight.InpracticetheCommissionhasheededthisadvice.

4Nowsubsections(4)–(9).5Thislanguagehassincebeensuperseded,astheMaineRulesofEvidencenowapplytojuvenile

adjudications.6Nowsubsection(10).7M.R.Crim.P.42nowstatesthatcontemptproceedingsaregovernedbyM.R.Civ.P.66. Civil

Rule66(b)(2)bestsupportsthissentence.8NowtheWorkersCompensationBoard.

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ExplanationofAmendment(October1,1976)

Thisamendmentisapurelyformalchangetomake itcompletelyclearthat the rules of evidence do not apply to small claims proceedings in theDistrict Court. The statute, 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 7451-7457,9 calls for a “simple,speedy and informal procedure”10 inwhich “the technical rules of evidenceshall not apply.”11 It was never intended to alter this procedure, but thegeneralityofRuleI101(a)12makingtherulesapplicabletoallproceedingsintheDistrictCourtwarrants anexpress exclusionof coverageof small claimsproceedings.

AdvisoryCommitteeNote(February15,1988Amendment)

This amendment of Rule 1101 makes the rules inapplicable toproceedings for the determination of probable cause. Traditionally inprobable cause hearings, for bindover of a defendant pending grand juryindictment, therulesofevidencehavenotbeenstrictlyapplied. Usually theprimary facts supporting the charge are established by evidence admissibleunder the rules, but subsidiary points are often established by hearsay andother inadmissible evidence. Strict applicability of the rules of evidence topreliminary proceedings of this sort could lead to needless formality inpreliminary proceedings, waste of time, and abuse of preliminary probablecausehearingstoharasstheprosecution.

9 These statutes have been repealed; the information can now be found at 14 M.R.S.

§§7481-7487(2014).10At14M.R.S.§7481(2014).11 This language is no longer in the Small Claims statutes. Maine Rules of Small Claims

Procedure6(b)statesthat“[t]herulesofevidence,otherthanthosewithrespecttoprivileges,shallnotapply.”12Rule101(a)(3).

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Federal Rule 1101(3) exempts probable cause hearings from theapplicabilityoftheFederalRulesofEvidence.13 Theamendmentalsomakesclearwhathasalreadybeenaccomplishedby statute, namely that the Rules of Evidence do not apply to juveniledetention (analogous to probable cause or bindover hearings) but they doapply to juvenile adjudications. See Maine Juvenile Code, 15 M.R.S.A.§3307(1).14

AdvisoryCommitteeNote

(December29,1994Amendment) ThisamendmentconformstheRulesofEvidencetorecentamendmentsin theMaine Juvenile Code, 15M.R.S.A. §§ 3001 et seq. TheMaine JuvenileCode, as presently applied, contemplates a bindover hearing in the DistrictCourt at which the court determines whether there is probable cause tobelieve that a juvenile crime has been committed and whether afterconsideration of the seriousness of the crime, the characteristics of thejuvenileandthedispositionalalternativesavailabletotheJuvenileCourtitisappropriate to prosecute the juvenile as an adult. 15M.R.S.A. §3101. TheCode provides that the Rules of Evidence shall apply “only to the probablecauseportionofthebindover15hearing.”15M.R.S.A.§3101(4)(B).TheCodealso provides that the Rules of Evidence “shall apply in the adjudicatoryhearing” (15 M.R.S.A. §3310(1)) but “shall not16 apply to dispositionalhearings.” (15 M.R.S.A. §3312(1)). Current practice in the Juvenile Courtfollows the requirements of the Code. This amendment brings the expresslanguageoftheRulesinlinewiththeCodeaswell.

13 FederalRule1101(c)currentlystatesthattheFederalRulesofEvidencedonotapplywhen

issuingsearch/arrestwarrantsorcriminalsummons,orin“apreliminaryexaminationinacriminalcase.”14 Subsection (1) of this statute has been repealed. Further, the entire sentence has been

supersededbythe1994amendment.15“...bind-over....”16“Donot....”

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AdvisoryCommitteeNote(June5,1995Amendment)

This amendment is intended to clarify the recent amendment of Rule1101 with respect to juvenile proceedings. The rules do not apply to anyactivities in the juvenilecourt, regardlessofhowdescribedordenominated,otherthanthedeterminationofprobablecauseinbindoverproceedingsandadjudicatoryproceedings.

RULE102.PURPOSETheserulesshouldbeconstruedsoastoadministereveryproceedingfairly,eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development ofevidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a justdetermination.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014]

MaineRule 102 and Federal Rule 102 are substantively identical, andtherefore the Advisory Committee recommends adoption of the language oftherestyledFederalRule.


ThelanguageofRule102hasbeenamendedaspartoftherestylingoftheEvidenceRules tomake themmoreeasilyunderstoodand tomakestyleandterminologyconsistentthroughouttherules.Thesechangesareintendedtobestylisticonly. There isno intent tochangeanyresult inanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility.

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Advisers’NotetoformerM.R.Evid.102(February2,1976)

Thisgeneralizedstatementofpurposeiscomparableto[M.R.Civ.P.]1andM.R.Crim.P.2.Itsetsthetoneofflexibilityandliberalityinconstruingtherulestotheendthattruthmaybeascertained.Thisnegatestheold-fashionedcommon-law rule that statutes—or rules—in derogation thereof are to bestrictlyconstrued.Theruleisaguideastotheprinciplesbywhichthejudge

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istoexercisehisdiscretion,butnotofcoursealicensetodisregardtherulestoreacharesulthebelievestobejust.

RULE103.RULINGSONEVIDENCE(a) Preservingaclaimoferror.Apartymayclaimerrorinarulingto

admitorexcludeevidenceonlyiftheerroraffectsasubstantialrightofthepartyand:

(1) Iftherulingadmitsevidence,aparty,ontherecord:

(A) Timelyobjectsormovestostrike;and

(B) Statesthespecificground,unlessitwasapparentfromthe

context;or

(2) Iftherulingexcludesevidence,apartyinformsthecourtofitssubstancebyanofferofproof,unlessthesubstancewasapparentfromthecontext.

(b) Court’sstatementabouttheruling;directinganofferofproof.The

court may make any statement about the character or form of theevidence,theobjectionmade,andtheruling.Thecourtmaydirectthatanofferofproofbemadeinquestion-and-answerform.

(c) Preventing the jury from hearing inadmissible evidence. To the

extent practicable, the court must conduct a jury trial so thatinadmissibleevidenceisnotsuggestedtothejurybyanymeans.

(d) Takingnoticeofplainerror.17Acourtmaytakenoticeofanobvious

error affecting a substantial right, even if the claim of error was notproperlypreserved.

(e) Effectofpretrialruling. Apretrialobjectiontoorprofferofevidence

mustbetimelyrenewedattrialunlessthecourtstatesontherecord,or

17Theterm“plainerror”isderivedfromtheFederalRule.Theterm“obviouserror”isusedin

Statepractice.SeeStatev.Dolloff,2012ME130,¶35,58A.2d1032.

22

the context clearly demonstrates, that a ruling on the objection orprofferisfinal.


MaineRule 103 is substantially similar to Federal Rule 103,with onesmalldifference.Presently,MaineRule103(e)putstheburdenoncounseltorenewanobjectionoroffermadein limineorotherwisebeforetheevidencewouldbeofferedat trial,unless the trial judgeor thecircumstancesmake itclearthatthepreviousrulingwasindeedfinal.TheFederalRule(attheendofoldsubsection(a)andinnewsubsection(b))makesthepretrialrulingfinalsothattheobjectionorprofferneednotberenewedattrial. The Maine departure represents a policy choice for Maine. Theproposed restyled Rule 103 embodies this policy choice by carrying overformerMaineRule103(e)withoutachangeinlanguage.



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Thisrule isdeclaratoryofMaine law. Insubdivision (d)18 theFederalRulereads“plainerror”,followingF.R.Crim.P.52(b).“Obvious”isusedhereto conform to M.R. Crim. P. 52(b), which used that term instead of “plain”.M.R.C.P.61providesthaterror“whichdoesnotaffectthesubstantialrightsoftheparties”mustbedisregarded.19TherearenumerouscasesinbothMaine

18Nowsubdivision(e)ofFederalRule103.19M.R.Civ.P.61nolongercontainsthequotedlanguage.

23

and federal courts in which the “obvious” or “plain” error rule has beeninvoked. There appears to be no difference in treatment by reason of thedifference in wording. The power is exercised cautiously and only whennecessarytopreventaclearmiscarriageof justice.Statev.Chaplin,308A.2d873(Me.1973).

AdvisoryCommitteeNote(April1,1998amendment)

This amendment [adding sub-§ (c)]20 is proposed to conform MaineRule103toa1997amendmentofthefederalcounterpart.Itisbelievedthatthisamendmentdoesnotchangeexisting law. SeeField andMurray,MaineEvidence(4thed.)§103.7atp.26,Statev.Knight,623A.2d[1293](Me.1993).

RULE104.PRELIMINARYQUESTIONS

(a) In general. The court must decide any preliminary question about

whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence isadmissible.

(b) Relevance that depends on a fact. When the relevance of evidence

dependsonwhetherafactexists,proofmustbeintroducedsufficienttosupport a finding that the fact does exist. The court may admit theproposedevidenceontheconditionthattheproofbeintroducedlater.

(c) Conductingahearingsothatthejurycannothearit.Thecourtmust

conductanyhearingonapreliminaryquestionso that the jurycannothearitif:

(1) Thehearinginvolvestheadmissibilityofaconfession;

(2) Adefendantinacriminalcaseisawitnessandsorequests;or

(3) Justicesorequires.

20Nowsubsection(e).

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(d) Cross-examiningadefendant ina criminal case. By testifyingonapreliminary question, a defendant in a criminal case does not becomesubjecttocross-examinationonotherissuesinthecase.

(e) Evidencerelevanttoweightandcredibility.Thisruledoesnotlimit

aparty’s right to introducebefore the juryevidence that is relevant totheweightorcredibilityofotherevidence.


Current Maine Rule 104 is slightly different from its former Federalcounterpart.FederalRule104(b)hasbeenrestyledtomakeitverysimilartoMaine Rule 104(b). The language regarding applicability of the rules ofevidenceinpreliminarydeterminationshasbeeneliminatedfromRule104(a)aspartoftherestylingprocesstoreflectthattheproposednewRule101setsforthallprovisionsregardingtheapplicabilityoftheRules.MaineRule104(a)previously included a reference to the inapplicability of the Rules onpreliminaryquestionsotherthanthosearisinginconnectionwithMotionstoSuppress“andthelike.”ThereisnoexpressreferencetoMotionstoSuppressintheproposedrevisedRule101asitwasthedeterminationoftheAdvisoryCommittee that Motions to Supress, which generally consider whetherevidencewasobtainedillegallysuchasinviolationofaperson’sconstitutionalrights, are not preliminary determinations of admissibility under Rule 104.Under the revised language and consistentwithwell-settledMaine law andpractice, the Maine Rules of Evidence will continue to apply duringevidentiaryhearingsonsuchmotions.


ThelanguageofRule104hasbeenamendedaspartoftherestylingoftheEvidenceRulestomakethemmoreeasilyunderstoodandtomakestyleandterminologyconsistentthroughouttherules. Thesechangesareintendedtobe stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling onevidenceadmissibility.

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25

Advisers’NotetoformerM.R.Evid.104

(February2,1976)

Subdivision (a) incorporates acceptedMaine practice indeclaring thatpreliminary questions of admissibility are for the court. The rule that thecourt is not bound by the rules of evidence in the determination of apreliminary question is made subject to one exception which requires therules to be followed in hearings on motions to suppress evidence and thelike.21 Thisexceptionisnot intheFederalRule. TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt has upheld the use of inadmissible hearsay on a motion to suppressevidence, supporting the proposition that the use of such out-of-courtstatements does not offend the defendant’s constitutional right ofconfrontationundertheSixthAmendmentandthedueprocessclause.UnitedStatesv.Matlock,415U.S.164,94S.Ct.988(1974).However,whenthereisaseriousfactualdisputeonanissuewhichmaybedecisiveofthecase,asonamotion to suppress, common fairness requires that the witness be presentandsubjecttocross-examinationundertherulesofevidence.Thewords“andthe like” are intended to embrace other questions, such as identification,where therightsofacriminaldefendantmaybeseriously jeopardized if theissueisdeterminedwithoutopportunityforcross-examinationofthewitnesswithknowledgeofthefacts.22Itshouldbenotedthatastatementmadebyapersonoutofcourtwhichisrelieduponbythewitnessindoingcertainacts,suchas search for evidence, isnothearsay since it isnot introduced for thetruth of the matter asserted. Rather it is evidence of the information thewitnesspossessedandthereforeofprobablecause.Apartfromthis,theruleisthat generally prevailing in Maine and elsewhere. There are numerouspreliminaryquestionswhichthecourthasalwaysdeterminedwithoutbeingboundbytherulesofevidence.Examplesarequestionsinvolvingexceptionstothehearsayrule,suchaswhetherconductisintendedasassertive,whethera statement was made for diagnostic purposes, whether a document is abusinessrecord,andwhetheradeclarantisunavailable.Thereisnoreasonto

21 The language that this part of the Advisers’ Note references has been removed fromRule104(a).TherulethattheRulesofEvidencedonotapplyindeterminationsofpreliminaryquestionshas beenmoved to Rule 101(b)(1), and the Restyling Note discusses that the “exception to theexception”stillappliesformotionstosuppress.22ThislanguageisnolongerpresentintheRules,but,astheRestylingNotetoRule101states,

the“exceptiontotheexception”rulehasnotchangedsimplybecauseoftherestyling.

26

alter this practice. Theexceptionwith respect toprivileges,which is in theFederal Rule, means that a privilege may not be violated in a preliminaryhearingtodeterminewhetherornotitexists. Subdivision(b)isinaccordwithMainelaw.Itdealswiththeproblemofconditional relevancy. When Item A and Item B considered separately areeachirrelevantinabsenceofproofoftheother,arelevancyobjectionmaybeinterposed to whichever one is offered first. But a party must startsomewhere. This rule requires the proponent merely to bring forwardevidence from which the truth of Item A could be found, upon therepresentation that evidence of Item B will be offered. Evidence of theconditionallyrelevantItemBcanthenbeshown.Thedisputeastothetruthofeachisultimatelyforthejuryratherthanthejudge.Buttheorderofproofis,asgenerally, for the judge. Rule611(a). Hecandecidewhether tohearevidenceof ItemAorof ItemB first. Hemay take into account the relativeprejudiceofhaving the juryhearone rather than theother if theproponentfailstoofferevidenceofoneofthemsufficienttowarrantafindingofitstruth.Whicheveroneheelectstohearfirstwillbeadmittedconditionallyor,inthetraditionalphraseology,debene. If theproponent fails tomakegoodonhisrepresentationtooffersufficientevidenceoftheseconditem,theevidenceofthefirstwillonmotionbestrickenandthejuryinstructedtodisregardit.SeeLipmanBros.v.HartfordAcc.&Indem.Co.,149Me.199,209ff.,100A.2d246,252ff.(1953).Itistheobligationofopposingcounseltomakethemotiontostrike.TheFederalRulehasnoprovisionaboutdiscretiontoadmitevidenceconditionally.23Thereasonforincludingitistomakeitcompletelyclearthatthe court’s control of the order of proof, as provided in Rule 611 (a), ispreserved. Subdivision (c) considers when preliminary questions should beconductedoutofthehearingofthe jury. Inacriminalcaseahearingontheadmissibilityofaconfessionisconstitutionallyrequiredtobeconductedoutofthejury’shearing.Jacksonv.Denno,378U.S.368,84S.Ct.1774(1964).TheSupremeCourthas alsoheld as a constitutionalmatter that theprosecutionmustatthepreliminaryhearingestablishvoluntarinessoftheconfessionbyapreponderanceof the evidence. Legov.Twomey,404U.S. 477,92S.Ct. 619(1972). The Law Court has gone beyond this minimum constitutionalstandard and required that the judge at the preliminary hearing determine

23Thisisnolongeraccurate,asFederalRule104(b)hasthesamelanguageastheMaineRule.

27

voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620(Me.1972). Onotherpreliminarymattersthejudgehasdiscretiontodecidewhethertheinterestsofjusticerequirethehearingtobeintheabsenceofthejury.ThisistheacceptedMainepractice.Inacriminalcasewhenanaccusedis a witness, he is entitled on request to have any preliminary hearingconductedoutofthejury’shearing. Subdivision (d) allows an accused in a criminal case to testify on apreliminarymatter,suchasamotiontosuppressevidence,withoutexposinghimselftogeneralcross-examination.TherearenoMainecasesonthepoint.The rule does not address itself to the question of subsequent use oftestimonygivenbyanaccusedonapreliminaryhearing. Asaconstitutionalmatter,however,suchtestimonycannotbeusedatthetrialasevidenceofhisguilt.Simmonsv.UnitedStates,390U.S.377,88S.Ct.967(1968).

RULE105.LIMITINGEVIDENCETHATISNOTADMISSIBLEAGAINST

OTHERPARTIESORFOROTHERPURPOSESIf the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for apurpose—butnotagainstanotherpartyorforanotherpurpose—thecourt,ontimelyrequest,mustrestricttheevidencetoitsproperscopeandinstructthejuryaccordingly.In a criminal case tried to a jury, evidence inadmissible as toonedefendantmust not be admitted as to other defendants unless all references to thedefendantastowhomitisinadmissiblehavebeeneffectivelydeleted.


The language of the first sentence of Maine Rule 105 is identical toFederalRule105.Maine’ssecondsentenceistoimplementMaine’sversionofthe holding inBruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968), which hasbeencarriedoverintotherestyledRules.


ThelanguageofRule105hasbeenamendedaspartoftherestylingoftheEvidenceRules tomake themmoreeasilyunderstoodand tomakestyleandterminologyconsistentthroughouttherules.Thesechangesareintended

28

tobestylisticonly. There isno intent tochangeanyresult inanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility.

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Thisruleacceptsforcivilcasesthelong-standingpracticeofinstructingthejurytoconsiderevidenceonlyonaparticularissueorwithreferencetoaparticular party even though it has an obvious and perhaps a highlyprejudicialbearingonsomeotherissueorparty.Incriminalcases,however,the ineffectivenessof such a limiting instruction is recognized. InBrutonv.United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968), the Court held that theconstitutional rightofconfrontation forbids theuse ina joint trialofanoralconfession of one codefendant expressly implicating the other when theconfessingcodefendantdoesnottakethestandandsubjecthimselftocross-examination. TheCourtconcludedthata jurywouldbeunabletoputoutofmind “powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant.”LongbeforeBruton,M.R.Crim.P.1424authorizedseverancewhenitappearedthatadefendantmightbeprejudicedbyajointtrial.Brutonemphasizesthatthis potential for prejudice has constitutional force. The rule thereforecompelsthestatetochoosebetweenseveranceandforegoinguseofevidenceadmissibleastofewerthanalldefendants,withthesinglequalificationthatastatementmay be admitted in a joint trial if all references to the defendantagainst whom it is inadmissible have been effectively deleted. ThisqualificationisrecognizedinMaine. Statev.Wing,294A.2d418(Me.1972).Itwill often be apparent that effective deletion is impossible, inwhich caseseverancewillbenecessary. The last sentence is not in the Federal Rule. For the reasons alreadystated,itsinclusionseemscalledforbyproperrespectfortheBrutonrule.

RULE106.REMAINDEROFORRELATEDWRITINGSORRECORDEDSTATEMENTS

If apartyutilizes in court all orpartof awritingor recorded statement, anadversepartymayrequiretheintroduction,atthattime,ofanyotherpart—or

24NowM.R.Crim.P.8(d).

29

any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to beconsideredatthetime.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] MaineRule106isalittlebroaderthanitsfederalcounterpart,inthatitauthorizestheintroductioninevidenceofawritingorotherpartsofawritingthatis“utilized”incourt,notjustadmitted.Thisistoallowapartytoattemptto counteract potentially incomplete ormisleading handling or reference towritingsincourteveniftheyarenotformallyofferedinevidence.SeeMaineAdvisers’Note toRule106. This policy choicehasbeen carriedover in therestyledRule.



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This rule codifies the familiar principle of “completeness”, which is

already embodied in M.R.C.P. 32(a)(4) as to depositions. Its purpose is toenable the court to correct the misleading impression created by takingmattersoutofcontext.Itappliestowritingsandrecordedstatementsbutnotto conversations. When part of a writing or recording is introduced, anadversepartyhastherighttoinspectitandmovethatanyotherpartbeputinevidence immediately after the incomplete portion has been introduced, sothat its impactwill notbe lessenedby thedelay. The courtobviouslyhas alargemeasure of discretion in determiningwhat in fairness should thus becontemporaneouslyconsidered.Thewords“utilizedincourt”aredesignedtopermit thesameprocedurewhenawriting issilentonapointaswhen it iscontrarytothetestimonyofawitnessonthestand.Aconcessiondrawnfromawitnessthathiswrittenstatementdoesnot includeacertainthingmaybejust as misleading as introduction of a part of a statement contrary to his

30

testimony. TheFederalRuleuses “introduced” insteadof “utilized in court”andthusdoesnotprotectagainstthemisleadingeffectwhichmayresultfromtheuseofastatementwithoutitsintroductioninevidence.

ARTICLEII.JUDICIALNOTICE

RULE201.JUDICIALNOTICEOFADJUDICATIVEFACTS

(a) Scope.Thisrulegovernsjudicialnoticeofanadjudicativefactonly,not

alegislativefact.(b) Kinds of facts that may be judicially noticed. The court may

judiciallynoticeafactthatisnotsubjecttoreasonabledisputebecauseit:

(1) Isgenerallyknownwithinthetrialcourt’sterritorialjurisdiction;

or

(2) Can be accurately and readily determined from sources whoseaccuracycannotreasonablybequestioned.

(c) Takingnotice.Thecourt:

(1) Maytakejudicialnoticeonitsown;or

(2) Must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court issuppliedwiththenecessaryinformation.

(d) Timing.Thecourtmaytakejudicialnoticeatanystageofthe

proceeding.(e) Opportunity tobeheard. Ontimelyrequest,apartyisentitledtobe

heardontheproprietyoftakingjudicialnoticeandthenatureofthefacttobenoticed.Ifthecourttakesjudicialnoticebeforenotifyingaparty,theparty,onrequest,isstillentitledtobeheard.

(f) Instructing the jury. The court must instruct the jury to accept the

noticedfactasconclusive.

31

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] Maine Rule 201 is similar, but not identical to Federal Rule 201. InMainethereisnodistinctionbetweencivilandcriminalcasesintheeffectofjudicialnotice.Inbothcasesthecourtinstructsthejurythatthefactnoticedshould be accepted as conclusive. This policy choice has been carried overinto the restyled Rule. See also 16 M.R.S. §§ 401-406 (addressing judicialnoticeoflawsofotherjurisdictions).



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This rule applies only to judicial notice of “adjudicative facts” as

distinguished from “legislative facts”, a distinction which has caused someconfusion. Anadjudicative fact is the “what-happened”, “who-did-what-and-when”kindofquestion thatnormallygoes toa jury. It seemsreasonable torequire,astheruledoes,thatajudiciallynoticedadjudicativefactmustbeonenotsubjecttoreasonabledispute.Legislativefactsarethoseacourttakesintoaccount indetermining theconstitutionalityor interpretationofastatuteorthe extension or restriction of a common law rule upon grounds of policy.They will often hinge on social, economic, or political facts not generallyknownby intelligent people or readily determinable by resort to sources ofunquestioned accuracy. Subdivision (a) excludes legislative facts from theoperationoftherule.

Subdivision (b) in stating the kinds of facts which can be judiciallynoticedisinaccordwithMainecaselaw.Torreyv.CongressSquareHotelCo.,145 Me. 234, 242, 75 A.2d 451, 457 (1950). There are many Maine casesallowing judicialnoticeof factscapableofaccurateandreadydeterminationby resort to sourceswhose accuracy cannot reasonablybequestioned. See,

32

e.g.,FirstNationalBankv.Kingsley,84Me.111,24A.794(1891)(uponwhatdayoftheweekacertaindayofthemonthfalls). Subdivisions (c) and (d)25 permit the court to take judicial noticewithout request and require proper judicial notice to be taken on request.Taking judicialnoticewithoutrequestreflectsexistingMainepractice,anditseemsreasonabletorequireitinappropriatecasesonrequestofaparty. Subdivisions (e), (f), and (g)26 explain the procedural mechanics ofjudicial notice. As amatter of fairness, it assures a party of the right to beheardinoppositiontothetakingofjudicialnotice.Atthehearinghecanofferevidenceandargumentthatthematterisreasonablysubjecttodispute.Ifhefails to convince the trial judge, his only remedy is by appeal. He cannotpresent contrary evidence to the jury because by hypothesis facts can bejudiciallynoticedonlyiftheyarenotsubjecttoreasonabledispute.Thecourtmust instruct the jury to accept as establishedany judiciallynoticed fact. Itwouldbeabsurdtoallowjurorstoconsider,forexample,onthebasisoftheirindividualrecollectionorspeculation,whetherDecember4,1972,actuallyfellonaMondayasthecourthadinstructedthem. Theruledoesnotdistinguishbetweencivilandcriminalcases.Mostofthecriminalcasesdealwithmattersofjurisdictionorvenue.Statev.Bennett,158Me.109,116,179A.2d 812,816 (1962) (judicialnotice thatHope is inKnoxCounty).Buttherule isnotsolimited.Theconstitutionalrighttotrialbyjurydoesnotextendtomatterswhicharebeyondreasonabledispute.Forinstance, the LawCourt has taken judicial notice that alcohol is intoxicatingandoverruledanexceptionbasedonlackofproofofthatfact.Statev.Kelley,129Me.8,149A.153(1930). Finally, this rule has nothing to dowith judicial notice of foreign law,whichiscoveredby16M.R.S.A.§§401–406andM.R.C.P.44A.

25Nowonlysubdivision(c).26Nowsubdivisions(d),(e),and(f).

33

TheFederalRuleaddsasentenceinsubdivision(g)27thatinacriminalcasethecourtshallinstructthejurythatitmay,butisnotrequiredto,acceptasconclusiveanyfact judiciallynoted.Sincejudicialnoticeis limitedtofactsnot subject to reasonable dispute, there is no reason for not making itmandatoryincriminalaswellasincivilcases.Itwouldbeabsurdinacriminalcaseasinacivilactiontoallowjurorstoquestiontheaccuracyofthecourt’sinstructionastowhatdayoftheweekDecember4,1972,actuallywas. It isessential tobear inmind thatresort to judicialnotice inanycase,civilorcriminal,ispermissibleonlyifthejudiciallynoticedfactisnotsubjecttoreasonabledispute.Thecourtmustnotacceptassufficienttheabsenceofactual dispute over, for example, a scientific conclusion found in a text ortreatise.Suchamisuseofjudicialnoticewoulddepriveacriminaldefendantofhisconstitutionalrighttojurytrial.

ARTICLEIII.PRESUMPTIONS

RULE301.PRESUMPTIONSINCIVILCASESGENERALLY(a) Effect.Inacivilcase,unlessastatuteortheserulesprovideotherwise,

the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden ofproving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probablethanitsexistence.

(b) Primafacieevidence. Astatuteprovidingthatafactorgroupoffacts

isprimafacieevidenceofanotherfactestablishesapresumptionwithinthemeaningofthisrule.

(c) Conflicting presumptions. If two presumptions conflict with each

other, the court must apply the presumption that is more stronglysupportedbypolicyandlogic.Ifneitherpresumptionismorestronglysupportedbypolicyandlogic,bothpresumptionsmustbedisregarded.


Maine Rule 301 is quite different from Federal Rule 301, in that theeffectofapresumptionisdifferentandthereareadditionalprovisionsdealing

27Nowsubdivision(f).

34

with the phrase “prima facie evidence” and conflicting presumptions. Theproposed restyled Rule attempts to retain these distinctions in restyledformatandlanguage.



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The problems in dealingwith presumptions are complex and difficult.

First of all, the term has been used in very different senses by courts andlegislatures. Thegenerallyprevailingviewamong the commentators is thatthe word presumption should be reserved for the convention that when adesignated fact called thebasic fact exists, another fact called the presumedfactmust be taken to exist in the absence of adequate rebuttal. It has thatmeaning in this rule. Laymen, and courts as well, frequently use it as asynonym for “inference” (“Dr. Livingston, I presume”), amatter of logic andexperience,notoflaw.Thetrieroffactisfreetoadoptorrejecttheinference.The phrase “conclusive presumption” is not a presumption in any usefulsense,butaruleoflawthatifonefact,thebasicfact,isproved,noonewillbeheard tosay that another fact, thepresumed fact,doesnot exist. Nor is the“presumptionof innocence”incriminalcasesreallyapresumptionatall,butratheraforcefulwayofsayingthattheprosecutionmustproveguiltbeyondareasonable doubt and that there is tobeno inferenceagainst thedefendantbecauseofhisarrest,indictment,orpresenceinthedock.

Givingpresumptionthemeaningstated,iftheonlyevidencerelatestoB,the basic fact, it is universally conceded that when B is established, P, thepresumedfact,hastobetakenastrue.ThetroublebeginswhenevidencethatPisnottrueisintroduced.Oneview,stillfollowedinthemajorityofstates,isthat the presumption places on the party against whom it is directed theburden of going forwardwith evidence but thatwhen there is testimony to

35

supporta findingof thenonexistenceof thepresumed fact, thepresumptiondisappearslikeaburstingbubbleandthecaseproceedsasthoughthereneverhad been a presumption. Another view is that the presumption continuesdespitecontradictoryevidence,andtheburdenofpersuasionisshiftedsothatthe party against whom the presumption is directed must show that thenonexistenceofthepresumedfactismoreprobablethanitsexistence. Thisruleadoptsforcivilactionsthesecondoftheseviewsandshiftstheburden of persuasion to the party againstwhom the presumption operates.ThisisachangeinMainelawasenunciatedinthelandmarkopinionbyJusticeWebberinHindsv.JohnHancockMut.LifeIns.Co.,155Me.349,155A.2d721(1959), where the Law Court took the position that a presumption persists“until the contrary evidence persuades the factfinder that the balance ofprobabilitiesisinequilibrium,or,statedotherwise,untiltheevidencesatisfiesthe jury or factfinder that it is as probable that the presumed fact does notexist as that it does exist.” The Hinds rule appears to have worked withreasonable satisfaction, but there have been difficulties in explaining to thejury the conceptofprobabilitiesbeing in equilibrium. Moreover, it involvesthelogicalimpossibilityoftreatingapresumptionasevidencetobebalancedagainstotherevidencewhenitisnotevidenceatallbutaruleaboutevidence.ThedifficultieswiththeHindsruleareenhancedbecauseitdoesnottakeintoaccount the different types of presumptions. Most presumptions aregroundeduponaninference;thatis,adeductionoffactthatmaylogicallyandreasonablybedrawn fromanother fact or groupof facts. Evidenceof theseunderlyingfactscanbebalancedagainstevidenceofcontraryfacts. It isnothelpful, however, to say that the presumption persists to the point ofequilibrium. On the other hand, some presumptions are not based uponrationalinferencebutarecreatedtoreflectadesirablepolicy.Anexampleisthepresumptionthatgoodsreceivedbytheterminalcarrierwereinthesameconditionas,whendeliveredtotheinitialcarrier. SeeRossv.MaineCentralR.R.,114Me.287,96A.223(1915).Herethereisnothingtobalanceagainstevidencethatthegoodscametothelastcarrierindamagedcondition,andtheHindsruleisparticularlyill-adaptedtothissituation. TheFederalRulelimitstheeffectofapresumptiontofixingtheburdenof going forward, so that the presumption disappears when evidence isintroduced which would support a contrary finding. Thus the offering oftestimony which no one in the courtroom believes serves to drop the

36

presumption out of the case. This gives too little weight to presumptions,especiallythosenotbasedonrationalinference.28 Inshiftingtheburdenofpersuasionthisrulehasthemeritofmakingitunnecessary for the court ever to mention the presumption and making itpossibletochargethejuryintermswhichitcanreadilyunderstand.Itmaybethought to give too great an effect to some presumptions, but this seemspreferable to thealternativeofgiving too littleweight. Inmaking itschoicetheCourthasadoptedtheruleoriginallypromulgatedbytheSupremeCourtand incorporated in the newly approved Uniform State Law. It was alsolookeduponwithfavorinJusticeWebber’sopinionwhichfinallysettledupontheHindsRule. It should be noted that the rule preserves any statute giving apresumptionadifferent effect. One such statute is theUniformCommercialCode, 11 M.R.S.A. §1-201(31),29 which defines a presumption in termsaffectingonlytheburdenofgoingforward. There are numerous statutes which state that one fact is prima facieevidenceof another fact. Thepurpose of subdivision (b) is tomake it clearthatsuchastatutecreatesapresumptionwithinthemeaningofthisruleinacivilcase.Rule303(a)istothesameeffectinacriminalcase. Subdivision (c) is designed to resolve the impasse when the court isconfrontedbyinconsistentpresumptions.Itdirectstheapplicationoftheonefoundeduponweightierconsiderationsofpolicy.Ifpolicyconsiderationsareof equalweight, both presumptions are to be disregarded. Thewording istaken from the Uniform Rules of Evidence approved in 1953 by theCommissionersonUniformStateLaws. Theprincipalclassofcasesinwhichtheproblemhasariseniswhererightsareassertedunderasecondmarriagebutnodirectevidenceisavailableofadeathordivorceterminatingthefirstmarriagebeforethesecond.Mostcourtssaythepresumptionofinnocenceor

28Thisisnolongeraccurate,lookingatthelanguageofFederalRule301andits1974Note.29 This statute has been repealed. 11M.R.S. § 1-1206 (2014) provides that, when the UCC

createsapresumption,“thetrieroffactmustfindtheexistenceofthefactunlessanduntilevidenceisintroducedthatsupportsafindingofitsnonexistence.”

37

ofthevalidityofamarriageisstrongerthanthepresumptionofcontinuanceoflifeorcontinuanceofmarriage.

RULE302.PRESUMPTIONOFLEGITIMACYA child conceived by or born to a woman while she is lawfully married ispresumedtobethechildofthewomanandherspouseunlessthecontraryisestablishedbyproofbeyondareasonabledoubt.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] Maine’sversionofRule302isentirelydifferentfromFederalRule302,which is not necessary inMaine. The restyled Rule attempts to restate theMaineRuleinmoresuccincttermsthatresonatewiththecriminalburdenofproofonwhich it isbased. There issomequestionaboutwhether thisRulecontinues to be necessary or appropriate in view of current developmentsthatpermitquickandeasydeterminationofbiologicalparentage.

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This rule gives separate treatment to the presumption of legitimacy.

Proofbeyonda reasonabledoubt is required, for reasonsof socialpolicy, torebut thispresumption. Therulehad itsorigin inbastardyproceedingsbutthepolicyisequallyapplicableinanyactioninvolvinglegitimacy.

FederalRule302dealswiththeeffectofapresumptioninacasewherestatelawsuppliestheruleofdecision,typicallyadiversityofcitizenshipcase.Itobviouslyhasnoplaceinastatecodeofevidence.

RULE303.PRESUMPTIONSINCRIMINALCASES

(a) Scope. Thisrulegovernstheapplicationofstatutoryandcommonlawpresumptions, including statutory provisions that certain facts areprimafacieevidenceofotherfactsorofguiltincriminalcases.

(b) Submission to jury. The court may not direct a verdict against anaccused based on a presumption or statutory provisions that certainfactsareprimafacieevidenceofotherfactsorofguilt. Thecourtmay

38

permitajurytoinferguiltorafactrelevanttoguiltbasedonastatutoryorcommonlawpresumptionorprimafacieevidence,iftheevidenceasawholesupportsguiltbeyondareasonabledoubt.

(c) Instructing the jury. Whenever the existence of a presumed factagainsttheaccusedissubmittedtothejury,thecourtininstructingthejuryshouldavoidchargingintermsofapresumption.Thechargemustinclude an instruction that the jurorsmaydrawreasonable inferencesfrom facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt and may convict theaccusedinrelianceuponaninferenceoffactiftheyconcludethatsuchinferenceisvalidandif theinferenceconvincesthemofguiltbeyondareasonabledoubtandnototherwise.


The Federal Rules of Evidence do not deal with presumptions in thecontext of criminal cases. The Maine Rule has been restyled in accordancewiththefederalrestylingformat.

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Subdivision (a) makes it clear that Maine statutes using the phrase“prima facie evidence” or “prima facie proof” will be regarded as creatingpresumptionswithinthemeaningofthisrule. Subdivision (b) recognizes thatpresumptions in criminalprosecutionsposeproblemsnot involvedincivilcases. Sinceaverdictofguiltycanneverbedirected,itfollowsthatthecourtcannotdirectthejurytofindapresumedfact against the accused as to any element of the offense. The use of apresumption cannot take away from the jury any evidentiary issue, and thecourtcansubmittheexistenceofthepresumedfacttothejuryonlyifthejurycouldfindguiltorthepresumedfactbeyondareasonabledoubtbasedontheevidence as awhole. This substantially reflectsMaine law. State v. O’Clair,256A.2d839(Me.1969). Subdivision (c) incorporates the recommendation of the LawCourt inState v. Poulin, 277 A.2d 493 (Me. 1971), that the trial judge should avoid

39

charging the jury in terms of a presumption, which was thought to beconfusing. It refers instead to the right todraw reasonable inferences fromfactsprovedbeyondareasonabledoubt,butmakesitclearthatthejurorsarenot required to accept thepresumed fact. Inotherwords, the presumptioncannotbemadeconclusive.30

ARTICLEIV.RELEVANCEANDITSLIMITS

RULE401.TESTFORRELEVANTEVIDENCE

Evidenceisrelevantif:(a) Ithasanytendencytomakeafactmoreorlessprobablethanitwould

bewithouttheevidence;and(b) Thefactisofconsequenceindeterminingtheaction.


MaineRule 401 and Federal Rule 401 are substantively identical, andtherefore the Advisory Committee recommends adoption of the language ofthe restyled Federal Rule. The restyled Rule breaks out the concepts ofclassicalrelevanceandmaterialityintwosubsections.



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30Thecurrentstateofthelawregardinguseofpresumptionsorinferencesincriminalcasesis

addressedinAlexander,MaineJuryInstructionManual,§6-13at6-23(2014ed.).

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This rule states traditional Maine law. See, e.g., Perlin v. Rosen,131Me.481,483,164A.625,626(1933).Theruledoesnotdefinerelevancyintermsofmateriality. Relevantevidenceisdefinedasmeaningevidenceofanyfactofconsequencetothedeterminationoftheaction.Materialitylookstotherelationbetweenthepropositionforwhichtheevidenceisofferedandtheissuesinthecase.Ifthepropositionisnotprobativeofamatterinissue,itis immaterial. If the proposition is material, evidence whichmakes it moreprobablethanitwouldbewithouttheevidenceisrelevantevidence.Nothingwould be gained by including in the rule any reference tomateriality. TheSupremeCourtpromulgatedtheruleinthisformandtheAdvisoryCommitteeNote said that the language “has the advantageof avoiding the looselyusedword`material.’”

RULE402.GENERALADMISSIBILITYOFRELEVANTEVIDENCE

Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following providesotherwise:• Afederalorstatestatute;• Theserules;or• Otherrulesapplicableinthecourtsofthisstate.Irrelevantevidenceisnotadmissible.


There are slight differences in language between the Maine and theFederalRules. TheFederalRule lists thevariousothersourcesofauthority.The existing and the restyled Maine versions merely make reference tostatutes and “other rules applicable in the courts of this state,” which isintendedtocoverconstitutionalrules.


ThelanguageofRule402hasbeenamendedaspartoftherestylingoftheEvidenceRules tomake themmoreeasilyunderstoodand tomakestyle

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andterminologyconsistentthroughouttherules.Thesechangesareintendedtobestylisticonly. There isno intent tochangeanyresult inanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility.

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ThegeneralrulethatallrelevantevidenceisadmissibleisdeclaratoryofMaine law. See, e.g., McCully v. Bessey, 142Me. 209, 49 A.2d 230 (1946);Turgeon v. Lewiston Urban Renewal Authority, 239 A.2d 173 (Me. 1968).These cases and many others emphasize the extent of the trial judge’sdiscretion.Theexceptionsmakeitclear,however,thatrelevantevidencemaybeexcludedbyreasonofastatuteorarule.Highlyrelevantevidencemaybeexcluded by rules based on policy considerations, such as rules of privilegeandrulesagainsthearsay.Examplesofconstitutionallimitationsareevidenceagainstanaccusedobtainedbyunlawfulsearchandseizureandincriminatingstatements elicited in violation of his right to counsel. These limitationswould be binding even if not stated in the rules. They are included for thesakeofclarity.

RULE403.EXCLUDINGRELEVANTEVIDENCEFORPREJUDICE,

CONFUSION,WASTEOFTIME,OROTHERREASONSThecourtmayexcluderelevantevidenceifitsprobativevalueissubstantiallyoutweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, orneedlesslypresentingcumulativeevidence.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] MaineRule 403 and Federal Rule 403 are substantively identical, andtherefore the Advisory Committee recommends adoption of the language oftherestyledFederalRule.

FederalAdvisoryCommitteeNote ThelanguageofRule403hasbeenamendedaspartoftherestylingoftheEvidenceRules tomake themmoreeasilyunderstoodand tomakestyle

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andterminologyconsistentthroughouttherules.Thesechangesareintendedtobestylisticonly. There isno intent tochangeanyresult inanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility.

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This rule reflects Maine law. See e.g., State v. Berube, 297 A.2d 884(Me.1972). Thetrial judgehasbroaddiscretionindeterminingwhethertheprobativevalueof evidence is outweighedby the riskofunfair prejudiceorconfusionofissuesorbysheerwasteoftime.

RULE404.CHARACTEREVIDENCE;CRIMESOROTHERACTS(a) Characterevidence.

(1) Prohibited uses. Evidence of a person’s character or charactertrait isnot admissible toprove thaton aparticularoccasion thepersonactedinaccordancewiththecharacterortrait.

(2) Exception for a defendant in a criminal case. A defendant may

offer evidence of the defendant’s pertinent trait, and if theevidenceisadmitted,theprosecutormayofferevidencetorebutit.

(3) Exceptionsforawitness.Evidenceofawitness’scharactermaybe

admittedunderRules607,608,and609.

(b) Crimes,wrongs,orotheracts. Evidenceof a crime,wrong, orotheractisnotadmissibletoproveaperson’scharacterinordertoshowthaton a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with thecharacter.


Maine Rule 404 differs in some respects from its federal counterpart.TheMaineRuledoesnot includeanyexceptionforevidenceofthecharacterofavictiminacriminalcase,orpermittingtheprosecutiontouseevidenceof

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thedefendant’scharactertorebutit. TheMaineRulealsodoesnotspelloutthegroundsforlimitedadmissibilityofevidenceofotherwrongsunderRule404(b). Thisdoesnotmean thatsuchevidence isnotadmissible for limited“non-character” purposes. However, the Maine Rule does not list somepermissible non-character uses lest it be inferred that these are the onlynon-character purposes for which the evidence may be admitted. ThesedifferenceshavebeenmaintainedintherestyledRule.



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This rule dealswith the use of character evidence for the purpose of

provingthatapersonactedinconformitywithitonaparticularoccasion.Theseparatequestionofthemethodofproof,onceitisestablishedthatcharacterevidence in some form is admissible, is dealt with in Rule 405, and if thecharacteristhatofawitnessinRules608to610.

Subdivision (a) states the general rule that character evidence is notadmissible for thispurpose. ThishasbeenMaine law sincePotter v.Webb,6Me.14(1829), incivil cases. It isequallyclear that thestate inacriminalactioncannotintroduceinitiallyevidenceofthebadcharacteroftheaccused.Statev.Tozier,49Me.404(1862).Thisruleisnotbasedonlackofrelevancybutratherbecausethedangerofprejudice(“he’sabadman,soheisprobablyguilty”)outweighstheprobativevalue. Exception(1)31appliesonlytocriminalcases.Anaccusedisallowedtoproduceevidenceofhisgoodcharacter,butthestatemaythenrebutit.Statev.Tozier,supra.

31Thisexceptionisnowat(a)(2).

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Exception (2)32 simply refers to Rules 607 to 609, which deal withevidenceofthecharacterofawitnesstoimpeachhiscredibility. The rule does not include an exception allowing an accused to offerevidenceofapertinenttraitofthecharacterofthevictimofacrimeasproofthatheactedinconformitytherewithontheoccasioninquestion.Exampleswouldbecharacterevidencetosupportaclaimofself-defensetoahomicidechargeorconsent inacaseof rape. TheFederalRule allowssuchevidence,but it is omitted from this rule because it has slight probative value and islikely to be highly prejudicial, so as to divert attention from what actuallyoccurred. Absenceof thisexceptionmaychangeMaine law; it isunclear. Itshould be noted that this rule does not keep out the victim’s reputation forviolence,provedtohavebeenknowntotheaccusedbeforetheevent,forthepurposeofshowinghisreasonableapprehensionofimmediatedanger. Subdivision (b) deals with evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.Such evidence is not admissible to prove character in order to show that apersonacted inconformity therewith. Thesubdivisiondoesnotexclude theevidence when offered for another purpose, such as proof of motive,opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence ofmistake or accident. Maine law is in accord. State v. Aubut, 261 A.2d 48(Me.1970)(evidenceofattempttoutterforgedinstrumentofsametenoronsame day admissible to show knowledge of forgery); State v. Wyman,270A.2d460(Me.1970)(evidenceofothercrimeofpreciselysimilarnatureadmissible to show intent; jury must be carefully instructed as to limitedpurpose).

RULE405.METHODSOFPROVINGCHARACTER(a) By reputation. When evidence of a person’s character or character

trait is admissible, itmay be proved by testimony about the person’sreputation. On cross-examination of the character witness, the courtmay allow an inquiry into relevant specific instances of the person’sconduct.

32Thisexceptionisnowat(a)(3).

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(b) By specific instances of conduct. When a person’s character orcharactertraitisanessentialelementofacharge,claim,ordefense,thecharacteror traitmayalsobeprovedby relevant specific instancesoftheperson’sconduct.


Existing Maine Rule 405 permits proof of character evidence only byreputation.ThissubstantivedifferencebetweentheMaineandFederalRulesismaintainedintherestyledRule.



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This rule covers the allowable methods of proving character once

character evidence has become admissible under Rule 404. Proof may bemade by testimony of reputation. This is in accord with Maine law. SeePhillipsv.Kingfield,19Me.375(1841);Blissv.Shuman,47Me.248(1859);Statev.Morse,67Me.428(1877).

TheruledoesnotfollowtheFederalRuleinallowingproofofcharacterby the opinion of a witness. There is some justification for that approach,since the jury is likely to think that awitnesswho says that thedefendant’sreputationisgoodisinfactvouchingforhim.Thereis,however,theriskthatwholesale allowance of opinion testimonywould tend to turn a trial into aswearingcontestbetweenconflictingcharacterwitnesses.

Thelastsentenceofsubdivision(a)allowsinquiryoncross-examinationinto relevant specific instances of conduct. Inquiry of a character witness,

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“Haveyouheard . . .”ofacertaineventwaspermitted in the leadingcaseofMichelsonv.UnitedStates,335U.S.469,69S.Ct.213(1948),inwhichthetrialcourtguardedthepracticefrommisusebyascertainingoutofthepresenceofthe jury that the question related to an actual event andwas not a randomshot or a groundless question to “wait33 an unwarranted innuendo into thejury box.” There are noMaine cases on the point, but the practice seems adesirableone.34

Subdivision (b) allows inquiry into specific instances of conduct ondirectexaminationwhencharacterisactuallyinissue;thatis,whencharacteror a character trait is an operative fact which under the substantive lawdetermines the legal rightsoftheparties. Thisappears tobe inaccordwithMainelaw.Smithv.Wyman,16Me.13(1839).

RULE406.HABIT;ROUTINEPRACTICE(a) Admissibility.Evidenceofaperson’shabitoranorganization’sroutine

practice may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion theperson or organization acted in accordance with the habit or routinepractice.Thecourtmayadmitthisevidenceregardlessofwhetheritiscorroboratedorwhethertherewasaneyewitness.

(b) Methodofproof.Habitorroutinepracticemaybeprovedbyproofofa

sufficientnumberof instancesofconduct tosupporta finding that thehabitexistedorthatthepracticewasroutine.


Maine Rule 406(a) is identical with Federal Rule 406. Maine Rule406(b) specifically authorizes the use of evidence of specific instances of

33“...waft....”34 Update:InStatev.Shulikov,1998ME111,¶¶16-17,712A.2d504,theLawCourtheldthat

there was no manifest injustice when a prosecutor cross-examined two witnesses regardingspecificinstancesofthedefendant’sconduct,withoutthecourthavingfirstdeterminedoutsideofthe jury’s presence whether there was a basis for the questions, because the State laterdemonstrated on the record it had a factual basis for asking the questions, the defendantacquiesced in the questioning and did not ask the State to demonstrate its foundation for thequestions,andnofurtherreferencetothespecificinstancewasmadeattrial.

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conducttoprovehabitorroutinepractice.ThelanguageofMaineRule406(b)hasbeencarriedoverintotherestyledRule.



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Subdivision (a) recognizes the relevancy of a person’s habit or the

routine practice of an organization in proving that conduct on a particularoccasionwas inconformity therewith. Rule404states thegeneral rule thatevidenceofaperson’scharacteroratraitofhischaracterisnotadmissibleforthepurposeofprovingthatheactedinconformitytherewithonaparticularoccasion.Whyshouldhabitbetreateddifferently?Therationaleisthathabitdescribesone’sregularresponsetoarepeatedspecificsituationsothatdoingthe habitual act becomes semi-automatic. It is the notion of the invariableregularitythatgiveshabitevidenceitsprobativeforce.Evidencethatoneisa“carefulman”ora“carefuldriver”isinadmissibleaslackingthespecificityofanactbecomingsemi-automatic;itgoestocharacterratherthanhabit. Thusintemperate“habits”cannotbeshowntoprovedrunkennessatthetimeofanaccident.Evidenceofotherassaultsisinadmissibletoprovetheinstantoneinacivilactionforassault.

The cases have more readily admitted the routine practice of anorganizationthanthatofanindividual.See,e.g.,Commonwealthv.Torrealba,316Mass.24,54N.E.2d939(1944)(customofstoretogivesalesslipswitheachpurchase). But inMaineanotaryhasbeenpermittedtostatehisusualcourse of proceedings and his customary habits of business on the issue ofnoticeofdishonortotheindorseeofanote.UnionBankv.Stone,50Me.595(1862).

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It isnotclear towhatextent thisrulechangesMaine law. Therehavebeen references in the cases to the general rule that prior habits are notadmissibletoprovethedoingofacertainactonaspecificoccasion.SeeStatev. Brown, 142 Me. 106, 48 A.2d 29, 33 (1966); Duguay v. Pomerleau,299A.2d914 (Me. 1967). In neither of these cases, however, was thereferencenecessarytotheresult. Subdivision(b)allowsproofofhabitorroutinepracticebytestimonyofa sufficient number of specific instances of conduct to add up to a habit orroutine.Thejudgehasconsiderablediscretiononthispointandmaydisallowproof of specific instances under the overriding provisions of Rule 403.Subdivision(b) isomitted fromtheFederalRule. With it leftout, theresultwouldbetogobacktoRule402andmakeadmissibleanyrelevantevidenceastohabit.Theinclusionof(b)hasadesirablelimitingeffect.

RULE407.SUBSEQUENTREMEDIALMEASURES;NOTIFICATIONOFDEFECT

(a) Subsequent remedial measures. When measures are taken that

wouldhavemadeanearlierinjuryorharmlesslikelytooccur,evidenceofthesubsequentmeasuresisnotadmissibletoprove:

(1) Negligence; (2) Culpableconduct; (3) Adefectinaproductoritsdesign;or (4) Aneedforawarningorinstruction.

But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such asimpeachment or—if disputed—proving ownership, control, or thefeasibilityofprecautionarymeasures.

(b) Notification of defect. Notwithstanding subdivision (a) of this rule, amanufacturer’swrittennotificationtopurchasersofadefectinitsproductisadmissibletoprovetheexistenceofthedefect.

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The bulk of Maine Rule 407(a) has been restyled in accordance withFederalRule407. MaineRule407(b),whichhasnofederalcounterpart,hasbeenrestyled.


The language of Rule 407 has been amended as part of the generalrestylingoftheEvidenceRulestomakethemmoreeasilyunderstoodandtomakestyle and terminologyconsistent throughout therules. Thesechangesareintendedtobestylisticonly.Thereisnointenttochangeanyresultinanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility. Rule407previouslyprovided that evidencewasnot excluded if offeredforapurposenotexplicitlyprohibitedbytheRule.ToimprovethelanguageoftheRule,itnowprovidesthatthecourtmayadmitevidenceifofferedforapermissiblepurpose. There isno intent tochange theprocess foradmittingevidence covered by the Rule. It remains the case that if offered for animpermissiblepurpose, itmustbeexcluded,and ifoffered forapurposenotbarred by the Rule, its admissibility remains governed by the generalprinciplesofRules402,403,801,etc.

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[Caution:MuchofthisAdviser’sNoteisnotapplicabletotheRuleasamendedeffectiveJuly1,1996,followingastatutorychange.Seebelow.] Subdivision (a) is directly contrary to Maine law. See Carleton v.Rockland, Thomaston & Camden St. Ry., 110 Me. 397, 86A. 334 (1913). Itdeclares thatevidenceof repairs and the likeafter anevent isadmissible toprove negligence or culpable conduct. The public policy behind the ruleagainst admissibility was that it would deter repairs. This rationale isunpersuasive today. Insome instances subsequentrepairsmaybeevidenceof culpability. Inother instancesquite the contrary is the fact. Despite thisdeparture fromprior authority, it is still open to the trial judge underRule403toexcludesuchevidenceifhebelievesitsprobativevalueissubstantially

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outweighedbydangerofunfairprejudice, confusionof issues,ormisleadingthejury.Asituationwhenthechangeiseffectuatedforreasonsunrelatedtothehazardwouldbe a clear case for suchexclusion. Moreover, evidenceofsubsequent repairs goes only to the proof of an existing defect. It has norelevancy to the question whether the condition had existed long enoughbefore the accident in suit so that the defendant should have known of it.Indeed, evidence that the condition was promptly corrected when thedefendantlearnedofitmightbehelpfultothedefendant. The exclusionary rule is already subject to numerous exceptions inMaineandelsewhere.SeeCarletonv.Rockland,Thomaston&CamdenSt.Ry.,supra (evidence of subsequent repairs admissible, not on the issue ofnegligence,butonwhetheritwasthedutyofthedefendantorsomeoneelsetomaketherepairs). Itshouldbeemphasizedthatalthoughevidenceofsubsequentremedialmeasuresisadmitted, itremainsforthejurytodecidewhetherthestandardof reasonable carehasbeen satisfied. Proof that suchmeasureswere takenclearly does not compel a finding that the previous condition reflectedculpableconduct. Subdivision(b) isaimedattheincreasinglycommonsituationwhereamanufacturersendsa“recallletter”topurchasersnotifyingthemofadefectinaproductandaskingitsreturnforcorrectivemeasures.Thisisrelevantasanadmission of existence of the defect and would be receivable against themanufacturer under Rule 801(d)(2) unless excluded by reasons of policy.There appear to be no such reasons. A manufacturer of motor vehicles ortires is now required by statute to give notification of any safety-relateddefect. 15 U.S.C. §1402.35 Manufacturers of other products would almostcertainly give a similar notification. It would be in their enlightened self-interesttodoso. Thisproblemhas sufficient similarity toproofof subsequent remedialmeasurestowarrantmakingitaseparatesubdivisionoftherule.Actuallythedifference is substantial. Proof of subsequent remedial measures is not anadmission of anything. Repairs made after damage related to the veryproperty or chattel involved in an accident may warrant the inference of

35Thisstatutehasbeenrepealed.

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negligence. Similarly achange indesignmaywarrant the inference that thepreviousdesignwasfaulty.Arecallletterisanout-and-outadmissionoftheexistenceofadefect.Thecaseforallowingitinevidenceismuchstronger. Therecall lettershouldnotof itself suffice toestablishcausation. Forinstance,ifthereisevidencethatthesteeringgearofanautomobilesuddenlyfailed, a recall letterwouldbe admissible as to the existenceof a defect. If,however, there isnoevidence thatsteeringgear failurecaused theaccident,theclaimwouldfailforlackofproofofcausation. Itwouldalsoseemthatproofthataplaintiffreceivedanddidnotheedthewarningofadefectwouldbeadmissibleonthequestionofhisduecare. The Federal Rule follows the conventional doctrine that evidence ofsubsequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove negligence orculpableconductanddoesnotdealwiththeadmissibilityofrecallletters.

Consultant’sNote(July15,1995Amendment)

Caution:ThisnoterelatestoaversionofRule407(a)whichhasbeenlargelysuperseded! This amendment isdesigned to limit theeffectofpriorRule407. ThenewversionofRule407(a)makesadmissiblesubsequentremedialmeasuresinvolvingthedesignorconditionofpremisesoratangiblethingtotheextentsuchmeasuresarelogicallyrelevanttoanissueinthecase.ThisformulationmerelyrestatesandclarifiesthepriorformulationofRule407(a)asthatruleapplied to premises and tangible things. The amended rule does notmakeadmissible subsequent remedial measures not involving premises or atangible thing. Thus, the revised rule would not support admissibility ofchangesininstitutionalpractice,training,procedures,orinstructionsincasesbased on allegedly negligent practice, procedures, training or instructions.Theadmissibilityofpost-eventchangesincasesofthiskindisdeterminedbythe general rules of relevance, Rules 401-403. Presumably it would bepermissible for theLawCourt to construe these rules to re-erect a commonlawbarriertosuchevidence,atleastincertaincontexts.

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TheamendmentalsomakesevidenceotherwiseadmissibleunderRule407(a) nonetheless excludable if the probative value of the evidence issubstantiallyoutweighedby thedangerofunfairprejudice, confusionof theissuesormisleading the jury, orby considerationsof undue delay,wasteoftime,orneedlesspresentationofcumulative evidence.The inclusionofRule403languageinthetextofRule407isnotintendedtosuggestthatRule403doesnotapplytoevidencemadeadmissiblebyotherrules,but istomakeitclearthatthepositivegrantofadmissibilityinRule407(a)isalwayssubjecttotheauthorityofthetrialcourttoapplythepoliciesofRule403.

Consultant’sNote(July4,1996Amendment)

This amendment is designed to bring Rule 407(a) in conformitywithChapter576of thePublicLawsof1996asenactedby theMaineLegislatureonMarch29,1996. The rule as amended follows Federal Rule 407 inmaking subsequentremedialmeasuresinadmissibletoprovenegligenceorculpableconduct,butpotentiallyadmissibleforotherpurposes.Thelistofsuchotherpurposesforwhich such evidencemay be admitted is not intended to be exhaustive, butincludes themost commonbases onwhich admissionmay bewarranted inspecificcases.Chapter576expresslystatesthatit“appliestocausesofactioninwhichtheharmorinjuryoccurredonoraftertheeffectivedateofthisAct.”Non-emergency legislation of the 1996 legislative session becomes effectiveonJuly4,1996. TheamendmentmakesrevisedRule407effectiveasofJuly4,1996andwould apply to trials and rulings occurring on or after its effective dateregardlessofthedateofinjuryorofthedateofcommencementoftheaction.ThisprovisiononapplicabilityofthenewrulewaschosenbytheLawCourtinpreference to the corresponding provisionofChapter576, in the interestofclarityandsimplicityofapplication.

AdvisoryCommitteeNote(April1,1998Amendment)

ThisamendmentisproposedtobringMaineRule407(a)inconformitywithFederalRule407asamendedin1997.Theamendmentmakesclearthat

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theoperativedate for “subsequent” is thedateof the injuryon trial,not thedateaproductwasdesignedormanufactured,andnotthedateofsomepriorfailureorotheroccurrence.TheamendmentalsomakesitclearthatRule407appliesincasesofstrictliabilityand“productsliability”aswellastraditionalnegligence.

RULE408.COMPROMISEOFFERSANDNEGOTIATIONS(a) Settlementdiscussions.Evidenceofthefollowingisnotadmissible—

on behalf of any party—either to prove or disprove the validity oramount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistentstatementoracontradiction:

(1) Furnishing, promising, or offering—or accepting, promising to

accept, or offering to accept—a valuable consideration incompromisingorattemptingtocompromisetheclaim;and

(2) Conductorastatementmadeduringcompromisenegotiationsor

inmediationabouttheclaim.(b) Mediation. Evidence of conduct or statements by any party or

mediatoratamediationsession:

(1) Undertaken to comply with any statute, court rule, oradministrativeagencyrule;

(2) Towhichthepartieshavebeenreferredbyacourt,administrative

agency,orarbitrator;or(3) In which the parties and mediator have agreed in writing or

electronicallytomediatewithanexpectationofconfidentiality;

Isnotadmissibleintheproceedingwithrespecttowhichthemediationwas held or in any other proceeding between the parties to themediation that involves the subject matter of the mediation for anypurposeotherthantoprove:• Fraud;• Duress;

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• Othercausetoinvalidatethemediationresult;or• Existenceofanagreement.


MaineRule408hasevolvedtobecomequitedifferentfromFederalRule408inform,ifnotinsubstance.TherestyledMaineRulebringsthelanguageand structure of the Maine Rule back to be more in conformity with therestyledFederalRule.TheproposedrestyledMaineRulefollowstheFederalRuleinreferringtothevalidityoramountofadisputedclaimratherthantheprior Maine formulation of “any substantive issue in dispute between theparties.” The priorMaine languagewas inserted to dealwith divorce casesandothermattersthatdidnotseemtoinvolvemonetary“claims.”Thephrasehas been clumsy and opaque in practice, and the federal formulation seemsclearer,particularlyif“claim”isbroadlyreadasanysubstantivelegalpositionof a party. Rule 408(b) is unique to Maine and is the result of extendednegotiations with the mediation community. Since there is no federalcounterpart,andhencenoneedforMaine-Federalconsistency,theproposedrestyledversionisthesameastheexistingversion.


The language of Rule 408 has been amended as part of the generalrestylingoftheEvidenceRulestomakethemmoreeasilyunderstoodandtomakestyle and terminologyconsistent throughout therules. Thesechangesareintendedtobestylisticonly.Thereisnointenttochangeanyresultinanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility. Rule408previouslyprovidedthatevidencewasnotexcludedifofferedforapurposenotexplicitlyprohibitedbytheRule.ToimprovethelanguageoftheRule,itnowprovidesthatthecourtmayadmitevidenceifofferedforapermissiblepurpose. There isno intent tochange theprocess foradmittingevidence covered by the Rule. It remains the case that if offered for animpermissiblepurpose, itmustbeexcluded,and ifoffered forapurposenotbarred by the Rule, its admissibility remains governed by the generalprinciplesofRules402,403,801,etc. The Committee deleted the reference to “liability” on the ground thatthe deletion makes the Rule flow better and easier to read, and because

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“liability” is covered by the broader term “validity.” Courts have notmadesubstantive decisions on the basis of any distinction between validity andliability. No change in current practice or in the coverage of the Rule isintended.

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Thisruledeclaresevidenceofacompromiseoroffertocompromiseor

ofcompromisenegotiationstobeinadmissibleontheissueof liabilityfororamountofadisputedclaim.ThisgoessomewhatbeyondpresentMainelaw.In Hunter v. Totman, 146 Me. 259, 80 A.2d 401 (1951), it was held thatadmissibilitydependsonintention;iftheofferisintendedtobeanadmissionof liability coupled with an endeavor to settle, it is admissible to proveliability. The rule avoids the need of determining intention andmakes theevidence inadmissible without qualification. The purpose is to encouragesettlementdiscussionandtodoawaywithanyneedforthecautiouslawyertoprefaceastatementwiththewords“withoutprejudice”. Evidenceofacompromiseoffermaybeadmissibleforanotherpurpose,suchastendingtoshowbiasorprejudiceofawitness. The Federal Rule omits the reference to “any other claim.”36 It alsoincludes the followingsentence: “Thisruledoesnotrequire theexclusionofany evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in thecourse of compromise negotiations.”37 The meaning of this sentence isunclear;itseemstostatewhatthelawwouldbeifitwereomitted.Theruleexcludes “conductor statements”made in compromise negotiations. Surelythe presentation during negotiations of admissible evidence would notinsulate such evidence from use at the trial, as for example when counseldisplays a hospital record. If Congress meant “admissible” rather than“discoverable”,thesentenceisneedless. Ifitintendedtorefertotheregulardiscovery procedures, it seems equally needless. If “discoverable” means

36ThecurrentMaineRulealsoomitsthereference.37ThislanguageisnolongerpresentintheFederalRule.

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something that the adversary would not have learned about except for thesettlement negotiations, as a layman might use the term, inclusion of thesentencewouldbeindefensible.

AdvisoryCommitteeNote(1985Amendment)

By 1985 amendment the applicability of Rule 408 to negotiations indomestic relations matterswasmademore clear by the amendment of thesecondsentenceofRule408(a)toreferto“anysubstantiveissueindispute.”38The purpose of this amendment was to negate any implication that“compromisenegotiations”referredonlytothekindsofclaimsmentionedinthefirstsentenceoftherule,butincludedanykindoflitigableclaim,demand,ordefense. Becauseof thestrongpublicpolicy favoring freenegotiationsand freeexpression of the parties during court-sponsored mediation in domesticrelationscases,statementsorconductbyanyparty (includingthemediator)occurringduringthecourseofacourt-sponsoredmediationsessionaremadeinadmissibleforanypurpose.


It has been suggested by a variety of sources that conduct andstatements made in the course of mediation and other alternative disputeresolution procedures should not be admissible in evidence based uponpolicies fostering the use of mediation and other alternative disputeresolutionprocedures. Muchofwhat issaidanddoneby thepartiesduringthecourseofmediation isprotectedunderRule408(a)as itexistedprior tothe 1992 amendment inasmuch as mediation can be regarded as merely astructured formof compromisenegotiations. On theotherhand, in viewofthehighlevelofinterestinmediationconfidentialityitmaybehelpfultomakeit clear that mediation is entitled to the same level of protection asnegotiations carried on directly between the affected parties without theparticipationofathirdpartyfacilitator.

38Thislanguagehassincebeenremoved—seetheRestylingNoteforexplanation.

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Itshouldbenotedthatthisproposedrulerevisiondoesnotconferanykindofmediator’s“privilege.”39AtthetimeoftheenactmentoftheRulestheCommitteerestricteditscodificationofprivilegestothosewhichhadexistedat common laworby statute asof that time. TheCommittee is reluctant toproposenewprivilegesintheabsenceofsomeclearlegislativeorCourtpolicyindicationthatsuchprivilegesarewarranted. Nor does the amendment create an absolute ban on the use ofstatements or conduct in mediation for all purposes. Thus, statements orconduct in mediation could be admissible where relevant on somenonsubstantive issues suchasbiasorprejudiceof awitness, credibilityof awitness and the like.40 Statements and conduct in court-sponsoredcompulsorydivorcemediationcontinuetobesubjecttoabroaderprotectionunderRule408(b). The proposed amendment does not address the discoverability ofstatementsorconductduringmediation,nordoesitseektoimposeanysortofobligationofconfidentialityuponanyparticipantinthemediationprocess.The scope of discovery iswithin the purview of the civil and criminal rulescommittees. Confidentiality is an issue for the Legislature or an authorityregulating mediators and is not a proper issue for the Evidence RulesCommittee.

AdvisoryCommitteeNote(December2009)

ThisamendmentmakesmajorchangesinbothRule408(a)andinRule408(b).Rule408(a)isamendedtofollowacorrespondingchangein[FederalRuleofEvidence]408andtoclosealoopholeinthepriorversion.Theruleasamended provides that statements and conduct in settlement negotiationsthatarerendered inadmissibleonanysubstantiveissuebetweenthepartiesmaynotbeusedtoimpeachawitnessthroughpriorinconsistentstatementor

39 The language of this paragraph is outdated. The Rules now include amediator’s privilege

(Rule514).40Inadmissiblestatementsarenolongerallowedforimpeachmentpurposes.

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contradiction. Such statements or conduct would not necessarily beinadmissiblewhenofferedforsomeotherpurpose. Rule 408(a) continues to refer to mediation despite the expansion ofRule 408(b) in order to make clear that the fact that a statement is madeduring mediation does not deprive it of its character as a statement incompromisenegotiationsoraffectitsinadmissibilityunderRule408(a). Rule 408(b) has been rewritten and expanded. The new Rule 408(b)applies not only to court ordered domestic relations mediations, but to allmediationsundertakentocomplywithanystatute,courtrule,administrativeagencyrule.Italsocoversmediationsinwhichthepartieshavebeenreferredtomediationbyanycourt,administrativeagencyorarbitrator, regardlessofwhether such mediations are provided for by rule. Finally, it coversmediations in which the parties have agreed in writing or electronically(e-mail) to mediate with an expectation of confidentiality. These wouldinclude mediations covered by typical mediations agreements withconfidentialityclauses. Statements of either parties ormediator in allmediations covered byRule 408(b) are inadmissible for all purposes other than to prove fraud orduress to invalidate the mediation result both in the proceeding beingmediatedand in anyotherproceedingbetween theparties to themediationthat involves the same subjectmatter.41 The rule is designed to encourageparties to speak openly and freely inmediation by assuring them that theirstatementswill notbeusable against them in the casebeingmediatedor inanyothercasebetweenthesamepartieswiththesamesubjectmatter.Ontheother hand, revised Rule 408(b) does not render statements in mediationinadmissible in proceedings involving third parties, such as criminalproceedings, or even in proceedings between themediating parties that donot involve the subject matter of the mediation. Nor does it insulatestatementsinmediationfromcivildiscovery.

41TheRulenowallowsfortheuseofstatementstoprovefraud,duress,orsomethingelsethat

wouldinvalidatethemediationresult,ortoproveexistenceofanagreement.

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RULE409.OFFERSTOPAYMEDICALANDSIMILAREXPENSESEvidenceoffurnishing,promisingtopay,orofferingtopaymedical,hospital,orsimilarexpensesresultingfromaninjuryisnotadmissibletoproveliabilityfortheinjury.





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This rule is generally in accord with Maine law. Lyle v. Bangor&AroostookRy.,150Me.327,331,110A.2d584,587(1954).Theruledoesnot supersede or conflict in any way with 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2426, whichprovides that no payment on account of bodily injury or death or propertydamage shall constitute anadmissionof liabilityorwaiverofdefense, orbeadmissibleinevidenceinanactionunlesspleadedasadefense;andthatanysuchpaymentshallbecrediteduponanysettlementorjudgmentinanactionagainstthepayororhisinsurer.

RULE410.PLEAS,PLEADISCUSSIONS,ANDRELATEDSTATEMENTSInacivilorcriminalcase,evidenceofthefollowingisnotadmissibleagainstthepersonwhomadethepleaorparticipatedinthepleadiscussions:(a) Aguiltypleathatwaslaterwithdrawn;

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(b) Anolocontendereplea;(c) Astatementmadeinconnectionwithaguiltyornolocontenderepleaor

during a proceeding on either of those pleas under Maine Rule ofCriminalProcedure11oracomparableFederalorstateprocedure;or

(d) Anoffertopleadguiltyornolocontendere.


Maine’sRule410 isstructurallymuchsimplerand lesscomprehensivethan the current version of the federal counterpart. The proposed restyledMaineRuleattemptstoadoptthefederalstructurebutretainthesmallerandsimplerscopeoftheMaineRule. ThevariousexceptionsintheFederalRuleandthereferencestopleanegotiationsappeartogosubstantivelybeyondtheMaineRule.Eventhoughtheymayhavemerit,considerationofsuchchangesisbeyondthescopeoftherestylingproject.



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There is noMaine case dealingwith the admissibility of awithdrawn

plea. InMassachusettsaguiltypleatodrunkendrivingwaslaterwithdrawnand the defendant was acquitted at trial, but the guilty plea was heldadmissible inanactionforpersonal injuries. Morrisseyv.Powell,304Mass.268,23N.E.2d411(1939).Caseselsewhereareinconflict. Exclusionof offers topleadguiltymakespleabargaining in a criminalcasesomewhateasier.

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Thisruleisconcernedonlywithwithdrawnpleas.Anacceptedpleaofnolocontendereisnotadmissibleinacivilaction.Statev.Fitzgerald,140Me.314,37A.2d799(1944). The Federal Rule adds a final sentence reading: “This rule shall notapplytotheintroductionofvoluntaryandreliablestatementsmadeincourton the record in connectionwithanyof the foregoingpleasorofferswhereoffered for impeachment purposes or in a subsequent prosecution of thedeclarant for perjury or false statement.”42 The primary reason for notincludingitisthattheuseofsuchastatement“forimpeachment”raisesagaintheineffectivenessofa limitinginstruction. Thejurywouldalmostcertainlyconsideritasanadmissionofguilt.

RULE411.LIABILITYINSURANCEEvidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is notadmissible to prove whether the person acted negligently or otherwisewrongfully.


Maine Rule 411 is substantially identical with the first sentence ofFederalRule411. ThesecondsentenceoftheoriginalFederalRule411wasomitted in the Maine rule as redundant and unnecessary. See, e.g., Rule404(b).ButseeRule407.TheproposedrestyledMaineRulefollowsthefirstsentenceoftherestyledFederalRule.


The language of Rule 411 has been amended as part of the generalrestylingoftheEvidenceRulestomakethemmoreeasilyunderstoodandtomakestyle and terminologyconsistent throughout therules. Thesechangesareintendedtobestylisticonly.Thereisnointenttochangeanyresultinanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility.

42Thislanguagehaschanged,andtheFederalRuledoesnotappeartoallowimpeachmentuseanymore.FederalRuleofCriminalProcedure11anditsnotesdonotseemtoclarifythesituation.

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Rule411previouslyprovidedthatevidencewasnotexcludedifofferedforapurposenotexplicitlyprohibitedbytheRule.ToimprovethelanguageoftheRule,itnowprovidesthatthecourtmayadmitevidenceifofferedforapermissiblepurpose. There isno intent tochange theprocess foradmittingevidence covered by the Rule. It remains the case that if offered for animpermissiblepurpose, itmustbeexcluded,and ifoffered forapurposenotbarred by the Rule, its admissibility remains governed by the generalprinciplesofRules402,403,801,etc.

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Theexclusionofevidenceof liability insuranceor the lackof iton theissueof fault is inaccordwithMaine law. St.Pierrev.Houde,269A.2d538(Me.1970).Theinferencethataninsuredpersonwouldonthataccountdrivecarelessly is too weak. The Maine policy against injection of the fact ofinsuranceintoanactionisastrongone.SeeM.R.C.P.17(a)which,despitetherequirementthatanactionmustbeprosecutedinthenameoftherealpartyininterest,allowsasubrogatedinsurertosueinthenameoftheassured.SeealsoAllen v. Pomroy, 277A.2d 727 (Me. 1971). Numerous cases apply thegeneral rule that evidence of insurance in negligence cases is “immaterial,prejudicial, and inadmissible.” Deschaine v. Deschaine, 153 Me. 401, 407,140A.2d746,749(1958).SeealsoDownsv.Poulin,216A.2d29,33(1966);Duguayv.Pomerleau,299A.2d914(Me.1973)(statingthegeneralstandardthat reference to insurance is to be avoided unless extraordinarycircumstancesrequireit).Theruledoesnotcompeltheexclusionofevidenceof insuranceagainst liabilitywhenit isrelevantforanotherpurpose,suchasproofofagency,ownershiporcontrol,orbiasorprejudiceofawitness.

RULE412.SEX-OFFENSECASES:THEVICTIM’SSEXUALBEHAVIORORPREDISPOSITION

(a) Prohibiteduses. Thefollowingevidenceisnotadmissibleinacivilor

criminalproceedinginvolvingallegedsexualmisconduct:

(1) Evidenceofferedtoprovethatanallegedvictimengagedinothersexualbehavior;or

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(2) Evidence offered to prove an alleged victim’s sexualpredisposition.

(b) Exceptions.

(1) Criminalcases. Thecourtmayadmit the followingevidence in acriminalcase:

(A) Evidence of specific instances of an alleged victim’s sexual

behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than thedefendantwasthesourceofsemen,injury,orotherphysicalevidence;

(B) Evidence of specific instances of an alleged victim’s sexual

behaviorwith respect to the person accused of the sexualmisconduct,ifofferedbythedefendanttoproveconsentorifofferedbytheprosecutor;and

(C) Evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s

constitutionalrights.

(2) Civilcases.Inacivilcase,thecourtmayadmitevidenceofspecificinstancesofsexualbehaviorbyanallegedvictimofferedtoproveanallegedvictim’ssexualbehaviororsexualpredisposition if itsprobativevaluesubstantiallyoutweighsthedangerofharmtoanyvictimandofunfairprejudicetoanyparty.


Maine’sRule412hasgenerallyfolloweditsfederalcounterpart,buthasdiffered in some respects in both structure and substance. The maindifferencesarethebanonreputationandopinionevidenceintheMaineRuleand the omission in the Maine Rule of any special procedure to determineadmissibility.Theproposedrestyledversionfollowsthefederalversionmoreclosely,anddealswiththeprohibitionofreputationandopinionevidencebymaking it clear that theonlykindofevidenceofsexualbehavior thatcanbeadmitted under the Rule is evidence of specific acts that meets therequirementsofsubsection(b).TherestyledMaineRulefollowstheexistingRuleinomittinganyspecialprocedurefordeterminingadmissibility.

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AdvisoryCommitteeNote(February1,1983)

ThisRuleprohibitsanyevidenceof reputationoropinionofavictim’scharacter inaprosecutionforrapeandotherserioussexualoffenses. Italsoseverelyrestricts theuseofevidenceofspecific instancesofa victim’spriorsexualbehaviorwhenofferedbythedefense.TheruleissubjecttothepolicyofRule402onevidenceconstitutionallyrequiredtobeadmitted. The rule is patternedon newFederalRule412whichwasenactedbyCongresstocurbperceivedabusesintheuseofevidenceconcerningthepastsexual behavior of a victim of rape or sexual abuse. In some courts, widelatitude has been allowed defense counsel to introduce such evidence toshow: A. Lackofoverall credibilityof thevictim,particularlyon the issueofconsent;and B. An actual inference that the victim did consent on the specificoccasionforwhichthedefendantischarged. ThisdoesnotseemtohavebeenaseriousprobleminMainewheresuchtestimony has been generally excluded. Some of theMaine cases, however,contain dicta that could be read to support admissibility of reputationevidenceoncredibilityandperhapsonconsent.See,e.g.,Statev.McFarland,369A.2d227(Me.1977);Statev.Dipietrantonio,152Me.41(1956);Statev.Flaherty,128Me.141(1929).Thedangerintheadmissionofsuchevidenceisthelikelihoodthatitwillprovokemoralandemotionalreactionsinthetrierof fact increasing the risk of unfair prejudice. For this reason, Federal Rule

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412 has provided for an elaborate procedure designed to assess the risk ofunfair prejudice before admission of such evidence, even to the extentpermitted by the rule. InMaine it is not necessary to provide any specificprocedureinlightofthetrialjudge’spowertocontrolthepresentationoftheproofsoas tominimizeprejudiceand theoverall requirementsofRule403.Prosecutors,defensecounsel,andtrial judgesshouldbealerttothefactthatRule 403 does apply even to evidencemade specifically admissible by Rule412 (or any other rule). Where the prejudicial effect of such evidenceoutweighs the probative value, such evidencemust be excluded under Rule403. “Sexual behavior” is not specifically defined in the rule, but wouldincludethebehaviordescribedby17-AM.R.S.A.Section251(B,43CandD). Theword“past”inRule412referstooccasionspriortotrialandotherthan the occasions involved in the charges, whether prior or subsequenttheretointime. Rule 412(b)(1) would not affect the result in State v. Henderson,158Me. 364 (1958), upholding the admissibility of evidence of the victim’sprior intercourse with persons other than the accused to attack“corroborating”evidenceofthevictim’spregnancyofferedbytheprosecution. Rule412(b)(2)onlyapplies tocriminalprosecutionswhereconsentofthevictimisanissue. Rule412doesnotprohibitevidenceofastatementbythevictimabouther past sexual conduct when the statement is relevant as a statement forimpeachment or some other proper purpose. See, e.g., State v. Nelson,399A.2d1327(Me.1979)(rapevictim’spriorinconsistentstatementsaboutherpastsexualrelationsadmissibletoimpeach). The prosecution may also “open the door” to evidence otherwiseinadmissibleunderthisrulebyofferingevidenceofthevictim’slackofsexualexperienceorchastityondirect.SeeStatev.Gagne,343A.2d186(Me.1975).

43Subsection(B)of17-AM.R.S.§251hasbeenrepealed.

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[Note changeby1995Amendment44]Rule412doesnot automaticallyrender admissible evidence of prior sexual behavior in prosecutions forunlawful sexual contact, other criminal prosecutions, or civil cases.Admissibilityofsuchevidenceisgovernedbytheotherrulesonrelevancyandimpeachment. SeeStatev.Davis,406A.2d900(Me.1979)(unlawfulsexualcontact-evidenceofcomplainant’spreoccupationwithpullingdownthepantsof others was relevant to the complainant’s state of mind and to rebut theinference that a child of her tender years would be too innocent of sexualmatterstofabricateacharge). ObviouslyRule412appliestotheprosecutionaswellastothedefense.Thusunless a victim’s lackof chastity isproperly raisedby thedefense, theprosecutionmaynotintroduceevidenceofthevictim’schastitytosupportaninferenceoflackofconsent.

AdvisoryCommitteeNote(1995Amendment)

This amendment is to conform the terms of the Rules to changes indefinition of crimes in the Maine Criminal Code. By 1989 amendment, thecrimesof rapeandgrosssexualmisconduct,asearlierdefinedby theMaineCriminalCode(17-AM.R.S.A.§§252,253)wereredefinedandcombinedintothe crime of gross sexual assault (17-AM.R.S.A. §253). The policies whichmadeRule412applicable to thecrimesasearlierdefinedremainvalidwithrespecttotheredefinedandrenamedoffense. ThisamendmentalsoamendsEvidenceRule412tocoverprosecutionsforunlawfulsexualcontact.


The amendment toRule 412 is designed to broaden the rule to covercivilaswellascriminalcases.TheformulationoftherulefollowsthecurrentMaineRule412rather than thenewFederalRule412because1) theMainerulehasworkedwelltodate,and2)thestructureoftheMaineruleseemstolenditselfbettertoapplicationtocivilaswellascriminalcases.

44Also,notethechangebythe2000Rulesamendment.

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Theamendedrulewouldapplytoanycase,civilorcriminal“inwhichapersonisaccusedofsexualmisconducttowardanindividual.”Casesinvolvingsexual misconduct but not directed toward an individual (pornography?)wouldnotbecoveredbyeitherthelanguageortherationaleofthisrule.Theterm“sexualmisconduct” is intendedtoincludeall formsofcivilorcriminalmisconduct which involve sexual activity or verbal references to intimatesexual activity including sexual harassment, exposure, telephone sexualharassment, intentional inflictionofemotionaldistress. It isnot intended toinclude misconduct not involving sexual activity or verbal references tointimatesexualactivitybutwhichisdirectedatmembersofasexuallydefinedgroupsuchassomeformsof“hatecrimes.” “Sexual behavior” is intended to include all forms of intimate sexualactivity,whetherornotconsensual,aswellasintimateconversationinvolvingasexualrelationshiporsexualgratification. In both civil and criminal cases reputation or opinion evidence of thesexual character of an alleged victim would be forbidden. There does notseemtobeanymorereasonforthiskindofevidenceincivilcasesthanthereisincriminalcases. In criminal cases the rule on evidence of specific instances of conductwouldremain“asis.”Evidence“constitutionallyrequired”tobeadmitted(e.g.[State v.] Jacques, 558 A.2d 706 (1989)) is now included among theenumeratedexceptionsasisthecasewiththecorrespondingfederalrule. Subdivision (c)45 proposes a somewhat broader rule for civil cases,requiring that the proponent of the evidence satisfy the judge that theprobativevalueoftheevidenceonacontrovertedissueoutweighsthedangerofunfairprejudice,etc.Boththeweight(probativevalue)andthefocus(onacontroverted issue)wouldbe involved in thedeterminationofadmissibility.To cover thepossibility that in a civil case an individualwhoseprior sexualconduct would be protected by this rule might not be the other party, theconcept of “unwarranted harm to the individual” has been included in the

45Nowsubsection(b)(2).

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balancing formula.46 This formulation erects ameaningful threshold to theuse of this kind of evidence in civil cases, but does not forbid it entirely orrestrictitsusetoartificialcategoriesorforspecificinferences.Thethresholdof admissibility under Rule 412 specifies that the evidence can only beadmittedifthecourtfindthattheprobativevalueoftheevidenceexceedthedangerofunfairprejudice.ThisiscontrastedtothethresholdunderRule403wherebyrelevantevidence isadmittedunless thedangerofunfairprejudicesubstantiallyoutweighstheprobativevalue. The same kind of reasoning employed by the Law Court inadministering the “constitutionally required” exception to criminalRule412couldbeappliedtoadministeringRule412(c)incivilcases.Thus,wheretheproponentofevidenceofpriorsexualbehaviorofavictimcouldarticulateaninference from the prior sexual behavior of the victimwhichwould have alogical bearing directly on a controverted issue in the case, the evidencewouldbelikelyadmissibleintheabsenceofseriousprejudice,confusion,etc.Thecourtwouldordinarilybeexpectedtoarticulatetherelevantinferenceforwhichtheevidencewouldbeadmissibleandhowtheevidencesupportedtheinference.Suchevidencecanalsobeadmittedinbothcivilandcriminalcasesiftheopposingparty“opensthedoor.” This rule applies in civil cases to issues of both liability and damages.Rule 403 continues to give the court power to exclude evidence subject toRule 412 based on considerations such as unnecessary presentation ofcumulativeevidenceandwasteoftime. This rulewould not restrict evidence of sexual activity of a party to acase other than one in which a person is accused of “sexual misconduct”towardanindividual.Thusitwouldnotapplytothedefenseoftruthinalibelcaseortoproofofcharacterinacustodycase.ThesecaseswouldcontinuetobegovernedbyRules403-405. Theproposedrevisedrule,asthecurrentMaineRule412,doesnotspellout a special procedure for admissibility determinations. Confiding thismattertothegoodsenseofcourtandcounselhasworkedwelltodate.

46Thelanguageisnow“thedangerofharmtoanyvictimandofunfairprejudicetoanyparty.”

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RULE413.PROTECTIONOFPRIVACYINCOURTPROCEEDINGS(a) Evidenceoftheidentity,address,employmentorlocationofanyperson

mustbeexcludedifsuchpersonrequeststheexclusionofsuchevidenceand:

(1) The court is notified that there is a court order in effect that

prohibitscontactbetweensuchpersonandanotherperson;or(2) It is alleged under oath, orally or in writing, that such person’s

health,safetyorlibertywouldbejeopardizedbythedisclosureofsuch information, and the court determines that disclosure ofsuchinformationwouldjeopardizesuchpersonasallegedunlessthecourtfindsthatsuchevidenceisofamaterialfactessentialtothedeterminationoftheproceeding.

(b) Thecourtmustconductallproceedings todetermine theadmissibility

of evidence under this rule in a manner so as not to disclose theinformationsoughttobeexcluded,unlessthecourtfindsthataparty’sright to due process and a fair hearing would be violated if theinformationisnotdisclosed.

(c) If thecourtdetermines that informationotherwise inadmissibleunder

thisRulemustbeadmittedasevidenceofamaterialfactessentialtothedeterminationoftheproceedings,thecourtmustreceivesuchevidenceincamera.InchildprotectiveproceedingspursuanttoTitle22,Chapter1071oftheMaineRevisedStatutes,suchevidencemustalsobereceivedoutsideof thepresenceofanyperson,and theattorneyofanyperson,who:

(1) Is subject to a court order prohibiting contact with the personrequestingexclusionoftheevidence;or

(2) Constitutes a risk to the health, safety, or liberty of the personrequestingexclusionoftheevidence.

(d) Personswhomay object to the admission of evidence under this ruleinclude:

(1) Partiestotheproceeding;

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(2) Parties’attorneys; (3) Aguardianadlitem; (4) Anypersoncalledasawitness; (5) Ajuror;and

(6) Anyperson,who,althoughnotawitnessorparty, isasubjectoftheproceeding,suchasachildoraprotectedperson.


Federal Rules 413–415 have not been adopted in Maine. In place of

FederalRule413,MainehasadoptedMaineRule413pursuant to legislativedirective. Because there is no Federal Rule with which to maintainconsistency, restyling has been limited to applying the federal restylingconventionstotheMaineRuleasadopted.

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AdvisoryCommitteeNote2007

Rule 413 implements the legislative directive of 4 M.R.S. § 8-B and22M.R.S. § 4007(1A)47 enacted by Chapter 351 of the Public Laws of 2007.TheRulemakesevidenceoftheidentity,employment,address,orlocationofanypersoninadmissiblewhenthereisallegedtobeacourtorderinexistenceprohibiting contact between that person and another person, or when thecourt determines that disclosure of the identifying information mightjeopardizetheperson’shealth,safety,orliberty,unlessthecourtfindsthattheevidenceisnecessarytodeterminetheissuesintheproceeding. Thecourtisrequiredtoconductproceedingstodetermineadmissibilityundertheruleinsuchamannersoasnottodisclosetheinformationatissueunlesssuchdisclosureisnecessaryasamatterofdueprocess.

47Nowat22M.R.S.§4007(1-A)(2014).

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Even if the court determines that the evidence should be admitted asnecessary to determine an issue in the proceeding, the information is to bereceived in camera, and, in the caseof childprotectiveproceedings, outsidethepresenceof thepartyorperson fromwhomharm is feared, andoutsidethepresenceofhisorherattorney. Objection may be raised under this rule by parties, witnesses, theirattorneys,andotherpersonsaffectedbytheproceedings. Furtherprohibitionsondisclosure,recordkeeping,etc.aretheprovinceofothers.

ARTICLEV.PRIVILEGES

RULE501.PRIVILEGESRECOGNIZEDONLYASPROVIDEDBYLAWUnless an applicable state or federal constitution, statute, or rule providesotherwise,nopersonhasaprivilegeto:(a) Refusetobeawitness;

(b) Refusetodiscloseanymatter;(c) Refusetoproduceanobjectorwriting;or(d) Prevent another from testifying as a witness, from disclosing any

matter,orfromproducinganobjectorwriting.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] TheFederalRulesofEvidencedonotsetforthprivileges,exceptfortheAttorney-ClientPrivilege inFederalRule502,and therefore theMaineRulesofEvidence501–514areentirelydifferentfromArticleVoftheFederalRules.TheMaineRulesinthisArticlehaveeachbeenrestyledinaccordancewiththefederalrestylingconventions,and,aspartofthisprocess,theCommitteehasproposedsomeminornonsubstantivechangestoclarifytheRules.

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Maine Rule 501 has been restyled in accordance with the federalrestyling conventions, and, as part of this process, the Committee hasproposedsomeminor,nonsubstantivechangestoclarifytheRule.

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Thisrule limitsprivileges to thoseprovidedbyConstitutionorstatute

or by rules promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court. This means thatcommon law privileges, such as that between attorney and client, must beincluded in these rules. On theotherhand, aprivilege createdby statute ispreservedwithoutanyneedtodealwithit.Noattemptismadetoincorporatethe constitutional provisions relating to admission or exclusion of evidence.They do not readily lend themselves to codification, and the best point ofreference is the provisions themselves and the decisions construing them.The most familiar constitutional privilege is the privilege against self-incrimination. Other concepts having constitutional dimension are therequired exclusion of involuntary confessions, confessions made by onedeprivedoftherighttocounsel,andthefruitsofunlawfulsearchandseizure.Therearealsovariousfederalandstateimmunitystatutestoprotectpersonscompelled to testify. A degree of secrecy of grand jury deliberations isprovidedbyM.R.Crim.P.6(e).

The Court did not use its rulemaking power to create new privileges.Most evidentiary rules relate to what happens in the courtroom and aredesignedtofacilitateascertainmentofthetruth.Privileges,ontheotherhand,aredesigned toshutout the truthsoas toprotectrelationshipsofsufficientsocial importance to assure their confidentiality. This judgment based onsocialpolicy isonewhich isbestmadeby theelectedrepresentativesof thepeople. Where there is a common law privilege, the Court has felt free incodifying it to fill gaps for which there is no precise Maine authority.Similarly,withrespecttostatutoryprivileges,suchastheclergyman-penitentprivilege,theCourthasalteredthestatutorywordingtofittheformatoftherules and prescribed details not in the statute but consistent with thelegislativepolicy.

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The changes that have been made are set forth in the Notes to theseveralprivilegesthatfollow. TheFederalRulesconfinethetreatmentofprivilegetoRule501,whichprovides (1) that in federal cases privileges shall be governed by theprinciplesofthecommonlawastheymaybeinterpretedinthelightofreasonand experience (the language48 of F.R.Crim.P. 26); and (2) that in actionswherestatelawsuppliestheruleofdecisionprivilegesshallbedeterminedinaccordancewithstatelaw. The rules that follow are based in a largemeasure on the rules withrespect to privilege promulgated by the SupremeCourt,with some changesmadeintheUniformStateLaw.

RULE502.LAWYER-CLIENTPRIVILEGE(a) Definitions.Asusedinthisrule:

(1) A“client”is:

(A) Aperson;(B) Apublicofficer;

(C) Acorporation;

(D) Anassociation;or

(E) Anyotherorganizationorentity,publicorprivate;

To whom a lawyer renders professional legal services, or whoconsultswithalawyerwithaviewtowardobtainingprofessionallegalservicesfromthelawyer.

(2) A“representativeof theclient” isapersonwhohasauthorityon

behalfoftheclientto:

48Formerlanguage.

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(A) Obtainprofessionallegalservices;or(B) Actonadvicerenderedaspartofprofessionallegalservices.

(3) A“lawyer”is:

(A) Apersonauthorized topractice law inanystateornation;or(B) A person whom the client reasonably believes to beauthorizedtopracticelawinanystateornation.

(4) A“representativeof the lawyer” isapersonwho isemployedbythe lawyer to assist the lawyer in the rendition of professionallegalservices.

(5) A communication is “confidential” if it is made to facilitate the

provisionof legalservices to theclientand isnot intended tobedisclosed toany thirdpartyother than those towhomtheclientrevealedtheinformationintheprocessofobtainingprofessionallegalservices.

(b) General rule. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and toprevent any other person from disclosing, the contents of any confidentialcommunication:

(1) Between the client or client’s representative and the client’slawyerorlawyer’srepresentative;

(2) Betweenthelawyerandthelawyer’srepresentative;

(3) Bytheclient,theclient’srepresentative,theclient’slawyer,orthe

lawyer’srepresentativetoalawyerrepresentinganotherpartyinthatpendingactionconcerningamatterofcommoninterest inapendingaction;

(4) Betweentheclient’srepresentatives,orbetweentheclientandhis

orherrepresentative;or

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(5) Amongtheclient’slawyersandthoselawyers’representatives.

(c) Whomayclaimtheprivilege.

(1) Theprivilegemaybeclaimedby:

(A) Theclient;(B) Theclient’sguardianorconservator;

(C) The client’s personal representative, if the client is

deceased;or

(D) An officer, manager, trustee, or other agent authorized toact on behalf of a legal entity—such as a corporation,limited liability company, partnership, or trust—in legalmatters or in obtaining the services of, or communicatingwith, an attorney for the entity, whether or not the entitystillexists.

(2) There is a presumption that the personwhowas the lawyer orlawyer’s representative at the time of the communication inquestionhasauthoritytoclaimtheprivilegeontheclient’sbehalf.

(d) Exceptions. The lawyer-client privilege is subject to the following

exceptions:(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. The lawyer-client privilege does

notapplyiftheclientsoughtorobtainedthelawyer’sservicestohelpapersonplanorcommitwhattheclientkneworreasonablyshouldhaveknownwasacrimeorfraud.

(2) Claimants Through Same Deceased Client. The lawyer-client

privilege does not apply to any communication relevant to anissue between parties who claim through the same deceasedclient.

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(3) Breach of Duty by Lawyer or Client. The lawyer-client privilegedoes not cover any communication relevant to an issue of thelawyer’sbreachofadutytotheclient,oroftheclient’sbreachofadutytothelawyer.

(4) Document Attested by Lawyer. The lawyer-client privilege does

not apply to a communication relevant to an issue about adocumenttowhichthelawyerisanattestingwitness.

(5) Joint Clients. When a communication is offered in an action

betweenclientswhowererepresented jointlyby the lawyer, thelawyer-clientprivilegedoesnotprotectthatcommunicationifitisrelevant to amatter of common interest between clients, and ifthe communication was made by any one of the clients to thelawyerretainedorconsultedaspartofajointrepresentation.

(6) Public Officer or Agency. The lawyer-client privilege does not

apply tocommunicationsbetweenapublicofficeroragencyanditslawyers.However,ifthecourtdeterminesthatdisclosurewillseriouslyimpairthepublicofficer’soragency’sabilitytoprocessa claim or carry out a pending investigation, litigation, orproceeding in thepublic interest, the lawyer-clientprivilegewillapply to communications concerning the pending investigation,claim,oraction.


Maine Rule 502 has been restyled in accordance with the federalrestyling conventions, and, as part of this process, the Committee hasproposedsomeminor,nonsubstantivechangestoclarifytheRule.49

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49WhenaRule502questionisaddressedasanethicalissueorobligation,Rule1.6oftheMaine

RulesofProfessionalConduct(ConfidentialityofInformation)shouldalsobereviewed.

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ThereisnothinginthisrulethatisbelievedtobecontrarytoanyMainedecision,butthereareseveralmattersonwhichMainecaselawissilent. Subsection (a)(2) defines “representative of the client” as one havingauthority to obtain legal services and50 to act on advice rendered pursuanttheretoonbehalf of the client. This is an adoptionof the so-called “controlgroup” test. It narrows the privilege, confining it to communications bypersonsofsufficientauthoritytomakedecisionsfortheclient. Itwouldnotprotect communications from lower-level employees to lawyers to enablethemtoadvise adecision-makingsuperior. To illustratebyanexample, ifabank teller seeks advice from the bank’s attorney whether to accept assufficientaparticularendorsement,thecommunicationwouldpresumablybeprivileged because the tellerwould have authority to act on the advice. If,however, he gave the attorney a statement about a customer slipping on aforeignobjectashewaspresentingacheck tobecashed, therewouldbenoprivilege. This would be true even though his decision-making superiorsdirectedhimtomakethestatement. The distinction between a privilege and the work product ruleembodied inM.R.C.P.26(b)(3)shouldbeemphasized. If there isaprivilege,disclosurecannotberequiredeitherindiscoveryproceedingsorattrial.Thework product rule gives a qualified protection to unprivileged informationprepared in anticipation of trial, which can be overcome by a showing ofsubstantialneed.Ithasnothingtodowithadmissibilityattrial. Subsection(d)(6)deniesaprivilegebetweenpublicofficersoragenciesand their lawyersunless thecommunicationconcerns apendingmatterandthe court determines that disclosurewould seriously impair the conduct of

50TherestyledversionoftheRule,aswellasthemostrecentformerversionoftheRule,utilizes

“or” rather than “and.” This difference seems inconsistent with the paragraph. The 1983AmendmentNotesaysthecontrolgrouptestismaintained,soitisunclearwhenorwhytheword“or”wassubstitutedfor“and,”andwhetheritchangesthemeaningofthispartoftheRule.

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theproceedinginthepublicinterest.51NoMainelawonthesubjecthasbeenfound.


InUpjohnv.U.S.,449U.S.383,101S.Ct.677(1981), theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtdisapprovedofthe“controlgrouptest” infederalcourt. TheCourt declined to attempt to delineate any substitute. Although the controlgroup test is law in a minority of jurisdictions, it appears that there is noconsensusintheotherjurisdictionsastothebestruletogovernthescopeofthe attorney/client privilege as applied to corporate clients. After carefullyreconsideringthematterin1982,theAdvisoryCommitteehasrecommendedretentionofthecontrolgrouptestwithoutchange.52 It should be reemphasized that the privilege conferred byRule 502 isindependentofthe“workproduct”doctrinewhichgivesdiscoveryprotectionto certain kinds of material developed by or under the supervision of anattorney in preparation for litigation. In many cases informationalcommunicationsfromemployeesoutsidethecontrolgroupcanbeprotectedfromcivildiscoverybytheworkproductdoctrine.

RULE503.HEALTHCAREPROFESSIONAL,MENTALHEALTHPROFESSIONAL,ANDLICENSEDCOUNSELINGPROFESSIONAL

PATIENTPRIVILEGE(a) Definitions.Asusedinthisrule:

(1) A “patient” is a person who consults, is examined by, or isinterviewedby:

51Rule502(d)(6)hassincebeenamendedtoprovideexceptionstothe“noprivilege”statement.Rule 502(d)(6) presently states: “The lawyer-client privilege does not apply to communicationsbetweenapublicofficeroragencyanditslawyers.However,ifthecourtdeterminesthatdisclosurewillseriouslyimpairthepublicofficer’soragency’sabilitytoprocessaclaimorcarryoutapendinginvestigation,litigation,orproceedinginthepublicinterest,thelawyer-clientprivilegewillapplytocommunicationsconcerningthependinginvestigation,claim,oraction.”52Seefootnoteaboveabout“or”versus“and”language.

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(A) Ahealthcareprofessional;(B) Amentalhealthprofessional;or

(C) Alicensedcounselingprofessional.

(2) A“healthcareprofessional”is:

(A) Apersonauthorizedtopracticeasaphysician;(B) Alicensedphysician’sassistant;or

(C) Alicensednursepractitioner;

UnderMainelaw,orundersubstantiallysimilar lawofanyotherstate or nation, while that person is practicing the health careprofessionforwhichheorsheislicensed.

(3) A“mentalhealthprofessional”is:

(A) A health care professional engaged in the diagnosis or

treatment of a mental or emotional condition, includingalcoholordrugaddiction;

(B) A person licensed or certified as a psychologist orpsychological examiner under Maine state law or undersubstantially similar law of any state or nation whilepracticingassuch;

(C) A person licensed as a clinical social worker underMaine

state laworundersubstantiallysimilar lawofanystateornationwhilepracticingassuch.

(4) A“licensedcounselingprofessional”is:

(A) A“licensedprofessionalcounselor”;(B) A“licensedclinicalprofessionalcounselor”;

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(C) A“licensedmarriageandfamilytherapist”or;

(D) A“licensedpastoralcounselor”;

Who is licensed to diagnose and treat mental health disorders,intra- and inter-personal problems, or other dysfunctionalbehaviorofasocialandspiritualnatureunder32M.R.S.§13858,orunderasubstantiallysimilar lawof anyotherstateornation,while that person is practicing the counseling profession forwhichheorsheislicensed.

(5) A communication is “confidential” if it was not intended to be

disclosedtoanythirdpersons,otherthan:

(A) Those who were present to further the interests of thepatientintheconsultation,examination,orinterview;

(B) Those who were reasonably necessary to make the

communication;or

(C) Those who are participating in the diagnosis and/ortreatment under the direction of the health care, mentalhealth, or licensed counseling professional. This includesmembersofthepatient’sfamily.

(b) General rule. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to

preventanyotherpersonfromdisclosing,confidentialcommunicationsmade for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient’s physical,mental, or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction,betweenoramongthepatientand:

(1) Thepatient’shealthcareprofessional,mentalhealthprofessional,

orlicensedcounselingprofessional;and(2) Thosewhowereparticipatinginthediagnosisortreatmentatthe

directionofthehealthcare,mentalhealth,orlicensedcounselingprofessional.Thisincludesmembersofthepatient’sfamily.

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(c) Criminal defendant’s privilege. When the court orders that thedefendant’s mental condition be examined in order to determinecriminal responsibility, the defendant has a privilege to refuse todisclose, and to prevent others from disclosing, any communicationmadeduringthatexaminationthatconcernstheoffensecharged.

(d) Whomayclaimtheprivilege.

(1) Theprivilegemaybeclaimedby:

(A) Thepatient;(B) Thepatient’sguardianorconservator;or

(C) The patient’s personal representative, if the client is

deceased.(2) Thereisapresumptionthatthepersonwhowasthehealthcare,

mentalhealth, or licensed counseling professional at the timeofthe communication in question has authority to claim theprivilegeonbehalfofthepatient.

(e) Exceptions.Theprivilegeforcommunicationsbetweenapatientanda

healthcareprofessional,amentalhealthcareprofessional,oralicensedcounselingprofessionalissubjecttothefollowingexceptions:

(1) Proceedingsforhospitalization.Theprivilegeunderthisruledoes

notapplytocommunicationsrelevanttoan issueinproceedingstohospitalizethepatientformentalillnessiftheprofessionalhasdetermined in the course of diagnosis or treatment that thepatientneedstobehospitalized.

(2) Examinationbyorderofcourt.Ifthecourtordersanevaluationof

apatient’sphysical,mental, or emotional condition,whether thepatient is a party or a witness, the privilege does not apply tocommunicationsmadeduringthecourseofthatevaluation,unlessthe court orders otherwise. However, a criminal defendant’scommunicationsduring thecourseofacourt-orderedevaluation

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or examination are still privileged to the extent provided bysection(c)ofthisrule.

(3) Conditionanelementofclaimordefense.Theprivilegeunderthis

ruledoes not apply to communications relevant to an issueof aphysical,mental,oremotionalconditionofthepatientif:

(A) The condition is an element of the patient’s claim ordefense;or(B) Theconditionisanelementoftheclaimordefenseof:

(i) Anypartyclaimingthroughorunderthepatient;

(ii) Anypartyclaimingbecauseofthepatient’scondition;

(iii) Anypartyclaimingasabeneficiaryofthepatient;or

(iv) Any party claiming through a contract to which thepatientisorwasaparty.

(4) After the patient’s death. The privilege does not apply after the

patient’s death in any proceeding in which any party puts thepatient’sphysical,mental,oremotionalconditioninissue.



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Therewasnodoctor-patientprivilegeatcommon law. There isat thepresent time a statutory privilege. P.L. 1973, c. 625, § 218. It is a dubiousprotectiontotheconfidentialityoftherelationship,sincedisclosurewouldberequired “when a court in the exercise of sound discretion deems such

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disclosure necessary to the proper administration of justice.” Under thisformulation no clear assurance to the patient could be given before thecommunicationwasmadethatitwouldnotbeorderedtobedisclosed. The rule as promulgated by the Supreme Court did not provide ageneral doctor-patient privilege, but did define “psychotherapist” so as toincludeanyphysicianwhileengagedinthediagnosisortreatmentofamentalor emotional condition. The American Medical Association objected to therejectionoftheprivilegeathearingsontheHousebill.Itdidnotadvocateanunrestrictedprivilege. Itwassatisfied thatnoprotectionshouldbegiven tocommunications relevant to the patient’s condition in an action where theconditionwasanelementofhis claim ordefense. TheCourthas adopted aphysician-patient privilege in the limited form recommended by the AMA.ThisiscomparabletotheexceptionintheMainestatuteofactions“whenthephysical or mental condition of the patient is at issue.” Elimination of theopen-ended denial of the privilege at the discretion of the court does notsacrifice any value of importance to the administration of justice, and itrelieves theuncertainty in the statute as to the extentof the confidentiality.The rule incorporates the statutory privileges of the psychologist orpsychologicalexaminer,32M.R.S.A.§3815,53addedbyP.L.1968,c.544,§82,and the psychiatrist, 16 M.R.S.A. § 60,54 added by P.L. 1973, c. 481. It hasomitted the statutory requirement that a psychiatrist must be “boardcertified”. In fact, board certification is not required as a condition of apsychiatrist’srighttopractice.Thestatuteonpsychologistsandpsychologicalexaminershasnosuchrequirement.Thereisnoapparentjustificationforthedistinction, nor does it seem right to put upon the patient the burden ofdiscovering whether the psychiatrist is board certified in order to knowwhetherhiscommunicationsareprivileged. Other changes from the statutes in the rule correct statutorydeficiencies (1)declaring “communications” privileged without reference toconfidentiality, (2)not including communications to a person reasonablybelieved to be a psychotherapist, (3) not including the right of a guardian,conservator, or personal representative to claim the privilege or in terms

53Thisstatutehasbeenrepealed.54Thisstatutehasbeenrepealed.

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giving a psychotherapist authority to claim it on behalf of the patient, and(4)notincludingtheexceptionslistedintherule.Thesechangesfleshoutthelegislativeintentandareconsistentwiththatintent. The definition of confidentiality in subdivision (a)(4)55 and thestatement in subdivision (b)56 of the general rule of privilege are broadenoughtoincludetheincreasinglycommonuseofgrouptherapywhereotherpatients are present during the communication. Such persons would beparticipating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of thepsychotherapist. Subdivision(c)givesseparatetreatmenttoanexaminationorderedbythecourttodeterminethecriminalresponsibilityofanaccusedinacriminalproceeding. The purpose is to ensure protection against disclosure of anycommunication made to the examiner concerning guilt or innocence. Itpreserves the rule enunciated in State v. Hathaway, 161 Me. 255,211A.2d558(1965).Theexceptioninsubdivision(d)(2)57excludesfromitsoperationcommunicationsprivilegedundersubdivision(c).


(July2008) This amendment would expand the coverage of the physician-psychotherapist privilege in Rule 503 to include communications betweencertaindescribedmentalhealthprofessionalsandtheirpatientsorclients. Whenvariouspre-existing,common-law,andstatutoryprivilegeswerecodified in the Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Advisory Committee and theMaineSupreme JudicialCourt followedthe leadof theoriginalUnitedStatesSupremeCourtversionoftheFederalRulesofEvidenceandtookarelativelyconservative view of the scope of the physician-psychotherapist privilege.Maine Evidence Rule 503 as originally adopted limited the evidentiaryprivilege to communications to or from licensed physicians (or persons

55Nowsubsection(a)(5).56Nowsubsection(b)(2).57Nowsubsection(e)(2).

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reasonablybelievedtobesuch)andlicensedpsychologistsandpsychologicalexaminers. Although then, asnow, awidevarietyof counselingandmentalhealth professionals treated and consulted with clients and patients on aconfidential basis, coverage of the privilegewas deliberately kept relativelynarrow, largely out of a concern that a broader definition might lead toevidentiary unavailability of statements rendered in a variety of situationsthat could be characterized as counseling or therapeutic in one way oranother. Thisdoesnotmeanthattherehasbeennoprotectionofconfidentialityfor patients and mental health professionals. In many cases the statutesunderwhichdifferentgroupsofmentalhealthprofessionalsorcounselorsarelicensedhaveimposeddutiesofconfidentialityandhaveestablishedstatutoryprivilegesformembersofthelicensedgroups.Inmanycasesthesestatutoryprivilegesauthorizedisclosurebycourtorderwhennecessary for thesoundadministrationofjustice. Over the three decades since original promulgation of the Rules ofEvidencethenumberandscopeofactivityofmanydifferentkindsofmentalhealthprofessionalsandcounselorshavegreatlyincreased.Therehasbeenafrequentandofteninsistentcallforstrongerprotectionoftherelationshipsofthese therapists and counselors to theirpatients in the formof extensionofthestatutoryprivilege. TheimpetustowardextensionofthepsychotherapistprivilegebeyondthetraditionalholderswasincreasedbytheSupremeCourtdecisioninJaffeev.Redmond,518U.S.1(1996).TheretheSupremeCourtruledasamatteroffederal common law of evidence that communications between a clinicalsocial worker and her patient were absolutely privileged from disclosuredespitetheirlikelyrelevancetotheissuesinacivilaction.TheSupremeCourtappliedtheabsoluteprivilegedespitetheexistenceofconditionalprotectionunderthelawsofthestateunderwhichthesocialworkerwaslicensed. Today evidence rules, statutes, and common law among theAmericanjurisdictions vary widely in the scope of the psychotherapist privilege,although it appears that the trend is toward a more expansive privilege interms ofmental health and counseling professionals covered. The UniformRules of Evidence have been recently amended in 1999 to include analternative proposal extending the psychotherapist privilege to a “mental

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health provider,” namely “a person licensed or reasonably believed by thepatient so tobewhile engaged in thediagnosisor treatmentof amental oremotionalconditionincludingalcoholordrugaddiction.” Thepressureforincreasedcoverageappearstobecomingmainlyfromtwo groups: (1) various clinical social workers and licensed mental healthprofessionalswhoprovidetherapyformentaloremotionaldiseaseincludingdrug and alcohol addiction; (2) a broader group of professional counselorswhoprovidevariouskindsofcounselingservices,butwhodonotnecessarilytreatmentaloremotionaldiseasesoraddictions. The proposed amendment would extend the absolute evidentiaryprivilege to licensed nurse practitioners and licensed physician’s assistantswhentreatingpatients.Theprivilegewouldalsoencompasslicensedclinicalsocial workers when treating emotional and mental conditions and fourdefined classes of licensed counseling professionals, “licensed professionalcounselors,” “licensed clinical professional counselors,” “licensed marriageand family therapists,” and “licensed pastoral counselors,”when performingtheir counseling functions. Valid and complete licensure would be aprerequisitefortheprivilege. Clinicalsocialworkersarelicensedunder32M.R.S.§§7051etseq. Ofthevariouskindsofsocialworkerscoveredbystate licensingrequirements,thosedesignatedandlicensedas“clinicalsocialworkers”seembesttofitthetraditionalroleofpsychotherapistascontemplatedbytheprivilege.SeeJaffeev.Redmond,supra. The licensed counseling professionals proposed to be covered by theprivilege are now licensedunder32M.R.S. §§13851et seq. These licensedcounselors provide different forms of psychotherapy in at least somecircumstances. Such professionals are currently covered by a conditionalprivilegewhichpermitsdisclosureofclientcommunications“whenacourtinthe exercise of sound discretion determines the disclosure necessary to theproperadministrationofjustice.”32M.R.S.§13862.Theruledoesnotcoverprofessionalsnotlicensedbutreferredtoin32M.R.S.§13856. This proposal does not cover communications to and by unlicensedmentalhealthprofessionalsandcounselorsorbypersonslicensedtoprovidespecializedcounseling,suchasguidancecounseling.TheCommitteeisofthe

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view that a generic definition that is not tied to some kind of clearrequirement of state licensure would make the privilege administrativelyunworkable.ForthesamereasontheCommitteehasnotrecommendedthatthe privilege attach to persons “reasonably believed to be” licensed clinicalsocialworkersorlicensedcounselors.TheprivilegewouldextendtopersonsnotlicensedinMaine,butlicensedinanalogouscategorieswithsubstantiallysimilarlegalrequirementsbyotherstatesornations.

RULE504.SPOUSALPRIVILEGE(a) Definition.Acommunicationbyamarriedpersonisconfidentialif:(1) Thepersonmakesitprivatelytotheperson’sspouse,and

(2) Thepersonmakingitdoesnotintendforittobedisclosedtoany

otherperson.

(b) Generalrule.Amarriedpersonhasaprivilegetopreventtheperson’sspousefromdisclosingthecontentsofanyconfidentialcommunicationbetweenthepersonandthespouse.

(c) Who may claim the privilege. The person who made the

communication can claim the privilege. The spouse also haspresumptiveauthoritytoclaimtheprivilegeontheperson’sbehalf.

(d) Exceptions. The spousal privilege is subject to the followingexceptions:

(1) Thespousalprivilegedoesnotapplyinaproceedinginwhichonespouseischargedwithacrimeagainstthepersonorpropertyof:

(A) Theotherspouse;

(B) Achildofeitherspouse;

(C) Anypersonresidingineitherspouse’shousehold;or

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(D) Any third person, if the crime against that person orproperty occurred in the course of committing a crimeagainst the other spouse, a child of either spouse, or anypersonresidingineitherspouse’shousehold.

(2) The spousal privilege does not apply in a civil proceedingwhen

thespousesareadverseparties.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] Maine Rule 504 has been restyled in accordance with the federalrestyling conventions, and, as part of this process, the Committee hasproposedsomeminor,nonsubstantivechangestoclarifytheRule.

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This rule preserves15M.R.S.A. §1315,whichmakes the spouseof anaccused a competent witness in a criminal proceeding except in regard to“marital communications”. This phrase has been § 1315, whichmakes thespouse construed to mean confidential communications. State v. Benner,284A.2d 91 (1971) (where the court assumed without deciding that theprivilege comprehends conductother thanverbal exchanges). The rule alsopreservesthecommonlawprivilegerecognizedinMainecaselaw.Walkerv.Sanborn, 46 Me. 470 (1859). The basis of the privilege was stated to beprinciplesofpublicpolicytopreservethepeaceofdomestic life. Itdoesnotapplywhen the parties are hostile to each other and are living apart underarticlesofseparationwhenthecommunicationismade.Holyokev.Holyoke’sEstates,110Me.469,87A.40(1913). Subdivision(d)givesnoprivilegeifonespouseischargedwithacrimeagainst the other, a child of either, any person residing in the household ofeither, or a third person committed in the course of committing a crimeagainstanyof them. Nor is thereanyprivilege incivilproceedingsbetweentheparties,suchasdivorce.TheruleappearstobeconsistentwithMainelaw,althoughtherearesomepointsnotcoveredbydecisions.

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TheruleaspromulgatedbytheSupremeCourtwasmarkedlydifferent.Itrecognizedaprivilegeofanaccusedinacriminalproceedingtokeephisorherspouseoffthewitnessstand(withtheexceptionslaterlisted).Itdidnotrecognizeanyprivilegeforconfidentialcommunicationsbetweenthespouseseither in a criminal case, if the accused does not exercise the privilege topreventthespousefromtestifying,orinacivilaction.

RULE505.RELIGIOUSPRIVILEGE(a) Definitions.Asusedinthisrule:

(1) A“memberoftheclergy”isanindividualwhohasbeenordainedor accredited as a spiritual advisor, counselor, or leader by anyreligiousorganizationestablishedonthebasisofacommunityoffaith andbelief, doctrines, and practicesof a religious character,or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the personconsultingthatindividual.

(2) Acommunicationis“confidential”if:

(A) Itismadeprivately;and(B) Itisnotintendedfordisclosureotherthantootherpersons

present in furtherance of the purpose of thecommunication.

(b) General rule. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and topreventanyotherpersonfromdisclosing,aconfidentialcommunicationmadetoamemberoftheclergywhowasactingasaspiritualadviseratthetimeofthecommunication.

(c) Whomayclaimtheprivilege.Theprivilegecanbeclaimedby:

(1) Thepersonwhomadethecommunication;

(2) Theperson’sguardianorconservator;or

(3) Theperson’spersonalrepresentative,ifthepersonisdeceased.

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Thepersonwhowasaclergymemberatthetimeofthecommunicationalso has presumptive authority to claim the privilege on behalf of thepersonwhomadethecommunication.


Maine Rule 505 has been restyled in accordance with the federalrestyling conventions, and, as part of this process, the Committee hasproposedsomeminor,nonsubstantivechangestoclarifytheRule.Amongthechanges recommended for the Maine privileges was to Rule 505. Thedefinition of “member of the clergy” has been revised to be inclusive of allreligions, but the language remains restrictive in ensuring that theprivilegemaynotbeapplied tocommunicationswithmembersof theclergywhoarenot specifically certified or ordained by a religious community. Thus,communications involving lay practitioners who participate in teaching oradvisoryroles,forexample,wouldnotfallundertheprivilege.

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There is a statutory privilege for penitential communications to

clergymen. 16M.R.S.A.§57,58addedbyP.L.1965,c.117. Thisrule acceptsthe privilege but modifies it slightly to conform to the style of the otherprivilege rules. The definition of clergyman is changed to include a personreasonably believed to be one by the person consulting him. The privilegeprotects a communication to a clergyman in his professional character asspiritualadviserbutdoesnotrequire,asthestatutedoes,thatitbe“madeinthe course of the discipline or practice of the church or religiousdenomination or organization of which the penitent is a member.” Thereseemstobenogoodreasonnottoincludewithintheprivilegeaconfidentialcommunicationmadetoaspiritualadviserassucheventhoughthepenitentwas not a member of his church or denomination. The rule is designed toprotecttheconfidentialityofcommunicationsonawidevarietyofethicalandmoralissues.


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RULE506.POLITICALVOTE(a) Generalrule.Everypersonhasaprivilegetorefusetodisclosehisor

herownvoteatapoliticalelectionconductedbysecretballot.(b) Exceptions.Theprivilegedoesnotapplyifthecourt:(1) Findsthatthevotewascastillegally;or

(2) Determines that thedisclosure should be compelledpursuant to

stateelectionlaws.


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A privilege not to disclose the tenor of one’s vote appears to be

universallyrecognizedalthough there arenoMainecaseson thepoint. Theprivilegeisnotapplicableifthevotewascastillegally.Ofcourse,theprivilegeagainst self incrimination would be available under appropriatecircumstances.

RULE507.TRADESECRETS(a) General rule. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and topreventanyotherpersonfromdisclosing,atradesecretthatthepersonowns.

(b) Whomayclaimtheprivilege.Theprivilegemaybeclaimedby:(1) Thepersonwhoownsthetradesecret;

(2) Theperson’sagent;or

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(3) Theperson’semployee.(c) Exceptions.Thetradesecretsprivilegedoesnotapplyifitwillconcealfraudorotherwiseworkinjustice.Ifthecourtdirectsthatthetradesecretbedisclosed, itmusttakemeasurestoprotecttheinterestsofthetradesecret’sowner,theotherparties,andjustice.


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Thisprivilegeiswidelyrecognized.NoMainecasehasbeenfound,but

M.R.C.P. 26(c) allows the judge in discovery proceedings tomake any orderwhich justice requires including an order “that a trade secret or otherconfidential research, development, or commercial information not bedisclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.” This evidence ruleextends the underlying policy from the discovery stage into the trial. Thedifference in circumstances between the two stagesmaywell be enough torequireadifferentrulingattrial.

The privilege is a limited one. Patents and copyrights secure ampleprotectionwhentheyareobtainable.Theneedforprotectionoftradesecretswithoutresorttopublicregistrationisrelativelyrare,andWigmoresaysthepresumptionshouldbeagainsttheirpropriety.Theruleallowstheprivilegeonlyifitwillnottendtoconcealfraudorotherwiseworkinjustice. The last sentence of the rule gives room for judicial ingenuity inevolving protective measures to achieve some control over disclosure.Perhapsthemostcommonissimplytotakethetestimonyincamera.

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RULE508.SECRETSOFSTATEANDOTHEROFFICIALINFORMATION;GOVERNMENTALPRIVILEGES

(a) Privilege.IfthefederalorMaineconstitution,orafederalorMaine

statute,createsagovernmentalprivilege,apersonmayclaimtheprivilegepursuanttotheapplicableprovisionoflaw.Thereisnoothergovernmentalprivilege.

(b) Effectofsustainingaclaimofgovernmentalprivilege. If thecourtsustains a claim of governmental privilege and thereby appears todeprive another party ofmaterial evidence, the courtmust make anyordersrequiredbytheinterestsofjustice.Theseordersmayinclude:

(1) Strikingthetestimonyofawitness;

(2) Declaringamistrial;

(3) Making a finding on an issue as to which the evidence was

relevant;or

(4) Dismissingtheaction.


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Mostoftheproblemsinthisfieldariseinfederallitigation,andthisrulereflectsadecisiontosteerasclearoftheproblemaspossible. Itrecognizes,as it must do, a privilege created by federal law to the extent that theConstitutionrequiresandsaysthat itmaybeclaimedasprovidedbyfederallaw. NoothergovernmentalprivilegeisrecognizedexceptascreatedbytheConstitutionorastatuteofthisstate.

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RULE509.IDENTITYOFINFORMANT(a) Ruleofprivilegeanddefinitions.

(1) Ruleofprivilege.TheUnitedStates,astateorsubdivisionthereof,or any foreign country has a privilege to refuse to disclose theidentityofaninformant.

(2) Definitions. Asused in this rule, an “informant” is apersonwho

has furnished information relating to or assisting in aninvestigationofapossibleviolationoflawto:

(A) Alawenforcementofficerconductinganinvestigation;or(B) Amemberofalegislativecommitteeor itsstaffconducting

aninvestigation.

(b) Whomay claim the privilege. An authorized representative of thepublicentitythatreceivedtheinformationmayclaimtheprivilege.

(c) Exceptions.Theprivilegeoftheidentityofaninformantdoesnotapply

if:

(1) Theinformant’sidentityorhisorherinterestintheinvestigationhas already been revealed to those who might resent thecommunication;or

(2) Theinformantappearsasawitnessforthestate.

(d) Testimonyonrelevant issue. If itappearsthataninformantmaybeable to give relevant testimony in a civil or criminal case to which apublicentityisaparty,thepublicentitymayinvoketheprivilege.Ifthepublicentityinvokestheprivilege:

(1) The courtmay give the public entity an opportunity to show, incamera and on the record, whether the informant can, in fact,supplytherelevanttestimony.Theshowingmaybeintheformofaffidavits or, if the court finds that the matter cannot besatisfactorilyresolvedwithaffidavits,throughtestimony.

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(2) If the court finds that there is a reasonable probability that theinformercangiverelevanttestimony,thecourtmay,eitheronitsownoronmotionofaparty,enteranorderrequiringthepublicentity to disclose the identity of the informantwithin a specifictimeandprovidingrelief tootherparties in theevent thepublicentity elects not to disclose the identity of the informantwithinthetimespecified.

(A) Inacriminalcase,thereliefmayincludeoneormoreofthefollowing:

(i) Granting the defendant additional time or acontinuance;

(ii) Relieving the defendant from making disclosuresotherwiserequired;

(iii) Prohibiting theprosecution from introducing certainevidence;and

(iv) Dismissingthecharges.

(B) Inacivilcase,thecourtmayprovideanyreliefrequiredintheinterestsofjustice.

(C) Whenorderingrelief,thecourtshallensurethat:

(i) Evidence submitted to the courtmust be sealed andpreservedforappeal;

(ii) A docket entry specifying the form, but not thecontent,oftheevidencemustbemade;and

(iii) Allcounselandpartiesmaybepresentateverystageof the proceedings under this rule, except that, at ashowingincamera,onlycounselforthepublicentitymaybepresent.

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TheprivilegeofthestatetorefusetodisclosetheidentityofaninformeriswellsettledinMaineaselsewhere.Statev.Fortin,106Me.382,76A.896(1910). It reflects a recognition that effective use of informers in lawenforcementcompelsprotectionoftheiranonymity.Itisonlytheidentityofthe informer thatneed notbe revealed. The contentofwhathe says isnotprivileged except to the extent necessary to conceal his identity. Thereference to “any foreign country” is designed especially to preserve theprivilege of Canadian police officials not to disclose the identity of aninformer. The exceptions to the privilege set forth in subdivision (c)59 seementirely reasonable although there is noMaine case law dealingwith them.When the informer’s identity has been disclosed to “thosewhowould havecause toresent thecommunication”, aphrase fromRoviarov.UnitedStates,353U.S.53,60,77S.Ct.623,627(1957), there isno longerareason for theprivilege. Thesameistrue if theinformerappearsasawitness. Subsection(c)(2)60 isbuilt chiefly fromthe teachingsofRoviarov.UnitedStates, supra,the leading case. The informer privilege cannot be used to suppress theidentity of a witness when the right of the accused to prepare his defenseoutweighsthepublic interest inprotectingtheflowof information. Therulelays out a procedure for determining whether the informer can supplyrelevant testimony, including proceedings in camera at the state’s request,withaprovisionforsealingandpreservingevidencesoastomakeitavailableineventofanappeal.Anappealinwhichtheappellantcannotknowwhatthe

59Nowsubsections(c)and(d),andincludingmorein(c)(2)aspartoftherestyling.60Nowsubsection(d).

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sealed evidence is poses obvious practical difficulties, but there is at leastsome possibility of effective review. The rule further prescribes whathappens when the state elects not to disclose the informer’s identity. Theusualresult inacriminalcasewouldbeadismissalofthecharges,butthereareotheroptionsopentothecourt.


TheproceduresetforthinRule509(c)(2)61applieswhenthe informer

may be able to give testimony relevant to any issue in a criminal case,including suppression of evidence. See State v. Chase, 439 A.2d 526 (Me.1982).

RULE510.WAIVEROFPRIVILEGEBYVOLUNTARYDISCLOSURE(a) Generalrule. Apersonwhohas aprivilegeunder theseruleswaivesthe privilege if the person or the person’s predecessor while holding theprivilegevoluntarilydisclosesorconsentstothedisclosureofanysignificantpartoftheprivilegedmatter.(b) Exception.Thisruledoesnotapplyifthedisclosureisitselfprivileged.


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The proposition that a privilege is waived by voluntary disclosure isuniversallyrecognized.

61Nowsubsection(d).

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RULE511.PRIVILEGEDMATTERDISCLOSEDUNDERCOMPULSIONORWITHOUTOPPORTUNITYTOCLAIMTHEPRIVILEGE

Aprivilegeisnotwaivedbyadisclosurethatwas:(a) Compellederroneously;or(b) Madewithoutopportunitytoclaimtheprivilege.


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Whendisclosureofprivilegedmatterhasbeenerroneously compelledor has been made without an opportunity for the holder to claim it, theconfidentiality cannot be restored. This rule gives, however, the remedy ofexcludingtheevidenceif laterofferedinevidenceagainsttheholder. Itmaybe argued that the holder should stand his ground when the privilege iswrongly denied him, refuse to answer, take the consequences including ajudgmentofcontempt,andexhaustallhislegalremedies.But,inthewordsoftheFederalAdvisoryCommittee,“thisexactsoftheholdergreaterfortitudeinthe face of authority than ordinary individuals are likely to possess, andassumesunrealistically thata judicial remedy isalwaysavailable.” It iswellsettled in self-incrimination cases that a disclosure erroneously compelledcannotbeusedinasubsequentcriminalprosecutionagainsttheholder. Theprincipleisequallysoundwhenappliedtootherprivileges. Illustrationsofdisclosurewithoutopportunitytoclaimtheprivilegearedisclosure by an eavesdropper, by a person used in the transmission of aprivileged communication and by a person participating in group therapyunderthedirectionofapsychotherapist. Theruledealsonlywithdisclosureofprivilegedmatter. Itdoesnotaffect thedeterminationofwhat isor isnotprivileged.Thelawisinastateoffluxastowhetherthisprohibitionagainst

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disclosureofacommunicationfromattorneytoclientorfromonespousetothe other extends to personswho obtain knowledge of it by overhearing iteither by eavesdropping or accidentally. The traditional view is that thecommunication is not privileged since themeans of preserving secrecy arelargelyofthepersonmakingthecommunication.Wigmore,Evidence,§2326(attorney-client),§2339(1) (husband-wife). TheUniformRulesofEvidence(1953)couchtheattorney-clientprivilegesoastoapplyitifknowledgeofthecommunication came to the witness in a manner not reasonably to beanticipatedbytheclient.TherearenoMainedecisionsonthesubject.Inanyevent,thisruleisinapplicableifthematterisnotprivileged.Ifitisprivileged,the holder has the right to prevent disclosure, and the evidence isinadmissibleagainsttheholder,provided,ofcourse,thatheobjectswhenitisofferedattrial.

RULE512.COMMENTUPONORINFERENCEFROMCLAIMOFPRIVILEGEINCRIMINALCASES;INSTRUCTION

(a) Commentorinferencenotpermitted.Theclaimofaprivilegeisnota

proper subject of comment by either a judge or counsel in a criminalcase, regardless of whether the privilege was claimed in the presentproceeding or on a prior occasion. The fact findermay not draw anyinferencefromtheclaimofprivilege.

(b) Claimingprivilegeoutsidethehearingof the jury. Incriminal jury

trials,proceedingsshallbeconducted,totheextentpracticable,soastoallowprivilegeclaimstobemadeoutsideofthehearingofthejury.

(c) Jury instruction. Unless waived, any criminal defendant who has

claimedaprivilegeisentitledtoaninstructionthatnoinferencemaybedrawnfromtheclaimofprivilege.


Maine Rule 512 has been restyled in accordance with the federalrestyling conventions, and, as part of this process, the Committee hasproposedsomeminor,nonsubstantivechangestoclarifytheRuleandmakeitconsistent with Maine precedent. See State v. Libby, 410 A.2d 562, 564(Me.1980);Alexander,MaineJuryInstructionManual§6-8at116(2014ed.).

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(February2,1976)

This rule is consistent with Maine law so far as the privilege againstself-incrimination isconcerned. It isprovidedin15M.R.S.A.§1315thatthefact an accused does not testify in his own behalf shall not be taken asevidence of guilt, and that the accused is entitled to an instruction to thateffect.Ifaclaimofprivilegeisnotapropersubjectforcommentorinference,it follows that proceedings for making the claim should, to the extentpracticable, not be conducted in the presence of the jury. It is especiallyimportant not to allow the jury to hear a claim of privilege by a nonpartywitness.Aninferenceagainstapartyfromaclaimofprivilegeoverwhichhehasnocontrolisclearlyunfair.ThisisalsoinaccordwithMainelaw.InStatev. Robbins, 318A.2d 51, 57 (Me. 1974), the LawCourt said: “It is desirablethat a witness’ invocation of the privilege before the jury is to be avowed,though it is not per se prejudicial.” Usually it is ascertainable in advancewhether a privilegewill be claimed, but unforeseen situations are bound toarise. Much must be left to the discretion of the trial judge and theprofessionalresponsibilityofcounsel.Sinceopinionswilldifferastowhetherajuryinstructionnottodrawanadverseinferencewillbehelpfulorharmful,subdivision(c)leavesittothejudgmentofcounselfortheaccusedwhethertorequestit.Itisamatterofrightifrequested.

RULE513.CLAIMOFPRIVILEGEINCIVILCASES(a) Commentpermitted. Inacivilaction,aparty’sclaimof theprivilege

againstself-incriminationisapropersubjectofcommentbyajudgeorbycounsel,regardlessofwhetherthepartyclaimedtheprivilegeinthepresentproceedingoronaprioroccasion.

(b) Inference permitted. In a civil action, the fact finder may draw an

appropriate inference fromaparty’s claimof theprivilege against selfincrimination.

(c) Claim of privilege by a nonparty witness. Rule 512 governs a

nonpartywitness’sclaimofprivilegeinacivilactionorproceeding.

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(d) Claim of privilege other than the privilege againstself-incrimination.Rule512governsanyparty’sorwitness’sclaimofanyprivilegeotherthantheprivilegeagainstself-incriminationinacivilactionorproceeding.



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This rule allows an adverse inference from a claim of privilege by a

partyinacivilcaseandpermitscommentuponitbythejudgeorcounsel.Itisnot clear under Maine law whether such inference and comment arepermissible.ThereisasuggestioninHindsv.JohnHancockMut.LifeIns.Co.,155Me.349,374,155A.2d 721, 735 (1959), that an inference is improper.Themajorityofthesurprisinglyfewcasesinother jurisdictionsdealingwiththe question allow inference and comment. See Kaye v. Newhall,356Mass.300,249N.E.2d583(1969).

Sincetheruleallowsanadverseinferencefromtheclaim,theprocedureunderRule512formakingtheclaimoutofthejury’shearingwouldbewhollyinappropriate.Indeed,thefailuretoaskinthehearingofthejuryaquestionto which a privilege claim could be raisedmight itself lead to an inferenceagainstthepartywhodidnotaskit. Subdivision(b)62recognizesthedifferencebetweenaclaimapartyinacivilcaseandaclaimbyanonpartywitness.Ittreatsanonpartywitnessthesameinacivilcaseasinacriminalproceedinganddoesnotallowinferenceorcomment.

62Nowsubsection(c).

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The rules as promulgated by the Supreme Court made no distinctionbetween civil and criminal cases and did not allow adverse comment orinferenceineither.


(November2011)

Since the adoptionof theMaineRules ofEvidence in1975,Mainehasbeen one of a smallminority of jurisdictions that have generally permittedcomment and inference in a civil case based on a party’s invocation of anevidentiary privilege. In most jurisdictions that permit such comment andinference, it is limited to theprivilege against self-incrimination. Practicallyallofthecasesthathaveaddressedthis issuehavebeenconcernedwiththeprivilegeagainst self-incrimination. TheMaine experiencehasbeen similar.Totheextentthatprivilegessuchasthelawyer-clientprivilegearegroundedon policies other than self-incrimination, there can be a question whetherburdeningtheinvocationofsuchprivilegesmightaffectthesepolicies. The proposed amendment,whichwill limit the potential for commentandinferencetotheinvocationoftheprivilegeagainstself-incrimination,willresolvepotentialconfusionarisingfromtheexistingrule.SeeTanguayv.Asen,1998ME277,722A.2d49.

RULE514.MEDIATOR’SPRIVILEGE(a) Definitions.Asusedinthisrule:

(1) A“mediatingparty”isapersonwhoisparticipatinginmediationasapartyorasaparty’srepresentative,regardlessofwhetherthesubjectmatterofthemediationisinlitigation.

(2) A “mediation” is any process in which a mediator facilitates

communicationandnegotiationbetweenpartiestoassisttheminreaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute,regardlessofwhetherthedisputeisthesubjectoflitigation.

(3) A “mediator” is a neutral person conducting the mediation

proceeding.

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Thisrule issubjecttoanystateandfederalstatutesandregulationsofmediationstakingplacepursuanttosuchstatutoryauthority.

(b) Generalrule.(1) Amediatorhas aprivilege to refuse to testify in anyproceeding

concerning a mediation or any communication between themediatorandaparticipantinthemediationthatwasmadeduringthe course of, or that related to the subject matter of, anymediation.

(2) Allmemorandaandotherworkproduct—includingfiles,reports,

interviews, case summaries, and notes—preparedbyamediatorareconfidentialandarenotsubjecttodisclosureinanyjudicialoradministrative proceeding involving any of the parties to themediationinwhichthematerialsweregenerated.

(c) Exceptions.Themediator’sprivilegedoesnotapply:

(1) Mediated agreement. To a communication in an agreementevidencedbyarecordsignedbythepartiestotheagreement.

(2) Furtheranceof crimeor fraud. If themediatingpartywhomade

thecommunicationsoughtorobtainedthemediator’sservicestoenable or aid anyone to plan, commit or conceal what themediatingparty knewor reasonably shouldhaveknown tobe acrimeorfraud.

(3) Plantoinflictharm.Tothreatsorstatementsofintentiontoinflict

bodilyinjuryorcommitacrime.

(4) Mediator misconduct. To communications sought or offered toproveordisproveaclaimorcomplaintofprofessionalmisconductormalpracticebythemediator.

(5) Party or counsel misconduct. To communications sought or

offeredtoproveordisproveaclaimorcomplaintofprofessionalmisconduct or malpractice by a mediation party, nonparty

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participant, or a party’s representative based on conduct thatoccurredduringamediation.

(6) Welfare of child or adult. In a criminal proceeding or a child or

adult protective action, to communications sought or offered toproveordisproveabuse,neglect,abandonment,orexploitation.

(7) Manifest injustice. If, after a hearing in camera, a court,

administrativeagency,orarbitratorfindsthatthedisclosureofacommunication is necessary in a particular case to prevent amanifestinjustice,andthattheneedfordisclosureoutweighstheimportance of protecting the general requirement of mediationconfidentiality.



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AdvisoryCommitteeNote(December2009)

ThepurposeofthisnewRule514istoprovideaprivilegeformediatorsnot to be called aswitnesses to statements or conduct of parties occurringduringthecourseofmediation. Thereisnolimitationonthesubjectmatteror the circumstances of the mediation, nor is there a particular level offormality prescribed. The proposed rule is based on similar rules in otherstatesandontheUniformMediationAct(UMA),whichhasnotbeenadoptedinMaine.Thisprivilegeissubjecttoanumberofexceptions. The privilege only applies to mediation proceedings conducted by aneutralmediator. Thus,whenaparty’s lawyer,aguardianadlitem,orotherpersonwith a particular point of view to represent attempts to function as“mediator” insettlementorotherdiscussions,theprivilegeisnotapplicable.Theprivilegealsodoesnotapply toconferenceswith“settlement judges”orother judicialofficialswhomaybeactinginameditativecapacitybecauseoftheimportanceoftransparencyofpublicjusticeinstitutions.

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Theprovisionsof thisRule are explicitlymade subject to any stateorfederal statute or regulations issued pursuant to such statutes governingmediationsheldpursuant tosuchstatutes. Incaseofconflictsuchstatutoryprovisionswillgovern. Many states have made explicit exemptions to the privilege forinformationrelatingtoadministrativeaspectsofthemediation.Thisincludes,forexample,whetherthemediationhasoccurredorhasterminated,whetherasettlementwasreached,andattendancebytheparties. Section7(b)oftheUMAaccomplishesthisobjective. Theindividualmediatorandthemediationprofessionhaveaninterestinmaintainingtheirneutralitythattranscendsanyparticulardispute.Section(b)thereforeestablishesbroadprotectionforthemediator.Thefirstclauseofthissection63makestherecordsofthemediatorconfidentialandnotsubjectto disclosure in subsequent proceedings that involve the mediating parties.The second clause64 gives themediator aprivilege from testifyingabout themediation or disclosing any communication made between him or her andanyparticipant inthemediation. Thephrase“anycommunication,” includesnotonly those communicationsmade inprivate caucusbut also thosemadewithotherspresentandallothercommunications. This privilege belongs tomediators, notmediating parties. This Ruledoes not empower a party to prevent a mediator from testifying if themediator chooses to do so. Prevailing ethical precepts generally preventmediatorsfromdisclosingmediationcommunicationsunlessorderedtodosobyacourt.See,e.g.,MaineAssociationofMediatorsCodeofConduct,StandardV and Association for Conflict Resolution Code of Ethics, Section 3. Theseprovisionswould,ineffect,requireamediatortoclaimtheprivilegewheneverapplicable,unlessthepartiesagreedotherwise. Subsection (1) of the exceptions is based on the UMA § 6(a)(1) andpermits evidence of a signed agreement to be introduced in subsequentproceedings.Thisincludesagreementstomediate,agreementsastohowthe

63Nowspecificallyat(b)(2).64Nowspecificallyat(b)(1).

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mediation will be conducted as well as agreements that memorialize theparties’resolutionoftheconflict.Consistentwiththepracticeofmoststates,thisexceptiondoesnotincludeoralagreementsmadebetweentheparties. Anexceptionforcommunicationsmadeduringamediationdesignedtofurtheracrimeorfraud,asestablishedbysubsection(2),isprobablythemostcommon single exception amongst the states that have adopted suchprivileges. The lawyer-client privilege established by these Rules alsocontainssuchanexception(Rule502(d)(1)). ThelanguageofthisexceptiondrawsonthatusedinRule502aswellasUMA§6(a)(4),whichextendstheexemptiontocovercaseswherethemediationisusedtoconcealanongoingcrime. This exemption does not apply to admissions of past crimes, whichremainsprivileged. Subsection (3) isbasedonUMA§6(a)(3) and similarprovisionshavebeenadoptedinmanystates. Subsection (4) creates an exemption for cases in which professionalmisconduct by the mediator is alleged. Such a provision is increasinglycommon amongst states and is also present inUMA § 6(a)(5). As theUMAcommentary notes, such disclosuresmaybenecessary topromotemediatoraccountabilitybyallowinggrievancestobebrought,andfairnessrequiresthatthemediatorbeabletodefendhimselforherselfagainstsuchaclaim. Subsection (5) is adapted from the UMA § 6(a)(6). However, in theUMA, this exception does not apply to the mediator privilege. The UMAjustifies retaining the mediator’s privilege in such cases to maintain theintegrity of the mediation process and impartiality of the mediator, whichwould be threatened if the mediatorwas frequently called intomisconductcases to be the tie-breaking witness. The exemption created in this Ruleappliesduetoskepticismaboutthefrequencyinwhichsuchcasesoccurandthecompellingneedforevidencewhensuchcasesdoarise. Subsection (6) makes an exception to the privilege for informationrelevanttochildandadultabuseandneglect.Suchprovisionsarecommoninthe domestic mediation confidentiality statutes of many states. Thus, amediatorcouldberequiredtotestifyinacriminalproceedinginvolvingchildoradultabuseorneglectaswellasinaprotectiveproceedingbroughtunder22M.R.S.,ch.958A,22M.R.S.,ch.1071orsomesimilarstatutoryprovision.

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Subsection (7) is designed to allow for other, non-listed exceptions totheprivilegeonanadhocbasis topreventmanifest injustice. Anumberofstates,suchasOhioandWisconsin,haveadoptedsuchprovisions.UMA§6(b)establishesanexceptionincertaincases,suchasfortheimplementationofamediated agreement, but only after it is determined, after an in camerahearing, that “the evidence is not otherwise available” and the need for theevidence“substantiallyoutweighs”theinterestinprotectingconfidentiality.

ARTICLEVI.WITNESSES

RULE601.COMPETENCYTOTESTIFYINGENERAL(a) Every person is competent to be awitness unless these rules provide

otherwise.(b) Apersonmaynotbeawitnessifthecourtfindsthat:

(1) The person cannot communicate about the matter so that thejudge and jury can understand, either directly or through aninterpreter;

(2) The person cannotunderstand theduty, as awitness, to tell thetruth;

(3) Thepersonhadnoreasonableabilitytoperceivethematter;or

(4) Thepersonhasnoreasonableabilitytorememberthematter.


Maine’sRule601departsfairlysignificantlyfromitsfederalcounterpartinestablishingspecificcriteriaforcompetencyasawitnessintherule itself.Thesespecificrequirementshavebeencarriedoverintotherestyledversion.

FederalRestylingCommitteeNote

ThelanguageofRule601hasbeenamendedaspartoftherestylingoftheEvidenceRules tomake themmoreeasilyunderstoodand tomakestyle

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andterminologyconsistentthroughouttherules.Thesechangesareintendedtobystylisticonly. There isno intent tochangeanyresult inanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility.

AdvisoryNote–June2015

Thisamendmentdeletessubdivision(c)ofRule601asredundantandunnecessary.ThequalificationandswearingofaninterpreterasawitnessisexplicitlycoveredbyRule604.Theredoesnotappeartobeanygoodreasonto provide in Rule 601 as well that an interpreter is subject to the rulesrelatingtowitnesses.

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Advisers’NotetoformerM.R.Evid.601(February2,1976)65

This rule eliminates all grounds of incompetency except thosespecificallyrecognizedintherulesthatfollow.TheonlysignificantchangeistheabolitionoftheDeadMan’sAct.16M.R.S.A.§letseq.Thereasonbehindtheexclusionofasurvivor’stestimonyconcerningatransactionofadecedentwhenofferedagainstthelatter’sestatewasthat“wheredeathhasclosedthemouthofoneparty,thelawseekstomakeanequalitybyclosingthemouthofthe other.” Wilson v.Wilson, 157Me. 119, 123, 170A.2d 679, 682 (1961).The rule reflects the belief that this surviving relic of the common lawdisqualificationofparties aswitnesses leads tomoremiscarriagesof justicethanitprevents.TheActmanifeststhecynicalviewthatapartywillliewhenhecannotbedirectlycontradictedandtheunrealisticassumptionthatjurors,knowingthesituation,willbelieveanythingtheyhearinthesecircumstances.It has already been eroded by exceptions. 16 M.R.S.A. § 1, exceptions 1through6, andmost important, 16M.R.S.A. §59, addedbyP.L.1967, c. 406,whichmadethedisqualificationinapplicableinactionsforpersonalinjuryorwrongfuldeath.ThiseliminatedoneofthemostcontroversialaspectsoftheAct.Thisruledoesawaywiththerestofit. Subdivision (b) is declaratory of Maine law.66 State v. Brewer,325A.2d26 (Me.1974). It allows the trial judge todecideas apreliminary

65AllofthestatutesreferencedinthisAdviser’sNotehavebeenrepealed.

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question whether a proposed witness is capable of expressing himselfunderstandablyandofunderstandingthedutytotell thetruth. Thetrendisincreasingly to resolve doubts in favor of letting the jury hear the evidenceandappraiseitscredibility. TheFederalRule isthesameassubdivision(a)exceptthat itprovidesforcompetencyofawitnesstobedeterminedinaccordancewithstatelawincivilactions inwhichstate lawapplies theruleofdecision. This follows thesame pattern as the Federal Rules on privilege. Subdivision (b) has nocounterpartintheFederalRule.

AdvisoryCommitteeNote(April1990Amendment)

Under former Rule 601 as construed by the Law Court in State v.Hussey, 521 A.2d 278 (Me. 1987) the competency of a proposedwitness isestablished by a finding by the trial judge that the witness (a) can expresshimself understandably, and (b) understands the duty to tell the truth. Onappealthetrialcourt’sfindingisreviewableforclearerror. Prior to the adoptionof theRules, a trial judge’sdeterminationof thecompetency of a witness to testify was reviewable for abuse of discretion.Presumably if the trial judge thought under all the circumstances that theproposedwitness’stestimonywouldnotbereliable,hecouldrefusetolethimor her testify at all. Under Rule 601 as construed in Hussey, a proposedwitness couldbedisqualified from testifyingonly if the trial courtmade thefinding that the witness either could not express himself or could notunderstandthedutytotellthetruth. If testimonialcompetencyistobedeterminedbyasimplepreliminaryfinding,thethresholdrequirementsfortestimonyshouldincludetheabilitytoperceive and remember. Certainly perception and memory are vital to awitness’s ability tobear testimony. Theseabilitiesor lackof themareoftenthesubjectmatterofattacksonwitnesscredibility.Theruleasamendedwillscreen out a witness who had no reasonable ability to perceive facts and

66ThisparagraphoftheAdvisers’Notehasbeensupersededbythe1990amendment—seethe

1990AdvisoryCommitteeNoteherein.

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reliablyrememberthem.Itisnotintendedtopermitthetrialjudgetoruleonthecredibilityofawitnessinadvancebynotpermittingthewitnesstotestify. At the time Rule 601 was enacted the Advisory Committee did notbelieve it was changing Maine law. The Advisor’s Notes to Rule 601 asoriginallyenactedreads:

Subdivision (b) is declaratory of Maine law. State v. Brewer,325A.2d 26 (Me. 1974). It allows the trial judge to decide as apreliminary question whether a proposed witness is capable ofexpressinghimselfunderstandablyandofunderstandingthedutyto tell the truth. The trend is increasingly to resolve doubts infavor of letting the jury hear the evidence and appraise itscredibility.

Thethenleadingcase,Statev.Ranger,149Me.52,56(1953)specificallyreferstotheabilitytoperceiveandarticulateinthefollowingterms:

Theproposedchildwitnessshouldknowthedifferencebetweentruth and falsehood, and apparently must be able to receiveaccurate impressions of facts, and be able to relate truly theimpressions received. The child witness should have sufficientcapacity to understand, in some measure, the obligation of anoath;ortorealizethatitiswrongtofalsify,andthatifhedoestellanuntruthheislikelytobepunished.

Although Rule 601 applies to all witnesses, it will bemost frequentlyappliedtochildrenasprofferedwitnesses.Theyoungerthepotentialwitness,themoreconsciousshouldbetheinquiryintowhetherthewitnessisabletoperceiveandrelatesufficientlyreliably soas tobeaconduit for informationintothecourtroom. Although the trial court may generally conduct voir dire on thecompetence of a witness outside the presence of the jury, that should notpreclude a party from addressing the credibility andweight of thewitness’testimonybysimilarquestionsoncrossexamination.

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The proposed amendment deletes the reference to interpreters fromRule601.67InterpretersarespecificallyregulatedbyRule604.

RULE602.NEEDFORPERSONALKNOWLEDGEAwitnessmaynottestifytoamatterunlessevidenceisintroducedsufficientto support a finding that thewitnesshaspersonal knowledgeof thematter.Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of thewitness’s own testimony. This rule is subject to theprovisionsofRule703,relatingtoopiniontestimonybyexpertwitnesses.




ThelanguageofRule[602]hasbeenamendedaspartoftherestylingof

theEvidenceRules tomake themmoreeasilyunderstoodand tomakestyleandterminologyconsistentthroughouttherules.Thesechangesareintendedtobystylisticonly. There isno intent tochangeanyresult inanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility.

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Thisruleisuniversallyaccepted.Theburdenoflayingafoundationthatthewitness had an adequate opportunity to observe is on the proponent ofthetestimony.Byfailingtoobjecttheopponentwaivesthepreliminaryproofbutnotthesubstanceoftherequirement.Ifitlaterappearsthatthewitnessdidnotactuallyobserveafactastowhichhetestified,thetestimonywillbestricken on motion. The reference to Rule 703 is designed to avoid anypossibility of conflict between this rule and the rule allowing an expert to

67InterpretersarenowthesubjectofRule601(c),aswellasRule604.

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express opinions based on facts of which he does not have personalknowledge.

RULE603.OATHORAFFIRMATIONTOTESTIFYTRUTHFULLYBefore testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to testifytruthfully.Theoathoraffirmationmustbeinaformdesignedtoimpressthatdutyonthewitness’sconscience.





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ThisruleisinaccordwithMainelaw16M.R.S.A.§55(noincompetencyon account of religious belief; atheist may testify under solemn affirmationand is subject to pains and penalties of perjury);68 1 M.R.S.A. § 72(l)69 (apersonconscientiouslyscrupulousoftakinganoathmayaffirm).

68Thisstatutehasbeenrepealed.69Nowat1M.R.S.§72(1-A)(2014).

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RULE604.INTERPRETERSAninterpretermustbequalifiedandmustgiveanoathoraffirmationtomakeatruetranslation.





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This rule implements M.R.C.P. 43(1) and M.R. Crim. P. 28(b), both ofwhichprovidefortheappointmentandcompensationofinterpreters.

RULE605.JUDGE’SCOMPETENCYASAWITNESSThepresidingjudgemaynottestifyasawitnessatthetrial.Apartyneednotobjecttopreservetheissue.



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Thisbroadruleofajudge’sincompetencyasawitnessinatrialatwhichhe is presiding is plainly sound if the highly unlikely occasion for its useshould arise. The automatic objection in the last sentencemakes an actualobjectionunnecessaryso thatanobjector’s rightsarepreservedwithout thepossibleriskofantagonizingthejudgebeforewhomthetrialwouldcontinue.

RULE606.JUROR’SCOMPETENCYASAWITNESS

(a) Atthetrial.Ajurormaynottestifyasawitnessbeforeanyjurydrawn

fromthepanelofwhichthejurorwasamember.Ifa juroriscalledtotestify, the courtmust give anyparty anopportunity toobjectoutsidethejury’spresence.

(b) Duringaninquiryintothevalidityofaverdictorindictment.

(1) Prohibitedtestimonyorotherevidence.Duringaninquiryintothevalidityofaverdictorindictment,ajurormaynottestifyabout:

(A) Any statement made or incident that occurred during the

jury’sdeliberations;

(B) Theeffectofanythingonthatjuror’soranotherjuror’svote;or

(C) Any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or

indictment.

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The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of ajuror’sstatementonthesematters.

(2) Exceptions.Ajurormaytestifyaboutwhether:

(A) Extraneousprejudicialinformationwasimproperlybroughttothejury’sattention;or

(B) Anoutsideinfluencewasimproperlybroughttobearonany

juror.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] MaineRule606issubstantiallysimilartoFederalRule606,exceptthattheMaine Rule includes language broadening the contexts inwhich a jurormaynotbecalledasawitness. Also,Mainehasnotadoptedanexceptionto606(b)(2) for testimonyaboutamistake inentering theverdictonaverdictform.70 These distinctions have been carried over as part of the restylingprocess.



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Subdivision (a) is based upon considerations similar to the ruledeclaringthetrialjudgetobeincompetentasawitness.

70 SeeStatev.Hurd,2010ME118.¶¶31-45,8A.3d651;Taylorv.Lapomarda,1997ME216,

¶¶5-10,702A.2d685.

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Subdivision (b) is in accord with Maine law. Patterson v. Rossignol,245A.2d852(Me.1968).

RULE607.WHOMAYIMPEACHAWITNESSAnyparty,includingthepartythatcalledthewitness,mayattackthewitness’scredibility.





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This rule departs from traditional Maine practice. State v. Fournier,267A.2d 638 (Me. 1970). The policy reason for not allowing a party toimpeachawitnesshehascalledwasthathevouchesforthecredibilityofhisownwitnesses.Thisisunrealisticsinceapartydoesnothaveafreechoiceinselectingwitnesses. There hasbeena recent trend to abandon theold ruleeitherbystatuteor,occasionally,by judicialdecision. It iswidelysupportedbythecommentators.Thisrulegoesalongwiththattrend. Under present lawapartywho is surprisedby unfavorable testimonymay inquire about prior contradictory statements. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.Stevens,123Me.368,123A.38(1924). Suchcontradictorystatementsmaybeused,however,onlyforimpeachmentandnotasaffirmativeevidence.Thisrule provides an effective weapon for dealing with a turncoat witness who

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changes his story and deprives the party calling him of essential testimony.Under Rule 801(d)(1) the prior statement, if under oath, can be used assubstantiveevidenceofitstruth,aswillbeexplainedintheNotetothatrule.

RULE608.AWITNESS’SCHARACTERFORTRUTHFULNESSORUNTRUTHFULNESS

(a) Reputation evidence. A witness’s credibility may be attacked or

supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having acharacter for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Evidence of truthfulcharacter is admissible only after the witness’s character fortruthfulnesshasbeenattacked.

(b) Specificinstancesofconduct. Except foracriminalconvictionunder

Rule609,extrinsicevidenceisnotadmissibletoprovespecificinstancesof a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’scharacterfortruthfulness. Thecourtmay,oncross-examination,allowaparty to inquire into specific instancesof awitness’s conduct if theyareprobativeofthecharacterfortruthfulnessoruntruthfulnessof:

(1) Thewitness;or(2) Another witness about whose character the witness being

cross-examinedhastestified.By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any privilegeagainst self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to the witness’scharacterfortruthfulness.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] MaineRule608 is verysimilar to its federalcounterpart,butdoesnotallow opinion evidence of character for truthfulness, only reputation. TheMaine restyled version changes references to “credibility” to “character fortruthfulness”tofollowthefederalversion.

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The language of Rule 608 has been amended as part of the generalrestylingoftheEvidenceRulestomakethemmoreeasilyunderstoodandtomakestyle and terminologyconsistent throughout therules. Thesechangesareintendedtobestylisticonly.Thereisnointenttochangeanyresultinanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility. The Committee is aware that the Rule’s limitation of bad-actimpeachmentto“cross-examination”istrumpedbyRule607,whichallowsapartyto impeachawitnessondirectexamination.Courtshavenotreliedonthe term“oncross-examination” to limit impeachment thatwouldotherwisebepermissibleunderRules607and608.TheCommitteethereforeconcludedthatnochange to the languageof theRulewasnecessary in thecontextofarestylingproject.

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Inallowingreputationevidenceofthecharacterofawitness,thisruleisconsistent with Rule 405(a). The limitation confining this evidence tocharacter forveracity insteadofevidenceofcharactergenerally is inaccordwiththeweightofauthority.Itavoidssurprise,wasteoftime,andconfusionandmakes the taskofbeingawitness somewhat lessunpleasant. Allowingcharacter evidence in support of the credibility of a witness only after hischaracterhasbeenattackedisalimitationimposedatcommonlaw.Itsavesanenormousamountoftime. Subdivision (b) gives the court discretion to allow inquiry on cross-examinationintospecificinstancesofconductbearinguponthecredibilityofawitness. It is in accordwithMaine law. State v.Whitehead,151Me.135,116A.2d618(1955). Itisunclearwhetherlimitingcross-examinationtomattersprobativeoftruthfulness or untruthfulness changes Maine law. It does not seem to bespelledout inMaine cases and the rule inother jurisdictionsvaries. In anyevent,thelimitationseemsareasonableone.

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RULE609.IMPEACHMENTBYEVIDENCEOFACRIMINALCONVICTION(a) In general. Evidence of a criminal conviction offered to impeach a

witness’s character for truthfulness must be admitted if its probativevalueoutweighsitsprejudicialeffectonacriminaldefendantoronanypartyinacivilactionifthecriminalconvictionis:

(1) Foracrimethat,intheconvictingjurisdiction,waspunishablebydeathorbyimprisonmentformorethanoneyear;or

(2) For any crime if the court can reasonably determine thatestablishing the elements of the crime required proving—or thewitnessadmitting—adishonestactorfalsestatement.

(b) Timelimit.Evidenceofaconvictionisadmissibleunderthisruleonlyif:

(1) Lessthan15yearshaspassedsincetheconviction;or(2) Less than 10 years has passed since the witness was released

fromconfinementfortheconviction.(c) Effect of a pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation.

Evidenceofaconvictionisnotadmissibleiftheconvictionhasbeenthesubject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or otherequivalentprocedure.

(d) Juvenileadjudications.Evidenceofajuvenileadjudicationinapublic

proceeding is admissible under this rule. Evidence of a juvenileadjudicationinaproceedingthatwasclosedtothepublicisadmissibleonlyinjuvenileproceedingsthatarealsoclosedtothepublic.


Maine Rule 609 is differs in a number of respects from its federalcounterpart. MaineRule609requiresallconvictionstopassa“reverseRule403” test, i.e. they can be admitted only if their probative value as tocredibilityoutweighs anydangerofunfairprejudice to a criminaldefendantoranycivilparty. Thereareminordifferences in time limits and theMaine

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timebar is absolute. The proposed restyledRulemaintains the substantivedifferencesastheyarenow.



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Subdivision(a),inmakingconvictionofacrimeadmissibleifpunishablebyimprisonmentforoneyearormore, isessentiallythesameas16M.R.S.A.§56,71asamendedbyP.L.1973,c.295,whichspeaksintermsof“convictionof a felony”. Under Maine law any crime that may be punished byimprisonment for one year or more is a felony. “May be punished” means“punishable”; the punishment that may be imposed, not that which isimposed, determineswhether or not the offense is a felony. Smith v. State,145Me.313,326,75A.2d538,545 (1950). The sentenceactually imposedgoverns whether imprisonment shall be in the State Prison. 15 M.R.S.A.§1703.72Sincetherulepermitstheuseofconvictionsinotherstates,wherethedistinctionbetweenfeloniesandmisdemeanorsmaynolongerprevail, itis preferable to speak in terms of the duration of possible punishment. Cf.proposed Maine Criminal Code, 107th Legislature, L.D. 314. If the crimeinvolveddishonestyorfalsestatement,theevidenceisadmissibleregardlessof the punishment. This approximates the provision of 16 M.R.S.A. § 5673which allows evidence of a conviction for “any larceny or any other crimeinvolving moral turpitude”. It has the advantage of avoiding the lattertroublesomephrase. SeeStatev. Jenness,143Me.380,62A.2d867(1948);

71Thisstatutehasbeenrepealed.72Thisstatutehasbeenrepealed.73Thisstatutehasbeenrepealed.

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State v. Peaslee, 287 A.2d 588 (Me. 1972). The subdivision includes adiscretionaryfactor,takenfromtheFederalRule,underwhichthecourtwillexcludetheevidenceunless itdeterminesthat itsprobativevalueoutweighsitsprejudicialeffect. Subdivision (1b)74 preserves the time limitations of the statutewhichexcludeevidenceofconvictionsdeemedtobe tooold towarrant admission.Subdivision(c)rendersinadmissibleconvictionswhichhavebeenthesubjectof a pardon, annulment or certificate of rehabilitation. The latter two areincluded although unknown to Maine practice because convictions in otherstates comewithin the rule. Subdivision (d),making juvenile adjudicationsinadmissible,isinaccordwith15M.R.S.A.§2606.75 Theruleinsubdivision(a)followstheFederalRuleclosely.TheFederalRule has the trivial difference of using the phrase “in excess of one year”76rather than “one year or more”. It also limits the discretionary factor tocrimessetforthinclause(1)ratherthanapplyingtotheentiresubdivision.77Itfurtherincludesinsubdivision(b)anadditionaldiscretionaryfactorwhichmay in the interestsof justicepermit theshowingofaconvictionolder thanthenormaltimelimitsallow(tenyearsintheFederalRule). There is also a provision in subdivision (a) of the Federal Rule thatevidenceofaconviction“shallbeadmittedifelicitedfromhimorestablishedby public record during cross-examination”.78 This appears to produce aresultCongresscouldnothaveintended.Itisplainthat,asunderpresentlaw,a witness can be asked if he is the so-and-so who on a stated date wasconvicted of the crime of such-and-such. If the answer is yes, there is no

74Nowsubsection(b).75Thissentenceissupersededbythe1985amendment—seeNoteherein.76Now“formorethanoneyear.”77 Thecontinuedaccuracyofthissentenceisunclear. FederalRule609(1)isdiscretionaryin

thatsubsection(a)issubjecttoRule403andsubsection(b)issubjecttotheso-calledreverse403test.However,theentireRule609wouldbesubjecttoRule403analysis,eventhoughitdoesnotexplicitlysaysoinsubsection(2).78ThislanguagewasremovedfromtheFederalRulein1990—thereisaNoteundertheFederal

Ruleregardingtheamendment.

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problem. If it is no, the state is put to its proof. It must not only have acertifiedcopyoftheconvictionbutapersonwhocanidentifythewitnessasthepersonconvicted.Thiscannotbedone“duringcross-examination”,astherule seems to require, except perhaps by suspending the cross-examinationandputtingon the identifyingwitness. Thismightbedeemedtobe“duringcross-examination”. Nothing but harm and confusion could come fromincludingthisclause. Subdivision(c)of theFederalRulemakesaconviction thesubjectofapardon and the like inadmissible only if based on a finding of eitherrehabilitationorinnocence.Thisisinappropriate,forMaineatleast,becauseordinarilythereasonforapardonisnotamatterofrecord. Subdivision(d)oftheFederalRuledepartsfromthisrulebyallowinginacriminalcaseevidenceofajuvenileadjudicationofawitnessotherthantheaccusedif itwouldbeadmissibletoattackthecredibilityofanadultandthecourt makes the finding that its admission is necessary for a fairdetermination,thusattemptingtobalancetheharmtothejuvenileagainstthegaininthefairadministrationofjustice. TheFederalRulehasasubdivision(e),whichallowsaconvictiontobeshowndespitethependencyofanappeal.

1978AmendmentNote(April6,1978)

This amendmentreplaced theword“and” inRule609(b)of theMaineRulesofEvidenceasoriginallypromulgatedwiththeword“or”. In itsorderadoptingtheamendment,theSupremeJudicialCourtstated:

The Court had dispensed with the requirements for notice andopportunitytocommentonthegroundthatthepublicinterestsorequires because unless it is amended the rule reaches anunintendedandunreasonableresult.

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AdvisoryCommitteeNote(January31,1985Amendment)

Subsection (d) makes evidence of a juvenile adjudication generallyadmissibleunderRule609onlyiftheadjudicationresultsfromaproceedingopen to the public. See 15 M.R.S.A. § 3307(2)(A). Otherwise, suchadjudicationsareadmissibleunderthisruleonlyinothernonpublic juvenilecases.

Advisers’Note(April16,1990Amendment)

Theforegoingamendment[addingthereferencestowitnesscredibilityandtothecriminaldefendantoranycivilparty]isforthepurposeoffurtherstressing that the only legitimate basis for admission of a prior criminalconvictionunderthisruleistheinferencethatapersonconvictedofcrimeorofspecifickindsofcrimesmightnotbe truthful intestimony. Theruledoesnot support or permit the admission of prior convictions to sustain aninferenceofsubstantiveguilt,innocenceorliabilitywithrespecttoanyissueinthecase. The amendment also makes it clear that before admitting a criminalconviction of any witness under this provision, the court must balance theprobativevalueoftheconvictiononthecredibilityofthewitnessagainstanyunfair prejudice to a criminal defendant or any civil party. The state in acriminalcaseisnotentitledtotheprotectionofthebalancingtestcontainedin Rule 609. However if the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of theissues, misleading the jury or waste of time substantially outweighs theprobativevalueofaprofferedconviction, it canbeexcludedunderRule403onmotionofanyparty,includingtheprosecution. The rule is applied most often to protect a criminal defendant whotestifiesinhisownbehalf.Italsoisdesignedtoscreenoutunfairprejudiceincivilcases.Ineachcasetheprofferedconvictionmustqualifyastotypeunderparagraph a) and recency under paragraph b). The trial judge must thenweigh the probative value of the particular conviction offered on thecredibility as awitness of the person convicted against the unfair prejudicefrom other inferences that may be drawn from the conviction or anyemotionalreactionevokedbyit.

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OneinstanceinwhichtheCourtshouldgiveparticularconsiderationtotheriskofunfairprejudiceiswhereacriminaldefendantwouldbeimpeachedwithapriorconvictionsosimilar to theoffensecharged that the jurymightdraw the improper inference that the defendant merely repeated priorcriminal conduct. Prior convictions for sex offenses tend to evoke strongemotional reactions. Such convictions could be excluded under this rule.Convictions of offenses which have little probative force on testimonialcredibility would be subject to exclusion on a lesser showing of unfairprejudice than convictions of offenses highly relevant to a witness’truthfulnessonthestand. Frequently thedeterminationof theadmissibilityofconvictionsunderthisrule iscrucialtothedefendant’selectiontotestify inhisownbehalf. Inmanycasesthiselectionwillaffecttheentiretrialstrategyofthedefense.Thetrial court should generally entertain a motion in limine to determine theadmissibilityof anyprior convictionsof thedefendantbefore the trial or, atthe latest,before theopeningstatements. See,Statev.Pottios,564A.2d64,fn.1 (Me. 1989). If examining counsel has any question about theadmissibilityofapriorconvictionunderthisrule,opposingcounselshouldbegivenanopportunitytoobjectbeforethequestionisposedinfrontofthejury.


Thepurposeofaddingtheword“specific”79inRule609(a)istomakeitclearthatevidencethatisadmissibleunderthisruleisevidenceofaspecificcrime, not a generic “serious” crime, “felony,” “misdemeanor” or othersubstitute. This requires the trial court to balance the potential of unfairprejudice from evidence of the specific crime of which the witness wasconvictedagainst theprobativevalueofevidenceofconvictionofthatcrimeonissuesofcredibility. To permit evidence of a generic “serious crime,” “felony” or othersubstitutewould permit the jury to speculate about the crime ofwhich the

79Therestylingremovedtheword“specific”butdidnotintendtochangetheeffectoftheRule(seetheRestylingNote),sothecommentasawholeisstillrelevant.

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witnesswasconvictedandperhapsdrawinferences,whichcouldbeunfairtothewitness.

RULE610.RELIGIOUSBELIEFSOROPINIONSEvidenceofawitness’sreligiousbeliefsoropinionsisnotadmissibletoattackorsupportthewitness’scredibility.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] MaineRule 610 and Federal Rule 610 are substantively identical, andtherefore the Advisory Committee recommends adoption of the language oftherestyledFederalRule.



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Advisers’NotetoformerM.R.Evid.610(February2,1976)80

Thisruleisdirectlycontraryto16M.R.S.A.§55,whichallowsaperson’sreligiousbelieftobeshowntoaffecthiscredibility.ThestatutetracesbacktoP.L.1847,c.34,whichwasasubstituteforP.L.1833,c.58.Theearlierstatutemade a person who did not believe in a Supreme Being incompetent as awitness. Indoingawaywiththeincompetencyrulethelegislaturemadetheconcessionwithrespecttoimpeachment.Thepresentstatuteisinfactadeadletteranditshouldbedoneawaywith.

80TheentiretyoftheNoteisoutdated,asthestatuteitdiscusseshasbeenrepealed.TheNoteis

includedforhistoricalcontext.

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RULE611.MODEANDORDEROFEXAMININGWITNESSESANDPRESENTINGEVIDENCE

(a) Controlbythecourt;purposes. The courtmustexercisereasonable

controloverthemodeandorderofexaminingwitnessesandpresentingevidencesoasto:

(1) Makethoseprocedureseffectivefordeterminingthetruth;

(2) Avoidwastingtime;and

(3) Protectwitnessesfromharassmentorundueembarrassment.

(b) Scopeofcross-examination. Cross-examinationmayaddressmatters

relevanttoanyissueinthecase,includingthecredibilityofanywitness.The court may limit cross-examination about matters that were notaddressedondirectexamination.

(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on direct

examination except as necessary to develop the witness’s testimony.Ordinarily,thecourtshouldallowleadingquestions:(1) Oncross-examination;and(2) When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a

witness identifiedwith anadverseparty. Ahostilewitnessor awitness identifiedwithanadversepartymaybecross-examinedby the adverse party, but only as to matters that the witnesstestifiedtoduringhisorherexaminationinchief.

(d) Cross-examinationrelatingtosignatures.Ifawitness’sexamination

in chief addresses only the signature to or execution of a paper,cross-examinationmustbelimitedtothatsignatureorexecution.


MaineRule611 issimilar to its federalcounterpart,butdoesnot limitcross-examination to thesubjectmatterofdirectunless thewitnesswas theadverseparty,was identifiedwith the adverseparty, or testifiedonly to the

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signaturetoorexecutionofapaper.Thisdistinctionhasbeencarriedoverintherestylingprocess.



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ThisrulestatesMainelaw. Itpreservesthewide-openrulepermittingcross-examinationonanyissueinthecase,subjecttoadiscretionaryrighttolimit it in the interests of justice. Falmouth v.Windham, 63Me. 44 (1873).The trial of a multi-count indictment might present a suitable occasion forexercising a discretionary limitation. The reference to “direct and cross-examination” is designed to emphasize the scopeof the court’s control overthe order of proof.81 This rule is contrary to that in the federal courts andmanystatecourtswhichlimitscross-examinationtothesubjectmatterofthedirect examination. The Federal Rule retains the traditional federal viewlimitingcross-examinationtothescopeofthedirect.82 Subdivision (c) incorporates the rule laid down inM.R.C.P. 43(b)83 onexamination of hostile witnesses. The third sentence of the Federal Rulereads: “When a party calls a hostilewitness, an adverse party, or awitness

81 The restyling changed this language but the effect of the Rule remains the same (see the

RestylingNote).82TheFederalRuleauthorizesthecourttoallowinquiryintomattersoutsidethescopeofdirect

oncross-examination.83ThisRulehasbeenabrogated.

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identifiedwithanadverseparty, interrogationmaybebyleadingquestions.”Thisrulehasagreaterdegreeofprecision.84 Thissubdivisioninmerelystatingthatleadingquestionsshouldnotbeused on direct examination except as may be necessary to develop thetestimony lacks the precision of most of the rules. In taking it from theFederal Rule the Courtwas aware of this imprecision but concluded that itwasunwisetosetoutalltheexceptionstotheruleagainstleadingquestionsthat came to mind. In practice objection on this ground is rarely made topreliminary stage-setting questions and is given short shrift if it is made.Leadingquestionswhen thememoryof thewitnesshasbeenexhaustedarepermissible as “necessary to develop his testimony.” In short, thegeneralization that leading questions “should not be used” (not, it is to benoted, a flatprohibitionof theuse) isnot tobe takenas changing theareaswhereleadinghastraditionallybeenpermitted.

RULE612.WRITINGUSEDTOREFRESHAWITNESS’SMEMORY(a) Whiletestifying. Ifawitnessusesawritingorobjecttorefreshhisor

hermemorywhiletestifying,theadversepartyisentitledtoproductionofthewritingorobjectatthetime.

(b) Beforetestifying.Ifawitnessusesawritingorobjecttorefreshhisor

hermemorybefore testifying, thecourtmayrequireproductionof thewritingorobjectintheinterestsofjustice.

(c) Termsandconditions.

(1) Ifapartyisentitledtoproductionofawritingorobjectunderthisrule,thatpartymayinspectit,cross-examinethewitnessaboutit,andintroducerelevantpartsofitinevidence.

(2) If a party claims that the writing contains material that is

irrelevanttothewitness’stestimony,thecourtmustexaminethewriting in camera, remove any irrelevant portions, and orderproductionoftherestofthewriting.

84TheFederalandMaineRulesarethesameonthisissuenow.

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The court must preserve any portion of the writing that is withheldunderthissubsection,andmustprovideittotheappellatecourtifthereisanappeal.

(d) Failuretoproduceordeliverthewriting.Ifawritingisnotproduced

or is not delivered as ordered, the court may issue any appropriateorder.Butifthestatedoesnotcomplyinacriminalcase,thecourtmuststrikethewitness’stestimonyormay—ifjusticesorequires—declareamistrial.


MaineRule612issomewhatdifferentfromitsfederalcounterpart.TheproposedrestyledRulemaintainsthosedifferences.


ThelanguageofRule612hasbeenamendedaspartoftherestylingoftheEvidenceRules tomake themmoreeasilyunderstoodand tomakestyleandterminologyconsistentthroughouttherules.Thesechangesareintendedtobystylisticonly. There isno intent tochangeanyresult inanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility.

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Subdivision(a)dealswithrefreshingtherecollectionofawitnesswhiletestifying, as is presently permitted under Maine law. Cope v. Sevigny,289A.2d682(Me.1972). Subdivision(b)givesthecourtadiscretionarypowerintheinterestsofjustice to require production of a writing used by a witness to refresh hismemorybeforetestifying.ThereappearstobenoprecedentforthisinMainecaselawbutitshouldbeanaidtobringingoutthetruth. Subdivision(c)covers the termsandconditionsofproductionanduseof awritingproducedunder the rule. The reference to thepreservation forappealofportionsofawritingexcisedafterexaminationincameraisderived

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from18U.S.C.§3500(theJencksAct).Thereappeartobenoreportedfederalcasesdealingwithsuchanappeal. The Federal Rule is different inwording but not greatly different as asubstantivematter.Itdoesnotinclude“object”aswellas“writing”.Thisrule,followingtheUniformStateLaw,isaclearerstatement.

RULE613.WITNESS’SPRIORSTATEMENTWhenexaminingawitnessaboutthewitness’spriorstatement,apartyneednot show it or disclose its contents to thewitness. But the party must, onrequest,showitordiscloseitscontentstoanadverseparty’sattorney.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] Maine Rule 613 is somewhat similar to its federal counterpart.However, the requirement in the Federal Rule that thewitness be given anopportunitytoexplainapriorinconsistentstatementisnotmaintainedintheMaineRule.Therestyledversioncontinuesthisdistinction.



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This rule abolishes the old English requirement under which across-examiner before questioning a witness about his own prior writtenstatement must first show it to the witness. It was changed by statute inEngland long ago but is still widely followed in this country. There is noreported decision in Maine either accepting or rejecting the rule, but inday-to-day practice in the trial courts it is not required. It is obvious thatcross-examinationmaybemoreeffectiveif thewitnessisnotgivenachance

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toseehisstatementbeforecommittinghimself. Theprovisionfordisclosureonrequesttoopposingcounselistopreventunwarrantedinsinuationsthatastatementhasbeenmadewhenthefactistothecontrary. TheFederalRuleincludesasubdivision(b)barringextrinsicevidenceofa prior inconsistent statement unless the witness has been given anopportunity to explain or deny it. This is the general rule but the Mainepracticehasbeen to thecontrarysinceWarev.Ware,8Me.42(1931). SeeCurrier v. Bangor Ry. & Elec. Co., 119 Me. 313, 111 A. 333 (1920). Oftencounsel decides as a matter of tactics to confront the witness with thestatement,but ithasnotbeencompulsory. Nosuchrequirementis includedbecausetheprevailingpracticehasworkedwell.

RULE614.COURT’SCALLINGOREXAMININGAWITNESS(a) Calling.Thecourtmaycallawitnessonitsown,orataparty’srequest.

Eachpartyisentitledtocross-examinethewitness.(b) Examining. Thecourtmayexamineawitnessregardlessofwhocalls

thewitness.(c) Objections. A party may object to the court’s calling or examining a

witnesseitheratthattimeoratthenextopportunityoutofthehearingofthejury.


Maine Rule 614 is similar with its federal counterpart. The restyledversionmaintainstheminordifferences.


ThelanguageofRule614hasbeenamendedaspartoftherestylingoftheEvidenceRules tomake themmoreeasilyunderstoodand tomakestyleandterminologyconsistentthroughouttherules.Thesechangesareintendedtobystylisticonly. There isno intent tochangeanyresult inanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility.

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This rule is consistentwithMaine law. State v. Dupuis, 159Me. 100,188A.2d688(1963)(judgemay,afterstaterests,recallwitnessforpurposeof eliciting basis of stated conclusions previously given without objection);Statev.Haycock,296A.2d489(Me.1972)(judgemayinterrogatewitnesssolong as he does not assumeposture of advocate or retreat fromposition ofjudicial impartiality); State v. Hunnewell, 334 A.2d 510 (Me. 1975) (to thesameeffect). Subdivision (c) gives an opportunity to object to the judge’s conductwithout the embarrassment of doing so in the hearing of the jury. Abenchconferencewhichthejurycanobservebutnothearisacompliancewiththerule.“Nextavailableopportunity”istobeinterpretedreasonably.Aninstantdemand for abench conference isnot required,but thedelay should notbeprotracted. Althoughtherulerecognizesthepowerofthecourttocallawitnessonits own motion, the use of the words `when necessary in the interests ofjustice’ is designed to emphasize that the power ought to be exercised veryrarely,especiallyincriminalcases.85Asituationmayoccasionallyarisewheretheprosecution,orpossiblythedefense,disclosestothecourtthatawitnessitisunwillingtosponsorcouldofferhighlyrelevanttestimony.Arequestthatthiswitnessbe calledas the court’switness andall partiesbe free to cross-examinemightwellbegranted.Thisisquitedifferentfromthecourt’scallingawitnesswithoutasuggestionofeitherprosecutionordefenseonthebasisofthecourt’sownknowledgeorinvestigation. TheFederalRuledoesnot include “whennecessary in the interestsofjustice”86insubdivision(a)andinsubdivision(c)reads“whenthejuryisnotpresent”.

85Thislanguagehasbeenremovedintherestyling,buttheeffectoftheRuleremainsunchanged

(seetheRestylingNote).86NeitherdoesthecurrentMaineRule.

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RULE615.EXCLUDINGWITNESSESAt a party’s request or on the court’s own initiative, the court may orderwitnessesexcludedsothattheycannothearotherwitnesses’testimony.Butthisruledoesnotauthorizeexcluding:(a) Apartywhoisanaturalperson;(b) Anofficeroremployeeofapartythatisnotanaturalperson,afterbeing

designatedastheparty’srepresentativebyitsattorney;or(c) Apersonwhosepresenceapartyshowstobeessentialtopresenting

theparty’sclaimordefense.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] Maine Rule 603 is similar to its federal counterpart. The minordifferences in the proposed restyled Rule preserve the substantivedifferences.



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Thisrulemakesexclusionofwitnessesfromthecourtroomwhileotherwitnessesaretestifyingwhollydiscretionary,reversibleonlyforabuse.Statev. Miller, 253 A.2d 58 (Me. 1969). In practice the court routinely grants arequest for exclusion. The Federal Rule makes exclusion mandatory onrequest.

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RULE616.ILLUSTRATIVEAIDS

(a) Otherwise inadmissibleobjectsordepictionsmaybeused to illustrate

witnesstestimonyorcounsel’sarguments.(b) Thecourtmaylimitorprohibittheuseofillustrativeaidsasnecessary

toavoidunfairprejudice,surprise,confusion,orwasteoftime.(c) Opposingcounselmustbegivenreasonableopportunitytoobjecttothe

useofanyillustrativeaidpreparedbeforetrial.(d) Thejurymayuseillustrativeaidsduringdeliberationsonlyifallparties

consent,orifthecourtsoordersafterapartyhasshowngoodcause.Illustrative aids remain thepropertyof theparty thatprepared them. Theymaybeusedby any partyduring the trial. Theymustbepreserved for therecordforappealorfurtherproceedingsupontherequestofanyparty.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] MaineRuledoesnothaveafederalcounterpart. Ithasbeenrevisedinaccordancewiththeconventionsofthefederalrestyling.

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This rule is intended to authorize and regulate the use of “illustrativeaids”duringtrial. Objects, including papers, drawings, diagrams, the blackboard and thelikewhichareusedduringthetrialtoprovideinformationtothefinderoffactcanbeclassifiedintwocategories.Thefirstcategory,admissibleexhibits,arethose objects, papers, etc.,which in themselves have probative force on theissues in the case and hence are relevantunderRule 401. Suchobjects areadmissible in evidence upon laying the foundation necessary to establishauthenticityandrelevancyandtoavoidthestricturesofthehearsayruleandotherevidentiaryscreens.Usuallythejuryispermittedtotaketheseobjects

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with them to the jury room, to study them and to draw inferences directlyfromthemrelatingtotheissuesinthecase. The second class of objects are those objects which do not carryprobativeforceinthemselves,butareusedtoassistinthecommunicationoffactsbya layorexpertwitness testifyingorbycounselarguing. Thesemayinclude blackboard drawings, pre-prepared drawings, video recreations,charts, graphs, computer simulations, etc. They are not admissible inevidencebecausetheythemselveshavenorelevancetotheissuesinthecase.Theirutilityliesintheirabilitytoconveyrelevantinformationwhichmustbeprovided directly from some actual evidentiary source,whether that sourcebewitnessorexhibitwhichisadmissibleinevidence.Theultimatecredibilityand scope of the information conveyed is that of the source, not that of theillustrativemedia. This latter group of objects can be referred to as “illustrative aids.”Sometimes they have been referred to as “demonstrative exhibits” or even“chalks.” Frequently voluminous evidentiary data is summarized in tabular, orevengraphicform,andisofferedasasummaryunderRule1006.Asummarywhichpresentsthedatasubstantiallyinitsoriginalformwouldbeadmissibleinevidence.Asummarywhichpresentsthedatainatabularorgraphicformto“argue”thecaseorsupportspecificinferenceswouldbeanillustrativeaidandwouldbegovernedbythisrule. Whilesuchaidsdonothaveevidentiaryforceinthemselves,theycanbeextremelyhelpfulinassistingthetrieroffacttovisualizeevidentiarymaterialwhich isotherwisedifficult tounderstand. For thesamereason, illustrativeaidscanalsobesubjecttoabuse.Sometimestheformoftheillustrativemaybegrosslyorsubtlydistortedto“improve”upontheunderlyingtestimony,tooversimplify, or to provide subliminal messages. The opportunity forinventiveness and creativity in illustrative aidsmay exaggerate the effect ofdisparitiesinfinancialresourcesbetweenparties. The proposed rule addresses some of the most common issuesassociatedwiththeuseofillustrativeaids.

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First of all, Rule 616(a) permits the use of illustrative aids for thepurpose of illustrating the testimony of witnesses or the arguments ofcounsel. In the case ofwitness testimony, the foundation for the use of anillustrativeaidwouldbetestimonytotheeffectthattheaidwouldassistthewitness in illustrating her testimony. It is clear that the object need not beadmissible in evidence to be useful as an illustrative aid. Thus there is noneedtoestablishtheauthenticityofanillustrativeaidorevenitsaccuracyaslong as it has no probative force beyond that of illustrating a witness’stestimony. Paragraph(b)oftheproposedrulemakesclear,however,thatthecourtretains the discretion to condition, restrict or exclude the use of anyillustrative aid in order to avoid the risk of unfair prejudice, surprise,confusionorwasteoftime. This issimilartothediscretionexercisedbythecourt under Rule 403 in dealing with objects which are admissible inevidence. Because of the multiplicity of potential problems which may beencountered,itisdeemedwisertoallowthecourtameasureofdiscretioninapplyinggeneralstandardsratherthantoestablishalegaltestforutilizationofthesemedia. Some of the problems associated with the use of illustrative aids canincludethefollowing: 1. Cases where the illustrative aid is so crafted as to haveprobativeforceofitsown.Fewpeoplewouldattributemuchprobativeforceto a blackboard drawing which is used to illustrate a witness’s testimony.However, with a precisely drawn chart, or even more a computer videodisplay, the perceived quality of the media may impart to the informationconveyed a degree of authority, accuracy and credibilitymuch greater thanthesourcefromwhichtheinformationoriginallycame.Ifthecourtfindsthattheuseofillustrativeaidsresultsina“dressingup”oftestimonytoalevelofperceiveddignity,accuracyorqualitygreaterthanitdeservesandthisworksanunfairprejudice,theaidcouldbelimitedorexcludedunderRule616(a).87 2. Sometimes illustrative aids are used to take advantage ofandheightenadisparityineconomicresources.Theentertainmentqualityof

87NowRule616(b).

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certain media may give an edge to a wealthy litigant which is entirelyunjustifiedbytheactualfacts. 3. There is risk that the jury may draw inferences from theillustrativeaidsdifferentfromthoseforwhichtheillustrativeaidwascreatedandoffered.Thisisespeciallylikelytobeariskifthejurytakestheaidswiththeminthejuryroomtoexperimentwithorscrutinize. 4. Use of illustrative aids often makes a more informativevisualpresentationwhichisdifficulttocaptureonanoralrecord.Problemsofownershipandcontroloftheaidsmaymakeitimpossibletodocumentinthetranscriptameaningfulrecordonappeal. 5. Ordinary discovery procedures concentrate on the actualinformationpossessedbythewitnessesandknownexhibits.Illustrativeaidsas such are not usually subject to discovery and often are not prepared farenough in advance of trial. Their sudden appearance at trial may not givesufficientopportunity foranalysis,particularly if theyarecomplex,andmaycauseunfairsurprise. Illustrative aids may themselves become issues in the case leading towaste of time quibbling over the fairness of the illustrative aid, or battlesbetweenopponentsmarkingupeachother’sillustrativeaid,andthelike. Oneoftheprimarymeansofsafeguardingandregulatingtheuseoftheillustrative aids is to require advance disclosure. The rules proposes thatillustrativeaidspreparedbeforeuseincourtbedisclosedpriortousesoastopermit reasonable opportunity for objection. The rule applies to aidsprepared before trial or during trial before actual use in the courtroom. Ofcourse, this would not prevent counsel from using the blackboard orotherwisecreatingillustrativeaidsrightinthecourtroom. “Reasonable opportunity” for objection means reasonable under thecircumstances. In a case where the aid is simple and is generated shortlybefore or even during trial, disclosure immediately before use would allowreasonableopportunity for theopponent tocheckout theaid. On theotherhand counsel proposing to use a computer simulation or other complexillustrative media should be expected to make the aid and any informationnecessarytocheckitsaccuracyavailablesufficientlyfar inadvanceofuseso

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astopermitarealisticappraisalandunderstandingoftheproposedaid.Theidea is to permit opposing counsel the opportunity to raise any issues offairnessorprejudicewiththecourtoutofthepresenceofthejuryandbeforethe jury may have been tainted by the use of the illustrative aid. Thisrequirement of prior disclosure should be applied to both prosecution anddefense in criminal cases consistent with constitutional rights of criminaldefendants. Therule alsoprovides that illustrative aids arenot togo to thejuryroomunlessallpartiesagreeorunlessthecourtorders.Inmanycases,itislikelythatthepartieswillagreethatcertainillustrativeaidsmightgotothejuryroomtoaidthejuryintheirunderstandingoftheissues.Inothercases,itispossiblethat,despitetheprotestofoneparty,thecourtmaydeterminethatthejury’sconsiderationofthe issuesmightbesoaidedbyanillustrativeaidusedduringthetrialthat itshouldgowiththejurytothejuryroom. But inthe absenceof suchagreementor specific order, the residual rulewouldbethatillustrativeaidsmaybeusedinthecourtroomonly. Arecurrentproblemwiththeuseofillustrativeaidsarisesfromthefactthat theseareoftenproprietary itemspreparedbyaparticularparty togivethat party an advantage in the courtroom presentation. However, when awitnesshasreliedheavilyonan illustrativeaid ingivingher testimony, it isoftenimpossibletocross-examinethatwitnesseffectivelywithouttheuseofthesameillustrativeaid.Similarly,ifanillustrativeaidhasbeenimportantinthe presentation of one side, the other side ought to have access to thatillustrativeaidinmeetingthetestimonyillustrated.“Use”ofanillustrativeaiddoes not mean despoiling it. Mutual courtesy and respect, reinforced ifnecessary by court supervision and aided by mylar overlays and the like,should suffice to preserve each party’s illustrative aids from detractingmarkingsbyopposingcounselorwitnesses. The authorization here provided for the use of non-admissible“illustrative aids” does not prevent a party from using an actual probativeexhibit also as an illustrative aid. For instance, awitnessmightbe asked toindicatebymarkingonaphotographthelocationofanobjectwhichwasnotpresentatthetimethephotographwastaken.Thephotograph,asanexhibit,wouldbeprobative in itself.The jurycoulddraw inferencesdirectly from it.But the marks added by the witnesses would be a visual form of witnesstestimony. The preservation of that particular testimony in visual form forlater inspection by the jury during deliberations might give that testimonyundueweightanddurabilityunderthecircumstances. Thusthecourtwould

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havethediscretionunderthisruletowithholdfromthejuryroomanexhibitto which illustrative markings had been added if the markings would giveundueweighttoawitness’stestimonyonadisputedissueorotherwisewouldhavesomeunfairlyprejudicialeffect. The courtwouldalsohave thediscretionunder this rule to restrict orprohibitmarking on an evidentiary exhibit if the effectwould be to removetheexhibitfromthejuryroomduringdeliberations.Thus,ifacounselwishestomark or to enhance an admitted exhibit or add additionalmaterial as anillustrative aid, it probably should be done on another counterpart of theexhibit orwith amylaroverlayor someother suitable removablemeans sothattheexhibitcouldbeconsideredinthejuryroominitsoriginalstate.

ARTICLEVII.OPINIONSANDEXPERTTESTIMONY

RULE701.OPINIONTESTIMONYBYLAYWITNESSESIf a witness is not testifying as an expert, opinion testimony is limited toopinionsthatare:(a) Rationallybasedonthewitness’sperception;and(b) Helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to

determiningafactinissue.


MaineRuleofEvidence701issimilartoitsfederalcounterpart.Mainehas not adopted the final subparagraph (c) of Federal Rule 701 and thatomissioniscarriedthroughintherestyledRule.



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The Committee deleted all reference to an “inference” on the groundsthat thedeletionmade theRule flowbetter andeasier to read, andbecauseany “inference” is covered by the broader term “opinion.” Courts have notmadesubstantivedecisionsonthebasisofanydistinctionbetweenanopinionandaninference.Nochangeincurrentpracticeisintended.

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This rule is declaratory of Maine law. Clause (a) is the familiarrequirementoffirsthandknowledgeorobservation.See,e.g.,Wilesv.ConnorCoal & Wood Co., 143 Me. 250, 60 A.2d 786 (1948) (estimate of speedinadmissible when no adequate opportunity to observe). Clause (b) limitstestimony in the formofopinionsor inferences to thosehelpful inresolvingissues.Oftentheonlywaytoconveywhatthewitnessobservedisintheformof opinion or inference. Speed is an obvious example; identity is another.Courtsadmitsuchtestimonyoutofnecessity,oftenreferringtoitasa“short-hand rendering of facts.” Stacy v. Portland Publishing Co., 68Me. 279, 285(1878). The opinion or inference of a witness is not “helpful” under thisprovision if relatingwhatheobservedwouldput the jury in theposition tocometoitsownconclusion.Hencesuchanopinionwouldberejected.

RULE702.TESTIMONYBYEXPERTWITNESSESA witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,training, or educationmay testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise ifsuch testimony will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or todetermineafactinissue.


MaineRuleofEvidence702issimilartoitsfederalcounterpart.Mainedid not adopt the final subparagraphs of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 andthatomissioniscarriedthroughintherestyledRule.

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This rule is also declaratory of Maine law. The concluding phraseallowing the expert to testify “in the form of an opinion or otherwise” isdesignedtoallowanexperttogiveanexpositionofrelevantscientificorotherprinciplesintheformofstatementsoffact.Cf.Statev.Thomas,299A.2d919(Me.1973)(objectiontoexpert’stestimony“presentedasastatementoffact”asopposedtobeing“onlyanopinionandnotanobservedfact”overruled;“ahypertechnicalexerciseinsemantics”,saidthecourt).

RULE703.BASISOFANEXPERT’SOPINIONTESTIMONY

Anexpertmaybaseanopiniononfactsordatainthecasethattheexperthasbeenmadeawareoforhaspersonallyobserved. Ifexperts in theparticularfield would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming anopiniononthesubject,thefactsordataneednotbeadmissiblefortheopiniontobeadmitted.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] MaineRuleofEvidence703issimilartoitsfederalcounterpart.MainedidnotadoptthefinalsubparagraphofFederalRule703,anomissionthatiscarriedthroughintherestyledRule.


The language of Rule 703 has been amended as part of the generalrestylingoftheEvidenceRulestomakethemmoreeasilyunderstoodandtomakestyle and terminologyconsistent throughout therules. Thesechanges

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areintendedtobestylisticonly.Thereisnointenttochangeanyresultinanyrulingonadmissibility. The Committee deleted all reference to an “inference” on the groundsthat thedeletionmade theRule flowbetter andeasier to read, andbecauseany “inference” is covered by the broader term “opinion.” Courts have notmadesubstantivedecisionsonthebasisofanydistinctionbetweenanopinionandaninference.Nochangeincurrentpracticeisintended.

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An expertmay base his opinion (1) on firsthand observation, as by aphysiciantreatingapatient;(2)onpresentationatthetrial,asbythefamiliarhypothetical question or by having the expert attend the trial and hear thetestimonyestablishing the facts relied on; or (3) presentationofdata to theexpertoutsideofcourtandotherthanbyhisowndirectperception.Thekeyprovisionisthefinalsentenceallowingopiniononfactsordatanotadmissiblein evidence. This is supported by Warren v. Waterville Urban RenewalAuthority,235A.2d295(Me.1967),althoughthereareearliercases lookingtheotherway.Theplainintentionoftheruleistobringjudicialpracticeintolinewiththepracticeofexpertsthemselveswhennotincourt.Forexample,aphysician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from avariety of sources such as hospital records, X-ray reports, statements bypatients, and reports from nurses and technicians. Most of these could bepresented in the form of admissible evidence, but only through a time-consumingprocessofauthentication.Thetestiswhetherthefactsordataareof a type reasonably relied upon by experts. As the Federal AdvisoryCommittee said: “The physician makes life-and-death decisions in relianceupon them. His validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination,oughttosufficeforjudicialpurposes.” Thequestionwhetherfactsordataareofatypereasonablyrelieduponis a preliminary one for the court. A statement by the witness that he, orexperts generally, found facts or data of a given type reliable in forming anopinionisnotcontrollinguponthecourt.TheFederalAdvisoryCommittee,toallay the fear that enlargement of permissible data might break down therulesof exclusion unduly, stressed the reasonable reliance requirement and

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gave the opinion of an “accidentologist” as to the point of impact based onstatements of bystanders as an example of a situation where it was notsatisfied.

RULE704.OPINIONONANULTIMATEISSUEAnopinionisnotobjectionablemerelybecauseitisanopiniononanultimateissue.


Maine Rule of Evidence 704 is similar to its federal counterpart. TheMaineRuledoesnot contain reference to a special treatmentof opinions incriminalcases.ThisdifferencewascarriedoverintherestyledRule.


The language of Rule 704 has been amended as part of the generalrestylingoftheEvidenceRulestomakethemmoreeasilyunderstoodandtomakestyle and terminologyconsistent throughout therules. Thesechangesareintendedtobestylisticonly.Thereisnointenttochangeanyresultinanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility. The Committee deleted all reference to an “inference” on the groundsthat thedeletionmade theRule flowbetter andeasier to read, andbecauseany “inference” is covered by the broader term “opinion.” Courts have notmadesubstantivedecisionsonthebasisofanydistinctionbetweenanopinionandaninference.Nochangeincurrentpracticeisintended.

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Theoldrule,hereabolished,forbiddinganopiniononanultimateissuetobedecidedbythejuryhasbeeningrowingdisfavorinrecentyears. Thisdoesnotlowerthebarstoadmitallsuchopinions.UnderRules701and702opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact and Rule 403 provides forexclusion of time-wasting evidence. A lay opinion, for example, that thedefendantwasnegligentwouldsurelyberejected.

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RULE705.DISCLOSINGTHEFACTSORDATA

UNDERLYINGANEXPERT’SOPINION(a) Disclosureofunderlyingfacts.Unlessthecourtordersotherwise,an

expertmaystateanopinion—andgivethereasonsforit—withoutfirsttestifying to the underlying facts or data. But the expert may berequiredtodisclosethosefactsordataoncross-examination.

(b) Objection. Apartymayobjecttoanexpertwitness’stestimonyonthe

groundthattheexpertlacksasufficientbasisforexpressinganopinion.Beforetheexpertgivesanopinion,counselmaybeallowedtoexaminetheexpertaboutthefactsordataunderlyingtheopinionoutsideofthejury’spresence.Ifthereisevidencesufficienttosupportafindingthatthe expert lacks a sufficient basis for the opinion, the opinion isinadmissible, unless the party who called the expert witness firstestablishestheunderlyingfactsordata.


Maine Rule of Evidence 705 is similar to its federal counterpart. TheMaine version sets forth a procedure to test the factual basis for experttestimony before it is admitted, which has been included in the restyledversion.


The language of Rule 705 has been amended as part of the generalrestylingoftheEvidenceRulestomakethemmoreeasilyunderstoodandtomakestyle and terminologyconsistent throughout therules. Thesechangesareintendedtobestylisticonly.Thereisnointenttochangeanyresultinanyrulingonevidenceadmissibility. The Committee deleted all reference to an “inference” on the groundsthat thedeletionmade theRule flowbetter andeasier to read, andbecauseany “inference” is covered by the broader term “opinion.” Courts have notmadesubstantivedecisionsonthebasisofanydistinctionbetweenanopinionandaninference.Nochangeincurrentpracticeisintended.

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(February2,1976) Subdivision(a) isdesigned toeliminate thenecessityofahypotheticalquestion in eliciting expert testimony. Wigmorehas said: “Thehypotheticalquestion,misusedbytheclumsyandabusedbytheclever,hasinpracticeledtointolerableobstructionoftruth.”2Wigmore,Evidence§686.Theremedyistoallowtheopiniontobegivenwithoutpriordisclosureoftheunderlyingfactsordata.Theprovisionthatpriordisclosureoftheunderlyingfactsisnotrequireddoesnotmeanthattheexpertisforbiddentodisclosethemondirectexamination.Therulepermitshimtodoso,eventhoughfactsnotadmissiblein evidence may be included, as Rule 703 allows. The rule supersedesstatementstothecontraryinWarrenv.WatervilleUrbanRenewalAuthority,235A.2d295(Me.1967). The court has discretion to require prior disclosure of the underlyingfacts,eitheronanobjectionthataninadequatefoundationhasbeenlaidorforotherreasons.Inanyeventdisclosuremayberequiredoncross-examination.Tactically, of course, a party may prefer to disclose these facts on directexamination. Subdivision(b)reflectstheawarenessthatapotentialforseriousabuseexistsintheuseofthetechniquepermittedinsubdivision(a).Anexpertmaypredicatehisopiniononunreliabledataanditsweaknessmaynotberevealedon direct examination. This may put the adverse party at a tacticaldisadvantage, forcing him to engage in blind cross-examination. Moreover,once the opinion is heard by the jury, itmaywell be that nothing done oncross-examination or by the court can eliminate the resulting prejudice. Incivil cases if counsel has engaged in the pretrial discovery permitted byM.R.C.P.26(b)(4),heshouldbeequippedtochallengethebasisoftheopinion.This subdivision allows the alternative, however, of a voir dire examinationbefore the opinion is admitted, so as to give a basis for its exclusion in anappropriatecase.

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This amendmentmerely clarifies the language of Rule 705(a) that thedisclosure of underlying facts referred to by the rule is disclosure in priortestimonyincourt,notpretrialdisclosureduringthecourseofdiscovery.Therule permitting an expert to give an opinion without first testifying to theunderlying facts and data is not intended to limit or define the scope ofrequiredorpermittedpretrialdiscoveryofexperttestimony.

RULE706.COURT-APPOINTEDEXPERTWITNESSES(a) Appointment process. On a party’s motion or on its own, the court

mayorder theparties toshowcausewhyexpertwitnessesshouldnotbeappointedandmayaskthepartiestosubmitnominations.Thecourtmay appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of its ownchoosing.Butthecourtmayonlyappointsomeonewhoconsentstoact.

(b) Expert’srole. Thecourtmustinformtheexpertoftheexpert’sduties.

Thecourtmaydosoinwritingandhaveacopyfiledwiththeclerkormay do so orally at a conference in which the parties have anopportunitytoparticipate.Theexpert:(1) Mustadvisethepartiesofanyfindingstheexpertmakes;

(2) Maybedeposedbyanyparty;

(3) Maybecalledtotestifybythecourtoranyparty;and

(4) May be cross-examined by any party, including the party that

calledtheexpert.(c) Compensation. Theexpert isentitled toreasonablecompensation,as

set by the court. Unless provided otherwise by law, the partiesmustpaytheexpert’scompensationinwhateverproportionthecourtdirects,at a time chosen by the court. Thereafter, the expert’s compensationmaybechargedinthesamemannerasothercosts.

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(d) Disclosing the appointment to the jury. The court may authorizedisclosuretothejurythatthecourtappointedtheexpert.

(e) Parties’choiceoftheirownexperts. Thisruledoesnotlimitapartyincallingitsownexperts.


Maine Rule of Evidence 706 is similar to its federal counterpart. TheMaine Rule sets forth a different procedure for assigning the costs forcompensationof the expertwitness.Thisdifferencewas carriedover in therestyledRule.



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Court-appointedexpertsareprovidedforinM.R.Crim.P.28(a).88Thereisnobroad statutoryprovisionor rule for suchappointments in civil cases.Under19M.R.S.A.§§277-279,89addedbyP.L.1967,c.325,§2,thecourtmayin paternity cases appoint qualified experts to perform blood tests. Theexpertsaretobecalledascourtwitnesses,subjecttocross-examination,andtobepaidasthecourtorders.Thisrulegeneralizestheproceduresunderthestatute.

88 Rule 28 the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure and theMaine Rules of Unified Criminal

Procedureappliesonlytocourtappointmentofinterpretersandtranslators.89Thisstatutehasbeenrepealed.

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Thisrule is identical90totheFederalRule. Althoughitrecognizesthatthepowerofthetrial judgetoappointanexpertofhisownchoosingshouldexist, the Court shares the view of theAdvisory Committee that exercise ofpowerincivilcasesshouldberesortedtoonlyinexceptionalsituations.TheCommitteesaid:“Inanyjurycasetheopinionofanexpertknowntobecourt-appointed and hence presumably impartial would almost surely be givendecisiveweight.Inacasetriedwithoutjurythejudgewhoselectedtheexpertcouldscarcelybeexpectedbythepartiesnottoadopthisopinion.Theuseofa court-appointed expert in personal injury cases seems especially unwise.TheCommitteerecommendstheruleinthisformbecauseitcouldnotdeviseanysatisfactorylimitationtopreventpotentialabuse.”

ARTICLEVIII.HEARSAY

RULE801.DEFINITIONSTHATAPPLYTOTHISARTICLE;EXCLUSIONSFROMHEARSAY

(a) Statement. ‘‘Statement’’ means a person’s oral assertion, written

assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as anassertion.

(b) Declarant.‘‘Declarant’’meansthepersonwhomadethestatement.(c) Hearsay.‘‘Hearsay’’meansastatementthat: (1) Thedeclarantdoesnotmakewhile testifyingat thecurrent trial

orhearing;and (2) A party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

assertedinthestatement.(d) Statements thatarenothearsay. Astatement thatmeetsoneof the

followingconditionsisnothearsay:

90 TheFederalandMaineRulesareno longer identical—see theRestylingNote to theMaine

Rule.

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(1) Adeclarant-witness’sprior statement. Thedeclaranttestifiesandis subject to cross-examination about aprior statement, and thestatement:

(A) Isinconsistentwiththedeclarant’stestimonyandwasgiven

under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or otherproceedingorinadeposition;or

(B) Isconsistentwiththedeclarant’stestimonyandisoffered:

(i) to rebut an express or implied charge that thedeclarantrecentlyfabricateditoractedfromarecentimproperinfluenceormotiveinsotestifying;or

(ii) torehabilitatethedeclarant’scredibilityasawitness

whenattackedonanotherground;or

(C) Identifies a person as someone the declarant perceivedearlier.

(2) Anopposingparty’sstatement.Thestatementisofferedagainstan

opposingpartyand:

(A) Wasmade by the party in an individual or representativecapacity;

(B) Isonethepartymanifestedthatitadoptedorbelievedtobe

true;

(C) Wasmadebyapersonwhomthepartyauthorizedtomakea statement on the subject, but was not made to theprincipaloremployer;

(D) Was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter

within the scope of that relationship and while it existed,butwasnotmadetotheprincipaloremployer;or

(E) Was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in

furtheranceoftheconspiracy.

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Thestatementmustbeconsideredbutdoesnotbyitselfestablishthedeclarant’sauthorityunder(C), theexistenceorscopeoftherelationship under (D), or the existence of the conspiracy orparticipationinitunder(E).

AdvisoryCommitteeNote–August2018

Thisamendmentaffectsboththeadmissibilityandtheprobativeeffectofapriorconsistentstatement.ItisdesignedtobringMaineRuleofEvidence801(d)(1)intoconformitywiththecorrespondingfederalruleasamendedin2014. With the change, a fact-finder can now consider an admissible priorconsistentstatementbothforitsrehabilitativeandsubstantiveeffect. Under former Maine Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1), a prior consistentstatement could be admitted only to rebut an express or implied attack onwitness credibility based on “recent fabrication or improper influence ormotive.” Under the new rule language, a prior consistent statement isadmissible when relevant to rehabilitate a declarant’s credibility whenattackedonanyground. In the past, a Maine jury could consider a prior consistent statementonlyas evidenceof thecredibilityof thewitness,andnotas evidenceof thetruthoftheunderlyingsubstantivematter.SeeM.R.Evid.801Advisers’NotetoformerM.R.Evid.801(February2,1976).Ontheotherhand,FederalRuleofEvidence801(d)hasbeenconstruedtoallowpriorconsistentstatementstobeconsideredassubstantiveevidenceaswellasrehabilitativeofcredibility. The existing requirement that a prior consistent statement offered torebut an attack on credibility based on recent fabrication or improperinfluence ormotivemust have beenmade prior to the time of the assertedfabricationorimproperinfluenceormotiveisnotaffectedbythischange.Ontheotherhand,ifthepriorconsistentstatementisrelevanttorebutanattackoncredibilityonsomeotherground,thereisnoabsoluterequirementthatitantedate aprior inconsistentstatement inorder tobeadmissibleunder thisRule. It would be admissible under the amended Rule under anycircumstances inwhich itwouldberelevant torehabilitate thecredibilityofthewitness.

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The following excerpt from theAdvisory CommitteeNote to the 2014amendmenttotheFederalRulealsoappliestotherevisedMainerule:

Though the original Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provided forsubstantiveuseof certainprior consistent statements, the scopeofthatRulewaslimited. TheRulecoveredonlythoseconsistentstatements that were offered to rebut charges of recentfabricationorimpropermotiveorinfluence.TheRuledidnot,forexample, provide for substantive admissibility of consistentstatementsthatareprobativetoexplainwhatotherwiseappearstobeaninconsistencyinthewitness’stestimony.Nordiditcoverconsistent statements thatwouldbeprobative to rebut a chargeof faulty memory. Thus, the Rule left any prior consistentstatementspotentiallyadmissibleonlyforthelimitedpurposeofrehabilitatingawitness’scredibility.TheoriginalRulealsoledtosome conflict in the cases; some courts distinguished betweensubstantiveandrehabilitativeuseforpriorconsistentstatements,while others appeared to hold that prior consistent statementsmustbeadmissibleunderRule801(d)(1)(B)ornotatall. Theamendmentretains therequirementset forth inTomev. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995): that under Rule801(d)(1)(B),aconsistentstatementofferedtorebutachargeofrecent fabrication o[r] improper influence or motive must havebeenmadebeforetheallegedfabricationorimproperinfluenceormotive arose. The intent of the amendment is to extendsubstantive effect to consistent statements that rebut otherattacks on a witness—such as the charges of inconsistency orfaultymemory. The amendment does not change the traditional andwell-accepted limits on bringing prior consistent statementsbefore the factfinder for credibility purposes. It does not allowimpermissiblebolsteringofawitness.Asbefore,priorconsistentstatements under the amendment may be brought before thefactfinder only if they properly rehabilitate a witness whosecredibility has been attacked. As before, to be admissible forrehabilitation, a prior consistent statement must satisfy thestrictures of Rule 403. As before, the trial court has ample

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discretion to exclude prior consistent statements that arecumulativeaccountsofanevent.Theamendmentdoesnotmakeany consistent statement admissible that was not admissiblepreviously—the only difference is that prior consistentstatements otherwise admissible for rehabilitation are nowadmissiblesubstantivelyaswell.


MaineRule801issubstantiallysimilarFederalRule801,exceptthattheMaine Rule is structured somewhat differently with respect to theadmissibilityofpriorconsistentstatements. Also,Maineexcludes fromRule801(b)(2) “in-house”statementsmadebyanagent,employee,or authorizedperson. These distinctions have been carried over as part of the restylingprocess.

FederalCommitteeRestylingNote


Statements falling under the hearsay exclusion provided by Rule

801(d)(2) are no longer referred to as “admissions” in the title to thesubdivision. The term “admissions” is confusing because not all statementscoveredbytheexclusionareadmissionsinthecolloquialsense—astatementcanbewithintheexclusionevenifit“admitted”nothingandwasnotagainsttheparty’sinterestwhenmade.Theterm“admissions”alsoraisesconfusionin comparison with the Rule 804(b)(3) exception for declarations againstinterest.Nochangeinapplicationoftheexclusionisintended.

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Thedefinitions in thisruleposesomeproblemsandbringaboutsomechanges in Maine law. Subdivision (a) excludes from the operation of the

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hearsayruleallevidenceofconductnotintendedasanassertion.Inadditiontoverbalassertions,“statement”includesnonverbalconduct,suchaspointingat someone, which is assertive in nature. (“That’s the man!”) When anassertion is intended is a preliminary question for the court, and often adifficultone. Subdivision(c) embodies in thedefinitionof “hearsay” astatement,asdefinedin(a),otherthanonemadeonthewitnessstand,offeredtoprovethetruth of the matter asserted. This is familiar law. See, e.g., Rockland&Rockport Lime Co. v. Coe-Mortimer Co., 115 Me. 184, 98 A. 657 (1916).Wherethefactthatthewordswerespokenisrelevant,aswordsofofferandacceptance in a contract action or slanderous words in a defamation case,thereisnohearsayproblem.Thewitnessonthestandcanbecross-examinedastowhatwassaidanditstruthisnotinissue. Subdivision (d) expands what is not hearsay. The importance ofexcluding a statement from the definition of hearsay is that it becomesadmissible as substantive evidence. Subsection (1) changes the Maine lawwith respect to prior inconsistent statements of a witness. Traditionally,evidence of such a statement has been admissible only to impeach thetestimonyofthewitnessonthestandandnotforitstruth.Statev.Fournier,267A.2d638,640(Me.1970). Aninstructiontothiseffectis,however,hardfor the jury to comprehend. Under this rule when the declarant actuallytestifiesasawitness,the jurycanjudgehisdemeanorandhiscredibilitycanbe tested by cross-examination. If the prior inconsistent statement waspreviouslygivenunderoathsubjecttothepenaltyofperjuryatatrialorotherproceeding, it becomes admissible for its truth and not merely to impeach.When the jury decides whether the truth is what the witness now says incourt orwhat he swore to before, it is still deciding fromwhat it sees andhearsincourt.AsoriginallyproposedbytheSupremeCourt,theruledidnotrequirethepriorstatementtobeunderoathinorderforittobeadmissibleassubstantiveevidence.TheFederalRuleasenactedbyCongressdoesrequirean oath, and the Court accepts this requirement as desirable. While thesanctityattributedtotheoathislessthanitoncewas,aswornstatementisasolemnundertaking,subjecttotheperjurypenalty,andinherentlymuchmorecrediblethanamereunswornstatement.Iftherewerenorequirementforanoath,itwouldbepossibletogetacasetothejurywhentheonlyevidenceofan essential fact was a casual out-of-court statement which the declarantrepudiates in courtunderoath. Anyprior inconsistent statementnotunder

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oathisstilladmissibleforthepurposeofimpeachment,asitisunderpresentlaw. Theconcludingsentencelimitingapriorconsistentstatement,whetheror not under oath, to use in rebuttal of a claim of recent fabrication orimproper influence or motive states the present Maine law. Althoughprobablyunnecessary, it is includedhere for thesakeofclarity. Onereasonfor including it is to emphasize the difference from the Federal Rule,whichmakesapriorconsistentstatementsubstantiveevidence.91 Subsection (2) dealswith admissionsbyaparty-opponent. Therehasbeenalearneddisputeoverwhetheraparty’sadmissionsareadmissibleasanexceptiontothehearsayruleorarenotclassifiedashearsayatall. Thisruletakes the latter view. In either event, they are admissible. A party’s ownstatementistheclassicexampleofanadmission. It isoftenconfusedwithastatementagainstinterest,ahearsayexceptioncoveredinRule804(b)(3).Anadmissionmaybemadeonlybyaparty.Itneednotbeofhisownknowledge,itneednotbecontrarytohisinterestwhenmade,anditisnotnecessarythatthepartybeunavailableattrial.Astatementagainstinterestneednotbe,andusuallyisnot,madebyaparty.Itmustbecontrarytothedeclarant’sinterestwhenmade,andthedeclarantmustbeunavailableattrial. Subsection (2)(B), covering adoptive admissions, is in accord withMainelaw.Adoptionmaybemanifestedbywordsorbysilence.Silencemaybeatacitadmissionoffactsstatedinoneshearingundercircumstancessuchas naturally call for a reply if no admission is intended. Gerulis v. Viens,130Me.378,156A.378(1931).Thepartymusthaveheardandunderstoodthestatementandhavebeenatlibertytoreply. Subsection (2)(C) makes admissible statements made by a personauthorizedbyaparty tomakea statement to a thirdperson concerning thesubject. Statementsmadebytheagenttotheprincipalarenotadmissionsoftheprincipal.ThisisinaccordwithMainelaw.Warnerv.MaineCentralR.R.,111Me.149,88A.403(1913). Subsection (2)(D) makes admissible an out-of-court statement of anagentorservantconcerningamatterwithinthescopeofhisemployment,but

91 Federal Rule 801 only allows prior consistent statements to rebut an express or impliedchargeofrecentfabricationorimpropermotive,torehabilitatecredibilityonceattacked,orifitwasastatementofidentificationofsomeone.

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not to his principal or employer, made during the existence of therelationship.Thetraditionalrulehasbeentoapplytheusualagencytestanddetermine whether the statement was authorized by the principal. Thedifficultywiththisisthatveryrarelyisanagentemployedtomakedamagingstatements. Thetruckdriverishiredtodrive,nottotalk.Thesubsectionatleast formally changes Maine law. In practice, however, another basis foradmissibility has frequently been found, such as a spontaneous statement,part of the res gestae and the like, often by stretching those concepts to orbeyondthebreakingpoint. Subsection(2)(E)makingadmissiblethestatementsofaco-conspiratorofapartyduringthecourseandinfurtheranceoftheconspiracyisinaccordwithMaine law. SeeStatev.Vetrano,121Me.368,117A.460(1922). It isconsistentwiththepositionoftheSupremeCourtindenyingadmissibilitytostatementsmade after the objectives of the conspiracy have either failed orbeenachieved.Krulewitchv.UnitedStates,336U.S.440,69S.Ct.716(1949). There are three departures from the Federal Rule. One alreadymentionedisthedifferenceintreatmentofapriorconsistentstatement.Theother twoare in subdivision (d)(2)(C) and (D), inbothofwhich statementsmadebyanagentorservant tohisemployerarenotadmissionsagainst theemployer,astheyareundertheFederalRule.

ExplanationofAmendment(October1,1976)

The purpose of this amendment was to exclude from the category ofhearsay a statement of prior identification of a personmade by a declarantwho testifies at the trial and is subject to cross-examination. It restores aprovisionintheTentativeDraftoftheruleswhichwasintheSupremeCourt’sproposedruleandinthebillasitpassedtheHouseofRepresentatives.Whenthe TentativeDraftwas submitted to the Bar, no adverse comments on therule were received. The provision was deleted by Congress in the finalversion of the rule in the face of a threatened filibuster which jeopardizedpassage of the bill. The Court on recommendation of the Evidence RulesCommitteealsodeleteditsolelytoconformtotheFederalRuleasenactedbyCongress.CongressrestoredtheprovisiononOctober16,1975,sothereasonforitsdeletionfromtheMainerulenolongerexists.

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AdvisoryCommitteeNote(April1,1998Amendment)

This amendment is proposed to bring Maine Rule 801(d)(2) intoconformitywithitsfederalcounterpartasamendedin1997.Theamendmentresolves a previously unresolved issue inMaine, namelywhether a hearsaystatementcanbeusedtoprove itsownfoundationasavicariousadmission.SeeFieldandMurray,MaineEvidence(4thEd.)§§801.7and801.8.Undertherule as amended, the hearsay statements could be used to prove thefoundation for the vicarious admissions, but would not alone be sufficientproofofsuchfoundationwithoutsomeindependentevidence.

RULE802.THERULEAGAINSTHEARSAYHearsayisnotadmissibleunlessanyofthefollowingprovidesotherwise:

• Astatute;• Theserules;or• OtherrulesprescribedbytheMaineSupremeJudicialCourt.


The restyled rule leaves out the definition of “as provided by law”inserted in Maine Rule 802 in favor of the federal approach of listing thealternativesourcesofhearsayexceptions.

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The proposition that hearsay is not admissible except as provided bytheserulesrequiresnocomment.

RULE803.EXCEPTIONSTOTHERULEAGAINSTHEARSAY—REGARDLESS

OFWHETHERTHEDECLARANTISAVAILABLEASAWITNESSThe following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless ofwhetherthedeclarantisavailableasawitness:

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(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining anevent or condition, made while or immediately after the declarantperceivedit.

(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or

condition,madewhilethedeclarantwasunderthestressofexcitementthatitcaused.

(3) Then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A

statementofthedeclarant’sthen-existingstateofmind(suchasmotive,intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such asmental feeling,pain,orbodilyhealth),butnot includingastatementofmemory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless itrelatestothevalidityortermsofthedeclarant’swill.

(4) Statementmade formedical diagnosis or treatment. A statementthat:

(A) Ismade for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis

ortreatment;and(B) Describes medical history; past or present symptoms or

sensations;theirinception;ortheirgeneralcause.

(5) Recordedrecollection.Arecordthat:

(A) Isonamatterthewitnessonceknewaboutbutnowcannotrecallwellenoughtotestifyfullyandaccurately;

(B) Wasmadeoradoptedbythewitnesswhenthematterwasfresh

inthewitness’smemory;and(C) Accuratelyreflectsthewitness’sknowledge.

Ifadmitted,therecordmaybereadintoevidencebutmaybereceivedasanexhibitonlyifofferedbyanadverseparty.

(6) Recordsofaregularlyconductedactivity. Arecordofanact,event,

condition,opinion,ordiagnosisif:

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(A) Therecordwasmadeatornearthetimeby—orfrominformation

transmittedby—someonewithknowledge;(B) The record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted

activityofabusiness,organization,occupation,orcalling,whetherornotforprofit;

(C) Makingtherecordwasaregularpracticeofthatactivity;

(D) Alltheseconditionsareshownbythetestimonyofthecustodian

or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complieswith Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12) or with a statute permittingcertification;and

(E) Theopponentdoesnotshowthatthesourceofinformationorthe

method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack oftrustworthiness.

(7) Absenceofarecordofaregularlyconductedactivity.Evidencethat

amatterisnotincludedinarecorddescribedinparagraph(6)if:

(A) Theevidenceisadmittedtoprovethatthematterdidnotoccurorexist;

(B) Arecordwasregularlykeptforamatterofthatkind;and

(C) Neither the possible source of the information nor other

circumstancesindicatealackoftrustworthiness.(8) Publicrecords.Arecordorstatementofapublicofficeif:

(A) Itsetsout:

(i) The office’s regularly conducted and regularly recordedactivities;

(ii) Amatterobservedwhileunderalegaldutytoreport;or

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(iii) Factualfindingsfromalegallyauthorizedinvestigation.(B) Thefollowingarenotwithinthisexceptiontothehearsayrule:

(i) Investigative reports by police and other law enforcementpersonnel;

(ii) Investigative reports prepared by or for a government, a

public office or an agency when offered by it in a case inwhichitisaparty;

(iii) Factualfindingsofferedbythestateinacriminalcase;

(iv) Factual findings resulting from special investigation of a

particularcomplaint,case,orincident;and

(v) Anymatterastowhichthesourcesofinformationorothercircumstancesindicatelackoftrustworthiness.

(9) Public records of vital statistics. A record of a birth, death, or

marriage,ifreportedtoapublicofficeinaccordancewithalegalduty.(10)Absenceofapublicrecord.Testimony—oracertificationunderRule

902—that a diligent search failed to disclose a public record orstatementifthetestimonyorcertificationisadmittedtoprovethat:

(A) Therecordorstatementdoesnotexist;or

(B) Amatterdidnotoccurorexist, ifapublicofficeregularlykepta

recordorstatementforamatterofthatkind.(11)Records of religious organizations concerning personal or family

history. A statement of birth, legitimacy, ancestry,marriage, divorce,death,relationshipbybloodormarriage,orsimilarfactsofpersonalorfamily history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religiousorganization.

(12)Certificates of marriage, baptism, and similar ceremonies. A

statementoffactcontainedinacertificate:

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(A) Madebyapersonwhoisauthorizedbyareligiousorganizationor

bylawtoperformtheactcertified;(B) Attesting that the person performed a marriage or similar

ceremonyoradministeredasacrament;and(C) Purportingtohavebeen issuedatthetimeoftheactorwithina

reasonabletimeafterit.(13)Family records. Astatementof fact aboutpersonalor familyhistory

containedinafamilyrecord,suchasaBible,genealogy,chart,engravingon a ring, inscription on a portrait, or engraving on an urn or burialmarker.

(14)Records of documents that affect an interest in property. The

recordofadocumentthatpurportstoestablishoraffectaninterest inpropertyif:(A) The record is admitted to prove the content of the original

recordeddocument,alongwithitssigninganditsdeliverybyeachpersonwhopurportstohavesignedit;

(B) Therecordiskeptinapublicoffice;and(C) A statute authorizes recording documents of that kind in that

office.(15)RESERVED.(16) Statementsinancientdocuments. Astatementinadocumentthatis

atleast20yearsoldandwhoseauthenticityisestablished.(17)Market reports and similar commercial publications. Market

quotations, lists, directories, or other compilations that are generallyreliedonbythepublicorbypersonsinparticularoccupations.

(18) Statements in learned treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets. Astatementcontainedinatreatise,periodical,orpamphletif:

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(A) The statement is called to the attention of an expertwitness on

cross-examination;and(B) The publication is established as a reliable authority by the

expert’s admission or testimony, by another expert’s testimony,orbyjudicialnotice.

Ifadmitted,thestatementmaybereadintoevidencebutnotreceivedasanexhibit.

(19)Reputation concerning personal or family history. A reputation

amongaperson’sfamilybyblood,adoption,ormarriage—oramongtheperson’sassociatesorinthecommunity—concerningtheperson’sbirth,adoption,legitimacy,ancestry,marriage,divorce,death,relationshipbyblood,adoption,ormarriage,orsimilarfactsoftheperson’spersonalorfamilyhistory.

(20)Reputationconcerningboundariesorgeneralhistory.Areputation

in a community—arising before the controversy—concerningboundariesoflandinthecommunityorcustomsthataffecttheland,orconcerninggeneralhistoricaleventsimportanttothatcommunity,state,ornation.

(21)Reputation concerning character. A reputation among a person’s

associatesorinthecommunityconcerningtheperson’scharacter.(22) Judgment of a previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment of

convictionif:(A) Thejudgmentwasenteredafteratrialorguiltyplea;(B) The conviction was for a crime punishable by death or by

imprisonmentformorethanayear;(C) The evidence is admitted to prove any fact essential to the

judgment;and

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(D) Whenofferedby theprosecutor in acriminalcase forapurposeotherthanimpeachment,thejudgmentwasagainstthedefendant.

(23) Judgments involving personal, family, or general history, or a

boundary. A judgmentthat isadmittedtoproveamatterofpersonal,family,orgeneralhistory,orboundaries,ifthematter:(A) Wasessentialtothejudgment;and(B) Couldbeprovedbyevidenceofreputation.

AdvisoryCommitteeNote–August2018

This amendment revises subdivision (6) of Rule 803 to follow acorresponding2014amendment toFederalRulesofEvidence803(6)and toclarify that, while the proponent has the burden of establishing thefoundational elements listed in sections (A)–(D), the proponent need notinitially show that the source of information or circumstances of itspreparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. It is up to the opponent toshow that the source of information or the method or circumstances ofpreparationoftherecordindicatealackoftrustworthiness. Thisisnotasubstantivechange.Inpractice,partiesandcourtsseemtohave assumed that the language “neither the source of information nor themethodorcircumstancesofpreparationindicatealackoftrustworthiness”inexistingRule803(6)meantthattheburdenofdemonstratingthesecontraryindications iswith theopponent. Although thisprovisohasbeenapplied incasesreviewedbytheLawCourt,see,e.g.,Adamaticv.ProgressiveBakingCo.,Inc., 667 A.2d 871 (Me. 1995), there are no known Law Court decisionsdiscussingwhichpartyhaseither theburdenofgoingforwardor theriskofnonpersuasion. TheAdvisoryCommitteeNote to the2014Federal803(6)amendmentstates:

TheRulehasbeenamendedtoclarifythatiftheproponenthasestablishedthestatedrequirementsoftheexception—regularbusiness with regularly kept record, source with personalknowledge, record made timely, and foundation testimony or

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certification—then the burden is on the opponent to show thatthe source of information or the method or circumstances ofpreparationindicatealackoftrustworthiness.Whilemostcourtshaveimposedthatburdenontheopponent,somehavenot. It isappropriate to impose thisburdenon theopponent,as thebasicadmissibility requirements are sufficient to establish apresumptionthattherecordisreliable.

The opponent, to meet its burden, is not necessarily

required to introduceaffirmative evidenceofuntrustworthiness.For example, the opponent might argue that a record wasprepared in anticipation of litigation and is favorable to thepreparing party without needing to introduce evidence on thepoint.Adeterminationofuntrustworthinessnecessarilydependsonthecircumstances.

If lackof trustworthinessofaprofferedbusinessrecord isassertedbyanopposingpartyonvoirdire,bytheprofferofevidence,orbyargument,thecourt can take into account the parties’ relative access to information indeterminingwhether the objecting party has carried its burden of showinglackoftrustworthiness.


Restyled Rule 803 preserves the substantive differences between theMaine and the Federal Rules. Maine does not have any residual hearsayexception.92

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Theframeworkofthisandthefollowingruleistoseparatestatementsmadebyadeclaranteventhoughheisavailableasawitnessfromthosemadebyadeclarantwho isunavailable. For themostpart, the exceptions in thisrule from the prohibition against hearsay evidence are those evolved on a

92SeeRule807oftheFederalRulesofEvidence.

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case-by-case basis by the common law and presently recognized in Maine.Thedifferenceswillbediscussedundertheseparatesubdivisions. Subdivisions(1)and(2)overlapsomewhat,althoughtheyarebasedondifferent theories. The theory of (1) is that a statement substantiallycontemporaneous to the event being described is most unlikely to be adeliberateorconsciousmisrepresentation. Thereisnorequirementthattheeventbe an excitingone, although it usuallywill be, sinceunexciting eventsare not likely to evoke comment. The theory of (2) is that witnessing astartlingeventproducesastateofexcitementwhich for the timebeingstillsthereflectivefacultiesandnegativesapurposetofabricateevidence.Itdiffersfrom(1) in thatagreater lapseof time isallowable. Thecrucialquestion ishowlongthestateofexcitementmaybefoundto last. This isapreliminaryquestion for the judge. Theprinciple iswell establishedbyMaine case law.SeeStatev.Ellis,297A.2d91(Me.1972),whereadmissibilitywasdenied,andState v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973), where the statements wereadmitted. Subdivision (3) makes admissible statements of the declarant’s thenexistingstateofmind,suchasintent,plan,motive,andthelike.TheprincipleisillustratedbyMainecases.Colbyv.Tarr,139Me.277,29A.2d749(1943);State v. Trask, 223A.2d 823, 826 (Me. 1966). The rule excludes in generalstatements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.This,astheFederalAdvisoryCommitteesaid,isnecessarytoavoidthevirtualdestruction of the hearsay rule which would result from allowing state ofmind,provablebyanout-of-courtstatement,toserveasabasisforinferenceof the happening of the event which produced the state of mind. A primeexampleof this danger is Shepard v.UnitedStates, 290U. S. 96,54S.Ct. 22(1933). There the statement that “Dr. Shepard has poisonedme”was heldinadmissibledespitetheargumentthatitshowedthevictim’sstateofmind—a will to live—in order to rebut evidence of intent to commit suicide. Itpreserves the result in thenotorious caseofMutualLife Ins.Co. v.Hillmon,145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909 (1892), where a letter from oneWalters that heintended to go to Crooked Creek with Hillmon was held admissible, hisstatementofpresent intentmaking itmoreprobable thathewentandwentwith Hillmon. A statement of then existing state of mind eliminates thememoryriskinherentinastatementreflectingapaststateofmind.

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The subdivision also removes from the generalization excludingstatements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believedstatementsrelatingtotheexecution,revocation,oridentificationofthetermsofthedeclarant’swill, thusmakingsuchstatementsadmissible. TheFederalAdvisoryCommitteesaidthatthisrepresentsanadhocjudgment,restingonpractical grounds of necessity and expediency rather than logic. This ruledoes not affect theMaine casesholding thatoral testimonyof the testator’sintentionsisinadmissible.Bryantv.Bryant,129Me.251,151A.429(1930);FirstPortlandNat’lBankv.Kaler-Vaill,155Me.50,151A.2d708(1959). Subdivision(4)recognizesanexceptiontothehearsayrulestatementsmadeforthepurposeofmedicaldiagnosisortreatment.SuchstatementsarenowadmissibleunderMainelaw,notasproofofthefactsstatedbutonlyastheymightsupportorexplainthedoctor’sdiagnosisoropinion.Goldsteinv.Sklar, 216A.2d298 (Me.1966). This subdivisionadmits the statements fortheirtruth. Thejustificationisthepatient’sstrongmotivationtobetruthful.Furthermore,itisunrealistictoassumethatthelayjuroriscapableofmakingthe nice discrimination between admissibility for truth and for the otherpurposesallowableunderpresentlaw. Thewords“insofarasreasonablypertinenttodiagnosisortreatment”93are broad enough to cover statements as to the cause of an injury (“I wasstruck by a car”) but not statements of fault (“The car went through a redlight”). Thestatementneednothavebeenmadedirectlytoaphysicianinorderto be admissible, but would include statements to an ambulance driver,emergency room attendants (interns, nurses, orderlies and the like), or tomembersofthefamily.“Medicaltreatment”isnotbroadenough,however,toinclude a statement by a child to its mother for administration of a homeremedysuchasadoseofaspirinorsoakingofabruisedhand. Subdivision (5) recognizes the familiar hearsay exception for pastrecollectionrecorded.Copev.Sevigny,289A.2d682(Me.1972).Theruleissilentas towhetherexhibitsare tobesent to the juryroom, thusgiving thecourt the same discretion as at present. Customarily the written

93 The language is now “is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis ortreatment,”buttheNoteisstillaccurateotherwise.

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memorandumisnotallowedtogotothejuryroombecauseitmayimpart“anaura of veracity and accuracy not normally attached to the spoken words.”Morganv.Paine,312A.2d178,185(Me.1973). Subdivision(6)coversthehearsayexceptionforrecordsofaregularlyconductedbusiness.Itgivessomewhatbroadercoveragetobusinessrecordsthan present Maine law. It would not admit personal check stubs, heldinadmissible in Supruniuk v. Petriw, 334 A.2d 857 (Me. 1975), and likeindividual financial records nor a personal diary concerning daily weatherconditions, regularly kept as a hobby, held inadmissible under the old“shopbook”ruleinArnoldv.Hussey,111Me.224,88A.724(1913).Itshouldbenotedthatrecordsnotadmissibleunderthisexceptionmaygetinthroughsome other route, such as admissions, statements against interest, pastrecollectionrecorded,andsoon. Subdivision (7) is a necessary complement to subdivision (6). Itprovidesthattheabsenceofanentryisadmissibletoprovenonoccurrenceornonexistence of the matter. Compare M.R.C.P. 44(b), dealing with proof oflackofofficialrecord. Subdivision(8)createsahearsayexception forvarious typesofpublicrecordsandreports.Thereisacommonlawexceptionforpublicrecordsandthere are numerous Maine statutes facilitating the admission of specifiedofficial records. This subdivision is largely a generalized statement of theprovisionsfoundinthesestatutes. Thejustificationistheassumption,bynomeansaninevitableone,thatapublicofficialwillperformhisdutiesproperly.There is an escape clause in (B)(v) providing for exclusion if there arecircumstancesindicatinglackoftrustworthiness. ThecorrespondingFederalsubdivision is substantially different in form and in some respects insubstance also. The chief substantive difference is that the Federal Ruleexcludes frommatters as towhich therewasa duty to report “[i]n criminalcases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcementpersonnel.”94 Note, however, sub-paragraph (B) of the Maine rule, whichexcludes from this exception investigative reports by police and other law

94ThelanguageintheFederalRulehaschanged:“butnotincluding,inacriminalcase,amatter

observedbylaw-enforcementpersonnel.”OtherwisetheNoteisstillaccurateonthispoint.

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enforcement personnel. The formulation of the subdivision, which is takenfromtheUniformStateLaw,seemsmorereadilyunderstandable. Subdivision(9)makesadmissiblerecordsofvitalstatistics.Itiswrittenso that it is sufficient if the report is made to a public office pursuant torequirementsoflaw(notnecessarilybyapublicofficer). Thuscertificatesofministers or physicians are admissible. The subdivision does notmake therecord admissible as to cause of death. In this respect it is like 22M.R.S.A.§2707. Under Maine case law the certificate is not admissible for thatpurpose.Bartonv.Beck’sEstate,159Me.446,195A.2d63(1963). Subdivision (10) is similar to subdivision (7) in permitting proof ofnonoccurrenceofaneventbyevidenceofnonexistenceofapublicrecordthatwouldordinarilybemadeofitsoccurrence.Thusthismodeofproofmaybeusedinconnectionwithmattersreferredtoinsubdivisions(8)and(9),justascanbedoneundersubdivision(7)withrespecttosubdivision(6). Subdivision (11) may overlap somewhat subdivision (6). It makesadmissible statements from records of churches and religious societiesconcerning births, marriages, divorces, deaths and other similar facts ofpersonalor familyhistory. Manyof thesecouldcome inunder thebusinessrecordsexceptioninsubdivision(6).Thatsubdivision,however,requiresthatanyperson supplying the recorded informationhavea duty todo so,95 thusfollowing the leading case of Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517(1930) (police report incorporating information obtained from a bystanderinadmissible). Thepresentsubdivisiondoesnotincludesucharequirement,onthetheorythatthereiseveryreasontoreposetrustinthedatasubmittedto a religious organization, such as the age of a child for inclusion in abaptismalcertificate. Subdivision (12) provides for admission of statements of fact in amarriage,baptismal,orsimilarcertificate.Itduplicatesinpartsubdivision(8)forpublic records, but it is broader, includingbaptismand confirmation. Itappliestothecertificategiventothepartiesbytheclergymanorlikepersonwhoperformstheceremony.

95Subsection(6)doesnotexpresslyrequirethesupplieroftherecordedinformationtohaveadutytosupplyit.Subsection8(A)(ii),however,doesincludethe“duty”language.

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Subdivision(13)conformstothetraditionalapproach,makingrecordsof familyhistory inBibles and the like admissible. It covers inscriptionsonfamily portraits, tombstones and other types of record, even though theauthormaynotbeidentifiable. Subdivision(14)createsahearsayexceptionfortherecordofadeedasproofofthecontentofthedocumentanditsexecutionanddelivery.ThisisaslightchangeinMainelaw. Under16M.R.S.A.§45296anattestedcopyfromthe registry may be used in evidence without proof of execution when thepartyoffering it isnot thegrantee in thedeed,nor claimingashisheir, norjustifying as his agent. This subdivision makes such a record admissiblewithoutlimitation.Itistobenotedthattherecordismerelymadeadmissiblewithoutgiving itpresumptive force. If there isagenuinecontroversy,morepersuasiveevidenceshouldbesought. The Federal Rule contains a subdivision (15) recognizing a hearsayexceptionforstatementsindocumentsaffectinganinterestinproperty.TheCourt accepted subdivision (14) for the record of a document affecting aninterest in property as proof of its content, execution, and delivery butdeclinedtoextendtheexceptiontostatementscontainedinsuchadocument. Subdivision (16) makes admissible statements in a document inexistence twenty years or more if its authenticity has been established.Authentication may be achieved by showing that a document is “ancient”pursuanttoRule901(b)(8).Butauthenticationdoesnotresolvethequestionofadmissibilityofassertivestatementsinthedocument.Ahearsayexceptionisalsonecessary,andthissubdivisionprovidesit. Italsoreducesthethirty-year time period of the common law tradition, recognized in Landry v.Giguere,128Me.382,147A.816(1929),totwentyyears. Subdivision (17) creates an exception to the hearsay rule for marketquotations,directoriesorotherpublishedcompilationsusedandrelieduponbythepublicorbypersonsinparticularoccupations.Mainenowprovidesin11 M.R.S.A. § 2-724, the Uniform Commercial Code, that when goods aretradedinanestablishedmarket,marketreportsinofficialpublications,tradejournals, or newspapers are admissible. There are decisions from other


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jurisdictions admitting stock market quotations, city directories, telephonedirectories,andthelike. Subdivision(18)changesMainelawbymakinglearnedtreatisescalledtoanexpert’sattentiononcross-examinationandestablishedasauthoritativeadmissibleassubstantiveevidence. Hithertoadmissionofa learnedtreatiseoverobjectionhasbeen forbiddenexcept to impeachanexpertwitnesswhoreliesupon suchauthority for theopinionhehas expressed. Goldthwaitev.SheratonRestaurant,154Me.214,145A.2d362(1958).Thissubdivision,asin the case of other rules, implicitly accepts the proposition that jurors areunlikely to understand and follow limitations on the purpose for whichevidence is admitted, such as the difference between use for impeachmentandassubstantiveevidence.Itistobenotedthattheexperthimselfneednotevenrecognizethetreatiseasauthoritativesolongasitsauthoritativenessissomehowestablished,suchasbytestimonyofanotherexpertor,conceivably,by judicialnotice. Thus thepossibility is avoided that the expertmayblockcross-examinationbydenyingeitherrelianceorauthoritativeness. Thereisnothinginthissubdivisiontopreventtheuseforimpeachmentofanywriting,authoritativeornot,ascanbedoneatpresent. TheFederalRulemakesadmissiblealearnedtreatiserelieduponbyanexpertondirectexaminationaswellasonecalledtohisattentionuponcross-examination. It seems undesirable to allow an expert to bolster his directtestimony by use of a supporting treatise as substantive evidence. TheFederalAdvisoryCommittee’sstatementthatthechanceofmisunderstandingand misapplication of the treatise is avoided because the expert is on thestandandavailabletoexplainitisunimpressive. Subdivision(19)recognizesandbroadensoneoftheoldestexceptionsto the hearsay rule, evidence of reputation concerning personal or familyhistory. Marriage has always been considered a proper subject of proof byevidence of community reputation, but there has been a split as to birth,death, legitimacy,adoptionandrelationship. Thisexceptionextendstoallofthesematters. The rule allows evidence of reputation in the community oramongassociates aswell as in the family. TheFederalAdvisoryCommitteesaid: “Thisworld [inwhich the reputationmayexist]hasproved capableofexpandingwithchangingtimesfromthesingleuncomplicatedneighborhood,inwhichallactivitiestakeplace,tothemultipleandunrelatedworldsofwork,

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religiousaffiliation, andsocialactivity, ineachofwhichareputationmaybegenerated.” The ruledoesnot require that thedeclarationsbemadebeforethecontroversyleadingtothelitigationdeveloped,norisitnecessarytoshowthatthedeclarantisunavailable.Itmustbeemphasizedthatreputationinthecommunitymeansmorethanmeregossip. Subdivision (20) makes admissible evidence of reputation in acommunity,arisingbeforethecontroversy,astoboundariesaffectinglandsinthe community. It allows such evidence with respect to both public andprivateboundaries. This is the general rule in theUnitedStates, butMainehaslimiteditsapplicationtopublicboundaries.Chapmanv.Twitchell,37Me.59(1853).Therulealsoadmitsreputationevidenceastomattersofgeneralhistory.ThisaspectoftheruleisinaccordwithMainelaw.Piperv.Voorhees,130Me.305,155A.556(1931)(MaineHistoricalSocietyMapintheHistoryofScarboroughadmissiblewithoutextrinsicevidenceofauthenticity). Subdivision(21)makesadmissibleevidenceofreputationofaperson’scharacteramonghisassociatesor inthecommunity. Thishaslongbeenthesubjectof ahearsay exception. This subdivision ismerely a restatement, inthe hearsay context, of Rule 405(a) which outlines the methods of provingcharacter. Subdivision(22)makesevidenceofaconvictionofacrimepunishablebyimprisonmentforoneyearormoreadmissibleforthepurposeofprovinganyfactessentialtothejudgment(butnotajudgmentagainstapersonotherthan the accused when offered by the state to prove any such fact). Thetraditional rule denies admissibility, but there is no Maine case law on thepoint. There is an increasing tendency to hold a judgment of conviction of acrime conclusive against the accused in a subsequent civil case, as when aperson convicted of arson seeks to recover on the fire insurance policycovering theburnedproperty. This subdivisionhas nothing todowith thisuseof res judicataor collateral estoppel. However desirable itwouldbe tohavesucharule,itisamatterofsubstantivelawbeyondthescopeofrulesofevidence. Failing that, the half-way measure of making evidence of aconviction admissible but not conclusive seems desirable. Adoption of thesubdivisionshouldnotbetakenasforeclosingtheCourtfromholdingthatresjudicataprinciplesmaketheconvictionconclusive.

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Subdivision(23)makes admissibleaprior judgment involvingmattersof personal, family or general history or boundaries, if the same would beprovable by reputation evidence. It seems reasonable to conclude that theprocess of inquiry and scrutiny which is relied upon to render reputationreliable is present to as great or greater degree in the process of litigation.Thenumberofcasesdealingwiththeissueisverysmall.Intheleadingcase,Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 550 (1848), a prior judgment oflegitimacywasreceivedasprimafacieevidenceinalatercivilaction. The Federal Rule contains a subdivision (24), a catch-all provision97which would allow the court to admit evidence “having equivalentcircumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” to the listed exceptions. ThisreflectsthejudgmentofCongressthat it isundesirabletofreezethehearsayexceptionssoastopreventtheordinaryandrationaldevelopmentofthelawof evidence without the necessity of amending the rules to respond to asituation which has arisen in a given trial. Such an amendment would ofcourse be too late to affect the result of that trial. The rule as enacted byCongressplainlyevincesconcernlesttoomuchuncertaintybeinjectedinthelawofevidenceandafearthattrialjudgeswouldexerciseinwidelydifferentways their judgment as to what constituted “equivalent circumstantialguaranteesoftrustworthiness.”Theruleincorporatessafeguardsdesignedtominimize thishazard. It requires adeterminationby the trialcourt that thestatementisofferedasevidenceofamaterialfact,thatitismoreprobativeonthepointthananyotherevidencereasonablyavailable,andthattheinterestsof justice will best be served by its admission. Moreover, notice of theintentiontoofferthestatementmustbegivensufficiently inadvanceoftrialtoprovideafairopportunitytopreparetomeetit. Thenoticemustgivetheparticularsofthestatement,includingthenameandaddressofthedeclarant.The court will be expected to give the opponent a full and adequateopportunitytocontesttheadmissionofthestatement. Moreover,theSenateCommittee Report emphasized the exceptional nature of the use of theprovisionsaying: “It is intended that theresidualhearsayexceptionswillbeusedveryrarely,andonlyinexceptionalcircumstances.Thecommitteedoesnot intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsaystatements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained in

97 Thishasbeen transferredtoFederalRule807, theresidualexception. Subsection803(24)nowreads:“[OtherExceptions.][TransferredtoRule807.]”

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rules 803 and 804(b). The residual exceptions are not meant to authorizemajorjudicialrevisionsofthehearsayrule,includingitspresentexceptions.” The Court decided not to adopt any catch-all provision. It wasimpressed by the theoretical undesirability of foreclosing furtherdevelopment of the law of evidence on a case-by-case basis. It concluded,however,thatdespitethepurportedsafeguards,therewasaseriousriskthattrialjudgeswoulddiffergreatlyinapplyingtheelasticstandardofequivalenttrustworthiness.Theresultwouldbealackofuniformitywhichwouldmakepreparation for trial difficult. Norwould it be likely that the LawCourt onappeal could effectively apply correctivemeasures. Therewould indeed bedoubtwhetheranaffirmanceofanadmissionofevidenceunderthecatch-allprovision amounted to the creation of a new exception with the force ofprecedent or merely a refusal to rule that the trial judge had abused hisdiscretion. Flexibility in construction of the rules so as to promote growth anddevelopment of the law of evidence is called for by Rule 102. Under thismandatetherewillberoomtoconstrueanexistinghearsayexceptionbroadlyintheinterestofascertainingtruth,asdistinguishedfromcreatinganentirelynew exception based upon the trial judge’s determination of equivalenttrustworthiness, a guideline which the most conscientious of judges wouldfindextremelydifficulttofollow.

AdvisoryCommitteeNote(July1,2002Amendment)

These amendments are intended to ease the process of admission ofrecordsofregularlyconductedactivitycoveredbyRule803(6). Rule803(6)exceptsfromtheHearsayRulerecordscertifiedinaccordwithRules902(11)and 902(12). The new subsections of Rule 902 provide for certification ofrecordsof regularlyconductedactivitybydomesticentities inbothcivilandcriminalcases,andforcertificationofrecordsofforeignentitiesincivilcasesonly. The certificate establishes the foundational facts required foradmissibility under Rule 803(6). The new rules apply both to records ofpartiesaswellasrecordsofnon-partyentities. TheproposedamendmentparallelsarecentamendmenttotheFederalRules of Evidence. Like the Federal version, the Maine version requires

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advance notice of intention to offer evidence under this provision.98 TheMaine version goes a little beyond the Federal version in expresslyauthorizingthetrialcourttodeclinetoacceptthecertificationintheinterestsof justice,99 thus requiring the party offering the certificate to provide thefoundationbyother evidence, inmost cases testimony complyingwithRule803(6).Totheextentfeasibleobjectiontoacertifiedrecordmustbemadeinatimelymannertopermittheproponentopportunitytoprocureanynecessaryfoundationtestimony. Forthepurposeofthisrule,theterm“domestic”referstothe50UnitedStatesofAmerica,not justtheStateofMaine. Adomesticrecordwouldbearecordofanentitydoingbusinessinadomesticjurisdiction. ThechangesintherulesdonotaffectthescopeofRule803(6),whichisintended to cover recordsof entities andactivitiesother thangovernmentalrecordscoveredbyRule803(8).

RULE804.EXCEPTIONSTOTHERULEAGAINSTHEARSAY—WHENTHE

DECLARANTISUNAVAILABLEASAWITNESS(a) Criteria for being unavailable. A declarant is considered to be

unavailableasawitnessifthedeclarant:

(1) Is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of thedeclarant’s statement because the court rules that a privilegeapplies;

(2) Refusestotestifyaboutthesubjectmatterdespiteacourtorderto

doso;

(3) Testifiestonotrememberingthesubjectmatter;

98NeitherRulespecificallyrequiresadvancenoticeatthepresenttime.99Now,theMaineRuleadmitstheevidenceifthesourceoftheinformationandthemethodof

preparationdonotindicatealackoftrustworthiness,whiletheFederalRuleadmitstheevidenceiftheopponentoftheevidencedoesnotshowthatthesourceandmethodlacktrustworthiness.Thisindicates that theMaine Rule allows courts to exercisemore discretion, but there is no expresslanguageabouttheinterestsofjustice.

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(4) Cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because ofdeath or a then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mentalillness;or

(5) Isabsentfromthetrialorhearingandthestatement’sproponent

has not been able, by process or other reasonable means, toprocurethedeclarant’sattendance.

But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement’s proponentprocured or wrongfully caused the declarant’s unavailability as awitnessinordertopreventthedeclarantfromattendingortestifying.

(b) The exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against

hearsayifthedeclarantisunavailableasawitness:

(1) FormerTestimony.Testimonythat:(A) Was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful

deposition,whethergivenduringthecurrentproceedingoradifferentone;and

(B) Isnowofferedagainstapartywhohad—or, inacivilcase,

whose predecessor in interest had—an opportunity andsimilar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirectexamination.

(2) Statementunderthebeliefofimminentdeath.Astatementthatthe

declarant, while believing the declarant’s death to be imminent,madeaboutitscauseorcircumstances.

(3) Statement against interest. A statement—except, in a criminal

case,forastatementorconfessionmadebyadefendantorotherperson implicating both the declarant and the accused that isofferedagainsttheaccused—that:

(A) Areasonablepersoninthedeclarant’spositionwouldhave

madeonlyifthepersonbelievedittobetruebecause,whenmade, it was so contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary orproprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the

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declaranttocivilorcriminal liabilityortorender invalidaclaim by the declarant against another, or to make thedeclarantanobjectofhatred,ridicule,ordisgrace;and

(B) Is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly

indicateitstrustworthiness,ifitisofferedinacriminalcaseas one that tends to expose the declarant to criminalliability.

(4) Statementofpersonalorfamilyhistory.Astatementabout:

(A) The declarant’s own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry,marriage, divorce, relationship by blood, adoption, ormarriage,orsimilarfactsofpersonalorfamilyhistory,eventhough the declarant had no way of acquiring personalknowledgeaboutthatfact;or

(B) Another person concerning any of these facts, as well as

death, if thedeclarantwas related to thepersonbyblood,adoption,ormarriageorwassointimatelyassociatedwiththeperson’sfamilythatthedeclarant’sinformationislikelytobeaccurate.


RestyledMaineRule804preservesthesubstantivedifferencesbetweentheMaineandFederalRules.

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Thisrulecovershearsayexceptionswhenthedeclarant isunavailable.Subdivision (a) defines unavailability. Subsection (1), providing that asuccessful claim of privilege satisfies the unavailability requirement, is inaccordwithMainelaw.Statev.Robbins,318A.2d51(Me.1974).Subsection(2)providesthatonewhosimplyrefusestotestifydespiteanordertodosoisunavailable.NoMainecaseonthepointhasbeenfound,butthegreatweight

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ofauthorityisinaccord. McCormick,Evidence(2ded.)612;UnitedStatesv.Mobley,421F.2d345(5thCir.1970). Subsection(3)providesthatonewhotestifiestoalackofmemoryofthesubjectmatterofhisstatementisunavailable.Again,noMainecasehasbeenfoundand the cases elsewhere are few and conflicting. The claimed lackofmemorymustbeestablishedthroughthetestimonyofthewitnessatthetrialand subject to cross-examination on his memory and his motives. On thispreliminaryquestion,thecourtmaydisbelievethetestimonyofthedeclarantastohislackofmemory.SeeUnitedStatesv.Insana,423F.2d1165,1169-70(2dCir.1970). Subsection (4)provides that deathand then existingmental illnessorinfirmityaregroundsforafindingofunavailability. Deathisanobviousandlongstandingbasisforthisfinding.Dwyerv.State,154Me.179,145A.2d100(1958). Physical or mental illness or infirmity is also generally accepted.Compare M.R.C.P. 32(a)(3) (use of deposition if witness dead or unable toattendor testifybecauseofage, illness,or infirmity);M.R.Crim.P.15(e) (tosame effect—death, sickness, or infirmity). In Maine even a temporarydisability has been held sufficient. Chase v. SpringvaleMills Co., 75Me. 156(1883).Mostcasesinvolvingtemporarydisabilityare,however,handledbyacontinuance. Subsection (5) provides that a declarant is unavailable if his presencecannotbesecuredbylegalprocessorifhesimplycannotbefound. Thereisnorequirementthatanattemptbemadetodeposethedeclarant.TheFederalRuleistothecontrary.Theproponentmusthavebeenunabletoprocuretheattendance or testimony of the witness by process or other reasonablemean.100Thisimposesaneedlessandimpracticalcomplication.Depositionsare expensive and time-consuming and the Civil and Criminal Rules are notwelladaptedtoimplementingthisrequirement.Nopurposeisservedunlessthedeposition,iftaken,maybeusedasevidence.UnderM.R.C.P.32(a)(3)andM.R.Crim.P.15(e)adepositionmaynotbeadmissibleandunderM.R.Crim.P.

100 The sentence is essentially correct as is, but for clarification: If the testimony falls under

(b)(2),(3),or(4)oftheFederalRule,thesentenceiscorrect.Thetestimonyrequirementdoesnotapply to testimonyalreadygivenunderoath ((b)(1)), or statementsoffered against apartywhoprocuredthedeclarant’sunavailability((b)(6)),thesecondofwhichisnotpartoftheMaineRule.

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15(a) obstacles exist to even taking a deposition. The existing depositionprocedureremainsavailabletothosewhowishtouseit. Subdivision(a)concludeswiththepronouncementthatawitnessisnot“unavailable” if the circumstances which would otherwise constituteunavailability are due to the procurement or other wrongdoing of theproponentofthedeclaration.Cf.M.R.C.P.32(a)(3)(“...unlessitappearsthatthe absence of the witness was procured by the party offering thedeposition”);M.R.Crim.P.15(e)(same).101 Subdivision (b)(1) covers thehearsayexception for former testimony.ItisinaccordwithpresentMainelawinadmittingpriortestimonyonlyiftheparty againstwhom it isofferedor, in acivil case,apredecessor in interest,hadanopportunityandsimilarmotivetodevelopthetestimony.Ellsworthv.Waltham,125Me.214,132A.423(1926).Inacriminalcase,Statev.Budge,127Me.234,142A. 857 (1928), the statewasallowed to introduceupon asecondtrialthetestimonyatthefirsttrialofawitnesswhohadleftthestatesothathisattendancecouldnotbecompelled. Thiswasheldtobeaproperexceptiontothehearsayruleandnotaviolationoftheconstitutionalrightofconfrontation. It is also theMaine law, as it continues to be under the rule, that thetestimonyisadmissible ifofferedagainstapartywhocalledthewitnessatapriortrial.Directandredirectexaminationistheequivalentofanopportunityforcross-examination.Dwyerv.State,154Me.179,145A.2d100(1958). Subdivision (b)(2) covers the familiar common law exception to thehearsayrulefordyingdeclarations.Statev.Chaplin,286A.2d325(Me.1972).It expands the common law somewhat by making these declarationsadmissible concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarantbelieved tobehis impendingdeathwithout limitationas to typeofcase. Atcommonlawthedeclarationofthevictimwasadmissibleonlyifofferedinacriminalhomicidecase.Deathisnottheonlyformofunavailabilityunderthissubdivision.Ifthedeclarantbelieveddeathwasimminentwhenhespokeandifheisunavailableatthetimeoftrial, thedeclarationisadmissibleif infactthedeclarantisnotdeadwhenthecaseistried.TheFederalRulelimitsthis

101 That language appears tohavebeen removed, butM.R. Crim.P. 15(e) andM.R.U. Crim.P.15(e)includethequalification:“sofarasotherwiseadmissibleundertherulesofevidence.”

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exception to prosecutions for homicide and civil actions, thus eliminating itfromcriminalprosecutionsotherthanforhomicide. Subdivision (b)(3) covers declarations against interest. It applies todeclarations by nonparties; if a statement is that of a party, offered by anadverseparty,itisanadmissionunderRule801(d)(2),whichprovidesthatanadmission of a party opponent is not hearsay. The familiar common lawdeclaration against interest exception was confined to declarations againstpecuniaryorproprietaryinterest. Mainehaslongrecognizedthisexception.Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Martin, 128 Me. 96, 106, 145 A. 896, 900(1929).Itisrequiredthatthestatementbeagainstinterestatthetimeitwasmade. Small v. Rose, 97Me. 286, 54 A. 726 (1903). The subdivision addsdeclarations subjecting the declarant to criminal or civil liability, includingtortliability.Italsoaddsdeclarationstendingtomakethedeclarantanobjectofhatred,ridicule,ordisgrace.Thejustificationisthatthemotivationheretotell the truth is as strong as when financial interests are at stake. It is apreliminaryquestion for thecourtwhetheragivenstatementwould tend tomake thedeclarantanobjectofhate, ridicule,ordisgrace. TheFederalRuledoesnotincludeaprovisionforthislasttypeofdeclaration. Subdivision (b)(4) dealswith the hearsay exception for statements ofpersonal or family history. It drops some of the conditions imposed byNorthropv.Hale, 76Me.306 (1884), the leadingMaine case, in aneffort toensure reliability. These conditions on admissibility of declarationsconcerningpedigreewere:(1)theremustbeevidenceoutsidethedeclarationthatthedeclarantwaslawfullyrelatedbybloodormarriagetothepersonorfamilywhosehistorythefactsconcern;(2)thedeclarantmustbedeadwhenthe declaration is offered; and (3) the declaration must have been madebeforecommencementofthelitigation.Underthissubdivisiontheantelitemmotamrequirement iseliminated,thetimeofthedeclarationwithreferencetotheinstitutionofthelawsuitgoingtoitsweight,notitsadmissibility.Under(A)itisnotrequiredthatthedeclaranthavefirsthandknowledgeofthefactsofhisownpedigree.Obviously,hewouldhavenofirsthandknowledgeofthedate of his birth. Under (B) the declarant qualifies as a consequence ofintimateassociationwiththefamilyofthepersonwhosepedigreeisinissue.This is contrary to adictum inNorthrop. The subdivisionalso goesbeyondNorthropinallowingotherbasesofunavailabilitybesidesdeath.

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The Federal Rule contains a catch-all provision like that in Rule803(24).102

AdvisoryCommitteeNoteNovember2011

ThisproposedamendmentisdesignedtobringM.R.Evid.804(b)(3)inlinewithitsfederalcounterpart,asrecentlyamended. ThefederalAdvisoryCommitteerecommendedamendmentofFed.R.Evid.804(b)(3)toharmonizethe rule with several U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions that applied thecorroborationrequirementofRule804(b)(3) tostatementsofpenal interestusedagainsttheaccusedaswellastothosetendingtoexculpatetheaccused.The same policy considerations that support the corroboration requirementwhen statements against penal interest are offered to exculpate an accusedalsoapplytosuchstatementswhenofferedbytheprosecutionasevidenceofguilt.Thepolicyconsiderationssupportingtheamendmentofthefederalruleapplywith equal forcewithin theStateofMaine. These considerations andthedesirabilityofmaintainingsubstantialsimilaritybetweenthefederalandtheMainerulessuggestthatMaineRuleofEvidence804(b)(3)beamendedtocorrespondwith its federal counterpart. The amendment does not addresstheadmissibilityofstatementsagainstpenalinterestincivilcases.

RULE805.HEARSAYWITHINHEARSAY

Hearsaywithinhearsayisnotexcludedbytheruleagainsthearsayifeachpartofthecombinedstatementsconformswithanexceptiontotherule.



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102 The “catch-all” provision, formerlyFederalRule803(24), hasbeen transferred toFederal

Rule807,theresidualexception.

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(February2,1976) Thisrulecovershearsaywithinhearsay,sometimescalled“totempole”hearsay. It provides for a two-stageapproach. If eachpartof the combinedstatement conforms to some hearsay exception it is all is admissible. TheFederal Advisory Committee gives as an example a dying declarationwhichincorporatesadeclarationagainstinterestbyanotherout-of-courtdeclarant.Incontrast,adeclarationitselfwithinanexceptioncannotincludeastatementofanotherdeclarantwhichdoesnot fallwithinanexception. Anexample isJohnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930) (information from abystander incorporated in a police report not admissible; the bystander’sstatementwasinadmissiblehearsay).

RULE806.ATTACKINGANDSUPPORTINGTHEDECLARANT’SCREDIBILITY

When a hearsay statement—or a statement described inRule 801(d)(2)(C),(D),or(E)—hasbeenadmittedinevidence,thedeclarant’scredibilitymaybeattacked, and then supported,by anyevidence thatwouldbe admissible forthose purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. The court mayadmit evidence of the declarant’s inconsistent statement or conduct,regardlessofwhenitoccurredorwhetherthedeclaranthadanopportunitytoexplainordenyit.Ifthepartyagainstwhomthestatementwasadmittedcallsthe declarant as a witness, the party may examine the declarant on thestatementasifoncross-examination.



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This rule gives the factfinder the widest opportunity to assess thecredibilityofahearsaydeclaration.Itallowsanattackbyanyevidencewhichwouldbeadmissibleifthedeclaranthadtestifiedasawitness. Forexample,hisbiasorprejudice,hisconvictionofacrime,orhisinconsistentstatementsmaybeshown.Thisseemsnomorethancommonfairnessrequires. Classification of admissions by a party-opponent as not being hearsayunder Rule 801(d)(2) might have the consequence of not allowing thedeclarant’s credibility tobe attackedunder this rule if the reference to suchadmissions were not included. Plainly an employer should be allowed toimpeachanemployeeor anallegedconspirator to impeachaco-conspiratorsoastoweakentheeffectoftheirout-of-courtstatements.

ARTICLEIX.AUTHENTICATIONANDIDENTIFICATION

RULE901.AUTHENTICATINGORIDENTIFYINGEVIDENCE(a) Ingeneral. Tosatisfytherequirementofauthenticatingoridentifying

anitemofevidence,theproponentmustproduceevidencesufficienttosupportafindingthattheitemiswhattheproponentclaimsitis.

(b) Examples. The following are examples only—not a complete list—of

evidencethatsatisfiestherequirement:

(1) Testimonyofawitnesswithknowledge.Testimonythatanitemiswhatitisclaimedtobe.

(2) Nonexpertopinionabouthandwriting.Anonexpert’sopinionthat

handwritingisgenuine,basedonafamiliaritywithitthatwasnotacquiredforthecurrentlitigation.

(3) Comparisonbyanexpertwitnessorthetrieroffact.Acomparison

withanauthenticatedspecimenbyanexpertwitnessorthetrieroffact.

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(4) Distinctive characteristics. The appearance, contents, substance,internalpatterns, orotherdistinctive characteristicsof the item,takentogetherwithallthecircumstances.

(5) Opinionaboutavoice. Anopinion identifyingaperson’svoice—

whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronictransmission or recording—based on hearing the voice at anytimeundercircumstancesthatconnectitwiththeallegedspeaker.

(6) Evidence about a telephone conversation. For a telephone

conversation, evidence that a call was made to the numberassignedatthetimeto:

(A) A particular person, if circumstances, including self-

identification,showthatthepersonansweringwastheonecalled;or

(B) Aparticularbusiness,ifthecallwasmadetoabusinessand

the call related tobusiness reasonably transactedover thetelephone.

(7) Evidenceaboutpublicrecords.Evidencethat:

(A) A document was recorded or filed in a public office as

authorizedbylaw;or

(B) A purported public record or statement is from the officewhereitemsofthiskindarekept.

(8) Evidence about ancient documents or data compilations. For a

documentordatacompilation,evidencethatit:

(A) Is in a condition that creates no suspicion about itsauthenticity;

(B) Wasinaplacewhere,ifauthentic,itwouldlikelybe;and

(C) Isatleast20yearsoldwhenoffered.

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(9) Evidenceaboutaprocessorsystem.Evidencedescribingaprocessorsystemandshowingthatitproducesanaccurateresult.

(10)Methods provided by a statute or rule. Any method of

authentication or identification allowed by a rule of the MaineSupremeJudicialCourtorbyastatuteorasprovidedintheMaineConstitution.


The restyled Rule preserves the substantive differences between theMaineandFederalRules.TheproposedrestyledRuleadoptsthelanguageoftheFederalRule901(b)(3)inprovidingthatonemethodofauthenticationisacomparisonbythe“trieroffact”oftheitemofevidencewithanauthenticatedoriginal. The use of the term “court” in lieu of “trier of fact” in the currentMaineRulemaycausesomeconfusioninajurytrialasitisclearthattheRuleisintendedtopermitcomparisonbythetrieroffact.

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The rule implements Rule 104(b), which requires authentication ofevidence as a condition of its admissibility. Authentication is an aspect ofrelevancy. For instance, therelevancyofa letterofacceptance inacontractcaseagainstacorporationdependsuponitshavingbeenwrittenbysomeonewithauthority,realorapparent,todoso.Absentsuchauthenticationitisjustas irrelevant as if it bore on an immaterial topic. Similarly, a telephoneconversationmaybe irrelevantbecause thespeakerhasnotbeen identified;inotherwords,theconversationhasnotbeenauthenticated. Subdivision(a),requiringauthenticationoridentificationasaconditionprecedenttoadmissibility,isuniversallaw. Subdivision (b) provides a nonexclusive list of ten examples ofauthentication or identification. Most of them are noncontroversial andreflectgenerallyexistinglaw.

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Example (1) describes the most obvious method of authentication—testimonyofawitnesswithdirectknowledgethatamatteriswhatitpurportstobe;e.g.,“Iwrotethisdocument”;“IsawXsignit”;or“Ifoundthisgunatthescene”. Thewitnessmightalsobeone toaccountforthecustodyofthegunfromtheseizuretothetimeoftrial. Example (2) is in accordwithcustomarypracticeregardingnonexperthandwritingidentification.Anyonewithasufficientfamiliaritywithanother’shandwritingmaytestify.Thismaycomefromhavingseentheassertedauthorwrite, or from a bank clerk or teller. It is obvious that a lay person’sattempted distinction between a genuine writing and a skilled forgery isessentially valueless, and it is only good sense to obtain the testimony of abonafidehandwritingexpert ifthematterisofseriousconsequence.Itistobe noted that the nonexpert cannot give testimony based on familiarityacquiredforthepurposeofthelitigation,althoughtheexpertcan. Example (3) allowsahandwritingexpert toexpress anopinionon thebasisofacomparisonbetweenaquestioneddocumentandanauthenticatedgenuine specimen. This is the acceptedpractice. It also allows the court tomake the comparison. The question of authentication is a matter ofconditionalrelevancydependinguponfulfillmentofaquestionof fact,whichisgovernedbyRule104(b). Example (4) is rather vague in itswording, but it stands for the self-evidentpropositionthatanitemofevidencemaysometimesbeauthenticatedby its own special characteristics, viewed in the context of the case. Anexampleisthefamiliarreplydoctrinetotheeffectthatthearrivalbymailofareplypurportingtobefromtheaddresseeofapriorletterdulyaddressedandmailedissufficientevidenceofgenuinenesstogotothejury.Wheltonv.Daly,93N.H.150,37A.2d1(1944), isa leadingcase. Similarly,acommunicationmay be authenticated as coming from a particular person if it disclosesknowledge of facts known peculiarly by that person. Cf. Perley v. McGray,115Me. 398, 99 A. 39 (1916) (proof that copy of account was sent todefendant from fact thatdefendant actedon it a fewdays laterby returnofgoodsincludedintheaccount). Example(5)allowsvoiceidentification,heardfirsthandorbyelectronictransmission,byopinionbasedon familiarityobtainedeitherbeforeorafter

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thespeakinginquestion.Plainlysuchtestimonymaylackcredibility,butthisgoestoitsweightandnotitsadmissibility. Example (6)dealswithoutgoingrather than incoming telephonecalls.Acall fromthebluebyaperson identifyinghimselfasXrequires additionalproofofhis identity,whichmaybeby the techniquessuggested in (b)(4)or(b)(5). The calling of a number listed by the telephone company (see Rule803(17) for the hearsay exception for the listing) supports the assumptionthat the number is the one reached. If the telephone number is that of abusiness, the listing is a holding out of willingness to conduct business bytelephone, thepersonansweringandpurporting to speak for the concern ispresumed to have authority to do so, and a person to whom such a call istransferred is likewisepresumed tohaveauthority to speak for the concernwithrespecttomatterswithinitsordinarycourseofbusiness. Thisexample alsoprovides thatcircumstances,whichmay include theself-identifying statement of the person answering the outgoing call, maysuffice. See Palos v. United States, 416 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1969) (informerdialslistednumber,asksfordefendantandreceivesanswer,“Thisishe,”heldsufficient toauthenticate);UnitedStatesv.Benjamin,328F.2d854(2ndCir.1964)(tosameeffect).Butthecasesonthispointarenotunanimous. Example (7) is in accordwith standard practice. Public records havelong been subject to authentication by proof of production from propercustody.Theinclusionof“datacompilation”issufficienttocoverinformationretrievalbycomputer. Example (8) provides for authentication of ancient documents. TheiradmissibilityasahearsayexceptionhasbeendealtwithinRule803(16).Thissubdivision is unorthodox in two respects. (1) It extends the rule tocomputerized data, and (2) it reduces the time period from thirty years totwenty years. This would change the Maine law enunciated in Landry v.Giguere,128Me.382,147A.816(1929). Example(9)facesuptopresent-dayproblemswheretheaccuracyofaresultdependsupontheprocessorsystemthatproducestheresult.Theuseof a computer printout would be covered, as would a reading on radarequipment, upon evidence showing that the system produces an accurateresult. The Federal Advisory Committee pointed out that the rule is not

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intended to foreclose judicial notice of the accuracy of the system whereappropriate. Example(10)makesitclearthatmethodsofauthenticationprovidedbystatute are not superseded by the rule. An example of aMaine statute thatwould not be superseded is 13-A M.R.S.A. § 1306103 (various corporaterecordscertifiedunderoathofclerk,secretaryoranassistantsecretaryofthecorporationadmissible).Therearemanyothers.

RULE902.EVIDENCETHATISSELF-AUTHENTICATINGThe following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require noextrinsicevidenceofauthenticityinordertobeadmitted:(1) Domesticpublicdocumentsthataresealedandsigned.Adocument

thatbears:(A) AsealpurportingtobethatoftheUnitedStates;anystate,district,

commonwealth, territory, or insular possession of the UnitedStates;theformerPanamaCanalZone;theTrustTerritoryofthePacificIslands;apoliticalsubdivisionofanyoftheseentities;oradepartment,agency,orofficerofanyentitynamedabove;and

(B) Asignaturepurportingtobeanexecutionorattestation.

(2) Domesticpublicdocumentsthatarenotsealedbutaresignedand certified.Adocumentthatbearsnosealif:(A) Itbearsthesignatureofanofficeroremployeeofanentitynamed

inRule902(1)(A);and(B) Another public officer who has a seal and official duties within

thatsameentitycertifiesunderseal—or itsequivalent—that thesignerhastheofficialcapacityandthatthesignatureisgenuine.

(3) Foreignpublicdocuments.Adocumentthatpurportstobesignedor

attestedbyapersonwhoisauthorizedbyaforeigncountry’slawtodo


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so. The document must be accompanied by a final certification thatcertifies the genuineness of the signature and official position of thesigner or attester—or of any foreign official whose certificate ofgenuineness relates to the signature or attestation or is in a chain ofcertificatesofgenuinenessrelating to thesignatureorattestation.ThecertificationmaybemadebyasecretaryofaUnitedStatesembassyorlegation;byaconsulgeneral,viceconsul,orconsularagentoftheUnitedStates; or by a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign countryassignedoraccreditedtotheUnitedStates.Ifallpartieshavebeengivenareasonableopportunitytoinvestigatethedocument’sauthenticityandaccuracy,thecourtmay,forgoodcause,either:

(A) Order that itbe treatedaspresumptivelyauthenticwithout final

certification;or(B) Allowittobeevidencedbyanattestedsummarywithorwithout

finalcertification.(4) Certifiedcopiesofpublicrecords. Acopyofanofficialrecord—ora

copy of a document that was recorded or filed in a public office asauthorizedbylaw—ifthecopyiscertifiedascorrectby:

(A) The custodian or another person authorized to make the

certification;or(B) A certificate that complies with Rule 902(1), (2), or (3) or a

federalorstatestatute.(5) Official publications. A book, pamphlet, or other publication

purportingtobeissuedbyapublicauthority.(6) Newspapers and periodicals. Printed material purporting to be a

newspaperorperiodical.(7) Trade inscriptions and the like. An inscription, sign, tag, or label

purportingtohavebeenaffixedinthecourseofbusinessandindicatingorigin,ownership,orcontrol.

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(8) Acknowledgeddocuments. Adocumentaccompaniedbyacertificateof acknowledgment that is lawfully executed by a notary public oranotherofficerwhoisauthorizedtotakeacknowledgments.

(9) Commercial paper and related documents. Commercial paper, a

signatureonit,andrelateddocuments,totheextentallowedbygeneralcommerciallaw.

(10)Presumptions created by law. A signature, document, or anything

else that a federal statutedeclares tobepresumptivelyor prima faciegenuineorauthentic.

(11)Certified domestic records of a regularly conducted activity. The

originaloracopyofadomesticrecord thatmeetstherequirementsofRule 803(6)(A)–(C), as shown by a certification of the custodian oranother qualified person that complies with a statute or a ruleprescribed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. Before the trial orhearing, theproponentmustgive anadversepartyreasonablewrittennoticeoftheintenttooffertherecord—andmustmaketherecordandcertification available for inspection—so that the party has a fairopportunitytoobjecttotheauthenticityoftherecordoronthebasisofhearsay.Intheeventofanadverseparty’sobjectiontoarecordofferedunderthisparagraph,thecourtmayintheinterestsofjusticerefusetoaccept the certification under this paragraph and require the partyoffering the record to provide appropriate foundation by otherevidence.

(12)Certifiedforeignrecordsofaregularlyconductedactivity.Inacivil

case, the original or a copy of a foreign record that meets therequirements of Rule 902(11), modified as follows: the certification,rather than complyingwith a statuteorMaineSupreme JudicialCourtrule,mustbesignedinamannerthat,iffalselymade,wouldsubjectthemaker to a criminal penalty in the country where the certification issigned.TheproponentmustalsomeetthenoticerequirementsofRule902(11).

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The restyled Rule preserves the substantive differences between theMaineandFederalRules.

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Thisrulecoversvariouskindsofevidence theauthenticityofwhich issufficiently apparent to allow their introduction without use of extrinsicevidence.Suchevidenceissaidtobeself-authenticating.Theruleenumeratestencategories104ofthistype,mostofwhichreflectpresentpractice.Itistobeemphasizedthroughoutthisrulethatadmissibilityisaseparatequestionfromauthentication. Subdivision (1) deals with the self-authentication of domestic publicdocumentsunderseal.Thisisaseparatequestionfromtheiradmissibilityinevidenceasanexceptiontothehearsayrule,coveredinRule803(8). UnderpresentMaine law a public record kept inMainemay be proved by a copyattestedbyapersonpurportingtobetheofficerhavinglegalcustodythereofwithout further proof. A public record kept outside Maine but within theUnited States requires that the copy be accompanied by a certificate underseal by a specified public officer. M.R.C.P. 44(a), M.R. Crim. P. 27.105 Thissubdivision would eliminate the necessity of “double certification” if therecord is “domestic” in the sense that it is keptwithin the United States asdistinguished from a foreign country. It would make the procedure nowavailableforMainerecordsequallyapplicabletothosefromotherstates.Thejustification is that the overwhelming majority of these records will begenuineandtherareforgeryeasilydetected. If thereisagenuinedispute,achallenge can of course be made, but otherwise a good deal of needlesslawyers’workwillbesaved.

104Nowtwelvecategories,twoofwhicharediscussedattheveryendoftheNote.105 M.R.Crim.P.27andM.R.U.Crim.P.27addressrecordingandtranscriptionofproceedings

anddonotseemtoberelevanttothesentenceatpresent.

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Subdivision(2)dealswithapurportedofficialsignatureonadocumentnotofficiallysealed. Here thesafeguardofauthenticationbyanofficerwhohas a seal is provided because forgery is a more distinct possibility. Thesubdivisiondoesnotapplytonotariespublic,coveredinsubdivision(8). Subdivision(3)dealswiththeproblemofsubdivision(1)asappliedtothepublicdocumentofaforeigncountry.ItisessentiallythesameaspresentMaine law as set forth in M.R.C.P. 44(a) and incorporated by reference inM.R.Crim.P. 27,106 but it applies to foreign “public documents” whereas thepresentMainelawislimitedto“officialrecords”. Subdivision (4)provides for authenticationof copiesofpublic recordsor of documents recorded or filed pursuant to authorization by law or bycertification of the custodian or other person authorized to make thecertification(thecustodiannotnecessarilybeingtheauthorizedperson).Thecertification itself qualifies as a public document and is admissible asauthenticifitconformsto(1),(2),or(3)above. Subdivision(5)providesforself-authenticationofbooks,pamphlets,orother publications purporting to be issued by public authority. These aremost commonly statutes, court reports, rules, and regulations. Thisgeneralizes a rule covered by numerous statutes. For example, 1 M.R.S.A.§§361-363 self-authenticates the Maine Revised Statutes and theirsupplementsifthebookcarriesaprintedcertificateoftheSecretaryofState. Subdivision (6) allows self-authentication of printed materialspurporting to be newspapers and periodicals. The Federal AdvisoryCommittee said: “The likelihood of forgery of newspapers or periodicals isslight indeed.” The Federal Committee may not have been exposed to theconvincing-lookingfakednewspapers,completewithembarrassingheadlines,thatpracticaljokerscanbuyforamodestsum.Butitisprobablytruethattheriskofuseofafakedpaperinlitigationisslight.Again,itmustbeemphasizedthatadmissibilityoftheauthenticatedpaperisawhollyseparatematterfromauthentication.

106 See footnote 105. Rule 44 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure generally addresses

authenticationandproofofofficialrecords.

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Subdivision (7) does away with the need of proof of authenticity ofmercantile labels and the like purportedly affixed in the course of businessand indicatingownership, control, ororigin. ThiswoulddefinitelyoverturnthewellknowncaseofKeeganv.GreenGiantCo.,150Me.283,110A.2d599(1954),whichheld that the label ona canofpeas indicating that they camefrom the Jolly GreenGiantwas not sufficient authentication. The dissent inthat casewould thus become law. The continuing authority of KeeganwascastindoubtbyStatev.Rines,269A.2d9,14-15(Me.1970). Subdivision (8) provides for self-authentication of documentsaccompaniedbyacertificateofacknowledgmentunderthehandandsealofanotarypublicorotherofficerauthorizedtotakeacknowledgments.ThismaybesomewhatbroaderthanpresentMainestatutorylaw. Subdivision(9)governsquestionsofauthenticityofcommercialpaperas provided by general commercial law. The general commercial law is ineffect theUniformCommercial Code. 11M.R.S.A. §§ 1-202,107 3-307,108 and3-510109 are the relevant authentication provisions of the Code. They dealrespectivelywith documents authorized or required to be issued by a thirdparty,signaturesonanegotiableinstrument,andprotestanddishonor. Subdivision (10) deals with signatures, documents, or other matterdeclaredbyanystateor federalstatute tobepresumptivelygenuine. Thereare many Maine statutes of this type. Examples are 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 1183,1188110 (certificateofexaminingphysicianadmissibleonappeal fromdenialof marriage license); 12 M.R.S.A. § 3404(4)111 (adoption of regulations ofCommissioner of Sea and Shore Fisheries provable by certificate ofappropriate official; 16 M.R.S.A. § 457 (copies of register or enrollment ofvessel or other custom house records certified by consul, etc., admissible).

107Nowat11M.R.S.§1-1307(2014).108Nowat11M.R.S.§3-1308(2014).109Nowat11M.R.S.§3-1505(2014).110Bothstatuteshavebeenrepealed.111Thisstatutehasbeenrepealed.

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Federalstatutesinclude26U.S.C.§6064(signatureontaxreturnprimafaciegenuine); 10 U.S.C. § 936112 (signaturewithout seal prima facie evidence ofauthenticity of acts of certain military personnel who are given notarialpowers).[See the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 803 for discussion of theJuly1,2002amendmenttoRule902addingsub§§(11)and(12).]

RULE903.SUBSCRIBINGWITNESS’STESTIMONYAsubscribingwitness’stestimonyisnecessarytoauthenticateawritingonlyifrequiredbystatute.



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The common law required that attesting witnesses be produced oraccountedfor.Theserequirementshavegenerallybeenabolishedunlessthelawgoverningthevalidityofthewritingotherwiserequires. Thisruletakesthemodernapproach.ItdoesnotaffectthemethodofprovingawillinMaine.18M.R.S.A.§§103-106.113SeeInreKnapp’sEstate,145Me.189,74A.2d217(1950).

112 Presently10U.S.C. §936addresses authority toadministeroaths andact asanotarybut

doesnotdiscusssignaturesnorprimafacieevidence.113WithenactmentoftheProbateCode,Title18-AM.R.S.,thisstatutewasrepealed.

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ARTICLEX.CONTENTSOFWRITINGS,RECORDINGS,ANDPHOTOGRAPHS

RULE1001.DEFINITIONSTHATAPPLYTOTHISARTICLEInthisarticle:(a) A ‘‘writing’’ consistsof letters,words,numbers,or theirequivalentset

downinanyform.(b) A ‘‘recording’’ consists of letters, words, sounds, numbers, or their

equivalentrecordedinanymanner.(c) A‘‘photograph’’meansaphotographicimageoritsequivalentstoredin

anyform.(d) An ‘‘original’’ofawritingorrecordingmeans thewritingorrecording

itselforanycounterpartintendedtohavethesameeffectbythepersonwho executed or issued it. For electronically stored information,‘‘original’’meansanyprintout—orotheroutputreadablebysight—ifitaccurately reflects the information. An ‘‘original’’ of a photographincludesthenegativeoraprintfromit.


The restyled Rule preserves the substantive differences between theMaineandFederalRules,includingtheexclusionofadefinitionof“duplicate”to reflect Maine’s decision not to adopt Federal Rule 1003 regarding theadmissibilityofduplicates.

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This rule is a modernized version of the misleadingly named “bestevidencerule,”moreaccuratelytobecalledthe“originalwritingrule’’,asthedefinitionsinthisruleofthetermsusedlaterinthearticleshow.Subdivision(1) defines writings and recordings. Today, “writings’’ alone would be toonarrow, and the rule includes sophisticated methods of data compilation,storage, and retrieval. It also includes electronic recording devices, now in

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wide use (as in recording “Miranda warnings,” for example). Sinceinarticulate voices aswell aswordsand figuresmayhaveevidentiaryvalue,theruleadds“sounds’’tothedefinition. Subdivision(2)isself-explanatory.

Subdivision (3) defines an “original.” The nature of an original is notalwaysclear. Thedefinitioncoverssomeparticularizedexamples. Inclusionof any counterpart intended to have the same effectmakes it clear that if acontract states that two or more copies are to be executed and treated asoriginal,eachofthemisanoriginalunderthisdefinition.Thesameistrue,theFederalAdvisoryCommitteepointedout,ofasalesticketcarboncopygiventoa customer. Although strictly speaking the negative is the true original of aphotograph,commonusageandcommonsensetreatanyprintasanoriginalalso, and so does this subdivision. A computer printout or other outputreadablebysightisdefinedasanoriginal.

TheFederalRulegivesadefinitionofa“duplicate.” It isomittedherebecausetheMainerulegivesnospecialstatustoduplicates.

RULE1002.REQUIREMENTOFTHEORIGINAL

Anoriginalwriting,recording,orphotographisrequiredinordertoproveitscontentunlesstheserulesorastatuteprovidesotherwise.



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Thisruleisthefamiliaronerequiringproductionoftheoriginalwritingto prove its contents, expanded to include recordings and photographs asdefinedinRule1001.Itappliesonlywhenofferedtoprovethecontent.Thereare some events with legal significance that can only occur in writing; forexample,awill.Inprovingthatsortofeventtheoriginalmustbeproducedor

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itsabsenceaccountedforunderRule1004. Manysituationsarisewheretheparties choose to perform the event in writing although the law does notrequireit. Forexample,acontractmaybemadeoranoticegiveninwriting.Herealso theoriginalmustbeproducedoraccounted for. Aneventmaybeprovedwithout resort to awriting, such as paymentwithout producing thewrittenreceiptwhichwasgivenorearningswithoutproducingthebooksofaccountinwhichtheyareentered.Itisonlywhenapartyvoluntarilyseekstomakeproofbythewritingthattheruleapplies.

Usually a photograph is not offered to prove its content. Typically awitnessidentifiesaphotographasafairrepresentationofsomethinghesaw(unless it is shown to be a fair representation of something germane to thecase,itisirrelevant).Thephotographisadmissibletoillustratehistestimony.Thisisnotanattempttoprovethecontentofthepictureandtheruledoesnotapply.Sometimes,however,thecontentissoughttobeproved.TheFederalAdvisoryCommitteeoffersanautomaticphotographofabankrobberasonehavingindependentprobativevalue.Heretherulewithrespecttotheoriginalapplies.

There are some situations where the contents of a writing or aphotographaredirectlyinissue.Exampleswouldincludelibelandcopyrightcases,casesofinvasionofprivacybyphotograph,andX-rays.Note,however,thatwithrespect toX-rays,anexpertmaygiveanopinionbasedonmattersnotinevidence.Rule703. The reference to exceptions provided by these rules or by statutepreserves whatever such exceptions there may be. See, for example, 16M.R.S.A.§356(originalentryoftranscribedaccountneedbeproducedonlyifcourtsorequires).

RULE1003.RESERVED.

RULE1004.ADMISSIBILITYOFOTHEREVIDENCEOFCONTENTAn original is not required and other evidence of the content of a writing,recording,orphotographisadmissibleif:(a) Alltheoriginalsarelostordestroyed,andnotbytheproponentacting

inbadfaith;

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(b) Anoriginalcannotbeobtainedbyanyavailablejudicialprocess;(c) Thepartyagainstwhomtheoriginalwouldbeofferedhadcontrolofthe

original;wasatthattimeputonnotice,bypleadingsorotherwise,thattheoriginalwouldbeasubjectofproofatthetrialorhearing;andfailstoproduceitatthetrialorhearing;or

(d) The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a

controllingissue.


Maine Rule 1004 and former Federal Rule 1004 are substantiallyidentical,and there isnoreason todepart fromthe languageof therestyledFederalRule.

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This rule is largely declaratory of the circumstances under thetraditional best evidence rule where production of the original is excused.Loss or destruction of the original, unless the result of the proponent’s badfaith,and inability toobtain it froma thirdpersonby judicialprocedureareobvious grounds. Subdivision (3)114 provides that a notice to produce issufficientwhentheoriginalisinthecontrolofanopposingparty.Thisisnotaruleofdiscovery. Itgives theopponentanopportunity toproducebutdoesnotcompelit.Iftheopponentdoesnotproduce,theproponentwillunderthissubdivision be allowed to offer secondary evidence of the contents of theoriginal. Ifhedoesnothaveanysecondaryevidence,hemustusediscoveryprocedures like M.R.C.P. 34 in order to learn before trial what the originalcontains.Hecanthencompelproductionattrialbyuseofasubpoenaducestecum. The fact that the original is produced pursuant to notice does notmake it admissible. Paradis v. Lewiston, Augusta & Waterville St. Ry.,113Me.125, 93 A. 56 (1915). It is also now true that the producing partycannotget itadmittedmerelybecauseitwasproducedandexaminedbythe

114Nowsubsection(c).

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opponent. Morganv.Paine,312A.2d178,185(Me.1973)(overrulingpriordecisionstothecontrary). The rule does not recognize degrees of secondary evidence so as torequire the“secondbest”evidencewhen theoriginal isnotavailable. Ithasthe virtue of simplicity, and the practical motivation to get the mostsatisfactory evidence possible lest an adverse inference be drawn tends toprevent abuse. This is the English approach, followed in some Americancases, butmostof the courts in this countrydo setupordersofpreference,suchaspreferringawrittencopytooraltestimony. The rule gives no special status to “duplicates”; that is, counterpartsproducedbyamethodsoaccurateastoeliminatethepossibilityoferror.TheFederalRulemakesaduplicate admissible to the sameextent as anoriginalunlessinthecircumstancesitisunfairorunlessa“genuinequestion”israisedastotheauthenticityoftheoriginal.Thedeterminationofwhatconstitutedagenuine questionmightwell impose great difficulties, as for examplewhencounselobjectstotheduplicateontheplausiblegroundthathedoesnotknowabout the authenticity of the original andwishes to put his opponent to hisproof. It appears that special treatment of duplicates would cause moretrouble than it is worth. Naturally a duplicate will still be admissible assecondary evidence when production of the original is excused under thisrule. When it comes to a motion for a new trial or on appeal, an assertederror in admitting secondary evidence may be classed as harmless. Thepurposeofthebestevidenceruleistosecurethemostreliableinformationastothecontentsofadocumentwhenitstermsaredisputed.Theruleisnotanendinitself.Consequentlyifcomplainingcounselisaskedwhetherthereisanactualdisputeastothetermsofthewritingandhecannotgiveassurancethatsuch a good faith dispute exists, any deviation from the rule should beharmlesserror.

RULE1005.COPIESOFPUBLICRECORDSTOPROVECONTENT

Theproponentmayuseacopytoprovethecontentofanofficialrecord—orof adocument thatwas recordedor filed in apublicoffice as authorizedbylaw—if these conditions are met: the record or document is otherwiseadmissible;andthecopyiscertifiedascorrectinaccordancewithRule902(4)

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oristestifiedtobecorrectbyawitnesswhohascompareditwiththeoriginal.Ifnosuchcopycanbeobtainedbyreasonablediligence,thentheproponentmayuseotherevidencetoprovethecontent.


Maine Rule 1005 and former Federal Rule 1005 are substantiallyidentical,and there isnoreason todepart fromthe languageof therestyledFederalRule.

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Thisruleexemptspublicrecordsfromtherequirementofproductionof

theoriginalunderRule1002,since theirremoval frompubliccustody isnotfeasible. ContrarytotheapproachinRule1002,whichmakesnodistinctionbetween kinds of secondary evidence, this rule expresses an absolutepreference for certified or compared copies. Cf. 16M.R.S.A. § 456 (copy byphotographic, photostatic, or microfilm process or the like is admissible inevidenceasoriginal).

RULE1006.SUMMARIESTOPROVECONTENT

Theproponentmayuseasummary,chart,orcalculationtoprovethecontentof voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot beconveniently examined in court. The proponent must make the originalsavailableforexaminationorcopying,orboth,byotherpartiesatareasonabletimeandplace. And thecourtmayorder theproponent toproduce them incourt.


Maine Rule 1006 and former Federal Rule 1006 are substantiallyidentical,otherthantheFederalRule’sreferenceto“duplicates,”andthereisnoreasontodepartfromthelanguageoftherestyledFederalRule.

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Thisrule is inaccordwithMaine law. Statev.Huff,157Me.269,276,171A.2d210,214(1961).

RULE1007.TESTIMONYORSTATEMENTOFA

PARTYTOPROVECONTENTTheproponentmayprovethecontentofawriting,recording,orphotographbythetestimony,deposition,orwrittenstatementofthepartyagainstwhomtheevidenceisoffered.Theproponentneednotaccountfortheoriginal.


MaineRule1007andFederalRule1007aresubstantivelyidentical,andtherefore the Advisory Committee recommends adoption of the language oftherestyledFederalRule.

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This rule dispenseswith accounting for nonproduction of the originalwhenthecontentsareprovedbyopponent’stestimony,deposition,orwrittenadmission. The risk of inaccuracy is substantial and the rule is somewhatinconsistentwiththeunderlyingpurposeofpreferringoriginals,butitseemsreasonableinanadversarysituationsuchasthis.Thelimitationtotestimonyorawrittenadmissionwiselyprevents evidenceofanoraladmissionoutofcourt,whichmaybesuspect.

RULE1008.FUNCTIONSOFTHECOURTANDJURY

The court determines whether the proponent has fulfilled the factualconditionsforadmittingotherevidenceofthecontentofawriting,recording,orphotographunderRule1004or1005.

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MaineRule1008andFederalRule1008aresubstantivelyidentical,andtherefore the Advisory Committee recommends adoption of the language oftherestyledFederalRule.

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The ultimate decision in these matters of conditional relevancy is ofcourseforthejury.Statev.Chaplin,286A.2d325(Me.1972).

ARTICLEXI.MISCELLANEOUSRULES

AbrogatedJanuary1,2015.

MaineRestylingNote[November2014] In light of the significant revision to Rule 101 to incorporate thesubstance of Rules 1101 and 1102, the Advisory Committee RecommendsdeletionofbothoftheseRulesentirely.115

*****Endofdocument*****

115TheAdvisers’NotestoformerRule1101havebeenmovedtoRule101.FormerRule1102

hadnoaccompanyingnotes;itnowappearsasRule101(d).

4. EVIDENCE RULES plus 6-29-18 - Maine CourtsJun 29, 2018 · With Advisory Notes The Maine Rules...

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