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CENTRAL INTELLIG CE AGENCY ' 1.3(a)(4)WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

4 DEC 1961

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firIVOIrfED FOR RELEASE 3 0 JUN 1992IINçI AcciFipn

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Enclosure .3(a)(4)

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT

"The Organizational Structure of FieldCommand of a Front", by ColonelK. Pashuk

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article titled"The Organizational Structure of Field Command of a Front", byColonel K. Pashuk, which appeared in a special TOP SECRET issue.of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya . Mysl (Military Thought).

2. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utili-zation of any part of this document in any other form should beaddressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

tilLdLa.,LQUAA,LAA-LA.---

RICHARD HELMS

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cc: Military Assistant to the President

Special Assistant to the President forNational Security Affairs

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Director for IntelligenceThe Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, IntelligenceHeadquarters, U. S. Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for IntelligenceDepartment of the Army

Director of Naval IntelligenceDepartment of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and ResearchDepartment of State

Director, Division of IntelligenceAtomic Energy Commission

Chairman, Guided Missiles and AstronauticsIntelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

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"The Organizational Structure of FieldCommand of a Front", by ColonelK. Pashuk

COUNTRY /411USSR

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DATE OF INTO: 1961 (Prior to May)

APPRAISAL OFCONTENT

• Documentary

SOURCE: A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an articletitled "The Organizational Structure of Field Commandof a Front", written by Colonel K. Pashuk, Chief ofthe Operational Directorate of the Headquarters of aMilitary District.

This article appeared in the 1961 Second Editionof a special version of VOYENNAYA MYNA (MilitarThought) which is classified TOP SECRET by thSSovi.teand is issued irregularly. The 1961 Third Edition wentto press in July 1961.

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rit

The Organizational Structure

of

Field Command of a Front

bz

Colonel K. Pashuk, Chief of the OperationalDirectorate of the Headquarters of aMilitary District

The very great changes which have been taking placein the postwar period in the means and methods of armedconflict and, under the influence of these, in theorganizational structure of troops have not, in fact,affected command elements (organ upravleniya). TheOrganization of field command of an army and of afront has remained essentially the same as it was inthe years of World War II. Certain additions andchanges which have taken place in recent years havebrought nothing basically new to the organization offield commands.

The organizational structure and equipment of 4operational staffs (shtab) which exist at the presenttime have resulted in a certain contradiction withy

. modern requirements. They limit the combat capabilitiesof troops, and they are in fact a brake on the achieve-ment by the troops of high speeds in the conduct ofoperations. This is evident if only from the following.

The presence of nuclear-missile weapons in a frontpermits the fulfillment of operational tasks, not tomention tactical tasks, in a matter of minutes. Yetto collect and collate the facts of the situation inthe headquarters of the front takes several hours,and is even then an excessive strain on its officers.

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At the present time, combined-arms large units(soyedineniye) are at constant combat readiness,determined by the time necessary for the assembly ofa large unit when the alert is received and forits movement out from its permanent disposition .(dislokatsiya) points. Army headquarters (shtab)however do not possess such a degree of readinessand, in general, are insufficiently adapted to workunder field conditions, which, naturally, limits thecombat capabilities of army formations (obyedineniye).

The most important conditions for ensuring firmcontrol of troops are high mobility, the maneuverability,of headquarters (shtab), and their effective anti-atomicprotection. But how can there be talk of anti-atomicprotection, of mobility, or of the maneuverability ofthe headquarters (shtab) of a front and an army if theyare billetted in a tent camp on exercise? Thissituation is considered normal, for during critiquesAt exercises one can hear observations and objectionsonly to the fact that there are very many tents andthat they • are not in the right order.

A broad discussion of the questions of organizationand equipping of the elements for the control of troopsand of the organization and equipping of control points(punkty upravleniya) is necessary. It seems to us thatwithout the correct solution of these questions it isimpossible to achieve a significant increase of thecombat readiness of troops.

In our article we deal with several questions ofthe organizational structure of a field of a front.First of all, we will attempt to define the basicprinciples upon which this structure must be based.. \I

In our view, the organizational structure of afield command of a front must proceed from the releaseof the commander of troops of a front, to the maximumextent, from the decision of questions which are notdirectly connected with the combat activity of the troops.

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The commander must have sufficient time for study and .for the choice of the best methods of deciding thebasic current and future (perspektivnyy) tasks of theoperation.

With the existing organization, this requirementis not met. In the front field command there are 18independent directorates, staffs (shtab), and depart-ments (otdel) subordinated directly to the troopcommander. Under such an organization, the troopcommander is compelled to cut himself off systematicallyfrom the immediate direction of operations and todecide a mass of questions of secondary importance. Itis completely understandable that he is not in aposition to listen to all those making reports and togive them exhaustive and concrete instructions. Besidesthis, with the existence of such a quantity ofdepartments in the front field command, the solutionof any question by one of the departments requires itscoordination with numerous other departments, which leadsto a great waste of time and effort. In consequencethe front field command works for a considerable tim;not for the' troopsbut for itself, which does not helpthe operational efficiency of the direction in any way.

In order to ensure stable and continuous controlof troops, given the present means and methods of combat,the front field command must be streamlined to themaximum. The large and unwieldy headquarters (shtab),with the complements we use at present, would be unequalto the tasks of firm control of troops in the firstserious test. Clumsy and immobile, they provide asystem of no more than superficial and seeming controlof troops, to say nothing of their vulnerability, andof their consequent short tenure of life. How can onetalk of the operational efficiency and mobility of thefront field command, if its composition not countingservicing personnel, considerably exceeds 1000 men? Inour view, the strength of the command of a front shouldbe reduced by at least 3-4 times. However, this willbe possible only if the maximum use is made in the

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front field command of the various means of automation.Without this, under present conditions, it is, ingeneral, difficult to achieve, real operationalefficiency in the work of headquarters and to eliminatemultiplicity in the control of troops.

In speaking of the means. of automation, we havein view, first of all, those means whose introductionis already entirely possible at the present time;selector communications (selektornaya svyaz), portable

• recording equipment, facsimile telegraphy, televisioncommunications, speech secrecy apparatus, duplicatingapparatus, the simplest computing apparatus, etc.

Let us take one of the duties of the headquartersof a front - the collection and collation of facts y •about a situation. How many channels do one andthe same set of facts pass through before they reachthe troop commander of the front, and how much effortdoes the gathering of these facts cost? The troopcommander of the front hears the reports of the armycommanders (komandarm) or of the commanding officersof large units by high-frequency (VCh) telephone orother communications means. The chief of staff ofthe front hears the reports of the respective chiefsof staff by telephone (normally also by VCh)or,_ morerarely, by radio. The operational department (otdel)collects the facts of the situation through chiefsof directions (nachalnik napravleniya) and theirassistants by telephone, radio, and telegraph, withthe help of the communications officers. Commandersand officers of troop arms are engaged in the collectionof the facts of the situation through their channelsof communication. All these people receive the dataat various times, in varying completeness, and withvarying authenticity; the obtaining of the completefacts wastes too much time. It goes without sayingthat such methods of operation do not correspond topresent-day requirements. The facts of the situationshould pass from the troops to the front headquartersby the shortest possible route, and all work on collectionand collation of these facts should occupy a minimum oftime.

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The organizational structure of a front fieldcommand should reflect the specific nature offunctions of this control link (zveno). As is known,the front troop commander, the army commander, andthe corps commander decide questions which areessentially different' from one another.

The corps commander is interested in the progressof combat operations directly on the field of battle;he is concerned primarily with changes in the progressof these operations. The army commander is interestedin the ways in which combat operations are likely todevelop over several days. Using the resources ofoperational intelligence (razvedka), he follows themovement of the enemy's reserves and means for nuclearattack and thus comes to understand the situation moredeeply.

The front troop commander has *available intelligenceresources which allow hip to follow the 'situation inthe entire depth of a strategic direction or of atheater of military operations. His fundamental effortsare directed to the solution of long-term questions whichwill ensure the successful development of the wholeoperation. In conjunction with this, in the commandof the front, the questions of the use of nuclear-missile weapons and of rear support of the operationare decided in their full scope, demanding of thestaff and command of the front, as a whole, long-termplanning, foresight, and, consequently, work of acompletely different scope and content from that ofan army headquarters.

At the same time a front headquarters cannotlimit itself to a purely general knowledge of theoperational situation. It should ensure that the'front troop commander is constantly provided withfacts about the entire current situation in the area \Jof the front, because the frontcommander has at hisdisposal nuclear-missile resources which enable himto influence vigorously the successful decision not

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only of operational but also of tactical problems atany time.

The organizational structure of a front fieldcommand must reflect completely the decisive roleof nuclear-missile weapons in the achievement ofthe aim of an operation. The front troop commandershould have an element which concerns itself bothwith the solution of questions of the use of missiletroops in an operation and with the assurance ofdirect control or command of units and large unitsof these troops.

Besides this, since nuclear warheads (boyepripas)are at present delivered to the target not only bymissiles but also by aircraft and by other means,and also in view of the fact that the radiationsituation will exercise a considerable influence onthe progress of combat operations, the front fieldcommand should include an element which is concernedwith the general and specific planning of the use ofnuclear weapons, with careful study of the radiationsituation in the area of the front and of itsinfluence on the progress of the operation.

In the interests of stability of control of troops,the organizational structure of the front field command J

should ensure its division into several echelons(echelon), the real independence of each echelon inthe control-of-troops, rear units, and establishments,and the ability of the second echelon if necessary totake upon itself the control of the troops of thefront and to exercise this control, even if only fora short time.

The front field command should be able to detacha small operational group of officers with means ofcontrol, which could ensure control for the troopcommander during his movement to an advanced orauxiliary control point. This operational groupshould be constantly welding itself together evenwhile performing its district (okrug) command functions,

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and should have special field headquarters equip-ment and corresponding means of communication.

It is clear to everyone that the existingstructure of the front field command does not fullymeet the requirements enumerated above and needsconsiderable improvement. Which are the main changeswhich need to be introduced into this structure? .

First of all, the organization of a frontheadquarters as the basic nucleus of field commandmust be changed. The new organization of the head-quarters should ensure anew the solution of suchproblems as the collection, collation, and recordingof all data on tho operational situation. In ourview, a special element should be set up for this,which would be free from all other commitments. Thiscan be the operational center of the operationaldirectorate of the front headquarters. Only thiscenter must be concerned with collection and collationof all the facts on the situation and with theiruninterrupted transmission to the commander, to thechief of staff of the front and also to other interestedpersons and establishments, about which we will speaklater. All remaining directorates, departments, andservices are freed from carrying out this function andconcern thems•lves with their particular questions.The operational center should be equipped with modernmeans of communication, with radio speech-secrecyapparatus, facsimile telegraphy sets, receiving andtransmitting sots (teleustanovka), sound-recordingapparatus, and selector communications. In the futureit must have electronic computing machines which wouldautomate such processes as:

- tho collection and storage of facts on the position,state, and actions of enemy troops, and about theenemy's nuclear resources and their capabilities;

- the collection and storage of facts on the positionand state of friendly troops;

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tho systemization and collation of information onthe operational situation for . reports to the commandand the higher staff;

- the processing of data on the radiation situation.,the determination of areas contaminated by radiation,and of the levels of radiation for a given time.

The facts received by the operational center aboutthe position of the troops (friendly and enemy) shouldbe disseminated continuously by television sets orby telephones with visual presentation (videotelefonnayasvyaz) to the troop commander, chief of staff, andthe department of operational planning. If necessary,the front troop commander or the : front chief of staffcan be at the operational center personally for thedetailed solution of the most important questions ofcontrol of the troops.

Regular information about the position of thetroops in the detail necessary for the solution ofquestions by the arms of troops must be passed by a'special relay network for the remaining directorates(departments).

The operational center must have at its disposalseveral shifts (sens) of trained officer-operators.Each shift should also include an officer of engineertroops, on. from the chemical troops, one from thehydrometeorological service, and representatives ofthe VVS and PVO control points. The shift should beheaded by a responsible officer-operator (chief ofthe operational department) who can make an evaluationof the operational situation and pass it on at theproper time to the chief of staff or to the commanderso that a decision can be mad.. With three workingshifts and one reserve (for the forFard command post-PEP, or auxiliary control point-VIM)there may be nomore than 25 officers on the staff of the operationalcenter.

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The operational center cannot concern itself withquestions of planning an operation; for this _a specialelement is necessary - an operational planning department.Receiving systematic data about the current position ofthe troops from the operational center, the operationalplanning department analyzes and checks the fulfillmentof tasks by the troops of the front, prepares suggestionsfor the command on the conduct of combat operations, andpasses on the necessary operational tasks to the troops.In the future, the department of operational planningshould also be equipped with an electronic computer,which would lighten the performance of such tasks as:

- the production of estimates related to determining•the relative balance of forces and the regrouping oftroops;

• - the determination of the requirements for combatmeans either for a complete operation or for part ofone and the distribution of these means to directions;

- the distribution of nuclear means by targets, thedetermination of the best alternatives for destroyingenemy targets with the means available, and others.

When modern means of control are available, theexecution of the functions entrusted to the departmentdoes not call for a large number of officer-operators.The staff of the department can be within the limitsof 10-12 men.

The operational center and the department ofoperational planning should be united in a singleelement - the operational directorate, which wouldensure unity in the work of these two bodies.

The intelligence directorate does not lose itssignificance, but remains a component part of theheadquarters of the front.' But since a part of itsfunctions (the collection, collation,.recording, andstorage of data about the enemy which comes from thetroops) is carried out by the operational center,

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the complement of the intelligence directorate maybe reduced and its structure changed. At the sametime it is necessary to bear in mind that data .about the enemy reaches the front headquarters notonly from the troops but also from other sources:from the Chief Intelligence Directorate, from theintelligence directorates of neighboring fronts,from agent intelligence, from special diversionary-reconnaissance groups, from front radio and radio-technical intelligence, etc. This data should bechecked, compared, and evaluated by the intelligencedirectorate before being passed on to the operationalcenter, and for this it is expedient to have a specialelement - a control point for operational intelligence.

This control point, like the operational center,should work round the clock, and should therefore havethree duty shifts and one reserve shift. Each operation-al shift should include two operational intelligenceofficers, concerned with the collation and analysis ofall intelligence data, one officer from agent intelligence,one officer of radiotechnical intelligence, one aerial-reconnaissance officer, and one special communicationsofficer.

To direct combined-arms reconnaissance and theplanning and control of all types of intelligenceactivity in the intelligence directorate, besides thecontrol point for operational intelligence, it isnecessary to have another department for planning andcontrol, with a staff of officers of combined-arms andoperational intelligence, agent-intelligence officers,and radiotechnical intelligence officers.

We see no need for basic changes in the structureof the other departments of a front headquarters(replacement, communications, or topographical). How-ever, the strength of each can be reduced considerablyin connection with the possibility of automating andmechanizing their work. The role of the cipherdepartment obviously will decrease with the introduction

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of apparatus for ensuring the secrecy of radio,telephone, and telegraph conversations and,consequently, its strength, too, can be reduced.

The questions of the control of artillery in afront should be decided anew. The trend of develop-ment of combat means shows that the role of artilleryin the solution of operational tasks is decreasing.Clearly, artillery will perform only tactical tasks.As a consequence, the need for the presence in thefront field command of an element which would concernitself specially with the operational use of artilleryis disappearing. Questions of the combat use ofartillery can be settled successfully at the tacticallevel (zveno). Clearly these questions will be decidedin exceptional cases in the front command.

At the same time, the ever-increasing role ofmissile troops in the resolution of operational tasksrequires the presence in the front field command ofa special element, which would concern itself withtheir direct command, not only operational, but alsotactical control. Furthermore, we believe that thiselement must concern itself with the direct commandof missile large units and units. Such an element canbe the control point of the missile troops of the front.It should have direct radio, telephone, and telegraphcommunications with all missile large units and unitsof the front, and also selector and visual telephonic-communication with the operational center and theoperational intelligence control point.

The personnel of the control point of missiletroops must ensure its unbroken work round the clockand also the detachment, when necessary, of a smallbut harmonious group of officers for the control ofthe missile troops during trips by the chief (nachalnik)of the missile troops to the PKP or VPU with thefront troop commander. Hence, the control point of themissile troops can consist of three duty and one reserveoperational shift. Each shift would consist of two

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operators for the preparation of data and twocontrol officers. The work of each shift can beheaded either simultaneously or in turn by the chiefof missile troops, the chief of staff of the missiletroops, and by the deputy chief of staff of themissile troops (he is the chief of the control pointand chief of the operational department).

The operational department of the staff of the missile troops has the functions of planning theutilization of the missile troops, of supportingthem, of organizing reconnaissance, and of overseeingtheir combat activity. In view of this, besides thechief of the department, the operational departmentneeds a deputy chief of department (he is the chiefof reconnaissance), three senior planning and controlofficers, two senior intelligence officers, the chiefof communications, and his deputy.

It is clear that no one will doubt the need forthe presence in the front field command of an elementwhich is concerned with questions of antiaircraftdefense. However, its organizational structure mustalso be changed somewhat. The development in thecapabilities of antiaircraft missiles and of radio-technical troops and the use of nuclear weapons tocombat means of air attack, call for still morecentralization of the control of the forces and meansof PVO at front level. The need is growing continuouslyfor their direct command by the front PVO commander.Hence, we consider it expedient to have a PV0 control point in the front field command, equipped with modernmeans of control, which performs all tasks, beginningwith the planning of air defense and ending with thedirect control of PVO troops in battle. This pointmust be commanded by the chief of PVO troops of thefront or by his deputy and should be set up on theprinciple of continuous operation by three shifts andshould have a reserve shift for the control of PV0troops during trips to the PEP or VPU.

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The controlling bodies of the engineer andchemical troops must, in our view, remain in thefront field command. Their numerical strength canbe reduced considerably since a part of the functionswhich previously belonged to these departments willbe performed by the operational center, and also becauseof the possibility of equipping these departmentswith means of automation. However, there is no needto have these departments in direct subordination tothe front troop commander. They decide questions ofsupport of the combat operations of the troops, andtheir work should be more closely linked with thatof the operational and intelligence directorates ofthe front headquarters. The operational center willconcern itself with the collection, collation, andrecording of data on the position, bringing up tostrength, and condition of the engineer and chemicaltroops and of engineering and chemical equipment,and the front headquarters will also deal with thepreparation and delivery to the troops of ordersconcerned with the combat use of engineer and chemicaltroops. All this points to the expediency of includingengineer and chemical departments in the make-up of thefront headquarters.

• It is expedient that the unification in a singledirectorate of the elements dealing with questions ofautomotive servicing and of tank armament which hasnow taken place in the command of a district (okrug)should also be retained in the front field command withdirect subordination to the troop commander.

It is expedient to concentrate all questions of theorganization and structure of the rear, and of thematerial and medical support of the combat operationsof the troops in one body - the directorate of the front rear services, headed:by the deputy commander oftroops for the rear services. The organizationalstructure and numerical composition of the directorateof the rear services should be examined with a viewto cutting them down considerably. The nucleus ofthe directorate of the front rear services should bethe rear-services operational center organized in

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a manner similar to the operational center of thefront headquarters. The rear operational centermust decide all questions of collection, collation,and recording of data on the position and state ofrear units and establishments, supplies of equipment,Support to the troops, the structure of the operationaland troop rear areas, and others.

It should be constantly ready to pass this datato the chief of the rear services and also to theoperational center and to the chief of staff of thefront. The chief of the front rear services is theperson who reports .to the front troop commander onquestions about the rear services. In the future therear-services operational center should be equippedwith means of automation, which would facilitate thesolution of such questions as:

- recording the availability and movement ofmaterial-technical means and the compilation ofestimates of the requirements of the troops forthese;

- planning supply and evacuation of all types, usingthe various types of transport present in the front,armies, and large units;

- recording medical losses, the degree of fullnessof the medical establishments, the movements ofwounded and sick, and others.

The strength of the political directorate of afront, whose subordination should remain as before,can be reduced because of the transfer of the functionsof supply to the chief of the front rear services andof-the functions of recording, appointing, and movingParty-political worker cadres to the chief of thedirectorate of cadres of the front. The strength ofthe directorate of cadres can also be reduced considerablybecause of the availability of computers which allowthe automation of work on the registration of the cadresby the officer complement.

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Such, in our opinion, are the changes which itis necessary to introduce into the organizationalstructure of the front field command.

Proceeding from this structure, it is by nowalready possible to define in its general outlinesthe composition of the command post of a front. .It, obviously, will consist of two basic groups andone reserve group.

The first group: the commander of troops andthe chief of staff of the front, the operationalcenter, the department of operational planning of theoperational directorate, the operational intelligencecontrol point, the department of planning and controlof intelligence, and the 8th department.

The second group: the headquarters of the missiletroops, the control point of the PV0, the departmentof engineer troops, the chemical department, and thesignals department.

The reserve group of the command post includes -the reserve shift from the operational center, thereserve shift from the control point of missiletroops, the reserve shift from the intelligence controlpoint, and the reserve shift from the PVO control point.

The reserve group serves to man the .PKP or VPU.It can serve as the nucleus for „a new front fieldcommand, if the command post goes out of action asthe result of a nuclear strike by the enemy.

In conclusion, we shall dwell briefly on theorganization and movement of the control points.

The organization, disposition, and movement ofthe control points must meet the requirements forstable and uninterrupted control of the troops underany enemy Coercion. However, the present materialbase of our operational headquarters does not allowthese requirements to be met. The experience of

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exercises shows that even if the control of troopsis maintained on a sufficiently high level in theperiod of preparation of an operation, it very oftenbreaks down during the course of the operation. Assoon as the troops of the front are set in motion,control over them becomes insufficiently stable andthe control points become helpless.

The relief of control points is carried out byold methods, by the dispatch forward of operationalgroups to organize control points in a new place,because, since they are on the move, operationalheadquarters are not in a position to control thetroops. Consequently, when an operation is moving athigh speed, headquarters fall behind the troops alreadyby the second day.

In modern operations, the headquarters of a frontshould assure the commander reliable control of thetroops irrespective of whether it is stationary or onthe move. The control resources of a front headquartersmust ensure reliable communications and the conditionsnecessary for the work of officers on the move, and itsstaff and material base should ensure the rapid establish-ing, closing down, and movement of control points.

Unfortunately, questions of working convenience andof rest for the officers of the operational headquartershave not yet been solved by us. Even the experimentalmodels of radio trucks which are being developed foroperational headquarters at present do not allowofficers to work in them with a map. In consequence,there can be no talk of any control on the move orduring a short halt. We have not one acceptableproduction model of a staff vehicle for operationalheadquarters. Attempts by the headquarters ofdistricts and armies to get out of this situation bytheir own efforts and resources lead to the unreasonablewaste of considerable sums and to the weakening ofother links of the military machine.

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In our opinion it is advisable to perform thetask of developing a staff vehicle in a centralizedway. The design bureau of any automobile plantcould do this successfully within a few months. Theestablishment of normal conditions for the work ofofficers of operational headquarters will raise thequality and operational efficiency of their work and,consequently, will improve the control of troops asa whole.

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