4. Capital Structure 2
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Transcript of 4. Capital Structure 2
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1Capital Structure Decisions
Overview and preview of capital structure effects
Business versus financial risk
The impact of debt on returns
Capital structure theory
MM theory MM theory
Zero taxes
Corporate taxes
Bankruptcy cost
Example
Valuing equity as an option
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2Basic Definitions
V = value of firm
FCF = free cash flow
WACC = weighted average cost of WACC = weighted average cost of capital
rs and rd are costs of stock and debt
ws and wd are percentages of the firm that are financed with stock anddebt.
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3How can capital structure affect value?
)1( tt
WACC
FCFV
1 )1(ttWACC
(Continued)
WACC = wd (1-T) rd + ws rs
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4A Preview of Capital Structure Effects
The impact of capital structure on value depends upon the effect of debt on:debt on:
WACC
FCF
(Continued)
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5The Effect of Additional Debt
Effect on WACC Debt increases risk of bankruptcy
Causes pre-tax cost of debt, rd, to increase
Debtholders have a prior claim on cash flows relative to stockholders.
Debtholders fixed claim increases risk of Debtholders fixed claim increases risk of stockholders residual claim.
Cost of stock, rs, goes up.
Effect on FCF Tax shield effect
Reduces the taxes paid
Frees up more cash for payments to investors
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6 Bankruptcy costs (direct and indirect) Direct costs: Legal fees, fire sales, etc. Indirect costs: Lost customers, reduction in
productivity of managers and line workers, reduction in credit (i.e., accounts payable) offered by suppliers
Additional debt can also affect the behavior of managers.
Reductions in agency costs (FCF problem) )
Imp
(how mangers behave when there is a lot of debt or not debt) debt pre-commits, or bonds, free cash flow
for use in making interest payments. Thus, managers are less likely to waste FCF on perquisites or non-value adding projects.
Increases in agency costs (Underinvestment problem)
debt can make managers too risk-averse, causing underinvestment in risky but positive NPV projects.
Net effect = ?
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7Business Risk versus Financial Risk
Business risk:Uncertainty in future EBIT.
Depends on business factors such as competition, operating leverage, etc.competition, operating leverage, etc.
Financial risk:Additional risk concentrated on common
stockholders when financial leverage is used.
Depends on the amount of debt financing.
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8Consider Two Hypothetical Firms
Both firms have same total asset of $20,000, EBIT of $3,000, and tax rate of 40%.
They differ only with respect to use of
Firm U Firm L
No debt $10,000 of 12% debt
They differ only with respect to use of debt.
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9Impact of Leverage on Returns
EBIT $3,000 $3,000Interest
Firm U Firm L
InterestEBTTaxes (40%)NI
ROE
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Now consider the fact that EBIT is not known with certainty. What is the
impact of uncertainty on stockholder profitability and risk for Firm U and
Firm L?
Continued
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Firm U: Unleveraged
Prob. 0.25 0.50 0.25EBIT $2,000 $3,000 $4,000
EconomyBad Avg. Good
EBIT $2,000 $3,000 $4,000InterestEBTTaxes (40%)NI
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Firm L: Leveraged
Prob.* 0.25 0.50 0.25EBIT* $2,000 $3,000 $4,000
EconomyBad Avg. Good
EBIT* $2,000 $3,000 $4,000InterestEBTTaxes (40%)NI
*Same as for Firm U.
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Profitability Measures:
E(BEP) 15.0% 15.0%E(ROIC) 9.0% 9.0%E(ROE) 9.0% 10.8%
U L
E(ROE) 9.0% 10.8%
Risk Measures:
ROIC 2.12% 2.12%ROE 2.12% 4.24%
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Summary
Ratios such as BEP and ROIC are unaffected by financial leverage.
L has higher expected ROE.
But L also has greater volatility of ROE.
Implication?
For leverage to increase expected ROE, it must be that E(BEP) > rd.
In the example, E(BEP) = 15% while interest rate = 12%.
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Who are Modigliani and Miller (MM)?
They published theoretical papers that changed the way people thought about financial leverage.
They won Nobel prizes in economics for They won Nobel prizes in economics for their work.
MMs papers were published in 1958 and 1963. Miller had a separate paper in 1977. The papers differed in their assumptions about taxes.
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What assumptions underlie the MMand Miller models?
Firms can be grouped into homogeneous classes based on business risk.business risk.
Investors have identical expectations about firms future earnings.
There are no transactions costs.(More...)
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No financial distress costs.
All debt is riskless.
both individuals and corporations can borrow unlimited amounts of money at the risk-free rate.
Also, firms have zero growth. This implies expected EBIT is constant over time.
No agency costs. No agency costs.
MMs first paper (1958) assumed zero taxes. Later papers added taxes.
These assumptions were necessary for MM to prove their propositions on the basis of investor arbitrage.
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Proposition I:
VL = VU.
MM with Zero Taxes (1958)
VL = VU.
Proposition II:
rsL = rsU + (rsU - rd)(D/S).
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Firms U and L are in same business risk class.
EBITU,L = $500,000.
Given the following data, find V, S,rs, and WACC for Firms U and L.
Firm U has no debt; rsU = 14%.
Firm L has $1,000,000 debt at rd = 8%.
The basic MM assumptions hold.
There are no corporate or personal taxes.
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1. Find VU and VL.
VU = = = $3,571,429.
V = V = $3,571,429.
EBITrsU
$500,0000.14
VL = VU = $3,571,429.
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VL = D + S = $3,571,429
2. Find the market value of Firm Ls debt and equity.
VL = D + S = $3,571,429
$3,571,429 = $1,000,000 + S
S = $2,571,429.
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3. Find rsL.
rsL = rsU + (rsU - rd)(D/S)
= 14.0% + (14.0% - 8.0%)( )$1,000,000= 14.0% + (14.0% - 8.0%)( )= 14.0% + 2.33% = 16.33%.
$1,000,000$2,571,429
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4. Proposition I implies WACC = rsU.Verify for L using WACC formula.
WACC = wdrd + wsrs = (D/V)rd + (S/V)rsL
( )= ( )(8.0%)+( )(16.33%)
= 2.24% + 11.76% = 14.00%.
$1,000,000$3,571,429
$2,571,429$3,571,429
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Graph the MM relationships between capital costs and leverage as measured
by D/V.
Without taxesCost of Capital (%)
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0 20 40 60 80 100Debt/Value Ratio (%)
rsL
WACC
rd
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The more debt the firm adds to its capital structure, the riskier the equity becomes and thus the higher its cost.its cost.
Although rd remains constant, rsincreases with leverage. The increase in rs is exactly sufficient to keep the WACC constant.
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MM Theory: Corporate Taxes
Corporate tax laws favor debt financing over equity financing.
With corporate taxes, more EBIT goes to investors and less to taxes when leverage investors and less to taxes when leverage is used.
With corporate taxes added, the MM propositions become:Proposition I:
VL = VU + TD.
Proposition II:
rsL = rsU + (rsU - rd)(1 - T)(D/S).
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Notes About the New Propositions
1. When corporate taxes are added,VL VU. VL increases as debt is added to the capital structure, and added to the capital structure, and the greater the debt usage, the higher the value of the firm.
2. rsL increases with leverage at a slower rate when corporate taxes are considered.
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1. Find VU and VL.
VU = = = $2,142,857.EBIT(1 - T)
rsU
$500,000(0.6)0.14
Note: Represents a 40% decline from the no taxes situation.
VL = VU + TD = $2,142,857 + 0.4($1,000,000)
= $2,142,857 + $400,000
= $2,542,857.
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VL = D + S = $2,542,857
$2,542,857 = $1,000,000 + S
2. Find market value of Firm Ls debt and equity.
$2,542,857 = $1,000,000 + S
S = $1,542,857.
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3. Find rsL.
rsL = rsU + (rsU - rd)(1 - T)(D/S)
= 14.0% + (14.0% - 8.0%)(0.6)( )$1,000,000= 14.0% + (14.0% - 8.0%)(0.6)( )= 14.0% + 2.33% = 16.33%.
$1,542,857
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4. Find Firm Ls WACC.
WACCL= (D/V)rd(1 - T) + (S/V)rsL
= ( )(8.0%)(0.6)$1,000,000$2,542,857( )+( )(16.33%)
= 1.89% + 9.91% = 11.80%.
When corporate taxes are considered, the WACC is lower for L than for U.
$2,542,857
$1,542,857$2,542,857
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Cost of Capital (%)
MM relationship between capital costs and leverage when corporate taxes are
considered.
rsL26
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0 20 40 60 80 100Debt/Value Ratio (%)
rsL
WACC
rd(1 - T)
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Value of Firm, V (%)
4
3VL
MM relationship between value and debt when corporate taxes are considered.
TD3
2
1
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5Debt
(Millions of $)
VU
Under MM with corporate taxes, the firms value increases continuously as more and more debt is used.
TD
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How is all of this analysis different if firms U and L are growing?
Under MM (with taxes and no growth)VL = VU + TD
This assumes the tax shield is This assumes the tax shield is discounted at the cost of debt.
Now, assume the company grows (while maintaining the same capital structure).
The debt tax shield will be larger if the firms grow:
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7% growth, TS discount rate of rTS
Value of (growing) tax shield =
VTS = rdTD/(rTS g)
So value of levered firm =So value of levered firm =
VL = VU + rdTD/(rTS g)
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What should rTS be?
The smaller is rTS, the larger the value of the tax shield. If rTS < rsU, then with rapid growth the tax shield then with rapid growth the tax shield becomes unrealistically largerTSmust be equal to rsU to give reasonable results when there is growth. So we assume rTS = rsU.
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Relevant information for valuation
EBIT1 = $500,000
T = 40%
rTS =rsU = 14% rTS =rsU = 14%
rd = 8%
Required net reinvestment in operating assets = 10% of EBIT = $50,000.
Debt = $1,000,000
Growth rate=7%
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Calculating VU
NOPAT1 = EBIT1(1-T)
= $500,000 (.60) = $300,000
Investment in net op. assets Investment in net op. assets
= EBIT1 (0.10) = $50,000
FCF1 = NOPAT1 Inv. in net op. assets
= $300,000 - $50,000
= $250,000 (this is expected FCF next year)
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Value of unlevered firm, VU
Value of unlevered firm =
VU = FCF1/(rsU g)
= $250,000/(0.14 0.07)= $250,000/(0.14 0.07)
= $3,571,429
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Value of tax shield, VTS and VL
VTS = rdTD/(rsU g)
= 0.08(0.40)$1,000,000/(0.14-0.07)
= $457,143= $457,143
VL = VU + VTS= $3,571,429 + $457,143
= $4,028,571
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Levered cost of equity
In this case, the levered cost of equity is rsL = rsU + (rsU rd)(D/S)
This looks just like MM without taxesThis looks just like MM without taxeseven though we allow taxes and allow for growth.
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Cost of equity and WACC
Just like with MM with taxes, the cost of equity increases with D/V, and the WACC declines. WACC declines.
But since rsL doesn't have the (1-T) factor in it, for a given D/V, rsL is greater than MM would predict, and WACC is greater than MM would predict.
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Bankruptcy cost
MM theory ignores bankruptcy (financial distress) costs, which increase as more leverage is used.
At low leverage levels, tax benefits At low leverage levels, tax benefits outweigh bankruptcy costs.
At high levels, bankruptcy costs outweigh tax benefits.
An optimal capital structure exists that balances these costs and benefits.
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Choosing the Optimal Capital Structure: Example
Currently is all-equity financed.
Expected EBIT = $500,000.
Firm expects zero growth.Firm expects zero growth.
100,000 shares outstanding; rs = 12%;
P0 = $25; T = 40%; b = 1.0; rRF = 6%;
RPM = 6%.
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Estimates of Cost of Debt
Percent financedwith debt, wd rd
0% -
20% 8.0%20% 8.0%
30% 8.5%
40% 10.0%
50% 12.0%If company recapitalizes, debt would be issued to repurchase stock.
Temur SolievTypewritercomp is changing its capital structure
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The Cost of Equity at Different Levels of Debt: Hamadas Equation
MM theory implies that beta changes with leverage.
b is the beta of a firm when it has no bU is the beta of a firm when it has no debt (the unlevered beta)
bL = bU [1 + (1 - T)(D/S)]
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The Cost of Equity for wd = 20%
Use Hamadas equation to find beta:
bL = bU [1 + (1 - T)(D/S)]
= 1.0 [1 + (1-0.4) (20% / 80%) ]= 1.0 [1 + (1-0.4) (20% / 80%) ]
= 1.15
Use CAPM to find the cost of equity:
rs = rRF + bL (RPM)
= 6% + 1.15 (6%) = 12.9%
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Cost of Equity vs. Leverage
wd D/S bL rs
0% 0.00 1.000 12.00%
20% 0.25 1.150 12.90%20% 0.25 1.150 12.90%
30% 0.43 1.257 13.54%
40% 0.67 1.400 14.40%
50% 1.00 1.600 15.60%
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The WACC for wd = 20%
WACC = wd (1-T) rd + ws rs
WACC = 0.2 (1 0.4) (8%) + 0.8 (12.9%)
WACC = 11.28%
Repeat this for all capital structures
under consideration.
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WACC vs. Leverage
wd rd rs WACC
0% 0.0% 12.00% 12.00%
20% 8.0% 12.90% 11.28%20% 8.0% 12.90% 11.28%
30% 8.5% 13.54% 11.01%
40% 10.0% 14.40% 11.04%
50% 12.0% 15.60% 11.40%
Temur SolievTypewriterwant to find where is the WACC is minimized
Temur SolievTypewriter1. Minimize WACC ( this is easiest)=WdRd(1-T)+WsRs Rs=Rrf+b*RPm b=f(debt ratio) 2. Maximize V ( firm value, stock price) BL=bv(1+(1-T)D/s) 3. Maximize P ( share)
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Corporate Value for wd = 20%
V = FCF / (WACC-g)
g=0, so FCF = NOPAT = EBIT (1-T)=
($500,000)(1-0.40) = $300,000.($500,000)(1-0.40) = $300,000.
V = $300,000 / 0.1128 = $2,659,574.
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Temur SolievTypewriterPo=D1/(Rs - g)
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Temur SolievTypewriterV= (NoPAT-Cap Exp ( for growth))/WACC
Temur SolievTypewriterwhen growth rate is zero we dont need to write g
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Corporate Value vs. Leverage
wd WACC Corp. Value
0% 12.00% $2,500,000
20% 11.28% $2,659,57420% 11.28% $2,659,574
30% 11.01% $2,724,796
40% 11.04% $2,717,391
50% 11.40% $2,631,579
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Debt and Equity for wd = 20%
The dollar value of debt is:
D = wd V = 0.2 ($2,659,574) = $531,915.
S = V D
S = $2,659,574 - $531,915 = $2,127,659.
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Temur SolievTypewriterValue of the debt
Temur SolievTypewriterValue of the firm
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Debt and Stock Value vs. Leverage
wd Debt, D Stock Value, S
0% $0 $2,500,000
20% $531,915 $2,127,66020% $531,915 $2,127,660
30% $817,439 $1,907,357
40% $1,086,956 $1,630,435
50% $1,315,790 $1,315,790
Note: numbers are rounded
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Stock Price for wd = 20%
The firm issues debt, and uses debt proceeds
to repurchase stock.
Stock price changes after debt is issued.
S : value of stock after debt issuance S : value of stock after debt issuance
D : value of debt after debt issuance
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Stock Price for wd = 20% (Continued)
D0 and n0 are debt and outstanding
shares before recap.
D - D0 is equal to cash that will be used D - D0 is equal to cash that will be used
to repurchase stock.
S + (D - D0) is wealth of shareholders
after the debt is issued but immediately
before the repurchase.(More)
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Temur SolievTypewriterrecap-recapitalization
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Stock Price for wd = 20% (Continued)
P = S + (D D0)
n0
P = $2,127,660 + ($531,915 0) P = $2,127,660 + ($531,915 0)
100,000
P = $26.596 per share.
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Temur SolievTypewritercash stock holders receive
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Temur SolievTypewriterInitial stock price was $25 and now $26.596
Temur SolievTypewriterP=2127660/80000=26.60
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Number of Shares Repurchased
# Repurchased = (D - D0) / P
# Rep. = ($531,915 0) / $26.596
= 20,000.
# Remaining = 100,000-20,000=80,000
OR, # Remaining = n = S / P
n = $2,127,660 / $26.596
= 80,000.
P can also be found by
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Price per Share vs. Leverage
# shares # shares
wd P Repurch. Remaining
0% $25.00 0 100,0000% $25.00 0 100,000
20% $26.60 20,000 80,000
30% $27.41 30,416 69,584
40% $27.30 40,287 59,713
50% $25.87 49,134 50,866
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Optimal Capital Structure
wd = 30% gives:
Lowest WACC
Highest corporate valueHighest corporate value
Highest stock price per share
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How companies determine capital structure:Theory and Reality
In theory
WACC, firm value, stock price
According to survey, companies consider
A good credit rating
When issuing equity,
Consider EPS dilution
Consider recent stock appreciation (Market timing)
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Temur SolievTypewritertoo low deb ratio
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Equity as an option
Suppose the firm has $2 million face value of 1-year zero coupon debt, and the current value of the firm (debt plus equity) is $4 million.is $4 million.
If the firm pays off the debt when it matures, the equity holders get to keep the firm. If not, they get nothing.
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Equity as an option
The equity holder's position looks like a call option with
P = underlying value of firm = $4 million
P = underlying value of firm = $4 million
X = exercise price = $2 million
t = time to maturity = 1 year
Suppose rRF = 6%
= volatility of firm (debt + equity) = 0.60
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Use Black-Scholes to price this option
V = P[N(d1)] - Xe-rRFt[N(d2)].
d1 = . t
ln(P/X) + [rRF + (2/2)]t
d1 = . t
d2 = d1 - t.
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Black-Scholes Solution
V = $4[N(d1)] - $2e-(0.06)(1.0)[N(d2)].
ln($4/$2) + [(0.06 + 0.36/2)](1.0)
(0.60)(1.0)d1 = (0.60)(1.0)
= 1.5552.
d2 = d1 - (0.60)(1.0) = d1 - 0.60
= 1.5552 - 0.6000 = 0.9552.
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N(d1) = N(1.5552) = 0.9401
N(d2) = N(0.9552) = 0.8383Note: Values obtained from Excel using NORMSDIST function.
V = $4(0.9401) - $2e-0.06(0.8303)
= $3.7604 - $2(0.9418)(0.8303)
= $2.196 Million = Value of Equity
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Value of Debt
Value of debt = Total Value Equity
= $4 million 2.196 million= $4 million 2.196 million
= $1.804 million
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This value of debt gives us a yield
Debt yield for 1-year zero coupon debt
= (face value / price) 1
= ($2 million/ 1.804 million) 1 = ($2 million/ 1.804 million) 1
= 10.9%
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How does affect an option's value?
Higher volatility means higher option value.
Temur SolievTypewriterValuing option
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Values of Debt and Equity for Different Volatilities
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
Val
ue
(mil
lion
s)
Equity
Debt
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Volatility (sigma)
Val
ue
(mil
lion
s)
Debt
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Temur SolievTypewritermanagers can change sigma, riskier projects can be chosen
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Managerial Incentives
Manager can change a firm's by changing the assets the firm invests in. And changing can change the value of the equity. the equity.
So increasing can transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders by making the option value of the stock worth more, which makes what is left, the debt value, worth less.
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Bait and Switch
Managers who know this might tell debtholders they are going to invest in one kind of asset, and, instead, in one kind of asset, and, instead, invest in riskier assets. This is called bait and switch and bondholders will require higher interest rates for firms that has a history of doing this.
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