3x8 Artillery Tactics Befor During and After Desert Storm

7/29/2019 3x8 Artillery Tactics Befor During and After Desert Storm

1/117

3x8 ARTILLERY TACTICS:BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER OPERATION DESERT STORM

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for the

degreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

. HENRY 5 . LARSEN 111, CPT, USA . .B.B.A., University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1994

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


2/117

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: Captain Henry S. Larsen I11Title of Thesis: 3x8 Artillery Tactics: Before, During,and After Operation Desert Storm.

, Thesis Committee Chairmanaletz, M.S.

, Member-TC ~ i c h r d . Pena,. M.A. . .7 c%%& , Member, Consulting FacultyJames C. ~ c ~ a u b n ,h.D.

Accepted this 3rd day of June 1994 by:

, Director, Graduate DegreePhilip J.' Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those ofthe student author and do not necessarily represent theviews of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College orany other governmental agency. (References to this studyshould include the foregoing statement.)


3/117

ABSTRACT

3x8 ARTILLERY TACTICS: BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER OPERATIONDESERT STORM by CPT Henry S. Larsen 111, USA, 109 pages.

This thesis examines the 3x8 direct support field artillerybattalion in the Army's heavy divisions from its inceptionin 1976 to its present state. The study places specialemphasis on documenting the operational change of the firingbattery from primarily platoon-based operations beforeOperation Desert Storm to primarily battery-based operationsduring and after Operation Desert Storm.The thesis compares platoon and battery-based operationswith the Army's initial intent for 3x8 operations, theArmy's current doctrinal manuals, and its future artillerysystems. The two future direct support systems studied arethe M109A6 Paladin system (currently being fielded) and theAdvanced Field Artillery System (AFAS)The thesis concludes in determining that platoon-basedoperations should be the primary method of employing firingbatteries in 3x8 battalions both now and with futuresystems. The thesis makes a number of recommendations tofacilitate platoon and battery-based firing batteryoperations.

iii


4/117

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I could not have written this thesis without thepatience, efforts, and support given to me from a number ofpeople.First, I would like to thank my wife, Pamela, and mychildren--Blake, Katie, and Julie. Hundreds of hours that Icould have spent with them during this school year weresacrificed for this study. They were always supportive andnever complained,Second, I would like to thank my thesis committeemembers for making this both a challenging and enjoyableadventure. They challenged me to think, providedconstructive criticism and insight, and quickly returned allsubmissions so that I could continue with my work. I knowthat they also sacrificed many hours in assisting me in thisstudy.


5/117

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .BSTRACT iiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ivLIST OF ILLISTWTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IST OF TABLES viiCHAPTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NE INTRODUCTION 1. . . . . . . . . . .WO REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 17

. . . . . . . . . . . . .HREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 58. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .OUR ANALYSIS. 64FIVE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . 94. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IBLIOGRAPHY 104

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109


6/117

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure1. 3x6 FA Battalion Organization2 . 3x8 FA Battalion Organization3. Legal Mix V Study Team DS Battalion ~ i x e s4. Unique Targets Defeated Over a 24-hour Period5. Number of Companies Defeated Over a 24-hourPeriod6. Percent of Unit Available Over a 24-hourPeriod7. Expected Percentage Unit Survivability8. The Long-Run Expectation of Guns in Position9. Field Artillery 155mm Howitzer Laydown

10 . Battery Computer System Default sheaf

Page111 21 9212 1

2 2

22


7/117

LIST OF TABLE

Table Page1. Advanced Field Artillery System Projected 4Capabilities

vii


8/117

CHAPTER ONEINTRODUCTION

The mission of the field artillery is to destroy,neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, andmissile fire and to help integrate all fire supportassets into combined arms 0perations.l

How does the current trend of employing directsupport field artillery battalions at the National TrainingCenter affect U.S. field artillery tactics, currently and inthe future?

From its beginnings in the Revolutionary War, theUnited States field artillery has been organized in abattery-based system, that is to say that the firing batterywas the smallest tactical formation for the field artilleryon the battlefield. Eventually, from the battery formationevolved battalions, and later, the division artillery.

In 1976, the Legal Mix V study was conducted at theU.S. Army Field Artillery Center. The study team's missionwas to develop and test improvements in both weaponstechnology and organizational design for the United StatesArmy field artillery. One area the Legal Mix V study


9/117

examined was the improvement of the organizational structurein the division artillery of the Army's heavy divisions.

One of the improvements suggested by the Legal Mixstudy team was to increase the number of howitzers in adirect support field artillery battalion from eighteen totwenty-four. This increase of six howitzers represented apotential thirty-three percent increase in firepower for thebattalion. The study team also recommended that theadditional six howitzers be distributed evenly amongst thethree firing batteries within the battalion. Thisrecommendation changed the battalion organization from threebatteries of six guns (3x6) to three batteries of eight guns(3x8).

In a subsequent study, the Legal Mix V study teamtested the employment of the eight-gun firing battery. Thestudy examined five different employment models. The studyteam recommended that the eight-gun firing battery beemployed as two four-gun firing platoons with their own firedirection centers. This recommendation created the 3x8platoon-based battalion. This recommendation was adoptedand changed the basic field artillery firing unit from abattery to a firing platoon in the Army's heavy divisions.

Direct support field artillery battalions startedconverting from 3x6 battery-based organizations to a 3x8platoon-based organizations in 1985. This conversion was asmall portion of the Army's Division 86 and Army of

2


10/117

Excellence programs. For the field artillery, the change toplatoon-based operations represented a significant change inboth capabilities and tactics. Besides the thirty-threepercent increase in potential firepower, the new platoon-based operations represented a one hundred percent increasein available firing units. The -one hundred percent increaseis a comparison of the three firing batteries to the sixfiring platoons now available. From 1986 to 1989, fieldartillery battalions in the Army's heavy divisions fieldedthe additional six howitzers and employed the new tacticsincorporated in U.S. Army Field Manuals 6-50, Tactics.

cnl?s. and Procedures for The F l e l d e r y CannonBzLLary and 6-20-1, Tactics. Te c h n i c r u e s . Procedurcq for2h.e Field Ar t i l l e r y Cannon B a t t a L i . c n . These' tactics,stressed in both the doctrinal manuals and within the fieldartillery community, emphasized platoon-based operations.2Also during this period, field artillery batteries fieldedthe Battery Computer System (BCS) and some Army divisionswere receiving the Field Artillery Ammunition SupportVehicle (FAASV). At battalion-level, two Position/AzimuthDetermining.Systems (PADS) were added to the battalionsurvey section. The Position/Azimuth Determining Systemrepresented a marked improvement in speed over theconventional survey teams that proceeded this system. Thesechanges in tactics combined with the newly fielded equipmentrepresented the Army of Excellence changes to the direct


11/117

support field artillery battalions in the Army's heavydivisions.

Platoon-based operations increased a battalion'sfire support abilities by enhancing the unit in the areas offlexibility, survivability, responsiveness, mobility, andmassed fires.3 From the inception of 3x8 operations untillate in 1990, 3x8 battalions conducted platoon-basedoperations both at their home stations and at the NationalTraining Center.

During Operation Desert Shield, deployed fieldartillery battalions started training and employing theirfiring batteries as eight-gun firing units. Common reasonscited for this change in tactics were ease of command andcontrol; fewer lost units; simplified logistics; less unitsrequiring survey control; and battery survivability. DuringOperation Desert Storm, all five heavy division artilleries(1st Armored Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 1st InfantryDivision, 3d Armored Division, and 24th Infantry Division)employed their field artillery battalions using battery-based operations.

Since Operation Desert Storm, a preponderance ofartillery battalions continue to conduct battery-basedoperations at the National Training Center. This use ofbattery-based operations continues even though many of thecircumstances particular to the Persian Gulf War do notexist at the National Training Center.

4


12/117

designed to operate with even greater decentralization.Advancements in artillery ammunition capabilities arereducing the need for massed fires from multiple artilleryunits. Advanced artillery computer systems combined with anincrease in firing units will enable artillery battalions toengage more targets effectively.

Our training today must prepare field artilleryleaders for all contingencies in a force projection Army.Today's training must also prepare our leaders to commandand control the artillery systems of the future.

BlLRQ=This thesis examines 3x8 operations from its inception

to the present. The thesis also examines future artilleryorganizational requirements and compares those requirementswith platoon and battery-based operations. From thisanalysis of artillery organizations, conclusions are madeand recommendations suggested for both current and futureoperations.

In answering the thesis question, the thesis reviewsthe effects of battery-based operations on a number ofissues. These issues are artillery tactics, techniques, andprocedures; leadership development; massing of fieldartillery fires; movement; future artillery cannon systems;current and future advanced artillery munitions; artillery


13/117

gunnery; battalion and battery command and control; andartillery survey.

S u b o r d i iThere are seven subordinate thesis questions.Why did the U.S. artillery reorganize its direct

support battalions to the 3x8 platoon-based organization?This first subordinate question is answered from researchinto three primary sources: the U.S. Field Artillery LegalMix V study; the Army's Division 86 initiative later knownas the Army of Excellence program; and information obtamedfrom the Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Sill.Analysis of the information obtained from these sourcesdetermines what objectives the U.S. Army Field ArtillerySchool sought to achieve when establishing platoon-basedoperations.

What.are the U.S. artillery tactics for employing a3x8 artillery battalion? This subordinate question isanswered through research of two primary sources: U.S. ArmyField Manuals 6-20-1,1

Fleld A r W e r v C m n attal.ion, and 6-50, Tactics,erv C-

Battery. Analysis of the information obtained from thesesources establishes how the field artillery envisions theemployment of 3x8 battalions and batteries.


14/117

How were 3x8 artillery battalions conductingoperations prior to Operations Desert Shield and DesertStorm? This subordinate question is answered throughresearch into three primary sources: professional articleswritten about 3x8 employment techniques during this period,the Center for Army Lessons Learned, and National TrainingCenter take-home packages (after-action reports). Researchof this question establishes how field artillery units wereapplying 3x8 tactics prior to Operation Desert Storm.

How were 3x8 artillery battalions employed duringOperation Desert Storm? This subordinate question isanswered through research of four primary sources: theCenter for Army Lessons Learned, numerous professional

. . articles, unit kiistories, and personal- experience. . Researchof this subordinate question shows if a significant changein artillery employment did occ ur during Operation Desertstorm.

How are 3x8 artillery battalions currently beingemployed at the National Training Center? This question isanswered through research of three primary sources: theCenter of Army Lessons Learned, National Training Centertake-home packages, and interviews with field artilleryobserver/controllers stationed at the National TrainingCenter. Research of this subordinate question establisheshow units are currently employing 3x8 battalions.


15/117

How does this current employment technique comparewith the initial intent and design of 3x8 artillery? Thissubordinate question is answered by analyzing the results ofthe previous flve subordinate questions. By answering thisquestion, parts of the thesis question are answered,conclusions drawn, and recommendations made.

How does current training in battery-basedoperations affect the field artillery of the future? Thisfinal subordinate question is answered through research intofour primary sources: professional articles on thePaladidAdvanced Field Artillery System weapon system^;^weapon and ammunition information from the Directorate ofCombat Developments, Fort Sill; information provided by thePaladin New Equipment Training Team, Fort Sill; and the 2dBattalion, 17th Field Artillery (Paladin) take-home packagesfrom the National Training Center. Answering this finalsubordinate question allows for part of the thesis questionto be answered, conclusions drawn, and recommendations madeon future artillery employment.

of Terms3x6 Batt-: A 3x6 battalion is a field

artillery battalion consisting of a Headquarters andHeadquarters Battery (HHB), a Service Battery, and threesix-gun firing batteries. These firing batteries willconduct battery-based operations. A firing battery in this


16/117

organization is organized with one battery headquarterselement. The 3x6 Battalion was the direct support fieldartillery battalion organization in the Army's heavydivisions before the conversion to the 3x8 organization.

3x6 FA BattalionxFigure 1: 3x6 FA Battalion Organization

A 3x8 Battalion: A 3x8 battalion is a fieldartillery battalion consisting of a Headquarters andHeadquarters Battery, a Service Battery, and three eight-gunfiring batteries. A firing battery in this organization iscomposed of a battery headquarters and two four-gun firingplatoons. Each firing platoon has a platoon headquarters.A firing battery in this organization is designed to conductplatoon-based operations. The 3x8 battalion is the currentorganization of the direct support field artillerybattalions in the Army's heavy divisions.


17/117

I.j x8 FA Battalion

Firing PlatoonsPer BatteryI ' Figure 2: 3x8 FA Battalion Organization

Batt-v -based Operati= : Battery-based operationsrefer to a unit that moves to and occupies a position as anentire six or eight-gun firing battery. Once occupied, thebattery fire direction center controls and fires allhowitzers.

Direct Supp&: A battalion operating in directsupport of a maneuver brigade is primarily concerned withthe field artillery support needs of that maneuver brigade.Direct support is the most decentralized standard tacticalm i ~ s i o n . ~Doctr*: Fundamental principles by which militaryforces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of


18/117

national objectives. It is authoritative but requiresjudgment in application.=

Five Reauirements for Accurate Predicted Fire (APF)Accurate predicted fire is a field artillery standard thatunits strive for when firing. The five requirements toachieve accurate predicted fires are accurate unit location,accurate meteorological data, accurate weapon and ammunitiondata, accurate computational procedures, and accurate targetlocation. The firing unit is responsible for four of thesefive requirements. The fifth requirement, accurate targetlocation, is provided by the source identifying the locationof the target such as a fire support team (FIST) or weaponslocating radar (WLR). Accurate predicted fires allows afiring unit to obtain first round target effects (withoutadjustments) . This also facilitates massing fires withother firing units that meet the requirements for accuratepredicted fires.

Genera1 Suppar+: A battalion assigned the generalsupport mission supports the force as a whole and remainsunder the immediate control of the force artilleryheadquarters. It is the most centralized of the standardtactical missions.'

ELatoon based Ope raLb ns Platoon-based operationsrefer to a unit that moves to and occupies separatepositions as two unique platoon formations with fourhowitzers in each platoon. Once occupied, each platoon

12


19/117

controls and fires its four assigned howitzers by use of twoseparate platoon fire direction centers.

Proce-: A particular course or mode of actionthat describes how to perform a certain task.*

- Reinforcing is a tactical mission thatcauses one field artillery battalion to augment the fires ofanother field artillery unit.g

Tactics: The employment of units in combat. Theordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation toeach other/or to the enemy in order to utilize their fullpotentialities lom: echniques refers to the basic methodsof using equipment and personnel. Techniques give detail tohow commanders actually carry out assignments.ll

atlorna his study is delimited in that it only examines

the direct support field artillery battalion organizationfound in the Army's armored and mechanized infantrydivisions.

The study is limited to only unclassified sources.Only data from one of the four combat training

centers was used. Only National Training Center data wasconsidered relevant to the thesis problem. The JointReadiness Training Center is not conducting trainingrotations with heavy divisions. The Combat Maneuver


20/117

Training Center (CMTC) is not conducting training rotationswith entire field artillery battalions. The Combat ManeuverTraining Center is currently only allowing platoon firedirection centers and the battalion tactical operationscenter (TOC) on its training rotations. The primary reasonfor not allowing the entire field artillery battalion totrain during a Combat Maneuver Training Center rotation isthe lack of adequate maneuver space at Hohenfels (Germany)Training Area.

Information received from the National TrainingCenter observer/controllers, National Training Centerarchives, National Training Center take-home packages, andthe Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) has a non-attribution policy. No mention of specific NTC trainingunits or rotations is made in this thesis or provided tothird parties.

The study is also limited by the scarce number ofwritten.sources on artillery organizations.

To answer the thesis question, the researchaddresses several issues. These issues are the initial 3x8goals and objectives; future artillery organizational goalsand objectives; and battery-based goals and objectives.


21/117

Chapter One provides the background for the researchquestion and its significance.

Chapter Two is a review of significant literatureand studies pertaining to the thesis question. Althoughseveral books have been used in the research, thepreponderance of information collected was found in studies,data bases, and periodicals.

Chapter Three discusses the research methodologyused in this thesis. Chapter Four analyzes the informationgathered from sources in the literature review. Also usedin the analysis is data obtained from sources not mentionedin the literature review. Significant sources ofinformation used in the thesis were the Directorate ofCombat Developments and theGunnery Department, . Fort Sill;TRADOC Analysis Command, Command Historian's Office, and theCenter of Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth; NationalTraining. enter observer/.controllers, Fort Irwin; and theNational Training Center Archives, Monterey.

Chapter Five contains a conclusion andrecommendations for current and future artilleryorganizations.


22/117

Endnotes-u.s. Army,hattle (Washington: Department of the Army, 19881, 2-8.2Major General Raphael J. Hallada, "3x8: Our Force

Multiplier," Field Artillery J o u ~ ~ dFebruary 1989): 1.

4The Paladin M109A6 and Advanced Field ArtillerySystem howitzers are two new artillery systems designed toreplace the current M109A2/3 found in most of the Army'sheavy divisions. Additional information on these systems'capabilities is contained in Chapter Two.

-.S. Army, =DOC Pam 34 1 Doc-e, Tactlcs, T?c- and Procechues (Fort Monroe,Virginia: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, July1984), 3.7FM 6-7Q (1988), 2-9.S D O C am 34-1 (19841, 9.9 F M 6-2Q (l988), 2-9.1 0 m O C Pam 34-1 (l984), 6.IlIbid., 8.


23/117

CHAPTER TWOREVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In order to -thoroughly examine the thesis question,the literature review will present information in fivecategories corresponding with the subordinate questions.

. .re Per- to 3x8 C r e we U.S. AJXQL!S

Field s a historical study by Dr. Boyd L.Dastrup. The study covers the history of the U.S. Army'sfield artillery from 1775 through 1988. The book alsocovers European and Colonial field artillery use prior to

Dr. Dastrup, Fort Sill's current Command Historian,cites the field artillery's change from battery-based toplatoon-based operations in the following excerpt:

the Field Artillery School pursued force structureinitiatives because new weapon, command and control, andtarget acquisition systems were insufficient toreaddress the enemy's numerical and firepowersuperiority and fight the deep battle. Supported by theLegal Mix V Study of 1978, the school sought to improvefirepower, survivability, and man-to-equipment ratio byabandoning the six-gun battery in 155-mm. howitzer and8-inch howitzer battalions for an eight-gun battery.This action, called 3x8 conversion, would give abattalion three, eight-gun batteries rather than three,


24/117

six-gun batteries and expand the number of tubes in abattalion from eighteen to twenty-four. At the sametime the new organization would allow creating two,four-gun platoons in each battery and dividing them intoseparate, semi-independent units to enhancesurvivability.1The Legal Mix V study was conducted by the

Directorate of Combat Developments, Fort Sill and waspublished in a series of five volumes in 1977. The volumeswere originally classified "SECRET" but have since beendeclassified. The study was conducted in 1976-1977 todetermine the future needs of the field artillery in a mid-1980s time frame. One of the issues addressed in the studywas the up-gunning of the artillery in the Army's heavydivisions. The study is significant in that it recommendedan eight-gun battery organization over the then current six-gun battery organization.

The Legal Mix V study considered thirty-six separatemixes of division artillery groupings. Mixes includeddirect support battalions of six and eight guns per batteryand three to five batteries per battalion (i.e., 3x6, 3x8,4x6, 4x8, 5x6, and 5x8). These mixes were run through twoseparate war gaming models against a Soviet threat scenarioin a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) environment.Mixes were evaluated and compared to each other on threecriteria. The criteria used were combat effectiveness, unitcost effectiveness in combat, and cost to maintain the unitover a period of ten years.


25/117

The Legal Mix V study recommended a number of eight-gun battery mixes over six-gun'battery mixes in the modelingresults. The study does not mention or initially make arecommendation on platoon-based versus battery-basedoperations or organizations. At the time of the initialLegal Mix V study, the model used by the Directorate ofCombat Developments did not focus down to platoonresolution.

An earlier study conducted by the Legal Mix V studyteam did analyze platoon-based and battery-based artilleryorganizations to determine which would be a more effectiveorganization. "Artillery Support for the Restructured HeavyDivision, 1981" was a draft study by the Legal Mix V studyteam to determine what battalion organization would servethe artillery best in a 1980s time-frame. The study lookedat five different type mixes. Those mix types are outlinedin figure 3.

No Bns No Btrys No M109Alts Fire FDC'sPer Div l e . r l 3 1 B Units P I ?Mix 1 3 3 6/1 8~ 1 1Mix 2 3 4 8/32 2 1Mix 3* 3 4 8/32 2 2Mix 4 3 4 8/32 1 2Mix 5 3 5 6/30 1 1Figure 3: Legal Mix V Study Team DS Battalion Mixes2


26/117

Mixes one, four, and five are battery-basedorganizations. *Mix three is a 3x8 platoon-basedorganization. Mix two is a hybrid of platoon and battery-based organizations with the unit operating firing platoonsat two separate firing positions but firing the platoonssimultaneously under the control of one fire directioncenter. For the purposes of the thesis, mixes one, three,four, and five are applicable.

The study tested the different organizations usingtwo computer simulations in a NATO environment against aSoviet threat. The organizations occupied using standardand terrain-gun positioning techniques.3 The studyconsidered the effectiveness of the organizations in twobroad areas of cost analysis and survivability analysis.Mix three, the platoon-based organization, performed best inthe area of cost analysis. The cost analysis compared thetargets defeated during a period of time versus unit losses.Figures four through six show results from the legal mixstudy over a 24-hour period.


27/117

UNIQUE TARGETS DEFEATED

Figure 4: Unique Targets Defeated over a 24-hour Period4

COMPANIES DEFEATED24HOUR PERIOD

Figure 5': Number of Companies Defeated over a 24-HourPeriods


28/117

AVAILABLE AT END-OF-- (% )

Figure 6: Percent of Unit Available over a 24-Hour P e r i ~ d . ~

Figure seven shows the results of the legal mixstudy analyzing firing units survivability-. ver a 24-hour ' .period. The threat wargamed was soviet-style counterbatterytactics.


29/117

EXPECTED % SURVIVABIL ITY2PHOUR PERIOD

~ i g u r e Expected Percentage Unit Survivabilty.

The results of this legal mix study were:The best organization, of those alternativesexamined, for the direct support battalion in thereorganized division consists of 3 battalions equippedwith the M109A1 howitzer having 4 batteries perbattalion and 8 guns per battery deployed as two 4-gunfire units each having its own fire direction center.8

This recommendation led to the approval of split batteryoperations. Later the 3x8 battalion would be fielded in theArmy's heavy divisions with three firing batteries perbattalion vice the four firing batteries the study teamrecommended.

mv of R x c ~ ~ tf the1980's A m y by John L. Romjue is a historical study of theArmy's transition from the Reorganization Objective, ArmyDivisions (ROADS) in the 1960s through Division 86 to theArmy of Excellence in the late 19801s.9 The study is of


30/117

interest in that it addresses in depth the issues andleaders involved in changing the Army's division designs inthe mid-70's and 80's. The changes in the Army's divisionsduring this time frame also included the upgunning of thedirect support battalions from eighteen to twenty-fourhowitzers. Romjue cites these changes to the division'sartillery several times in the book, however, he does not gointo any great detail on the conversion from battery-basedto platoon-based operations and its significance.

The February 1989 issue of the Field ArtilleryJ3uma.l addressed the fairly recent concept of 3x8battalions (units began fielding in 1985). Major GeneralHallada, then commandant of the Field Artillery Center,wrote an introductory article titled "3x8: Our ForceMultiplier." He emphasized the importance of 3x8 operationsand what these operations brought to the AirLandbattlefield:

The concept of 3x8 operations emphasizes the fivefundamentals of fire support in the AirLand battle:flexibility, responsiveness, mobility, survivability,and massed fires.1The main benefit that Hallada stressed was that 3x8operations provided the maneuver commander six firing units

instead of three. This doubling of firing units allowed forbenefits in the areas of flexibility, responsiveness,


31/117

mobility, and survivability. Flexibility is obtained byhaving more units to position on the battlefield and to callupon to fire. Responsiveness is increased because moretargets can be serviced by six firing units versus three.

Hallada stated mobility was increased based on twoadvantages to 3x8 operations. One advantage was that sixfiring platoons increased the number of firing units thatwould be in position to fire at any given time. The secondmobility advantage was that the streamlined design of thefiring platoons consisting of "'pure shooters' with noadministrative vehicles slowing the battery's combatmovement"l1 would minimize the time that units weredisplaced from firing positions. Survivability wasincreased in platoon-based operations based on the platoon's"smaller size and the corresponding footprint they portrayto enemy target acquisition and counterfire assets."lz

Massing of fires was improved in 3x8 operations fortwo reasons. The first reason was the increase by thirty-three percent more guns in the 3x8 battalion over the 3x6battalion. The second reason was because of the thenrecently fielded Battery Computer System (BCS) in theplatoon fire direction centers.

As the Chief of the Field Artillery, Hallada'sarticle was important for a number of reasons. First, hisarticle stressed to the field artillery community that 3x8operations were platoon-based operations. Not once in the

25


32/117

article did Hallada mention employing firing units as entirefiring batteries. Second, he saw platoon-based operationsas "a major step towards autonomous firing operations"13 inhis reference to the howitzer improvement program (later theM109A6 Paladin) and the Advanced Field Artillery System(AFAS)

A second professional article in the same issue ofthe Field A r t u e r y J o W s an example of how the fieldartillery was employing 3x8 batteries before OperationDesert Storm. "3x8 Matures for Pathfinder Power" is anaccount of 3x8 operations in the 8th Infantry DivisionArtillery written by the divarty commander, Colonel Pickler,and the division artillery operations officer, Major Gay.The article was written in late 1988, about three yearsafter the division fielded the additional six howitzers inits direct support field artillery battalions. Thisdivision artillery had its full complement of additionalequipment to include two Position/Azimuth Determining System(PADS) vehicles, battery computer system equipped firedirection centers, and the Field Artillery AmmunitionSupport Vehicle (FAASV)

The authors stated that 3x8 operations improved thefield artillery's fire support in three areas: flexibilityand survivability, lethality, and logistics. The reason forthese improvements are seen in the following statement about3x8 operations:

2


33/117

It's important to note that the basic scheme ofField Artillery maneuver doesn't change dramatically;what does change is that 3x8, for the first time, offersus a command and control system that allows us to dowhat we have advertised for years: split-batteryoperations I4

The authors cited many similar survivability andflexibility issues as Hallada. They pointed out thatseventy-five percent of the German towns and villages thatthe division artillery occupied with four-gun platoons wouldnot support a six-gun firing battery. This increase inpotential firing positions increased the battalion operationofficer's (5-3) planning flexibility. Also, occupying theseurban sites increased the survivability of the firingplatoon.

The authors stressed that lethality was increased bythe number of firing units the battalion had in position tofire at any one time. By "leapfrogging" platoons, thebattalions always had at least fifty percent of the firingplatoons (twelve guns) in position to fire. This is incontrast to moving by battery, where you can have eitherthirty-three percent of the guns in position (eight guns) orsixty-seven percent of the guns in position (sixteen guns).

The 8th Infantry Divarty article is significant inthat this unit was conducting its operations just likeHallada's article stated 3x8 units should be operating.Both articles stressed the importance of conducting platoon-based operations and mentioned leapfrogging platoons to keep


34/117

fifty percent of a battalion's firepower in position readyto fire. In the area of lethality, both articles cited thatthe additional firing units provided the maneuver commanderthe ability to engage more enemy units on the battlefield.

"Operations Implications of 3x8 Field ArtilleryBattalionsR by Captain Buzon is a Naval Postgraduate Schoolthesis designed to provide some quantitative analysis onperceived shortfalls in 3x8 operations. The author cited inthe introduction of the thesis that there is a firepowerproblem being observed at the National Training Center withthe 3x8 battalions. The observer/controllers at theNational Training Center not only had not seen anysignificant increase in firepower based on the up-gunning ofthe 3x8 battalions, but they were actually observing "adecrease in the observed effectiveness of artillery duringbattles witnessed at NTC."lS

Possible.causes the author cited for this decreasein artillery firepower under the 3x8 platoon-basedorganization are lack of massing; command and control offires; battery leadership responsibilities; human factorsissues of automated fire control; and Joint MunitionsEffects Manual (JMEM) arguments. The observer/ controllers'primary stated reason for the lack of artilleryeffectiveness was...[the 3x8 units] would have greater effect if,[instead of trying to engaged multiple targets with


35/117

platoon fires], they would just pick one target andshoot the entire battery .... 6In support of these observer/controller contentions, Buzonsought to compare the effects of two platoon firing unitsfiring missions autonomously to those of an eight-gunbattery firing missions as one unit.

The thesis compared the two autonomous four-gunplatoons with the one eight-gun firing battery using theJanus computer simulations model and ten separate scenarios.The results of the ten scenarios showed no significantdifference between the two employment techniques in the areaof firepower. In fact, the author contended that thedifferences between model scenarios and performance are dueto environmental factors surrounding the battle andintangible, unit-oriented factors such as training; unitproficiency; commander's intent; level of execution; commandand control; communlcations; and innumerable otherfactors.17

The thesis concluded t h a t t h e National TralningCenter observation that "eight is better than four" couldnot be substantiated. The author also concludedthatfurther research should be performed in the area of 3x8organizational effectiveness.

U.S. Army Field Manual 6-50, ~ i ~ q u e s .Field ArtiUery.Lzino~n attery is the

field artillery base manual for how cannon firing batteryoperations should be conducted. The manual was updated on

2 9


36/117

20 November 1990 prior to Operation Desert Storm but fiveyears after 3x8 platoon-based organizations began beingfielded in the Army. The update of the manual reflected thechanges in the employment of eight-gun batteries using thefiring platoon employment method. The manual is significantto the thesis in that it states the approved tactics,techniques, and procedures for both a platoon-based andbattery-based field artillery organization.

Chapter One of Dl 6-50 is about the mission,organization, and key personnel of a field artillery cannonbattery. It divides the chapter into distinct sections forcannon batteries in both platoon-based and battery-basedunits. A caveat to how a battery should be employed isprovide on page 1-1 of the manual:

The field artillery cannon battery is the basicfiring element of the cannon battalion regardless of howthe battery is structurally organized. The battery'scapability is enhanced through the flexibility andsurvivability provided under an organization based onplatoons. In no way should the references to platoon-or battery-based organization be construed as the'structure for operational employment. Rather, the termspertain solely to organizational structure.l8On the same page, however, is the following guidance on theemployment of field artillery batteries:

Organizational structure does affect employment. Ina unit organized with a single six-gun battery, thebattery is necessarily employed as a single unit underthe direct control of the battery commander. In aplatoon-based unit, the battery may be employed in oneof the following ways:


37/117

* As two platoons under the control of the batterycommander.* As a single unit, with platoons merged.* As two independent platoons directly controlled by

the battalion S3, through the BC, with the batterycommander providing reconnaissance, selection, andoccupation of position (RSOP) and logistical support.This last employment option is the least desirable. Itis used only when the tactical situation permits noother means of command and control.19Field Manual 6-50 cites numerous examples of unit

actions, both battery and platoon-based, throughout themanual. In examples for occupying a new position, themanual shows a four-gun platoon using terrain gunpositioning; a four-gun platoon using a diamond formation;and a six-gun battery using a star formation. In thechapter covering battery defense, all four visual

. .diagrams/defense sketches depict a four-gun platoon. 'Infact throughout rield Manual 6 5Q there are eight four-gunplatoon examples, three six-gun battery examples, and oneeight-gun battery example. The one example of an eight-gunfiring battery is in the comrnunications chapter.20 Thefigure depicting an eight-gun firing battery shows thecommunications wiring diagram for a platoon-based batteryusing only one battery computer system (i.e. one availablefire direction center instead of the authorized two).

does not cover any tactics,techniques, and procedures for a consolidated eight-gunbattery. Except for the aforementioned example in the


38/117

communications chapter, Field Na u a l 6-5Q does not addressbattery operations in the degraded mode. Field Manual 6 50also does not mention when, if ever, a platoon-based batteryshould be consolidated into a single firing unit. Thisabsence of guidance includes Appendix F Special Operations.The special operations appendix covers artillery operationsin the mountains, jungles, northern (arctic), urban, anddesert environments. The appendix covers differentartillery considerations for the different environments, butdoes not suggest the consolidation of platoons for anyspecific environment or mission.

ture Pertzuuna to 3x8 OuerationsDurina Operations.There are several articles written by former divarty

and battalion commanders concerning 3x8 operations duringOperations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Articles fromthe 1st Infantry Divarty, 1st Cavalry Divarty, 3d ArmoredDivarey, and 24th Infantry Divarty, show that these unitswere conducting battery-based operations for the first timeduring these two operations. Analysis of these articleswill determine the reasons, both similar and different, forwhy these units reverted to battery-based operations.

The "1st Cav Div Arty: Report from Operation DesertShield" article was written by the divarty commander,Colonel Gass. The article was written prior to OperationDesert Storm and published just before the ground war

3


39/117

commenced. Gass stressed theneed to conduct a differentkind of 3x8 operations by operating the firing batteries as"single units instead of platoons"Z1, i.e. battery-basedoperations. Reasons cited for conducting battery-basedoperations were a reduced threat capability to acquirefiring units; command and control issues; simplifiedlogistics; fewer units aid in massing fires; and fewer unitsrequiring survey.

The command and control issues pertained to themovement of the entire battery under the battery commander'scontrol reduced the problems of lost units. Very few mapswere available to the units and those that were availablewere 1:250,000 scale. Fewer firing units eased the problems

. -of mmunition and fuel. distribution. Fewer firing unitsalso reduced the requirements for survey control and,'according to Gass, allowed the' attalions to mass firesbetter than six separate firing platoons could. Byoperating as a larger battery-based firing unit, the batterywas less vulnerable to ground attack and did not run asignificant risk to counterbattery fires from the diminishedIraqi threat.

The "Victory Artillery in Operation Desert Shield"article is an account of how 24th ID Divarty trained inpreparation for Operation Desert Storm. The author, ColonelRolston, was the division artillery commander for the unit.He stated in the article that the change to battery-based


40/117

operations was not because of the situation in Saudi Arabiabut "the result of a number of rotations through theNational Training Center.'Iz2 He stated that at the NationalTraining Center... e went to the extreme tactically. Instead of abattalion of three batteries, each with two platoons, weoperated more like a battalion with six firing"batteries". The platoons were often widely separated -sometimes by 10 kilometers or more. Units moved byplatoons rather than batteries, which exacerbated anyproblems we had.23

By conducting battery-based operations, Rolstoncited the following benefits: command and control;logistics; and massing of fires. He also mentioned thatbattery-based operations compensated for the level oftraining and experience of the platoon leaders within thedivision artillery. Rolston also took into account enemythreat when making the decision to move his batteries in"more or less one huge firing formation."z4

Rolston's article is reinforced by ~ieutenantColonel Florist article, "1-41 FA in Desert Storm: A TestBed for Doctrine and Equipment," about 24th InfantryDivision Artillery's operations during Operation DesertStorm. Floris commanded a direct support artillerybattalion in the 24th Infantry Division during OperationsDesert Shield and Desert Storm. He cited command andcontrol, security, movement, and timely execution of firesas the reasons for using battery-based operations overplatoon-based operations.

34


41/117

The 24th Infantry Division Artillery conductedbattery operations much in the same manner as the 1stCavalry Division Artillery in that "Platoons never traveledmore than 500 meters apart during the conflict and operatedwith one platoon fire direction center.. .. 2 5 The batteriesmoved in the desert wedge which made movement fast andfacilitated in the battalion conduct of hasty occupations.Using this wedge formation, the battalion "routinelyoccupied and was safe to fire in less than eight minuteswhile still meeting the requirements for accurate predictedfires.

"Reflection on the Storm: FA Vector for the Future" isan article written by Lieutenant Colonel Davis about hisbattalion's experiences during Operation Desert Storm andwhere he thinks the field artillery needs to go in the areaof future operations. Davis was a battalion commander lnthe 3d Armored Division Artillery during Operation DesertStorm. Like the 1st Cavalry Division and 24th InfantryDivision, the 3d Armored Division Artillery used battery-based operations over platoon-based operations. "An earlyvictim of the desert war was the 3x8 concept of employingbatteries in distinct plat0ons."2~

Reasons given for converting to battery-basedoperations were that it facilitated mass fires; simplifiedcommand and control; reduced position coordination withbrigade; eased logistical support; and enhanced local

3 5


42/117

security. He also recommended using 4x6 employment for thefuture Paladin system instead of the 3x8 platoon-basedsystem that is planned.

"In the Wake of the Storm: Improving the FA AfterOperation Desert Storm" is an article written by LieutenantColonel Lingamfelter who was serving as the 1st InfantryDivision Artillery executive officer during Operation DesertStorm. This article cited advantages in command and controland massing of artillery fires as the two primary reasonsfor movement by battery instead of platoon. The authorcited that massed artillery fires "(not less than abattery)Ir2e got the best effects as opposed to servicing alot of targets using the platoon-based concept.

In the area of command and control, he argued thatplatoon operations "complicate an already brittle commandand control en ~i ro nm en t. "~ ~he article continued wlth theassertion that movement by battery "works best". Reasonsfor battery movement were that the battlefield was alreadycrowded without individual firing platoons competing forspace. Also, that individual platoons were more vulnerableto bypassed enemy than entire firing batteries; andunexploded ordnance "require careful route reconnaissanceand convoy control by the battery c0mmander."3~


43/117

ture P e r t m a to 3x8 0~eraL.h.n~fter Opera-.-Analysis of the Field Artillery Battalion

Organization Using a Markov Chain" is an unpublished NavalPostgraduate School thesis by Captain Finlon. This thesiscompared the organizational effectiveness of. a 3x8 directsupport battalion (platoon-based) with a 4x6 direct supportbattalion (battery-based). The one discriminator used inthe thesis to compare the two organizations was the numberof weapons available for firing based on the movementpossibilities and potential that each type of unitpossessed. The better unit being the one that had the mosthowitzers in position to fire and the least number ofhowitzers on the move. The author compared the twoorganizations with a "simple" computer model using acontinuous time Markov ~hain.~l

Finlon's introduction of the two differentorganizations listed the "main feature of the 3x8 structureis that it allows the battery to conduct split-batteryoperations."32 The thesis stated that there were severaladvantages the 4x6 organization possessed over the 3x8organization to include additional flexibility. The authoranticipated the 4x6 structure to perform better than the 3x8structure in the computer model.

The model compared the two organizations ability toprovide fire support based on total number of howitzers in


44/117

position ready to fire. To keep the model simple, onlyhowitzers that were moving were not available for firing andno other possibilities such as maintenance failures orcombat losses were considered. The author ran his modelthrough eight scenarios--movement to contact, deliberateattack, exploitation, defense of the Main Battle Area (MBA),delay, reinforcing a movement to contact, reinforcing anexploitation, night movement to contact, and nightexploitation.

EXPECTATION OF GUNS IN POSITION

M TC D A T K EXP MBA DELAY R.MTC R.EXP NMTC N.EXPSCENARIO4x6 I %

Figure 8: The Long-Run Expectation of Guns in P ~ s i t i o n ~ ~

The 4x6 battalion performed better than the 3x8battalion in six of the eight scenarios. The twoorganizations are equal in effectiveness in the delay

38


45/117

mission; and the 3x8 battalion performed better than the 4x6in the night exploitation. The author concluded that basedon the criteria of howitzers available to fire that the 4x6organization is superior to the 3x8 organization.

One glaring error in the model was the potentialmovement scenarios the author allowed for the two types oforganizations. For the 3x8 battalion, the study allowed forthe unit to move by platoon or battery. This standard isrealistic since moving by elements smaller than platoon-sizeis fairly rare in training and in combat. This allowed inthe 3x8 model seven probabilities for howitzers in position(0,4,8,12,16,20, and 24 howitzers) The author allowed the4x6 battalion to move by battery or by platoon. This"platoon of guns" would be a two-gun subset of the battery.This allowed in the 4x6 model thirteen probabilities forhowitzers in position ( 2 , 4 , 6 , 8 , 10 , 12 , 14 , 16 , 18 , 20 , 22 , and 24howitzers) 3 4

Two problems exist with the movement assumptions madein this thesis. One problem is that the situation of movingtwo guns happens as often as moving the entire battery--itdoes not. A second problem is assuming that the 3x8organization can not perform this same capability.35 Infact, a 3x8 organization has more leadership and wheeledescort vehicles available to support a two-gun movement thanthat of a 4x6 organization.


46/117

ture Pertauung to Filtlye Artill-.Special Text 6-50-60, =tics. T e c h n i g M

Procedures for the M109A6 (Paladud Howitzer Sectlarrcplatoon. Battery. and Battalion is a student text publishedthe U.S. Army Field Artillery School. The manual issignificant to this thesis for two reasons. The firstreason is that it provides the current employment techniquesand capabilities of this next generation direct supporthowitzer. Second, the manual is the primary referencecurrently being used by the Paladin New Equipment TrainingTeam for the fielding of this system. The Paladin howitzeris currently only fielded in one field artillery battalion(2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery), but is scheduled to befielded in a number of the Army's active duty heavydivisions and th e National ~ r a i k n g enter over the nextfive years.

The Paladin howitzer system is the fourth productimprovement to the original MI09 self-propelled howitzer.36The primary advantages the Paladin possesses over theM109A2/A3 are:

1. Extended firing ranges.2. Self-determination of position (casting,northing and altitude).3. Self-determination of directiodazimuth.4. Capability of accepting a fire mission,computing the technical fire control solution, and slewingthe cannon to the proper elevation and defle~tion.~'


47/117

5. Shorter occupation time (75-120 seconds) whichrequire no support from battery personnel and equipment,i.e., platoon leaders, gunnery sergeants, aiming circles.

The Paladin is similar to the M109A2/A3 howitzer in a numberof areas to include:

1. Mobility/rate of march is identical.2. Rates of fire are identical.3. Awnunition storage capacity is nearly identical.4. Both systems are supported by the sameammunition carrier.

1 Text 6 50 60 like Field Ktbnual 6-50 andField Manual 6-20-1, stresses operating the Paladinbattalion in a 3x8 platoon-based ~rgan~zation. hebattalion organization for the Paladin system (TOE 06-365-L)i's virtually identical. to the M109A2/A3 3x8 battalion.currently fielded in the Army's heavy divisions (see Figure- -) 3 8 =ial Text 6 50 '60 mentions two methods ofemploying the Paladin system, by platoon (four guns) or bypairs (two guns under platoon control). The pairedemployment is the preferred method of the two employmentmethods.39 The manual continues to emphasize platoonoperations by mention of platoon position areas of 1000 X2000 meters when planning for positioning of the battalion(by the operations officer) and the battery (by the batterycommander). Within these platoon position areas the Paladinplatoon will conduct it own survivability moves underplatoon control.


48/117

Professional articles and Army manuals stressed the3x8 platoon based organization offered the advantage ofkeeping fifty percent of a unit's firepower in place byleapfrogging platoons behind maneuver elements. S g e d a lText. 6 50 6Q- states that this technique is no longernecessary.

the DS battalion does not necessarily have to "leapfrog"batteries or platoons in order to keep a firingcapability with the maneuver element. Platoons can movealong, keeping pace with their supported unit and stillbe able to provide near instantaneous field artillerysupport. Oerv Studv LI- --TOFCAS is a study on the Paladin and AFAS systems

conducted for the Department of the Army by MilitaryProfessional Resources, Inc. The TOFCAS-I1 study analyzedresults from the Paladin's Follow-On Operational Test andEvaluation (FOTE) and made recommendations for theemployment of the Paladin system as well as the futureAdvanced Field Artillery System and currently fieldedM109A2/A3 howitzer system.

The TOFCAS-I1 study team's focus was to use thePaladin FOTE as a vehicle to examine the seven basictasks a field artillery battalion must perform tosupport a maneuver force in relation to the TRADOCdomain of ~octr lne, raining, Leader Development,Organizations, Material and Soldier Performance and incontext of the-organizational lements ranging fromindividual through battalion level.41The Follow-On Operational Test and Evaluation of the

Paladin system was conducted at Fort Sill using a four-gun


49/117

platoon in November 1992. The platoon conducted theevaluation using tactics, techniques, and proceduresoutlined in ST 6 50 60 After an initial twelve-week train-UP the platoon conducted five live-fire field exercisesbased around a replicated threat environment founded onEuropean Scenario Oriented Recurring Evaluation System(SCORES V) Scenario and Test Threat Support P a ~ k a g e . ~ ~During the FOTE train-up and evaluation, the Paladin platoonfired over 25,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition. The Follow-OnOperational Test and valuation is the primary evidence usedby the TOFCAS-I1 study team in conducting their analysis andmaking their recommendations. The study team used the FOTEresults and compared these results to existing fieldartillery doctrinal manuals and.&ccial Text 6 50 6Q.Although the TOFCAS-I1 study made numerous recommendationson the Paladin, Advanced Field Artillery System, andM109A2/A3 systems, the most significant recommendations forthe purpose of this thesis were in the areas o forganizational design, doctrine, massing of fires, andleadership development.

In the area of field artillery doctrine, the studyconcluded that no significant changes need to be made to thecurrent existing field artillery doctrinal manuals due tothe new Paladin system and its capabilities. The study alsocommended the - Text 6 50 6Q as an. "excellent" initialeffort and recommended it as the base manual for the new

4


50/117

Paladin units to use in the field. The study recommendedthat the - Text 6 50 60 be updated based on unitexperiences and recommendations from 2d Battalion, 17thField Artillery generated by the unit's continued field useof the system and rotations to the National Training Center.

The field artillery organization recommended by theArmy during the Follow-On Organizational Test and Evaluationwas the platoon-based system found in the 3x8 battalion.The TOFCAS-I1 study mentioned that "the Army examined ingreat detail this basic firing element - the platoon"43 and"results of the FOTE confirmed that this organization couldfunction as intended and provide the necessary firesupport ... The TOFCAS-I1 study did examine the 3x6 and4x6 battery-based battalion organizations as possiblealternative organizations. The study concluded that both ofthese organizations could be used for employing the Paladinsystem but had drawbacks when compared with the 3x8 platoon-based organization. The 3x6 battalion could offer savlngsin personnel and equipment cost but would have significantlyless firepower and flexibility when compared to the 3x8battalion. The 4x6 battalion organization has the samefirepower potential as the 3x8 battalion but would havehigher operating overhead costs associated with anadditional battery organization and less flexibility thanthe 3x8 battalion organization. The TOFCAS-I1 studyconcluded that the 3x8 Table of Organization and Equipment

44


51/117

outlined in S l s e c ~ e x t 50 60- was the correct and bestorganization for the Paladin system.

The Paladin offers increased opportunities formassed fires based on increased ranges and mission responsetimes from the move the Paladin possesses over theM109A2/A3. The increased range of the Paladin allows for agreater common area for all firing elements within thebattalion to fire on. The ability to stop and fire within75-120 seconds of mission receipt allows for a battalion tomass all firing units if desired. The Paladin possesses thesame rates of fire as the M109A2/A3 and does not possess anyspecial program to ensure simultaneous or near simultaneousarrival of field artillery munitions on a target area. Thesimultaneous or near simultaneous arrival of munitions on atarget area is a critical component of terminal effects.The initial volley of artillery fire is more effective thanthe subsequent volleys due to the change in the target'sdisposition between volleys. An example of a change intarget disposition would be troops standing during theinitial volley then improving their disposition by moving tothe prone position and seeking cover before subsequentvolleys impacted. A battalion firing one volley (24 rounds)is more effective than a platoon firing six volleys (24rounds). This is true for the Paladin system as well as theM109A2/A3 howitzer.


52/117

The TOFCAS-I1 study also made recommendations on thefuture Advanced Field Artillery System in the areas ofsystem capabilities and integration of the Advanced FieldArtillery System into the Army. Just as the Paladinhowitzer system represented an evolutionary change over theM109A2/A3 howitzer; the TOFCAS-I1 study team recommendedthat the Advanced Field Artillery System must be arevolutionary change in capabilities over the Paladinsystem. To be an evolutionary change in artillerycapabilities, the Advanced Field Artillery System must becapable of:

1. Knowing precisely where it is relative toeveryone else on the battlefield.2. ,Knowing precisely.where it is pointing.3. Talking to other systems on the battlefield.4. Shooting in near-real time and further withprecision.5. Loading itself based on mission requirements.Even with the above listed changes, the TOFCAS-I1

study team suggested that the Advance Field Artillery Systemcould be employed using the same battalion organizationaldesign and tactics, techniques, and procedures outlined inST 6-50-60 for the Paladin howitzer system. The main reasonfor keeping a standard organizational design for the Paladinand Advanced Field Artillery System can be seen in figurenine.


53/117

n n n

YEARAFAS I 109A6M109A5 0 lOSAu3

Figure 9: Field Artillery 155mm Howitzer Laydown45

Over the next sixteen years, the field artillerywill have two and then three significantly differenthowitzer systems in direct support of the-Army's eavydivisions. Assuming that theArmy will continue with itspersonnel management system of rotating officers andnoncommissioned officers every two to three years, the Armywould have a very significant training problem if theorganizational designs of these units were not similar.

The f DO~UIEI&SAdvanced F l e l d e r v ystem (

red R e s u ~ ~ l vehlcle ( FARV) is a Department of47


54/117

the Army memorandum dated 14 June 1993 from the Commandant,U.S. Army Field Artillery School to the Commander, U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command. This forty-three pagememorandum states the desired operational requirements forthe Advanced Field Artillery System and its primary supplyvehicle. The document is significant to 'this thesis in thatit will be used in establishing the projected capabilitiesof the ~ dva nce ield Artillery System. The Advanced FieldArtillery System is currently a fully-funded project withhowitzers to be fielded into units starting in2005.

Besides listing the operational requirements for theAdvanced Field Artillery System', the memorandum alsojustified these requirements in Annex A; establishes theoperational mode summary/.mission profile in-Annex ; andstates training support requirements in Annex E.Significant increases in the capabilities of the AdvancedField Artillery System over the paladin and M109A2/A3howitzer systems will exist once.the Advanced FieldArtillery Systems is fielded based on the requestedcapabilities. Table' One lists some of the increasedcapabilities the Advanced Field Artillery System isprojected to have.


55/117

Table 1Advanced Field Artillery System Projected Capabilities.

Advanced Field Artillem System Capabllltles. .Maximum Range (unassisted)Maximum Range (assisted)Max Rate of Fire:

Sustained Rate of Fire:Simultaneous Impact Mission Capability:

Sustained Highway Speed:Sustained Cross-country Speed:Crew:

40 kilometers50 kilometers10-12 rounds perminute for thefirst 3-5minutes3-6 rounds perminute4-8 rounds allimpactingwithin 4 seconds40-48 MPH23-29 MPH3 wersonnelOn-the-move Fire Mission Response Time': 30145 secondsIn-position Fire Mission Response Time: 15-20 seconds

The Advanced Field Artillery S y s L a n ~. .cle F1rm.g Batterv.Platoon.es. and Proce- (for

purposes of this thesis and brevity will be referred to asthe m- is a Department of the Army contractedstudy on the future employment of the Advanced FieldArtillery System. The m i t e completed 30 July1993, is significant to this thesis in two areas. The firstarea is in the capabilities of the Advanced Fleld ArtillerySystem and best methods in employing its advancements. Thesecond area is the increase in duty requirements andresponsibilities to be placed on platoon leaders, platoonsergeants, platoon gunnery sergeants, and howitzer section


56/117

chiefsbecause of the new technological advances in theAdvanced Field Artillery System and the decentralized.operations the BEBS- suggested are necessary.

The =,White P a p s listed four possible battalionorganizations for the Advanced Field Artillery Battalion.These organizations are similar to the battery and platoon-based organizations that already exist in the fieldartillery today. The suggested organizations are a 3x8battalion with two four-gun platoons in three firingbatteries, a 3x6 battalion with three six-gun batteries, a4x6 battalion with four six-gun batteries, and a 3x4battalion with three four-gun batteries. The

states that no matter which of the four battalionorganizations adopted by the Gmy,'the employment of t h efield artillery battery will be the same at the batterylevel or below.

At the battery level, the BFAS White Paperrecommended that the Advanced Field ~ r t i l l k r ~ystem beemployed in pairs or as autonomous howitzers. The paperstated that this decision should be made based on elementsof METT-T (specifically Mission, Enemy, and Training).consolidation of the howitzers to a four-gun platoon/batteryor a six-gun battery should be performed when an extremelyhigh ground threat exists or when equipment failures withthe platoon operations center or a number of Advance Filed


57/117

Artillery System howitzers exist (i.e., three or morehowitzers' computers are i n ~ p e r a b l e ~ ~ )

Command and controlof platoon operations willrequire more from the platoon leadership than in previousplatoon or batter-based operations. Two examples of theincreased Advanced Field Artillery System capabilities andthe effect on command and control are:

The advanced capabilities of the AFAS~FARV llow amore decentralized execution than is feaslble withcurrent howitzer systems; this ability should be takenadvantage of whenever possible. Employment andemplacement considerations should not be confused withhow units are best to engage the enemy. Units could beunder decentralized control for positioning but undervery centralized control for engagement of the enemybased on the commander's intent, attack guidance andvision of how best to fight.47

and,Platoon leaders and sergeants will be faced withsimilar problems to those of the battery commander.They will not only have to know about technical and

tactical fire control, they will also have to befamiliar with logistical resupply procedures,maintenance, messing, medical and survey operations toname just a few areas of additional areas of interest.Coordination with adjacent units at platoon level willbecome the normal rather than the exception. Planningfor and conducting rearm, refit, and refuel operationswill become a full time job for the platoon leader. Theplatoon sergeant will assist in the planning but willhave to ensure these operation are executedflawle~sly.~8Platoon duties that will be more difficult to perform or areunique to an Advanced Field Artillery System platoon becauseof its decentralized control are: logistics to includefood, fuel, ammunition, and liquid propellent resupply;

5


58/117

terrain management; platoon mutual supporting fires; platoondefense; casualty collection; communications systemscontrol; and degraded operations pladstanding operationsprocedures.

The technical fire control of the Advanced FieldArtillery System and its regard to massing also have animpact on this thesis. "The preferred method of engagementfor the AFAS will be MRSI.. .. 4 9 The MRSI (multiple roundssimultaneous impact) capability in the Advanced FieldArtillery System is the unique capability of one howitzer toplace four to six rounds on a target simultaneously as, ineffect, a one-gun time-on-target. This capability is due tothe system's use of liquid propellent, rapid loading rates,'and on-board technical fire control. Because of laws ofphysics, this capability exists at ranges between six andforty kilometers and will be available on the Advanced FreldArtillery System between eight and thirty-six kilometer^.^^This capability allows for a platoon to achieve the samemassing effects of two batteries up to a battalion. TheBEBS White P w uggests that when a battalion receives afire mission, the battalion fire direction center shoulddetermine the number of rounds to be fired to produce thedesired effects and then transmit the fire mission to theminimum number of platoons required based on the MRSIcapability. This procedure will, in turn, allow for theexposure of fewer howitzers to enemy counterfire assets;

5 2


59/117

and, also allow the battalion to mass on multiple targetswith the effects of multiple battalions if necessary.


60/117

EndnoteslBoyd L. Dastrup, K i n g o f Historyof the U.S. Army's F d d r w Fort Monroe, VA: Officeof the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and AnalysisCommand, 1992), 310.2U.S . Army, A r t i l l - l h e estructured

H m , 981. . . (Fort Sill, OK: Department of theArmy, 10 November 1976) .1.3Terrain gun positioning is a method of positioninghowitzers by dispersing them over a large area andmaximizing the natural cover and concealment offered by thelocal terrain. Terrain gun positioning is used extensivelywhen enemy counterfire or air attack threat is likely.

Restructured Heavy

sIbid., 5.9John L. Romjue, The of Exc-e 1980s Army. (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), 24-26.loMajor General Raphael J. Hallada, "3x8: Our ForceMultiplier," ELeld Artillery Journal (February 1989), 1.

14Colonel John M. Pickler and Major Mark P. Gay,"3x8 Matures for Pathfinder Power," F i e l d e r y ou-(February 1989) 24.

15Captain C. Craig Buzon, "Operations Implicationsof 3x8 Field Artillery Battalions" (Thesis, NavalPostgraduate School, 1990)', 2.


61/117

-8U.S. Army, F i e l d q u e s ,. .and Washington,D.C.: Department of the Army, August 1992), 1-1.

zlColone1, ames M. Gass, "1st Cav Div Arty: Reportfrom Operation Desert Shield,"Field-(February 1991) 26.

22Colonel David A. Rolston, "Victory Artillery inOperation Desert Shield," W d rtillery Journal (April1991) 23.

25Lieutenant Colonel John A. Floris, "1-41 FA inDesert Storm: A Test Bed for Doctrine and Equipment," E i d derv J o W April 1992) 41.

z7Lieutenant Colonel M. Thomas Davis, "Reflection onthe Storm: FA Vector for the Future, Field & S i l h z yJournal (August 1993): 46.

28Lieutenant Colonel L. Scott Lingamfelter, "In theWake of the Storm: Improving the FA After Operation DesertStorm," F i e l d e r ? J o W August 1991) 27.

3lCaptain Matthew A. Finlon, "Analysis of the FieldArtillery Battalion Organization Using a Markov Chain"(Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1991), 12.


62/117

35Infiltration is a movement technique of moving byanything less than the entire firing battery or firingplatoon. The method of moving by infiltration is listed inField Manual 6-50 for both a platoon-based and battery-basedorganization. Field Manual 6-50 specifically states "When aplatoon moves by infiltration, vehicles are dispatchedindividually or in small groups without reference to a marchtable." Captain Finlon is incorrect to allow only battery-based units to move in two-gun subsets when the option isjust as applicable to platoon-based units.- -6U.S. Army, S T 6 u e s T e c h n i q u e s , ndHowitzer Section,on. Ratterv. and Battalion (Fort Sill, OK: UnitedStates Army Field Artillery School, June 19931, 1-2.

. .41Military Professional Resources, Inc., Transltronof F Studv - (TOFCAS 11)(Alexandria, VA: Military Professional Resources, Inc.,September l993), 1.

46Tec-Masters, Inc., and Advanced SystemsTechnology, Inc., Admnced Field Artillery System a d u t u- Batter~~Platoon.nd. d P r o c e W(Alexandria, VA: Tec-Masters, Inc., July, 19931, 32.


63/117

5oU.S. Army, M e m o r a n d u m a 1 raftts IORD) for the Advancedcle (m Fort Sill, OK: Department of the Army, 14June l993), A-6.


64/117

CHAPTER THREERESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology in this thesis follows thefive elements of critical thinking. These five elements areobserving, questioning, investigating, analyzing, andsynthesizing.1

QklservingFor the author, the observing of different artillery

organizations and the effectiveness of these organizations. . began in 1986.when the battalion I was assigned to converted

from a 3x6 battery-based organization to a 3x8 platoon-basedorganization. As a battalion fire direction officer andbattalion maintenance officer, I observed problems in thenew platoon-based operations the battalion was conducting.Specifically, these problems were in the areas of commandand control, officer and noncommissioned officerresponsibilities, and fire direction.

The next 'time I made significant observations about3x8 operations was in 1990 while serving as a firing batterycommander. During Operation Desert Shield, the battalion Iwas serving in, and later the entire 1st Cavalry Division


65/117

Artillery, converted its operations from platoon-based to anad hoc battery-based operation. Reasons for this conversionare covered in Chapter Two. At that time, I considered thisbattery-based method a temporary solution for the short-termsituation we faced. This solution also exposed me to thefact that the field artillery had no tactics, techniques,and procedures for the consolidation of two complete four-gun firing platoons. Problems I observed while in commandincluded the management of battery leadership (i.e., twoeach of platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, gunnerysergeants, and fire direction officers/centers at the samefiring point), fire direction center span of command andcontrol over eight guns, and gunnery issues.

. . . The last significant observation about artilleryorganizations I made was as a gunnery instructor at the U.S.Army Field Artillery School. In November 1992, I wasassigned the task of streamlining artillery occupationprocedures. This tasking was initiated by Major GeneralMarty, then commander of the Field Artillery School andCenter, based on the poor occupation times by fieldartillery units at the National Training Center. Whileworking on this problem with observer controllers at theNational Training Center, I discovered that almost none ofthe units were conducting platoon-based operations duringtheir rotations. In fact, units were conducting variationsof the "desert wedge" they used in the Persian Gulf (1st


66/117

Cavalry, 24th Infantry, and 1st Infantry Divisions). Thetwo divisions (4th Infantry and 5th Infantry Divisions) thatwere not deployed to the Persian Gulf were also conductingbattery-based operations based on experiments conducted athome station and numerous articles on the successes of thedesert wedge.

The significance of these observations is that avast majority of units were using somewhat similar battery-based operations but techniques varied from division todivision based on Operation Desert Storm experiences andperceived home station successes. Because Pield -50

cs. Technlaues.TProcedurese Fheeld A r uw n attery does not specifically address procedures forthis type of organization, units freely experimented withemployment techniques, especially in the areas of batterycommand and control and fire direction center operations.The problem of creating better occupation procedures wasfrustrating when units were conducting non-standardoperations and the organization being used is not currentlyrecognized by the field artillery mission training plans(MTPs)

These three periods of observations led to myquestioning of field artillery organizations and,specifically, the battery-based versus platoon-based


67/117

organizations. This thesis looks at the current fieldartillery organizations, both battery-based and platoon-based, and compares them to the capabilities and needs ofthe field artillery of the future. Specifically, whichorganization supports the field artillery's futurecapabilities in the areas of advanced weapon systems,gunnery techniques, and ammunition capabilities.

LnvesticratinaInvestigation will be conducted primarily by .

reviewing literature and studies conducted on artilleryorganizations. Also, I will conduct interviews with subjectmatter experts stationed at Fort Sill, the National Training

. Center, and Fort Leavenworth. Results of the investigationare contained in the 'review of the literature and %naiysischapters. The evidence gathered through investigation willbe categorized primarilyby the seven subordinate thesisquestions outlined in chapter one. These seven subordinatequestions are designed to focus the gathering of evidenceand analysis methods in a sequential nature.

Analysis of the evidence will be conducted inchapter four. The analysis will be a combination ofanalyzing tactics, techniques, and procedures; historicalexamples of unit organizations; and future artillery systemsand requirements. This "common type" MMAS thesis2 of

6


68/117

analyzing historical doctrinal procedures and developingsuggested future doctrinal methods lends itself primarily toa qualitative approach in the analysis of the evidence.Some of the evidence gathered is quantitative in nature andwill require quantitative analysis.

Based on the analysis of the gathered evidence, Iwill have to pass judgment (approval or disapproval) onoccurrences by analyzing facts and inferences gathered. Allevidence will be analyzed based on its relevance to thesubordinate questions and the credibility of the sourcebefore judgment can be passed. The final product of theanalysis will be answering the thesis' subordinatequestions.

Synthesis of the research question will consist ofproducing conclusions and recommendations for current andfuture artillery organizations. These conclusions andrecommendations will be contained in chapter five.


69/117

EndnoteslDr. Bruce Menning, guest lecturer MMAS program,from a lecture conducted on 22 October 1993 titled"Scholarly Perspectives."


70/117

CHAPTER FOURANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes information relevant to thethesis question, subordinate thesis questions, and issuespertaining to 3x8 operations. This chapter is divided intoseven sections corresponding to the seven subordinate thesisquestions.

y f l e l d e r v eorgauze its dlre&s~gport attaLlons to the 3x8 platoon based operation?

The primary reason for the change in the artilleryorganization in the mid-1980's was the overall need for amore powerful division organization recognized by the Army'ssenior leaders in the early 1970's. The Army during thisperiod was facing the bi-polar threat of the Soviet Unionand its Warsaw Pact allies. To fight outnumbered and win,Army leadership recognized the need for a new doctrine andalso a more combat effective division structure. TheDivision 86 and later the Army of Excellence programs. wereresponsible for the restructuring of the Army's heavydivisions from Reorganization Objective, Army Divisions(ROADS) to their present day configurations. The


71/117

restructuring of the division artillery was a part of thisoverall effort.

Just as the Army was restructuring to combat theenormous Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, the Field ArtillerySchool was developing division and corps artillery groupingsto combat the massive Soviet artillery threat. Along withhaving numerical superiority over U.S. artillery, theSoviets were also taking steps to make their artillery moretechnically proficient. Soviet counterbattery radars alongwith the already present sound-flash platoons were beingincorporated into their target acquisition capabilities.Improvements in Soviet gunnery techniques, to includelimited automation, were being made. Finally, more Sovietself-propelled artillery (models 2S1 and 2S3), designed muchlike the U.S. MI09 series, were being fielded in theirregimental and divisional artillery groupings.1 It wasagainst this threat that the U.S. Army Field ArtillerySchool developed its current division artillery for a heavydivision.

The Field Artillery School, through the Directorateof Combat Developments, conducted a number of legal mixstudies designed at improving and developing artilleryweapons, ammunition, and organizational design. The LegalMix V study team recommended a battalion structure of fourbatteries with eight howitzers per battery as the optimumstructure for the cannon artillery in the Army's heavy

65


72/117

division. The study further recommended the eight-gunbattery be divided into two four-gun firing platoons with afire direction center in each platoon controlling theplatoon's fires. The overarching concern and drive forhaving separate firing platoons versus one firing batterywas the need for survivability when facing the Sovietcounterbattery, ground, and air threats. Otherconsiderations for platoon operations included its lethalityand mobility.

Two other significant considerations in theselection of 3x8 operations existed. One consideration wasthe desire to structure the field artillery company-grade 'officer positions closer to those of the Armor and Infantry.branches in the area of platopn 1eaders;Z Both armor and 'infantry companies have three platoon leader positions andone executive officer per company. These jobs areconsidered essential in a combat arms officer's careerprogression. The field artillery in a battery-basedorganization has only two lieutenant positions - batteryexecutive officer and battery fire direction officer. Withplatoon-based operations, the number of lieutenants in abattery doubles with two platoon leaders and two firedirection officers. This brings the number of officers in abattery to an equal number when compared to an armor orinfantry company and also a similar duty description in theform of platoon leader.

66


73/117

A second consideration was the battery computersystem and its criteria for selecting howitzer aimpoints.The default aimpoint selection standard for the batterycomputer system is a circular sheaf with aimpointspositioned along a fifty meter circle around the target gridlocation. The aimpoints are spaced equidistant around thecircle. No matter how many howitzers are in the firingunit, the circle does not increase in size, just the numberof aimpoints increase (see figure 10). This in effect makesfor diminishing returns with each additional howitzer afterfour aim point^.^

GT Line -. GT Line

Four Aimpoints50-meter Radius

Eight Aimpoints50-meter Radius

Figure 10: Battery Computer System Default Sheaf4


74/117

The final decision to go with three batteries versusfour was in keeping with the size restraints for thedivision artillery and the constraints placed on the armoredand mechanized infantry divisions them~elves.~ o aid inthe employment of 3x8 platoon-based operations were threeessential items of new equipment to be fielded during thistime period. The Position/Azimuth Determining System (PADS)would be fielded with two systems per battalion to providefaster and more accurate survey to the firing units. Thebattery computer system (BCS) would be fielded one perplatoon fire direction center and would enable platoons todigitally communicate with the battalion fire directioncenter and for increased survivability by allowing a platoonto occupy a large area and use terrain gun positioningtechniques on a routine basis. The third item was theAdvanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). TheAdvanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System was deslgnedto replace the aging Tactical Fire Direction System(TACFIRE) in the battalion fire direction center. Thiswould give the battalion a responsive fire directioncomputer capable of performing tactical and technical firedirection and ease the increased command and controlrequirements that 3x8 platoon-based operations creates forthe battalion. The TACFIRE system was identified as needingto be replaced as early as 1980 during the Fire SupportMission Area Analysis.6 The Advanced Field Artillery

6

7/29/2019 3x8 Artillery Tactics

3x8 Artillery Tactics Befor During and After Desert Storm

Documents

Transcript of 3x8 Artillery Tactics Befor During and After Desert Storm