SECOND DIVISION

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIANG.R. No. 152640REFORM, rep. by SECRETARYHERNANI A. BRAGANZA,Present:Petitioner,PUNO,J., Chairperson,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,-versus -CORONA,AZCUNA, andGARCIA, JJ.

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONSPromulgated:SATELLITE CORP.,Respondent.June 15, 2006

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xDECISIONAZCUNA,J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) seeking the nullification of the Decision and Resolution, datedNovember 23, 2001andMarch 7, 2002, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57435, entitled Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) v. DAR.The controversy involves a parcel of land owned by respondent PHILCOMSAT situated within the area which had been declared a security zone under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, entitled Declaring the Area within a Radius of Three Kilometers surrounding the Satellite Earth Station in Baras, Rizal, a Security Zone.The facts of the case are as follows:PHILCOMSAT is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, where its Philippine Space Communications Center (PSCC) is located. The PSCC, which principally consists of herein respondents satellite earth station, serves as the communications gateway of thePhilippinesto more than two-thirds of the world. Incidentally, the property had been planted with fruit trees, rice and corn by farmers occupying the surrounding areas of the PSCC.OnApril 30, 1982, P.D. No. 1845 was promulgated.This decree was amended onJuly 29, 1982by P.D. No. 1848, Section 1 of which states:Section 1.Declaration of Security Zone. The entire area surrounding the satellite earth station in Sitio San Miguel, Barrio Pinugay,MunicipalityofBaras,ProvinceofRizal,IslandofLuzon, within a radius of three kilometers, more or less, from the main satellite earth station, the metes and bounds of such area to be determined by the Minister of National Defense, is hereby declared a security zone. For this purpose, and in the interest of national security, ingress to and egress from the security zone as well as occupancy of portions thereof shall be controlled and regulated, without prejudice to the payments of just compensation to persons whose rights of ownership may be injuriously affected thereby x x x.The three-kilometer security zone covers an area of 5,654 hectares, which includes the 700 hectares owned by PHILCOMSAT that is being subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)[1]of the government. Also included within this three-kilometer radius is the 1.5 kilometers radius from the antenna wherein local harmful Radio Frequency Interference resulting from ignition systems, motor starters, high voltage discharges, and the like, is captured and amplified which can hamper telecommunications services.[2]Pursuant to the decree, the Ministry of National Defense promulgated theRevised Rules and Regulations to Implement P.D. No. 1845 dated30 April 1982, as amended, Declaring the Philippine Earth Station (PES) Security Zone. In view of this, the metes and bounds of PHILCOMSATs satellite earth station in Baras, Rizal, were delineated.In 1992, a Notice of Coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by petitioner DAR informing the former that the land in question shall be placed under CARPs compulsory acquisition scheme.OnJanuary 28, 1994, PHILCOMSAT wrote to DAR seeking an exemption of the subject property from CARP coverage, insisting that the land will be utilized for the expansion of its operations, and for the following reasons:[3]1)The land is being used for national defense in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 which provides:Section 10.Exemptions and Exclusions. -- Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense x x x,shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.2)The company should be free from harmful Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) to maintain highest service reliability;3)Compliance with the provisions of P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D.1848, stating the vitality of the PSCC in the security system within the purview of national defense; and,4)The development of the area, in response to thePhilippines plan to launch its own national satellite and to address the massive telecommunications build-up in the Asia-Pacific Region.[4]Respondents application for exemption from CARP coverage was evaluated by DAR. During the pendency of the application, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, in a letter datedMarch 21, 1994, suggested that respondent enter into a usufructuary agreement with the occupants of the subject property until such time that it will have to use the property for its planned expansion. The occupants, however, refused to enter into such an agreement.[5]Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanay, Rizal, in its Resolution No. 65-94 that was endorsed to DAR, moved for the coverage of the 700-hectare PHILCOMSAT property within the security zone under CARP. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Teresa, Rizal further opined that subjecting the surrounding agricultural area within the security zone under CARP will not be detrimental to the operations of PHILCOMSAT.[6]OnMay 25, 1998, an Order was issued by then Secretary Garilao rejecting PHILCOMSATs application for exemption from CARP, citing three main reasons:1)The occupants in the area can be considered asbona fidetenants of the registered owner before PHILCOMSAT acquired the same for its projected expansion of operations as they have been tilling said area for several years;2)Said occupants had been identified by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) as potential CARP beneficiaries when the land was placed under the compulsory acquisition scheme; and,3)The term security zone is not embraced within the definition of lands used for national defense under Section 10 of R. A. No. 6657.[7]Its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied, PHILCOMSAT filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.Granting said petition, the Court of Appeals held:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order dated 25 May 1998 issued by respondent Department of Agrarian Reform as well as the Resolution dated 31 January 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said Order are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered, declaring the subject landholdings of petitioner situated at Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, exempted from the CARP coverage, considering that it was declared a security zone under P.D. [No.] 1845, as revised by P.D. [No.] 1848.SO ORDERED.[8]A motion for reconsideration of the above decision was filed by DAR but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution, datedMarch 7, 2002.[9]Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT R.A. NO. 6657 (COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988) AND P.D. NO. 1848, WHICH DECLARED THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING AS A SECURITY ZONE, CANNOT, IN EFFECT, CO-EXIST WITH EACH OTHER;IITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE STATUTORY RULEGENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT; AND,IIITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS EXEMPT FROM THE COVERAGE OF CARP.Thus, the main issue in this case is whether or not the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a security zone under P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, can be subjected to CARP.P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, was issued way before the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The same was issued in 1982 pursuant to an exigency to create a security zone in the surrounding areas of PHILCOMSATs satellite earth station in order to ensure its security and uninterrupted operation considering the vital role of the earth station in the countrys telecommunications and national development. Thus, P.D. No. 1845 provides:WHEREAS, the only earth station in thePhilippinesfor world satellite telecommunications is located in a remote and sparsely populated place in sitio San Miguel, Barrio Pinugay,MunicipalityofBaras,ProvinceofRizal;WHEREAS, the said earth station is vital to the existence and maintenance of satellite telecommunications between the Philippines and most countries of the world and plays an invaluable role in the sustenance and development of our political, economic, commercial, and social life;WHEREAS, in view of its location, it would be easy for saboteurs or criminal elements to destroy or cause damage to the said earth station thereby paralyzing the system and curtailing momentous public service; andWHEREAS, to protect and insure the safety and uninterrupted operation of this modern media of international communications, it is necessary to establish a security zone all around the said earth station.P.D. No. 1848, amending P.D. No. 1845, subjected the security zone to the authority of the Ministry of National Defense, consequently conferring on the Minister of National Defense the power and authority to determine who can occupy the areas within the security zone, and how the lands shall be utilized, to wit:SEC. 3. --Occupation by Owner. Owners of land within the security zone and/or their bona fide tenants, lessees, or agents can occupy or continue to occupy their respective lands or areas therein subject to prior written permission or authority of the Minister of National Defense.SEC 4. --In cases where an owner or a bona fide occupant is, in the determination of the Minister of National Defense, not entitled to an occupancy permit, he shall have the option of demanding payment of just compensation for his property rights, or to sell such rights to any person qualified to own or occupy such property.SEC. 5. -- The Armed Forces of thePhilippinesmay, thru negotiation or expropriation, acquire ownership of any land or area located or situated within the zone.The law, in effect, by declaring the area a security zone, has granted to the Ministry of National Defense the control and administration of the same. As a rule, where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred.[10]Upon the passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which became effective onJuly 15, 1988, all public and private agricultural lands,[11]and other lands of public domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, were declared subject to its coverage.[12]The area in question which is included within the security zone is agricultural.It has been planted with different crops and fruit trees by its occupants, and has been found by DAR to be suitable for agriculture.The area, however, should be exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of P.D. No. 1845, as amended, which, as stated earlier, declared the area to be a security zone under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense.It is evident from the very wording of the law that the government recognized the crucial role of PHILCOMSATs operations to national security, thereby necessitating the protection of its operations from unnecessary and even anticipated disruption. Thus, every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.[13]In this regard, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals when it stated that:The subject property is clearly within the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, in accordance with Chapter II, section 4(d) thereof, had it not been decreed by P.D. No. 1845 that it is a security zone. The very purpose by which P.D. No. 1845 was passed declaring the area within a radius of three kilometers surrounding the satellite earth station in Baras, Rizal a security zone is to protect and insure the safety and uninterrupted operation of the modern media of international communications in the said property, as indicated in the whereas clause of said law. Thus, to subject said security zone to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government would negate the very purpose by which P.D. 1845, as revised by P.D. 1848, was decreed. These laws have never been repealed.P.D. 1848 is also specific in that occupation of the area, either by the owners or their bona fide tenants, require a prior written permission or authority from the Ministry of the National Defense, now Department of National Defense. It is therefore the Department of National Defense which will determine [x x x] who can occupy the subject property, and not the Department of Agrarian Reform. To subject the property in question to agrarian reform is indirectly giving the Department of Agrarian Reform authority to determine [x x x] who can occupy the property, in violation of the mandate of P.D. 1848.We find it not necessary to determine whether or not the subject property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for national defense, to be exempted from the coverage of R.A. 6657. The law which decreed the areas a security zone is very clear in its purpose. It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specifically designed for the said case must prevail over the other (Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 738).[14]Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A. No. 6657,[15]as amended, provides that lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act. The determination as to whether or not the subject property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for national defense usually entails a finding of fact which this Court will not normally delve into considering that, subject to certain exceptions, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is called upon to review only errors of law.[16]Suffice it to state, however, that as a matter of principle, it cannot seriously be denied that the act of securing a vital communication facilities is an act of national defense.Hence, the law, by segregating an area for purposes of a security zone for such facilities, in effect devoted that area to national defense.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57435, dated

November 23, 2001andMarch 7, 2002, respectively, are herebyAFFIRMED.No costs.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

ISLANDERS CARP-FARMERSG.R. No. 159089BENEFICIARIES MULTI-PURPOSECOOPERATIVE, INC.,Present:Petitioner,Panganiban,CJ,Chairman,- versus -Ynares-Santiago,Austria-Martinez,Callejo, Sr., andChico-Nazario,JJLAPANDAY AGRICULTURALAND DEVELOPMENTPromulgated:CORPORATION,Respondent.May 3, 2006x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- x

DECISIONPANGANIBAN,CJ:T

he Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).Included in the definition of agrarian disputes are those arising from other tenurial arrangements beyond the traditional landowner-tenant or lessor-lessee relationship.Expressly, these arrangements are recognized by Republic Act 6657 as essential parts of agrarian reform.Thus, the DARAB has jurisdiction over disputes arising from the instant Joint Production Agreement entered into by the present parties.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for Review[1]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the June 30, 2003 Decision[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 65498.The assailed Decision disposed as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision datedOctober 18, 1999dismissing the complaint filed by [petitioner] issued by theRegionalTrialCourtofTagumCity, Branch 1, is herebyAFFIRMED.[3]The FactsThe facts of the case are narrated by the CA in this wise:OnMarch 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint Production Agreement for Islanders Carp-Farmer Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. [petitioner] with Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation [respondent].Almost three years after, onApril 2, 1996, [petitioner], represented by its alleged chairman, Manuel K. Asta, filed a complaint [with the RTC] for Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus, Damages, with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against [respondent], the alleged x x x officers [of petitioner] who entered into the agreement, and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Davao (hereinafter PARO), represented by Saturnino D. Sibbaluca.[Petitioner] subsequently filed an amended complaint with leave of court alleging that the persons, who executed the contract were not authorized by it.[Respondent] then filed a Motion to Dismiss onApril 18, 1996x x x, stating that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (hereinafter DARAB) has primary, exclusive, and original jurisdiction; that [petitioner] failed to comply with the compulsory mediation and conciliation proceedings at the barangay level; and for the unauthorized institution of the complaint in behalf of [petitioner].[Respondent] also averred that [petitioner] was engaged in forum shopping because [it] also filed a petition before the Department of Agrarian Reform praying for the disapproval of the Joint Production Agreement.x x x PARO also filed a motion to dismiss onMay 16, 1996.On August 21, 1996, [respondent] then filed a case at the DARAB for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance, Injunction with Restraining Order, Damages and Attorneys Fees.OnFebruary 25, 1997, the DARAB decided the case in favor of [respondent] declaring the Joint Production Agreement as valid and binding and ordering [petitioner] to account for the proceeds of the produce and to comply with the terms of the contract.The [RTC] then issued [its] decision onOctober 18, 1999.[Petitioner], before [the CA], rais[ed] the following errors on appeal:ITHE [RTC] GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AT BAR ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION.IITHE [RTC] GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE JOINT PRODUCTION AGREEMENT AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO[4]Ruling of the Court of AppealsFinding the relationship between the parties to be an agricultural leasehold, the CA held that the issue fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.Hence, the appellate court ruled that the RTC had correctly dismissed the Complaint filed by petitioner.Moreover, being in the nature of an agricultural leasehold and not a shared tenancy, the Joint Production Agreement entered into by the parties was deemed valid by the CA.The agreement could not be considered contrary to public policy, simply because one of the parties was a corporation.Hence, this Petition.[5]IssuesPetitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:IWhether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the dismissal of the case at bench by RTC of Tagum City on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the suit.IIWhether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that the Joint Production Agreement is valid instead of declaring it as null and void ab initio, its provisions, terms and condition, cause and purposes being violative of [t]he express mandatory provision of R.A. 6657.IIIWhether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the Joint Production Agreement is a leasehold contract and therefore valid.IVWhether or not x x x the x x x Court of Appeals gravely erred in interpreting and applying the prevailing doctrines and jurisprudence delineating the jurisdiction between the regular court and DARAB on the matter of agricultural land and tenancy relationship.[6]Simply put, the question to be resolved by the Court is this: which of the various government agencies has jurisdiction over the controversy?The Courts RulingThe Petition has no merit.Sole Issue:JurisdictionSection 50 of Republic Act 6657[7]and Section 17 of Executive Order 229[8]vests in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.[9]Through Executive Order 129-A,[10]the President of thePhilippinescreated the DARAB and authorized it to assume the powers and functions of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.[11]Moreover, Rule II of the Revised Rules of the DARAB provides as follows:Section 1.Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. -- The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicateall agrarian disputesinvolving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following:a) The rights and obligations of persons,whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws[.][12]The subject matter of the present controversy falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.In question are the rights and obligations of two juridical persons engaged in themanagement, cultivationanduseof agricultural land acquired through the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.Petitioner contends that, there being no tenancy or leasehold relationship between the parties, this case does not constitute an agrarian dispute that falls within the DARABs jurisdiction.[13]We clarify.To prove tenancy or an agricultural leasehold agreement, it isnormallynecessary to establish the following elements: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is a piece of agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.[14]In the present case, the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly absent.Petitioner is thus correct in claiming that the relationship between the parties is not one of tenancy or agricultural leasehold.Nevertheless, we believe that the present controversy still falls within the sphere ofagrarian disputes.Anagrarian disputerefers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements -- whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise -- over lands devoted to agriculture.Such disputes include those concerning farm workers associations or representations of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.Also included isany controversy relating to the terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries -- whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.[15]It is clear that the above definition is broad enough to include disputes arising from any tenurial arrangement beyond that in the traditional landowner-tenant or lessor-lessee relationship.Tenurial ArrangementsRecognized by LawThe assailed Joint Production Agreement[16]is a type ofjoint economic enterprise.Joint economic enterprises are partnerships or arrangements entered into by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) land beneficiaries and investors to implement agribusiness enterprises in agrarian reform areas.[17]Recognizing that agrarian reform extends beyond the mere acquisition and redistribution of land, the law acknowledges other modes of tenurial arrangements to effect the implementation of CARP.[18]In line with its power to issue rules and regulations to carry out the objectives of Republic Act 6657,[19]the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1999, which issued Rules and Regulations Governing Joint Economic Enterprises in Agrarian Reform Areas.These rules and regulations were to provide CARP beneficiaries with alternatives to sustain operations of distributed farms and to increase their productivity.[20]Section 10 of this administrative order states as follows:SEC. 10.Resolution of DisputesAs a rule, voluntary methods, such as mediation or conciliation and arbitration, shall be preferred in resolving disputes involving joint economic enterprises.The specific modes of resolving disputes shall be stipulated in the contract, and should the parties fail to do so, the procedure herein shall apply.The aggrieved party shall first request the other party to submit the matter to mediation or conciliation by trained mediators or conciliators from DAR, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or the private sector chosen by them.x x xx x xx x xShould the dispute remain unresolved, it may be brought to either of the following for resolution depending on the principal cause of action:(a)DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) if it involves interpretation and enforcement of an agribusiness agreement or an agrarian dispute as defined in Sec. 3(d) of RA 6657[.]The present controversy involves the interpretation and enforcement of the terms of the Joint Production Agreement.Thus, the case clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.This Court in fact recognized the authority of the DAR and the DARAB when it ruled thus:All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature.All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.[21]Validity of the JointProduction AgreementAs already discussed above, jurisdiction over the present controversy lies with the DARAB.As the RTC had correctly dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, it was superfluous for the trial court -- and the CA for that matter -- to have ruled further on the issue of the validity of the agreement.The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competence.[22]Since the DARAB had already ruled in a separate case on the validity of the Joint Venture Agreement,[23]the proper remedy for petitioner was to question the Boards judgment through a timely appeal with the CA.[24]Because ofthe manifest lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, we must defer any opinion on the other issues raised by petitioner until an appropriate review of a similar case reaches this Court.[25]WHEREFORE, the Petition isDENIED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISIONLAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,Represented by MARGARITO B. TEVES, President and CEO, LETICIA LOURDES CAMARA, Department Head-Landowners Compensation Department II, and ROMEO V. CADANIAL, Acting LVD Head, AOC XI, Petitioners,- versus -THE HONORABLE BERNARDO V. SALUDANES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, DIOSDADO CAJES, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, SORIANO FRUITS CORPORATION, ANTIPAS A. DONADO, JR., and OFELIA G. DONADO, AMS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, MA. CRISTINA A. SORIANO, DANILO M. TATEL, ERNESTO T. NAKANO, SPOUSES CARMELO T. GEMPESAN, ARMS FARMING CORPORATION, MARIA ISABLE O. SORIANO, ALBERTO M. SORIANO, and RODOLFO B. UBALDO, Respondents. G.R. No. 146581 Present:PANGANIBAN,J., Chairman,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES, andGARCIA,JJ. Promulgated: December 13, 2005

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NSANDOVAL GUTIERREZ,J.: For our resolution is the instant petition for review oncertiorariassailing the Resolutions dated November 22, 2000[1]and January 9, 2001[2]of the Court of Appeals (Seventeenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59492. The instant case stemmed from twenty one (21) petitions[3]for just compensation filed on April 6, 1999 by several landowners with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), herein petitioner, and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) were impleaded as respondents. The petitions involve several tracts of land forming part of a banana plantation operated by the AMS Group of Companies, one of herein respondents. Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the landowners offered to sell these parcels of land to the government. The Special Agrarian Court consolidated the cases and named a panel of Commissioners to receive and evaluate evidence on the amount of compensation to be paid to the landowners. After trial, the Special Agrarian Court admitted and approved the Appraisal Report of the Commissioners. On February 7, 2000, the said court rendered its joint Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises duly considered, the Court hereby renders its judgment fixing, as it has judiciously determined, the just compensation for the landholdings and the improvements of all the herein petitioners in all these above-captioned docketed agrarian cases, as follows: First Hereby fixing, as determined, the just compensation of herein petitioners aggregate landholdings of 123.4629 hectares hereby fixed and determined atP25,405,553.55, plus the fixed and determined just compensation for the existing improvements thereon ofP32,800,000.00, or a total ofP58,205,553.55; and proper-computed adjustment to make such valuation at par with current true value of the Philippine Peso vis--vis the US Dollar, said upgraded amount in its upgraded value totalsP89,547,005.46; and further adding thereto the computed interests pegged at 6% per annum, which amounted toP21,986,680.68, the total amount of just compensation which Respondent-DAR through LBP must pay, jointly and severally, to petitioners for their landholdings and improvements would be, as it is hereby fixed in the aggregate amount ofP111,533,686.14; Second Hereby ordering the Respondent DAR, through the LBP, to pay jointly and severally, all fees/expenses payable to the Commissioners which shall be taxed, as part of the costs, as expressly mandated under Section 12, Rule 67 of the !997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to be claimed by petitioners in a Bill of Costs to be submitted for proper action by the Court; Third Hereby ordering the Respondent DAR, through the LBP, to pay, jointly and severally, the 10% attorneys fees based on the total amount herein fixed and approved for payment as the just compensation to the petitioners, likewise to be claimed in a Bill of Costs which petitioners shall submit for proper action by the Court. Fourth All such amounts to be paid jointly and severally by Respondent DAR through LBP, in cash or LBP bonds, are to deposited with the Clerk of Court of this Court, for ultimate turnover to the petitioners through their Attorneys-in-Fact within fifteen (15) days from finality of this judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED.On March 7, 2000, petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Special Agrarian Court. On March 17, 2000, the LBP filed with the same court a Notice of Appeal. On March 23, 2000, the DAR also filed its Notice of Appeal. On March 24, 2000, the Special Agrarian Court issued an Order denying due course to the LBPs Notice of Appeal. Its counsel received a copy of this Order on April 6, 2000. On the same date, the Special Agrarian Court likewise denied due course to the DARs Notice of Appeal. On April 14, 2000, the LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated March 24, 2000 but was denied by the Special Agrarian Court in its Order dated March 24, 2000. Counsel for the LBP received a copy of this Order on May 2, 2000. On May 3, 2000, the joint Decision, having become final and executory, was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment of the Special Agrarian Court. On August 2, 2000, the LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition forcertiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59492. In a Resolution dated November 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed thirty-two (32) days beyond the sixty (60) day reglementary period prescribed by Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated January 9, 2000. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.Petitioner bank admits that its petition before the Court of Appeals was indeed filed thirty-two (32) days late. However, it pleads for an exemption from the operation of Section 4, Rule 65 by reasons of justice and equity. We deny the petition outright. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:SEC. 4.When and where petition filed. The petition may be filednot later than sixty (60) days from noticeof the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty day period shall be counted notice of the denial of said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the act or omission of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer, or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time shall be granted except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days.InYutingco v. Court of Appeals,[4]we held that the period of 60 days to file a petition for certiorari is reasonable and sufficient. It provides for ample time for a party to mull over and prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court, tribunal, board, or officer, It was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. Hence, the 60-day period must be considered non-extendible, except where a good and sufficient reason can be shown to warrant an extension. While we agree with petitioner LBP that this Court has the power to suspend its Rules, however, it has not shown any compelling reason why we should do so. Moreover, records reveal that petitioner has paid respondents the amounts specified in the joint Decision of the Special Agrarian Court. This has rendered the case moot and academic.WHEREFORE,the petition isDENIED. The challenged Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59492 areAFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISIONHEIRS OF JULIAN DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 162890AND LEONORA TALARO, asrepresented by MAXIMINOPresent:DELA CRUZ,Petitioners, PUNO,J.,Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., - versus - TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO,*JJ.HEIRS OF ALBERTO CRUZ, asrepresented by BENEDICTO U. Promulgated:CRUZ,[1]Respondents. November 22, 2005x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - xD E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.: Assailed in this petition for review oncertiorariis the Decision[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69671, reversing the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 6297, and ordering the dismissal of the petition of the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz in Reg. Case No. 5853 NNE96 for lack of jurisdiction.The Republic of the Philippines acquired the De Leon Estate located inBarangayCasulucan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija for resale to deserving tenants and landless farmers, conformably with Commonwealth Act No. 539, as amended by Republic Act No. 1400. The property was under the administration of the Land Tenure Administration and later the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Sometime in 1950, the DAR allocated a portion of the property in favor of Julian dela Cruz who was a tenant thereon. Such portion was identified as Lot No. 778 with an area of 3.362 hectares.[3] Sometime in September 1960, the Republic of the Philippines sold Lot No. 778 to Julian dela Cruz by virtue of an Agreement to Sell. On September 27, 1960, the DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. AS-5323 in his favor as the qualified allocatee of the landholding.[4] Julian bound and obliged himself to pay the amortizations over the land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the property and made payments to the government for a period of almost 20 years. He died in 1979 and was survived by his wife, Leonora Talaro-dela Cruz and their 10 children, including Mario and Maximino dela Cruz.[5]For a time, Mario administered the landholding. Too old and sickly to cultivate the property by herself, Leonora dela Cruz executed a private document in May 1980 in which she declared that, with the consent of her children, she had sold the land in favor of Alberto Cruz, who henceforth had the right to possess and cultivate the property, and the obligation to continue the payment of the amortizations due over the land under the terms of the Agreement to Sell. Mario dela Cruz conformed to the deed.[6] Alberto took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over a period of 10 years without any protest from Leonora and her children. He then filed an application to purchase the property with the DAR. On August 8, 1990, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Paterno Revollido prepared and signed an Investigation Report, recommending that the landholding be declared vacant and disposable to a qualified applicant. Declaring that there was no adverse claimant, the said report also recommended the approval of Albertos application to purchase the property.[7] Appended to the report was the deed executed by Leonora in favor of Alberto.On November 16, 1990, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order[8]approving the recommendation of the MARO. He directed the cancellation of Julians CLT and declared that whatever rights Julian had over the landholding and payments made in favor of the government under the Agreement to Sell were forfeited. The dispositive portion of the order reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, an Order is hereby issued:1. Canceling the Order of Award-CLT No. AS No. 5323 issued on 9-27-60, subject hereof, forfeiture whatever rights and payments made on the account of the lot in favor of the government, declaring Lot No. 778 pt Block No. xx Pls-Psd-Pcs N. 56903 of De Leon Estate, located at Casulucan, Talavera, N.E. vacant and disposable to the qualified applicant; and2. Giving due course to the application of Mr. Alberto L. Cruz to purchase the said lot.Let a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA), as the case may be, be issued to the herein new awardee-applicant after fifteen (15) days posting of this Order, if no protest has been filed byaffected parties.SO ORDERED.[9]It appears on the dorsal portion of the order that only Julian (although already deceased by then) was given a copy of the order by registered mail.[10]The PARO endorsed the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to the DAR Secretary, copy furnished the Regional Director. The DAR Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution reviewed and evaluated the records and recommended that the PAROs recommendation be affirmed.On June 27, 1991, the DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA No. 51750 over the property in favor of Alberto Cruz, and the certificate was registered with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On August 15, 1991, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. CLOA- 0-3035 over the landholding in favor of Alberto Cruz.[11] The title containedan annotation prohibiting the beneficiary from selling or transferring the landholding within a period of 10 years from issuance, except to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Sometime in early 1996, Maximino, one of the surviving children of Julian, discovered that the landholding had already been registered in the name of Alberto Cruz. On October 10, 1996, Leonora and her 10 children, with the assistance of the DAR Bureau of Legal Assistance, filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the following: the order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 issued in favor of Alberto Cruz. The petitioners declared,inter alia, that they were the surviving heirs of Julian dela Cruz; they had no knowledge of the sale by Leonora and Mario of their right as beneficiaries of the property; not being privies to the said sale, they were not bound by the private deed executed by Leonora; and such sale, as well as the issuance of the CLOA and the title over the property in favor of Alberto, was null and void, inasmuch as they violated agrarian reform laws and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980. They insisted that they were deprived of their rights as heirs of the beneficiary without due process of law.[12] In his comment on the petition, Alberto Cruz alleged that he acquired the rights over the landholding from Leonora forP51,000.00 and had taken possession of the subject property. He further averred that he collected hisshare in the produce of the land with the consent of Leonora and her children. He had been paying the amortizations for the property to the government and in fact had already paid the purchase price of the property to the LBP in full.[13] Meantime, on November 14, 1996, Alberto Cruz paidP8,054.07 to the DAR for the property and for which he was issued a receipt.[14] The PARO directed the Register of Deeds to cancel the annotation at the dorsal portion of the title covering the property.[15]After due proceedings, the PARAD granted the petition in a Decision[16]dated July 9, 1997. It declared that the petitioners were the rightful allocatees of the property, and directed the MARO to cancel CLOA No. 51750 and TCT No. CLOA -0-3035 and issue another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was ordered to vacate the property. The PARAD also directed the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the said title and issue a new one over the landholding in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:1. Declaring the petitioners to be the rightful allocatees of the subject land;2. Ordering the respondent or anyone acting in his behalf to peacefully relinquish the possession of the land in question unto the herein petitioners;3. Ordering the MARO of Talavera, Nueva Ecija and/or the PARO of North Nueva Ecija to cancel TCT No. CLOA-0-3035, (DAR CLOA No. 51750) previously issued to respondent Alberto Cruz and, in lieu thereof, to generate a new one in the name of herein petitioners, the heirs of Julian dela Cruz;4. Directing the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the above-mentioned CLOA and to register the new one to be generated in its stead.[17]Alberto appealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD on June 19, 2000. The DARAB ruled that the rights of the petitioners as farmers-beneficiaries could not be transferred or waived except through hereditary succession or to the government, conformably with agrarian reform laws and that the private document Leonora executed may be assailed by her children by Julian, who were not privies thereto. The DARAB also ruled that in executing the private document, Leonora failed to comply with DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980.[18]The DARAB further declared that, even if the private document may be considered a waiver of Leonoras tenancy rights over the landholding, nevertheless, the CLOA and the title may still be canceled as such waiver is null and void. CitingTorres v. Ventura,[19]it held that thepari delictodoctrine is not applicable. The DARAB ruled that under DAR Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, such sale, the CLOA and the Torrens title issued over the landholding in favor of Alberto may be cancelled by it.[20] Alberto filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision which the DARAB denied on February 11, 2002.[21]Alberto then filed a petition for review in the CA, where he raised the following issues:IWHETHER OR NOT THE DAR ADJUDICATION BOARD HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;IIWHETHER OR NOT THE CLOA AWARDED TO ALBERTO CRUZ MAY BE CANCELLED; and

IIIWHETHER OR NOT THE SAID LOT MAY STILL BE AWARDED TO HEREIN PETITIONERS. He alleged that the Dela Cruz heirs filed their petition with the PARAD only on October 17, 1996, long after the lapse of 16 years after Leonora executed the private document and conveyed the property to him on June 1, 1980. Conformably with Section 38 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, their petition with the PARAD had already prescribed. He also alleged that the said heirs should have filed an action for recovery of possession of the property within 10 years from 1980, conformably with Article 1134 of the New Civil Code. Moreover, their action in the PARAD was barred by estoppel because they failed to oppose the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO, the issuance of the CLOA and the transfer of title in his favor. The petitioner maintained that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the respondents petition because the implementation of agrarian reform laws and rules and regulations was administrative in nature. He argued that the respondents should have sought relief from the DAR insteadof filing their petition with the DARAB. The petitioner posits that the landholding subject matter of the petition is a landed estate acquired by the government under R.A. No. 1400; hence, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, which prohibits the sale of tenancy rights over the landholding, does not apply. Moreover, the ruling inTorres v. Venturadoes not apply because the facts therein are different from those obtaining in the present case. In their Comment on the petition, the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz maintained that Section 38 of R.A. No. 3844 and Section 1134 of R.A. No. 386 have no application in the case, considering that the issue is not one of tenancy because they had never entered into such a relationship with Alberto. They averred that they were not barred from filing their petition, either by laches or by prescription, because they discovered the private document their mother executed only in 1995. They claimed that they filed their petition with the PARAD instead of filing an administrative complaint with the Office of the DAR Secretary because time was of the essence and further delay in the resolution of the case would only cause great and irreparable injury to them. Besides, the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz averred, the MARO and the PARO violated DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990, and deprived them of their right as beneficiaries over the property without due process of law. They maintained that under Rule 2, paragraph (f) of the DARAB New Rules and Procedures, the DARAB had jurisdiction over actions involving the issuance, correction or cancellation of the CLOA and Emancipation Patents registered with the LRA. They insisted that the ruling of this Court inTorres v. Venturais decisive of the issues in the case.In a Decision dated March 31, 2003, the CA granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the petition of the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz in the PARAD for lack of jurisdiction. The CA declared that there was no tenancy relationship between respondent Alberto and the said heirs; hence, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the petition. It declared that the issue before the DARAB was the rightful ownership over the landholding.The said heirs moved for the reconsideration of the decision contending that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is not confined solely to agrarian disputes, but includes the cancellation of CLOAs registered with the LRA in favor of persons who are qualified beneficiaries under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657. The Heirs of Julian dela Cruz reiterated the claim that the MARO and PARO violated their right to due process and the pertinent agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations. Further, they asserted that respondent Alberto was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the DARAB because he never raised the same in the PARAD and the DARAB. However, the appellate court resolved to deny the motion in its Resolution[22]dated March 18, 2004.In the instant petition for review, the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz, as petitioners, maintain that under Rule VI, Section 1(f) of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs registered with the LRA even if there is no tenancy relationship between theparties. The petitioners point out that the issues before the DARAB do not only involve the ownership of the landholding, but also whether the PARO violated their substantive and procedural right to due process, as well as agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations in issuing the November 16, 1990 Order, and whether they are the rightful allocatees of the landholding under the ruling of this Court inTorres v. Ventura.In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioners petition in the DARAB was one for recovery of ownership over the landholding, which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).The petition is denied for lack of merit.It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action.[23] Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to atribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.[24]Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss.[25] Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy.[26] If the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB.[27]The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.[28] The ruling of the appellate court that the ownership over the landholding was the threshold issue before the DARAB is not correct. The petitioners did not claim ownership over the landholding. When Julian dela Cruz died in 1979, he had not yet paid in full the amortizations for the property. The DAR issued only a CLT in his favor on September 27, 1960. Unless and until the amortization for the landholding is fully paid, the DAR will not issue a CLOA in the name of the beneficiary. It is only upon the issuance of the CLOA that a beneficiary becomes the owner of the property.[29]The decisive issues raised by the petitioners and Alberto in their pleadings before the DARAB related to the following: whether petitioner Maximino dela Cruz and his siblings are bound by the deed of transfer/sale of the tenancy rights executed by their mother in favor of Alberto; and whether the August 8, 1990 report of the MARO and the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO violated R.A. No. 1400, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian reform laws and pertinent DAR Orders, memoranda and circulars, including the substantive and procedural rights of the petitioners.[30] However, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that the dispute between the petitioners and the respondents over the validity of the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 and the cancellation thereof is not agrarian in nature. Under Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229, the DAR is vested with quasi-judicial power and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as other matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform laws, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture. The President of the Philippines created the DARAB and authorized it to assume the power and functions pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases, which may be delegated to the regional offices of the DAR in accordance with rules and regulations to be promulgated by the DARAB.Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or, otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. InMorta, Sr. v. Occidental,[31]this Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. InVda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,[32]the Court held that the jurisdiction of the DAR is limited to the following:a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; andc) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.[33]The petitioners themselves categorically admitted in their pleadings that there was no landlord-tenancy relationship between them and Alberto over the landholding. Nor did they have any tenurial, leasehold, or agrarian relations whatsoever when petitioners Leonora and her son Mario executed the deed of sale in May 1980 in favor of Alberto, nor when the petitioners filed their petition with the DARAB. The sole tenant-beneficiary over the landholding was Julian dela Cruz. There is no showing that before the execution of the deed of transfer/sale, Alberto was a tenant or farmer, or that he was landless. The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in theadministrativeimplementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB.In the present case, the DAR Secretary approved CLOA No. 51750 in the name of Alberto in the exercise of his administrative powers and in the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. The approval was based on the Report of the MARO, the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO and the recommendation of the DAR Director of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, over whom the DAR Secretary has supervision and control. The DAR Secretary also had the authority to withdraw the CLOA upon a finding that the same is contrary to law and DAR orders, circulars and memoranda. The resolution of such issues by the DAR Secretary will entail the application and implementation of agrarian reform laws, inclusive of P.D. No. 946 as well as the implementing orders, circulars and rules and regulations issued by the DAR. On the issue of who may be or shall be declared as the owner-cultivator of the landholding, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian reform laws, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1978 as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 14, Series of 1988, and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980 will apply. On the issue of whether or not the petitioners sold their tenancy rights over the landholding and barred them from asserting their rights, either bypari delicto, prescription or laches, the DAR Secretary will apply P.D. No. 27 and the rulings of this Court inTorres v. Ventura[34]andCorpus v. Grospe,[35]reiterated inSiacor v. Gigantana.[36] On the issue of whether the petitioners were denied of their right to substantive and procedural due process, the DAR Secretary will take into account,inter alia, Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990.As the Court ruled inNuesa v. Court of Appeals:[37]P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, including: xxx (5) issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer in cases outside the purview of P.D. No. 816.The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding the case on the merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his case.As held by this Court inCenteno vs. Centeno,the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy between them within the ambit of the above-cited provision. Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondents petition in the first place.Note that Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990, governs the distribution and titling of lots in landed estates administered by the DAR. This Order explicitly provides that since land has a social function, there is a concomitant social responsibility in its ownership and should, therefore, be distributed to the actual occupant/tillers thereof. In the investigation on December 27, 1993, conducted by the Regional Officer of DAR, it was established that the subject lots were in the possession and cultivation of persons other than the awardee Verdillo. Clearly, this constituted a violation of the terms of the Order of Award issued in favor of private respondent as an awardee, aside from contravening the underlying principles of agrarian reform as a social justice measure. Given these circumstances, we find petitioner Restituto Riveras plea to overturn the ruling of the Court of Appeals meritorious.While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, care should be taken that administrative actions are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In this case, respondent DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera and private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in sustaining DARABs unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of its jurisdiction. It bears stressing that in Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, it is made clear that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657,[38]and other agrarian reform laws and pertinent rules, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the DAR Secretary. Indeed, under P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian reform laws (including R.A. No. 6657), the DAR Secretary is vested with the administrative authority to issue and correct or recall the CLT issued under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Secretary is vested with authority to approve and execute CLOAs on which are based the TCT to be issued by the Register of Deeds. The DARAB has no jurisdiction over the orders, resolutions, or other administrative circulars of the DAR Secretary in the exercise of its administrative powers.In fine then, the petitioners should have filed their petition against Alberto Cruz with the DAR Secretary instead of the DARAB. For its part, the DARAB should have dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction; or, at the very least, transferred the petition to the DAR Secretary for resolution on its merits. In case the DAR Secretary denies their petition, the petitioners may appeal to the Office of the President, and in case of an adverse ruling, a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING,the petition isDENIED. The CourtAFFIRMSthe decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69671WITH MODIFICATION.The dismissal of DARAB Reg. Case No. 5853 NNE96 for lack of jurisdiction is without prejudice to its re-filing in accordance with DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2000, within thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision.SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN G.R. No. 162070REFORM, represented by SECRETARYJOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), Present: Petitioner, Davide,C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, - versus - Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia,JJ.DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T.SUTTON-SOLIMAN and Promulgated:HARRY T. SUTTON, Respondents. October 19, 2005x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xDECISIONPUNO,J.: This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the Constitution. The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1]their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.On December 4, 1990, in anen bancdecision in the case ofLuz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,[2]this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.In view of theLuz Farms ruling,respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.[3]On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.[4] Petitioner ignored their request.On December 27, 1993, DAR issuedA.O. No. 9, series of 1993,[5]which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits,viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e.,1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL. On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under theLuz Farms doctrine,their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.[6] On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order[7]partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.[8] They filed a notice of appeal[9]with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of theLuz Farms casewhich declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR.[10]It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to theLuz Farms caseas the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However,the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE,premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is herebyDECLAREDnull and void. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reforms ruling that petitioners landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the government isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.[11] Hence, this petition. The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising. Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform program. Petitioners arguments fail to impress. Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature,i.e.,the power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review.[12] They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.The fundamental rule in administrative law is that,to be valid, administrative rules and regulationsmust be issued by authority of a law andmust not contravene the provisions of the Constitution.[13]The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution.Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended.Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.[14]In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However,the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude,inter alia,all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in theLuz Farmscasethat livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.[15]Clearly, petitionerDAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.The subsequent case ofNatalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR[16]reiterated our ruling in theLuz Farmscase. InNatalia Realty,the Court heldthat industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL.[17] We stressed anew thatwhile Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands,the term agricultural land does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, inNatalia Realty,even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which arearable yetstill undeveloped,could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands. A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention.The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case.Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines.[18]Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is theconversion of agricultural landsfor non-agricultural purposesafter the effectivity of the CARL.There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one.[19] In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881[20]which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically,the new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising.[21]With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails.[22] The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.IN VIEW WHEREOF,the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISIONHOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE G.R. No. 140847DE BARILI, CEBU CITY, Petitioner, Present: PUNO,J.,- versus - Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIANREFORM, Respondent.Promulgated:September 23, 2005x-------------------------------------------------------------------- xD E C I S I O NTINGA,J.: At the core of this case is an obscure old special law. The issue is whether a provision in the law prohibiting the sale of the properties donated to the charitable organization that was incorporated by the same law bars the implementation of agrarian reform laws as regards said properties.Petitioner Hospicio de San Jose de Barili (Hospicio) is a charitable organization created as a body corporate in 1925 by Act No. 3239. The law was enacted in order to formally accept the offer made by Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui to establish a home for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids and incapacitated and helpless persons.[1] The Hospicio was to be maintained with the revenues of the personal and real properties to be endowed by the Cuis and other donors.[2] Section 4 of Act No. 3239 provides that [t]he personal and real property donated to the [Hospicio] by its founders or by other persons shall not be sold under any consideration.[3] On 10 October 1987, the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) Region VII issued an order ordaining that two parcels of land owned by the Hospicio be placed under Operation Land Transfer in favor of twenty-two (22) tillers thereof as beneficiaries. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, a land reform law, was cited as legal basis for the order. The Hospicio filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary, citing the aforementioned Section 4 of Act No. 3239. It argued that Act No. 3239 is a special law, which could not have been repealed by P.D. No. 27, a general law, or by the latters general repealing clause. The DAR Secretary rejected the motion for reconsideration in anOrderdated 30 March 1997. Therein, the DAR Secretary held that P.D. No. 27 was a special law, as it applied only to particular individuals in the State, specifically the tenants of rice and corn lands. Moreover, P.D. No. 27, which covered all rice and corn lands, provides no exemptions based on the manner of acquisition of the land by the landowner.[4] TheOrderof the DAR Secretary was assailed in aPetition for Certiorarifiled with the Court of Appeals. In aDecision[5]dated 9 July 1999, the Court of Appeals Special Eleventh Division affirmed the DAR Secretarys issuance. It sustained the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) position that Section 4 of Act No. 3239 was expressly repealed not only by P.D. No. 27, but also by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, both laws being explicit in mandating the distribution of agricultural lands to qualified beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals further noted that the subject lands did not fall among the exemptions provided under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6657. Finally, the appellate court brought into play the aims of land reform, affirming as it did the need to distribute and create an economic equilibrium among the inhabitants of this land, most especially those with less privilege in life, our peasant farmer.[6] Unsatisfied with the Court of AppealsDecision, the Hospicio lodged the presentPetition for Review. The Hospicio alleges that P.D. No. 27, the CARL, and Executive Order No. 407[7]all violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. More sedately, the Hospicio also argues that Act No. 3239 was not repealed either by P.D. No. 27 or Rep. Act No. 6657 and that the forced disposition of the Hospicios landholdings would incapacitate the discharge of its charitable functions, which equally promote social justice and the upliftment of the lives of the less fortunate. On the other hand, the OSG, representing respondent DAR, bluntly replies that Act No. 3239 was repealed by P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657, which do not exempt lands owned by eleemosynary or charitable institutions from the coverage of those agrarian reform laws. A brief recapitulation of the relevant laws is in order. P.D. No. 27, "Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them Ownership of the Land they Till, and Providing the Instrument and Mechanism Therefor, has once been touted as perhaps a radical solution in its pristine sense, one that goes at the root [of the problem of land tenancy].[8]Its constitutionality was upheld inDe Chavez v. Zobel.[9]The law generally ordains the emancipation of tenants and confers on them ownership of the lands they till.[10]The following provisions of P.D. No. 27 have concretized this policy:NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, as amended do hereby decree and order the emancipation of all tenant farmers as of this day, October 21, 1972;This shall apply to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands[[11]] primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not;The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated;In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it; The CARL was not yet in effect when the DARRO and the DAR issued their respective orders. Said law vests P.D. No. 27 with suppletory effect insofar as the earlier law does not run inconsistent with the later law.[12]Under Section 4 of the CARL, placed under coverage are all public and private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, subject to the exempted lands listed in Section 10 thereof.We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither P.D. No. 27 nor the CARL exempts the lands of the Hospicio or other charitable institutions from the coverage of agrarian reform. Ultimately, the result arrived at in the assailed issuances should be affirmed. Nonetheless, both the DAR Secretary and the appellate court failed to appreciate what to this Court is indeed thedecisive legal dimensionof the case. Section 4 of Act No. 3239 prohibits the sale under any consideration of the lands donated to the Hospicio. But the land transfers mandated under P.D. No. 27 cannot be considered a conventional sale under our civil laws. Generally, sale arises out of a contractual obligation. Thus, it must meet the first essential requisite of every contract that is the presence of consent.[13] Consent implies an act of volition in entering into the agreement.[14]The absence or vitiation of consent renders the sale either void or voidable. In this case, the deprivation of the Hospicios property did not arise as a consequence of the Hospicios consent to the transfer. There was no meeting of minds between the Hospicio, on one hand, and the DAR or the tenants, on the other, on the properties and the cause which are to constitute the contract[15]that is to serve ultimately as the basis for the transfer of ownership of the subject lands.[16]Instead, the obligation to transfer arises by compulsion of law, particularly P.D. No. 27.[17] Agrarian reform is justified under the States inherent power of eminent domain that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.[18]It has even been characterized as beyond the traditional exercise of eminent domain, but a revolutionary kind of expropriation. As expounded in the landmark case ofAssociation of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, thus:. . . . However, we do not deal here with thetraditionalexercise of the power of eminent domain.This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is arevolutionarykind of expropriation.The expropriation before us affectsallprivate agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.[19] This characterization is warranted whether the expropriation is operative under the CARL or P.D. No. 27, as both laws are keyed into the same governmental objective. Moreover, under both laws, the landowner is entitled to just compensation for the properties taken. The twin process of expropriation of lands under agrarian reform and the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has been aptly described in common law jurisdictions as sale made under the process of the court, and in the mode prescribed by law, and which is not the voluntary act of the owner, such as to satisfy a debt, whether of a mortgage, judgment, tax lien, etc.[20]The term has not been precisely defined in this jurisdiction, but reference to the phrase itself is made in Articles 223, 232, 237 and 243 of the Civil Code, which uniformly exempt the family home from execution, forced sale, or attachment.[21]Yet a forced sale is clearly different from the sales described under Book V of the Civil Code which are conventional sales, as it does not arise from the consensual agreement of the vendor and vendee, but by compulsion of law. Still, since law is recognized as one of the sources of obligation, there can be no dispute on the efficacy of a forced sale, so long as it is authorized by law. The crucial question now arises, whether the sale prohibited under Section 4 of Act No. 3239 includes even a forced sale. Of course an overly literal reading of the provision would justify such inclusion, but appropriately a more sophisticated approach to statutory construction is warranted. No sance is required to discern the intent of Section 4. It ensures that the properties received by the Hospicio are not alienated for profit by the officers or administrators, in contravention of the charitable purpose for which the Hospicio was created. To an extent, it makes possible the perpetual operation of the Hospicio, which was empowered by law to operate for an indefinite period, by assuring the existence of the property on which the Hospicio could operate. We also do