33700000 Post Soviet Georgian Nationalism Social Memory Cultural Trauma

7/31/2019 33700000 Post Soviet Georgian Nationalism Social Memory Cultural Trauma

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Post-Soviet Georgian Nationalism in the Context of

Social Memory and Collective Trauma Theories

Shota Khinchagashvili

September 5, 2008


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Introduction

The dissertation is a moderate attempt to envisage the phenomenon of nationalism in

post-soviet Georgia from the perspective of social memory concept and the theory of cultural

trauma. The main research question can be formulated in following way: how are the basic

elements of historical narrative reflected in modern collective memory of Georgians? This a

priori necessitates a brief overview and characterisation of traditional Georgian historical

narrative. Preliminary analysis suggests that contemporary Georgian national narratives

revolve around two main categories: (a) traumatic events evolving around the concepts like

pain, loss, acts of injustice, and etc. and (b) pro-western (anti-Russian) orientation as a

cultural paradigm. The first category can be better understood in the light of the theory of

cultural trauma. Moreover, the latter is also applicable to the contemporary political discourse

that reinterprets recent past the same way; hence it might be named as a cross-generational,

constant model in Georgias collective memory.

The study of contemporary nationalism in Georgia is still a relatively virgin field of

academic enquiry. Prior to the 1990s the main attention and interest to Georgian context

from outside world was largely of linguistic, literal and historical character (including several

historical studies I heavily rely on throughout my discussion). After the declaration of

independence and the entrance in the community of sovereign states (United Nations), part of

the international scholarship became preoccupied mainly with regional studies in the prism of

international relations (security and economic issues)1, especially on the background of inter-

ethnic tensions and armed conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions (Cornell 2001:

chapter 4, esp. 163-174). The South Caucasus region (comprised by new sovereign republics

of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), together with North Caucasus, became the second

Balkans where the question of conflictual ethnic and national identities, collective memories

and historical narratives is yet to be studied.

Despite the growing number of informative academic literature, the systematic,

monographic works on Georgian collective identity and its social dynamics as well as its

morphology are scarce. Hence, this thesis represents a moderate effort to approach thequestion of post-soviet Georgian national identity from barely applied theoretical perspective

which goes beyond the observable traits of troubled inter-ethnic interaction (the process) and

drastic political and economic changes of recent past.

However, the shift in socio-political realm of the society does not explain by itself more

fundamental questions regarding the possible underlying reasons that triggered the


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deterioration of inter-communal relationships in South Caucasus and, specifically in our case,

Georgia. Moreover, I generally base my discussion on Brubakers negation (1998: 285-288)

of the traditional misconceptionrepressed paradigm in the discussion of nationalisms

which in this case would erroneously surmise federal, multinational state system of USSR as

the political organism reducing, conserving and only delaying previously existing

nationalisms with its supranational discourse and political structure. However, my central

scope is rather different than reiterating the critique of mentioned myth: to provide this

problematic research question with different, not necessarily substitute theoretical vision of

socio-cultural developments. In this way, the main spirit of study is to diversify concepts and

approaches in the study of modern Georgian collective perceptions and to go further than

seeing institutional rearrangements as a universal answer. Interesting is to reveal the character

of contemporary Georgian societys national identity and collective memory in the process of

transformation and mediation and to locate them in the realm of collective memory concept.

The main part of discussion on Georgians social perception regarding collective

memory and national history concentrates on post-soviet period. The notion of Georgians

henceforth will be deliberately reduced to the understanding of politically and culturally

dominant ethnic group of fractured and unconsolidated political community - Georgian state.

Concentration on the dominant group as a main social unit (social group) for study in no way

presupposes the analytical indifference to other ethnic minorities residing in Georgia.

Moreover, as we shall see later, development and the very discourse of ethnic Georgians

collective identity and historical memory is inextricably intertwined with the content of other

ethnic communities national discourses. Highly variable level of legitimacy of national, state

borders (and their contested character) in those discourses methodologically suggests not to

be restricted by them throughout the analysis as cross-border identities and the question of

inter-ethnic relations can not be disassociated from the main topic. The issue of collective

narratives of ethnic minorities (residing in Georgia and having historical homelands as well

as those groups that are perceived by any party to have no home) will be seen in the

conceptual framework of counter-narratives.

The study is meant to avoid a traditional mono-paradigmatic enquiry and tries to

combine different theoretical approaches to the subject. As an umbrella theoretical

perspective, I employ highly interdisciplinary heritage of nationalism studies. Specifically, I

rely on the loose vision of so called modernist approach with its general theoretical

understanding ofnation-state and ethnic/national identity.


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The key-words for this study are sociological notions as collective identity, social

memory2, ethno-historical narrative and national discourse. They will be clarified and

defined later, during the specific discussion on respective theoretical approaches.

Structure of the thesis

The plan of the thesis starts out with an initial chapter covering most relevant existing

literature in the field. Proceeding from this point, larger space will be devoted to the

examination of Georgian historical narrative and national discourse. Identifying and outlining

narrative markers of collective national perception of what makes up the past of the nation

and its present aspiration, how the both interact and determine each other would hopefully lay

a good ground for future studies on their vitality and underlying reasons. The main strategy

shall imply identification of basic collective identity markers and the analysis of the

transformation of social memory of Georgians in order to reveal the reasons for their

appreciation, idealisation and collective memorialisation.

It should be noted that the role of history is frequently named as the central

phenomenon in emerging national movements in post-soviet South Caucasian space.

However, paradoxically enough, the analytical category of social memory and respective

theoretical approach is surprisingly overlooked and neglected. While following the

instrumentalist vision of politics of memory which places dominant groups as the virtual

authors or manipulators of basic social perceptions on national idea and its challenges, and

although I will frequently address political discourse, there is no intention to concentrate

fundamentally on major actors in process as it calls for a separate in-depth analysis. Instead,

the paper is a mere try to see a general picture and enrich theoretical discussion with

introspective notions of collective memory and its post-soviet dynamics for the first time. As

it regards cultural trauma, it might reveal interesting aspects of general working of collective

memory and, at the same time, could link the research question to more specific cases of

trauma and its direct relation to dominant groups.


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Theories of Social Memory and Cultural Trauma

The rise and fall of totalitarian regimes and concomitant ideologies3

in the 20th

century

have given rise to different attempts to understand various social phenomena of contemporary

industrial and post-industrial societies. Among them one of the central objects of interest is

national identity and collective/social memory.

Basic terms and operative concepts

The main interpretative tools and analytical notions of the thesis come from

methodological and theoretical tradition of social constructionism. It is a set of various

theories of sociology of knowledge and social epistemology, aspiring to analyze different

aspects of collective life of humans and socio-cultural system, its functioning, dynamics and

interrelation of its constituent elements, and etc. Its main objective is to reveal sociallydetermined and constructed nature of collective life, practices and ideas, notions, values and

cultural elements, those that are traditionally perceived of as a priori given, unquestioned

and natural (Rousseau 2002: 236). In following chapters the notion of social memory will be

viewed as an ever-changing category that emanates from symbolic interaction (not to be

confused with the established micro-sociological perspective known as symbolic

interactionism), stressing on the process of communication, actors, agents involved, process

of interpretation, mediation and distribution of collectively appreciated public perceptions,

distributed through symbolizedand abstracted meanings. Hence, the basic understanding is

that social constructions, be they identity or collective memory (described below), are never

static - they are constantly in change, frequently negotiated, contested, - dynamic and

ambiguous elements to observe, especially in case of a society undergoing fundamental and

rapid reorganization of social and political life that (rather indirectly) generates redefinition

of social constructs.

Social identity is a central notion for the thesis. It can be defined as the cognitive

phenomenon derived from ones feelings and knowledge of self (internal dimension - self-

identification) referred to group membership, the one that is shared with others and also

represents a mechanism for self-categorization (external dimension) (Jenkins 1996: 23, 83;

Rosenberg 1979; Turner et al. 1987; Tajfel 1979: 94-109). It is a social aspect of personal

self, individual perception which determines the notion of us internalized group

membership.


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Belonging (self-categorization) inevitably produces in-group and out-group dimensions

in social perception, where the strength of (belonging to) the former leads member of one

group to reveal and display in-group favouritism. It comes from basic psychological drive to

attain positive image and esteem of the self(self-concept) (Tajfel & Turner 1986), typically

via comparing ones group with others and stressing positive bias toward a group one

belongs to (positive distinction and comparison). Michael Ignatieff interestingly described

(1999: 91-102) paradoxical process similar to this (which he called the narcissism of minor

difference, borrowing from Freud) in context of inter-ethnic conflict - on the case of Serbo-

Croation confrontation in Yugoslavia: each conflicting party, sharing a number of common

traits and sociocultural elements, imaginedand reiterated exaggerated differences used as a

legitimatization of enmity discourse. As author remarked, nationalism is the transformation

of identity into narcissism. It is a language game that takes the facts of difference and turns

them into a narrative justifying political self-determination (ibid, 96).

It is important here to define other several terms relevant for the discussion. I deal with a

Georgian society - large social group representing (the core unit of a) political community

(Georgia), consolidated by collectively perceived sameness and shared values. Hence, the

notions ofnation, national identity and ethno-historical narrative are central here.

There are numerous accurately formulated, classical (sometimes mutually exclusive)

definitions of a nation. Most of them seem to agree in seeing nation as an imagined

collectivity sharing several basic elements such as territory, language and/or culture (Gellner

1983: 6-7; Anderson 1991: 6; Kymlicka 1995:11). This imagination is attainable through the

transmission and distribution of common culture (process of homogenization), generating

shared national identity (identity understood as a sense of belonging, self-identity,

reciprocally recognised by members of collectivity in social interaction). The functionality of

this type of identity takes us back to a concept of a nation, redefining it primarily as a

community of memory, mnemonic community (Misztal 2003b:15-17). Performance and

durability of such collectivity across time and space depends on the successfully agreed,

distributed and consumed products of interpretation of past which is typically related, at the

same time, to the vision of possible and desirable future. Hence, a memory seems to be a

social glue for a nation, helping it in achieving certain degree of cohesion and stability by

legitimizing its mere existence.

National identity itself is a complex phenomenon with a number of social dimensions,

among which collective mnemonic aspect is central for us. Specifically, the most important is

to emphasize that national identity not only stresses the in-group similarities vis--vis the


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other group (differentiation); it also needs a sense of sharing [collective] fate (a discourse)

where a specific ethno-historical narrative plays a crucial role. As Bhabha (2000 [1990]: 19)

notes,

The nation, like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of

endeavours, sacrifice, and devotion. Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the

most legitimate, for the ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past,

great men, glory [...], this is the social capital upon which one bases a

national idea.

As a sociological and anthropological concept, narrative is understood as a textual,

rhetorical resource, cultural tool for representing past realm with its events and actors and

provide the structured and meaningful interpretation of it. As Lyotard demonstrated on the

example of Cashinahua Indians of South America, the narrative is actively employed to

identify the status, roles, rights, responsibilities and expected behaviour of self and other

members of collectivity as well as the rules of interrelation among them (cited in Connor

1997:24). It represents a socio-cultural construct which is internalized by the members of a

society and, by the same token, legitimizes existing (positively or naturally) perceived

practice, social organization and the way of life, primarily the statuses of individuals and

sub-groups. As Alasdair MacIntyre once noted, human being is a storytelling animal, he/she

inherently need a stories (narrative) to understand themselves and also attain a coherent

picture of the world one inhabits (1981: 216). In general sense, the suggestion that what we

all do is shaped and determined by the narratives and we define who we are by the fact of

what we are part of is a narrative paradigm, which understands human being as homo narrans

(Fisher 1999: 270-272).

Sociological analysis of a narrative has a direct implication on the study of

national/ethnic dimension of collective identity and memory. It gained its strength during the

20th

century and is indebted from general spirit of deconstructionist paradigm of

(methodological) postmodernism and poststructuralism; the latter, on its part, borrowing

methodology from literal and linguistic studies and semiotics. Deconstructionist strategy

(which could be seen as a methodological premise for postmodernist theory and philosophy

dealing with the epistemology) approached existing social perceptions imprinted into socio-

cultural systems by deconstructing them and attacking (questioning) universalising,

foundational meta-narratives, scrutinizing and demonstrating complex, deep-seated aspects of

power-relations. Heuristic methodological approach of deconstructionism and the major

inquiries by Foucault, Derrida and others into the realm of power relations, language games,


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theories of knowledge and forms of representations provided the field with good

instrumentarium for the study of nationalist social practices, including politics of memory

and identity; it remains one of the central strategies in attempts to deconstruct discourses,

their language as well as commemorative discourses of social practices that lie at the very

basis of nationalism.

Hence, it could be said that the deconstructionist approach would interpret nationalism as

another manifestation of foundational, identitarian discourse (Walker 2001: 615-630).

Initial steps in this direction in the realm of cultural analysis are present in seminal works of

critical post-colonial studies (F. Fanon (1965), G. C. Spivak (1988) and others). Most

influential works were made by E. Said (1978) and Bhabha (1994) who, by introducing the

notion ofinternalisation in the context of post-coloniality, not only shed a theoretical light on

post-colonial developments and nationalist movements since 1950s-1960s but also

interestingly explored the universal binary ofdominantand marginal discourses. The latter

dichotomy is indeed important. Equally significant seems a historical aspect - post-colonial

period of the 20th

century which saw a relatively new wave of historical (historiographical)

reproduction where a narrative provides a progressive discourse on national emancipation

vis--vis the oppressive Other (here - colonizer), offering, at the same time, legitimacy for the

idea of (the need for) homogenization (as a return to the natural state of affairs disrupted by a

foreign rule and alien culture). The ever evolving tendency for homogeneity, dream of any

nation-sate, naturally was on non-reconciliatory terms with ethno-linguistic heterogeneity

of most of the emerging post-colonial states.

I would argue that the theoretical perspective on the described trend of national

emancipation and state-building should not be strictly historically isolated as the period

central for this thesis, which could be conditionally baptized as a third wave of

decolonization following the end of the Second World War and culminating by the

dissolution of Soviet Union, shares certain similar trends with it. This especially concerns the

liberal dilemma of nation-building and concomitant homogenization process (McLeod

2000: 104)

Social/Collective Memory

The first major effort to engage with the collective/social dimension of memory was

made by French sociologist and philosopher Maurice Halbwachs. He borrowed ([1926]

1950) the notion of memory from individual psychological realm and transplanted it into

sociological analysis where it represented strictly socio-cultural phenomenon - counterpart of


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individual memory - shared and distributed among individuals of collectivity, but individuals

wereunderstood strictly as members of certain social group.

Thus, social memory is mediated and socially/culturally transmissible across time and

place (generations), though never static. It is an intangible socio-cultural heritage, although

its manifestations and materializations are common practice in modern societies. This aspect

- bodily practices, corporeal manifestations, ceremonies and rituals in the process of

memorialisation and commemoration was aptly explored by Paul Connerton in his prominent

workHow Societies Remember (1989). Around the same period Pierre Nora (1989; 1996)

stressed the topographical aspect of collective remembering and contributed enormously to

the field of study. He, having concentrated on spatial aspect of remembrance and

commemoration, at the same time emphasized the essential importance of differentiating the

notions of history and memory.

Difference between history and memory. Why it matters?

Nora specified the meaning of memory as individual experience and tradition, that is,

what is witnessed and remembered by an individual, while history is just a version of past

(1996: 4). Therefore, history is an indirect memory - mediated, stored, where past is a social

construction mostly formed by present context, its needs and various factors. Social memory

is distanced and consequently abstracted from the first-hand empirical knowledge (which

might be even absent or questioned to be real). Thus, collective memory can be conditionally

characterised as a memory having no direct and immediate contact to an event, - a fragment

of past that usually cannot be observed and memorized in direct way but is still mediated and

shaped by textual, visual and other forms (Wertsch 2002: 5). To rephrase Peter Novick (1999:

3,4), collective memory is disinterested or/and unable to understand the original context of

historical event, it simplifies and explains things in less sophisticated and intellectual way.

Narrative text here should be understood as not just the chronicle of events but the intrinsic

impulse for moralising the content (White 1978: 12-13), and giving legitimacy to existing

socio-political order.

Although differentiation ofcollective memory and history is undoubtedly possible, one

aspect of the interrelation between the two should be noted for future discussion, as it has a

direct and crucial implication on national narrative and discourse. Traditional understanding

is that history represents a craft of historians, the practise of scientific historical enquiry, an

endeavour for critical, impersonal study of the past while collective memory is a personal

(hereperson - individual who is inevitably a member and sharer of the heritage of collective


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social knowledge and tradition) perception in which past is chaotic, not necessary linear or

organized, that is, somewhat timeless (Halbwachs [1926] 1950: 78). Unlike memory, history

is critical, self-conscious, in the hands of professionalised intellectual class - academic

practitioners (Nora 1989, 8, 9). Indeed, collective memory is somehow ahistorical (Lyotard

1984: 21) and mythological, but so is national history in its purest. Hence, the central point of

interest is not the ideal incompatibility of the two in terms of categories, but their

interweaving similarity in the practice, in terms of social agency and cultural production: in

order to understand the nature of historical narrative, one should take into account a generic

character of memory industry operating on the level of nation (as a cultural or political

community). The latter represents a specific form of modernised political project where

urbanisation and the development of the culture of citizenship brings about the necessity to

respond to the challenge of cultural uprootedness and social anomy with the production of

collective, shared identity. In this very enterprise of homogenization the biggest part of

professional historians and intellectuals are those who establish the national historical

narrative and hence collective, public memory according to national discourse and identity

(Potter 1962: 924-950; see also Berger et.al. 1999). As national historical narrative is

influenced by collective (nationalist) aspirations and identity (and vice versa), ideal

distinction between emotional, imaginative past/memory and intellectual, critical history

seems to be blurred. The latter is frequently compromised by the discursive historicism of

collective ideological aspirations, especially when the institutionalization (or major

reformation) of national history is under way.

The understanding of memory/collective history (past) is close to Smiths (2003: 169)

notion ofethnohistory. The very central model of a Golden Age (aptly described by same

Smith (ibid. 190-217), predominant in most of the nationalist narrative templates which I

shall discuss in the next chapter, is usually nothing but the product of academic work.

Organized, written and distributed national histories with their structured narratives (instead

of free-floating popular folk and oral accounts) reflect the basic national discourse in a

given society and facilitate a social cohesion via elaborated and shared national identity.

Collective memory understood in the process of distribution, contestation... and selection

The taxonomy of social dimension of memory is very rich. Most of them evolve around

historical discourse sustained, promoted and mastered by dominant, hegemonic or sometimes

marginalized social groups that claim to possess objective knowledge of the past. I shall try to


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single out those that are important and operative for my future discussion.

Specifically, I concentrate on the dichotomy ofofficial memory and counter-memory.

Official memory is the result of a discourse endorsed and promoted by existing dominant

institutions and actors in a certain society/political community (Wright 1985: 5). It stands

close to Andersons description (2006: 159) of official nationalism and relevant ideology:

emanating from the state, and serving the interests of the state first and foremost. However,

in terms of nationalism and nationalist discourse, naturally state apparatus is not the only

dimension involved in its distribution and the term for this case, I would argue, should be

understood in far more flexible way, including thus intellectual elite (established academic

circles) of a society equally sharing and further promoting a discourse in public sphere.

Counter-memory and respective counter-narrative, in contrast, bears a discourse which

challenges official history and its interpretation, tries to reform and redefine its content or

elements (Assman 1997: 12) which leads to eventual contestation and counter-reaction from

master-narrative dominant in public sphere (Preston 1997: 63).

The dichotomy between the two will be applied to the discussion of Georgian society in

post-totalitarian period which brought about the disappearance of restricting official ideology

and stagnant academic mono-methodology.

As we deal with a case of specific social transformation, it seems plausible to outline the

notion ofmnemonic socialization -acentral aspect of social remembering understood as an

incessant course of negotiation and mediation (Zarubavel 1997, 87). It represents a process of

nurturing adolescent recruits of social group (here - ethnic group or nation) with major

ethno-historical narrative, explaining various aspects of social present, past and future

through the agents like education system, family, public cultural groups, historical museums,

mass-media and etc.

Mnemonic socialization implies the process of selective remembering, that is, how

certain event should be remembered (interpreted), and the tendency of omitting other facts.

In this aspect, it resembles to Ernest Renans observation on the nations ability of selective

forgetting and repression of historical errors for the sake of unity and successful nation-

building ([1882] 1990:11). Billig (1995: 38) introduced the notion of collective amnesia,

which is sometimes strategically mediated, organized and politically orchestrated as in the

cases of authoritative Marxist regimes.

Hence, what we have here is an intrinsic incompatibility of (a) the positivist utopian ideal

for disinterested historical enquiry and (b) paradigm of national mythologized narrative

which serves as a basis of national discourse, explaining the collectives destiny and other


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aspects of social life. Consequently, it is not that history is just doomed to be subjectively,

selectively constructed: every blind historiographic enterprise of telling everything that

happened would undermine and neglect the sanctity of national discourse which fashions its

homogeneity, density, superiority across time exclusively by its selective approach to past

events.

Certainly, I do not intend to discuss in depth the role of professional historians, historical

narrative production and its relation to ethno-national discourse. I shall rather attempt to show

this problem in the light of specific, Georgian post-soviet experience. From the theoretical

point of view, in this case it would be enough to underpin the assumption of socio-political,

institutional and ideological determinism of academic scholarship. The process of

professionalization of historical science (18th

and especially 19th

centuries) went in parallel of

industrialisation and the flourishing era of nation-states (White 1990:32). Academisation of

historiography was generally important trend in the history of science but, ironically, it

ultimately did not save historians from its traditional sociocultural function - representing a

class of cultural priests producing national (popular) histories (Funkenstein 1993: 20),

conversely, it did standardise this practice with more vigour and necessity. Here I would

argue again that the hope of positivists that past could be studied without any prejudice from

present circumstances and conjuncture was utopian; same scrutinized academic works done

in Rankean spirit could not help but satiate excessive public interest by engaging with

predominantly political history, producing thus, although with far better scientific

methodology, a certain narrative for national discourse (Kramer & Maza 2006: 169).

Collective (national) identity inevitably provides (influences) professional historians with

narrative vision, irretrievably affecting ones critical abilities (which could be called

analytical sobriety), giving accents in order to know (paradoxically, knowing here does not

necessarily imply the conscious ideological loyalty, choice or calculation) how and which

events, occurrences and artefacts of the past are to be interpreted (Halbwachs [1926] 1950:

44), are worthy of discussion and noting.

Examining determinist and instrumentalist vision on collective memory

Theoretical edifices erected by Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983), Hobsbawm (1983)and

others, as well as sociological study of collective memory initiated by Halbwachs,

successfully abstracted from Emile Durkheims thesis (1925) that traditional, preindustrial

societies are inclined and need to elaborate the sense of historical continuity and belonging in

order to keep political community functional and working, securing in this way collectives


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stability (Misztal 2003a). Gellner (1983: 29-37) applied this thesis to modern nation-states,

insisting that fundamental changes brought by industrialization were a catalyst for the need of

newer forms of social bonding and cementing. As noted above, Hobsbawm and Ranger

(1983) went even further with politics of memory, taking most instrumentalist approach.

Authors tried to conceptualize the fabricated character of collective perceptions which

guaranteed loyalty to the state - the practice of inventing such symbols as flags, national

anthems, collective official rituals, uniforms and etc (1983: 1-8). This approach heavily relied

on revised vision of Marxist theory of dominant ideology where apart from class; attention is

paid to the means of media, education system and academia. This instrumentalist,

functionalist approach is thought to be somewhat limited as it supposedly disregards the

following question - why certain memories work while others do not? However, I would

argue that the instrumentalist dealing with the past inherently denies the problematic

character of this question owing to the truism that not all known and documented historical

events (resource) would fit and follow the logic of nationalist discourse, - as the collective

national discourse is always imaginative and mythological, national historical narrative is

always selective and can tolerate empiricism only as far as it helps. More important for this

case seems to avoid artificial reductionism and, as noted elsewhere, not to omit the class of

cultural practitioners as in post-Soviet South Caucasus the principal axis of the

development of collective identities went in contestation with each other, endorsed by the

conflicting historical narratives where discourse on past (in)justice(s) and inflicted human

and territorial losses, as we shall see, took central function of collective claim-making. That

is what takes us to the concept of cultural trauma.

Cultural trauma theory

This theoretical perspective might help to characterise historical narratives that played

major role in shaping post-soviet collective identities and inter-ethnic relations with

minorities and neighbouring ethno-national groups.

The central element of the concept of cultural trauma is the act of commemoration, -

social cognitive re-experiencing of the past event and its value. This especially makes sense

in case of tragedy, loss, which could develop into a collective, cultural trauma. Cultural

trauma can be defined in most concise way as the signification of the fact (past or ongoing

event); it is a place where past and the masses meet in practice. In other words,

Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been

subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group


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consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future

identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways (Alexander 2004: 1).

Experiencing trauma directly affects the status quo of socio-cultural identity and

collective memory, and the latter is continuously re-visited and re-constructed. The main

essence of the theory is to study the relation between the original event and its meaning

(trauma), accentuating primarily on value and epistemological nature of the latter rather than

on its ontology; ontological aspect is present in and claimed by same discourse ethics of

collective trauma narrative, while the meaning and interpretation, social perception of the

object of memory is scrutinized, not the past event itself. Specifically, it falls within the realm

of social memory studies, not historical research. It is not about establishing the truthfulness

(or falsity) of a past event but rather revealing reasons that determine the nature of its

construction in a given manner and that make it durable on the surface of certain discourse

(Alexander 2004: 9).

Methodological-scientific basis of cultural trauma theory comes from the tradition of

psychoanalysis. The notion of trauma is borrowed from medicine and psychiatry, but

reinterpreted in absolutely different, social dimension (Sztompka 2004:167). The original

(individual) meaning of trauma is an effect of abrupt and painful event and traumatic

response of the individual affected by it. An event produces unconscious emotional fears

which leads one to repress the experience (which is a type of psychological defence), as it is

too painful and traumatic to be fully acknowledged and accepted. However, the memory

about certain event and experience is only repressed, not gone and entirely absent; moreover,

it is sometimes back and reinterpreted (this concept was initially developed by Freud in his

1896 work "On the etiology of hysteria"). Classical (individual) psychoanalysis is more

concerned with objective and true reconstruction of the past in its purest and most real ways.

In social dimension the situation is radically dissimilar: the solution, if ever sought for, is

never dependant on absolute objectivity and the key is not its full acknowledgment and

extraction from unconscious into the conscious (Alaxander, ibid, 8).

Alexander also rightly rejects rational, naturalist interpretation of trauma which is

characteristic for enlightenment thinking, claiming that the trauma is socially mediated

phenomenon, independent and not immanently ensuing from the object of interpretation as

the event, cause of trauma, might be even non-present, sometimes anticipated before or even

imagined, non-actual (loose social equivalent of individualfalse memory). Hence, there is an

attempt to distance from the theory that claims the axiology of the event itself, which could

be (ethically, morally) answered, overcome or challenged. Alexander borrows the term


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imagined from Andersons theoretical framework (1983). However, as same Anderson

noted (ibid, 6), imagined here shouldnt be equated with falsity; deliberativeness appears

to be problematic category to measure, especially as we deal with phenomenons that are not

observable and examinable through laboratory experiments. However, with regard to trauma,

it would be sufficient here to reiterate that it is the result of interpretation and representation

of event, not the direct and natural result of pain. On the other hand, not all painful and

drastic social crises are traumas in the sense of collective (social) memory (there will be an

attempt to stress on such occurrences); social crises must become cultural crises (Alexander

2004: 10), only then they became a value-point of social remembering and interpretation. The

process can be outlined in following manner:

EVENT TRAUMA PROCESS REPRESENTATION

The question of agency is important and plays crucial role as they broadcast meanings

and representations. Societies, as broad as they are, never define trauma process, they only

accept, fail to accept or reject it. As Thompson noted (1998: 21), what is interpreted,

broadcasted and represented is always connected with the ongoing social reality and present,

in a form of the need for moral/ethical and socio-political action modelled e.g. as a

responsibility to act. There could be named a number of instruments of rhetorical and

moral character that are usually stressed and collectivised; they vary from case to case:

cost/consequence of the loss, degradation of certain values, negative effect of status quo (e.g.

threat of assimilation), a need for specific action (reparation, policy, doing justice, grass-root

political mobilization), and etc.

In the realm of nationalism studies the trauma process (traumatisation; interpretation and

representation of past event) and Weberian notion of carrier groups (1868: 468-517) and

their meaning making in public sphere (Alexander 2003: 94) sheds more light on the issue

of agency. In following chapter this aspect is reiterated on the example of academic society:

class of literati and urban intelligentsia have always been one of the founders of national

movements where collective discontent and the painful events from the past become the main

tool to interpret and collectivise a new socio-cultural vision on past. This theoretical

perspective is occasionally applied in the study of the development of nationalisms in South-

Caucasian societies (Suny 1993: 53, 54) as well as in soviet (Martin 2001: 15-20) and post-

soviet politics (Beissinger 2002: 9-10); it promises interesting grounding for future studies.

Carrier groups are identified in this case with cultural nationalists, public intellectuals


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engaged in the process of trauma creation: they try to outline the nature of the pain and

victimize own collectivity in a way that the perception (pain, feeling of injustice) is

conveyed, distributed and shared by a large number of individuals. In this process the past

events are regularly interpreted and reinterpreted. The last but not least element is defining

antagonist - attributing and projecting the burden of responsibility of trauma to others

(Alexander ibid: 12-15). The later stage implies the gradual pacification of collective

mobilization of claims which enters the realm of official policy and cultural production and

practice (Alexander 2004: 22-23, Smesler 2004: 52).

As preliminary analysis suggests, recent historical narrative of Georgian nationalist

discourse are based mostly on traumatic events with relevant perceived actors and their (as

well as own) collective claims to legitimacy. The next chapter will try to elaborate more on

this matter.

.


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Georgian historical narrative and nationalist discourse

Hereby is offered the analysis of post-soviet Georgian collective memory by describing a

general template of ethno-historical narrative as well as an overview of post-independence

political discourse and its transitional character. Central is the aspect of negotiation and

reinterpretation which is especially important in the case of counter-memories of ethnic

minorities that challenge dominating national idea with its contradictory narratives and make

political discourse more disposed to legitimise itself with historical concepts. In reference to

historical narrative, several fundamental constants shall be outlined in order to demonstrate

how they have been readdressed and reformulated.

The content of the chapter is organized in several subtopics discussing different aspects

of perceived important events observed through the prism of process of signification. In some

instances I shall briefly note the paradoxical cases so characteristic for collective memory

that memorizing inherently implies parallel forgetting, unconcern, negation or fundamental

reinterpretation.

I mostly rely on works about the history of Georgia by R.G. Suny (1983; 1988), S.F.

Jones (1996) and other authors in an attempt to revisit Georgian nationalism studies from the

perspective of cultural trauma and more general concept oftraumatization. A big attention is

devoted to the contemporary political discourse in Georgia reflected in statements, speeches

and other sources.

Identifying oppressor in early Georgian national discourse

Abolition of Georgian monarchy (Lang 1957: 247) by the end of 18th century and full

annexation of the modern-day Georgian territories in the first half of following century is

generally remembered as the loss of national independence. In the narrative of Soviet

Georgian historiography these developments are offered as a mere manifestation of imperial

Tsarist policy while the latter was implicitly juxtaposed to the ideal of social revolution and

emancipation of masses (proletariat) from oppressing powers (Marxist-Leninist paradigm)

(Dumbadze 1974). Despite differences, the nationalist discourse on the abolition of the

Georgian monarchy is interpreted as an act of undermining Georgian sovereignty. After the

declaration of Georgian independence in 19914

the annexation of Georgian domains on the

verge of 18th

-19th

centuries was further articulated, in this case as a routine Russian political

behaviour, in close connection with prior violations of bilateral agreements and following

uprisings. Heavily stressed is also a failure of Russian forces in 1795 to provide necessary


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military protection to Georgian ally when Tbilisi became a victim of intervention of Agha

Mohammed Khan, Shah of Iran (Suny 1994 [1988]: 59). The event is usually presented as a

first major example of unreliability of northern Christian neighbour. On the other hand, the

role of Russia during Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878) in returning South-Eastern and

Western territories that Georgians remembered as historically Georgian lands (Lang 1962:

203) never entered public discourse.

Such a selective character of collective memory correlates with the logic of cultural

trauma theory: Russias rigid representation as the villain was unlikely to be questioned,

therefore her crucial role in regaining old Georgian territories during 1877-88 war (which

makes her an ally) is apparently less stressed, if not forgotten (in popular realm of memory),

as the moments like the mentioned case would ambiguate a traditional historical role (image)

of Russia. The character of the latter was shaped and, with a strong accent on the concept of

victimhood, was collectivised in social memory of Georgians through the public activities of

the second half of 19th

century (a period which some scholars with modernist approach

(Anderson 1983; Gillis 1994) would mark as the time of birth of Georgian nationalism and

(re-)emergence of Georgian national identity, a vision which I would generally share).

This period saw the unprecedented activism of Georgians educated in secular and

western fashion and full of progressive ideas that flourished in Russian educational centres by

that time. One of the representatives of cohort of reformism and modernity was prominent

publicist, social critic and lawyer Ilia Chavchavadze, who is considered as the founding

father of modern Georgian nation (Wheatley 2005: 215). Chavchavadze and his like-minded

companions, cultural nationalists and social reformers, promoted the development of

public institutions and local education system (Rayfield 2000: 173-174), fostering at the same

time the all-Georgian, national identity under the trinity formula fatherland, language, faith

(Darchiashvili 2002: 127;) which would transgress different socio-economic classes of ethnic

Georgians (King 2008: 148-149). However, eventually these circles failed to enter active

political arena and consolidate its forces; they ultimately lost to the generation of 1890s,

returnees from Russian and European centres inspired by radical social-democratic doctrines

(Suny 1988: 147-164).

While the mentioned failure could be explained by the feeble character of Georgian

middle class (Suny 1988: 115), here important is another question: aspiration of 19th

century

nationalists for uniting Georgians as a nation with shared identity was accompanied by the

recognition of main oppressors and groups that impeded nations ideals. They were fiercely

confronted by traditionalist Georgian gentry, military careerists working as state servants


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in Russian bureaucracy and also by emerging generation of popular Marxists. Nevertheless,

Russian hegemony was identified as a central victimizer of Georgians, while in some

instances the severe competition with Armenian urban middle class was also reflected in their

works, reinterpreted as cultural enmity (Suny 1983: 111-12; 132). In 1899 popular Georgian

newspaper Iveria publishes Chavchavadzes polemical essay Scientists of Armenians and

the Laments of the Stones where he, although mostly in politically correct manner, fiercely

criticized Armenian historical scholarship accusing them of attempting to falsify the artefacts

and monuments of Georgian cultural heritage by presenting them as Armenians. The very

first part starts with the victimization of Georgian nation and concludes with the call for

defending national prestige against offenders (Jones 2005: 87). In his autobiographical

Travelers' Diaries (1861) Chavchavadze (1861) highlighted the stagnation of Russian social

life while at the same time let a native Georgian ordinary mountaineer speak about his

feelings that rejected the Russian rule.

Hence, it is apparent that at its very initial development modern Georgian nationalist

movement employed the traumatic discourse and the image of victimizer concerned

minorities too: apart from the dream for independence, expressed in contemporary literature

which presents Russia as unreformed and disappointingly pseudo-European political space

where Georgian nation is oppressed, Armenians are equally externalized while being

identified as a main cultural contenders threatening traditional Georgian cultural heritage and

historical past.

Soviet period

The first half of the 20th century saw the dominance of popular right-wing branch of

socialist ideology in South Caucasian societies. They were confronted by Russia-based

revolutionary socialists who prevailed throughout the territory of former Tsarist Russia. This

is important to note in order to emphasize the gap between Georgian national movement of

late 19th

century and the creation of first Georgian sovereign state: Chavchavadzes ideal for

the national self-rule was mostly dormant or at least out of political discourse until the

Bolshevik revolution of 1917 headed by Lenin. This shift dictated Georgian social-democrats

(Mensheviks) to ally with their ideological counterparts of South Caucasus region and later

follow individual route of nation-building and independence since 1918 (Lang 1962: 204-

208). In 1921 Georgia was occupied by Bolshevist Russias Red Army (Conquest 1968) and

we shall see later how this even was reflected in social memory of Georgians.


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The phase encompassing 70 years of Soviet rule should be overviewed in a few detail.

Most importantly, Soviet system only reformed political organization of pre-existing

Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921). After the uprisings and unsuccessful acts of

defiance (most notable 1924 uprising, (Suny 1988: 418) and the World War II the nature of

Georgian nationalism seems ambivalent and needs further study. However, from the 9th

of

March, 1956 Tbilisi demonstrations, when Georgians protested against Khrushchevs

criticism of ethnic Georgian Stalin (as it was interpreted as an insult on whole nation

(Minahan 1998: 120), one could speculate about Georgian nationalisms re-directed

character at that time instead of long-forgotten independence as a reference point revolved

around victimhood, the latter notion (paradigm) was dropped in favour of banal national pride

embodied in the cult of Stalin. However, later collective ethno-national conservatism became

more sensitive on the background of Russification trends in language policy of Soviet

Kremlin: 1978 events, when Georgians opposed to the removal of the status of Georgian as

official language from Georgian SSR constitution, became the first popular political

resistance against the centre (Moscow) which achieved success (Grenoble 2003: 118-119).

Hence, it could be said that the triumphal victory (although claiming many lives) in

World War II and the successive strengthening of the cult of the leader (if not leaders,

provided we also add the influential security chief of USSR L. Beria to the list) of Georgian

origin could somehow quell the collective feeling of oppression and perception of national

subjugation. However, since the beginning of destalinization process and incessant practice

of revision of Soviet heroes, leaders and, generally, of the whole recent Soviet past (aptly

observed by Wertsch 2002: 76-82) did not substantially delegitimise communist ideology at

once but surely provided a more appropriate ground for national discontent in Georgia.

Moreover, relative liberalization of public and intellectual life in post-authoritative

totalitarian super-state produced further opportunities: Khrushchevs policy ofKorenizatsiya

(indigenization, nativisation), which aimed at developing new generation of

nomenclature (nomenklatura) and apt local elites, effectively ethno-territorialized political

space of USSR (Goldenberg 1994: 41; Jones & Parsons 1996: 296). Subsequently,

introduction of local languages in administration and educational system invigorated the

development of intellectual elites concentrated in writers unions and universities (Strayer

1998: 72-73; Sakwa 1999: 144-145). They were engaged with reproduction of historical

national narratives of localities that were later widely distributed and entered the realm of

collective memories of minorities.


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By the decline of Soviet Union these semi-institutionalized (partially penetrated in still

highly centralized education system) national narratives became anti-Soviet counter-

narratives (although criticism of soviet rule varies from case to case and is selective), hence,

responsible and the oppressor later was easily transformed and generalized to include

Soviet rule. Furthermore, counter here implies not the exclusively bilateral soviet vs. anti-

soviet dichotomy; it rather followed inherited Matrioshka-style soviet federal system

hierarchy of institutionalized nationalities, where conflictual memories, revolving around the

notion and image of victim and oppressor, assigned same significations according to

mentioned hierarchy in such a manner that e.g. self-victimizing Georgian ethnicity vis--vis

Russian political dominance was at the same time an equal aggressor in the counter-memory

of ethnic minorities in Georgia. While the cases related to the latter category will be

addressed later, here it could be stated that national narratives of minorities, collectivised and

entered in local political discourses, also relied on the concept of traumatization and

oppression.

Period of transition

Nationalist circles emerged during the perestroika and glansnost (Gorbachevs liberal

policy in economical and political life) based their demands for national independence on the

existence of sovereign state Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921). However, this

was mainly a legal argument. Certainly it entered popular discourse and served as a

legitimating element in Georgian public. Nevertheless, on the level of popular ideology and

collective memory, Chavchavadzes heritage seemed to dominate the space. One of the

influential dissident organizations by the end of 1980s was named after Chavchavadze

(Wheatley 2005: 42). Moreover, the national Church of Georgia (Georgian Apostolic

Autocephalous Orthodox Church), which was repressed during (early) Soviet times and had

close ties with nationalist dissident movement, canonized secularist Chavchavadze in 1987

(Szajkowski 1994: 44). The socialist government of 1918-1921 independent Georgia enjoyed

quite ambivalent and moderate collective fascination, apparently outshined by far more

appreciated anti-Bolshevik uprisings that followed the Russian occupation. It is also obvious

that Anti-soviet resistance was in some way personified with the name of Kakutsa

Cholokashivli, leader of Georgian guerrilla resistance of the 1920s.

Georgian nationalist circles ofperestroika period were human rights activists as much as

nationalists. Apart from the demand for political freedom, they were heavily concerned with

group (national) rights, predominantly with basic political demands: protection of national


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language and preservation of material cultural heritage (Jones 1993: 304). By the end of

1980s these public figures became popular political leaders of Georgian society that led

country to independence (restoration of independence based on the constitution of 1921) on

9th

of April 1991 and Gamsakhurdias presidency.

The choice of the date of 9 April was not random; it represents an example of politics of

memory as that day was an anniversary of crackdown and violent dispersion of anti-soviet

civil disobedience in 1989 in Tbilisi, resulting in 19 civilian deaths (Cornell 2001:161). Since

then, the site of the tragedy is a place of annual commemoration, accompanied with silent

march, bringing flowers, lighting candles and chanting.

9 April demonstration initially was a response to the separatist demand formulated in so

called Declaration of Likhni of previous month, when Abkhazians (local political elite,

intelligentsia and mobilized supporters) collectively addressed Moscow with the demand for

separation of the region from Georgia (Beissinger 2002: 301). Already by that time the

discourse of rising Abkhazian nationalism was constructed upon the collective counter-

memory with the main emphasis on Georgianization policy promoted by Beria, aiming at

demographic and cultural assimilation of Abkhazians (Slider 1985: 58). Accordingly, it

defined Georgian political centre (in alliance of mentioned ethnic Georgian leaders of

Kremlin) as the main victimizer, oppressor and persisting threat to Abkhazian national

identity.

Inter-ethnic tensions was further aggravated by-then still dissident Gamsakhurdias

exclusivist nationalist discourse which partially developed from his wider pan-Caucasian

concept, implying messianic vision on Georgian nation (spiritual mission of the latter was

to uphold its allegedly historical status of being a place of East-West cultural-spiritual

synthesis). Moreover, his main theses (Gamsakhurdia 1991), interpreting the hypothesis of

Humboldt and also Japhetic concept of Marr, presented Georgian nation as the part of the

descendants of Caucasian race concentrated in contemporary times in the region of Caucasus

(Smith 1998: 178-179). The racial-cultural entity was juxtaposed to Indo-European peoples,

newcomers, suggesting the references to Armenians, Azeris and other ethnic groups.

Gamsakhurdia did not relax his tone to ethnic minorities after he came in power (Barrington

2006: 256-258).

As it regards to the annexation of 1921, it was rediscovered as collective trauma and the

idea of being deprived of sovereignty was collectivised only by the dissolution of USSR.

However, minorities in the interpretation of this event are represented not as co-sharers of

this political tragedy but quite contrary as the integral part of the force that inflicted it on


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Georgian nation. Hence, they are equally externalized from the notion of Georgian nation.

Unlike the annexation itself, the very paradigm concerning minorities living in Georgia was

latently present and conserved throughout the Soviet period.

In mutually exclusive narratives pre-soviet and soviet-time developments became the

main resources for contestation. Scholars (Goldenberg 1994: 10; Nodia 1998: 20-23)

rightfully observe that the ethno-territorial disputes of the 1990s in Georgia in fact were

preceded by academic contestation on historical past, with collective memory wars

concerning both Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region. Contestation concerned

historical figures, toponymy and most importantly, the concept of autochthonism and

historical ownership of the territory (Toria 2006: 27-28).

In Georgian ethno-historical discourse the most radical interpretation of Abkhazian

history (presenting contemporary Abkhazians as non-indigenous population of Abkhazia)

developed by P. Ingorokva enjoyed immense popularity (Smith 1998: 55). The contradiction

is obvious also in case of Ossetians: for instance, their 1919 uprising in northern Georgia,

supported by Russians, is traditionally seen by Georgians as Bolksheviks subversive

activities and a prelude to 1921 Soviet intervention, giving the image of Ossetians as

migrated people who became a reliable force of foreign aggressors. In official soviet

historiography it was interpreted as a popular revolt against the oppressions and injustices of

the Menshevik government of Tbilisi. The Ossetian national narrative sees the named events

as an attempt to conduct genocide against Ossetian nation (Jones 1993: 290-295).

Thus, the verge of the 1980-90s saw the radical ethnicization of contending political

discourses where the idea of national guilt of the otherand historical (in)justice is the central

element. This general paradigm of development in Georgia led not only to the ethno-

territorial disputes, but, on very basic level, to the very ambiguous and ambivalent

perspective on the patria. Specifically, Georgians collective, popular identification highly

miscorrelates the civic/state borders as the former rather runs along the ethno-demographic

vision. Group solidarity, as well as the perception of traumatic events, is vastly defined by

historical wrongs in retrospective and the most vivid expression of this is cross-border

relations with kin groups outside of Georgian state.

Same kind of affiliation and solidarities define which massive event is developed into

traumatic one, which becomes the object of collective pain and burden. To be more specific,

national narratives and collective memories apparently determine present perceptions on

existing national threats and the latter, on its part, influence the process of identifying some


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events and a vision on results of certain historical developments in traumatic (or,

contrariwise, amnesiac that is, inclination to disregard and ignore) way.

Remembering and forgetting; sharing or neglecting a collective pain

Before proceeding with the discussion on ambiguous character of Georgian social

memory, I think it is necessary to revisit the interrelation of social change and the processes

of (its) interpretation.

Naturally, contemporary Georgian national historical discourse should be considered in

the light of post-communist transformation. Any kind of institutional, legal or cultural

transformation, naturally, implies important social changes. Yet here I would like to re-

emphasize Sztompkas reminder that trauma is only an indirect product of change; social life

is nothing but an incessant change (2004:158), while trauma is a logical product of

traumatisation, trauma process - giving meaning and interpreting only a part of given events.

While fundamental technological and institutional transformation, the rapid change in socio-

economic life of a society usually begets important changes in socio-cultural sphere, their

nature can never be predicted and defined in advance - collective meanings and the dynamics

of their change stimulated by the process on the background of social disorientation is

unpredictable and does not comply to any sociological paradigm of change. Social memory is

always selective and the images of the past are frequently conjured up to the service of

present needs and challenges. Georgian case is no exception. Hereby, I shall try to have a

closer look at this kind of phenomenon on several other examples.

De-facto shrinking of jurisdiction over South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia in

the first half of 1990s overshadowed collective interest towards territories that had been lost

in previous centuries, when the disintegration of feudal Georgian state led to the final loss

(Shaw & Shaw 1976: 181) of south-western territories (Tao-Klarjeti, contemporary Turkish

regions of Ardahan, Artvin, Kars, Erzurum); those are perceived as a birthplace and

geographic origin of Georgian statehood (Berdzenishvili et.al. 1962: 129). However, the

interest never faded away entirely, especially as there is an ethnic kin living on the

historical lands of Georgia. Laz people, ethnic group populated in coastal zone of the

mentioned Turkish area, are linguistically connected with one of the constituent groups of

Georgian nation, namely Mingrelians (western Georgia) that share common Georgian

national identity (Cornell 2001: 49). Consequently, both factors (territorial identification with

the past and ethnic brethren) determine a vivid curiosity of Georgian public to this Turkish

region, expressed in recent past with the intensification of intercultural ties, especially


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through folk music festivals (Information for the Press, 2006) and academic/tourist

expeditions aiming at visiting old Georgian architectural monuments. The history and

contemporary life of Laz community was also depicted in highly-televised Georgian

documentaries like Gelino, Mystic Colchis (Kalandia 2007) and others. A major tragic

event stressed in Georgian historiography is also the mass exile of Georgians of Kakheti

region (Eastern Georgia) to Iran by Shah Abbas about 400 years ago (Suny 1994 [1988]: 50-

51). Nowadays their descendents represent a semi-assimilated community concentrated in

Western part of Isfahan province (Oberling 1963: 128-33).

This homogenously shared fascination for historical relatives of a nation can be

juxtaposed to a case which generates asymmetrically developed collective feelings,

characterized by a high degree of ambivalence producing mutually exclusive attitudes and

discourse. The issue of Meskhetian Turks is such a case.

Meskhetian Turks represent a Muslim population (or second and third generation of that

population) of Southwest Georgia banished to Central Asian republics by the order of Stalin

in 1944. A part of these communities strive for re-immigration back to their initial habitat.

The gross violation of human rights and the tragic events that followed their life in exile

never developed into what has been previously defined as cultural trauma in the domain of

Georgian public life. The question of their repatriation, although declared to be a

responsibility of Georgian government with the support and supervision of Council of Europe

(Opinion No. 209, 1999), is met with suspicion (Burjanadze meets, 2007). Fiercer was

initial reaction in 1991, when President Gamsakhurdia, previously an avid supporter of their

repatriation (Cornell 1994: 183), sternly opposed Meskhetians campaign for the return

(Khazanov 1995: 208). Among the arguments of those that are resisting to the initiative are

the allegations based on historical reasoning, namely a memory of pan-Turkish policy and,

more commonly, speculation on their non-Georgian identity, presenting them as others

(Szporluk 1994: 249; Khurbanov & Khurbanov 1995: 237). Efforts of different groups and

individuals5

in Georgia to defend and lobby the interests of Muslim Meskhetian makes a

typical case of (unsuccessful) attempt to collectivise immigrants trauma in Georgian society

proper. The prevailing idea that while facing the loss of jurisdiction over certain regions any

initiative that bears potential of further instability should be avoided prevented (Cornell 2001:

183) trauma process to homogenize public opinion, disabling agents in mediation to

collectivise their tragedy. Collective trauma occurs when the concept of loss and injustice is

shared by a number of people seeing themselves in similar condition or at least having an


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equal feeling of being victimized and facing common obligation (Sztompka 2004:160).

Instead, this instance makes massive rather than cultural trauma.

Perhaps the recent documentary of Chagelishvili, Meskhetians (2008) can be seen as

a continuing attempt to enter the debate. The documentary offers tragic narrative partially

told by same displaced Meskhetian respondents (predominantly residing in Central Asian

countries), most of them still preserving some of the basic cultural traits (limited knowledge

of Georgian language, poetry, recollections on original region of residence and etc.) and

hesitantly or otherwise identifying themselves as Georgians. There are shown also the

examples of a number of successful re-emigration in small numbers while stressing on the

safe character of the initiative of repatriation. Safety here relates to the general, popular

political (and collectivised) thesis (mentioned recently) of state securitization in post-

socialist countries where there is a primacy of state security and territorial integrity over the

rights of minority groups. It is determined by specific geopolitical situation or, more

interestingly, by collective perceptions on it, social sentiments and perceived fears (Kymlicka

2002: 20). Consequently, there is a possibility to speculate that this might be an example

when the perceived threats inherently dictates to the formation of specific collective attitude

which would forget, ignore and disregard, even deny and reinterpret the traumatic

discourse that, in similar other cases, are accepted and shared as a common cultural trauma.

Analogous, although less radical case would be also a tragedy of mukhadzhirstvo a

case in the history of Abkhazians and other groups of Caucasus region massive immigration

of Muslim population after the establishment of Russian military dominance in 1964 in the

region. It is commemorated but not reinterpreted for present realities as the post-Soviet

secessionism inherently implies cultural and political orientation towards Russian space and

this (hinting at the negative historical role of Russian in Abkhazians past) would explicitly

come in contradiction to a contemporary political discourse and ideology. Contrarily, their

ethno-linguistically close neighbours in southern Russia Adighe people, together with

Middle Eastern and European immigrants, have massively mobilized their efforts since

1990s with the demand to recognize the event as an act of Genocide (Globe, 2005).

Complexities of transformation of contemporary Georgian political discourse on past

The disproportionalities among the interpretations of the past and its selective nature is

also interesting to view on the high level of politics of Georgia, where the initiatives to re-

shift collective perceptions are obvious. At the same time, as we shall see, the paradigm of


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cultural trauma and victimhood, the notions of inflicted pain and historical injustices remains

to be the central elements of public discourse on past and present.

The main promoter of specific post-Shevardnadze national idea is the head of state,

President Micheil Saakashvili. In fact, there is a two-fold tendency (of different and

overlapping categories) can be observed here: (a) immense application of historical parallels,

heavy historicism and persistence of cultural trauma in legitimization of present national

goals and (b) challenge to the mono-ethnic exclusivist collective memory.

Saakashvili tries to desacralize ethnicity and employ civic multiculturalist discourse6.

However, sacral stays a vision on national history which plays one of the central roles in the

process of legitimization of pro-European political discourse. This is interesting as much as

the latter inherently implies the preservation of anti-Soviet/anti-Russian paradigm in the

politics of memory. The reburial of the remains of Cholokashvili from French Leuville

Cemetery of Georgian political immigrants to national pantheon in Tbilisi should be seen in

this prism. The current government of Georgia, having decided to give a final rest to national

hero in the homeland which he fled, organized a ceremony of burial unprecedented with its

massive theatricalised character and official participation7, accompanied with anti-Soviet

commemorative speeches8.

Another vivid example of the politics of memory and the agency in the trauma process is

the Museum of Soviet Occupation opened on the Day of Independence in 2006. The museum

offers a rich archive of documents, photo and video material depicting the repressing decades

of soviet politics with an opportunity to hear a public lecture on recent Georgian history

(Kaylan 2007). It also provides a user-friendly web-site with a rich online database

(http://archive.security.gov.ge/okupaciis.html): family members of repressed (imprisoned,

exiled or killed, or all three) individuals have a possibility to look up for a specific

information and also get a general picture of the process amid the dramatic visual records and

documentaries. The mass consumption of opened archival data, addressing traumatic events

of the Soviet years, fosters anti-Soviet (if not anti-Russian) popular memory and facilitates

the political and mnemonic socialization of young Georgian internet-users.

Naturally, art industry is also actively involved in the process of production of collective

memory. In fact, it always was from the very foundation years of Georgian nationalist

movement of 19th

century. This reality is testified with the case of the popular act the Jeans

Generation an account based on a true story of a terrorist act in 1983 dramatic criminal

case of several politically motivated young Georgians who attempted to hijack airplane and

escape abroad but ended up being assaulted by special forces that claimed a number of


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civilian lives (Kvanchilashvili, 2008). The story became reinterpreted as the anti-communist

saga where naive and free-spirited, desperate individuals became a victim and at the same

time, unintentionally, victimizers in their doomed attempt to break away from oppressing

political regime in a hope to reach the free world (the West). The same story is also

provided on mentioned archive hosted on the site Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs

(Plain highjackers).

Paradoxically, the anti-Russian discourse is still equated with the anti-soviet paradigm, it

did not undergo any substantial redefinition. This discourse, specifically in this case of the

1921 annexation and its alleged lingering endeavour to repeat the act continued to be a

central symbolic reference in political discourse during the 2008 Russian military

intervention which followed the renewed armed conflict between separatist Ossetian and

Tbilisi armed forces in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region. Most of the presidential speeches

commenting on ongoing crisis included the reference to Soviet annexation of 1921, making

his point for international community with relatively internationally known cases of soviet

invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 [...] soviet tanks moved into Prague in 1968 and into

Budapest in 1956 or Stalins advance to Finland in 1939 (President of Georgia met, 2008)

As for the namely Georgia-Ossetian relationships, there is a high probability that the

recent developments will leave even fewer resources for reconciliation between contesting

Georgian and Ossetian historical narratives and collective memories in the nearest future. A

heavy artillery assault by official Tbilisi on separatist forces during the mentioned 2008

conflict and alleged mass casualties returned a concept of genocide back in the Ossetian

political discourse with more vigour. While for my present purposes such a claim (South

Ossetia seeks, 2008), as well as its refutation (Osborn & Whalen, 2008) does not need to be

considered more than a part of information war, one could speculate that this interpretation

(official Tbilisis will to exterminate the whole Ossetian nation) will remain in the domain of

ethno-national Ossetian discourse and the concept of cultural trauma constructed on the

alleged attempts of Genocide with be further collectivise in social memory of ethnic

Ossetians. Much more promising seems Tbilisis undertakings in other cases, like Armenian-

Georgian relationships.

During and after the conflict, as the Bagramian battalion of local Armenians fought on

the side of secessionists in Abkhazia (Kukhianidze 1998: 115), pejorative image of

Armenians were reinforced. Although this episode did not remain for long in official Georgia

political discourse, it still firmly stays in the domain of popular memory of Georgians.

Georgian-Armenian relations as well make the case of conflicting memories that also implies


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territorial claims. Moreover, a dispute over Christian churches and cultural architectural

monuments, a theme initially emerged as early as in 19th

century, is still a common concern.

Inter-ethnic contestation is reflected in contradictory historical narratives too. For instance,

predominantly Armenian-populated southern Georgian region of Javakheti is considered as

historical part of the nation in popular memories of both groups (Nodia 2002: 34). During the

presidency of Shevardnadze local schools were supplied with textbooks from Armenia which

supposedly strengthened popular Armenian counter-narrative. A new Georgian government

came into power in 2003 obviously realized that, as Gellner puts it (2006 [1983]: 34),

monopoly on education was no less important than the monopoly on legitimate violence.

Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia has set an objective to homogenize the national

curricula, and the policy also implies stimulating representatives of the minority group to

acquire basic knowledge of official language (Texbook Tavtgavi, 2008). More

interestingly, although Georgian government is reluctant to institutionalize de facto

dominance of minority language in the region, its official policy also addressed the problem

of ethnocentric, exclusivist vision of Georgian history teaching which predisposes youth to

acquire structured emotional (negative) images of other ethnic groups. Currently such

hidden language of biases and stereotypes in school programs of history, geography and

civic education are actively studied. For instance, the analysis (Sarjveladze et. al., 2006) of

narratives of school textbooks of history circulating on 8th

and 9th

levels reveal two major

categories of we and them, including in the latter Ossetians, Abkhazians, Armenians and

others, to whom a lot of negative verbs and adjectives are applied (like resettled [in

Georgia], strangers [pejorative synonym],primitive, traitors, and etc).

---

The observation on post-communist developments and characteristics of Georgian social

memory indicates the enrichment and diversification of cultural tools in more technological

sense of the notion. Documentaries, reproducing the images on the screen with artistic

narration and moral/ethnical memory work represent cultural novelty that has a potential to

reinforce or redefine certain elements of collective memory of Georgians. As we have seen,

museum is also transgress the limits of tourism industry and, in case of Soviet Occupation

Museum, became another agent in trauma process. In overall, there is an impression that

historians are losing their monopoly on the right to narrate national history while the

historical narration itself is still certainly an undisputed, though not the unique source for

social memory.


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Conclusion

Proceeding from the discussion, it could be stated that the Georgian collective memory is

fundamentally shaped by the idea of independence and fight against Russian oppression,

aggression or threat, a discourse that entered Georgian historical narrative through literal

works and publications since Chavchavadzes generation and from its very initial period was

based on the paradigm of victimhood. After the fall of USSR this discourse re-emerged and

was strengthened by constructed vision on the loss of independence (1921), national

resistance (especially 1924 upheaval headed by Cholokashvili), political repressions (by the

agency like museums and archives) and ruthless, inhuman aggression (9th

of April, 1989).

It is also obvious that the pro-western discourse a central paradigm of cultural and

political orientation of Georgians is reinforced with heavy application of historical parallels

of the same kind that are embedded in the matrix of social memory. However, there is a

possibility to view pro-western/pro-European discourse as a by-product of anti-soviet/anti-

Russian collective sentiment, the one which has not undergone substantial changes and has

not bee revised. Moreover, it is being further fostered and collectivised by different agents,

among them by the current Georgian government in the first place.

The analysis of some of the points among listed constructed and narrated moments of

victimisation in modern history of Georgia, especially 9 April tragedy suggests that the

theory of cultural trauma seems applicable and promising conceptual framework and offers

interesting opportunities for further studies of contemporary Georgian (an not only Georgian)

nationalism. At this stage the main objective was to observe more general trends in

nationalist discourse based on historical narratives and the main conclusion is that it seems to

follow the paradigm of collective moral attribution of responsibility for oppression and

ungratefulness. It is apparent that victimisation is a basic and most general narrative

template and premise of Georgian nationalist discourse; the blame-work encompasses not

only the big Other (Russia) but also various ethnic communities of Georgia. The latter

aspect was discussed in brief, in the context of contestation. Consequently, a tendency similar

to that of Georgian nationalist discourse on past was revealed in counter-narratives of ethnicminorities. Although this demands a further study and more in-depth analysis, the general

character of nationalist discourses of Abkhazians and Ossetians equally revolve around the

traumatic events (e.g. Georgianization or genocide(s), respectively).

Hence, Georgian historical narrative is frequently challenged by ethnic minority

narratives and this makes academic works distinctively polemical, reinforcing radical


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nationalist interpretations and providing political elites and general public with a specific

discourse on collective traumas. This multiplicity of histories (read: memories) and

mnemonic battles seem to remain a prevailing paradigm in troubled inter-ethnic relations.

The character of representation of ethnic minorities in Georgian social memory is

predominantly negative and, as we have seen, it might had been originated in milder forms

during the 19th

century intellectual activism, but was mainly shaped during the soviet times,

on the background of ethno-territorial institutionalisation and the emergence of national-

cultural elites and academia.

While addressing the question of contestation and mnemonic wars, I have also touched

upon the aspect of forgetting in parallel with collective remembering is apparently a complex

and frequent occurrence. The concept of collective amnesia seems to make sense in cases like

Mukhadzirstwo or Meskhetian Turks when important social changes are neglected and

disregarded.

Although here the attempts are only

33700000 Post Soviet Georgian Nationalism Social Memory Cultural Trauma

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