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THREE HUNDRED AND SIX (306) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Culled from Significant Laws and Decisions of the Supreme Court)

Attorney EDWIN REY SANDOVAL(May 7, 2002)

POLITICAL LAW

1. Distinguish sovereignty f rom d ominion .

Held: S overeignty is the right to exercise the functions of a S t ate to the exclus ion of any other S t ate . I t i s often referred to as the power of im peri um, which i s defined as the government au thority po sse ssed by the S t ate . On the other hand, dominion, or domini um, i s t he capa city of t he S t ate to own or acquire pro perty such as lands a nd n at ur al re so urce s. (Separate Opinion,Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, EnBanc, See Footnote 86)

2. W hat w as the basis f or the early Spanish d ecrees em bracing the theory o f j ura regalia? Is this also the basis o f the d eclaration in S ection 2, Article XII o f the 1987 C onstitution that all l an d s o f the pu bl ic d omain are o w ne d b y the S tate? C onsequent l y , d i d Spain acquire tit l e over a ll l an d s in the P hi l ippines in the 16 th c entury?

Held: Dominium was th e bas i s for the e ar ly Spani sh dec ree s em bracing the theo ry of j u ra r eg ali a. Th e decl arat ion in S ec t ion 2 , Art icle XII of the 1987 C on st i t u t ion that a ll lands of the pu blic dom ain are owned by th e Stat e i s likewi se founded on dominium . I f dominium, no t im pe rium, i s th e bas i s of the theo ry of j u ra r eg ali a, then the land s which Spa in acqui red in the 16 th cen t u ry we re limi t ed t o non- priv at e land s, becau se i t could only acqui re lands which we re no t y e t pr iv at ely-owned o r occu pied by th e Fili pino s. Hence, Spa in acqui red t i t le only ove r landswhich we re unoccu pied and uncl aimed, i .e ., pu blic lands. (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in

Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc, SeeFootnote 86)

3. W hat is the Do c trine o f C onstitutiona l S uprema c y?

Held: Unde r th e do ctri ne o f c o ns t i t u t io na l sup rema c y, i f a l aw o r c o ntra ct v io l a t es a ny no rm o f th e C o ns t i t u t io n, tha t l aw o r c o ntra ct , whe the r p romu lga t ed by the l e gis l a t i ve o r b y the exe c u t i ve bra nch o r e nt e red i nt o by p ri va t e pe rso ns f o r p ri va t e pu rposes, is nu ll a nd void a nd wi thou t a ny f o rc e a nd e ff e ct. Th us, si nc e the C o ns t i t u t io n is the f u ndame nt a l , pa ramou nt a nd sup reme l aw o f th e na t io n, i t is deemed wri tt e n i n e ve ry s t a t u t e a nd c o ntra ct . (Manila PrinceHotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997] [Bellosillo])

4 . W hat are se lf- exe c uting an d non - se lf exe c uting provisions o f the C onstitution?

Held: A provision which lays down a g e ne ral principle, such as thos e f ound in Article IIof the 1987 Constitution , is usua lly not s elf-exec uting. But a provision which is comp le t e in itself and become s op e rative without th e aid of supp le me ntary or e nab ling le gislation , or that whichsupp lie s su ff icie nt ru le by me ans o f which th e right it grants may b e e njoyed or prot ec t ed, is self-exec uting. Thus a constitutiona l provision is s elf-exec uting i f the natur e and ex t e nt o f the right confe rred and the liability impos ed are f ixed by th e Constitution its elf, so that th e y can b e de t e rmined by an examination an d constru ction o f its t e rms , and the re is no languag e indicatingthat th e subj ec t is r efe rred to th e le gislatur e f or a ction. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267SCRA 408 [1997] [Bellosillo])

5 . Are provisions o f the C onstitution se lf- exe c uting or non - se lf exe c uting? W hy?

Held: Unle ss it is expre ssly provided that a le gislative act is n ece ssary to e nf orce aconstitutiona l man dat e, the pre sumption no w is that a ll provisions ar e self-exec uting. I f the constitutiona l provisions ar e tre at ed as r eq uiring le gislation inst e ad of self-exec uting , the le gislatur e would have the powe r to ignor e and practically nu llif y th e man dat e of the f undame nta l law. This can b e cata clysmic. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997][Bellosillo])



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ge ne ral law waiving th e immunity o f the stat e f rom suit is f ound in Act No. 3083 , whe re the Philippine gove rnme nt conse nts an d submits to b e sued upon any mon e y claim invo lving liabilityarising f rom contra ct , expre ss or imp lied, which could se rve as a basis o f civil action b e t wee n th e privat e parti e s. Implied cons e nt , on th e othe r han d, is conceded whe n th e Stat e itself comme nce s litigation , thus op e ning its elf to a count e rclaim or whe n it e nt e rs into a contra ct. Inthis situation , the gove rnme nt is dee med to hav e de sce nded to th e le vel of the othe r contra cting

party an d to hav e dive st ed itself of its sov e re ign immunity. This ru le x x x is not , howe ve r, without qua lif ication. Not a ll contra cts e nt e red into by th e gove rnme nt op e rat e as a waive r o f itsnon -suabi lity; distinction must sti ll be made be t wee n on e which is exec ut ed in th e exe rcise of itssove re ign f unction an d anoth e r which is done in its propri e tary capa city.

In Unit ed Stat e s o f Ame rica v. Ruiz (136 SCRA 48 7 ) , whe re the que stioned transa ctionde alt with th e improve me nts on th e wharv e s in th e nava l insta llation at Subi c Bay, we held:

The tra ditiona l rule of immunity exe mpts a Stat e f rom b e ing su ed in th e courtsof anoth e r Stat e without its cons e nt or waive r. This ru le is a n ece ssary cons eq ue nce of the principle of inde pe nde nce and eq ua lity of Stat e s. Ho we ve r, the rule s o f Int e rnationa l Law are not p e trif ied ; th e y are constant ly de veloping an d e volving. And becaus e the activitie s o f stat e s hav e multiplied, it has b ee n n ece ssary to distinguish th e m - be t wee nsove re ign an d gove rnme nta l acts (jur e impe rii ) and privat e, comme rcial and propri e taryacts (jur e ge stionis ) . The re su lt is that Stat e immunity no w ext e nds on ly to a cts jur e impe rii. The re strictive app lication o f Stat e immunity is no w the rule in th e Unit ed Stat e s, the Unit ed Kingdom an d othe r stat e s in We st e rn Europ e .

X x x

The re strictive app lication o f Stat e immunity is prop e r on ly whe n th e proceed ingsarise out o f comme rcial transa ctions o f the f ore ign sov e re ign, its comme rcial activitie s oreconomi c aff airs. Stat ed diffe re nt ly, a Stat e may b e said to hav e de sce nded to th e le vel of an in dividua l and can thus b e dee med to hav e tacit ly give n its cons e nt to b e sued onlywhe n it e nt e rs into busin e ss contra cts. It doe s not app ly whe re the contra cts r elat e tothe exe rcise of its sov e re ign f unctions. In this cas e the proj ec ts ar e an int e gra l part o f the nava l bas e which is de vot ed to th e defe nse of both th e Unit ed Stat e s an d the Philippine s, indisputab ly a f unction o f the gove rnme nt o f the highe st or de r; th e y ar e not utilized f or nor ded icat ed to comme rcial or busin e ss purpos e s.

(D epartment of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug])

11. W hen is a suit against a pu bl i c o ff i c ia l d eeme d to be a suit against the S tate? Dis c uss .

Held: 1 . The doctrine of stat e immunity f rom suit app lie s to complaints f iled against pub lic off icials f or a cts done in th e pe rf orman ce of the ir dutie s. Th e rule is that th e suit must b e re garded as on e against th e Stat e whe re the satis f action o f the judgme nt against th e pub lic off icial conce rned will req uire the Stat e itself to p e rf orm a positiv e act , such as appropriation o f the amount n ece ssary to pay th e damag e s a warded to th e plaintiff .

The rule doe s not app ly whe re the pub lic off icial is charg ed in his o ff icial capa city f or a ctsthat ar e unlawf ul and injurious to th e rights o f othe rs. Pub lic off icials ar e not exe mpt , in th e irpe rsona l capa city, f rom liability arising f rom a cts committ ed in ba d f aith.

N e ithe r doe s it app ly whe re the pub lic off icial is cle arly be ing su ed not in his o ff icial capa city but in his p e rsona l capa city, although th e acts comp lained of may hav e bee n committ ed while he occupied a pub lic position. (Ama do J. L ansang v. C A, G.R. No. 102667 , Feb. 23 , 2000 , 2 n d Di v. [Qu isum b ing ])

2. As e arly as 1 9 54 , this Court has pronoun ced that an o ff ice r cannot sh elt e r hims elf bythe ple a that h e is a pub lic age nt a cting un de r th e color o f his o ff ice whe n his a cts ar e whollywithout authority. Unti l rece nt ly in 1 99 1 (Chavez v. San diganbayan , 1 93 SCRA 282 [ 1 99 1 ] ) , thisdoctrine still f ound app lication , this Court saying that immunity f rom suit cannot institutiona lize irre sponsibi lity an d non -accountabi lity nor grant a privi le ged status not claimed by any oth e roff icial of the R e pub lic. (R ep u bl ic v. S an dov a l, 220 SC RA 124 , March 19 , 1993 , En Banc [C ampos, J r .])

12 . S tate instan c es w hen a suit against the S tate is proper .

Held: Some instan ce s whe n a suit against th e Stat e is prop e r ar e:



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1 ) Whe n th e R e pub lic is sued by nam e ;2 ) Whe n th e suit is against an unin corporat ed gove rnme nt ag e ncy;3) Whe n th e suit is on its f ace against a gov e rnme nt o ff ice r but th e case is su ch that

ultimat e liability will belong not to th e off ice r but to th e gove rnme nt.Re pu bl ic v. S ando v al, 220 SC RA 124 , March 19 , 1993 , En Banc [C ampos, J r .])

13. H as the government w aive d its immunity f rom suit in the M en d io l a massa c re , an d, there f ore ,shou ld in d emni f y the heirs an d vi c tims o f the M en d io l a in c i d ent? C onsequent l y , is the suit f i l e d against the R epu bl i c by petitioners in sai d c ase rea ll y a suit against the S tate?

Held: Pe titione rs x x x advance the argum e nt that th e Stat e has imp liedly waived itssove re ign immunity f rom suit. It is th e ir conside red view that by th e recomme ndation ma de bythe Commission f or th e gove rnme nt to in de mnif y th e he irs an d victims o f the M e ndiola incide nt and by th e pub lic add re sse s ma de by th e n Pre side nt Aquino in th e af t e rmath o f the killings , the Stat e has conse nt ed to b e sued .

X x x

This is not a suit against th e Stat e with its conse nt.

First ly, the recomme ndation ma de by th e Commission r e garding inde mnif ication o f the he irs o f the dece ased and the victims o f the incide nt by th e gove rnme nt doe s not in any wayme an that liability automati cally atta che s to th e Stat e . It is important to not e that A.O. 11 expre ssly stat e s that th e purpos e of cre ating th e Commission was to hav e a bo dy that will conduct an inve stigation o f the disorde r, de aths an d casua ltie s that too k place . In th e exe rcise of its f unctions , A.O. 11 provide s gui del ine s, and what is r ele vant to Our discussion r e ads:

1 . Its conclusions r e garding th e ex ist e nce of probab le caus e f or th e commission o f any o ffe nse and of the pe rsons probab ly guilty o f the sam e sha ll be su ff icie nt comp liance with th e rule s on pr eliminary inve stigation an d the charg e s arising th e ref rom may b e f iled direc t ly with th e prop e r court.

In effec t , what e ve r may b e the f indings o f the Commission, the sam e sha ll only se rve asthe caus e of action in th e e ve nt that any party dec ide s to litigat e his/h e r claim. Th e ref ore, the Commission is m e rely a pr eliminary ve nue . The Commission is not th e e nd in itself . What e ve rrecomme ndation it ma ke s cannot in any way bin d the Stat e immed iat ely, such r ecomme ndationnot having b ecome f inal and exec utory. This is pr ec isely the e sse nce of it be ing a f act- f indingbody.

Secondly, what e ve r a cts or utt e rance s that th e n Pre side nt Aquino may hav e done orsaid, the sam e are not tantamount to th e Stat e having waived its immunity f rom suit. Th e Pre side nt s act o f joining th e mar che rs, days a f t e r th e incide nt , doe s not m e an that th e re was anadmission by th e Stat e of any liability. In f act to borro w the words o f pe titione r x x x, it was an

act o f so lidarity by th e gove rnme nt with th e pe ople . More ove r, pe titione rs r ely on Pre side nt Aquino s speec h promising that th e gove rnme nt would add re ss th e grie vance s o f the rallyists. Bythis a lone, it cannot b e infe rred that th e Stat e has a dmitt ed any liability, much le ss can it b e infe rred that it has cons e nt ed to th e suit.

Although conse nt to b e sued may b e give n imp liedly, still it cannot b e maintain ed that such cons e nt was giv e n conside ring th e circumstan ce s obtaining in th e instant cas e .

Thirdly, the case doe s not qua lif y as a suit against th e Stat e .

X x x

While the R e pub lic in this case is sued by nam e, the ultimat e liability doe s not p e rtain tothe gove rnme nt. Although th e military o ff ice rs an d pe rsonn el, the n party defe ndants , we re discharging th e ir off icial f unctions whe n th e incide nt o ccurred, the ir f unctions ce as ed to b e off icial the mome nt th e y exceeded the ir authority. Bas ed on th e Commission f indings , the re was lack of

justi f ication by th e gove rnme nt f orce s in th e use of f ire arms. Mor e ove r, the me mbe rs o f the police and military crowd dispe rsa l units committ ed a prohibit ed act un de r B.P. Blg. 880 as th e re was unn ece ssary f iring by th e m in dispe rsing th e marche rs.



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As e arly as 1 9 54 , this Court has pronoun ced that an o ff ice r cannot sh elt e r hims elf by th e ple a that h e is a pub lic age nt a cting un de r th e color o f his o ff ice whe n his a cts ar e wholly without authority. Unti l rece nt ly in 1 99 1 (Chavez v . San diganbayan , 1 93 SCR A 282 [ 1 99 1 ] ) , this doctrine still f ound app lication , this Court saying that immunity f rom suit cannot institutiona lize irre sponsibi lity an d non -accountabi lity nor grant a pri v ile ged status not claimed by any oth e roff icial of the R e pub lic. The military an d police f orce s we re de ployed to e nsur e that th e ra lly

would be pe acef ul and orde rly as well as to guarant ee the sa fe ty o f the ve ry pe ople that th e y ar e duty-boun d to prot ec t. Ho weve r, the f acts as f ound by th e tria l court sho wed that th e y f ired at the unru ly crowd to dispe rse the latt e r.

While it is tru e that nothing is b e tt e r s e tt led than th e ge ne ra l rule that a so ve re ign stat e and its po litical sub div isions cannot b e sued in th e courts exce pt whe n it has gi ve n its conse nt , it cannot b e inv oked by both th e military o ff ice rs to r ele ase the m f rom any liability, and by th e he irsand v ictims to de man d inde mnif ication f rom th e gove rnme nt. Th e principle of stat e immunityf rom suit doe s not app ly, as in this cas e, whe n th e relief de man ded by th e suit r eq uire s noaff irmative off icial action on th e part o f the Stat e nor th e aff irmative discharg e of any ob ligationwhich b elongs to th e Stat e in its po litical capa city, eve n though th e off ice rs or ag e nts who ar e made defe ndants claim to ho ld or a ct on ly by v irtue of a tit le of the stat e and as its ag e nts an d se rv ants. This Court has ma de it quit e cle ar that eve n a high position in th e gove rnme nt doe snot confe r a lice nse to p e rsecut e or r eckle ssly injure anoth e r.

The ine scapab le conclusion is that th e Stat e cannot b e held civ illy liable f or th e de athsthat f ollowed the incide nt. Inst e ad, the liability shou ld f all on th e nam ed defe ndants in th e lowe rcourt. In line with th e ruling o f this Court in Shau f v . Court o f Appe als ( 1 9 1 SCR A 7 1 3 [ 1 990] ) , he re in pub lic off icials, hav ing b ee n f ound to ha ve act ed be yond the scope of the ir authority , maybe held liable f or damag e s. (R e pu b lic v. S ando v al, 220 SC RA 124 , March 19 , 1993 , En Banc [C ampos, J r .])

Ci t ize nship

14 . T o w hat c itizenship prin c ip l e d oes the P hi l ippines a d here to? Exp l ain , an d give i ll ustrative c ase .

Held: The Philippine law on citize nship a dhe re s to th e principle of j u s san gu inis.The reu nde r, a child f ollows th e nationa lity or citize nship o f the pare nts r eg ardle ss o f the place of his/h e r birth , as oppos ed to th e doctrine of j u s so li which de t e rmine s nationa lity or citize nship onthe basis o f place of birth.

Privat e re spon de nt Rosa lind Y bas co Lope z was born on May 16 , 1 934 in Napi e r Te rrace, Broome, We st e rn Au stra lia, to th e spo u se s, Tele sf oro Y bas co, a Filipino citize n an d native of Dae t , Camarine s Nort e, and The re sa Marque z, an Au stra lian. Histori cally, this was a y e ar b ef ore the 1 93 5 Constit u tion too k into effec t an d at that tim e, what s e rved as th e Constit u tion o f the Philippine s we re the principal org anic acts by which th e Unit ed Stat e s g ove rned the cou ntry.

The se we re the Philippine Bill of J uly 1 , 1 9 02 and the Philippine Au tonomy Act o f Augu st 2 9 , 1 9 16 , also known as th e Jone s Law.

Among othe rs, the se laws def ined who we re dee med to b e citize ns o f the Philippine Is lands. x x x

Unde r both or g anic acts , all inhabitants o f the Philippine s who we re Spanish s u bj ec ts on April 11 , 1 899 an d re sided the re in including the ir childre n ar e dee med to b e Philippine citize ns.Privat e re spon de nt s f ath e r, Tele sf oro Y bas co, was born on Jan u ary 5 , 1 87 9 in Da e t , Camarine sNort e, a f act duly e vide nced by a ce rtif ied true copy o f an e ntry in th e R eg istry o f Births. Th u s, u nde r th e Philippine Bill of 1 9 02 and the Jone s Law, Tele sf oro Y bas co was dee med to b e aPhilippine citize n. By virt ue of the sam e laws, which we re the laws in f orce at th e time of he rbirth , Tele sf oro sdaug ht e r, he re in privat e re spon de nt Rosa lind Y bas co Lope z, is likew ise a citize nof the Philippine s.

The sig ning into law of the 1 93 5 Philippine Constit u tion has e stab lished the principle of j u s san gu inis as basis f or th e acqu isition o f Philippine citize nship x x x. So a lso, the principle of j u s san gu inis, which confe rs citize nship by virt ue of blood relationship , was s u bseque nt ly re tained u nde r th e 1 9 73 and 1 9 87 Constit u tions. Th u s, the he re in privat e re spon de nt , Rosa lind Y bas coLope z, is a Filipino citize n, having bee n born to a Fi lipino f ath e r. Th e f act o f he r be ing born in Au stra lia is not tantamo u nt to h e r losing he r Philippine citize nship. I f Au stra lia f ollows th e



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principle of j us s oli, th e n at mo s t, privat e res ponde nt can a ls o claim Aus tra lian citize ns hipresul ting to h e r po ssess ion o f du al citize ns hip. (Vall e s v. COMELEC , 337 SC RA 543 , Aug . 9 , 2000 , En Banc [P urisima ])

15 . W hat are the w ays o f a cq uiring c itizenship? Dis c uss .

Held: The re are t wo ways o f acquiring citize nship : ( 1 ) by birth , and ( 2 ) bynatura lization. Th e se ways o f acquiring citize nship corre spon d to th e t wo kinds o f citize ns: the natura l-born citize n, and the natura lized citize n. A pe rson who at th e time of his birth is a citize nof a parti cular country , is a natura l-born citize n th e re of .

As def ined in th e x x x Constitution , natura l-born citize ns are thos e citize ns o f the Philippine s f rom birth without having to p e rf orm any a ct to a cquire or p e rfect his Philippine citize nship.

On th e othe r han d, natura lized citize ns ar e thos e who hav e become Filipino citize nsthrough natura lization, ge ne rally unde r Common we alth Act No. 4 73 , othe rwise known as th e R e vised Natura lization Law, which r e pe aled the f orme r Natura lization Law ( Act No. 2 9 2 7), and byR e pub lic Act No. 530 . (Antonio Be ngson III v. H RET, G.R. N o . 142840 , May 7 , 2001 , En Banc [K apunan ])

1 6. T o be natura l ize d, w hat must an app l i c ant prove? W hen an d w hat are the c on d itions be f ore the d e c ision granting P hi l ippine c itizenship be c omes exe c utory?

Held: To b e natura lized, an app licant has to prov e that h e poss e sse s a ll the qua lif ications an d none of the disqua lif ications provi ded by law to b ecome a Filipino citize n. Th e dec ision granting Philippine citize nship b ecome s exec utory on ly a f t e r t wo ( 2 ) ye ars f rom itspromu lgation whe n th e court is satis f ied that during th e int e rve ning p e riod, the app licant has ( 1 )not lef t th e Philippine s; ( 2 ) has ded icat ed himself to a lawf ul calling or pro fe ssion; ( 3) has not bee n convict ed of any o ffe nse or violation o f gove rnme nt promu lgat ed rule s; or (4) committ ed any a ct pr ejudicial to th e int e re st o f the nation or contrary to any gov e rnme nt announ ced policie s(S ec tion 1 , R.A. 53 0). (Antonio Be ngson III v. H RET, G.R. N o . 142840 , May 7 , 2001 , En Banc [K apunan ])

1 7. W hat q ua l i f i c ations must be possesse d b y an app l i c ant f or natura l ization?

Held: Sec tion 2 , Act 4 73 provide s th e f ollowing qua lif ications :

(a) He must b e not le ss than 21 ye ars o f age on th e day o f the he aring o f the pe tition;(b) He must hav e re sided in th e Philippine s f or a continuous p e riod of not le ss than t e n

ye ars;( c) He must b e of good mora l chara ct e r an d belie ve s in th e principle s un de rlying th e

Philippine Constitution , and must hav e conduct ed himself in a prop e r an d irre proa chab le mann e r during th e e ntire pe riod of his re side nce in th e Philippine s in

his relation with th e constitut ed gove rnme nt as well as with th e community in whichhe is living;( d) He must o wn r e al e stat e in th e Philippine s worth not le ss than f ive thousan d pe sos ,

Philippine curre ncy, or must hav e some known lucrative tra de, profe ssion , or lawf ul occupation;

( e ) He must b e ab le to sp e ak and writ e English or Spanish an d any o f the principal languag e s; an d

( f ) He must hav e e nro lled his minor childre n o f school age, in any o f the pub lic schoo lsor privat e schools recognized by th e Bure au o f Privat e Schoo ls o f the Philippine swhe re Philippine history , gove rnme nt an d civic are taught or pr e scribed as part o f the schoo l curriculum, during th e e ntire pe riod of the re side nce in th e Philippine sreq uired of him prior to th e he aring o f his p e tition f or natura lization as Philippine citize n.

(Antonio Be ngson III v. H RET, G.R. N o . 142840 , May 7 , 2001 , En Banc [K apunan ])

18. W hat are the d is q ua l i f i c ations un d er S e c tion 4 , Ac t 4 73, in an app l i c ation f or natura l ization?

Held: Sec tion 4 , Act 4 73 , provide s th e f ollowing disqua lif ications :



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(a) He must not b e oppos ed to organiz ed gove rnme nt or a ff iliat ed with any asso ciationor group o f pe rsons who upho ld and t e ach doctrine s opposing a ll organiz ed gove rnme nts;

(b) He must not b e defe nding or t e aching th e nece ssity or propri e ty o f viole nce, pe rsona l assau lt , or assassination f or th e succe ss an d pred ominan ce of the ir ide as;

(c) He must not b e a po lygamist or b elie ve r in th e practice of polygamy;

(d) He must not hav e bee n convict ed of any crime involving mora l turpitu de ;(e ) He must not b e su ffe ring f rom m e nta l alie nation or in curab le contagious dise as e s;(f ) He must hav e, during th e pe riod of his re side nce in the Philippine s (or not le ss than

six months b ef ore f iling his app lication) , mingled socially with th e Filipinos , or whohave not e vinced a sin ce re de sire to le arn an d e mbra ce the customs , tra ditions an d ide als o f the Filipinos;

(g) He must not b e a citize n or sub ject o f a nation with whom th e Philippine s is at war , during th e pe riod of such war;

(h) He must not b e a citize n or sub ject o f a f ore ign country whos e laws do not grant Filipinos th e right to b ecome natura lized citize ns or sub jects th e re of .

(Antonio Be ngson III v. H RET, G.R. N o . 142840 , May 7 , 2001 , En Banc [K apunan ])

19. C an a l egitimate c hi ld born un d er the 193 5 C onstitution o f a Fi l ipino mother an d an a l ien f ather va l i dl y e l e c t P hi l ippine c itizenship f ourteen (14) years a f ter he has rea c he d the age o f ma j ority?

Held: Unde r Article IV, Sec tion 1 (3) o f the 1 9 35 Constitution , the citize nship o f ale gitimat e child born o f a Filipino moth e r an d an a lie n f ath e r f ollowed the citize nship o f the f ath e r, unle ss , upon r e aching th e age of ma jority, the child elec t ed Philippine citize nship. C. A.No. 62 5 which was e nact ed pursuant to Sec tion 1 (3), Article IV of the 1 9 35 Constitution , pre scribe s th e proced ure that shou ld be f ollowed in orde r to ma ke a va lid elec tion o f Philippine citize nship. Ho we ve r, the 1 9 35 Constitution an d C. A. No. 62 5 did not pr e scribe a tim e pe riod within which th e elec tion o f Philippine citize nship shou ld be made . The 1 9 35 Chart e r on lyprovide s that th e elec tion shou ld be made upon re aching th e age of ma jority. The age of ma jority th e n comme nced upon r e aching t we nty-one (21 ) ye ars. In th e opinions o f the Secre taryof Justice on case s invo lving th e validity of elec tion o f Philippine citize nship , this dile mma wasre so lved by basing th e time pe riod on th e dec isions o f this Court prior to th e effec tivity of the 1 9 35 Constitution. In th e se dec isions, the prop e r pe riod f or elec ting Philippine citize nship was , inturn , bas ed on th e pronoun ce me nts o f the De partm e nt o f Stat e of the Unit ed Stat e s Gove rnme nt to th e effec t that th e elec tion shou ld be made within a re asonab le time af t e r attaining th e age of ma jority. Th e phras e re asonab le time has bee n int e rpre t ed to m e an that th e elec tion shou ld be made within thr ee (3) ye ars f rom r e aching th e age of ma jority.

The span o f f ourt ee n (1 4) y e ars that laps ed f rom th e time that p e rson r e ached the age of ma jority unti l he f inally expre ssed his int e ntion to elec t Philippine citize nship is cle ar ly waybe yond the cont e mplation o f the req uire me nt o f elec ting upon r e aching th e age of ma jority.

Philippine citize nship can n e ve r be tre at ed like a commo dity that can b e claimed whe n

needed and suppr e ssed whe n conve nie nt. On e who is privi le ged to elec t Philippine citize nshiphas on ly an in choat e right to su ch citize nship. As su ch, he shou ld avai l of the right with fe rvor, e nthusiasm an d promptitu de . (R e: App lication for Ad mission to th e P hi lippin e B ar, Vic e nt e D . Ching, Bar Matt e r No . 914 , Oct . 1 , 1999 , En Banc [K apunan ])

2 0. H o w may P hi l ippine c itizenship be renoun c e d ? I s the app l i c ation f or an a l ien c erti f i c ate o f registration , an d the possession o f f oreign passport , tantamount to a c ts o f renun c iation o f P hi l ippine c itizenship?

Held: Pe titione r a lso cont e nds that e ve n on th e assumption that th e privat e re spon de nt is a Fi lipino citize n, she has non e thele ss r e noun ced he r Philippine citize nship. To buttr e ss thiscont e ntion , pe titione r cit ed privat e re spon de nt s application f or an a lie n C e rtif icat e of R e gistration(ACR) an d Immigrant Ce rtif icat e of Re side nce (ICR), on Se pt e mbe r 1 9 , 1 9 88 , and the issuan ce tohe r o f an Austra lian passport on Mar ch 3 , 1 9 88 .

X x x

In or de r that citize nship may b e lost by r e nunciation , such r e nunciation must b e expre ss.Pe titione r s cont e ntion that th e app lication o f privat e re spon de nt f or an a lie n ce rtif icat e of re gistration , and he r Austra lian passport , is be ref t o f me rit. This issu e was put to r e st in th e case



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of Aznar v . COMELEC (18 5 SCRA 703 [1990] ) and in the more recen t ca se of M ercad o v .M anzan o and COMELEC ( G .R. No. 13 5 083, 307 SCRA 630, M ay 26, 1999 ) .

In the ca se of Aznar , th e Cour t r uled tha t th e mere fac t th a t h e is an Amer ican did n ot mean tha t h e is n o lon ger a Filipin o, and tha t an a pplica tion f or an alien cer tif ica t e of re gist ra tion wa s n ot t an t a moun t to ren uncia tion of his Philippine citizen ship.

And , in M ercad o v . M anzan o and COMELEC, it wa s h eld tha t th e fact th a t re spo nden t M anzan o wa s re gist ered a s an Amer ican citizen in the Burea u o f Immig ra tion and De por t a tion and wa s ho ldin g an Amer ican pa sspo r t o n Apr il 22, 1997, o nly a year bef ore he f iled a cer tif ica t e of cand idacy f or v ice- may or of M aka ti, were just a sser tion s o f his Amer ican na tional it y bef ore the t er mina tion of his Amer ican citizen ship.

Thus, th e mere fac t th a t p r iva t e re spo nden t Ros alind Y ba sco Lopez wa s a holder of an Aust ralian pa sspo r t and had an alien cer tif ica t e of re gist ra tion are n ot ac ts con stitutin g an effec tive ren uncia tion of citizen ship and do n ot mi lit a t e a ga in st h er cla im of Filipin o citizen ship.For ren uncia tion to effec tively re su lt in the loss o f citizen ship, th e sa me must b e expre ss. As h eld by this Cou r t in the af orec it ed ca se of Aznar , an a pplica tion f or an alien cer tif ica t e of re gist ra tion doe s n ot a moun t to an expre ss ren uncia tion or re pudia tion of one scitizen ship. Th e a pplica tion of the here in pr iva t e re spo nden t f or an alien cer tif ica t e of re gist ra tion , and her holdin g o f an

Aust ralian pa sspo r t, a s in the ca se of M ercad o v . M anzan o, were mere ac ts o f a sser tion of her Aust ralian citizen ship b ef ore she effec tively ren ounced the sa me . Thus, a t th e most, p r iva t e re spo nden t h ad dual citizen ship sh e wa s an Aust ralian and a Filipin o, a s well.

More over , u nder Commonweal th Act 63, th e fac t th a t a child of Filipin o p aren t/s wa sborn in an other coun t ry ha s n ot b een included a s a gr ound f or losin g o ne sPhilippine citizen ship.Since pr iva t e re spo nden t did n ot lose or ren ounce her Philippine citizen ship, p e titioner s cla imtha t re spo nden t must go th r ough th e pr oce ss o f re pa t r ia tion doe s n ot ho ld wa t er . (Vall e s v.COMELEC, 337 S CRA 543 , Aug . 9 , 2000 , En Banc [P urisima ])

21. H o w may Fi l ipino c itizens w ho l ost their c itizenship rea cq uire the same?

Answer: Filipino citize ns who hav e lost th e ir citize nship may x x x re acquire the sam e inthe mann e r provided by law. Common we alth Act No. 6 3 e nume rat e s th e three mode s by whichPhilippine citize nship may b e re acquired by a f orme r citize n: (1 ) by natura lization, (2 ) byre patriation , and (3) by direc t a ct o f Congr e ss. ( Fr i v aldo v. COMELEC, 257 S CR A 727 , Ju ne28 , 1996 , E n B a n c [P a n ga n i b a n]; An to n io Ben g s o n III v. H RET, G.R. N o . 142840 , May 7 , 2001 , E n B a n c [K apu n a n])

22 . Distinguish natura l ization f rom repatriation .

Held: N atura lization is a mo de f or both a cquisition an d re acquisition o f Philippine citize nship. As a mo de of initially acquiring Philippine citize nship , natura lization is gov e rned byCommon we alth Act N o. 4 73 , as am e nded . On th e othe r han d, natura lization as a mo de f or

re acquiring Philippine citize nship is gov e rned by Common we alth Act N o. 6 3 ( An Act Providing f orthe W ays in W hich Philippine Citize nship May Be Lost or R e acquired [19 36 ] ) . Unde r this law, af orme r Filipino citize n who wishe s to r e acquire Philippine citize nship must poss e ss ce rtainqua lif ications an d none of the disqua lif ications m e ntion ed in Sec tion 4 o f C. A. 4 73 .

R e patriation , on th e othe r han d, may b e had unde r various statut e s by thos e who lost the ir citize nship due to: (1 ) de se rtion o f the armed f orce s ( Sec tion 4 , C. A. N o. 6 3) ; ( 2 ) se rvice inthe armed f orce s o f the allied f orce s in W orld W ar II ( Sec tion 1 , R e pub lic Act No. 9 6 5 [19 53 ] ) ;( 3) se rvice in th e Armed Force s o f the Unit ed Stat e s at any oth e r time ( Sec . 1 , R e pub lic Act N o.26 30 [19 6 0] ) ; (4 ) marriag e of a Filipino woman to an a lie n ( Sec . 1 , R e pub lic Act N o. 81 71[199 5 ] ) ; an d ( 5) political and economi c nece ssity (Ibi d ) .

As distinguish ed f rom th e le ngthy pro ce ss o f natura lization, re patriation simp ly consistsof the taking o f an oath o f alle giance to th e R e public of the Philippine s an d re gist e ring sai d oathin th e Local Civil R e gistry o f the place whe re the pe rson conce rned re side s or last r e sided .

In Angat v. R e pub lic ( 314 SCR A 438 [1999] ) , we held:

[ P]ar e nthe tically, unde r th e se statut e s (r efe rring to R A N os. 9 6 5 and 26 30 ) , the pe rson de siring to r e acquire Philippine citize nship would not e ve n b e req uired to f ile ape tition in court , and all that h e had to do was to ta ke an oath o f alle giance to th e



9

Re pub lic of the Philippine s an d to r e gist e r that f act with th e civil re gistry in th e place of his re side nce or whe re he had last r e sided in th e Philippine s.

More ove r, re patriation r e sults in th e recove ry o f the origina l nationa lity. This m e ans that a natura lized Filipino who lost his citize nship will be re stor ed to his prior status as a natura lized Filipino citize n. On th e othe r han d, if he was origina lly a natura l-born citize n b ef ore he lost his

Philippine citize nship , he will be re stor ed to his f orme r status as a natura l-born Fi lipino. (Antonio Be ngson III v. H RET, G.R. N o . 142840 , May 7 , 2001 , En Banc [K apunan ])

23. W ho may va l i dl y avai l o f repatriation un d er R.A. N o . 8171 ?

Held: R. A. N o. 81 71 , which has laps ed into law on Octobe r 2 3 , 1 99 5 , is an a ct provi dingf or th e re patriation (a) o f Filipino wome n who hav e lost th e ir Philippine citize nship by marriag e toalie ns an d (b) o f natura l-born Fi lipinos who hav e lost th e ir Philippine citize nship on a ccount o f political or economi c nece ssity. ( Ge rar d o Angat v. Re pu bl ic, G.R. N o . 132244 , Se pt . 14 , 1999 [ Vitug ])

2 4 . B e f ore w hat agen c y shou ld app l i c ation f or repatriation un d er R.A 8171 b e f i l e d ?

Held: Unde r Sec tion 1 of P.D. N o. 72 5 , dat ed June 5 , 1 9 75 , ame nding C. A. N o. 6 3 , anapp lication f or r e patriation could be f iled with th e Spec ial Committ ee on N atura liz ation chaired bythe Solicitor Ge ne ral with th e Unde rsecre tary o f Fore ign Aff airs an d the Direc tor o f the N ationa l Int ellige nce Coordinating Age ncy as th e othe r me mbe rs. Although th e age ncy was de activat ed by virtu e of Pre side nt Coraz on C. Aquino s M e moran dum o f March 2 7 , 1 9 87 , it was not , howe ve r, abrogat ed . The Committ ee was r e activat ed on Jun e 8, 1 99 5 . He nce, the app lication shou ld be f iled with sai d Age ncy, not with th e Re giona l Trial Court. ( Ge rar d o Angat v. Re pu bl ic, G.R.No . 132244 , Se pt . 14 , 1999 [ Vitug ])

2 5 . M ay a natura l-born Fi l ipino w ho be c ame an Ameri c an c itizen sti ll be c onsi d ere d a natura l- born Fi l ipino upon his rea cq uisition o f P hi l ippine c itizenship an d, there f ore , q ua l i f ie d to run f or C ongressman?

Held: Re patriation r e su lts in th e re cove ry of th e orig inal nationa lit y . This m e ans that anatura lized Filipino who lost his citiz e nship will be re stor ed to his prior status as a natura lized Filipino citize n. On th e othe r han d, if he was ori g inally a natura l-born citiz e n b e fore he lost hisPhilippine citize nship , he will be re stor ed to his form e r status as a natura l-born Fi lipino.

In r e spon de nt Cruz s case, he lost his Fi lipino citize nship whe n h e re nde red se rv ic e in th e Armed Forc e s of th e Unit ed Stat e s. Ho weve r, he subs eq ue nt ly re ac quired Philippine citize nshipunde r R. A. N o. 26 30 , which pro v ide s:

Se ction 1 . Any pe rson who ha d lost his Philippine citize nship b y re nde ring se rv ic e to, or acc e pting commission in , the Armed Forc e s of th e Unit ed Stat e s, or aft e rse paration from th e Armed Forc e s of th e Unit ed Stat e s, ac quired Unit ed Stat e s

citize nship , may re ac quire Philippine citize nship b y taking an oath of a lleg ianc e to th e Re pub lic of th e Philippine s an d reg ist e ring the sam e with Loca l Civ il Reg istry in th e plac e whe re he re side s or last r e sided in th e Philippine s. Th e said oath of a lleg ianc e sha ll contain a r e nunciation of an y othe r citize nship.

Hav ing thus ta ke n th e req uired oath of a lleg ianc e to th e Re pub lic an d hav ing reg ist e red the sam e in th e Civ il Reg istry of Mang atar e m, Pang asinan in accor danc e with th e afore cit ed prov ision, re spon de nt Cruz is dee med to ha ve re cove red his orig inal status as a natura l-borncitize n, a status which h e ac quired at birth as th e son of a Fi lipino fath e r. It b e ars str e ssing that the act of r e patriation a llows him to r e cove r, or r e turn to , his orig inal status b e fore he lost hisPhilippine citize nship.

Pe titione r s cont e ntion that r e spon de nt Cruz is no longe r a natura l-born citiz e n sinc e he had to p e rform an act to r eg ain his citiz e nship is unt e nab le . [T]h e t e rm natura l-born citiz e nwas first de fined in Artic le III , Se ction 4 of th e 1 9 73 Constitution as fo llows:

Se ction 4. A natura l-born citiz e n is on e who is a citiz e n of th e Philippine s frombirth without ha v ing to p e rform an y act to ac quire or pe rf e ct his Philippine citize nship.



10

Two r eq uisit e s must concur f or a p e rson to b e conside red as su ch: (1 ) a p e rson must b e a Filipino citize n f rom birth an d (2 ) h e doe s not hav e to p e rf orm any a ct to obtain or p e rfect hisPhilippine citize nship.

Unde r th e 1 9 73 Constitution def inition, the re we re t wo cat e gorie s o f Filipino citize nswhich we re not conside red natura l-born : (1 ) thos e who we re natura lized and (2 ) thos e born

bef ore January 1 7 , 1 9 73 (the dat e of effec tivity of the 1 9 73 Constitution) , of Filipino moth e rswho, upon r e aching th e age of ma jority, elec t ed Philippine citize nship. Thos e natura lized citize ns we re not conside red natura l-born obvious ly becaus e the y we re not Fi lipinos at birth an d had to p e rf orm an a ct to a cquire Philippine citize nship. Thos e born o f Filipino moth e rs b ef ore the effec tivity of the 1 9 73 Constitution we re likew ise not conside red natura l-born b ecaus e the y a lsohad to p e rf orm an a ct to p e rfec t th e ir Philippine citize nship.

The pre se nt Constitution , howe ve r, now conside rs thos e born o f Filipino moth e rs b ef ore the effec tivity of the 1 9 73 Constitution an d who elec t ed Philippine citize nship upon r e aching th e ma jority ag e as natura l-born. Af t e r def ining who ar e natura l-born citize ns, Sec tion 2 of Article IVadds a s e nt e nce: Those who elec t Philippine citize nship in a ccordance with paragraph (3), Sec tion 1 he re of sha ll be dee med natura l-born citize ns. Cons eq ue nt ly, only natura lized Filipinosare conside red not natura l-born citize ns. It is appar e nt f rom th e e nume ration o f who ar e citize nsunde r th e pre se nt Constitution that th e re are only t wo class e s o f citize ns: (1 ) thos e who ar e natura l-born an d (2 ) thos e who ar e natura lized in accordance with law. A citize n who is not anatura lized Filipino, i.e ., did not hav e to un de rgo th e proce ss o f natura lization to obtain Philippine citize nship , nece ssari ly is a natura l-born Fi lipino. N ot eworthy is th e abs e nce in th e said e nume ration o f a s e parat e cat e gory f or p e rsons who , af t e r losing Philippine citize nship , subs eq ue nt ly re acquire it. The re ason th e ref ore is cle ar : as to su ch p e rsons , the y would e ithe rbe natura l-born or natura lized de pe nding on th e re asons f or th e loss o f the ir citize nship an d the mode pre scribed by th e app licab le law f or th e re acquisition th e re of . As r e spon de nt Cruz was not req uired by law to go through natura lization pro ceed ings in or de r to r e acquire his citize nship , he is pe rf orce a natura l-born Fi lipino. As su ch, he poss e ssed all the nece ssary qua lif ications to b e elec t ed as m e mbe r o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s. (Antonio Be ngson III v. H RET, G.R. N o .142840 , May 7 , 2001 , En Banc [K apunan ])

26. Distinguish d ua l c itizenship f rom d ua l a ll egian c e .

Held: Dual citize nship aris e s whe n, as a r e su lt o f the concurre nt app lication o f the diffe re nt laws o f t wo or mor e stat e s, a p e rson is simu ltan e ous ly conside red a nationa l by th e said stat e s. For instan ce, such a situation may aris e whe n a p e rson whos e pare nts ar e citize ns o f astat e which a dhe re s to th e principle of jus san g uinis is born in a stat e which f ollows th e doctrine of jus so li. Such a p e rson , ipso f acto an d without any vo luntary a ct on his part , is concurre nt lyconside red a citize n o f both stat e s.

Dual alleg iance, on th e othe r han d, refe rs to a situation in which a p e rson simu ltan e ous lyowe s, by som e positive act , loyalty to t wo or mor e stat e s. Whi le dua l citize nship is invo luntary , dua l alleg iance is th e re sult o f an in dividua l s volition. (M e rca d o v. Man z ano, 307 S CRA 630 ,

May 26 , 1999 , En Banc [ Me n d o z a ])

27. W hat is the main c on c ern o f S e c tion 5 , Arti cl e IV , 1987 C onstitution , on c itizenship? C onse q uent l y , are persons w ith mere d ua l c itizenship d is q ua l i f ie d to run f or e l e c tive l o c a l positions un d er S e c tion 4 0(d ) o f the Lo c a l G overnment C o d e?

Held: In in cluding Sec tion 5 in Article IV on citize nship , the conce rn o f the Constitutiona l Commission was not with dua l citize ns p e r se but with natura lized citize ns who maintain th e iralle giance to th e ir countri e s o f origin e ve n a f t e r th e ir natura lization. H e nce, the phras e dua l citize nship in R. A. No. 716 0, Sec tion 4 0(d) (Local Gove rnme nt Code ) must b e unde rstoo d asrefe rring to dua l alle giance . Cons eq ue nt ly, pe rsons with m e re dua l citize nship do not f all unde rthis disqua lif ication. Un like thos e with dua l alle giance, who must , x x x, be sub ject to stri ct proce ss with re spec t to th e t e rmination o f the ir status , f or candidat e s with dua l citize nship , it shou ld suff ice if, upon th e f iling o f the ir ce rtif icat e of candidacy, the y elec t Philippine citize nshipto t e rminat e the ir status as p e rsons with dua l citize nship conside ring that th e ir condition is th e unavoi dab le conseq ue nce of conflicting laws o f diffe re nt stat e s.

By elec ting Philippine citize nship , such candidat e s at th e sam e time f orswe ar a lle giance to th e othe r country o f which th e y are also citize ns an d the re by t e rminat e the ir status as dua l citize ns. It may b e that , f rom th e point o f view of the f ore ign stat e and of its laws, such an



11

individua l has not effec tively re noun ced his f ore ign citize nship. That is o f no mom e nt.(M e rcado v. Man z ano, G.R. N o . 135083 , 307 S CRA 630 , May 26 , 1999 [ Me ndo z a ])

28. C ite instan c es w hen a c itizen o f the P hi l ippines may possess d ua l c itizenship c onsi d ering the c itizenship cl ause (Arti cl e IV) o f the C onstitution .

Held:

1 ) Thos e born o f Filipino f ath e rs an d /or moth e rs in f ore ign countri e s which f ollow the principle of jus so li;

2 ) Thos e born in th e Philippine s o f Filipino moth e rs an d alie n f ath e rs i f by th e laws o f the ir f ath e r scountry su ch childre n ar e citize ns o f that country;

3) Thos e who marry a lie ns i f by th e laws o f the latt e r s country th e f orme r ar e conside red citize ns, unle ss by th e ir act or omission th e y are dee med to hav e re noun ced Philippine citize nship.

(M e rcado v. Man z ano, G.R. N o . 135083 , 307 S CRA 630 , May 26 , 1999 [ Me ndo z a ])

29. Does res j u d i c ata app l y in c ases hinging on the issue o f c itizenship?

Held: Pe titione r maintains f urth e r that whe n citize nship is rais ed as an issu e in judicial or a dministrativ e proceed ings , the re solution or dec ision th e re on is g e ne rally not conside red re s judicata in any subs eq ue nt pro ceed ing cha lle nging th e sam e ; citing th e cas e of Moy Ya Lim Yaov. Commission e r o f I mmigration ( 4 1 SCRA 292 [1971] ) . He insists that th e sam e issue of citize nship may b e thre shed out an ew .

Pe titione r is correc t inso f ar as th e ge ne ral rule is conce rned, i.e ., the principle of re s judicata g e ne ra lly doe s not app ly in cas e s hinging on th e issue of citize nship. Ho we ve r, in th e cas e of B urca v. R e pub lic ( 5 1 SCRA 2 4 8 [1973] ) , an exce ption to this g e ne ra l rule wasrecognized . The Court ru led in that case that in or de r that th e doctrine of re s judicata may b e app lied in case s o f citize nship , the f ollowing must b e pre se nt :

1 ) a p e rson s citize nship b e raised as a mat e rial issue in a controv e rsy whe re said pe rson is a party;

2 ) the Solicitor Ge ne ra l or his authoriz ed re pre se ntativ e took active part in th e re so lution th e re of, and

3) the f inding on citize nship is a ff irmed by this Court.

Although th e ge ne ral rule was s e t f orth in th e case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not f oreclose the we ight o f prior ru lings on citize nship. It elucidat ed that r eliance may som e how be placed on th e se ant ecede nt o ff icial f indings , though not r e ally binding, to ma ke the eff ort e asie ror simp le r. (Vall e s v. COMELEC, 337 S CRA 543 , Aug . 9 , 2000 , En Banc [P urisima ])

Ci v ilian Su p r e mac y Claus e

30. T he P resi d ent issue d Letter o f I nstru c tion (LOI) or d ering the d ep l oyment o f mem bers o f the P hi l ippine M arines in the metropo l is to c on d u c t j oint visi bi l ity patro l s w ith mem bers o f the P hi l ippine N ationa l P o l i c e in various shopping ma ll s . W i ll this not vio l ate the c ivi l ian suprema c y cl ause un d er S e c tion 3, Arti cl e II o f the C onstitution? Does this not amount to an " insi d ious in c ursion " o f the mi l itary in the task o f l a w en f or c ement in vio l ation o f S e c tion 5 ( 4) ,

Arti cl e X VI o f the C onstitution?

Held: The de ployme nt o f the Marine s doe s not constitut e a br e ach o f the civiliansupr e macy claus e . The calling o f the marine s in this cas e constitut e s p e rmissible use of militaryass e ts f or civilian law e nf orce me nt. x x x The limit ed parti cipation o f the Marine s is e vide nt in th e provisions o f the LOI itself, which su ff icie nt ly provide s th e me t e s an d boun ds o f the Marine s' authority. It is not eworthy that th e local police f orce s ar e the one s in charg e of the visibilitypatro ls at a ll time s, the re al authority b elonging to th e PN P. In f act , the M e tro Mani la Police Chief is th e ove rall le ade r o f the PN P-Philippine Marine s joint visibility patro ls. Unde r th e LOI, the police f orce s ar e tas ked to bri ef or orie nt th e so ldie rs on po lice patro l proced ure s. It is th e irre sponsibi lity to direc t an d manag e the de ployme nt o f the Marine s. It is , likew ise, the ir duty toprovide the nece ssary eq uipme nt to th e Marine s an d re nde r logistical support to th e se soldie rs.In view of the f ore going , it cannot b e prop e rly argu ed that mi litary authority is supr e me ove rcivilian authority.



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More ove r, the de ployme nt o f the Marine s to assist th e PN P doe s not unma ke the civilianchara ct e r o f the police f orce . N e ithe r doe s it amount to an insi dious incursion of the military inthe tas k of law e nf orce me nt in vio lation o f Sec tion 5[ 4] , Article XVI of the Constitution.

In this r e gard, it is not correc t to say that G e ne ral Angelo Re ye s, Chief of Sta ff of the AFP, by his a lle ged involve me nt in civilian law e nf orce me nt , has b ee n virtua lly appoint ed to a

civilian post in de rogation o f the af orec it ed provision. Th e re al authority in th e se ope rations , asstat ed in th e LOI, is lodged with th e he ad of a civilian institution , the PN P, and not with th e military. Such b e ing th e case, it doe s not matt e r whe the r th e AFP Chief actua lly parti cipat e s inthe Tas k Force Tulungan sin ce he doe s not exe rcise any authority or contro l ove r th e sam e .Since none of the Marine s was in corporat ed or e nlist ed as m e mbe rs o f the PN P, the re can b e noappointm e nt to a civilian position to sp e ak of . He nce, the de ployme nt o f the Marine s in th e joint visibility patro ls doe s not de stroy th e civilian chara ct e r o f the PN P.

Conside ring th e abov e circumstan ce s, the Marine s re nde r nothing mor e than assistan ce req uired in conducting th e patro ls. As su ch, the re can b e no insidious incursion of the militaryin civilian a ff airs nor can th e re be a vio lation o f the civilian supr e macy claus e in th e Constitution.

It is worth m e ntioning that mi litary assistan ce to civilian authoriti e s in various f ormspe rsists in Philippine jurisdiction. Th e Philippine expe rie nce re ve als that it is not av e rse toreq ue sting th e assistan ce of the military in th e imple me ntation an d exec ution o f ce rtaintra ditiona lly civil f unctions. x x x [S]ome of the multif arious a ctivitie s whe re in military ai d hasbee n r e nde red, exe mplif ying th e activitie s that bring both th e civilian an d the military tog e the r ina r elationship o f coope ration , are:

1 . Elections;2 . Administration o f the Philippine N ationa l Red Cross;3. Relief and re scue ope rations during calamitie s an d disast e rs;4. Amat e ur sports promotion an d de velopme nt;5 . De velopme nt o f the culture and the arts;6 . Conse rvation o f natura l re sour ce s;7. Imp le me ntation o f the agrarian r ef orm program;8. Enf orce me nt o f customs laws;9. Composit e civilian-military law e nf orce me nt a ctivitie s;1 0. Conduct o f lice nsur e examinations;11 . Conduct o f nation wide t e sts f or ele me ntary an d high s choo l stu de nts;12 . Anti-drug e nf orce me nt a ctivitie s;1 3. Sanitary insp ec tions;1 4. Conduct o f ce nsus work;1 5 . Administration o f the Civil Ae ronauti cs Boar d;16 . Assistan ce in insta llation o f we ath e r f orecasting de vice s;1 7. Pe ace and orde r po licy f ormu lation in local gove rnme nt units.

This un que stionab ly constitut e s a g loss on exec utive powe r r e su lting f rom a syst e mati c,

unbro ke n, exec utive practice, long pursu ed to th e knowled ge of Congr e ss an d, ye t , ne ve r b ef ore que stioned . What we have he re is mutua l support an d coope ration b e t wee n th e military an d civilian authoriti e s, not de rogation o f civilian supr e macy.

In th e Unit ed Stat e s, whe re a long tra dition o f suspi cion an d hosti lity towards th e use of military f orce f or dome stic purpos e s has p e rsist ed and whos e Constitution , unlike ours , doe s not expre ssly provide f or th e powe r to call, the use of military p e rsonn el by civilian law e nf orce me nt off ice rs is a llowed unde r circumstan ce s simi lar to thos e surroun ding th e pre se nt de ployme nt o f the Philippine Marine s. (IBP v. H on . Ronaldo B . Z amora, G.R. N o . 141284 , Aug . 15 , 2000 , En Banc [K apunan ])

The Rig ht t o a Balanc e d and He al thf ul Ecolog y

31. I s the right to a ba l an c e d an d hea l th f u l e c o l ogy any l ess important than any o f the c ivi l an d po l iti c a l rights enumerate d in the B i ll o f R ights? Exp l ain .

Held: While the right to a ba lanced and he althf ul ecology is to b e f ound unde r th e Declaration o f Principle s an d Stat e Policie s an d not un de r th e Bill of Rights , it doe s not f ollow that it is le ss important than any o f the civil and political rights e nume rat ed in th e latt e r. Such a right belongs to a diffe re nt cat e gory o f rights a ltoge the r f or it conce rns nothing le ss than s elf-



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pre se rvation an d self-pe rpe tuation , the advance me nt o f which may e ve n b e said to pr ed at e all gove rnme nts an d constitutions. As a matt e r o f f act , the se basic rights n eed not e ve n b e writt e nin th e Constitution f or th e y are assum ed to exist f rom th e ince ption o f human kind. I f the y are now explicit ly me ntion ed in th e f undame nta l chart e r, it is b ecaus e of the well-f ounded fe ar o f itsf rame rs that un le ss th e rights to a ba lanced and he althf ul ecology an d to h e alth ar e man dat ed asstat e policie s by th e Constitution its elf, the re by high lighting th e ir continuing importan ce and

imposing upon th e stat e a so le mn ob ligation to pr e se rve the f irst an d prot ec t an d advance the second, the day would not b e too f ar whe n a ll else would be lost not on ly f or th e pre se nt ge ne ration , but a lso f or thos e to come ge ne rations which stan d to inh e rit nothing but par ched e arth in capab le of sustaining life . (Oposa v. F actoran, J r ., 224 S CRA 792 [1993][ Da v id e])

32. T he P rovin c e o f P a l a w an an d the C ity o f P uerto P rin c esa ena c te d or d inan c es prohi biting the c at c hing an d/ or exportation o f l ive tropi c a l f ishes , an d imposing pena l ties f or vio l ations thereo f, in or d er to stop the i ll ega l pra c ti c e o f c yani d e f ishing w hi c h d estroys the c ora l s an d other marine resour c es . S evera l f ishermen apprehen d e d f or vio l ating the or d inan c es in q uestion c ha ll enge d their c onstitutiona l ity c onten d ing that the or d inan c es vio l ate d their pre f erentia l right as su bsisten c e an d margina l f ishermen to the use o f our c ommuna l marine resour c es guarantee d b y the C onstitution , un d er S e c tion 7, Arti cl e X III . W i ll you sustain the c ha ll enge?

Held: The prefe re ntia l right of subsist e nce or margina l f ishe rme n to th e use of marine re sour ce s is not abso lut e . In a ccordance with th e R e ga lian D octrine, marin e re sour ce s b elong tothe Stat e, and, pursuant to th e f irst paragraph o f Sec tion 2 , Article XII of the Constitution , the ir

exploration , de velopme nt an d utilization x x x sha ll be unde r th e f ull contro l and sup e rvision o f the Stat e . More ove r, the ir man dat ed prot ec tion , de velopme nt an d cons e rvation x x x implyce rtain r e strictions on what e ve r right o f e n joyme nt th e re may b e in f avor o f anyon e . What must be born e in mind is th e Stat e policy e nshrin ed in th e Constitution r e garding th e duty o f the Stat e to prot ec t an d advance the right o f the pe ople to a ba lanced and he althf ul ecology in a ccord withthe rhythm an d harmony o f natur e ( Sec tion 16 , Article II ) . The ordinance s in que stion ar e me ant prec isely to prot ec t an d cons e rve our marin e re sour ce s to th e e nd that th e ir e n joyme nt may b e guarant eed not on ly f or th e pre se nt g e ne ration , but a lso f or th e ge ne rations to come . The right to a ba lanced and he althf ul ecology carrie s with it a correlative duty to r ef rain f rom impairing th e e nvironme nt. (Tano v. G o v. S a lv a d or P . S ocrat e s, G.R. N o . 110249 , Aug . 21 , 1997)

Aca demi c F r eed om

33. M ay a university va l i dl y revoke a d egree or honor it has c on f erre d to a stu d ent a f ter the gra d uation o f the l atter a f ter f in d ing that su c h d egree or honor w as o btaine d through f rau d ?

Held: In G ar c ia v . Fa c u l ty Ad missio n C ommittee , Loyo l a Sc hoo l o f T heo l ogy (68 SCRA277 [197 5 ] ) , the SC poi nte d out that a c a d emi c f ree d om o f i nstitutio ns o f higher l ear ni ng is a f ree d om gra nte d to i nstitutio ns o f higher l ear ni ng whi c h is thus give n a wi d e s phere o f authority c ertai nl y exte nd i ng to the c hoi c e o f stu d e nts . If su c h i nstitutio n o f higher l ear ni ng c a n

d e c i d e who c a n a nd who c a nnot stu d y i n it , it c ertai nl y c a n a l so d etermi ne o n whom it c a n c o nf er the ho nor a nd d isti nc tio n o f bei ng its gra d uates .

Where it is show n that the c o nf erme nt o f a n ho nor or d isti nc tio n was o btai ne d through f rau d, a u niversity has the right to revoke or with d raw the ho nor or d isti nc tio n it has thus c o nf erre d. T his f ree d om o f a u niversity d oes not termi nate u po n the gra d uatio n o f a stu d e nt ,f or it is pre c ise l y the gra d uatio n o f su c h a stu d e nt that is i n questio n. (UP Boar d of Re g e nts v. H on . Court of App e a ls an d Arokiaswamy Wi lliam Margar e t C el in e , G.R. N o . 134625 , Aug . 31 , 1999 , 2 n d Di v. [ Me n d o z a ])

3 4 . W hat are the essentia l f ree d oms su bsume d in the term a c a d emi c f ree d om ?

Held: In Ate neo d e M a ni l a University v . C apu l o ng ( G .R. N o . 99327, 27 M ay 1993 ) , t his C ourt cite d wit h approva l t he for mu l atio n m a d e by J ustice Fe l ix Fra nkfurter of t he esse ntia l free d o ms su bsu me d i n t he ter m aca d e mic free d o m e nco mpassi ng not o nl y t he free d o m to d eter mi ne x x x o n aca d e mic grou nd s who may teac h, what may be taug ht ( a nd ) how it s ha ll be taug ht , but l ikewise who may be a dmitte d to stu d y . We have t hus sa nctio ne d its i nvocatio n by a schoo l i n rejecti ng stu d e nts who are aca d e mica ll y d e l i nque nt ( T a ngo na n v . P a no , 137 SCRA2 45 [198 5 ] ) , or a l aywo ma n seeki ng a dmissio n to a se mi nary ( G arcia v . Loyo l a S choo l of T heo l ogy , 68 SCRA 277 [197 5 ] ) , or stu d e nts vio l ati ng S choo l R u l es o n Discip l i ne . (Ate neo d e



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M ani l a University v . C apu l ong , supra . ) (Isa be lo, J r . v. P e rp e tual He lp Coll e g e of Ri z al, Inc ., 227 S CRA 595-597 , No v. 8 , 1993 , En Banc [ Vitug ])

Econo m ic Polic y

3 5 . Does the C onstitutiona l po l i c y o f a se lf- re l iant an d in d epen d ent nationa l e c onomy ru l e out f oreign c ompetition?

Held: The constitutiona l policy of a self-reliant an d inde pe nde nt nationa l economydoe s not n ece ssari ly ru le out th e e ntry o f f ore ign inve stm e nts , goods an d se rvice s. It cont e mplat e s n e ithe r economi c seclusion nor me ndicancy in th e int e rnationa l community.

Aside f rom e nvisioning a tra de policy bas ed on eq ua lity an d rec iprocity, the f undame nta l law e ncourag e s industrie s that ar e compe titive in both dome stic and f ore ignmarke ts , the re by de monstrating a cle ar po licy against a sh elt e red dome stic tra de e nvironme nt , but on e in f avor o f the gradua l de velopme nt o f robust in dustrie s that can compe t e with th e be st in th e f ore ign mar ke ts. (Tanada v. Angara, 272 S CRA 18 [1997])

T he Rig hts of I nd ig e n ous C ultu ra l C ommu n ities/I nd ig e n ous Peoples

36. E numerate the C onstitutiona l provisions re c ognizing an d prote c ting the rights an d interests o f the in d igenous peop l es .

Held: The f rame rs o f the 1 9 87 Constitution , looking ba ck to th e long de stitution o f ourle ss f ortunat e broth e rs , f ittingly sa w the histori c opportunity to a ctua lize the ide als o f pe ople e mpowe rme nt an d social justice, and to r e ach out parti cular ly to th e margina lized sec tors o f socie ty, including th e indige nous p e ople s. Th e y incorporat ed in th e f undame nta l law se ve ral provisions r ecognizing an d prot ec ting th e rights an d int e re sts o f the indige nous p e ople s, to wit :

Sec tion 22 . Th e Stat e recognize s an d promot e s th e rights o f indige nous p e ople swithin th e f ramework of nationa l unity an d de velopme nt. (Arti cle II of the Constitution , e ntit led Stat e Principle s an d Policie s )

Sec tion 5 . The Stat e, sub ject to th e provisions o f the Constitution an d nationa l de velopme nt po licie s an d programs , sha ll prot ec t th e rights o f indige nous cultura l communiti e s to th e ir ance stra l lands to e nsur e the ir economi c, social, and cultura l well-be ing.

The Congr e ss may provi de f or th e app licability of customary laws gov e rningprop e rty rights an d relations in de t e rmining th e owne rship an d ex t e nt o f ance stra l domains. (Arti cle X II of the Constitution , e ntit led Nationa l E conomy an d Patrimony )

Sec tion 1 . The Congr e ss sha ll give the highe st priority to th e e nactme nt o f me asur e s that prot ec t an d e nhan ce the right o f all the pe ople to human dignity, red uce social, economi c and political ineq ua litie s, and re move cultura l ineq ua litie s by eq uitab lydiff using we alth an d political powe r f or th e common goo d.

To this e nd, the Stat e sha ll re gulat e the acquisition, owne rship, use and disposition o f prop e rty an d its incre me nts. (Arti cle X III of the Constitution , e ntit led Social

Justi ce and H uman Rights )

Sec tion 6 . Th e Stat e sha ll app ly th e principle s o f agrarian r ef orm or st ewardship , whe ne ve r app licab le in accordance with law, in th e disposition an d utilization o f othe rnatura l re sour ce s, including lands o f the pub lic domain un de r le as e or conce ssion , sub ject to prior rights , home st e ad rights o f sma ll se tt le rs, and the rights o f indige nouscommuniti e s to th e ir an ce stra l lands. ( I bid. )

Sec tion 1 7. Th e Stat e sha ll recognize, re spec t , and prot ec t th e rights o f cultura l communiti e s to pr e se rve and de velop th e ir culture s, traditions, and institutions. I t sha ll conside r th e se rights in th e f ormu lation o f nationa l plans an d policie s. (Article X IV of the Constitution , e ntit led E ducation , Scie nce, Techno logy, Arts, Culture, and Sports )



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Sec tion 12 . The Congr e ss may cre at e a consu ltative body to a dvise the Pre side nt on po licie s a ffec ting in dige nous cultura l communiti e s, the ma jority o f the me mbe rs o f which sha ll come f rom su ch communiti e s. (Article X VI of the Constitution , e ntit led G e ne ral Provisions )

(S e parat e Opinion, K apunan, J. , in Isagani Cru z v. S e cr e tary of En v ironm e nt and Natural Re sourc e s, e t al ., G.R. N o . 135385 , D e c . 6 , 2000 , En Banc)

37. Dis c uss the I n d igenous P eop l es R ights Ac t (R.A. N o . 8371 ) .

Held: Re pub lic Act N o. 837 1 is e ntit led " An Act to Recognize, Prot ec t an d Promot e the Rights o f Indige nous Cultura l Communiti e s/In dige nous Pe ople s, Cre ating a N ationa l Commissionon In dige nous Pe ople s, Estab lishing Imp le me nting Mechanisms , Appropriating Fun ds The ref or, and f or Oth e r Purpos e s." It is simp ly known as "Th e Indige nous Pe ople s Rights Act o f 1 99 7" orthe IPRA.

The IPRA recognize s th e exist e nce of the indige nous cultura l communiti e s or in dige nouspe ople s (ICCs/I Ps) as a distinct s ec tor in Philippine socie ty. It grants th e se pe ople the owne rshipand poss e ssion o f the ir an ce stra l domains an d ance stra l lands, and def ine s th e ex t e nt o f the se lands an d domains. Th e owne rship giv e n is th e indige nous conce pt o f owne rship un de rcustomary law which tra ce s its origin to nativ e tit le .

X x x

Within th e ir an ce stra l domains an d ance stra l lands, the ICCs/I Ps ar e give n th e right toself-gove rnan ce and e mpowe rme nt (Sec tions 1 3 to 2 0), social justice and human rights (Sec tions21 to 2 8), the right to pr e se rve and prot ec t th e ir cultur e, tra ditions, institutions an d communityint ellec tua l rights , and the right to de velop th e ir o wn s cie nce s an d t echno logie s (Sec tions 2 9 to37 ). (S e parat e Opinion, Puno, J. , in Isagani Cru z v. S e cr e tary of DENR, e t a l. , G.R. No .135385 , D e c . 6 , 2000 , En Banc)

38 . De f ine " in d igenous peop l es / in d igenous c u l tura l c ommunities ."

Held: 1 . Dra wing inspiration f rom both our f undame nta l law and int e rnationa l law, IPRA now e mploys th e politically-correc t con junctive t e rm "indige nous p e ople s/indige nouscultura l communiti e s" as f ollows:

Sec tion 3. Def inition o f T e rms. - For purpos e s o f this Act , the f ollowing t e rmssha ll me an :

(i) Indige nous p e ople s/In dige nous cultura l communiti e s. - refe r to a group o f pe ople orhomog e nous so cie tie s ide ntif ied by s elf-ascription an d as cription by oth e rs, whohave continuous ly lived as organiz ed community on communa lly boun ded and def ined t e rritory, and who hav e, unde r claims o f owne rship sin ce time imme moria l, occupied, poss e ssed and utilized such t e rritorie s, sharing common bon ds o f

languag e, customs , tra ditions, and oth e r distinctive cultura l traits , or who hav e, through r e sistan ce to po litical, social and cultura l inroads o f colonization , non -indige nous r eligions an d culture s, became historically diffe re ntiat ed f rom th e ma jority o f Filipinos. In dige nous p e ople s sha ll likew ise include pe ople s who ar e re garded as in dige nous on a ccount o f the ir de sce nt f rom th e popu lations whichinhabit ed the country at th e time of conque st or colonization , or at th e time of inroads o f non -indige nous r eligions an d culture s, or th e e stab lishme nt o f pre se nt Stat e boun darie s, who r e tain som e or a ll of the ir own so cial, economi c, cultura l and political institutions , but who may hav e bee n displaced f rom th e ir tra ditional domainsor who may hav e re se tt led outsi de the ir an ce stra l domains x x x.

(S e parat e Opinion, K apunan, J. , in Isagani Cru z v. S e cr e tary of En v ironm e nt and Natural Re sourc e s, e t al ., G.R. No . 135385 , D e c . 6 , 2000 , En Banc)

2 . The IPRA is a law de aling with a sp ec if ic group o f pe ople, i.e ., the Indige nous Cultura l Communiti e s (ICCs) or th e Indige nous Pe ople s (IPs). Th e t e rm "ICCs" is us ed in th e 1 9 87 Constitution while that o f "IPs" is th e cont e mporary int e rnationa l languag e in th e Int e rnationa l Labor Organization (ILO) Conve ntion 16 9 (Conve ntion Conce rning In dige nous an d Tribal Pe ople sin Inde pe nde nt Countri e s, June 2 7 , 1 9 89) an d the Unit ed N ations (UN ) Dra f t Declaration on th e Rights o f Indige nous Pe ople s (G uide to R. A. 83 71 , published by th e Coa lition f or I Ps Rights an d Ance stra l Domains in coope ration with th e ILO and B ilance - Asia De partm e nt , p. 4 [ 1 999] - he re inaf t e r refe rred to as G uide to R. A. 83 71 ).



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I n d igenous C u l tura l C ommunities or I n d igenous P eop l es re f er to a group o f peop l e or homogeneous so c ieties w ho have c ontinuous l y l ive d as an organize d c ommunity on c ommuna ll y boun d e d an d d e f ine d territory . These groups o f peop l e have a c tua ll y o cc upie d , possesse d an d uti l ize d their territories un d er cl aim o f o w nership sin c e time immemoria l. They share c ommon bon d s o f l anguage, c ustoms, tra d itions an d other d istin c tive c u l tura l traits, or, they, by their

resistan c e to po l iti c a l , so c ia l an d c u l tura l inroa d s o f c o l onization, non-in d igenous re l igions an d c u l tures, be c ame histori c a ll y d i ff erentiate d f rom the Fi l ipino majority . I CC s / I P s a l so in cl u d e d es c en d ants o f I CC s / I P s w ho inha bite d the c ountry at the time o f c onquest or c o l onization, w ho retain some or a ll o f their o w n so c ia l , e c onomi c , c u l tura l an d po l iti c a l institutions but w ho may have been d isp l a c e d f rom their tra d itiona l territories or w ho may have resett l e d outsi d e their an c estra l d omains . (S e parat e Opinion, Puno, J. , in Isagani Cru z v. S e cr e tary of DENR, e t al ., G.R. No . 135385 , D e c . 6 , 2000 , En Banc)

39. De f ine " an c estra l d omains " an d " an c estra l l an d s ." Do they c onstitute part o f the l an d o f the pu bl i c d omain?

Held: Ance stra l domains an d ance stra l lands ar e the privat e prop e rty o f indige nouspe ople s an d do not constitut e part o f the land of the pub lic domain.

The IPRA grants to I CCs/I Ps a distinct kind of owne rship ov e r an ce stra l domains an d ance stra l lands. Ance stra l lands ar e not th e sam e as an ce stra l domains. Th e se are def ined inSec tion 3(a) an d (b) o f the Indige nous Pe ople s Rights Act x x x.

Ance stra l domains ar e all are as b elonging to I CCs/I Ps h eld unde r a claim o f owne rship, occupied or poss e ssed by I CCs/I Ps by th e mselve s or through th e ir an ce stors , communa lly orindividua lly since time imme moria l, continuous ly unti l the pre se nt , exce pt whe n int e rrupt ed bywar , f orce ma je ure or displace me nt by f orce, dece it , st e alth or as a cons eq ue nce of gove rnme nt pro jects or any oth e r vo luntary de alings with gov e rnme nt an d /or privat e individua ls orcorporations. Ance stra l domains compris e lands, inland wat e rs, coasta l are as , and natura l re sour ce s th e re in an d include s an ce stra l lands, f ore sts , pastur e, re side ntial, agricultura l, and othe r lands individua lly owned whe the r a lie nab le or not , hunting groun ds, buria l groun ds, worship ar e as , bodie s o f wat e r, mine ra l and othe r natura l re sour ce s. Th e y a lso include landswhich may no longe r be exclusively occupied by I CCs/I Ps but f rom which th e y tra ditionally ha d acce ss to f or th e ir subsist e nce and tra ditional activitie s, parti cularly th e home rang e s o f ICCs/I Pswho ar e still noma dic and /or shi f ting cultivators (Sec tion 3[a] , IPRA).

Ance stra l lands ar e lands h eld by th e ICCs/I Ps un de r th e sam e conditions as an ce stra l domains exce pt that th e se are limit ed to lands an d that th e se lands ar e not m e rely occupied and poss e ssed but ar e also uti lized by th e ICCs/I Ps un de r claims o f individua l or tra ditional groupowne rship. Th e se lands include but ar e not limit ed to r e side ntia l lots , rice t e rrace s or pa dd ie s, privat e f ore sts , swidde n f arms an d tree lots (Sec tion 3[b] , IPRA). (S e parat e Opinion, Puno,

J. , in Isagani Cru z v. S e cr e tary of DENR, e t a l., G.R. No . 135385 , D e c . 6 , 2000 , En Banc)

4 0. H o w may I CC s / I P s a cq uire rights to their an c estra l d omains an d an c estra l l an d s?

Held: The rights o f the ICCs/I Ps to th e ir an ce stra l domains an d ance stra l lands may b e acquired in t wo mo de s: (1 ) by nati ve tit le ove r both an ce stra l lands an d domains; or (2 ) bytorre ns tit le unde r th e Public Land Act an d the Land Re gistration Act with r e spec t to an ce stra l lands on ly. (S e parat e Opinion, Puno, J. , in Isagani Cru z v. S e cr e tary of DENR, e t a l. , G.R. No . 135385 , D e c . 6 , 2000 , En Banc)

4 1 . W hat is the c on c ept o f " native tit l e " ? W hat is a C erti f i c ate o f An c estra l Domain T it l e (CAD T ) ?

Held: N ative tit l e refe rs t o I CCs/I Ps pr econque st ri ght s t o l a nds a nd domai ns h e l d unde ra cl ai m o f private owne rsh i p a s fa r b ack a s m e mory r eac he s. Th e se l a nds a re dee med neve r t ohave bee n publ ic l a nds a nd a re i ndi spu ta bly pre sumed t o h ave bee n h e l d t hat wa y si nce bef ore t he Spa ni sh Conque st . The ri ght s o f ICCs/I Ps t o t hei r a nce st ra l domai ns (which a lso i nclude a nce st ra l l a nds) by vi rt ue of native tit l e sha ll be recogni zed a nd re spected (Secti on 11, I PRA).Forma l recogn iti on, whe n sol icited by I CCs/I Ps conce rned , sh a ll be e mbodied i n a Ce rtificate of

Ance st ra l Domai n Tit l e (C ADT), which sh a ll recogn i ze t he tit l e of t he conce rned ICCs/I Ps o ve r t he te rrit orie s ide ntified a nd de l i neated .



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Like a torr e ns tit le, a CADT is e vide nce of privat e owne rship o f land by nativ e tit le .Native tit le, howe ve r, is a right o f privat e owne rship p eculiarly grant ed to I CCs/I Ps ov e r th e irance stra l lands an d domains. Th e IPRA cat e gorically decl are s an ce stra l lands an d domains h eld by nativ e tit le as n e ve r to hav e bee n pub lic land. Domains an d lands h eld unde r nativ e tit le are, the ref ore, indisputab ly pre sumed to hav e ne ve r bee n pub lic lands an d are privat e .

The conce pt o f native tit le in th e IPRA was ta ke n f rom th e 1 9 09 case of Carino v. Insu larG ove rnme nt ( 4 1 Phil. 93 5 [ 1 9 09] , 2 1 2 U.S. 44 9 , 5 3 L. E d. 5 9 4) . Carino f irmly e stab lished aconce pt o f privat e land tit le that ex ist ed irre spec tive of any roya l grant f rom th e Stat e . (S e parat e Opinion, Puno, J. , in Isagani Cru z v. S e cr e tary of DENR, e t al ., G.R. No .135385 , D e c . 6 , 2000 , En Banc)

4 2. Dis c uss the c on c ept o f "j ura rega l ia " an d ho w it evo l ve d in the P hi l ippines . Does it negate native tit l e to l an d s he ld in private o w nership sin c e time immemoria l ?

Held: Ge ne rally, unde r th e conce pt o f jura r eg ali a, pri vat e t i t le to land must b e tra ced tosome g rant , expre ss or i mplied, f rom th e Span i sh Crown or i ts su cce ssors , the Ame rican Coloni al g ove rnme nt , and the re af t e r, the Phili ppi ne Re pub lic. The belief that th e Span i sh Crown i s th e origi n o f all land t i t le s i n th e Phili ppi ne s has p e rsi st ed becaus e t i t le to land must e manat e f romsome sour ce f or i t cannot i ssu e f orth f rom no whe re .

In i ts broa d se nse, the t e rm "jura r eg ali a" refe rs to roya l g rants , or thos e rig hts whichthe K i ng has by v i rtue of hi s pr e rog at i ve s. In Span i sh law, i t r efe rs to a r ig ht which th e sove reig nhas ov e r anyth i ng i n which a subj ec t has a r ig ht o f prop e rty or propr iedad. The se we re rig htse njoyed duri ng fe udal t i me s by th e ki ng as th e sove reig n.

The the ory o f the fe udal syst e m was that t i t le to a ll lands was or igi nally held by th e K i ng, and while the use of lands was g rant ed out to oth e rs who we re pe rmi tt ed to ho ld the m un de rce rta i n condi t i ons , the K i ng the ore t ically re ta i ned the t i t le . By fict i on o f law, the K i ng wasreg arded as th e origi na l propr ie tor o f all lands, and the true and only sour ce of t i t le, and f romhi m a ll lands we re held . The the ory o f jura r eg ali a was th e ref ore noth i ng more than a natura l f rui t o f conque st.

The Reg ali an th e ory, howe ve r, doe s not n eg at e nat i ve t i t le to lands h eld i n pr i vat e owne rsh i p s i nce t i me i mme mori al. In th e landmark case of Cari no v. Insu lar Gove rnme nt ( 4 1Phil. 93 5 , 212 U. S. 44 9 , 5 3 L. E d. 5 9 4 [1909] ) , the Uni t ed Stat e s Supre me Court , re ve rs i ng the deci si on o f the pre-w ar Phili ppi ne Supre me Court , made the f ollowi ng pronoun ce me nt :

x x x E ve ry pr e sumpt i on i s an d oug ht to b e take n a g ai nst th e Gove rnme nt i n acase like the pre se nt. It m ig ht , pe rhaps , be prop e r an d sufficie nt to say that whe n, asf ar ba ck as t e st i mony or m e mory g oe s, the land has b ee n h eld by i ndi vidua ls un de r aclai m o f pri vat e owne rsh i p, i t will be pre sumed to hav e bee n h eld i n th e sam e way f rombef ore the Span i sh conque st , and ne ve r to hav e bee n pub lic land. x x x ( Car i no v.Insu lar Gove rnme nt , supra not e 7 5 , at 9 4 1 )

The abov e ruli ng i nst i tut i ona li zed the recog ni t i on o f the exi st e nce of nat i ve t i t le to land, or o wne rsh i p o f land by F ili pi nos by v i rtue of poss e ss i on un de r a clai m o f owne rsh i p s i nce t i me i mme mor i al and i nde pe nde nt o f any g rant f rom th e Span i sh Crown, as an exce pt i on to th e the oryof jura r eg ali a.

X x x

Car i no was decided by th e U.S. Supre me Court i n 1909 , at a t i me whe n deci si ons o f the U.S. Court we re bi ndi ng as pr ecede nt i n our jur i sdict i on ( Sec t i on 10 , Phili ppi ne Bill of 1902 ) . We app lied the Car i no doctri ne i n th e 19 4 6 case of Oh Cho v. Di rec tor o f Lands (7 5 Phil. 890 [19 4 6 ] ) , whe re we stat ed that "[a] ll lands that we re not a cqui red f rom th e Gove rnme nt ei the r by pur chas e or by g rant , belong to th e pub lic doma i n, but [a]n exce pt i on to th e rule would be any land that shou ld have bee n i n th e poss e ssi on o f an o ccupant an d of hi s pr edece ssors i n i nt e re st s i nce t i me i mme mor i al, f or su ch poss e ss i on would just if y th e pre sumpt i on that th e land had ne ve r bee n part of the pub lic doma i n or that i t ha d bee n pr i vat e prop e rty e ve n b ef ore the Span i sh conque st.(S e parat e Opinion, K apunan, J. , in Isagani Cru z v. S e cr e tary of DENR, G.R. No .135385 , D e c . 6 , 2000 , En Banc)

4 3. Distinguish o w nership o f l an d un d er native tit l e an d o w nership by a cq uisitive pres c ription against the S tate .



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Held: Owne rship by virtu e of native tit le pre suppos e s that th e land has b ee n h eld by itsposs e ssor an d his pr edece ssor -in-int e re st in th e conce pt o f an o wne r since time imme moria l.The land is not a cquired f rom th e Stat e, that is , Spain or its su cce ssor -in-int e re st , the Unit ed Stat e s an d the Philippine Gove rnme nt. Th e re has b ee n no trans fe r o f tit le f rom th e Stat e as th e land has b ee n r e garded as privat e in chara ct e r as f ar ba ck as m e mory go e s. In contrast ,

owne rship o f land by a cquisitive pre scription against th e Stat e involve s a conve rsion o f the chara ct e r o f the prop e rty f rom a lie nab le pub lic land to privat e land, which pr e suppos e s a trans fe rof tit le f rom th e Stat e to a privat e pe rson. (S e parat e Opinion, K apunan, J. , in Isagani Cru z v. S e cr e tary of DENR, G.R. No . 135385 , D e c . 6 , 2000 , En Banc)

The Rig h t of t he Stat e to Re co ve r Prop e rti e s Un la w fu lly Acquir ed b y P u bl ic Officia ls or E m p loy ee s

44 . Does the right o f the S tate to re c over properties un l a wf u ll y a cq uire d b y pu bl i c o ff i c ia l s or emp l oyees w hi c h may not be barre d b y pres c ription , l a c hes , or estoppe l un d er S e c tion 15 ,

Arti cl e X I o f the C onstitution app l y to c rimina l c ases f or the re c overy o f i ll- gotten w ea l th?

Held: Sec tion 1 5 , Article XI, 1 9 87 Constitution provi de s that [T]he right o f the Stat e torecove r prop e rtie s un lawf ully acquired by pub lic off icials or e mployee s, f rom th e m or f rom th e irnominee s as trans fe ree s, sha ll not b e barr ed by pr e scription, lache s, or e stopp el. From the proceed ings o f the Constitutiona l Commission o f 1 9 86 , howe ve r, it was cle ar that this provisionapp lie s on ly to civil actions f or r ecove ry of ill-gott e n we alth , and not to crimina l case s. Thus , the pros ecution o f offe nse s arising f rom , relating or in cide nt to , or invo lving ill-gott e n we althcont e mplat ed in Sec tion 1 5 , Article XI of the Constitution may b e barr ed by pr e scription.(Pr e si de ntia l Ad H oc F act -F in d ing Committ ee on B e h e st Loans, e t a l. v. H on . Aniano A.D e si e rto, e t a l. , G.R. No . 130140 , Oct . 25 , 1999 , En Banc [ Da v i de , C .J.] )

STRUC TURE O F G O VERN MEN T

Th e Doctrin e o f Sep aration o f Po we rs

45 . M ay the G overnment , through the PC GG , va l i dl y bin d itse lf to c ause the d ismissa l o f a ll c ases against the M ar c os heirs pen d ing be f ore the S an d igan bayan an d other c ourts in a C ompromise Agreement entere d into bet w een the f ormer an d the l atter?

Held: This is a direc t e ncroa chme nt on judicial powe r, parti cularly in r e gard to crimina l jurisdiction. W ell-se tt led is th e doctrine that on ce a cas e has b ee n f iled bef ore a court o f compe t e nt jurisdiction , the matt e r o f its dismissa l or pursuan ce lie s within th e f ull discre tion an d contro l of the judge . In a criminal case, the mann e r in which th e pros ecution is han dled, including th e matt e r o f whom to pr e se nt as witne sse s, may lie within th e soun d discre tion o f the gove rnme nt pros ecutor; but th e court dec ide s, bas ed on th e e vide nce proffe red, in what mann e r

it will dispose of the cas e . Juris diction, once acquired by th e tria l court , is not lost de spit e are so lution , e ve n by th e justice secre tary , to withdraw the inf ormation or to dismiss th e comp laint.The pros ecution s motion to withdraw or to dismiss is not th e le ast bin ding upon th e court. Onthe contrary , dec isiona l rule s req uire the tria l court to ma ke its own e valuation o f the me rits o f the case, becaus e granting su ch motion is eq uivale nt to effec ting a disposition o f the case itself .

Thus , the PCGG, as th e gove rnme nt pros ecutor o f ill-gott e n we alth case s, cannot guarant ee the dismissa l of all such criminal cas e s against th e Marcose s p e nding in th e courts , f orsaid dismissa l is not within its so le powe r an d discre tion. (Cha vez v. PC GG , 299 SCRA 744 , D e c . 9 , 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

D ele ga t i o n of P owers

4 6. W hat are the tests o f a va l i d d e l egation o f po w er?

Held: Empowe ring th e COMELEC, an a dministrative body exe rcising quasi -judicial f unctions , to promu lgat e rule s an d re gulations is a f orm o f dele gation o f le gislative authority x x x. Howe ve r, in e ve ry case of pe rmissible dele gation , the re must b e a sho wing that th e dele gation its elf is va lid. It is va lid only if the law (a) is comp le t e in itself, se tting f orth th e re inthe policy to b e exec ut ed, carried out , or imp le me nt ed by th e dele gat e ; an d (b) f ixe s a stan dard



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the limits o f which ar e su ff icie nt ly de t e rminat e and de t e rminab le to which th e dele gat e must conf orm in th e pe rf orman ce of his f unctions. A suff icie nt stan dard is one which def ine sle gislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boun darie s an d spec if ie s th e pub lic age ncy toapp ly it. It in dicat e s th e circumstan ce s un de r which th e le gislative comman d is to b e effec t ed .(Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 , March 19 , 1997 )

Th e Le gi sl ati ve Dep art me nt

4 7. Dis c uss the nature o f the P arty -List system . I s it , w ithout any q ua l i f i c ation , open to a ll ?

Held: 1 . The party -list syst e m is a so cial justice too l de signed not on ly to giv e more law to th e gre at mass e s o f our p e ople who hav e le ss in life, but a lso to e nab le the m to b ecome ve ritab le lawmake rs th e mselve s, e mpowe red to parti cipat e direc t ly in th e e nactme nt o f lawsde signed to b e nef it th e m. It int e nds to ma ke the margina lized and the unde rre pre se nt ed not me rely passiv e rec ipie nts o f the Stat e s be ne vole nce, but a ctive participants in th e mainstr e am o f re pre se ntative de mocracy. Thus , allowing a ll individua ls an d groups , including thos e which no w dominat e district elec tions , to hav e the sam e opportunity to parti cipat e in party -list elec tionswould de sec rat e this lof ty ob jective and mongr elize the social justice mechanism into anatro cious v e nee r f or tra ditional politics. (Ang Bagong Bayani O FW La b or Party v.COMELEC, G.R. No . 147589 , Jun e 26 , 2001 , En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

2 . Crucial to th e re so lution o f this cas e is th e f undame nta l social justice principle that thos e who hav e le ss in life shou ld have more in law. The party -list syst e m is on e such too l int e nded to b e nef it thos e who hav e le ss in life . It giv e s th e gre at mass e s o f our p e ople ge nuine hope and ge nuine powe r. It is a m e ssag e to th e de stitut e and the prejudiced, and e ve n to thos e in th e unde rgroun d, that chang e is possib le . It is an invitation f or th e m to come out o f the irlimbo an d se ize the opportunity.

Cle arly, the ref ore, the Court cannot a cce pt th e submissions x x x that th e party -list syst e m is , without any qualif ication , ope n to a ll. Such position doe s not on ly we ake n th e elec tora l chan ce s o f the margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed ; it a lso pr ejudice s th e m. It would gut th e substan ce of the party -list syst e m. Inst e ad of ge ne rating hop e, it would cre at e a mirag e .Inst e ad of e nab ling th e margina lized, it would f urth e r we ake n th e m an d aggravat e the irmargina lization. (Ang Bagong Bayani O FW Lab or Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 147589 ,

J un e 26 , 2001 , En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

4 8. Are po l iti c a l parties even the ma j or ones prohi bite d f rom parti c ipating in the party -l ist e l e c tions?

Held: Unde r th e Constitution an d RA 7941 , privat e re spon de nts cannot b e disqua lif ied f rom th e party -list elec tions , me rely on th e groun d that th e y ar e political parti e s. Sec tion 5 , Article VI of the Constitution , provide s that m e mbe rs o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s may be elec t ed through a party -list syst e m o f re gist e red nationa l, re giona l, and sec tora l partie s or

organizations.

Furthe rmor e, unde r Sec tions 7 and 8 , Article IX [C] of the Constitution , political parti e smay b e re gist e red unde r th e party -list syst e m. X x x

During th e del ibe rations in th e Constitutiona l Commission , Comm. Christian S. Monso d point ed out that th e parti cipants in th e party -list syst e m may be a r e giona l party , a s ec tora l party , a nationa l party , UN IDO, Magsasa ka, or a r e giona l party in Mindanao. x x x.

Indeed, Commission e r Monso d stat ed that th e purpos e of the party -list provision was toope n up th e syst e m, in orde r to giv e a chan ce to parti e s that consist e nt ly p lace third or f ourth incongr e ssiona l district elec tions to win a s e at in Congr e ss. He explained: The purpos e of this isto op e n th e syst e m. In th e past elec tions , we f ound out that th e re we re ce rtain groups or parti e sthat , if we count th e ir vot e s nation wide, have about 1 ,000 ,000 or 1 ,500 ,000 vot e s. But th e ywe re always thir d or f ourth p lace in e ach o f the districts. So, the y hav e no voi ce in th e Asse mbly. But this way, the y would have f ive or six re pre se ntativ e s in th e ass e mbly e ve n if the ywould not win individua lly in le gislative districts. So, that is e sse ntia lly the mechani cs, the purpos e and ob jective of the party -list syst e m.

For its part , Sec tion 2 of RA 7941 also provi de s f or a party -list syst e m o f re gist e red nationa l, re giona l and sec tora l parti e s or organizations or coa litions th e re of, x x x. Sec tion 3



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expre ssly stat e s that a party is e ithe r a po litical party or a s ec tora l party or a coa lition o f partie s. More to th e point , the law def ine s political party as an organiz ed group o f citize nsadvocating an i de ology or p lat f orm , principle s an d policie s f or th e ge ne ra l conduct o f gove rnme nt and which, as th e most imm ed iat e me ans o f securing th e ir adoption , re gularly nominat e s an d supports ce rtain o f its le ade rs an d me mbe rs as candidat e s f or pub lic off ice .

Furthe rmor e, Sec tion 11 of RA 7941 le ave s no doubt as to th e parti cipation o f political partie s in th e party -list syst e m. X x x

Indubitab ly, the ref ore, political parti e s e ve n th e ma jor on e s may parti cipat e in th e party -list elec tions.

That po litical parti e s may parti cipat e in th e party -list elec tions doe s not m e an , howe ve r, that any po litical party or any organization or group f or that matt e r may do so. Th e req uisit e chara ct e r o f the se parti e s or organizations must b e consist e nt with th e purpos e of the party -list syst e m, as laid down in th e Constitution an d RA 7941 . X x x (Ang Bagong Bayani O FWLab or Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 147589 , Jun e 26 , 2001 , En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

49. W ho are the margina l ize d an d un d errepresente d se c tors to be represente d un d er the party - l ist system?

Held: The margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed sec tors to b e re pre se nt ed unde r th e party -list syst e m ar e e nume rat ed in Sec tion 5 of RA 7941 x x x.

While the e nume ration o f margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed sec tors is not exclusive, it de monstrat e s th e cle ar int e nt o f the law that not a ll sectors can b e re pre se nt ed unde r th e party -list syst e m. X x x

[W]e stre ss that th e party -list syst e m s eek s to e nab le ce rtain Fi lipino citize ns spec if ically thos e belonging to margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed sec tors , organizations an d partie s to b e elec t ed to th e House of Re pre se ntativ e s. Th e ass e rtion x x x that th e party -list syst e m is not exclusive to th e margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed disre gards th e cle ar statutorypolicy. Its claim that e ve n th e sup e r-rich an d ove rre pre se nt ed can parti cipat e de secrat e s th e spirit o f the party -list syst e m.

Indeed, the law craf t ed to a dd re ss th e peculiar disadvantag e of Payatas hov el dwelle rscannot b e appropriat ed by th e mansion o wne rs o f Forbe s Park. The int e re sts o f the se t wosec tors ar e mani fe st ly disparat e ; h e nce, the x x x position to tr e at th e m similar ly def ie s re asonand common s e nse . X x x

While the busine ss mogu ls an d the me ga -rich ar e, nume rically sp e aking, a tiny minority , the y are ne ithe r margina lized nor un de rre pre se nt ed, f or th e star k re ality is that th e ir economi c clout e nge nde rs po litical powe r mor e awe som e than th e ir num e rical limitation. Tra ditiona lly, political powe r doe s not n ece ssari ly e manat e f rom th e size of one sconstitu e ncy; indeed, it is

likely to aris e more direc t ly f rom th e numb e r an d amount o f one s bank accounts.

It is ironi c, the ref ore, that th e margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed in our mi dst ar e the ma jority who wallow in pov e rty, de stitution an d inf irmity. It was f or th e m that th e party -list syst e m was e nact ed to give the m not on ly ge nuine hope, but g e nuine powe r; to giv e the mopportunity to b e elec t ed and to r e pre se nt th e spec if ic conce rns o f the ir constitu e ncie s; an d simp ly to giv e the m a direc t vot e in Congr e ss an d in the larg e r a ff airs o f the Stat e . In its nob le st se nse, the party -list syst e m tru ly e mpowe rs th e mass e s an d ush e rs a n ew hope f or g e nuine chang e . Ve rily, it invit e s thos e margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed in th e past th e f arm han ds, the f ishe r f olk, the urban poor , e ve n thos e in th e unde rgroun d move me nt to come out an d participat e, as in deed many o f the m came out an d parti cipat ed during th e last elec tions. Th e Stat e cannot no w disappoint an d f rustrat e the m by disab ling th e de secrating this so cial justice ve hicle .

Becaus e the margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed had not b ee n ab le to win in th e congr e ssiona l district elec tions norma lly dominat ed by tra ditional politicians an d ve st ed groups , 2 0 pe rce nt o f the se ats in th e House of Re pre se ntative s we re se t asi de f or th e party -list syst e m.In arguing that e ve n thos e sec tors who norma lly contro lled 80 pe rce nt o f the se ats in th e House could parti cipat e in th e party -list elec tions f or th e re maining 2 0 pe rce nt , the OSG and the Comelec disre gard the f undame nta l diffe re nce be t wee n th e congr e ssiona l district elec tions an d the party -list elec tions.



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As e arlie r not ed, the purpos e of the party -list provision was to op e n up th e syst e m, inorde r to e nhan ce the chan ce of sec tora l groups an d organizations to gain r e pre se ntation in th e House of Re pre se ntativ e s through th e simp le st s che me possib le . Logic shows that th e syst e mhas b ee n op e ned to thos e who hav e ne ve r gott e n a f ootho ld within it thos e who cannot othe rwise win in r e gular elec tions an d who th e ref ore need the simple st s che me possib le to do

so. Conve rsely, it would be illogical to op e n th e syst e m to thos e who hav e long b ee n within it thos e privile ged sec tors that hav e long dominat ed the congr e ssiona l district elec tions.

X x x

Ve rily, allowing th e non -margina lized and ove rre pre se nt ed to vie f or th e re maining s e atsunde r th e party -list syst e m would not on ly dilut e, but a lso pr e judice the chan ce of the margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed, contrary to th e int e ntion o f the law to e nhan ce it. The party -list syst e m is a too l f or th e be nef it of the unde rprivile ged ; th e law could not hav e give n th e sam e too l to oth e rs, to th e pre judice of the int e nded be nef iciarie s. (Ang Bagong Bayani O FW La b or Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 147589 , Jun e 26 , 2001 , En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

5 0. S e c tion 5 (2 ) , Arti cl e VI o f the C onstitution provi d es that "[ t ] he party -l ist representatives sha ll c onstitute t w enty per c entum o f the tota l num ber o f representatives in cl u d ing those un d er the party -l ist ." Does the C onstitution re q uire a ll su c h a ll o c ate d seats to be f i ll e d up a ll the time an d un d er a ll c ir c umstan c es?

Held: The Constitution simp ly stat e s that "[t ]he party -list re pre se ntativ e s sha ll constitut e t we nty p e r ce ntum o f the tota l numb e r o f re pre se ntativ e s including thos e unde r th e party -list."

X x x

We rule that a simp le re ading o f Sec tion 5 , Article VI of the Constitution , e asily conve ysthe eq ua lly simp le me ssag e that Congr e ss was v e st ed with th e broa d powe r to def ine and pre scribe the mechani cs o f the party -list syst e m o f re pre se ntation. Th e Constitution explicit lyse ts down on ly th e pe rce ntag e of the tota l me mbe rship in th e House of Re pre se ntativ e s re se rved f or party -list re pre se ntativ e s.

In th e exe rcise of its constitutiona l pre rogativ e, Congr e ss e nact ed RA 7941 . As sai d e arlie r, Congr e ss decl ared the re in a po licy to promot e "proportiona l re pre se ntation " in th e elec tion o f party -list re pre se ntativ e s in or de r to e nab le Filipinos b elonging to th e margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed sec tors to contribut e le gislation that would be nef it th e m. It ho we ve rdee med it nece ssary to r eq uire parti e s, organizations an d coa litions parti cipating in th e syst e m toobtain at le ast t wo p e rce nt o f the tota l vot e s cast f or th e party -list syst e m in or de r to b e e ntit led to a party -list s e at. Thos e garn e ring mor e than this p e rce ntag e could have "add itiona l se ats inproportion to th e ir tota l numb e r o f vot e s." Furthe rmor e, no winning party , organization or

coa lition can hav e more than thr ee se ats in th e House of Re pre se ntativ e s. X x x

Conside ring th e f ore going statutory r eq uire me nts , it will be sho wn x x x that Sec tion5 (2 ), Article VI of the Constitution is not man datory. It m e rely provide s a ce iling f or party -list se ats in Congr e ss. (V e t e rans Fede ration Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 136781 , Oct . 6 , 2000 , En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

5 1 . W hat are the invio l a bl e parameters to d etermine the w inners in a P hi l ippine - sty l e party -l ist e l e c tion?

Held: To de t e rmine the winne rs in a Philippine-style party -list elec tion, the Constitutionand Re pub lic Act N o. 7941 man dat e at le ast f our invio lab le param e t e rs. Th e se are:

First , the twenty percent allocation - the combin ed numb e r o f all party -list congr e ssm e n sha ll not exceed t we nty p e rce nt o f the tota l me mbe rship o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s, including thos e elec t ed unde r th e party list.

S econd, the two percent threshold - only thos e garn e ring a minimum o f t wo p e rce nt of the tota l valid vot e s cast f or th e party -list syst e m ar e "qua lif ied " to hav e a s e at in th e House of Re pre se ntativ e s.



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T hir d, the three seat limit - e ach qua lif ied party , re gardle ss o f the numb e r o f vot e s it actua lly obtain ed, is e ntit led to a ma ximum o f three se ats; that is , one "qua lif ying" and t woadd itional se ats.

Fourth , proportional representation - the add itiona l se ats which a qua lif ied party ise ntit led to sha ll be comput ed "in proportion to th e ir tota l numb e r o f vot e s." (V eterans

Fe d eration P art y v. COMELEC, G.R. N o. 136781 an d C ompanion C ases , Oc t. 6 , 2000 , E n B an c [ P an g aniban] )

5 2. S tate the gui d e l ines f or s c reening P arty -List P arti c ipants .

Held: In this light , the Court f inds it appropriat e to lay down th e f ollowing gui deline s, culled f rom th e law and the Constitution , to assist th e Comelec in its work.

First , the political party , sec tor , organization or coa lition must r e pre se nt th e margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed groups i de ntif ied in Sec tion 5 of RA 7941 . In oth e r words, it must sho wthrough its constitution , article s o f incorporation , bylaws, history , plat f orm o f gove rnme nt an d tra ck record that it r e pre se nts an d seek s to up lif t margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed sec tors.

Ve rily, ma jority o f its m e mbe rship shou ld belong to th e margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed . And it must de monstrat e that in a conflict o f int e re st , it has chos e n or is likely to choos e the int e re st of such s ec tors.

Second, while e ve n ma jor po litical parti e s ar e expre ss ly a llowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to parti cipat e in th e party -list syst e m, the y must comp ly with th e decl ared statutorypolicy o f e nab ling Filipino citize ns b elonging to margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed sec tors x x x to b e elec t ed to th e House of Re pre se ntativ e s. In oth e r words, while the y are not disqualif ied me rely on th e groun d that th e y ar e political partie s, the y must sho w, howe ve r, that th e yre pre se nt th e int e re sts o f the margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed . X x x.

T hird, in view of the ob jections direc t ed against th e re gistration o f Ang Buhay Hayaang Y umabong , which is a lle gedly a r eligious group , the Court not e s th e expre ss constitutiona l provision that th e religious s ec tor may not b e re pre se nt ed in th e party -list syst e m. x x x

Furthe rmore, the Constitution provi de s that r eligious de nominations an d sec ts sha ll not be re gist e red . ( Sec . 2 [ 5 ] , Article IX [ C] ) T he prohibition was explained by a m e mbe r o f the Constitutiona l Commission in this wise: [ T ]he prohibition is on any r eligious organizationre gist e ring as a po litical party. I do not s ee any prohibition h e re against a pri e st running as acandidat e . T hat is not prohibit ed he re ; it is th e re gistration o f a r eligious s ec t as a po litical party.

Fourth , a party or an organization must not b e disqualif ied unde r Sec tion 6 of RA 7941 , which e nume rat e s th e groun ds f or disqualif ication as f ollows:

1 ) It is a r eligious s ec t or de nomination , organization or asso ciation organiz ed f or

religious purpos e s;2 ) It a dvocat e s viole nce or un lawf ul me ans to s eek its goa l;3) It is a f ore ign party or organization;4) It is r ece iving support f rom any f ore ign gov e rnme nt , f ore ign po litical party ,

f oundation , organization , whe the r direc t ly or through any o f its o ff ice rs or m e mbe rsor indirec t ly through thir d parti e s f or partisan elec tion purpos e s;

5 ) It vio lat e s or f ails to comp ly with laws, rule s or r e gulations r elating to elec tions;6 ) It decl are s untruth f ul stat e me nts in its p e tition;7) It has ce as ed to exist f or at le ast on e (1 ) ye ar; or8) It f ails to parti cipat e in th e last t wo (2 ) pr eced ing elec tions or f ails to obtain at le ast

t wo pe r ce ntum (2% ) o f the vot e s cast un de r th e party -list syst e m in th e t wo (2 )preced ing elec tions f or th e constitu e ncy in which it ha d re gist e red .

N ot e shou ld be take n o f paragraph 5 , which disqua lif ie s a party or group f or violation o f or f ailure to comp ly with elec tion laws an d re gulations. Th e se laws include Sec tion 2 of RA 7941 , which stat e s that th e party -list syst e m s eek s to e nab le Filipino citize ns b elonging to margina lized and unde rre pre se nt ed sec tors , organizations an d parti e s x x x to b ecome me mbe rs o f the House of Re pre se ntative s. A party or organization , the ref ore, that doe s not comp ly with this po licymust b e disqua lif ied .



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F i f th , the par t y or organ i zati on mus t not be an a djunct of, or a pro ject organ i zed or ane ntit y funded or ass i sted by, the gove rnme nt . By the ve ry na t ure of the par t y-li st sys te m, the par t y or organ i zati on mus t be a group of citi ze ns, organ i zed by citi ze ns an d ope ra ted by citi ze ns.It mus t be i nde pe nde nt of the gove rnme nt . The par tici pa ti on of the gove rnme nt or it s off ici als i nthe affa i rs of a par t y-li st candidate i s no t only ille ga l and unfa i r t o o the r par tie s, bu t alsodelete ri ous t o the ob jecti ve of the law: t o e nab le citi ze ns b elongi ng t o marg i nali zed and

unde rre pre se nted sect ors an d organ i zati on t o b e elected t o the House of Re pre se nt ati ve s.

S ixth , the par t y mus t not only comp ly with the req ui re me nt s of the law; it s nom i nee smus t likewi se do so. x x x

S e ve nth , no t only the candidate par t y or organ i zati on mus t re pre se nt marg i na li zed and unde rre pre se nted sect ors; so a lso mus t it s nom i nee s. To r e pe at , un de r S ecti on 2 of RA 7941 ,the nom i nee s mus t be F ili pi no citi ze ns wh o b elong t o marg i na li zed and unde rre pre se nted sect ors, organ i zati ons an d par tie s. Surely, the i nte re st s of the youth canno t be fully re pre se nted by a r eti ree ; n eithe r can th ose of the urban poor or the worki ng class, by an i ndus t ri ali st . Toallow othe rwi se i s t o b et ray the S t ate policy t o g i ve ge nui ne re pre se nt ati on t o the marg i na li zed and unde rre pre se nted .

E i ghth , x x x while lacki ng a well-de f i ned political cons tit ue ncy, the nom i nee mus t likewi se be ab le t o cont ri bute t o the formu lati on an d e nact me nt of appropr i ate le gi slati on th at will be ne f it the na ti on as a wh ole . x x x (Ang Bagong Bayani O FW La b or Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 147589 , Jun e 26 , 2001 , En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

5 3. Acc use d- appe ll ant C ongressman R omeo G . J a l os j os f i l e d a motion be f ore the C ourt asking that he be a ll o w e d to f u ll y d is c harge the d uties o f a C ongressman , in cl u d ing atten d an c e at l egis l ative sessions an d c ommittee meetings d espite his having been c onvi c te d in the f irst instan c e o f a non -bai l a bl e o ff ense . H e c onten d e d that his ree l e c tion being an expression o f popu l ar w i ll c annot be ren d ere d inuti l e by any ru l ing , giving priority to any right or interest not even the po l i c e po w er o f the S tate . R eso l ve .

Held: The immunity f rom arr e st or de t e ntion o f Se nators an d me mbe rs o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s x x x arise s f rom a provision o f the Constitution. Th e history o f the provisionsho ws that th e privile ge has a lways b ee n grant ed in a r e strictive se nse . The provision grantingan exe mption as a sp ec ial privile ge cannot b e ext e nded be yond the ordinary m e aning o f itst e rms. It may not b e ext e nded by int e ndme nt , implication or eq uitab le conside rations.

The 1 9 35 Constitution provi ded in its Article VI on th e Le gislative De partm e nt :

Sec . 1 5 . The Se nators an d Me mbe rs o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s sha ll in a ll case s exce pt tr e ason , felony, and bre ach o f the pe ace, be privile ged f rom arr e st duringthe ir att e ndance at th e se ssions o f Congr e ss , and in going to an d re turning f rom th e sam e ; x x x.

Becaus e of the broa d cove rage of felony an d bre ach o f the pe ace, the exe mption app lied only to civil arre sts. A congr e ssman like the accused- app ellant , convict ed unde r Tit le Ele ve n o f the Re vised Pe na l Code could not claim par liame ntary immunity f rom arr e st. H e was sub ject tothe sam e ge ne ra l laws gov e rning a ll pe rsons sti ll to b e tried or whose convictions we re pe ndingapp e al.

The 1 9 73 Constitution broa de ned the privile ge of immunity as f ollows:

Article VIII, Sec . 9. A Me mbe r o f the Batasang Pambansa sha ll, in a ll offe nse spunishab le by not mor e than si x ye ars imprisonm e nt , be privile ged f rom arr e st during hisatt e ndance at its s e ssions an d in going to an d re turning f rom th e sam e .

For o ffe nse s punishab le by mor e than si x ye ars imprisonm e nt , the re was no immunityf rom arr e st. Th e re strictive int e rpre tation o f immunity an d the int e nt to conf ine it within caref ullydef ined param e t e rs is i llustrat ed by th e concluding portion o f the provision, to wit :

X x x but th e Batasang Pambansa sha ll surr e nde r th e me mbe r invo lved to th e custo dy o f the law within t we nty f our hours a f t e r its a djournm e nt f or a r ece ss or f or itsnex t s e ssion , othe rwise such privile ge sha ll ce ase upon its f ailure to do so.



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The pre se nt Constitution a dhe re s to th e sam e re strictive rule minus th e obligation o f Congr e ss to surr e nde r th e sub ject Congr e ssman to th e custo dy o f the law. The req uire me nt that he shou ld be att e nding s e ssions or committ ee mee tings has a lso b ee n r e moved . For r elativelyminor o ffe nse s, it is e nough that Congr e ss is in s e ssion.

The accused- app ellant argu e s that a m e mbe r o f Congr e ss f unction to att e nd se ssions is

unde rscored by Sec tion 16 (2 ), Article VI of the Constitution which stat e s that

(2 ) A ma jority o f e ach Hous e sha ll constitut e a quorum to do busin e ss , but asma lle r numb e r may a djourn f rom day to day an d may compel the att e ndance of abs e nt M e mbe rs in su ch mann e r, and unde r su ch p e na ltie s, as su ch Hous e may provi de .

Howe ve r, the accused- app ellant has not giv e n any r e ason why h e shou ld be exe mpt ed f rom th e ope ration o f Sec tion 11 , Article VI of the Constitution. Th e me mbe rs o f Congr e sscannot compel abs e nt m e mbe rs to att e nd se ssions i f the re ason f or th e abs e nce is a le gitimat e one . The conf ine me nt o f a Congr e ssman charg ed with a crime punishab le by imprisonm e nt o f more than si x ye ars is not m e rely authoriz ed by law, it has constitutiona l f oundations.

Accused- app ellant s reliance on th e ruling in Aguina ldo v. Santos (212 SCR A 7 6 8 , at 773 [ 1 99 2 ]), which stat e s, int e r a lia, that

The Court shou ld ne ve r re move a pub lic off ice r f or a cts done prior to his pr e se nt t e rm o f off ice . To do oth e rwise would be to de prive the pe ople of the ir right to elec t the ir off ice rs. Wh e n th e pe ople have elec t ed a man to o ff ice, it must b e assum ed that the y did this with th e knowled ge of his life and chara ct e r, and that th e y disre garded orf orgav e his f au lt or mis conduct , if he had bee n gui lty o f any. It is not f or th e Court , byre ason o f such f au lt or mis conduct , to pra ctically ove rrule the will of the pe ople .

will not ex tricat e him f rom his pr ed icame nt. It can b e re adily s ee n x x x that th e Aguina ldo case involve s th e administrative re mova l of a pub lic off ice r f or a cts done prior to his pr e se nt t e rm o f off ice . It doe s not app ly to imprisonm e nt arising f rom th e e nf orce me nt o f crimina l law.More ove r, in th e sam e way that pr e ve ntive susp e nsion is not r e mova l, conf ine me nt p e ndingapp e al is not r e mova l. He re mains a Congr e ssman un le ss expelled by Congr e ss or , othe rwise, disqua lif ied .

One rationa le be hind conf ine me nt , whe the r pe nding app e al or a f t e r f inal conviction , ispub lic self-defe nse . Socie ty must prot ec t its elf . It a lso s e rve s as an examp le and warning toothe rs.

A pe rson charg ed with crime is ta ke n into custo dy f or purpos e s o f the administration o f justice . As stat ed in Unit ed Stat e s v. G usti lo (1 9 Phil. 2 08 , 212 ), it is th e in jury to th e pub lic which Stat e action in crimina l law seek s to r ed re ss. It is not th e in jury to th e comp lainant. Af t e rconviction in th e R e giona l Trial Court , the accused may b e de nied bail and thus sub ject ed toincarce ration i f the re is risk of his abs conding.

The accused- app ellant stat e s that th e ple a o f the elec torat e which vot ed him into o ff ice cannot b e supp lant ed by un f ounded fe ars that h e might e scape e ve ntua l punishm e nt i f pe rmitt ed to p e rf orm congr e ssiona l dutie s outsi de his re gular p lace of conf ine me nt.

It will be recalled that whe n a warrant f or a ccused- app ellant s arre st was issu ed, he fled and e vaded captur e de spit e a call f rom his colle agu e s in th e House of R e pre se ntativ e s f or him toatt e nd the se ssions an ds to surr e nde r vo luntari ly to th e authoriti e s. Ironi cally, it is no w the sam e body whos e call he initially spurn ed which a ccused- app ellant is invo king to justi f y his pr e se nt motion. This can not b e count e nan ced becaus e, x x x aside f rom its b e ing contrary to well-def ined Constitutiona l re strains , it would be a mo cke ry of the aims o f the Stat e s pe na l syst e m.

Accused- app ellant argu e s that on s e ve ral occasions , the R e giona l Trial Court o f Makatigrant ed se ve ra l motions to t e mporari ly le ave his cell at th e Makati City Jai l, f or o ff icial or m ed ical re asons x x x.

He also calls att e ntion to various instan ce s, af t e r his trans fe r at th e N ew Bilibid Prison inMuntin lupa City, whe n he was likew ise allowed /p e rmitt ed to le ave the prison pr e mise s x x x.



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The re is no sho wing that th e abov e privile ge s ar e peculiar to him or to a m e mbe r o f Congr e ss. Em e rge ncy or compelling t e mporary le ave s f rom imprisonm e nt ar e allowed to a ll prison e rs, at th e discre tion o f the authoriti e s or upon court or de rs.

What th e accused- app ellant s eek s is not o f an e me rge ncy natur e . Allowing a ccused-app ellant to att e nd congr e ssiona l se ssions an d committ ee mee tings f or f ive (5 ) days or mor e in a

week will virtua lly ma ke him a f ree man with a ll the privile ge s appurt e nant to his position. Suchan ab e rrant situation not on ly ele vat e s a ccused- app ellant s status to that o f a sp ec ial class , it a lsowould be a mo cke ry of the purpos e s o f the correc tion syst e m. X x x

The accused- app ellant av e rs that his constitu e nts in th e First District o f Zamboanga del N ort e want th e ir voice s to b e he ard and that sin ce he is tre at ed as bona f ide me mbe r o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s, the latt e r urg e s a co-eq ua l bran ch o f gove rnme nt to r e spec t hisman dat e . He also claims that th e conce pt o f t e mporary de t e ntion doe s not n ece ssari ly curtai l hisduty to discharg e his man dat e and that h e has a lways comp lied with th e conditions/r e strictionswhe n h e is a llowed to le ave jail.

We re main unp e rsua ded .

X x x

Whe n th e vot e rs o f his district elec t ed the accused- app ellant to Congr e ss , the y did sowith f ull aware ne ss o f the limitations on his f reed om o f action. Th e y did so with th e knowled ge that h e could achie ve only su ch le gislative re su lts which h e could accomp lish within th e conf ine sof prison. To giv e a mor e drasti c illustration , if vot e rs elec t a p e rson with f ull knowled ge that h e is su ffe ring f rom a t e rmina l illne ss , the y do so knowing that at any tim e, he may no longe r s e rve his f ull t e rm in o ff ice . (P e opl e v. J alosjos, 324 SCRA 689 , Feb. 3 , 2000 , En Banc [Ynar e s -Santiago ] )

54 . Dis c uss the o bj e c tives o f S e c tion 26(1 ) , Arti cl e VI o f the 1987 C onstitution , that "[ e ] very bi ll passe d b y the C ongress sha ll em bra c e on l y one su bj e c t w hi c h sha ll be expresse d in the tit l e thereo f."

Held: The ob jective s o f Sec tion 26 (1 ), Article VI of the 1 9 87 Constitution ar e:

1 ) To pr e ve nt ho dge-podge or log-rolling le gislation;2 ) To pr e ve nt surpris e or f raud upon th e le gislatur e by m e ans o f provisions in bi lls o f

which th e tit le s gav e no in f ormation , and which might th e ref ore be ove rlooked and carele ss ly an d unint e ntiona lly adopt ed ; an d

3) To f airly appris e the pe ople, through su ch pub lication o f le gislative proceed ings as isusua lly ma de, of the sub jects o f le gislation that ar e be ing conside red, in orde r that the y may hav e opportunity o f be ing h e ard the re on by p e tition or oth e rwise if the ysha ll so de sire .

Sec tion 26 (1 ) o f Article VI of the 1 9 87 Constitution is su ff icie nt ly complied with whe re x x x the tit le is compr e he nsive e nough to e mbra ce the ge ne ral ob jective it seek s to a chie ve, and if all the parts o f the statut e are relat ed and ge rman e to th e sub ject matt e r e mbodied in th e tit le or solong as th e sam e are not in consist e nt with or f ore ign to th e ge ne ra l sub jec t an d tit le . (Agripino A. D e G u z man, J r ., e t al . v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 129118 , July 19 , 2000 , e n Banc [ Purisima ] )

55 . S e c tion 44 o f R.A. N o . 8189 ( T he V oter's R egistration Ac t o f 1996 ) w hi c h provi d es f or automati c trans f er to a ne w station o f any E l e c tion Off i c er w ho has a l rea d y serve d f or more than f our years in a parti c u l ar c ity or muni c ipa l ity w as assai l e d f or being vio l ative o f S e c tion 26(1 ) o f Arti cl e VI o f the C onstitution a ll ege dl y be c ause it has an iso l ate d an d d i ff erent su bj e c t f rom that o f RA 8189 an d that the same is not expresse d in the tit l e o f the l a w.S hou ld the c ha ll enge be sustaine d ?

Held: Sec tion 44 o f RA 81 89 is not iso lat ed conside ring that it is r elat ed and ge rman e tothe sub ject matt e r stat ed in th e tit le of the law. The tit le of RA 81 89 is "The Vot e r's Re gistration Act o f 1 99 6 " with a sub ject matt e r e nunciat ed in th e explanatory not e as " AN ACT PROVIDIN GFOR A GEN ERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTIN G A S Y STEM OF CON TIN UIN GREGISTRATION , PRESCRIBIN G THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AN D AUTHORIZIN G THE APPROPRI ATION OF FUN DS THEREFOR." Sec tion 44 , which provi de s f or th e re assignm e nt o f elec tion o ff ice rs, is rele vant to th e sub ject matt e r o f re gistration as it s eek s to e nsur e the



26

int e grity o f the re gistration pro ce ss by provi ding gui del ine f or th e COMELEC to f ollow in th e re assignm e nt o f elec tion o ff ice rs. It is not an a lie n provision but on e which is r elat ed to th e conduct an d proced ure of continuing r e gistration o f vot e rs. In this r e gard, it be ars str e ssing that the Constitution doe s not r eq uire Congr e ss to e mploy in th e tit le of an e nactme nt , languag e of such pr ec ision as to mirror , f ully index or cata logue, all the cont e nts an d the minut e de tailsthe re in. (Agripino A. D e G u z man, J r ., e t al . v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 129118 , July 19 ,

2000 , En Banc [ Purisima ] )

5 6. Do c ourts have the po w er to in q uire into a ll egations that , in ena c ting a l a w, a H ouse o f C ongress f ai l e d to c omp l y w ith its o w n ru l es?

Held: The case s, both h e re and abroa d, in varying f orms o f expre ssion , all de ny to th e courts th e powe r to in quire into a lle gations that , in e nacting a law, a Hous e of Congr e ss f ailed tocomp ly with its o wn ru le s, in th e abs e nce of sho wing that th e re was a vio lation o f a constitutiona l provision or th e right o f privat e individua ls. In Osm e na v. P e ndatun (109 Phi l. At 870-871 ) , it was h eld: At any rat e, courts hav e decl ared that the rule s a dopt ed by del ibe rative bodie s ar e sub ject to r e vocation , modif ication or waive r at th e ple asur e of the body a dopting th e m. And it has b ee n sai d that Parliame ntary ru le s ar e me rely pro ced ura l, and with th e ir obs e rvance, the courts hav e no conce rn. Th e y may b e waived or disre garded by th e le gislative body. Cons eq ue nt ly, me re f ailure to conf orm to par liame ntary usag e will not inva lidat e that a ction(ta ke n by a del ibe rative body ) whe n th e req uisit e numb e r o f me mbe rs hav e agreed to aparticular m e asur e .

It must b e re alized that e ach o f the three de partm e nts o f our gov e rnme nt has itsse parat e sph e re which th e othe rs may not inva de without ups e tting th e delicat e ba lance onwhich our constitutiona l orde r r e sts. Du e re gard f or th e working o f our syst e m o f gove rnme nt , more than m e re comity, compels reluctan ce on th e part o f the courts to e nt e r upon an in quiryinto an a lle ged violation o f the rule s o f the House . Courts must a ccordingly decl ine the invitationto exe rcise the ir powe r. (Arroyo v. D e V e n e cia, 277 SCRA 268 , Aug . 14 , 1997[ Me n do z a ] )

5 7. W hat is the B i c amera l C on f eren c e C ommittee? Dis c uss the nature o f its f un c tion an d its j uris d i c tion .

Held: While it is tru e that a confe re nce committ ee is the mechanism f or compromisingdiffe re nce s b e t wee n th e Se nat e and the House, it is not limit ed in its jurisdiction to this que stion.Its broa de r f unction is de scribed thus :

A confe re nce committ ee may de al ge ne rally with th e sub ject matt e r or it may b e limit ed to r e solving th e prec ise diffe re nce s b e t wee n th e t wo hous e s. Eve n whe re the confe re nce committ ee is not by ru le limit ed in its jurisdiction , le gislative custom s e ve rely limits th e f reed omwith which n ew sub ject matt e r can b e inse rt ed into th e confe re nce bill. But o ccasiona lly aconfe re nce committ ee produce s un expec t ed re su lts , re su lts b e yond its man dat e . The se excursions o ccur e ve n whe re the rule s impos e strict limitations on confe re nce committ ee

jurisdiction. This is symptomati c of the authoritarian po we r o f confe re nce committ ee .(Phi lippin e J u d g e s Association v. Pra d o, 227 SCRA 703 , No v. 11 , 1993 , En Banc [ Cru z] )

5 8. Dis c uss the E nro ll e d B i ll Do c trine .

Held: Unde r th e e nrolled bill doctrine, the signing o f H. Bill N o. 71 89 by th e Spe ake r o f the House and the Pre side nt o f the Se nat e and the ce rtif ication by th e sec re tarie s o f both Hous e sof Congr e ss that it was pass ed on Nove mbe r 21 , 1 99 6 are conclusive of its due e nactme nt. x x x To b e sure, the re is no claim e ithe r he re or in th e dec ision in th e EV AT case s (To le ntino v.Sec re tary o f F inance ) that th e e nrolled bill e mbodie s a conclusive pre sumption. In on e case ( Astorga v. Vi lle gas , 5 6 SCR A 71 4 [ 1 9 74 ] ) we we nt b e hind an e nro lled bill and consu lt ed the

Journa l to de t e rmine whe the r ce rtain provisions o f a statut e had bee n approv ed by th e Se nat e .

But , whe re as h e re the re is no e vide nce to th e contrary , this Court will re spec t th e ce rtif ication o f the pre siding o ff ice rs o f both Hous e s that a bi ll has b ee n duly pass ed . Unde r thisrule, this Court has r ef used to de t e rmine claims that th e three-f ourths vot e needed to pass apropos ed ame ndme nt to th e Constitution ha d not b ee n obtain ed, becaus e a duly auth e nticat ed bill or re solution imports abso lut e ve rity an d is binding on th e courts. x x x



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This Court has r ef used to e ve n look into a lle gations that th e e nro lled bill se nt to th e Pre side nt contain ed provisions which ha d bee n surre ptitious ly inse rt ed in th e confe re nce committ ee x x x. (To le ntino v. S ec re tary o f F inance )

It has r ef used to look into charg e s that an am e ndme nt was ma de upon th e last r e adingof a bi ll in violation o f Art. VI , S ec . 26 ( 2 ) of the Constitution that upon th e last r e ading o f a bi ll,

no am e ndme nt sha ll be allowed . ( Philippine Judge s Ass n v. Prado, 22 7 S CR A 703 , 710 [1993] )

In oth e r cas e s, this Court has de nied claims that th e t e nor o f a bi ll was oth e rwise than asce rtif ied by th e pre siding o ff ice rs o f both Hous e s o f Congr e ss.

The e nrolled bill doctrine, as a ru le of e vide nce, is well-e stab lished . It is cit ed withapprova l by t ex t writ e rs h e re and abroa d. The e nro lled bill rule re sts on th e f ollowingconside rations :

X x x. As th e Pre side nt has no authority to approv e a bi ll not pass ed byCongr e ss , an e nro lled Act in th e custo dy of the S ec re tary o f Stat e, and having th e off icial att e stations o f the Spe ake r o f the House of R e pre se ntativ e s, of the Pre side nt o f the S e nat e, and of the Pre side nt o f the Unit ed Stat e s, carrie s, on its f ace, a so le mnassuran ce by th e le gislative and exec utive de partm e nts o f the gove rnme nt , charg ed, re spec tively, with th e duty o f e nacting an d exec uting th e laws, that it was pass ed byCongr e ss. Th e re spec t due to coeq ua l and inde pe nde nt de partm e nts r eq uire s th e judicial de partm e nt to a ct upon that assuran ce, and to a cce pt , as having pass ed Congr e ss , all bills auth e nticat ed in th e mann e r stat ed ; le aving th e court to de t e rmine, whe n th e que stion prop e rly arise s, whe the r th e Act , so auth e nticat ed, is in conf ormity with th e Constitution. (Marsha ll F ield & Co. v. Clark, 14 3 U.S. 6 4 9 , 6 7 2 , 3 6 L. E d. 2 9 4 , 303 [1891] )

To ov e rrule the doctrine now, x x x is to r e pudiat e the massiv e t e aching o f our case s an d ove rthro w an e stab lished rule of e vide nce . (Arroyo v. D e V e n e cia, 277 SCRA 268 , Aug . 14 , 1997 [ Me ndo z a ] )

5 9. W hen shou ld the Legis l ative J ourna l be regar d e d as c on cl usive upon the c ourts , an d w hy?

Held: The Journa l is re garded as conclusive with re spec t to matt e rs that ar e req uired bythe Constitution to b e recorded the re in. With r e spec t to oth e r matt e rs, in th e abs e nce of e vide nce to th e contrary , the Journa ls hav e also b ee n a ccorded conclusive effec ts. Thus , inUnit ed Stat e s v. Pons (3 4 Phil. 729 , 73 5 [1916]] , quoting ex rel. H e rron v. Smith , 44 Ohio 3 4 8 [1886] ) , this Court spo ke of the impe rative s o f pub lic policy f or r e garding th e Journa ls as pub lic me morials o f the most p e rman e nt chara ct e r, thus: The y shou ld be pub lic, becaus e all are req uired to conf orm to th e m; th e y shou ld be pe rman e nt , that rights a cquired today upon th e f aith o f what has b ee n decl ared to b e law sha ll not b e de stroy ed tomorro w, or at som e re mot e pe riod of time, by f acts r e sting on ly in th e me mory o f individua ls. X x x. (Arroyo v. D eV e n e cia, 277 SCRA 268 , 298-299 , Aug . 14 , 1997 [ Me n do z a ] )

60. W hat matters are re q uire d to be entere d on the J ourna l ?

Held:

1 ) The ye as an d nays on th e third and f inal re ading o f a bi ll (Art. VI , S e c. 26[2] ) ;2 ) The ye as an d nays on any que stion, at th e req ue st o f one-f if th o f the me mbe rs

pre se nt ( I d., S e c. 16[ 4 ] ) ;3) The ye as an d nays upon r e passing a bi ll ove r th e Pre side nt s ve to ( I d., S e c. 27[1] ) ;

and 4) The Pre side nt s ob je ction to a bi ll he had ve toed ( I d. ) .

(Arroyo v. D e V e n e cia, 277 SCRA 268 , 298 , Aug . 14 , 1997 [ Me ndo z a ] )

61. A d is q ua l i f i c ation c ase w as f i l e d against a c an d i d ate f or C ongressman be f ore the e l e c tion w ith the COM ELE C. T he l atter f ai l e d to reso l ve that d is q ua l i f i c ation c ase be f ore the e l e c tion an d that c an d i d ate w on , a l though he w as not yet pro cl aime d b e c ause o f that pen d ing d is q ua l i f i c ation c ase . I s the COM ELE C no w ouste d o f j uris d i c tion to reso l ve the pen d ing d is q ua l i f i c ation c ase an d, there f ore , shou ld d ismiss the c ase , c onsi d ering that j uris d i c tion is no w veste d w ith the H ouse o f R epresentatives E l e c tora l T ri buna l ( H R E T ) ?



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Held: 1 . In his f irst assignm e nts o f e rror , pe titione r vigorous ly cont e nds that a f t e r th e May 8 , 1 99 5 elec tions , the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction ov e r th e que stion o f pe titione r squa lif ications to run f or m e mbe r o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s. He claims that jurisdictionove r th e pe tition f or disqua lif ication is exclusively lodged with th e House of Re pre se ntativ e sElectora l Tribuna l (HRET). Give n th e ye t -unre solved que stion o f jurisdiction , pe titione r ave rs that the COMELEC committ ed se rious e rror an d grav e abus e of discre tion in direc ting th e susp e nsion

of his pro clamation as th e winning candidat e in th e Second Congr e ssiona l District o f Makati City.We disagree .

Pe titione r conve nie nt ly conf use s th e distinction b e t wee n an unpro claimed candidat e tothe House of Re pre se ntativ e s an d a m e mbe r o f the sam e . Obtaining th e highe st numb e r o f vot e s in an elec tion doe s not automati cally ve st th e position in th e winning candidat e . Sec tion 1 7 of Article VI of the 1 9 87 Constitution r e ads:

The Se nat e and the House of Re pre se ntativ e s sha ll have an E lectora l Tribuna l which sha ll be the sole judge of all cont e sts r elating to th e elec tion, re turns an d qua lif ications o f the ir re spec tive Me mbe rs.

Unde r th e abov e-stat ed provision , the elec tora l tribuna l cle arly assum e s jurisdiction ov e rall cont e sts r elative to th e elec tion, re turns an d qua lif ications o f candidat e s f or e ithe r th e Se nat e or th e House only whe n th e latt e r become me mbe rs o f e ithe r th e Se nat e or th e House of Re pre se ntativ e s. A candidat e who has not b ee n pro claimed and who has not ta ke n his oath o f off ice cannot b e said to b e a m e mbe r o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s sub ject to Sec tion 1 7 of Article VI of the Constitution. Whi le the proclamation o f a winning candidat e in an elec tion isminist e rial, B.P. Blg. 881 in con junction with Sec . 6 of R. A. 66 46 allows susp e nsion o f proclamation un de r circumstan ce s m e ntion ed the re in. Thus , pe titione r scont e ntion that a f t e rthe conduct o f the elec tion an d (pe titione r) has b ee n e stab lished the winne r o f the elec tora l exe rcise f rom th e mome nt o f elec tion, the COMELEC is automati cally dive st ed of authority to passupon th e que stion o f qua lif ication f inds no basis in law, becaus e e ve n a f t e r th e elec tions th e COMELEC is e mpowe red by Sec tion 6 (in r elation to Sec tion 7) o f R. A. 66 46 to continu e to h e arand dec ide que stions r elating to qua lif ications o f candidat e s. X x x.

Unde r th e abov e-q uot ed provision, not on ly is a disqua lif ication case against a candidat e allowed to continu e af t e r th e elec tion (and doe s not oust th e COMELEC of its jurisdiction) , but hisobtaining th e highe st numb e r o f vot e s will not r e su lt in th e susp e nsion or t e rmination o f the proceed ings against him whe n th e e vide nce of guilt is strong. Whi le the phras e whe n th e e vide nce of guilt is strong s ee ms to sugg e st that th e provisions o f Sec tion 6 ought to b e app licab le only to disqua lif ication case s un de r Sec tion 6 8 of the Omnibus E lection Code, Sec tion 7 of R. A. 66 46 allows th e app lication o f the provisions o f Sec tion 6 to case s invo lvingdisqua lif ication bas ed on ineligibility un de r Sec tion 78 of BP. Blg. 88 1 . X x x. (Aquino v.COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400 , 417-419 , S e pt . 18 , 1995 , En Banc [K apunan, J.] )

2 . As to th e House of Re pre se ntative s Electora l Tribuna l s supposed assumption o f jurisdiction ov e r th e issue of pe titione r squa lif ications a f t e r th e May 8 , 1 99 5 elec tions , suff ice it

to say that H RET s jurisdiction as th e so le judge of all cont e sts r elating to th e elec tions , re turnsand qua lif ications o f me mbe rs o f Congr e ss b e gins on ly a f t e r a candidat e has b ecome a m e mbe rof the House of Re pre se ntativ e s (Art. VI , Sec . 1 7 , 1 9 87 Constitution). Pe titione r not b e ing ame mbe r o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s, it is obvious that th e HRET at this point has no jurisdiction ov e r th e que stion. (Romuald ez- Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 , 340-341 , S e pt . 18 , 1995 , En Banc [K apunan, J.] )

62 . W i ll the ru l e be the same i f that c an d i d ate w ins an d w as pro cl aime d w inner an d a l rea d y assume d o ff i c e as C ongressman?

Held: While the COMELEC is ve st ed with th e powe r to decl are valid or inva lid ace rtif icat e of candidacy, its ref usa l to exe rcise that po we r f ollowing th e proclamation an d assumption o f the position by Farinas is a r ecognition o f the jurisdictiona l boun darie s s e paratingthe COMELEC and the Electora l Tribuna l of the House of Re pre se ntativ e s (HRET). Unde r Article

VI, Sec tion 1 7 of the Constitution , the HRET has so le and exclusive jurisdiction ov e r a ll cont e stsrelative to th e elec tion, re turns , and qua lif ications o f me mbe rs o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s.Thus , once a winning candidat e has b ee n pro claimed, take n his oath , and assum ed off ice as ame mbe r o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s, COMELEC s jurisdiction ov e r elec tion cont e sts r elatingto his elec tion, re turns , and qua lif ications e nds, and the HRET s own jurisdiction b e gins. Thus , the COMELEC s dec ision to discontinu e exe rcising jurisdiction ov e r th e case is justi f iable, indefe re nce to th e HRET s own jurisdiction an d f unctions.



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X x x

Pe titione r f urth e r argu e s that th e HRET assum e s jurisdiction on ly if the re is a va lid proclamation o f the winning candidat e . He cont e nds that i f a candidat e f ails to satis f y the statutory r eq uire me nts to qua lif y him as a candidat e, his subs eq ue nt pro clamation is voi d ab

initio. Whe re the proclamation is nu ll and void, the re is no pro clamation at a ll and the me re assumption o f off ice by th e proclaimed candidat e doe s not de prive the COMELEC at a ll of itspowe r to decl are such nu llity, according to p e titione r. But x x x, in an elec tora l cont e st whe re the validity of the proclamation o f a winning candidat e who has ta ke n his oath o f off ice and assum ed his post as congr e ssman is rais ed, that issu e is be st a ddre ssed to th e HRET. The re ason f or thisruling is s elf-e vide nt , f or it avoi ds duplicity of proceed ings an d a clash o f jurisdiction b e t wee nconstitutiona l bodie s, with due re gard to th e pe ople s mandat e . ( G u e rr e ro v. COMELEC, 336SCRA 458 , July 26 , 2000 , En Banc [Q uisum b ing ] )

63. I s there an appea l f rom a d e c ision o f the S enate or H ouse o f R epresentatives E l e c tora l T ri buna l ? W hat then is the reme d y , i f any?

Held: The Constitution man dat e s that th e House of Re pre se ntativ e s Electora l Tribuna l and the Se nat e Electora l Tribuna l sha ll e ach, re spectively, be the so le judge of all cont e stsrelating to th e elec tion , re turns an d qua lif ications o f the ir re spec tive me mbe rs.

The Court has str e ssed that x x x so long as th e Constitution grants th e HRET the powe rto b e the sole judge of all cont e sts r elating to th e elec tion, re turns an d qua lif ications o f me mbe rsof the House of Re pre se ntativ e s, any f inal action ta ke n by th e HRET on a matt e r within its jurisdiction sha ll, as a ru le, not b e re viewed by this Court. Th e powe r grant ed to th e Electora l Tribuna l x x x exclude s th e exe rcise of any authority on th e part o f this Court that would in anywise re strict it or curtai l it or e ve n a ffec t th e sam e .

The Court did recognize, of cours e, its po we r o f judicial re view in exce ptiona l case s. InRoble s v. H RET (181 SCR A 780 ) , the Court has explained that while the judgme nts o f the Tribuna l are be yond judicial int e rfe re nce, the Court may do so , howe ve r, but on ly in the exe rcise of this Court s so-called ex traor dinary jurisdiction x x x upon a de t e rmination that th e Tribuna l sdec ision or r e solution was r e nde red without or in exce ss o f its jurisdiction, or with grav e abus e of discre tion or paraphrasing Morr e ro (Morre ro v. B ocar [66 Phi l. 4 29] ) , upon a cle ar sho wing o f such arbitrary an d improvide nt us e by th e Tribuna l of its po we r as constitut e s a de nial of due proce ss o f law, or upon a de monstration o f a ve ry cle ar unmitigat ed e rror , mani fe st ly constitutingsuch grav e abus e of discre tion that th e re has to b e a re med y f or su ch abus e .

The Court doe s not x x x ve ntur e into th e pe rilous ar e a o f correc ting p e rce ived e rrors o f inde pe nde nt bran che s o f the Gove rnme nt; it come s in on ly whe n it has to vin dicat e a de nial of due proce ss or correc t an abus e of discre tion so grav e or g laring that no le ss than th e Constitution its elf calls f or r e med ial action. (Li b anan v. H RET, 283 SCRA 520 , D e c . 22 , 1997 [ Vitug ] )

T he Exe cuti ve D ep a r t me nt

6 4 . Di d f ormer P resi d ent E stra d a resign as P resi d ent or shou ld be c onsi d ere d resigne d as o f J anuary 20, 2001 w hen P resi d ent G l oria M a c apaga l Arroyo took her oath as the 14 th P resi d ent o f the R epu bl i c ?

Held: Re signation x x x is a f actua l que stion an d its eleme nts ar e be yond quibb le: t he re m ust b e an int e nt to r e sign an d t he int e nt m ust b e coupled by a cts o f relinquishme nt. The validity of a r e signation is not gov e rned by any f orm al req uireme nt as to f orm . It can b e ora l. It can b e writt e n. It can b e exp re ss. It can b e implied . As long as t he re signation is cle ar , it m ust be give n le ga l effec t.

In t he cas e s at bar , t he f acts s h ow t h at pe titione r did not writ e any f orm al le tt e r o f re signation b ef ore he e vacuat ed Malacanang Palace in t he af t e rnoon o f January 2 0 , 2 001 af t e rt he oat h- taking o f re sp onde nt Arroyo. Cons eq ue nt ly, whe t he r or not pe titione r re signed h as tobe de t e rm ined f rom h is a cts an d om issions b ef ore, during an d af t e r January 2 0, 2 00 1 or by t he tota lity of p rior, cont emp oran e ous an d p ost e rior f acts an d circum stantia l e vide nce be aring am at e rial rele vance on t he issue .



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Using this tota lity t e st , w e hold that pe titioner re signe d as P re sid e nt.

X x x

In sum , we hold that th e re signation o f the pe titione r cannot b e doubt ed . It wasconf irmed by his le aving Malacanang. In th e pre ss r ele as e containing his f inal stat e me nt , (1 ) h e

acknowled ged the oath-taking o f the re spon de nt as Pr e side nt o f the Re public albe it withre se rvation about its le ga lity; (2 ) h e e mphasiz ed he was le aving th e Palace, the se at o f the pre side ncy, f or th e sak e of pe ace and in orde r to b e gin th e he aling pro ce ss o f our nation. H e did not say h e was le aving th e Palace due to any kin d of inability an d that h e was going to r e - assum e the pre side ncy as soon as th e disability disappe ars; (3) h e expre ssed his gratitu de to th e pe ople f or th e opportunity to s e rve the m. Without doubt , he was r efe rring to th e past opportunity giv e n him to s e rve the pe ople as Pr e side nt; (4) h e assur ed that h e will not shirk f romany f utur e cha lle nge that may come ahe ad on th e sam e se rvice of our country. P e titione r srefe re nce is to a f utur e cha lle nge af t e r o ccupying th e off ice of the pre side nt which h e has giv e nup; an d (5 ) h e called on his support e rs to join him in th e promotion o f a constru ctive nationa l spirit o f reconciliation an d solidarity. C e rtain ly, the nationa l spirit o f reconciliation an d solidaritycould not b e attain ed if he did not giv e up th e pre side ncy. Th e pre ss r ele as e was p e titione r svaled ictory , his f inal act o f f arewell . H is pre side ncy is no w in th e past t e nse . (Estrada v.D e si e rto, G.R. Nos . 146710-15 , March 2 , 2001 , e n Banc [ Puno ] )

6 5 . Dis c uss our l ega l history on exe c utive immunity .

Held: The doctrine of exec utive immunity in this jurisdiction e me rged a s a ca se l a w. Inthe 1910 ca se of F orbe s, e t c. v. Chuo co Tiaco a nd Cross f ie l d (16 Phil. 5 3 4 [1910] ) , th e re spon de nt Tiaco, a Chine se citize n, su ed pe titione r W. C a me ron F orbe s, Gove rnor -Ge ne ra l of the Philippine Isl a nds, J.E. H a rding a nd C.R. Trowbri dge , Chief of Police a nd Chief of the Sec re t Se rvice of the City of Ma nil a , r e spec tive ly, f or da ma ge s f or a ll e ged ly conspiring to de port him toChina . In gr a nting a writ o f prohibition, this Court, sp eak ing thru Mr. Justi ce Johnson, h e l d:

The principl e of nonlia bility x x x doe s not m ea n th a t th e judicia ry ha s noa uthority to tou ch th e ac ts o f the Gove rnor -Ge ne ra l; th a t h e ma y, un de r cove r o f hisoff ice , do wh a t h e will, unimpeded a nd unre stra ined . Such a constru ction woul d mea ntha t tyr a nny, un de r th e guise of the exec ution o f the l a w, coul d w a l k def ia ntly a broad ,de stroying rights o f pe rson a nd of prop e rty, wholly f ree f rom int e rfe re nce of courts orl e gisl a ture s. This doe s not m ea n, e ithe r, th a t a pe rson in jured by th e exec utive a uthorityby a n ac t un justif ia bl e unde r th e l a w ha s no r e med y, but must submit in sil e nce . On th e contr a ry, it m ea ns, simply, th a t th e Gove rnor -Ge ne ra l, like the judge s o f the courts a nd the me mbe rs o f the Le gisl a ture , m a y not b e pe rson a lly mul ct ed in civil da ma ge s f or th e cons eq ue nce s o f a n ac t exec ut ed in th e pe rf orma nce of his o ff icia l dutie s. Th e judicia ryha s f ull pow e r to, a nd will, whe n th e ma tt e r is prop e rly pre se nt ed to it a nd the occa sion justly w a rra nts it, dec l a re a n ac t o f the Gove rnor -Ge ne ra l ill e ga l a nd void a nd pl ace a snea rly a s possibl e in st a tus quo a ny p e rson who h a s b ee n de prived his libe rty or hisprop e rty by su ch ac t. This r e med y is a ssur ed to e ve ry pe rson, how e ve r humbl e or o f

wha t e ve r country, wh e n his p e rson a l or prop e rty rights h a ve bee n invaded , e ve n by th e highe st a uthority o f the st a t e . The thing whi ch th e judicia ry ca n not do is mul ct th e Gove rnor -Ge ne ra l pe rson a lly in da ma ge s which r e sult f rom th e pe rf orma nce of his o ff icia l duty, a ny mor e tha n it ca n a me mbe r o f the Philippine Commission or th e Philippine Asse mbly. Publi c policy f orbids it.

N e ithe r doe s this prin cipl e of nonlia bility mea n th a t th e chief exec utive ma y not be pe rson a lly sued a t a ll in re l a tion to ac ts whi ch h e cl a ims to p e rf orm a s su ch o ff icia l.On th e contr a ry, it cl ea rly a ppea rs f rom th e discussion h e re tof ore had , p a rticul a rly tha t portion whi ch tou ched the lia bility of judge s a nd dre w a n a na logy be tw ee n su ch lia bilitya nd tha t o f the Gove rnor -Ge ne ra l, th a t th e l a tt e r is lia bl e whe n h e ac ts in a ca se sopl a inly outsi de of his pow e r a nd a uthority th a t h e ca n not b e sa id to h a ve exe rcised discre tion in de t e rmining wh e the r or not h e had the right to ac t. Wh a t is h e l d he re istha t h e will be prot ec t ed f rom p e rson a l lia bility f or da ma ge s not only wh e n h e ac ts withinhis a uthority, but a lso wh e n h e is without a uthority, provi ded he ac tua lly used discre tiona nd judgme nt, th a t is, th e judicia l faculty, in de t e rmining wh e the r he had a uthority to ac t or not. In oth e r wor ds, h e is e ntitl ed to prot ec tion in de t e rmining th e que stion o f hisa uthority. I f he dec ide wrongly, h e is still prot ec t ed provided the que stion o f hisa uthority w a s on e ove r which two m e n, r ea son a bly qua lif ied f or th a t position, might hone stly diffe r; but h e is not prot ec t ed if the l ack of a uthority to ac t is so pl a in th a t twosuch m e n coul d not hon e stly diffe r ov e r its de t e rmina tion. In su ch ca se , h e ac ts, not a s



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Gove rnor -Ge ne ral but as a privat e individua l, and, as su ch, must ans we r f or th e cons eq ue nce s o f his a ct.

Mr. Justi ce Johnson un de rscored the cons eq ue nce s if the Chief Executive was not grant ed immunity f rom suit , viz: x x x. Action upon important matt e rs o f stat e delayed ; th e time and substan ce of the chief exec utive spe nt in wrang ling litigation; disre spec t e nge nde red f or th e

pe rson o f one of the highe st o ff icials o f the Stat e and f or th e off ice he occupie s; a t e nde ncy tounre st an d disorde r; r e su lting in a way, in a distrust as to th e int e grity o f gove rnme nt its elf .

Our 193 5 Constitution too k effec t but it did not contain any sp ec if ic provision onexec utive immunity. The n came the tumu lt o f the martia l law ye ars un de r th e lat e Pre side nt Fe rdinand E. Marcos an d the 1 9 73 Constitution was born. In 1 9 81 , it was am e nded and one of the ame ndme nts in v olved exec utive immunity. Sec tion 1 7 , Article VII stat ed:

The Pre side nt sha ll be immun e f rom suit during his t e nure . The re af t e r, no suit whatso eve r sha ll lie f or o ff icial acts done by him or by oth e rs pursuant to his sp ec if ic orde rs during his t e nure .

The immuniti e s h e re in pro v ided sha ll app ly to th e incumbe nt Pre side nt r efe rred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.

In his s econd Vice nt e G. Sinco Profe ssoria l Chair Lec ture e ntit led, Pre side ntia l Immunity And All The King sM e n: The Law Of Priv ile ge As A Defe nse To Actions For Damag e s, (62 Phil. L.J. 11 3 [1 9 87 ]) p e titione r sle arned couns el, f orme r De an o f the UP Colle ge of Law, Atty. Pacif ico Agabin , bright e ned the modif ications effec t ed by this constitutiona l ame ndme nt on th e existing law onexec utive priv ile ge . To quot e his disquisition:

In the Philippine s though , we sought to do th e Ame rican on e be tt e r bye nlarging an d f ortif ying th e abso lut e immunity conce pt. First , we ext e nded it to shi eld the Pre side nt not on ly f rom civ il claims but a lso f rom criminal case s an d othe r claims.Second, we e nlarg ed its s cope so that it would cove r eve n a cts o f the Pre side nt outsi de the scope of off icial dutie s. And third, we broa de ned its cove rage so as to in clude not only th e Pre side nt but a lso oth e r pe rsons , be the y gove rnme nt o ff icials or pri v at e indiv idua ls, who a ct ed upon or de rs o f the Pre side nt. It can b e said that at that point most o f us we re su ffe ring f rom AIDS (or abso lut e immunity defe nse syndrome ).

The Opposition in th e the n B atasang Pambansa sought th e re pe al of this Marcosian conce pt o f exec utive immunity in th e 1 9 73 Constitution. Th e move was led by th e n Me mbe r o f Parliame nt , now Sec re tary o f Finance, Albe rto Romulo, who argu ed that th e af t e r incumbe ncy immunitygrant ed to Pre side nt Marcos v iolat ed the principle that a pub lic off ice is a pub lic trust. H e de noun ced the immunity as a r e turn to th e ana chronism th e king can do no wrong. The eff ort f ailed .

The 1 9 73 Constitution ce ased to ex ist whe n Pre side nt Marcos was oust ed f rom o ff ice by

the Pe ople Powe r rev olution in 1 9 86 . Whe n th e 1 9 87 Constitution was craf t ed, its f rame rs did not r ee nact th e exec utive immunity pro v ision o f the 1 9 73 Constitution. X x x (Estrada v.D e si e rto, G.R. Nos . 146710-15 , March 2 , 2001 , e n Banc [ Puno ] )

66 . C an f ormer P resi d ent E stra d a sti ll be prose c ute d c rimina ll y c onsi d ering that he w as not c onvi c te d in the impea c hment pro c ee d ings against him?

Held: We rejec t his argum e nt that h e cannot b e pros ecut ed f or th e re ason that h e must f irst b e convict ed in th e impe achme nt pro ceed ings. Th e impe achme nt tria l of pe titione r Estra dawas abort ed by th e walkout o f the pros ecutors an d by th e e ve nts that led to his loss o f the pre side ncy. In deed, on Fe bruary 7 , 2 001 , the Se nat e pass ed Se nat e Re so lution N o. 83

Recognizing that th e Impe achme nt Court is Fun ctus O ff icio. Since the Impe achme nt Court isnow f unctus o ff icio, it is unt e nab le f or p e titione r to de man d that h e shou ld f irst b e impe ached and the n convict ed bef ore he can b e pros ecut ed . The ple a if grant ed, would put a p e rpe tua l baragainst his pros ecution. Such a submission has nothing to comme nd itself f or it will place him ina b e tt e r situation than a non -sitting Pre side nt who has not b ee n sub ject ed to imp e achme nt proceed ings an d ye t can b e the ob ject o f a crimina l pros ecution. To b e sure, the de bat e s in th e Constitutiona l Commission ma ke it cle ar that whe n imp e achme nt pro ceed ings hav e become moot due to th e re signation o f the Pre side nt , the prop e r criminal and civil cas e s may a lre ady b e f iled against him x x x.



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This is in a ccord with our ru ling in I n R e: Saturnino B e rm udez (145 SCRA 160 [1986] ) that incum be nt Pre side nts ar e imm une f rom suit or f rom be ing brought to court during th e pe riod of the ir incum be ncy an d t e nure but not b e yond. Conside ring th e peculiar circumstan ce that th e impe achme nt pro ce ss against th e pe titione r has b ee n abort ed and the re af t e r h e lost th e pre side ncy, pe titione r Estra da cannot de man d as a condition sine qua non to his crimina l pros ecution b ef ore the Ombudsman that h e be convict ed in th e impe achme nt pro ceed ings.

(Estrada v. D e si e rto, G.R. Nos . 146710-15 , Mar . 2 , 2001 , e n Banc [ Puno ] )

67. S tate the reason w hy not a ll appointments ma d e by the P resi d ent un d er the 1987 C onstitution w i ll no l onger re q uire c on f irmation by the C ommission on Appointments .

Held: The af orecit ed provision (S ec tion 16, Arti cl e VII) of the Constitution has b ee n th e sub ject o f se ve ral case s on th e issue of the re strictive f unction o f the Commission on

Appointm e nts with r e spec t to th e appointing po we r o f the Pre side nt. This Court tou ched uponthe historical ant ecede nt o f the said provision in th e case of Sarmie nto III v. Mison (1 5 6 S CRA54 9 ) in which it was ratio cinat ed upon that S ec tion 16 o f Articl e VII of the 19 87 Constitutionreq uiring conf irmation by th e Commission on Appointm e nts o f ce rtain appointm e nts issu ed by th e Pre side nt cont e mplat e s a syst e m o f checks an d balan ce s b e t wee n th e exec utive and l e gislative bran che s o f gove rnme nt. E xpe rie nce sho wed that whe n almost all pr e side ntial appointm e ntsreq uired the cons e nt o f the Commission on Appointm e nts, as was th e case unde r th e 19 35 Constitution, th e commission b ecame a ve nue of "hors e tra ding" and similar malpra ctice s. Onthe othe r han d, pla cing absolut e powe r to ma ke appointm e nts in th e Pre side nt with har dly anycheck by th e l e gislatur e , as what happ e ned unde r th e 19 73 Constitution, l e ads to abus e of suchpowe r. Thus was p e rce ived the need to e stablish a "midd l e groun d" be t wee n th e 19 35 and 19 73 Constitutions. Th e f rame rs o f the 19 87 Constitution dee med it impe rative to sub ject ce rtain highpositions in th e gove rnme nt to th e powe r o f conf irmation o f the Commission on Appointm e ntsand to allo w othe r positions within th e exc lusive appointing po we r o f the Pre side nt. (Mana lo v.Sisto z a, 312 SCRA 239 , Aug . 11 , 1999 , En Banc [ Purisima ] )

6 8. E numerate the groups o f o ff i c ers w ho are to be appointe d b y the P resi d ent un d er S e c tion 16, Arti cl e VII o f the 1987 C onstitution , an d i d enti f y those o ff i c ers w hose appointments sha ll re q uire c on f irmation by the C ommission on Appointments .

Held: Conf ormab ly, as consist e nt ly int e rpre t ed and ruled in th e le ading cas e of Sarmie nto III v . Mison ( I bid. ) , and in th e subs eq ue nt cas e s o f B autista v . Sa longa (172 S CRA160 ) , Quintos- Dele s v . Constitutiona l Commission (177 S CRA 2 5 9 ) , and Calde ron v . Cara le (208 S CRA 2 54) , unde r S ec tion 16 , Article VII , of the Constitution , the re are f our groups o f off ice rs o f the gove rnme nt to b e appoint ed by th e Pre side nt :

First , the he ads o f the exec utive de partm e nts , ambassa dors , oth e r pub lic minist e rs an d consu ls, off ice rs o f the armed f orce s f rom th e rank of colonel or na v al captain , and oth e r o ff ice rs whos e appointm e nts ar e ve st ed in him in this Constitution;

S econd, all othe r o ff ice rs o f the Gove rnme nt whose appointm e nts ar e not

othe rwise prov ided f or by law;

Third, thos e whom th e Pre side nt may b e authoriz ed by law to appoint;

Fourth , off ice rs lowe r in ran k whose appointm e nts th e Congr e ss may by law ve st in th e Pre side nt a lone .

I t is well-se tt led that on ly pr e side ntial appoint ee s b elonging to th e f irst group r eq uire the conf irmation by th e Commission on Appointm e nts. (Mana lo v. Sisto z a, 312 SCRA 239 , Aug .11 , 1999 , En Banc [ Purisima ] )

69. U n d er R epu bl i c Ac t 697 5 ( the D I L G Ac t o f 1990 ) , the Dire c tor G enera l, Deputy Dire c tor G enera l, an d other top o ff i c ia l s o f the P hi l ippine N ationa l P o l i c e (PNP ) sha ll be appointe d b y the P resi d ent an d their appointments sha ll re q uire c on f irmation by the C ommission on

Appointments . R espon d ent S istoza w as appointe d Dire c tor G enera l o f the PNP but he re f use d to su bmit his appointment papers to the C ommission on Appointments f or c on f irmation c onten d ing that his appointment sha ll no l onger re q uire c on f irmation d espite the express provision o f the l a w re q uiring su c h c on f irmation . S hou ld his c ontention be uphe ld ?

Held: It is well-se tt led that on ly pre side ntial appoint ee s b elonging to th e f irst group(e nume rat ed unde r th e f irst s e nt e nce of Sec tion 16 , Article VII of the 1 9 87 Constitution) r eq uire



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the conf irmation by th e Commission on Appointm e nts. Th e appointm e nts o f re spon de nt o ff ice rswho ar e not within th e f irst cat e gory , need not b e conf irmed by th e Commission on Appointm e nts. As h eld in th e case of Tarrosa v . Singson (232 S CR A 55 3 ) , Congr e ss cannot bylaw expan d the powe r o f conf irmation o f the Commission on Appointm e nts an d req uire conf irmation o f appointm e nts o f othe r go ve rnme nt o ff icials not m e ntion ed in th e f irst s e nt e nce of S ec tion 16 of Article VII of the 1 9 87 Constitution.

Cons eq ue nt ly, unconstitutiona l are S ec tions 2 6 and 3 1 of R e pub lic Act 6 9 75 whiche mpowe r th e Commission on Appointm e nts to conf irm th e appointm e nts o f pub lic off icials whose appointm e nts ar e not r eq uired by th e Constitution to b e conf irmed . x x x. (Manalo v. Sisto z a, 312 SCRA 239 , Aug . 11 , 1999 , En Banc [ Purisima ] )

70. W i ll it be c orre c t to argue that sin c e the P hi l ippine N ationa l P o l i c e is a k in to the Arme d F or c es o f the P hi l ippines , there f ore , the appointments o f po l i c e o ff i c ers w hose ran k is e q ua l to that o f c o l one l or nava l c aptain w i ll re q uire c on f irmation by the C ommission on Appointments?

Held: This cont e ntion is x x x unt e nab le . The Philippine N ationa l Police is se parat e and distinct f rom th e Armed Force s o f the Philippine s. Th e Constitution , no le ss , se ts f orth th e distinction. Un de r Sec tion 4 o f Article XVI of the 1 9 87 Constitution ,

"The Armed Force s o f the Philippine s sha ll be compos ed of a citize n arm ed f orce which sha ll unde rgo mi litary training an d se rvice, as may b e provided by law.It sha ll kee p a r e gular f orce nece ssary f or th e security o f the Stat e ."

On th e othe r han d, Sec tion 6 of the sam e Article of the Constitution or dains that :

"The Stat e sha ll e stab lish an d maintain on e police f orce, which sha ll be nationa l in scope and civilian in chara ct e r to b e administ e red and contro lled by anationa l police commission. Th e authority o f local exec utive s ov e r th e police units inthe ir jurisdiction sha ll be provided by law."

To so distinguish th e police f orce f rom th e arm ed f orce s, Congr e ss e nact ed Re pub lic Act 6 9 75 x x x.

The re unde r, the police f orce is diffe re nt f rom an d inde pe nde nt o f the arm ed f orce s an d the ranks in th e military ar e not simi lar to thos e in th e Philippine N ationa l Police . Thus , direc torsand chief sup e rint e nde nts o f the PN P x x x do not f all unde r th e f irst cat e gory o f pre side ntia l appoint ee s req uiring conf irmation by th e Commission on Appointm e nts. (Mana lo v. Sisto z a, 312 SCRA 239 , Aug . 11 , 1999 , En Banc [ Purisima ] )

71 . T o w hat types o f appointments is S e c tion 15 , Arti cl e VII o f the 1987 C onstitution ( prohi biting the P resi d ent f rom ma k ing appointments t w o months be f ore the next presi d entia l e l e c tions an d up to the en d o f his term ) d ire c te d against?

Held: Sec tion 1 5 , Article VII is direc t ed against t wo typ e s o f appointm e nts : (1 ) thos e made f or buying vot e s an d (2 ) thos e made f or partisan conside rations. Th e f irst r efe rs to thos e appointm e nts ma de within t wo months pr eced ing th e Pre side ntia l elec tion an d are similar tothos e which ar e decl ared elec tion o ffe nse s in th e Omnibus E lection Code ; while the second consists o f the so-called midnight appointm e nts. Th e SC in In Re: H on . Mat e o A.Va le n z u el a an d H on . P laci d o B . Va llarta, (2 98 SCRA 408 , No v. 9 , 1998 , En Banc [ Nar v asa C .J.] ) clarif ied this whe n it h eld:

Sec tion 1 5 , Article VII has a broa de r s cope than th e Aytona ru ling. It may not unre asonab ly be dee med to cont e mplat e not on ly midnight appointm e nts thos e made obvious ly f or partisan r e asons as sho wn by th e ir numb e r an d the time of the ir ma king but a lso appointm e nts pr e sumed made f or th e purpos e of influe ncing th e out come of the Pre side ntia l elec tion.

7 2 . Distinguish the P resi d ent s po w er to c a ll out the arme d f or c es as their C omman d er - in -C hie f in or d er to prevent or suppress l a wl ess vio l en c e , invasion or re be ll ion , f rom his po w er to pro cl aim martia l an d suspen d the privi l ege o f the w rit o f ha beas c orpus . E xp l ain w hy the f ormer is not su bj e c t to j u d i c ia l revie w w hi l e the l atter t w o are .

Held: The re is a cle ar t ex tua l commitm e nt un de r th e Constitution to b e stow on th e Pre side nt f ull discre tionary po we r to call out th e armed f orce s an d to de t e rmine the nece ssity f or



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the exe rcise of such po we r. Sec tion 1 8, Article VII of the Constitution , which e mbodie s th e powe rs o f the Pre side nt as Comman de r-in-Chief, provide s in part :

The Pre side nt sha ll be the Comman de r-in-Chief of all armed f orce s o f the Philippine s an d whe ne ve r it b ecome s n ece ssary , he may call out su ch arm ed f orce s topre ve nt or suppr e ss lawle ss vio le nce, invasion or r e bellion. In cas e of invasion or

re bellion, whe n th e pub lic sa fe ty req uire s it , he may , f or a p e riod not exceed ing sixtydays , susp e nd the privile ge of the writ o f hab e as corpus , or p lace the Philippine s or anypart th e re of unde r martia l law.

The f ull discre tionary po we r o f the Pre side nt to de t e rmine the f actua l basis f or th e exe rcise of the calling out po we r is a lso imp lied and f urth e r r e inf orced in th e re st o f Sec tion 1 8 , Article VII x x x.

Unde r th e f ore going provisions , Congr e ss may r e voke such pro clamations (of martia l law)or susp e nsion (of the privile ge of the writ o f hab e as corpus) an d the Court may r e view the suff icie ncy of the f actua l basis th e re of . Howe ve r, the re is no su ch eq uivale nt provision de alingwith th e re vocation or r e view of the Pre side nt 's a ction to call out th e armed f orce s. Th e distinction p lace s th e calling out po we r in a diffe re nt cat e gory f rom th e powe r to decl are martia l law and the powe r to susp e nd the privile ge of the writ o f hab e as corpus , oth e rwise, the f rame rsof the Constitution would have simply lumped toge the r th e three powe rs an d provided f or th e irre vocation an d re view without any qua lif ication. E xpre ssio unios e st exclusio a lt e rius. X x x.That th e int e nt o f the Constitution is exact ly what its le tt e r says , i.e ., that th e powe r to call isf ully discre tionary to th e Pre side nt , is extant in th e delibe ration o f the Constitutiona l Commissionx x x.

The re ason f or th e diffe re nce in th e tre atm e nt o f the af ore me ntioned powe rs high lightsthe int e nt to grant th e Pre side nt th e wide st leew ay an d broa de st discre tion in using th e powe r tocall out b ecaus e it is conside red as th e le sse r an d more be nign po we r compar ed to th e powe r tosusp e nd the privile ge of the writ o f hab e as corpus an d the powe r to impos e martia l law, both o f which invo lve the curtai lme nt an d suppr e ssion o f ce rtain basi c civil rights an d individua l f reed oms , and thus n ece ssitating sa fe guar ds by Congr e ss an d re view by this Court.

More ove r, unde r Sec tion 1 8 , Article VII of the Constitution , in th e exe rcise of the powe rto susp e nd the privile ge of the writ o f hab e as corpus or to impos e martia l law, t wo conditionsmust concur: (1 ) th e re must b e an a ctua l invasion or r e bellion an d, (2 ) pub lic sa fe ty must r eq uire it. The se conditions ar e not r eq uired in th e cas e of the powe r to call out th e armed f orce s. Th e only crit e rion is that "whe ne ve r it b ecome s n ece ssary ," the Pre side nt may call the arm ed f orce s"to pr e ve nt or suppr e ss lawle ss vio le nce, invasion or r e bellion." The implication is that th e Pre side nt is giv e n f ull discre tion an d wide latitu de in th e exe rcise of the powe r to call ascompar ed to th e t wo oth e r po we rs.

If the pe titione r f ails, by way o f proo f, to support th e ass e rtion that th e Pre side nt a ct ed without f actua l basis , the n this Court cannot un de rta ke an in de pe nde nt inv e stigation b e yond the

ple adings. Th e f actua l nece ssity o f calling out th e armed f orce s is not e asily quanti f iable and cannot b e ob jectively e stab lished since matt e rs conside red f or satis f ying th e sam e is acombination o f se ve ral f actors which ar e not a lways a cce ssible to th e courts. B e side s th e abs e nce of t ex tua l stan dards that th e court may us e to judge nece ssity , inf ormation n ece ssary toarrive at su ch judgme nt might a lso prov e unmanag e ab le f or th e courts. Ce rtain p e rtine nt inf ormation might b e diff icult to v e rif y, or wholly unavai lable to th e courts. In many instan ce s, the e vide nce upon which th e Pre side nt might dec ide that th e re is a n eed to call out th e arm ed f orce s may b e of a natur e not constituting t echnical proo f .

On th e othe r han d, the Pre side nt as Comman de r-in-Chief has a vast int ellige nce ne t work to gath e r inf ormation , som e of which may b e classi f ied as high ly conf ide ntial or a ffec ting th e security o f the stat e . In th e exe rcise of the powe r to call, on-the-spot dec isions may b e impe ratively nece ssary in e me rge ncy situations to av e rt gr e at loss o f human live s an d massde stru ction o f prop e rty. In deed, the dec ision to call out th e military to pr e ve nt or suppr e sslawle ss viole nce must b e done swif t ly an d dec isively if it we re to hav e any effec t at a ll. Such asce nario is not f arfe t ched whe n we conside r th e pre se nt situation in Mindanao , whe re the insurg e ncy prob le m could spill ove r th e othe r parts o f the country. Th e de t e rmination o f the nece ssity f or th e calling out po we r if sub ject ed to un fe tt e red judicial scrutiny could be a v e ritab le pre scription f or disast e r, as su ch po we r may b e unduly strait jacke t ed by an in junction or at e mporary r e straining or de r e ve ry time it is exe rcised .



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Thus , it is th e unclouded int e nt o f the Constitution to v e st upon th e Pre side nt , asComman de r-in-Chief of the Armed Force s, f ull discre tion to call f orth th e military whe n in his judgme nt it is n ece ssary to do so in or de r to pr e ve nt or suppr e ss lawle ss vio le nce, invasion orre bellion. Un le ss th e pe titione r can sho w that th e exe rcise of such discre tion was grav elyabus ed, the Pre side nt 's exe rcise of judgme nt de se rve s to b e accorded re spec t f rom this Court.(Int e grat e d Bar of th e Philippin e s v. H on . Ronaldo B . Z amora, G.R. No . 141 2 84 , Aug .

15 , 2000, En Banc [K apunan ] )

73. B y issuing a T RO on the d ate c onvi c te d rapist L eo E c hegaray is to be exe c ute d b y l etha l in j e c tion , the S upreme C ourt w as c riti c ize d on the groun d, among others , that it en c roa c he d on the po w er o f the P resi d ent to grant reprieve un d er S e c tion 19, Arti cl e VII , 1987 C onstitution . J usti f y the SC' s a c t .

Held: Sec tion 1 9 , Article VII of the 1 9 87 Constitution is si mply the sour ce of p ow e r o f the Pre side nt to grant r ep rie ve s, comm utations , and p ardons an d rem it f ine s an d f orfe iture s a f t e rconviction b y f inal judgme nt. This p rovision , how e ve r, cannot b e int e rp re t ed as de ny ing th e p ow e r o f courts to contro l the e nf orceme nt o f the ir dec isions a f t e r th e f inalit y . In truth , anaccused who has b ee n convict ed by f inal judgme nt sti ll p osse sse s collat e ral rights an d the se rights can b e claimed in th e app rop riat e courts. For instan ce, a de ath convict who b ecome sinsan e af t e r his f inal conviction cannot b e exec ut ed while in a stat e of insanit y ( See Article 79 o f the R e vised Pe na l Code ) . The sus pe nsion o f such a de ath s e nt e nce is un disp utab ly an exe rcise of judicial p ow e r. It is not usur p ation o f the p re side ntia l p ow e r o f rep rie ve though its effec t isthe same the t emp orary sus pe nsion o f the exec ution o f the de ath convict. In th e sa me ve in, it cannot b e de nied that Congr e ss can at an y time ame nd R. A. No. 76 5 9 by red ucing th e pe na lt y of de ath to life imp risonme nt. Th e effec t o f such an a me ndme nt is like that o f comm utation o f se nt e nce . But b y no str e t ch o f the im agination can th e exe rcise by Congr e ss o f its ple nary p ow e rto a me nd laws b e conside red as a vio lation o f the Pre side nt sp ow e r to comm ut e f inal se nt e nce sof conviction. Th e p ow e rs o f the E xecutive, the L e gislative and the Judiciary to sav e the life of ade ath convict do not exclude e ach oth e r f or th e simple re ason that th e re is no high e r right thanthe right to life . (Ech e garay v. S e cr e tary of Justic e , 3 0 1 SCRA 96 , Jan . 19 , 1999 , En Banc [ Puno ] )

74 . Dis c uss the nature o f a c on d itiona l par d on . I s its grant or revo c ation by the P resi d ent su bj e c t to j u d i c ia l revie w ?

Held: A conditiona l par don is in th e natur e of a contra ct b e t wee n th e sove re ign po we ror th e Chief Executive and the convict ed crimina l to th e effec t that th e f orme r will rele as e the latt e r sub ject to th e condition that i f he doe s not comply with th e t e rms o f the pardon, he will be recommitt ed to prison to s e rve the unexpired portion o f the se nt e nce or an a dd itiona l one ( Alvarez v. D irec tor o f Prisons, 80 Phi l. 5 0 ) . By th e pardonee scons e nt to th e t e rms stipu lat ed inthis contra ct , the pardonee has th e re by p laced himself unde r th e sup e rvision o f the Chief Executive or his dele gat e who is duty-boun d to s ee to it that th e pardonee comp lie s with th e t e rms an d conditions o f the par don. Un de r Sec tion 6 4(i ) of the Re vised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authori zed to or de r the arre st an d re- incarce ration o f any su ch p e rson who, in

his judgme nt , sha ll f ail to comply with th e condition, or conditions o f his par don, paro le, orsusp e nsion o f se nt e nce . It is no w a well-e ntre nched rule in this jurisdiction that this exe rcise of pre side ntial judgme nt is b e yond judicial scrutiny. Th e de t e rmination o f the violation o f the conditional pardon r e sts exclusively in th e soun d judgme nt o f the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having cons e nt ed to p lace his libe rty on conditiona l pardon upon th e judgme nt o f the powe r that has grant ed it , cannot invo ke the aid of the courts , howe ve r e rrone ous th e f indingsmay b e upon which his r ecommitm e nt was or de red .

It matt e rs not that th e pardonee has a lle gedly bee n a cquitt ed in t wo o f the three criminal cas e s f iled against him subs eq ue nt to his conditional pardon, and that th e third re mains p e ndingf or thirt ee n ( 1 3) ye ars in appar e nt vio lation o f his right to a sp eed y tria l.

Ultimat ely, solely ve st ed in th e Chief Executive, who in th e f irst p lace was th e exclusive author o f the conditiona l pardon an d of its re vocation , is the coro llary pr e rogativ e to r e instat e the pardon i f in his o wn judgme nt , the acquitta l of the pardonee f rom th e subs eq ue nt charg e s f iled against him , warrants th e sam e . Courts hav e no authority to int e rfe re with th e grant by th e Pre side nt o f a par don to a convict ed crimina l. It has b ee n our f ortif ied ruling that a f inal judicial pronoun ce me nt as to th e guilt o f a par donee is not a r eq uire me nt f or th e Pre side nt to de t e rmine whe the r or not th e re has b ee n a br e ach o f the t e rms o f a conditiona l pardon. Th e re is likew ise nil a basis f or th e courts to effec tuat e the re instat e me nt o f a conditiona l pardon r e voked by th e



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Pre side nt in th e exe rcise of powe rs un disputab ly so lely an d abso lut ely in his o ff ice . (In Re:Wilfr e do Sumulong Torr e s, 2 51 SCRA 7 0 9 , D e c . 2 9 , 1995 [He rmosisima ] )

7 5 . W ho has the po w er to rati f y a treaty?

Held: In our jurisdiction, the powe r to rati f y is ve st ed in th e Pre side nt an d not , as

common ly belie ved, in th e le gislatur e . The role of the Se nat e is limit ed only to giving orwithho lding its cons e nt , or concurre nce, to th e ratif ication. (BAYAN [ Bagong Alyansang Maka b ayan ] v. Exe cuti ve S e cr e tary Rona ld o Z amora, G.R. No . 13857 0, Oct . 1 0, 2000, En Banc [ Bu e na ] )

76. W hat is the po w er o f impoun d ment o f the P resi d ent? W hat are its prin c ipa l sour c es?

Held: Impoun dme nt r efe rs to th e ref usa l of the Pre side nt , f or what e ve r re ason , tospe nd f unds ma de availab le by Congr e ss. It is th e f ailure to sp e nd or ob ligat e budge t authorityof any typ e .

Propon e nts o f impoun dme nt hav e invoked at le ast thr ee principal sour ce s o f the authority o f the Pre side nt. For e most is th e authority to impoun d give n to him e ithe r expre ss ly orimpliedly by Congr e ss. Second is th e exec utive powe r drawn f rom th e Pre side nt s role asComman de r-in-Chief . Third is th e Faithf ul Execution Claus e .

The propon e nts insist that a f aith f ul exec ution o f the laws req uire s that th e Pre side nt de sist f rom imp le me nting th e law if doing so would prejudice pub lic int e re st. An examp le give nis whe n through eff icie nt an d prude nt manag e me nt o f a pro ject , substantia l savings ar e made .In su ch a case, it is sh ee r f olly to expec t th e Pre side nt to sp e nd the e ntire amount bu dge t ed inthe law. (P HILCONSA v. Enriqu ez , 23 5 SCRA 5 06, Aug . 9 , 1994 [Q uiason ] )

The J u di cia l Dep ar tme n t

77. W hat are the re q uisites be f ore the C ourt c an exer c ise the po w er o f j u d i c ia l revie w ?

Held: 1 . The time- t e st ed stan dards f or th e exe rcise of judicial re view are: (1 ) th e ex ist e nce of an appropriat e cas e ; (2 ) an int e re st p e rsona l and substantia l by th e party raising th e constitutiona l que stion; (3) th e ple a that th e f unction b e exe rcised at th e e ar lie st opportunity;and (4) th e nece ssity that th e constitutiona l que stion b e pass ed upon in or de r to dec ide the case (S e parat e Opinion, K apunan, J. , in Isagani Cru z v. S e cr e tary of En v ironm e nt an dNatura l Re sourc e s, e t a l. , G.R. No . 1 3 5 3 85 , D e c . 6, 2000, En Banc)

2 . Whe n que stions o f constitutiona l signif icance are raised, the Court can exe rcise itspowe r o f judicial re view only if the f ollowing r eq uisit e s ar e comp lied with, nam ely: (1 ) th e ex ist e nce of an a ctua l and appropriat e case ; (2 ) a p e rsona l and substantia l int e re st o f the partyraising th e constitutiona l que stion; (3) th e exe rcise of judicial re view is p le aded at th e e arlie st

opportunity; an d (4) th e constitutiona l que stion is th e lis mota o f the cas e . (Int e grat ed Bar of th e Phi lippin e s v. H on . Rona ld o B . Z amora, G.R. No . 141 2 84 , Aug . 15 , 2000, En Banc [K apunan ] )

78. W hat is an " a c tua l c ase or c ontroversy " ?

Held: An "actua l case or controv e rsy" me ans an ex isting cas e or controv e rsy which isboth rip e f or r e solution an d sus ce ptible of judicial de t e rmination , and that which is not con jectura l or anti cipatory , or that which s eek s to r e solve hypoth e tical or fe igned constitutiona l prob le ms. A pe tition raising a constitutiona l que stion doe s not pr e se nt an "actua l controv e rsy," unle ss it a lle ge s a le ga l right or po we r. More ove r, it must sho w that a conflict o f rights ex ists , f orinhe re nt in th e t e rm "controv e rsy" is the pre se nce of opposing vi ew s or cont e ntions. Oth e rwise, the Court will be f orced to r e solve issue s which r e main un f ocused becaus e the y lack suchconcre t e ne ss provi ded whe n a que stion e me rge s pr ec isely f ramed f rom a clash o f adve rsaryargum e nts exploring e ve ry asp ec t o f a mu lti-f ace t ed situation e mbra cing conflicting an d de man ding int e re sts. Th e controv e rsy must a lso b e justiciable ; that is , it must b e sus ce ptible of judicial de t e rmination. (Int e grat ed Bar of th e Phi lippin e s v. H on . Rona ld o B . Z amora, G.R. No . 141 2 84 , Aug . 15 , 2000, En Banc [K apunan ] )

79. P etitioners I sagani C ruz an d C esar E uropa brought a suit f or prohi bition an d man d amus as c itizens an d taxpayers , assai l ing the c onstitutiona l ity o f c ertain provisions o f R epu bl i c Ac t N o .



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8371, other w ise k no w n as the I n d igenous P eop l es R ights Ac t o f 1997 ( I PRA ) , an d its I mp l ementing R u l es an d R egu l ations . A pre l iminary issue reso l ve d b y the SC w as w hether the petition presents an a c tua l c ontroversy .

Held: Courts can on ly dec ide actua l controv e rsie s, not hypoth e tical que stions or case s.The thre sho ld issue, the ref ore, is whe the r an "appropriat e case " exists f or th e exe rcise of judicial

re view in th e pre se nt cas e .

X x x

In th e cas e at bar , the re exists a live controv e rsy invo lving a clash o f le ga l rights. A law has b ee n e nact ed, and the Imp le me nting Rule s an d Re gulations approv ed . Mone y has b ee nappropriat ed and the gove rnme nt ag e ncie s conce rned have bee n direc t ed to imp le me nt th e statut e . It cannot b e succe ssf ully maintain ed that we shou ld await th e adve rse conseq ue nce s o f the law in orde r to conside r th e controv e rsy a ctua l and ripe f or judicial re so lution. It is pr ec iselythe cont e ntion o f the pe titione rs that th e law, on its f ace, constitut e s an un constitutiona l abdication o f Stat e owne rship ov e r lands o f the public domain an d oth e r natura l re sour ce s.More ove r, whe n th e Stat e machine ry is s e t into motion to imp le me nt an a lle ged unconstitutiona l statut e, this Court poss e sse s su ff icie nt authority to r e so lve and pre ve nt immin e nt in jury an d violation o f the constitutiona l proce ss. (S e parat e Opinion, K apunan, J. , in Isagani Cru z v.S e cr e tary of En v ironm e nt an d Natura l Re sourc e s, e t a l. , G.R. No . 1 3 5 3 85 , D e c . 6, 2000, En Banc)

80. W hat is the meaning o f "l ega l stan d ing " or l o c us stan d i?

Held: "Le ga l stan ding" or loc u s stan di has b ee n def ined as a p e rsona l and su bstantia l int e re st in th e case su ch that th e party has s u stain ed or will su stain dire ct in ju ry as a r e sult o f the gove rnme nta l act that is b e ing cha lle nged . The t e rm "int e re st " me ans a mat e rial int e re st , anint e re st in iss ue affe ct ed by th e de cree, as distingu ished f rom m e re int e re st in th e que stioninvolved, or a m e re incide nta l int e re st. Th e gist o f the que stion o f stan ding is whe the r a partyalle ge s "su ch p e rsona l sta ke in th e ou tcom e of the controv e rsy as to ass u re that concr e t e adve rse ne ss which sharp e ns th e pre se ntation o f issue s u pon which th e cou rt de pe nds f orillu mination o f diff ic ult constit u tiona l que stions. " (Int e grat ed Bar of th e Phi lippin e s v. H on .Rona ld o B . Z amora, G.R. No . 141 2 84 , Aug . 15 , 2000)

In a dd ition to th e ex ist e nc e of an act u al case or controv e rsy, a p e rson who assai ls th e validity of a stat u t e mu st hav e a p e rsona l and su bstantia l int e re st in th e case, su ch that , he hassu stain ed, or will su stain , a dire ct in ju ry as a r e sult o f its e nf orc e me nt. Evide nt ly, the rightsass e rt ed by p e titione rs as citiz e ns an d taxpaye rs ar e held in common by a ll the citize ns , the violation o f which may r e sult on ly in a "ge ne ralized grie vanc e ". Y e t , in a s e nse, all citize n's an d taxpaye r's s u its ar e eff orts to air g e ne ra lized grie vanc e s abo u t th e condu ct o f gove rnme nt an d the allocation o f powe r. (S e parat e Opinion, K apunan, J. , in Isagani Cru z v. S e cr e tary of En v ironm e nt an d Natura l Re sourc e s, e t a l. , G.R. No . 1 3 5 3 85 , D e c . 6, 2000, En Banc)

81. Asserting itse lf as the o ff i c ia l organization o f F i l ipino l a w yers tas k e d w ith the boun d en d uty to upho ld the ru l e o f l a w an d the C onstitution , the I ntegrate d B ar o f the P hi l ippines ( I B P ) f i l e d a petition be f ore the SC q uestioning the va l i d ity o f the or d er o f the P resi d ent c omman d ing the d ep l oyment an d uti l ization o f the P hi l ippine M arines to assist the P hi l ippine N ationa l P o l i c e (PNP ) in l a w en f or c ement by j oining the l atter in visi bi l ity patro l s aroun d the metropo l is . T he S o l i c itor G enera l q uestione d the l ega l stan d ing o f the I B P to f i l e the petition? R eso l ve .

Held: In th e case at bar , the IBP primari ly an chors its stan ding on its a lle ged re sponsibi lity to upho ld the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart f rom this decl aration , howe ve r, the IBP ass e rts no oth e r basis in support o f its locus stan di. The me re invocation bythe IBP of its duty to pr e se rve the rule of law and nothing mor e, while undoubt edly tru e, is not suff icie nt to clothe it with stan ding in this cas e . This is too g e ne ral an int e re st which is shar ed byothe r groups an d the whole citize nry. Bas ed on th e stan dards abov e-stat ed, the IBP has f ailed topre se nt a sp ec if ic and substantia l int e re st in th e re so lution o f the case . Its f undame nta l purpos e which, unde r Sec tion 2 , Rule 1 39 - A of the Rule s o f Court , is to ele vat e the stan dards o f the law profe ssion an d to improv e the administration o f justice is a lie n to , and cannot b e affec t ed by th e de ployme nt o f the Marine s. x x x More ove r, the IBP x x x has not sho wn any sp ec if ic in jurywhich it has su ffe red or may su ffe r by virtu e of the que stion ed gove rnme nta l act. In deed, none of its m e mbe rs, whom th e IBP purport edly re pre se nts , has sustain ed any f orm o f in jury as are su lt o f the ope ration o f the joint visibility patro ls. N e ithe r is it a lle ged that any o f its m e mbe rshas b ee n arr e st ed or that th e ir civil libe rtie s hav e bee n violat ed by th e de ployme nt o f the



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Marine s. What th e IBP pro jects as in jurious is th e suppos ed "militarization" of law e nf orce me nt which might thr e at e n Philippine de mocratic institutions an d may caus e more harm than goo d inthe long run. N ot on ly is th e pre sum ed "in jury" not p e rsona l in chara ct e r, it is likew ise toovagu e, high ly speculative and unce rtain to satis f y the req uire me nt o f stan ding. Since pe titione rhas not su cce ssf ully e stab lished a direc t an d pe rsona l in jury as a conseq ue nce of the que stioned act , it doe s not poss e ss th e pe rsona lity to assai l the validity of the de ployme nt o f the Marine s.

This Court , howe ve r, doe s not cat e gorically ru le that th e IBP has abso lut ely no stan ding to rais e constitutiona l issue s no w or in th e f utur e . The IBP must , by way o f alle gations an d proo f, satis f ythis Court that it has su ff icie nt sta ke to obtain judicial re solution o f the controv e rsy.(Int e grat e d Bar of th e Philippin e s v. H on . Ronaldo B . Z amora, G.R. No . 141 2 84 , Aug .15 , 2000, En Banc [K apunan ] )

82. C onsi d ering the l a ck o f re q uisite stan d ing o f the I B P to f i l e the petition q uestioning the va l i d ity o f the or d er o f the P resi d ent to d ep l oy an d uti l ize the P hi l ippine M arines to assist the PNP in l a w en f or c ement , may the C ourt sti ll proper l y ta k e c ognizan c e o f the c ase?

Held: Having stat ed the f ore going , it must b e e mphasiz ed that this Court has th e discre tion to ta ke cognizan ce of a suit which doe s not satis f y the req uire me nt o f le ga l stan dingwhe n paramount int e re st is invo lved . In not a few cas e s, the Court has a dopt ed a libe ral attitu de on th e locus stan di of a p e titione r whe re the pe titione r is ab le to craf t an issu e of trans ce nde nta l signif icance to th e pe ople . Thus , whe n th e issue s rais ed are of paramount importan ce to th e pub lic, the Court may brush asi de t echnicalitie s o f proced ure . In this cas e, a r e ading o f the pe tition sho ws that th e IBP has a dvanced constitutiona l issue s which de se rve the att e ntion o f thisCourt in vi ew of the ir s e riousne ss , novelty an d we ight as pr ecede nts. More ove r, becaus e pe ace and orde r ar e unde r constant thr e at an d lawle ss vio le nce occurs in in cre asing t e mpo , undoubt edly aggravat ed by th e Mindanao insurg e ncy prob le m, the le gal controv e rsy rais ed in th e pe tition a lmost ce rtain ly will not go a way. It will star e us in th e f ace again. It , the ref ore, be hoov e s th e Court to r elax the rule s on stan ding an d to r e so lve the issue now, rath e r than lat e r.(Int e grat ed Bar of th e Phi lippin e s v. H on . Rona ld o B . Z amora, G.R. No . 141 2 84 , Aug .15 , 2000)

83. W hen is an a c tion c onsi d ere d moot ? M ay the c ourt sti ll reso l ve the c ase on c e it has be c ome moot an d a c a d emi c ?

Held: 1 . It is a lle ged by re spon de nt that , with re spec t to th e PCCR [Pre paratoryCommission on Constitutiona l Ref orm], this case has b ecome moot an d acade mic. We agree .

An a ction is conside red moot whe n it no longe r pr e se nts a justiciable controv e rsybecaus e the issue s invo lved have become acade mic or de ad. Unde r E.O. N o. 4 3 , the PCCR wasinstru ct ed to comp le t e its tas k on or b ef ore June 30 , 1 999. Ho we ve r, on Fe bruary 1 9 , 1 999 , the Pre side nt issu ed Executive Orde r N o. 70 (E.O. N o. 70 ), which ext e nded the time f ram e f or th e comp le tion o f the commission s work x x x. The PCCR submitt ed its recomme ndations to th e Pre side nt on D ece mbe r 2 0, 1 999 an d was dissolved by th e Pre side nt on th e sam e day. It ha d likew ise spe nt th e f unds a llocat ed to it. Thus , the PCCR has ce ased to exist , having lost its raison

d être . Subs eq ue nt e ve nts hav e ove rtake n th e pe tition an d the Court has nothing lef t to r e solve .

The sta le ne ss o f the issue bef ore us is ma de more mani fe st by th e impossibi lity of granting th e relief prayed f or by p e titione r. Basi cally, pe titione r as ks this Court to e n join th e PCCR f rom a cting as su ch. Cle arly, prohibition is an inappropriat e re med y since the body sought to b e e n joined no longe r exists. It is well-e stab lished that prohibition is a pr e ve ntive re med y an d doe s not lie to r e strain an a ct that is a lre ady f ait a ccomp li. At this point , any ru ling re garding th e PCCR would simp ly be in th e natur e of an a dvisory opinion , which is def init ely be yond the pe rmissib le scope of judicial powe r. ( G on z a le s v. Nar v asa, 337 SCRA 733, Aug . 14 , 2000, En Banc [G on z aga -Re y e s ] )

2 . The pe tition which was f iled by privat e re spon de nts b ef ore the tria l court sought th e issuan ce of a writ o f man damus , to comman d pe titione rs to a dmit th e m f or e nro lme nt. Ta kinginto a ccount th e admission o f privat e re spon de nts that th e y hav e f inished the ir N ursing cours e at the Lanting Colle ge of N ursing e ve n bef ore the promu lgation o f the que stion ed dec ision, this case has cle ar ly b ee n ov e rtake n by e ve nts an d shou ld the ref ore be dismissed . Howe ve r, the case of East e rn Broa dcasting Corporation (DY RE) v. Dans , e t c., e t a l., G .R. N o. 5 9 32 9 , July 1 9 , 1 98 5 , 1 37 SCRA 6 2 8 is th e authority f or th e view that "e ve n if a cas e we re moot an d acade mic, a stat e me nt of the gove rning prin ciple is appropriat e in th e re solution o f dismissa l f or th e guidance not on ly of the parti e s but o f othe rs simi lar ly situat ed . We sha ll adhe re to this vi ew and proceed to dwell on



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the me rits o f this p e tition. (Uni ve rsity of San Agustin, Inc . v. Court of App e als, 230 SCRA 76 1 , 770, March 7, 1994 [ Nocon ] )

8 4 . I n c onne c tion w ith the M ay 11, 1998 e l e c tions , the COM ELE C issue d a reso l ution prohi biting the c on d u c t o f exit po ll s on the groun d, among others , that it might c ause d isor d er an d c on f usion c onsi d ering the ran d omness o f se l e c ting intervie w ees , w hi c h f urther ma k es the exit

po ll s unre l ia bl e . T he c onstitutiona l ity o f this reso l ution w as c ha ll enge d b y AB S-C B N B roa dc asting C orporation as vio l ative o f f ree d om o f expression . T he S o l i c itor G enera l c onten d s that the petition has been ren d ere d moot an d a c a d emi c be c ause the M ay 11, 1998 e l e c tion has a l rea d y been he ld an d d one w ith an d, there f ore , there is no l onger any a c tua l c ontroversy to be reso l ve d. R eso l ve .

Held: While the assai led Re solution r efe rred spec if ically to th e May 11 , 1 99 8 elec tion , itsimplications on th e pe ople sf undame nta l f reed om o f expre ssion trans ce nd the past elec tion. Th e holding o f pe riodic elec tions is a basi c fe atur e of our de mocratic gove rnme nt. By its v e ry natur e, ex it po lling is ti ed up with elec tions. To s e t asi de the re so lution o f the issue now will onlypostpon e a tas k that could well crop up again in f utur e elec tions.

In any e ve nt , in Sa longa v. Cru z Pano ( 1 3 4 SC R A 4 3 8 , 4 63 , F e b. 1 8, 1 9 85) , the Court had occasion to r e it e rat e that it a lso has th e duty to f ormu lat e guiding an d contro llingconstitutiona l principle s, prece pts , doctrine s, or ru le s. It has th e symbo lic f unction o f ed ucatingbe nch an d bar on th e ex t e nt o f prot ec tion giv e n by constitutiona l guarant ee s. Since the f undame nta l f reed oms o f speec h an d of the pre ss ar e be ing invo ked he re, we have re solved tose tt le, f or th e guidance of post e rity, whe the r th e y likew ise prot ec t th e holding o f exit po lls an d the disse mination o f data de rived the ref rom. (ABS -CBN Broa d casting Corporation v.COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 33 48 6, Jan . 2 8 , 2000, En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

85 . Dis c uss the nature o f a taxpayer s suit . W hen may it be a ll o w e d ?

Held: 1 . Pe titione r an d re spon de nts agr ee that to constitut e a ta xpaye r's suit , t woreq uisit e s must b e me t , nam ely, that pub lic f unds ar e disburs ed by a po litical sub division orinstrum e nta lity an d in doing so , a law is violat ed or som e irre gularity is committ ed, and that th e pe titione r is direc t ly a ffec t ed by th e alle ged ultra vir e s a ct. Th e sam e pronoun ce me nt was ma de in Kilosbayan , I nc. v. G uingona , Jr. , (232 SCRA 11 0 [ 1 99 4 ] , whe re the Court a lso r e it e rat ed itslibe ral stan ce in e nt e rtaining so -called taxpaye r's suits , e spec ially whe n important issu e s ar e involved . A close r examination o f the f acts o f this case would re adily de monstrat e that pe titione r's stan ding shou ld not e ve n b e made an issu e he re, "since stan ding is a conce pt inconstitutiona l law and he re no constitutiona l que stion is a ctua lly involved ."

I n th e cas e at bar , disburs e me nt o f pub lic f unds was on ly ma de in 1 9 75 whe n th e Province bought th e lands f rom Ortigas at P11 0.00 p e r square me t e r in line with th e ob jective s o f P.D. 6 74 . Pe titione r ne ve r refe rred to su ch pur chas e as an i lle ga l disburs e me nt o f pub lic f undsbut f ocused on th e alle ged f raudule nt r econve yance of said prop e rty to Ortigas b ecaus e the price paid was lowe r than th e pre vailing mar ke t va lue of ne ighboring lots. Th e f irst r eq uire me nt ,

the ref ore, which would make this p e tition a ta xpaye r's suit is abs e nt. Th e only re maining justif ication f or p e titione r to b e allowed to pursu e this a ction is whe the r it is , or would be, direc t lyaffec t ed by th e act comp lained of . As we stat ed in Kilosbayan , I nc. v. Morato (supra. ) ,

"Stan ding is a sp ec ial conce rn in constitutiona l law becaus e in som e cas e s suitsare brought not by parti e s who hav e bee n pe rsona lly in jured by th e ope ration o f a law orby o ff icial action ta ke n, but by conce rned citize ns , taxpaye rs or vot e rs who a ctua lly su e in th e pub lic int e re st. H e nce the que stion in stan ding is whe the r su ch parti e s hav e 'alle ged such a p e rsona l sta ke in th e out come of the controv e rsy as to assur e that concre t e adve rse ne ss which sharp e ns th e pre se ntation o f issue s upon which th e court solarg ely de pe nds f or illumination o f diff icult constitutiona l que stions. ' (Citing B ake r v. Carr , 3 6 9 U .S. 1 8 6 , 7l. E d. 2 d 6 33 [ 1 9 6 2] )"

U nde niab ly, as a ta xpaye r, pe titione r would some how be adve rsely a ffec t ed by an i lle ga l use of pub lic mone y. Wh e n, howe ve r, no su ch un lawf ul spe nding has b ee n sho wn, as in th e cas e at bar , pe titione r, e ve n as a ta xpaye r, cannot que stion th e transa ction va lidly exec ut ed by an d be t wee n th e Province and Ortigas f or th e simp le re ason that it is not privy to sai d contra ct. I nothe r words, pe titione r has abso lut ely no caus e of action , and cons eq ue nt ly no locus stan di, inthe instant case . (Th e Anti -G raft Le agu e of th e Phi lippin e s, Inc . v. San Juan, 260 SCRA 2 5 0, 2 5 3 -2 55 , Aug . 1 , 199 6, En Banc [ Rom e ro ] )



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2 . A taxpaye r is dee med to hav e the stan ding to rais e a constitutiona l issue whe n it ise stab lished that pub lic f unds hav e bee n disburs ed in a lle ged contrav e ntion o f the law or th e Constitution. Thus , a ta xpaye r s action is prop e rly brought on ly whe n th e re is an exe rcise byCongr e ss o f its ta xing or sp e nding po we r ( F last v. Cohe n, 39 2 U S 83 , 2 0 L E d 2 d 9 4 7 , 88 S Ct 19 4 2 ) . This was our ru ling in a r ece nt cas e whe re in pe titione rs Telec ommuni cations an d Broadcast Attorn e ys o f the Philippine s (T ELE B AP ) and GM A N e t work, Inc. que stioned the validity

of S ec tion 9 2 of B.P. Blg. 881 (oth e rwise known as th e Omnibus E lection Code ) req uiring ra dioand t ele vision stations to giv e f ree air time to th e Commission on E lections during th e campaignpe riod (Telec ommuni cations an d Broadcast Attorn e ys o f the Philippine s, Inc. v. Commission onE lections , 2 89 S CR A 337 [1998] ) . The Court h eld that p e titione r TELE B AP did not hav e anyint e re st as a ta xpaye r since the assai led law did not invo lve the taxing or sp e nding po we r o f Congr e ss.

Many oth e r ru lings hav e pre mised the grant or de nial of stan ding to ta xpaye rs uponwhe the r or not th e cas e involved a disburs e me nt o f pub lic f unds by th e le gislatur e . In Sani dad v.Commission on E lections (73 S CR A 333 [1976] ) , the pe titione rs th e re in we re allowed to bring ataxpaye r s suit to que stion s e ve ra l pre side ntia l dec ree s promu lgat ed by th e n Pre side nt Marcos inhis le gislative capa city calling f or a nationa l refe re ndum , with th e Court explaining that

X x x [i]t is no w an an cie nt ru le that th e valid sour ce of a statut e Pre side ntia l Decree s ar e of such natur e may b e cont e st ed by on e who will sustain a direc t in jury asa r e su lt o f its e nf orce me nt. At th e instan ce of taxpaye rs, laws provi ding f or th e disburs e me nt o f pub lic f unds may b e e n joined, upon th e the ory that th e expe nditure of pub lic f unds by an o ff ice r o f the Stat e f or th e purpos e of exec uting an un constitutiona l act constitut e s a misapp lication o f such f unds. Th e bre adth o f Pre side ntial Decree No.991 carrie s an appropriation o f F ive M illion Pe sos f or th e effec tive imple me ntation o f itspurpos e s. Pre side ntial Dec ree N o. 1031 appropriat e s th e sum o f E ight M illion Pe sos tocarry out its provisions. Th e int e re st o f the af ore named pe titione rs as ta xpaye rs in th e lawf ul expe nditure of the se amounts o f pub lic mone y su ff icie nt ly clothe s th e m with that pe rsona lity to litigat e the validity of the Decree s appropriating sai d f unds x x x.

In sti ll anoth e r cas e, the Court h eld that p e titione rs th e Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., a non -prof it civic organization ha d stan ding as ta xpaye rs to que stion th e constitutiona lity of R e pub lic Act N o. 3836 inso f ar as it provi de s f or r e tire me nt gratuity an d commutation o f vacationand sick le ave s to S e nators an d R e pre se ntativ e s an d to th e elec tive off icials o f both hous e s o f Congr e ss ( Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gim e ne z, 15 S CR A 4 79 [196 5 ] ) . And inPas cua l v. S ec re tary o f Public W orks (110 Phil. 331 [1960] ) , the Court a llowed pe titione r tomaintain a ta xpaye r s suit assailing th e constitutiona l soun dne ss o f R e pub lic Act N o. 9 2 0 appropriating P8 5 ,000 f or th e constru ction , re pair an d improve me nt o f feede r roa ds withinprivat e prop e rty. All the se case s invo lved the disburs e me nt o f pub lic f unds by m e ans o f a law.

M e anwhile, in Bugnay Constru ction an d De velopme nt Corporation v. L aron (176 S CR A 2 5 1 [1989] ) , the Court decl ared that th e trial court was wrong in a llowing r e spon de nt Ravanzo tobring an a ction f or in junction in his capa city as a ta xpaye r in or de r to que stion th e le ga lity of the

contra ct o f le ase cove ring th e pub lic marke t e nt e red into b e t wee n th e City of Dagupan an d pe titione r. Th e Court decl ared that Ravanzo did not poss e ss th e req uisit e stan ding to bring su chtaxpaye r s suit since [o]n its f ace, and the re is no e vide nce to th e contrary , the le as e contra ct e nt e red into b e t wee n p e titione r an d the City sho ws that no pub lic f unds hav e bee n or will be used in th e constru ction o f the marke t bui lding.

Coming no w to th e instant case, it is re adily appar e nt that th e re is no exe rcise byCongr e ss o f its ta xing or sp e nding po we r. Th e PCCR was cre at ed by th e Pre side nt by virtu e of E .O. N o. 4 3 , as am e nded by E .O. N o. 70. U nde r S ec tion 7 o f E .O. N o. 4 3 , the amount o f P3 million is "appropriat ed " f or its op e rationa l expe nse s "to b e sour ced f rom th e f unds o f the Off ice of the Pre side nt. x x x. The appropriations f or th e PCCR we re authoriz ed by th e Pre side nt , not by Congr e ss. In f act , the re was no appropriation at a ll. In a stri ct s e nse, appropriation hasbee n def ied as nothing mor e than th e le gislative authorization pr e scribed by th e Constitutionthat mon e y may b e paid out o f the Tre asury , while appropriation ma de by law refe rs to the act of the le gislatur e se tting apart or assigning to a parti cular us e a ce rtain sum to b e used in th e paym e nt o f de bt or due s f rom th e Stat e to its cred itors. The f unds us ed f or th e PCCR we re take n f rom f unds int e nded f or th e Off ice of the Pre side nt , in th e exe rcise of the Chief E xecutive spowe r to trans fe r f unds pursuant to S ec tion 2 5 ( 5) of Article VI of the Constitution.

In th e f inal ana lysis, it must b e stre ssed that th e Court r e tains th e powe r to dec ide whe the r or not it will e nt e rtain a ta xpaye r s suit. In th e case at bar , the re be ing no exe rcise by



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Congr e ss o f its ta xing or sp e nding po we r, pe titione r cannot b e allowed to que stion th e cre ationof the PCCR in his capa city as a ta xpaye r, but rath e r, he must e stab lish that h e has a p e rsona l and substantia l int e re st in th e case and that h e has sustain ed or will sustain direc t in jury as are su lt o f its e nf orce me nt. In oth e r words, pe titione r must sho w that h e is a r e al party in int e re st

that h e will stan d to b e be nef it ed or in jured by th e judgme nt or that h e will be e ntit led to th e avails o f the suit. N owhe re in his p le adings doe s p e titione r pr e sum e to ma ke such a

re pre se ntation. ( G on z al e s v. Nar v asa, 337 SCRA 733, Aug . 14 , 2000, En Banc [G on z aga -Re y e s ] )

86. W hat is a j usti c ia bl e c ontroversy? W hat are po l iti c a l q uestions?

Held: As a g e ne ral proposition , a controv e rsy is justiciable if it refe rs to a matt e r whichis appropriat e f or court r e view . It p e rtains to issu e s which ar e inhe re nt ly sus ce ptible of be ingdec ided on groun ds recognized by law. N e ve rthele ss , the Court doe s not automati cally assum e jurisdiction ov e r a ctua l constitutiona l case s brought b ef ore it e ve n in instan ce s that ar e ripe f orre so lution. On e class o f case s whe re in th e Court h e sitat e s to ru le on ar e "political que stions. " The re ason is that po litical que stions ar e conce rned with issu e s de pe nde nt upon th e wisdom, not the le ga lity, of a parti cular a ct or m e asur e be ing assai led . More ove r, the political que stion b e inga f unction o f the se paration o f powe rs, the courts will not norma lly int e rfe re with th e workings o f anoth e r co-eq ua l bran ch un le ss th e cas e sho ws a cle ar n eed f or th e courts to st e p in to upho ld the law and the Constitution.

As Tana da v. Angara (103 Phi l. 10 5 1 [19 5 7] ) puts it , political que stions r efe r "to thos e que stions which, unde r th e Constitution , are to b e dec ided by th e pe ople in th e ir sove re igncapa city, or in r e gard to which f ull discre tionary authority has b ee n dele gat ed to th e le gislative orexec utive bran ch o f gove rnme nt. " Thus , if an issu e is cle arly ide ntif ied by th e t ex t o f the Constitution as matt e rs f or discre tionary a ction by a parti cular bran ch o f gove rnme nt or to th e pe ople the mselve s th e n it is h eld to b e a po litical que stion. In th e classic f ormu lation o f Justi ce Bre nnan in Ba ke r v. Carr (369 U .S. 186 , 82 S Ct. 691 , 7 L . E d. 663 , 678 [1962] ) , "[p]romin e nt onthe sur f ace of any case held to invo lve a po litical que stion is f ound a t ex tua lly de monstrab le constitutiona l commitm e nt o f the issue to a coordinat e political de partm e nt; or a lack of judiciallydiscove rab le and manag e ab le stan dards f or r e solving it; or th e impossibi lity of dec iding without an initia l policy de t e rmination o f a kind cle arly f or non judicial discre tion; or th e impossibility of acourt 's un de rta king inde pe nde nt r e so lution without expre ssing lack of the re spec t due coordinat e bran che s o f gove rnme nt; or an unusua l need f or un que stioning a dhe re nce to a po litical dec isionalre ady ma de ; or th e pot e ntiality of e mbarrassm e nt f rom mu ltif arious pronoun ce me nts by variousde partm e nts on th e one que stion. "

The 1987 Constitution expan ds th e conce pt o f judicial re view by provi ding that "(T ) he Judicial powe r sha ll be ve st ed in on e Supre me Court an d in such lowe r courts as may b e e stab lished by law. Ju dicial powe r include s th e duty o f the courts o f justice to s e tt le actua l controv e rsie s invo lving rights which ar e le ga lly de mandab le and e nf orce ab le, and to de t e rmine whe the r or not th e re has b ee n a grav e abus e of discre tion amounting to lack or exce ss o f jurisdiction on th e part o f any bran ch or instrum e nta lity of the Gove rnme nt." ( Article V III , S ec . 1

of the 1987 Constitution ) U nde r this def inition, the Court cannot agr ee x x x that th e issue involved is a po litical que stion b e yond the jurisdiction o f this Court to r e view . Whe n th e grant o f powe r is qualif ied, conditiona l or sub ject to limitations , the issue of whe the r th e pre scribed qua lif ications or conditions hav e bee n m e t or th e limitations r e spec t ed, is justiciable - the prob le m b e ing on e of le ga lity or va lidity, not its wisdom. More ove r, the jurisdiction to del imit constitutiona l boun darie s has b ee n give n to this Court. Wh e n po litical que stions ar e involved, the Constitution limits th e de t e rmination as to whe the r or not th e re has b ee n a grav e abus e of discre tion amounting to lack or exce ss o f jurisdiction on th e part o f the off icial whos e action isbe ing que stioned .

By grave abus e of discre tion is m e ant simp ly capricious or whimsical exe rcise of judgme nt that is pat e nt an d gross as to amount to an e vasion o f positive duty or a virtua l ref usa l to p e rf orm a duty e n joined by law, or to a ct at a ll in cont e mplation o f law, as whe re the powe r isexe rcised in an arbitrary an d de spoti c mann e r by r e ason o f passion or hosti lity. U nde r thisdef inition, a court is without po we r to direc t ly dec ide matt e rs ov e r which f ull discre tionaryauthority has b ee n dele gat ed . But while this Court has no po we r to substitut e its judgme nt f orthat o f Congr e ss or o f the Pre side nt , it may look into th e que stion o f whe the r su ch exe rcise hasbee n ma de in grav e abus e of discre tion. A sho wing that p le nary po we r is grant ed e ithe rde partm e nt o f gove rnme nt may not b e an obsta cle to judicial inquiry, f or th e improvide nt exe rcise or abus e the re of may giv e rise to justiciable controv e rsy. (Int e grat ed Bar of th e



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Philippin e s v. H on . Ronaldo B . Z amora, G.R. No . 141 2 84 , Aug . 15 , 2000, En Banc [K apunan ] )

87. I s the l egitima c y o f the assumption to the P resi d en c y o f P resi d ent G l oria M a c apaga l Arroyo a po l iti c a l q uestion an d, there f ore , not su bj e c t to j u d i c ia l revie w ? Distinguish E D SA P eop l e P o w er I f rom E D SA P eop l e P o w er II .

Held: Re spon de nts r ely on th e cas e of L awye rs L e ague f or a B e tt e r Ph ili ppi ne s an d /orOlive r A. L oz ano v . Pre side nt Cora z on C. Aq ui no, e t a l. an d relat ed cas e s to s u pport th ei r th e si sthat s i nce the case s at bar i nv olve the legi t i macy of the g ove rnme nt o f re spon de nt Arroyo, e rg o,the y pr e se nt a po li t ical q ue st i on. A mor e ce re bra l re adi ng of the ci t ed cas e s w ill show that th e yare i napp licab le . In th e ci t ed case s, w e held that th e g ove rnme nt o f f orme r Pre side nt Aq ui nowas th e re sult o f a s ucce ss ful rev olu t i on by th e sove reig n p e ople , a lbei t a p e aceful one . N o le ssthan th e Freed om Const i t u t i on decl ared that th e Aq ui no g ove rnme nt was i nsta lled thro ug h adi rec t exe rci se of the pow e r o f the Fili pi no p e ople i n defi ance of the provi si ons o f the 1 9 73 Const i t u t i on, as am e nded . It i s f am ili ar le arn i ng that th e legi t i macy o f a g ove rnme nt s i red by asucce ss ful rev olu t i on by p e ople pow e r i s b e yond judici al scru t i ny f or that g ove rnme nt au tomat ically orb i ts o u t o f the const i t u t i ona l loop. In checke red contrast, th e g ove rnme nt o f re spon de nt Arroyo i s not r ev olu t i onary i n chara ct e r. Th e oath that sh e took at th e EDS A Shri ne i sthe oath u nde r th e 1 9 87 Const i t u t i on. In h e r oath, sh e cat eg orically swor e to pr e se rve and defe nd the 1 9 87 Const i t u t i on. In deed , sh e has str e ssed that sh e i s di schargi ng the pow e rs o f the pre side ncy u nde r th e au thor i ty o f the 1 9 87 Const i t u t i on.

In fi ne , th e leg al di st i nct i on b e tw ee n EDS A P e ople Pow e r I an d EDS A P e ople Pow e r II i scle ar. ED S A I i nv olve s th e exe rci se of the pe ople pow e r o f rev olu t i on wh ich o ve rthrows th e whole g ove rnme nt. EDS A II i s an exe rci se of pe ople pow e r o f f reed om o f speec h an d f reed om o f ass e mbly to p e t i t i on th e g ove rnme nt f or r ed re ss o f g riev ance s wh ich on ly a ffec t ed the office of the Pre side nt. EDS A I i s ex tra const i t u t i ona l and the legi t i macy of the ne w g ove rnme nt that re sult ed f rom i t cannot b e the su b ject o f judici al revie w, b u t EDS A II i s i ntra const i t u t i ona l and the re sig nat i on o f the si tt i ng Pre side nt that i t cau sed and the succe ssi on o f the Vice Pre side nt asPre side nt ar e su b ject to judici al revie w. EDS A I pr e se nt ed a po li t ical q ue st i on; EDS A II i nv olve sleg al q ue st i ons. X x x

N eedle ss to stat e , th e case s at bar pos e leg al and not po li t ical q ue st i ons. Th e pri nci pa l i ssue s f or r e solu t i on r e q ui re the prop e r i nt e rpre tat i on o f ce rta i n pro vi si ons i n th e 1 9 87 Const i t u t i on, notab ly Sec t i on 1 of Art icle II, an d Sec t i on 8 of Art icle VII, an d the allocat i on o f g ove rnme nta l pow e rs u nde r Sec t i on 11 of Art icle VII. The i ssue s like w i se call f or a r uli ng on th e scope of pre side nt i al i mmu ni ty f rom s ui t. Th e y a lso i nv olve the correc t cali brat i on o f the rig ht o f pe t i t i one r a g ai nst pr ejudici al pu blici ty. As e arly as th e 1 803 case of Marbu ry v . Madi son ( 1 Cranch [ 5 U S] 1 37 , L Ed 6 0 [ 1 803 ] ) , the doctri ne has b ee n laid down that i t i s e mphat ically th e provi nce and du ty o f the judici al de partm e nt to say what th e law i s x x x. Thu s, r e spon de nt si nv ocat i on o f the doctri ne of poli t ical q ue st i on i s b u t a f oray i n th e dark. ( J os e ph E . Estrada v. Aniano D e si e rto , G. R. Nos . 14 67 1 0 -15, March 2 , 200 1, En Banc [ Puno ] )

88 . I s the P resi d ent s po w er to c a ll out the arme d f or c es as their C omman d er - in -C hie f in or d er to prevent or suppress l a wl ess vio l en c e , invasion or re be ll ion su bj e c t to j u d i c ia l revie w, or is it a po l iti c a l q uestion? Cl ari f y .

Held: Whe n th e Pre side nt calls th e armed f orce s to pr e ve nt or suppr e ss lawle ssviole nce, invasion or r e bellion, he nece ssari ly exe rcise s a discre tionary po we r so lely ve st ed in hiswisdom. This is cle ar f rom th e int e nt o f the f rame rs an d f rom th e t ex t o f the Constitution its elf .The Court , thus , cannot b e called upon to ov e rrule the Pre side nt 's wisdom or substitut e its own.Howe ve r, this doe s not pr e ve nt an examination o f whe the r su ch po we r was exe rcised withinpe rmissib le constitutiona l limits or whe the r it was exe rcised in a mann e r constituting grav e abus e of discre tion. In vi ew of the constitutiona l int e nt to giv e the Pre side nt f ull discre tionary po we r tode t e rmine the nece ssity o f calling out th e arm ed f orce s, it is incumbe nt upon th e pe titione r tosho w that th e Pre side nt 's dec ision is tota lly b e ref t o f f actua l basis. Th e pre se nt p e tition f ails todischarg e such he avy bur de n as th e re is no e vide nce to support th e ass e rtion that th e re ex ists no justif ication f or calling out th e arm ed f orce s. Th e re is, likew ise, no e vide nce to support th e proposition that grav e abus e was committ ed becaus e the powe r to call was exe rcised in su ch amann e r as to vio lat e the constitutiona l provision on civilian supr e macy ove r th e military. In th e pe rf orman ce of this Court 's duty o f "purpos ef ul he sitation " bef ore declaring an a ct o f anoth e rbran ch as un constitutiona l, only whe re such grav e abus e of discre tion is cle ar ly sho wn sha ll the Court int e rfe re with th e Pre side nt 's judgme nt. To doubt is to sustain. (Int e grat ed Bar of th e



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Philippin e s v. H on . Ronaldo B . Z amora, G.R. No . 141 2 84 , Aug . 15 , 2000, En Banc [K apunan ] )

89. Do l o w er c ourts have j uris d i c tion to c onsi d er the c onstitutiona l ity o f a l a w ? I f so , ho w shou ld they a c t in the exer c ise o f this j uris d i c tion?

Held: We stre ss at th e outs e t that th e lowe r court ha d jurisdiction to conside r th e constitutiona lity of Sec tion 1 87 , this authority b e ing e mbra ced in th e ge ne ral def inition o f the judicial powe r to de t e rmine what ar e the valid and binding laws by th e crit e rion o f the irconf ormity to th e f undame nta l law. Spec if ically, BP 12 9 ve sts in th e re giona l tria l courts jurisdiction ov e r a ll civil case s in which th e sub ject o f the litigation is in capab le of pecuniarye stimation ( Sec . 1 9[ 1 ] ) , e ve n as th e accused in a crimina l action has th e right to que stion in hisdefe nse the constitutiona lity of a law he is charg ed with violating an d of the proceed ings ta ke nagainst him , parti cular ly as th e y contrav e ne the Bill of Rights. More ove r, Article VIII, Sec tion5 ( 2 ) , of the Constitution v e sts in th e Supre me Court app ellat e jurisdiction ov e r f inal judgme ntsand orde rs o f lowe r courts in a ll case s in which th e constitutiona lity or va lidity of any tr e aty , int e rnationa l or exec utive agree me nt , law, pre side ntia l dec ree, proclamation , orde r, instru ction, ordinance, or r e gulation is in que stion.

In th e exe rcise of this jurisdiction, lowe r courts ar e advised to a ct with th e utmost circumsp ec tion, be aring in min d the cons eq ue nce s o f a decl aration o f unconstitutiona lity uponthe stabi lity of laws, no le ss than on th e doctrine of se paration o f powe rs. As th e que stioned act is usua lly the han diwork of the le gislative or th e exec utive de partm e nts , or both , it will be prude nt f or su ch courts , if only out o f a b ecoming mo de sty , to defe r to th e highe r judgme nt o f this Court in th e conside ration o f its va lidity, which is b e tt e r de t e rmined af t e r a thoroughdel ibe ration by a colle giat e body an d with th e concurre nce of the ma jority o f thos e whoparticipat ed in its discussion ( Art. VIII , Sec . 4 [ 2 ] , Constitution ) (Dri lon v. Lim, 23 5 SCRA 1 3 5 , 1 3 9-14 0, Aug . 4 , 1994 , En Banc [ Cru z] )

90. W hat c ases are to be hear d b y the S upreme C ourt en ban c ?

Held: Unde r Supre me Court Circular N o. 2 -89 , dat ed Fe bruary 7 , 1 9 89 , as am e nded bythe Re so lution o f N ove mbe r 1 8, 1 99 3:

X x x, the f ollowing ar e conside red e n ban c case s:

1 ) Case s in which th e constitutiona lity or va lidity of any tr e aty , int e rnationa l orexec utive agree me nt , law, exec utive orde r, or pr e side ntia l dec ree, proclamation , orde r, instru ction , ordinance, or r e gulation is in que stion;

2 ) Criminal case s in which th e app e aled dec ision impos e s th e de ath p e na lty;3) Case s raising nov el que stions o f law;4) Case s a ffec ting ambassa dors , othe r pub lic minist e rs an d consu ls;5 ) Case s invo lving dec isions, re solutions or or de rs o f the Civil Se rvice Commission ,

Commission on E lections , and Commission on Audit;6 ) Case s whe re the pe na lty to b e imposed is the dismissa l of a judge, off ice r ore mployee of the judiciary, disbarm e nt o f a lawye r, or e ithe r th e susp e nsion o f any o f

the m f or a p e riod of more than on e (1 ) ye ar or a f ine exceed ing P1 0 ,000 .00 or both;7) Case s whe re a doctrine or prin ciple laid down by th e court e n ban c or in division may

be modif ied or re ve rsed ;8) Case s assign ed to a division which in th e opinion o f at le ast thr ee (3) m e mbe rs

the re of me rit th e att e ntion o f the court e n ban c and are acce ptab le to a ma jority o f the actua l me mbe rship o f the court e n ban c; an d

9) All othe r case s as th e court e n ban c by a ma jority o f its a ctua l me mbe rship maydee m o f suff icie nt importan ce to m e rit its att e ntion.

( F ir e ston e C e ramics, Inc . v. Court of App e als, 33 4 SCRA 4 6 5 , 4 7 1-4 72, Jun e 2 8 , 2000, En Banc [ Purisima ] )

91. W hat is f is c a l autonomy? T he f is c a l autonomy cl ause?

Held: As e nvisioned in th e Constitution , the f iscal autonomy e n joyed by th e Judiciary, the Civil Se rvice Commission , the Commission on Audit , the Commission on E lections , and the Off ice of the Ombudsman cont e mplat e s a guarant ee of f ull flexibility to a llocat e and utilize the irre sour ce s with th e wisdom an d dispat ch that th e ir need s req uire . It r ecognize s th e powe r an d authority to le vy, ass e ss an d collect fee s, f ix rat e s o f compe nsation not exceed ing th e highe st rat e s authoriz ed by law f or compe nsation an d pay p lans o f the gove rnme nt an d allocat e and



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disburs e such sums as may b e provided by law or pr e scribed by th e m in th e cours e of the discharg e of the ir f unctions.

Fiscal autonomy m e ans f reed om f rom outsi de contro l. The Judiciary, the Constitutiona l Commissions , and the Ombudsman must hav e the inde pe nde nce and flexibility needed in th e discharg e of the ir constitutiona l dutie s. Th e imposition o f re strictions an d constraints on th e

mann e r th e inde pe nde nt constitutiona l off ice s a llocat e and utilize the f unds appropriat ed f or th e irope rations is anath e ma to f iscal autonomy an d violative not on ly o f the expre ss man dat e of the Constitution but e spec ially as r e gards th e Supre me Court , of the inde pe nde nce and se paration o f powe rs upon which th e e ntire f abric of our constitutiona l syst e m is bas ed . (B e ng z on v. Drilon, 20 8 SCRA 1 33, April 15 , 199 2, En Banc [G uti e rr ez] )

92. M ay the Om bu d sman va l i dl y entertain c rimina l c harges against a j u d ge o f the regiona l tria l c ourt in c onne c tion w ith his han dl ing o f c ases be f ore the c ourt .

Held: Pe titione r criticize s th e jurispru de nce (M aceda v . V a squ e z, 221 SCRA 4 6 4 [1993] a nd D ol a l a s v . Office of th e Om budsma n-Minda na o, 26 5 SCRA 818 [1996] ) cit ed by th e Office of the Om budsma n a s e rrone ous a nd not a pplica bl e to his com pl a int. He insists th a t since hiscom pl a int inv ol ved a crim ina l cha rge a ga inst a judge , it wa s within th e a uthority of th e Om budsma n not th e Supreme Court to r e sol ve whe the r a crime wa s comm itt ed a nd the judge pros ecut ed the re for.

The pe tition ca n not su cceed .

X x x

We a gree with th e Solicitor Ge ne ra l tha t th e Om budsma n comm itt ed no gr ave a bus e of discre tion wa rra nting th e writs pr a yed for. Th e issue s h ave bee n s e ttl ed in th e ca se of I n R e:

Joa quin B orrome o (2 4 1 SCRA 4 08, 4 60 [199 5 ] ) . The re , we l a id down th e rul e tha t b e fore a civ il or crim ina l ac tion a ga inst a judge for a v iol a tion of Arts. 20 4 a nd 20 5 ( knowingly re nde ring a nun just judgme nt or or de r ) ca n b e e nt e rt a ined , th e re m ust first b e a fina l a nd a uthorit a tive judicia l dec l a ra tion tha t th e dec ision or or de r in qu e stion is in deed un just. The pronoun ceme nt ma y re sult fro m e ithe r:

( a ) an a ction o f ce rtiorari or prohibition in a high e r court impugning th e validity of the judgme nt; or

(b) an a dministrativ e proceed ing in th e Supre me Court against th e judge prec isely f orpromu lgating an un just judgme nt or or de r.

Likew ise, the de t e rmination o f whe the r a judge has ma licious ly delayed the disposition o f the case is a lso an exclusive judicial f unction (I n R e : B orrom e o, supra , at 4 61).

To re pe at , no oth e r e ntity or o ff icial of the gove rnme nt , not th e pros ecution orinve stigation s e rvice of any oth e r bran ch, not any f unctionary th e re of, has compe t e nce to

re view a judicial orde r or dec ision whe the r f inal and exec utory or not an d pronoun ce it e rrone ous so as to lay th e basis f or a criminal or a dministrativ e comp laint f or r e nde ringan un just judgme nt or or de r. That pr e rogativ e belongs to th e courts a lone .

This having b ee n sai d, we f ind that th e Ombudsman a ct ed in accordance with law and jurispru de nce whe n h e refe rred the cas e s against Ju dge Pelayo to th e Supre me Court f orappropriat e action. (D e V e ra v. P e layo, 33 5 SCRA 2 81 , July 6, 2000, 1 st Di v. [ Pardo ] )

93. Dis c uss the va l i d ity o f M emoran d um De c isions .

Held: 1 . The constitutiona l mandat e that no dec ision sha ll be re nde red by any court without expre ssing th e re in cle arly an d distinct ly th e f acts an d the law on which it is bas ed doe snot pr eclude the validity of "me moran dum dec isions" which a dopt by r efe re nce the f indings o f f act an d conclusions o f law contain ed in th e dec isions o f infe rior tribuna ls. X x x

He nce, e ve n in this jurisdiction , incorporation by r efe re nce is a llowed if only to avoi d the cumbe rsom e re production o f the dec ision o f the lowe r courts , or portions th e re of, in th e dec isions o f the highe r court ( F rancisco v. P e rmsku l, 1 73SCRA 32 4 , 333 ) . This is parti cularly tru e whe n th e dec ision sought to b e incorporat ed is a le ngthy an d thorough discussion o f the f actsand conclusions arriv ed at x x x. (Oi l an d Natura l G as Commission v. Court of App e a ls, 2 9 3 SCRA 26, Ju ly 23, 1998 [ Martin ez] )



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2 . We have sustain ed dec isions o f lowe r courts as having substantia lly or su ff icie nt lycomp lied with th e constitutiona l in junction not withstan ding th e laconic and t e rse mann e r inwhich th e y we re writt e n an d e ve n if the re [was lef t ] much to b e de sired in t e rms o f [the ir] clarity, cohe re nce and compr e he nsibility provided that th e y e ve ntua lly s e t out th e f acts an d the law on which th e y we re bas ed, as whe n th e y stat ed the le ga l qua lif ications o f the offe nse

constitut ed by th e f acts prov ed, the modif ying circumstan ce s, the parti cipation o f the accused, the pe na lty impos ed and the civil liability; or discussed the f acts comprising th e ele me nts o f the offe nse that was charg ed in th e inf ormation , and accordingly re nde red a ve rdict an d impos ed the corre spon ding p e na lty; or quot ed the f acts narrat ed in th e pros ecution s me moran dum but ma de the ir own f indings an d ass e ssme nt o f e vide nce, bef ore f inally agr ee ing with th e pros ecution se valuation o f the case .

We have also san ctioned the use of me moran dum dec isions ( I n F rancisco v. P e rmsku l, 173 SCRA 3 2 4 , 333 [1989 ], the Court de scribed [t ]he distinctive fe atur e s o f a m e moran dumdec ision ar e, f irst , it is re nde red by an app ellat e court , second, it incorporat e s by r efe re nce the f indings o f f act or th e conclusions o f law contain ed in th e dec ision, orde r, or ru ling un de r re view .Most lik ely, the purpos e is to a ff irm th e dec ision, although it is not impossib le that th e approva l of the f indings o f f acts by th e lowe r court may le ad to a diffe re nt conclusion o f law by th e highe rcourt. At any rat e, the re ason f or a llowing th e incorporation by r efe re nce is e vide nt ly to avoi d the cumbe rsom e re production o f the dec ision o f the lowe r court , or portions th e re of, in th e dec ision o f the highe r court. T he ide a is to avoi d having to r e pe at in th e body of the latt e rdec ision th e f indings or conclusions o f the lowe r court sin ce the y ar e be ing approv ed or a dopt ed anyway. ) , a sp ecie of succinct ly writt e n dec isions by app ellat e courts in a ccordance with th e provisions o f S ec tion 40 , B.P. Blg. 1 2 9 on th e groun ds o f exped ie ncy, practicality, conve nie nce and dock e t status o f our courts. W e have also decl ared that m e moran dum dec isions comp ly withthe constitutiona l man dat e .

I n F rancisco v. P e rmsku l, howe ve r, we laid the conditions f or th e validity of me moran dum dec isions, thus :

T he me moran dum dec ision, to b e valid, cannot in corporat e the f indings o f f act and the conclusions o f law of the lowe r court on ly by r e mot e refe re nce, which is to saythat th e cha lle nged dec ision is not e asily an d immed iat ely avai lab le to th e pe rson r e adingthe me moran dum dec ision. F or th e incorporation by r efe re nce to b e allowed, it must provide f or direc t a cce ss to th e f acts an d the law be ing a dopt ed, which must b e contain ed in a stat e me nt atta ched to th e said dec ision. I n oth e r words, the me moran dum dec ision authoriz ed unde r S ec tion 40 of B.P. Blg. 1 2 9 shou ld actua llye mbody the f indings o f f act an d conclusions o f law of the lowe r court in an ann ex atta ched to an d made an in dispe nsab le part o f the dec ision.

I t is expec t ed that this r eq uire me nt will allay th e suspi cion that no stu dy wasmade of the dec ision o f the lowe r court an d that its dec ision was m e rely a ff irmed without a prior examination o f the f acts an d the law on which it is bas ed . T he proximity at le ast

of the ann exed stat e me nt shou ld sugg e st that su ch examination has b ee n un de rtak e n.I t is , of cours e, also un de rstoo d that th e dec ision be ing a dopt ed shou ld, to b e gin with, comp ly with Article VIII , S ec tion 1 4 as no amount o f incorporation or a doption will rec tif yits violation.

T he Court f inds n ece ssary to e mphasiz e that th e me moran dum dec ision shou ld be sparing ly us ed le st it b ecome an a dd itive excuse f or judicial sloth. I t is an a dd itiona l condition f or th e validity of this kind of dec ision may b e re sort ed to on ly in case s whe re the f acts ar e in th e main a cce pt ed by both parti e s an d e asily de t e rminab le by th e judge and the re are no doctrina l comp lications invo lved that will req uire an ex t e nded discussionof the laws invo lved . T he me moran dum dec ision may b e e mployed in simp le litigationsonly, such as or dinary collection cas e s, whe re the app e al is obvious ly groun dle ss an d de se rve s no mor e than th e time needed to dismiss it.

X x x

He ncef orth , all me moran dum dec isions sha ll comp ly with th e req uire me ntshe re in se t f orth as to th e f orm pr e scribed and the occasions whe n th e y may b e re nde red .

Any de viation will summon th e strict e nf orce me nt o f Article VIII , S ec tion 1 4 of the Constitution an d strik e down th e flawed judgme nt as a lawle ss disobed ie nce .



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Te st ed against th e se stan dards, we f ind that th e RTC dec ision at bar mis e rab ly f ailed tomee t th e m an d, the ref ore, fell short o f the constitutiona l in junction. Th e RTC dec ision is bri ef indeed, but it is star kly ha llow, otiosely writt e n, vacuous in its cont e nt an d trit e in its f orm. It achie ved nothing an d att e mpt ed at nothing , not e ve n at a simp le summation o f f acts which could e asily be done . Its ina deq uacy sp e aks f or its elf .

We cannot e ve n conside r or a ff irm sai d RTC dec ision as a m e moran dum dec isionbecaus e it f ailed to comp ly with th e me asur e s o f validity laid down in F rancisco v. P e rmskul. It me rely a ff irmed in toto th e M e TC dec ision without saying mor e . A dec ision or r e solution , e spec ially on e re solving an app e al, shou ld direc t ly mee t th e issue s f or r e solution; oth e rwise, the app e al would be point le ss (S ee AB D Ove rse as Manpo we r Corporation v. N L RC, 286 S CRA 454 , 4 6 4 [1998] ) .

We the ref ore re it e rat e our a dmonition in Ni cos In dustria l Corporation v. Court o f Appe als(206 S CRA 127 , 13 4 [1992] ) , in that while we conceded that br e vity in th e writing o f dec isions isan a dmirab le trait , it shou ld not an d cannot b e substitut ed f or substan ce ; an d again in F ranciscov. P e rmskul, whe re we caution ed that exped ie ncy a lone, no matt e r ho w compelling, cannot excuse non -comp liance with th e constitutiona l req uire me nts.

This is not to discourag e the lowe r courts to writ e abbr e viat ed and concise dec isions , but ne ve r at th e expe nse of scholarly ana lysis, and more signif icant ly, of justice and f air p lay, le st th e fe ars expre ssed by Justi ce F e ria as th e pone nt e in Rome ro v. Court o f Appe als come true, i.e ., if an app ellat e court f ailed to provi de the app e al the att e ntion it right f ully de se rved, said court de prived the app ellant o f due proce ss sin ce he was a ccorded a f air opportunity to b e he ard by af air an d re sponsib le magistrat e . This situation b ecome s mor e ominous in criminal case s, as inthis cas e, whe re not on ly prop e rty rights ar e at sta ke but a lso th e libe rty if not th e life of ahuman b e ing.

F aith f ul adhe re nce to th e req uire me nts o f S ec tion 1 4 , Article VIII of the Constitution isindisputab ly a paramount compon e nt o f due proce ss an d f air p lay. It is likew ise de man ded bythe due proce ss claus e of the Constitution. Th e parti e s to a litigation shou ld be inf ormed of how it was dec ided, with an explanation o f the f actua l and le ga l re asons that led to th e conclusions o f the court. Th e court cannot simp ly say that judgme nt is r e nde red in f avor o f X and against Y and just le ave it at that without any justif ication whatso e ve r f or its a ction. Th e losing party is e ntit led to know why h e lost , so h e may app e al to th e highe r court , if pe rmitt ed, shou ld he belie ve that the dec ision shou ld be re ve rsed . A dec ision that doe s not cle arly an d distinct ly stat e the f actsand the law on which it is bas ed le ave s th e parti e s in th e dark as to ho w it was r e ached and isprec isely prejudicial to th e losing party , who is unab le to pinpoint th e possib le e rrors o f the court f or r e view by a high e r tribuna l. More than that , the req uire me nt is an assuran ce to th e parti e sthat , in re aching judgme nt , the judge did so through th e proce sse s o f le ga l re asoning. It is , thus , a sa fe guar d against th e impe tuosity o f the judge, pre ve nting him f rom dec iding ips e dixit.

Vouchsa fed ne ithe r th e sword nor th e purs e by th e Constitution but non e thele ss v e st ed with th e sove re ign pr e rogativ e of passing judgme nt on th e life, libe rty or prop e rty o f his fellowme n, the judge must u ltimat ely de pe nd on th e powe r o f re ason f or sustain ed pub lic conf ide nce in th e

justn e ss o f his dec ision.

Thus th e Court has stru ck down as voi d, dec isions o f lowe r courts an d e ve n o f the Court of Appe als whos e carele ss disre gard of the constitutiona l be he st exposed the ir som e time scava lie r attitu de not on ly to th e ir magist e rial re sponsibi litie s but likew ise to th e ir avowed fe alty tothe Constitution.

Thus , we nullif ied or dee med to hav e f ailed to comp ly with S ec tion 1 4 , Article VIII of the Constitution , a dec ision, re solution or or de r which: contain ed no ana lysis o f the e vide nce of the partie s nor r efe re nce to any le ga l basis in r e aching its conclusions; contain ed nothing mor e thana summary o f the t e stimonie s o f the witne sse s o f both parti e s; convict ed the accused of libel but f ailed to cit e any le ga l authority or prin ciple to support conclusions that th e le tt e r in que stion waslibelous; consist ed me rely of one (1 ) paragraph with most ly s wee ping g e ne ra lizations an d f ailed to support its conclusion o f parricide ; consist ed of f ive ( 5) pag e s, three (3 ) pag e s o f which we re quotations f rom th e labor arbit e r sdec ision including th e dispositive portion an d barely a pag e (t wo [2] short paragraphs o f t wo [2] s e nt e nce s e ach ) of its o wn discussion or r e asonings; wasme rely bas ed on th e f indings o f anoth e r court sans trans cript o f st e nographi c not e s, or f ailed toexplain th e f actua l and le ga l bas e s f or th e award of mora l damag e s.

In th e sam e ve in do we strike down as a nu llity th e RTC dec ision in que stion. (Yao v.Court of App e als, 3 44 SCRA 202, Oct . 2 4 , 2000, 1 st Di v. [ Da v id e] )



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9 4 . Does the perio d f or d e c ision ma k ing un d er S e c tion 15 , Arti cl e VIII , 1987 C onstitution , app l y to the S an d igan bayan? E xp l ain .

Held: The abov e provision doe s not app ly to th e Sandiganbayan. Th e provision r efe rsto r e gular courts o f lowe r colle giat e le vel that in th e pre se nt hi e rarchy app lie s on ly to th e Court o f

Appe als.

The Sandiganbayan is a sp ecial court o f the sam e le vel as th e Court o f Appe als an d poss e ssing a ll the inhe re nt po we rs o f a court o f justice, with f unctions o f a tria l court.

Thus , the Sandiganbayan is not a r e gular court but a sp ec ial one . The Sandiganbayanwas origina lly e mpowe red to promu lgat e its o wn ru le s o f proced ure . Howe ve r, on March 30 , 1 99 5 , Congr e ss r e pe aled the Sandiganbayan s po we r to promu lgat e its o wn ru le s o f proced ure and inst e ad pre scribed that th e Rule s o f Court promu lgat ed by th e Supre me Court sha ll app ly toall case s an d proceed ings f iled with th e Sandiganbayan.

Spec ial courts ar e judicial tribuna ls exe rcising limit ed jurisdiction ov e r parti cularor sp ec ialized cat e gorie s o f actions. Th e y ar e the Court o f Tax Appe als, the Sandiganbayan , and the Shari aCourts. ( Supra , Not e 2 3, at p. 8 )

Unde r Article VIII, Sec tion 5[5 ] of the Constitution Rule s o f proced ure of spec ial courtsand quasi -judicial bodie s sha ll re main effec tive unle ss disapprov ed by th e Supre me Court.

In his r e port , the Court Administrator would distinguish b e t wee n case s which th e Sandiganbayan has cognizan ce of in its origina l jurisdiction, and case s which f all within th e app ellat e jurisdiction o f the Sandiganbayan. Th e Court Administrator posits that sin ce in th e f irst class o f case s, the Sandiganbayan a cts mor e as a tria l court , the n f or that classi f ication o f case s, the three [3 ] month r e gle me ntary p e riod app lie s. For th e second class o f case s, the Sandiganbayan has th e t welve-month r e gle me ntary p e riod f or colle giat e courts. W e do not agree .

The law cre ating th e Sandiganbayan , P.D. No. 16 06 is cle ar on this issu e . It provi de s:

Sec . 6 . Maximum p e riod f or t e rmination o f cas e s As f ar as pra cticab le, the trial of cas e s b ef ore the Sandiganbayan on ce comme nced sha ll be continuous unti l t e rminat ed and the judgme nt sha ll be re nde red within thr ee [3 ] months f rom th e dat e the case was submitt ed f or dec ision.

On Se pt e mbe r 1 8 , 1 984 , the Sandiganbayan promu lgat ed its o wn ru le s, thus :

Sec . 3. Maximum Pe riod to Dec ide Case s The judgme nt or f inal orde r o f adivision of the Sandiganbayan sha ll be re nde red within thr ee [3 ] months f romthe dat e the case was submitt ed f or dec ision.

Give n th e clarity o f the rule that doe s not distinguish , we hold that th e three [3] monthpe riod, not th e t welve [1 2 ] month p e riod, to dec ide case s app lie s to th e Sandiganbayan.Furthe rmor e, the Sandiganbayan pr e se nt ly sitting in f ive [5 ] divisions, f unctions as a tria l court.The t e rm trial is used in its broa d se nse, me aning , it a llows intro duction o f e vide nce by th e partie s in th e case s b ef ore it. The Sandiganbayan , in origina l case s within its jurisdiction, conducts tria ls, has th e discre tion to we igh th e e vide nce of the parti e s, admit th e e vide nce it re gards as cred ible and rejec t that which th e y conside r p e r jurious or f abricat ed . (R e: Pro ble m of D el ays in Cas e s B e for e th e San d igan b ayan, A.M. No . 00 -8- 0 5- SC, No v. 2 8 , 200 1 , En Banc [ Par d o ] )

C ONS TITUTIO NAL L AW

A. TH E I N HEREN T P OW ERS OF TH E S T ATE

Po lic e Po we r

9 5 . De f ine P o l i c e P o w er an d cl ari f y its s c ope .



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Held: 1 . Police powe r is an inh e re nt attribut e of sove re ignty. It has b ee n def ined asthe powe r ve st ed by th e Constitution in th e le gislatur e to ma ke, ordain, and e stab lish a ll mann e rof whole some and re asonab le laws, statut e s an d ordinance s, e ithe r with p e na ltie s or without , not re pugnant to th e Constitution , as th e y sha ll judge to b e f or th e good and welf are of the common we alth , and f or th e sub jects o f the sam e . The powe r is p le nary an d its s cope is vast an d pe rvasive, re aching an d justif ying m e asur e s f or pub lic he alth , pub lic sa fe ty, pub lic mora ls, and

the ge ne ra l welf are .

It b e ars str e ssing that po lice powe r is lodged primarily in th e N ationa l Le gislatur e . It cannot b e exe rcised by any group or bo dy of individua ls not poss e ssing le gislative powe r. Th e N ationa l Le gislatur e, howe ve r, may dele gat e this po we r to th e Pre side nt an d administrative boar ds as well as th e lawmaking bo die s o f municipal corporations or local gove rnme nt units.Once dele gat ed, the age nts can exe rcise only su ch le gislative powe rs as ar e confe rred on th e mby th e nationa l lawmaking bo dy. (M e tropolitan Manila D eve lopm e nt Authority v. B e l - Air Villag e Association, Inc ., 32 8 SCRA 8 36, 84 3 -844 , March 27, 2000, 1 st Di v. [ Puno ] )

2 . The scope of police powe r has b ee n h eld to b e so compr e he nsive as to e ncompassalmost a ll matt e rs a ffec ting th e he alth , sa fe ty, pe ace, orde r, mora ls, comf ort an d conve nie nce of the community. Police powe r is e sse ntia lly r e gulatory in natur e and the powe r to issu e lice nse sor grant busin e ss p e rmits , if exe rcised f or a r e gulatory an d not r e ve nue- raising purpos e, is withinthe ambit o f this po we r.

X x x

[T]he issuan ce of busine ss lice nse s an d pe rmits by a muni cipality or city is e sse ntia llyre gulatory in natur e . The authority , which de volved upon local gove rnme nt units to issu e orgrant su ch lice nse s or p e rmits , is e sse ntia lly in th e exe rcise of the police powe r o f the Stat e within th e cont e mplation o f the ge ne ral welf are claus e of the Local Gove rnme nt Code .(Ac ebe do Optical Company, Inc . v. Court of App e als, 32 9 SCRA 3 14 , March 3 1 , 2000, En Banc [ Purisima ] )

96. Does Arti cl e 263( g ) o f the L a bor C o d e ( vesting upon the S e c retary o f L a bor the d is c retion to d etermine w hat in d ustries are in d ispensa bl e to the nationa l interest an d therea f ter , assume

j uris d i c tion over d isputes in sai d in d ustries ) vio l ate the w or k ers c onstitutiona l right to stri k e?

Held: Said article doe s not int e rfe re with th e worke rs right to stri ke but m e relyre gulat e s it , whe n in th e exe rcise of such right , nationa l int e re sts will be affec t ed . The rightsgrant ed by th e Constitution ar e not abso lut e . The y are still sub jec t to contro l and limitation toe nsur e that th e y ar e not exe rcised arbitrari ly. Th e int e re sts o f both th e e mploye rs an d the e mployee s ar e int e nded to b e prot ec t ed and not on e of the m is give n un due prefe re nce .

The Labor Code ve sts upon th e Sec re tary o f Labor th e discre tion to de t e rmine what industrie s ar e indispe nsab le to nationa l int e re st. Thus , upon th e de t e rmination o f the Secre taryof Labor that su ch industry is in dispe nsab le to th e nationa l int e re st , it will assum e jurisdiction

ove r th e labor disput e of said industry. Th e assumption o f jurisdiction is in th e natur e of police powe r me asur e . This is done f or th e promotion o f the common goo d conside ring that apro longed strike or lockout can b e inimical to th e nationa l economy. Th e Secre tary o f Labor a ctsto maintain in dustria l pe ace . Thus , his ce rtif ication f or compu lsory arbitration is not int e nded toimpede the worke rs right to stri ke but to obtain a sp eed y se tt le me nt o f the disput e . (Phi ltr e a dWork e rs Union [ PTWU ] v. Conf e sor, 26 9 SCRA 3 9 3, March 1 2, 199 7)

97. M ay so l i c itation f or re l igious purposes be su bj e c t to proper regu l ation by the S tate in the exer c ise o f po l i c e po w er?

Held: The constitutiona l inhibition o f le gislation on th e sub ject o f religion has a doub le asp ec t. On th e one han d, it f ore sta lls compu lsion by law of the acce ptan ce of any creed or th e practice of any f orm o f worship. Fr eed om o f cons cie nce and f reed om to a dhe re to su ch r eligiousorganization or f orm o f worship as th e individua l may choos e cannot b e re strict ed by law. On th e othe r han d, it sa fe guar ds th e f ree exe rcise of the chose n f orm o f religion. Thus , the Constitutione mbra ce s t wo conce pts , that is , f reed om to b elie ve and f reed om to a ct. Th e f irst is abso lut e but , in th e natur e of things , the second cannot b e . Conduct re mains sub ject to r e gulation f or th e prot ec tion o f socie ty. Th e f reed om to a ct must hav e appropriat e def initions to pr e se rve the e nf orce me nt o f that prot ec tion. In e ve ry case, the powe r to r e gulat e must b e so exe rcised, inattaining a p e rmissible e nd, as not to un duly inf ringe on th e prot ec t ed f reed om.



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Whe nce, e ve n th e exe rcise of religion may b e re gulat ed, at som e slight in conve nie nce, inorde r that th e Stat e may prot ec t its citize ns f rom in jury. Without doubt , a Stat e may prot ec t itscitize ns f rom f raudule nt so licitation by r eq uiring a strang e r in th e community , bef ore pe rmittinghim pub licly to so licit f unds f or any purpos e, to e stab lish his i de ntity an d his authority to a ct f orthe caus e which h e purports to r e pre se nt. Th e Stat e is likew ise f ree to r e gulat e the time and mann e r o f so licitation g e ne rally, in th e int e re st o f pub lic sa fe ty, pe ace, comf ort , or conve nie nce .

It doe s not f ollow, the ref ore, f rom th e constitutiona l guarant ee s o f the f ree exe rcise of religion that e ve rything which may b e so called can b e to le rat ed . It has b ee n sai d that a law advancing a le gitimat e gove rnme nta l int e re st is not n ece ssari ly inva lid as on e int e rfe ring with th e

f ree exe rcise of religion m e rely becaus e it a lso incide nta lly has a de trime nta l effec t on th e adhe re nts o f one or mor e religion. Thus , the ge ne ral re gulation , in th e pub lic int e re st , of so licitation , which doe s not invo lve any r eligious t e st an d doe s not unr e asonab ly obstru ct or delaythe collection o f f unds, is not op e n to any constitutiona l ob jection , e ve n though th e collection b e f or a r eligious purpos e . Such re gulation would not constitut e a prohibit ed pre vious r e straint onthe f ree exe rcise of religion or int e rpos e an ina dmissible obsta cle to its exe rcise .

Eve n with num e rous r e gulative laws in ex ist e nce, it is surprising ho w many op e rationsare carried on by p e rsons an d asso ciations who, secre ting th e ir activitie s un de r th e guise of be ne vole nt purpos e s, succeed in che ating an d def rauding a g e ne rous pub lic. It is in f act amazing ho w prof itable the f raudule nt s che me s an d practice s ar e to p e ople who manipu lat e the m. Th e Stat e has authority un de r th e exe rcise of its po lice powe r to de t e rmine whe the r ornot th e re sha ll be re strictions on so liciting by uns crupu lous p e rsons or f or un worthy caus e s or f orf raudule nt purpos e s. That so licitation o f contributions un de r th e guise of charitab le and be ne vole nt purpos e s is gross ly abus ed is a matt e r o f common knowled ge . Ce rtain ly the so licitation o f contributions in goo d f aith f or worthy purpos e s shou ld not b e de nied, but somewhe re shou ld be lodged the powe r to de t e rmine within re asonab le limits th e worthy f romthe unworthy. Th e ob jectionab le practice s o f uns crupu lous p e rsons ar e prejudicial to worthy an d prop e r charitie s which natura lly su ffe r whe n th e conf ide nce of the pub lic in campaigns f or th e raising o f mone y f or charity is le sse ned or de stroy ed . Some re gulation o f pub lic so licitation is , the ref ore, in th e pub lic int e re st.

To conclude, solicitation f or r eligious purpos e s may b e sub ject to prop e r re gulation bythe Stat e in th e exe rcise of police powe r. (C e nt e no v. Villalon -Pornillos, 236 SCRA 19 7, S e pt . 1 , 1994 [ Re galado ] )

The Po we r o f Em in e nt Do m ain

98. W hat is E minent Domain?

Held: 1 . Emine nt domain is th e right or po we r o f a sov e re ign stat e to appropriat e privat e prop e rty to parti cular us e s to promot e pub lic welf are . It is an in dispe nsab le attribut e of sove re ignty; a po we r groun ded in th e primary duty o f gove rnme nt to s e rve the common n eed

and advance the ge ne ra l welf are . Thus , the right o f e mine nt domain app e rtains to e ve ryinde pe nde nt gov e rnme nt without th e nece ssity f or constitutiona l recognition. Th e provisionsf ound in mo de rn constitutions o f civilized countri e s relating to th e taking o f prop e rty f or th e pub lic use do not by imp lication grant th e powe r to th e gove rnme nt , but limit a po we r whichwould othe rwise be without limit. Thus , our o wn Constitution provi de s that [p]rivat e prop e rtysha ll not b e take n f or pub lic use without just compe nsation. (Art. III , S ec . 9 ) . Furth e rmore, the due proce ss an d eq ua l prot ec tion claus e s ( 1 987 Constitution , Art. III , S ec . 1 ) act as a dd itiona l sa fe guar ds against th e arbitrary exe rcise of this gov e rnme nta l powe r.

Since the exe rcise of the powe r o f e mine nt domain a ffec ts an in dividua l s right to privat e prop e rty, a constitutiona lly-prot ec t ed right n ece ssary f or th e pre se rvation an d e nhan ce me nt o f pe rsona l dignity an d intimat ely connec t ed with th e rights to life and libe rty, the need f or itscircumsp ec t op e ration cannot b e ove re mphasiz ed . In City of Manila v. Chine se Community o f Manila we said ( 4 0 Phi l. 3 4 9 [1 9 1 9 ) :

The exe rcise of the right o f e mine nt domain , whe the r direc t ly by th e Stat e, or byits authoriz ed age nts , is nece ssari ly in de rogation o f privat e rights , and the rule in that case is that th e authority must b e strict ly constru ed . N o sp ecie s o f prop e rty is h eld byindividua ls with gr e at e r t e nacity, and none is guar ded by th e Constitution an d the lawsmore sed ulous ly, than th e right to th e f ree hold of inhabitants. Wh e n th e le gislatur e int e rfe re s with that right , and, f or gr e at e r pub lic purpos e s, appropriat e s th e land of ah



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individua l without his cons e nt , the plain m e aning o f the law shou ld not b e e nlarg ed bydoubt [f ul] int e rpre tation. ( B e ns le y v. Mountain lak e W at e r Co. , 13 Ca l., 306 an d cas e scit ed [73 Am. Dec., 5 76 ] )

The statutory po we r o f taking prop e rty f rom th e owne r without his cons e nt is on e of the most delicat e exe rcise of gove rnme nta l authority. It is to b e wat ched with je alous s crutiny.

Important as th e powe r may b e to th e gove rnme nt , the inviolab le san ctity which a ll f ree constitutions atta ch to th e right o f prop e rty o f the citize ns , constrains th e strict obs e rvance of the substantia l provisions o f the law which ar e pre scribed as mo de s o f the exe rcise of the powe r, and to prot ec t it f rom abus e x x x.

The powe r o f e mine nt domain is e sse ntia lly le gislative in natur e . It is f irmly se tt led, howe ve r, that su ch po we r may b e validly dele gat ed to local gove rnme nt units , othe r pub lic e ntitie s an d pub lic utilitie s, although th e scope of this dele gat ed le gislative powe r is n ece ssari lynarro we r than that o f the dele gating authority an d may on ly be exe rcised in strict comp liance with th e t e rms o f the dele gating law. (H e irs of Al be rto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 32 8 SCRA 1 37, 144-14 6, March 14 , 2000, 3 rd Di v. [G on z aga -Re y e s ] )

2 . Emine nt domain is a f undame nta l Stat e powe r that is ins e parab le f rom sov e re ignty.It is gov e rnme nt s right to appropriat e, in th e natur e of a compu lsory sa le to th e Stat e, privat e prop e rty f or pub lic use or purpos e . Inh e re nt ly poss e ssed by th e nationa l le gislatur e, the powe rof e mine nt domain may b e validly dele gat ed to local gove rnme nts , othe r pub lic e ntitie s an d pub lic utilitie s. For th e taking o f privat e prop e rty by th e gove rnme nt to b e valid, the taking must be f or pub lic purpos e and the re must b e just compe nsation. (Moday v. Court of App e als, 26 8 SCRA 58 6, Feb ruary 20, 199 7)

99. S tate some l imitations on the exer c ise o f the po w er o f E minent Domain .

Held: The limitations on th e powe r o f e mine nt domain ar e that th e use must b e pub lic, compe nsation must b e made and due proce ss o f law must b e obs e rved . The Supre me Court , taking cognizan ce of such issu e s as th e adeq uacy of compe nsation , nece ssity o f the taking an d the pub lic use chara ct e r or th e purpos e of the taking, has ru led that th e nece ssity o f exe rcisinge mine nt domain must b e ge nuine and of a pub lic chara ct e r. Gov e rnme nt may not capricious lychoos e what privat e prop e rty shou ld be take n. (Mo day v. Court of App e a ls, 26 8 SCRA 58 6, Feb ruary 20, 199 7)

100. Dis c uss the expan d e d notion o f pu bl i c use in eminent d omain pro c ee d ings .

Held: The City of Manila, acting through its le gislative bran ch, has th e expre ss po we r toacquire privat e lands in th e city an d subdivide the se lands into hom e lots f or sa le to bona f ide t e nants or o ccupants th e re of, and to labor e rs an d low-sa laried e mployee s o f the city.

That on ly a few could actua lly be nef it f rom th e expropriation o f the prop e rty doe s not diminish its pub lic chara ct e r. It is simp ly not possib le to provi de all at on ce land and shelt e r f or

all who n eed the m.

Coro llary to th e expan ded notion o f pub lic use, expropriation is not anymor e conf ined tovast tra cts o f land and landed e stat e s. It is th e ref ore of no mom e nt that th e land sought to b e expropriat ed in this case is le ss than ha lf a h ec tar e only.

Through th e ye ars , the pub lic use req uire me nt in e mine nt domain has e volved into aflexible conce pt , influe nced by changing conditions. Public use now include s th e broa de r notionof indirec t pub lic be nef it or a dvantag e, including in parti cular , urban land ref orm an d housing.( F i lstr e am Int e rnationa l Incorporat ed v. CA, 2 84 SCRA 7 1 6, Jan . 23, 1998 [F rancisco ] )

101. T he c onstitutiona l ity o f S e c. 92 o f B .P. B l g . 881 ( re q uiring ra d io an d te l evision station o w ners an d operators to give to the C ome l e c ra d io an d te l evision time f ree o f c harge ) w as c ha ll enge d on the groun d, among others , that it vio l ate d the d ue pro c ess cl ause an d the eminent d omain provision o f the C onstitution by ta k ing airtime f rom ra d io an d te l evision broa dc asting stations w ithout payment o f j ust c ompensation . P etitioners cl aim that the primary sour c e o f revenue o f ra d io an d te l evision stations is the sa l e o f airtime to a d vertisers an d that to re q uire these stations to provi d e f ree airtime is to authorize a ta k ing w hi c h is not

a d e minimis temporary l imitation or restraint upon the use o f private property . W i ll you sustain the c ha ll enge?



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Held: All broa dcasting , whe the r by ra dio or by t ele vision stations , is lice nsed by th e gove rnme nt. Airwave f req ue ncie s hav e to b e allocat ed as th e re are more individua ls who want to broa dcast than th e re are f req ue ncie s to assign. A f ranchise is thus a privi le ge sub ject , amongothe r things , to am e ndme nt by Congr e ss in a ccordance with th e constitutiona l provision that anysuch f ranchise or right grant ed x x x sha ll be sub ject to am e ndme nt , alt e ration or r e pe al by th e

Congr e ss whe n th e common goo d so r eq uire s. ( Art. X II , S ec . 11 )

I ndeed, provisions f or Comelec Time have bee n ma de by am e ndme nt o f the f ran chise s o f radio an d t ele vision broa dcast stations an d such provisions hav e not b ee n thought o f as ta kingprop e rty without just compe nsation. Art. X II , S ec . 11 o f the Constitution authoriz e s th e ame ndme nt o f f ran chise s f or the common goo d. What be tt e r me asur e can b e conce ived f orthe common goo d than on e f or f ree airtime f or th e be nef it not on ly o f candidat e s but e ve n mor e of the pub lic, parti cularly th e vot e rs, so that th e y will be f ully inf ormed of the issue s in anelec tion? [I ]t is th e right o f the viewe rs an d list e ne rs, not th e right o f the broa dcast e rs , which isparamount.

N or indeed can th e re be any constitutiona l ob jection to th e req uire me nt that broa dcast stations giv e f ree airtime . Eve n in th e Unit ed Stat e s, the re are re sponsib le scholars who b elie ve that gov e rnme nt contro ls on broa dcast m ed ia can constitutiona lly be institut ed to e nsur e dive rsityof view s an d att e ntion to pub lic aff airs to f urth e r th e syst e m o f f ree expre ssion. For this purpos e, broa dcast stations may b e req uired to giv e f ree airtime to candidat e s in an elec tion.

I n truth , radio an d t ele vision broa dcasting compani e s, which ar e give n f ranchise s, do not own th e airwave s an d f req ue ncie s through which th e y transmit broa dcast signa ls an d image s.The y are me rely give n th e t e mporary privi le ge of using th e m. Sin ce a f ran chise is a m e re privile ge, the exe rcise of the privile ge may r e asonab ly be burde ned with th e pe rf orman ce by th e grant ee of some f orm o f pub lic se rvice .

I n th e granting o f the privile ge to op e rat e broa dcast stations an d the re af t e r sup e rvisingradio an d t ele vision stations , the Stat e spe nds conside rab le pub lic f unds in lice nsing an d sup e rvising su ch stations. I t would be strang e if it cannot e ve n r eq uire the lice nsee s to r e nde rpub lic se rvice by giving f ree airtime .

The claim that p e titione r would be losing P5 2 ,380 ,000 .00 in unr e alized re ve nue f romadve rtising is bas ed on th e assumption that airtim e is f inished product which, it is sai d, become the prop e rty o f the company , like oil produced f rom r ef ining or simi lar natura l re sour ce s a f t e runde rgoing a pro ce ss f or th e ir production. As h eld in R ed L ion B roadcasting Co. v. F. C.C. ( 39 5 U.S. at 39 4 , 2 3 L . Ed. 2 d at 391, quoting 4 7 U.S.C. S ec . 30 1 ) , which uph eld the right o f a partype rsona lly atta cked to r e ply, lice nse s to broa dcast do not confe r owne rship o f de signat ed f req ue ncie s, but on ly th e t e mporary privi le ge of using th e m. Cons eq ue nt ly, a lice nse pe rmitsbroa dcasting , but th e lice nsee has no constitutiona l right to b e the one who ho lds th e lice nse orto monopo lize a ra dio f req ue ncy to th e exclusion o f his fellow citize ns. Th e re is nothing in th e First Ame ndme nt which pr e ve nts th e gove rnme nt f rom r eq uiring a lice nsee to shar e his

f req ue ncy with oth e rs an d to conduct hims elf as a pro xy or f iduciary with ob ligations to pr e se nt thos e view s an d voice s which ar e re pre se ntativ e of his community an d which would oth e rwise, bynece ssity, be barr ed f rom th e airwave s. As ra dio and t ele vision broa dcast stations do not o wnthe airwave s, no privat e prop e rty is ta ke n by th e req uire me nt that th e y provide airtime to th e Comelec . (TELEBAP, Inc . v. COMELEC, 2 89 SCRA 337, April 2 1 , 1998 [ Me ndo z a ] )

102 . M ay eminent d omain be barre d by " res j u d i c ata " or "l a w o f the c ase " ?

Held: The principle of res j u dicata , which f ind s a pplicat ion in g e ne rally all cases a nd procee dings , ca nno t ba r t he right of t he State or i ts a ge nts t o expropri ate private prop e rt y. Th e ve ry natu re of e mine nt doma in, as a n inh e re nt powe r o f t he State , dictates t hat t he right t oexe rcise t he powe r be a bs olute a nd u nfette re d e ve n by a prior j u dgme nt or r es j u dicata . The scope of e mine nt doma in is ple na ry a nd, like police powe r, ca n reac h e ve ry f orm o f prop e rt ywhich t he State might nee d f or p u blic use . All se pa rate inte rests of individ uals in prop e rt y a re held o f t he gove rnme nt u nd e r t his tac it a gree me nt or imp lie d r ese rvat ion. N otwit hsta nding t he gra nt t o individ uals , t he e mine nt doma in, t he highest a nd mo st exact id ea of prop e rt y, r e ma ins int he gove rnme nt , or in t he a ggre gate body o f t he pe ople in t he ir s ove re ign ca pac it y; a nd t he yha ve t he right t o r esu me t he possess ion o f t he prop e rt y whe ne ve r t he pu blic inte rest requ ires it .Thus , t he State or its aut horize d a ge nt ca nno t be f ore ve r ba rre d f rom exe rcis ing sa id righ t byreas on alone of pre vious non -comp lia nce wit h a ny le gal requ ire me nt .



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While the principle of res j u dica t a does not d e nigra t e the right o f the St a t e to exe rcise e mine nt dom a in, it do es a pply to s pecif ic issues d ec id e d in a pre vious case . For exa mple, a f inal

j u dgme nt di s miss ing a n expropri a tion su it on th e grou nd th a t th e re was no prior o ffe r pr eclu d es a noth e r su it ra is ing th e sa me issue ; it ca nnot , howe ve r, ba r th e St a t e or it s a ge nt f rom th e reaf t e rcomp lying with thi s requ ire me nt , as presc ribe d by law, a nd su bseque nt ly exe rcis ing it s powe r o f e mine nt dom a in ove r th e sa me prop e rty. (Municipality of Paranaqu e v. V .M. Re alty

Corporation, 2 9 2 SCRA 67 8 , July 20, 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

103. Dis c uss ho w expropriation may be initiate d, an d the t w o stages in expropriation .

Held: Expropriation may b e initiat ed by court a ction or by le gislation. In both instan ce s, just compe nsation is de t e rmined by th e courts (EPZA v . D ulay, 14 9 SCRA 30 5 [1987] ) .

The expropriation o f lands consists o f t wo stag e s. As explained in Municipality of B inanv . G arcia (180 SCRA 5 76 , 5 83- 5 8 4 [1989] , re it e rat ed in Nationa l Powe r Corp. v . Jo cson , 206 SCRA5 20 [1992] ) :

The f irst is conce rned with th e de t e rmination o f the authority o f the plaintiff toexe rcise the powe r o f e mine nt domain an d the propri e ty o f its exe rcise in th e cont ex t o f the f acts inv olved in th e suit. It e nds with an or de r, if not dismissa l of the action, "of conde mnation decl aring that th e plaintiff has a lawf ul right to ta ke the prop e rty sought tobe conde mned, f or th e pub lic use or purpos e declared in th e comp laint , upon th e paym e nt o f just compe nsation to b e de t e rmined as o f the dat e of the f iling o f the comp laint " x x x.

The second phas e of the e mine nt domain a ction is conce rned with th e de t e rmination by th e court o f "the just compe nsation f or th e prop e rty sought to b e take n." This is done by th e court with th e assistan ce of not mor e than thr ee (3 ) commission e rs x x x.

It is on ly upon th e comp le tion o f the se t wo stag e s that expropriation is sai d to ha ve bee ncomp le t ed . More ove r, it is on ly upon paym e nt o f just compe nsation that tit le ove r th e prop e rtypass e s to th e gove rnme nt. Th e ref ore, unti l the action f or expropriation has b ee n comp le t ed and t e rminat ed, owne rship o ve r th e prop e rty b e ing expropriat ed re mains with th e re gist e red owne r.Conseq ue nt ly, the latt e r can exe rcise all rights p e rtaining to an o wne r, including th e right todispose of his prop e rty, sub ject to th e powe r o f the Stat e ultimat ely to a cquire it throughexpropriation. (R e pu bl ic v. Sa le m In ve stm e nt Corporation, e t . a l. , G.R. No . 1 37 5 6 9 ,

J un e 23, 2000, 2 n d Di v. [ Me n d o z a ] )

10 4 . Does the t w o (2 ) stages in expropriation app l y on l y to j u d i c ia l, an d not to l egis l ative ,expropriation?

Held: The De la Ramas ar e mista ke n in arguing that th e t wo stag e s o f expropriation x x x only app ly to judicial, and not to le gislative, expropriation. Although Congr e ss has th e powe r to

de t e rmine what land to ta ke, it can not do so arbitrari ly. Ju dicial de t e rmination o f the propri e tyof the exe rcise of the powe r, f or instan ce, in view of alle gations o f partia lity an d prejudice bythos e adve rsely a ffec t ed, and the just compe nsation f or th e sub ject prop e rty is provi ded in ourconstitutiona l syst e m.

We see no point in distinguishing b e t wee n judicial and le gislative expropriation as f ar asthe t wo stag e s m e ntion ed abov e are conce rned . Both invo lve the se stag e s an d in both th e proce ss is not comple t ed unti l paym e nt o f just compe nsation is ma de . The Court o f Appe als wascorrec t in saying that B. P. B lg. 340 did not effec tively expropriat e the land of the De la Ramas. As a matt e r o f f act , it me rely comme nced the expropriation o f the sub ject prop e rty.

X x x

The De la Ramas ma ke much o f the f act that o wne rship o f the land was trans fe rred tothe gove rnme nt b ecaus e the eq uitab le and the be nef icial tit le was a lre ady a cquired by it in 1 9 83 , le aving th e m with on ly th e naked tit le . Howe ve r, as this Court h eld in Asso ciation o f Sma ll L andowne rs in th e Phil., I nc. v. S ecre tary o f Agrarian Ref orm ( 1 7 5 S CRA 343 , 389 [ 1 9 89] ) :

The recognized rule, indeed, is that tit le to th e prop e rty expropriat ed sha ll passf rom th e owne r to th e expropriator on ly upon f ull paym e nt o f the just compe nsation.



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Jurispru de nce on this s e tt led principle is consist e nt both h e re and in oth e r de mocratic jurisdictions. X x x

(R e pu b lic v. Sal e m In ve stm e nt Corporation, e t . al ., G.R. No . 1 37 5 6 9 , Jun e 23, 2000, 2 nd Di v. [ Me ndo z a ] )

10 5 . I s prior unsu cc ess f u l negotiation a c on d ition pre c e d ent f or the exer c ise o f eminent

d omain?

Held: Citing I ro n a nd St ee l Au t hor it y v . Cour t o f Appea l s (2 4 9 S CRA 5 38, Oct o ber 2 5 ,199 5) , pe titio ner ins is t s t ha t b e f ore e mine nt d o ma in m ay be exer cise d b y t he s t a t e , t here mus t be a show ing o f pr ior u nsu cc ess f u l ne go tia tio n wit h t he owner o f t he proper t y t o be expropr ia t e d.

Th is c o nt e ntio n is no t c orre ct. As po int e d ou t b y t he S o licit or Ge nera l t he c urre nt e ff e ctive l aw o n d e l e ga t e d au t hor it y t o exer cise t he power o f e mine nt d o ma in is f ou nd in S e ctio n12, Book III o f t he R ev ise d Adminis t ra tive Co d e , wh ic h prov id es:

SEC. 12. P ower o f Emine nt Do ma in The P res id e nt sha ll d e t er mine whe n it i s ne c essary or a d va nt a geous t o exer cise t he power o f e mine nt d o ma in in b eha lf o f t he N a tio na l Gover nme nt, a nd di re ct t he S o licit or Ge nera l, whe never he d ee ms t he a ctio na d v isa bl e , t o ins tit u t e expropr ia tio n pro c ee dings in t he proper c our t.

The f ore go ing prov is io n d oes no t requ ire pr ior u nsu cc ess f u l ne go tia tio n as a c o nditio npre c e d e nt f or t he exer cise o f e mine nt d o ma in. I n I ro n a nd St ee l Au t hor it y v . Cour t o f Appea l s ,t he P res id e nt c hose t o pres c r ibe t h is c o nditio n as a n a dditio na l requ ire me nt in s t ea d. I n t he ins t a nt c ase , however , n o su c h vo l u nt ary res t r ictio n was impose d. (SMI D evel opm e nt Corporation v. Re pu bl ic, 323 SCRA 8 62, Jan . 2 8 , 2000, 3 r d Di v. [ Pangani b an ] )

The Po we r o f Taxation

106. C an taxes be su bj e c t to o ff- setting or c ompensation?

Held: Taxe s cannot b e sub ject to compe nsation f or th e simple re ason that th e gove rnme nt an d the taxpaye r ar e not cred itors an d de btors o f e ach oth e r. Th e re is a mat e rial distinction b e t wee n a ta x and de bt. D e bts ar e due to th e Gove rnme nt in its corporat e capa city, while taxe s ar e due to th e Gove rnme nt in its sov e re ign capa city. It must b e not ed that adistinguishing fe atur e of a ta x is that it is compu lsory rath e r than a matt e r o f bargain. H e nce, atax doe s not de pe nd upon th e cons e nt o f the taxpaye r. I f any ta xpaye r can defe r th e paym e nt of taxe s by raising th e defe nse that it sti ll has a p e nding claim f or ref und or cred it , this would adve rsely a ffec t th e gove rnme nt r e ve nue syst e m. A taxpaye r cannot r ef use to pay his ta xe swhe n th e y f all due simp ly b ecaus e he has a claim against th e gove rnme nt or that th e collectionof a ta x is conting e nt on th e re su lt o f the lawsuit it f iled against th e gove rnme nt. (Phi le x Mining Corporation v. Commission e r of Int e rna l Reve nu e , 2 94 SCRA 6 8 7, Aug . 2 8 , 1998 [ Rom e ro ] )

107. U n d er Arti cl e VI , S e c tion 28, paragraph 3 o f the 1987 C onstitution , "[C] harita bl e institutions , c hur c hes an d parsonages or c onvents appurtenant thereto , mos q ues , non - pro f it c emeteries , an d a ll l an d s , b ui ld ings , an d improvements , a c tua ll y , d ire c t l y an d excl usive l y use d f or re l igious , c harita bl e or e d u c ationa l purposes sha ll be exempt f rom taxation ." YMCAcl aims that the in c ome earne d b y its bui ld ing l ease d to private entities an d that o f its par k ing spa c e is l i k e w ise c overe d b y sai d exemption . R eso l ve .

Held: The de bat e s, int e rpellations an d expre ssions o f opinion o f the f ram e rs o f the Constitution r e ve al the ir int e nt that which, in turn , may hav e guided the pe ople in rati f ying th e Chart e r. Such int e nt must b e effec tuat ed .

Accordingly, Justice Hilario G. Davi de, Jr. , a f orme r constitutiona l commission e r, who isnow a m e mbe r o f this Court , stre ssed during th e Concom de bat e s that "x x x what is exe mpt ed isnot th e institution its elf x x x; thos e exe mpt ed f rom r e al e stat e taxe s ar e lands, buildings an d improv e me nts a ctua lly, direc t ly an d exclusively used f or r eligious , charitab le or ed ucationa l purpos e s. Fath e r Joaquin G. Be rnas , an e mine nt authority on th e Constitution an d also ame mbe r o f the Concom , adhe red to th e sam e view that th e exe mption cre at ed by sai d provisionpe rtain ed only to prop e rty ta xe s.



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In his tr e atise on ta xation , M r. Justice Jose C. Vitug concurs , stating that "[t ]he tax exe mption cove rs prop e rt y taxe s on ly." (Commission e r of Int e rnal Reve nu e v. CA, 2 98 SCRA 8 3, Oct . 14 , 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

108. U n d er Arti cl e X IV , S e c tion 4 , paragraph 3 o f the 1987 C onstitution , "[A]ll revenues an d assets o f non - sto ck, non - pro f it e d u c ationa l institutions use d a c tua ll y , d ire c t l y , an d excl usive l y

f or e d u c ationa l purposes sha ll be exempt f rom taxes an d d uties ." YMCAa ll ege d that it " is a non - pro f it e d u c ationa l institution w hose revenues an d assets are use d a c tua ll y , d ire c t l y an d excl usive l y f or e d u c ationa l purposes so it is exempt f rom taxes on its properties an d in c ome ."

Held: We re it e rat e that privat e re spon de nt is exe mpt f rom th e paym e nt o f prop e rty ta x, but not in come tax on th e re nta ls f rom its prop e rty. Th e bare alle gation a lone that it is a non -sto ck, non -prof it ed ucationa l institution is insu ff icie nt to justif y its exe mption f rom th e paym e nt o f income tax.

[L]aws a llowing ta x exe mption ar e constru ed strictissimi juris. He nce, f or th e Y M CA tobe grant ed the exe mption it claims un de r th e abov ec it ed provision, it must prov e with substantia l e vide nce that (1 ) it f alls un de r th e classi f ication non -stock, non -prof it ed ucationa l institution; an d (2 ) th e income it seek s to b e exe mpt ed f rom ta xation is us ed actua lly, direc t ly, and exclusivelyf or ed ucationa l purpos e s. Ho we ve r, the Court not e s that not a s cintilla o f e vide nce wassubmitt ed by privat e re spon de nt to prov e that it m e t th e said req uisit e s. (Commission e r of Int e rna l Reve nu e v. CA, 2 98 SCRA 8 3, Oct . 14 , 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

1 09. I s the YMCAan e d u c ationa l institution w ithin the purvie w o f Arti cl e X IV , S e c tion 4 , par . 3 o f the C onstitution?

Held: We rule that it is not. Th e t e rm "ed ucationa l institution " or "institution o f le arning " has a cquired a well-known t echnical me aning , of which th e me mbe rs o f the Constitutiona l Commission ar e dee med cognizant. Un de r th e Education Act o f 1 9 82 , such t e rmrefe rs to s choo ls. Th e school syst e m is synonymous with f orma l ed ucation , which "refe rs to th e hie rarchically stru ctured and chrono logically gra ded le arnings organiz ed and provided by th e f orma l school syst e m an d f or which ce rtif ication is r equired in orde r f or th e le arn e r to progr e ssthrough th e grade s or mov e to th e highe r le vels." The Court has examined the " Ame nded Article s o f Incorporation " and "By-Laws" of the Y M CA, but f ound nothing in th e m that e ve n hintsthat it is a s chool or an ed ucationa l institution.

Furthe rmore, unde r th e Education Act o f 1 9 82 , e ve n non -f orma l ed ucation is un de rstoo d to b e school-bas ed and "privat e auspi ce s su ch as f oundations an d civic-spirit ed organizations " are ruled out. It is s e tt led that th e t e rm "ed ucationa l institution ," whe n us ed in laws granting ta x exe mptions , refe rs to a "x x x school se minary , colle ge or ed ucationa l e stab lishme nt x x x." ( 84 C JS 5 66 ) The ref ore, the privat e re spon de nt cannot b e dee med one of the ed ucationa l institutions cove red by th e constitutiona l provision un de r conside ration. (Commission e r of Int e rna l Reve nu e v. CA, 2 98 SCRA 8 3, Oct . 14 , 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

11 0. M ay the PC GG va l i dl y c ommit to exempt f rom a ll f orms o f taxes the properties to be retaine d by the M ar c os heirs in a C ompromise Agreement bet w een the f ormer an d the l atter?

Held: The powe r to ta x and to grant exe mptions is v e st ed in th e Congr e ss an d, to ace rtain ex t e nt , in th e local le gislative bodie s. Sec tion 2 8(4), Article VI of the Constitution , spec if ically provide s: N o law granting any ta x exe mption sha ll be pass ed without th e concurre nce of a ma jority o f all the me mbe rs o f the Congr e ss. The PCGG has abso lut ely nopowe r to grant ta x exe mptions , e ve n un de r th e cove r o f its authority to compromis e ill-gott e nwe alth cas e s.

Eve n granting that Congr e ss e nacts a law exe mpting th e Marcose s f rom paying ta xe s onthe ir prop e rtie s, such law will def init ely not pass th e t e st o f the eq ua l prot ec tion claus e unde r th e Bill of Rights. Any sp ec ial grant o f tax exe mption in f avor on ly o f the Marcos h e irs will constitut e class le gislation. It will also vio lat e the constitutiona l rule that ta xation sha ll be unif orm an d eq uitab le . (Cha vez v. PC GG , 2 99 SCRA 7 44 , D e c . 9 , 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

111. Dis c uss the purpose o f tax treaties?

Held: The RP-US Tax Tre aty is just on e of a numb e r o f bilat e ral tre atie s which th e Philippine s has e nt e red into f or th e avoidance of doub le taxation. Th e purpos e of the se int e rnationa l agree me nts is to r econcile the nationa l f iscal le gislations o f the contra cting parti e s in



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orde r to h elp th e taxpaye r avoi d simu ltan e ous ta xation in t wo diffe re nt jurisdictions. More prec isely, the tax conve ntions ar e draf t ed with a vi ew towards th e elimination o f int e rnationa l juridical doub le taxation x x x. (Commission e r of Int e rnal Reve nu e v. S .C . J ohnson and Son, Inc ., 30 9 SCRA 8 7, 1 0 1-1 02, Jun e 2 5 , 1999 , 3 rd Di v. [G on z aga -Re y e s ] )

112. W hat is " internationa l j uri d i c a l d ou bl e taxation " ?

Held: It is def ined as th e imposition o f comparab le taxe s in t wo or mor e stat e s on th e sam e taxpaye r in r e spec t o f the sam e sub ject matt e r an d f or ide ntical pe riods. (Commission e r of Int e rna l Reve nu e v. S .C . J ohnson an d Son, Inc ., 30 9 SCRA 8 7, 1 02, Jun e 2 5 , 1999 )

113. W hat is the rationa l e f or d oing a w ay w ith internationa l j uri d i c a l d ou bl e taxation? W hat are the metho d s resorte d to by tax treaties to e l iminate d ou bl e taxation?

Held: The appar e nt rationa le f or doing a way with doub le taxation is to e ncourag e the f ree flow of goods an d se rvice s an d the move me nt o f capita l, t echno logy an d pe rsons b e t wee ncountri e s, conditions dee med vital in cre ating robust an d dynamic economi e s. For e igninve stm e nts will only thrive in a f airly pred ictab le and re asonab le int e rnationa l inve stm e nt climat e and the prot ec tion against doub le taxation is crucial in cre ating su ch a climat e .

Doub le taxation usua lly ta ke s p lace whe n a p e rson is r e side nt o f a contra cting stat e and de rive s income f rom , or o wns capita l in, the othe r contra cting stat e and both stat e s impos e tax on that in come or capita l. In or de r to eliminat e doub le taxation , a ta x tre aty r e sorts to s e ve ral me thods. First , it s e ts out th e re spec tive rights to ta x of the stat e of sour ce or situs an d of the stat e of re side nce with r e gard to ce rtain class e s o f income or capita l. In som e case s, anexclusive right to ta x is confe rred on on e of the contra cting stat e s; ho we ve r, f or oth e r it e ms o f income or capita l, both stat e s ar e give n th e right to ta x, although th e amount o f tax that may b e imposed by th e stat e of sour ce is limit ed .

The second me thod f or th e elimination o f doub le taxation app lie s whe ne ve r th e stat e of sour ce is give n a f ull or limit ed right to ta x toge the r with th e stat e of re side nce . In this case, the tre atie s ma ke it incumbe nt upon th e stat e of re side nce to a llow relief in orde r to avoi d doub le taxation. Th e re are t wo me thods o f relief - the exe mption m e thod and the cred it me thod. In th e exe mption m e thod, the income or capita l which is ta xab le in th e stat e of sour ce or situs isexe mpt ed in th e stat e of re side nce, although in som e instan ce s it may b e take n into a ccount inde t e rmining th e rat e of tax app licab le to th e taxpaye r's re maining in come or capita l. On th e othe r han d, in th e cred it me thod, although th e income or capita l which is ta xed in th e stat e of sour ce is still taxab le in th e stat e of re side nce, the tax paid in th e f orme r is cred it ed against th e tax le vied in th e latt e r. Th e basi c diffe re nce be t wee n th e t wo m e thods is that in th e exe mptionme thod, the f ocus is on th e income or capita l itself, whe re as th e cred it me thod f ocuse s upon th e tax. (Commission e r of Int e rna l Reve nu e v. S .C . J ohnson an d Son, Inc ., 30 9 SCRA 8 7, 1 02 -1 03, Jun e 2 5 , 1999 )

114 . W hat is the rationa l e f or re d u c ing the tax rate in negotiating tax treaties?

Held: In n e gotiating ta x tre atie s, the unde rlying rationa le f or r ed ucing th e tax rat e isthat th e Philippine s will give up a part o f the tax in th e expec tation that th e tax give n up f or thisparticular inve stm e nt is not ta xed by th e othe r country. (Commission e r of Int e rna l Reve nu ev. S .C . J ohnson an d Son, Inc ., 30 9 SCRA 8 7, 1 03, Jun e 2 5 , 1999 )

B. THE B I LL OF RIG HTS

Th e D u e P roc e ss C laus e

115 . Dis c uss the Due P ro c ess Cl ause . Distinguish su bstantive d ue pro c ess f rom pro c e d ura l d ue pro c ess .

Held: Sec tion 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as th e "due proce ssclaus e " of the Constitution.

In or de r to f all within th e ae gis o f this provision , t wo conditions must concur, nam ely, that th e re is a de privation an d that su ch de privation is done without prop e r obs e rvance of due proce ss. Wh e n on e spe aks o f due proce ss o f law, howe ve r, a distinction must b e made be t wee nmatt e rs o f proced ure and matt e rs o f substan ce . In e sse nce, proced ura l due proce ss "refe rs to



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the me thod or mann e r by which th e law is e nf orced, " while substantiv e due proce ss "req uire sthat th e law itself, not m e rely the proced ure s by which th e law would be e nf orced, is f air, re asonab le, and just. " (Corona v. Unit e d Har b or Pilots Association of th e Phils ., 2 8 3 SCRA 3 1 , D e c . 1 2, 199 7 [ Rom e ro ] )

116. R espon d ents U nite d H ar bor P i l ots Asso c iation o f the P hi l ippines argue that d ue pro c ess

w as not o bserve d in the a d option o f PPA-AO N o . 0 4 -92 w hi c h provi d es that : ( a ) ll existing regu l ar appointments w hi c h have been previous l y issue d b y the B ureau o f C ustoms or the PPA sha ll remain va l i d up to 31 De c em ber 1992 on l y , an d ( a ) ll appointments to har bor pi l ot positions in a ll pi l otage d istri c ts sha ll, hen c e f orth , b e on l y f or a term o f one (1 ) year f rom d ate o f e ff e c tivity su bj e c t to rene w a l or c an c e ll ation by the P hi l ippine P orts Authority a f ter c on d u c t o f a rigi d eva l uation o f per f orman c e , a ll ege dl y be c ause no hearing w as c on d u c te d w here by re l evant government agen c ies an d the har bor pi l ots themse l ves c ou ld venti l ate their vie w s . T hey a l so c onten d e d that the so l e an d excl usive right to the exer c ise o f har bor pi l otage by pi l ots has be c ome veste d an d c an on l y be w ith d ra w n or shortene d by o bserving the c onstitutiona l man d ate o f d ue pro c ess o f l a w.

Held: The y ar e obvious ly refe rring to th e proced ura l asp ec t o f the e nactme nt.Fortunat ely, the Court has maintain ed a cle ar position in this r e gard, a stan ce it has str e ssed inthe rece nt case of L umiqu ed v. H on. E xe ve a ( G .R. No. 117 5 6 5 , Nove mbe r 18 , 1997 ) , whe re it decl ared that (a ) s long as a party was giv e n th e opportunity to defe nd his int e re sts in due cours e, he cannot b e said to hav e bee n de nied due proce ss o f law, f or this opportunity to b e he ard is the ve ry e sse nce of due proce ss. More ove r, this constitutiona l man dat e is dee med satis f ied if a p e rson is grant ed an opportunity to s eek reconside ration o f the action or ru lingcomp lained of .

In th e case at bar , re spon de nts qu e stion ed PPA- AO No. 04-9 2 no le ss than f our tim e sbef ore the matt e r was f inally ele vat ed to this Tribuna l. The ir argum e nts on this s core, howe ve r, f ailed to p e rsua de . X x x

N e ithe r doe s th e f act that th e pilots th e mselve s we re not consu lt ed in any way taint th e validity of the administrative orde r. As a g e ne ral rule, notice and he aring , as th e f undame nta l re quire me nts o f proced ura l due proce ss , are e sse ntia l only whe n an a dministrative bodyexe rcise s its quasi -judicial f unction. In th e pe rf orman ce of its exec utive or le gislative f unctions , such as issuing ru le s an d re gulations , an a dministrative body need not comp ly with th e re quire me nts o f notice and he aring.

Upon th e othe r han d, it is a lso cont e nded that th e so le and exclusive right to th e exe rcise of harbor pi lotag e by pilots is a s e tt led issue . R e spon de nts av e r that sai d right has b ecome ve st ed and can on ly be withdrawn or short e ned by obse rving th e constitutiona l man dat e of due proce ss o f law. The ir argum e nt has thus shi f t ed f rom th e proced ura l to on e of substan ce . It ishe re whe re PPA- AO No. 04-9 2 f ails to m ee t th e condition s e t by th e organi c law.

Pilotag e, just like othe r pro fe ssions , may b e practiced only by duly lice nsed individua ls.L ice nsur e is the granting o f lice nse e spec ially to pra ctice a pro fe ssion. It is a lso the syst e m o f granting lice nse s (as f or pro fe ssiona l practice ) in accordance with e stab lished stan dards. A lice nse is a right or p e rmission grant ed by som e compe t e nt authority to carry on a busin e ss or doan a ct which, without su ch lice nse, would be ille ga l.

Bef ore harbor pi lots can e arn a lice nse to pra ctice the ir pro fe ssion , the y lit e rally hav e topass through th e prove rbia l e ye of a n eedle by ta king, not on e but f ive examinations , e achf ollowed by a ctua l training an d practice . X x x

The ir lice nse is grant ed in th e f orm o f an appointm e nt which a llows th e m to e ngag e inpilotag e unti l the y re tire at th e age of 7 0 ye ars. This is a v e st ed right. Un de r th e t e rms o f PPA- AO No. 04-9 2 , [a]ll existing r e gular appointm e nts which hav e bee n pr e vious ly issued by th e Bure au o f Customs or th e PPA sha ll re main va lid up to 31 Dece mbe r 199 2 only, and (a ) ll appointm e nts to harbor pi lot positions in a ll pilotag e districts sha ll, he ncef orth , be only f or a t e rmof one (1 ) ye ar f rom dat e of effec tivity sub ject to r e newal or cancellation by th e Authority a f t e rconduct o f a rigid e valuation o f pe rf orman ce .

It is r e adily appar e nt that PPA- AO No. 04-9 2 unduly re stricts th e right o f harbor pi lots toe n joy th e ir pro fe ssion b ef ore the ir compu lsory r e tire me nt. In th e past , the y e n joyed a m e asur e of security knowing that a f t e r passing f ive examinations an d unde rgoing y e ars o f on-the-j obtraining , the y would have a lice nse which th e y could use unti l the ir re tire me nt , unle ss soon e r



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re voked by th e PPA f or m e nta l or physi cal unf itne ss. Un de r th e new issuan ce, the y hav e tocont e nd with an annua l cancellation o f the ir lice nse which can b e t e mporary or p e rman e nt de pe nding on th e out come of the ir p e rf orman ce e valuation. V e t e ran pi lots an d ne ophyt e s a like are sudde nly conf ront ed with on e-ye ar t e rms which ipso f acto expire at th e e nd of that p e riod.Re newal of the ir lice nse is no w de pe nde nt on a rigi d e valuation o f pe rf orman ce which isconduct ed only a f t e r th e lice nse has a lre ady bee n cancelled . He nce, the use of the t e rm

re newal. It is this pr e-e valuation cancellation which primari ly make s PPA- AO N o. 04-9 2 unre asonab le and constitutiona lly inf irm. In a r e al se nse, it is a de privation o f prop e rty without due proce ss o f law. (Corona v. Unit e d Har b or Pilots Association of th e Phils ., 2 8 3 SCRA 3 1 , D e c e m be r 1 2, 199 7 [ Rom e ro ] )

117. Does the d ue pro c ess cl ause en c ompass the right to be assiste d b y c ounse l d uring an a d ministrative in q uiry?

Held: The right to couns el, which cannot b e waived unle ss th e waive r is in writing an d in th e pre se nce of couns el, is a right a ff orded a susp ec t or an a ccused during custo dial inve stigation. It is not an abso lut e right an d may , thus , be invoked or r ejec t ed in a criminal proceed ing an d, with mor e re ason , in an a dministrativ e inquiry. In th e cas e at bar , pe titione rsinvoke the right o f an a ccused in criminal proceed ings to hav e compe t e nt an d inde pe nde nt couns el of his o wn choice . Lumiqued, howe ve r, was not a ccused of any crime in th e proceed ingsbelow. The inve stigation conduct ed by th e committ ee x x x was f or th e sole purpos e of de t e rmining i f he could be held administrativ ely liable unde r th e law f or th e comp laints f iled against him. x x x As su ch, the he aring conduct ed by th e inve stigating committ ee was not part of a criminal pros ecution. X x x

While inve stigations conduct ed by an a dministrative body may at tim e s b e akin to acriminal proceed ing, the f act r e mains that un de r ex isting laws, a party in an a dministrativ e inquiry may or may not b e assist ed by couns el, irre spec tive of the natur e of the charg e s an d of the re spon de nt 's capa city to r e pre se nt hims elf, and no duty r e sts on su ch a bo dy to f urnish th e pe rson b e ing inve stigat ed with couns el. In an a dministrativ e proceed ing x x x a r e spon de nt x x x has th e option o f e ngaging th e se rvice s o f couns el or not. x x x Thus , the right to couns el is not impe rative in administrative inve stigations b ecaus e such inquirie s ar e conduct ed me rely tode t e rmine whe the r th e re are f acts that m e rit disciplinary m e asur e s against e rring pub lic off ice rsand e mployee s, with th e purpos e of maintaining th e dignity o f gove rnme nt s e rvice .

The right to couns el is not in dispe nsab le to due proce ss un le ss r eq uired by th e Constitution or th e law. X x x. (Lumiqu ed v. Exeve a, 2 8 2 SCRA 1 2 5 , No v. 18 , 199 7 [ Rom e ro ] )

118. Does an extra d itee have the right to noti c e an d hearing d uring the eva l uation stage o f an extra d ition pro c ee d ing?

Held: Conside ring that in th e case at bar , the ex tradition pro ceed ing is on ly at itse valuation stag e, the natur e of the right b e ing claimed by th e privat e re spon de nt is n e bulous an d

the de gree of prejudice he will alle gedly su ffe r is we ak, we accord gre at e r we ight to th e int e re stse spous ed by th e gove rnme nt thru th e pe titione r Secre tary o f Justice . X x x

I n ti lting th e ba lance in f avor o f the int e re sts o f the Stat e, the Court str e sse s that it is not ruling that th e privat e re spon de nt has no right to due proce ss at a ll throughout th e le ngth an d bre adth o f the ex tra dition pro ceed ings. Proced ura l due proce ss r eq uire s a de t e rmination o f what proce ss is due, whe n it is due, and the de gree of what is due . Stat ed othe rwise, a priorde t e rmination shou ld be made as to whe the r pro ced ura l prot ec tions ar e at a ll due and whe n th e yare due, which in turn de pe nds on th e ex t e nt to which an in dividual will be " conde mned to su ffe rgrie vous loss." We have explained why an ex tra dit ee has no right to noti ce and he aring duringthe e valuation stag e of the ex tradition pro ce ss. As a f ore said, P.D. N o. 1 06 9 which imp le me ntsthe RP-US Extradition Tre aty a ff ords an ex tradit ee su ff icie nt opportunity to m ee t th e e vide nce against him on ce the pe tition is f iled in court. The time f or th e ex tra dit ee to know the basis o f the req ue st f or his extra dition is m e rely moved to th e f iling in court o f the f orma l pe tition f orex tra dition. Th e ex tra dit ee' s right to know is mom e ntari ly withheld during th e e valuation stag e of the ex tra dition pro ce ss to a ccommo dat e the more compelling int e re st o f the Stat e to pr e ve nt e scape of pot e ntia l ex tradit ee s which can b e prec ipitat ed by pr e matur e inf ormation o f the basisof the req ue st f or his ex tradition. N o le ss compelling at that stag e of the ex tra dition pro ceed ingsis th e need to b e more defe re ntia l to th e judgme nt o f a co-eq ua l bran ch o f the gove rnme nt , the Executive, which has b ee n e ndowed by our Constitution with gr e at e r po we r ove r matt e rsinvolving our f ore ign r elations. N eedle ss to stat e, this ba lance of int e re sts is not a stati c but a



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moving ba l an c e whi ch c an be adj ust ed a s th e ex tradi t ion pro c e ss move s f rom the admini stra t ive st age t o the judi c ia l st age and t o the exe cut ion st age de pending on fa ct o rs th a t wi ll c ome in t o pl a y. I n sum, we rul e tha t th e t em po ra ry ho l d on priva t e re sponden t 's pr ivi l ege of no t i c e and hea ring i s a sof t r e strain t on hi s r ig ht t o due pro c e ss whi ch wi ll no t de prive him of f undamen t a l fai rne ss sh o ul d he de c ide t o re si st th e req ue st fo r h i s ex tradi t ion t o the Uni t ed St a t e s. T he re i sno denia l of due pro c e ss a s l ong a s f undamen t a l fai rne ss i s a ssur ed a pa rty. (S e cr e tary of

J ustic e v. Hon . Ralph C . Lantion, G.R. No . 1 3 94 6 5 , Oct . 1 7, 2000, En Banc [ Puno ] )

Th e Equal Prot e ction Claus e

119. E xp l ain an d d is c uss the e q ua l prote c tion o f the l a w cl ause .

Held: 1 . The eq ua l prot ec tion o f the law is e mbra ced in th e conce pt o f due proce ss , ase ve ry un f air discrimination o ffe nds th e req uire me nts o f justice and f air p lay. It has non e thele ssbee n e mbodied in a s e parat e claus e in Article III , Sec. 1 , of the Constitution to provi de f or amore spec if ic guaranty against any f orm o f undue f avoritism or hosti lity f rom th e gove rnme nt. Arbitrarin e ss in g e ne ra l may b e cha lle nged on th e basis o f the due proce ss claus e . But i f the particular a ct assai led parta ke s o f an un warrant ed partia lity or pr ejudice, the sharp e r we apon tocut it down is th e eq ua l prot ec tion claus e .

According to a long line of dec isions , eq ua l prot ec tion simp ly req uire s that a ll pe rsons orthings simi larly situat ed shou ld be tre at ed alike, both as to rights confe rred and re sponsibi litie simposed . Similar sub jects , in oth e r words, shou ld not b e tre at ed diffe re nt ly, so as to giv e undue f avor to som e and un just ly discriminat e against oth e rs.

The eq ua l prot ec tion claus e doe s not r eq uire the unive rsa l app lication o f the laws on a ll pe rsons or things without distinction. This might in f act som e time s r e su lt in un eq ua l prot ec tion, as whe re, f or examp le, a law prohibiting matur e books to a ll pe rsons , re gardle ss o f age, would be nef it th e mora ls o f the youth but vio lat e the libe rty o f adults. What th e claus e req uire s iseq ua lity among eq ua ls as de t e rmined according to a va lid classi f ication. By classi f ication isme ant th e grouping o f pe rsons or things simi lar to e ach oth e r in ce rtain parti culars an d diffe re nt f rom a ll othe rs in th e se sam e parti culars. (Phi lippin e J u d g e s Association v. Pra d o, 227 SCRA 703, 7 11- 7 1 2, No v. 11 , 199 3, En Banc [ Cru z] )

2 . The eq ua l prot ec tion claus e ex ists to pr e ve nt un due f avor or privi le ge . It is int e nded to eliminat e discrimination an d oppr e ssion bas ed on in eq ua lity. Recognizing th e exist e nce of re al diffe re nce among m e n, the eq ua l prot ec tion claus e doe s not de man d abso lut e eq ua lity. It m e relyreq uire s that a ll pe rsons sha ll be tre at ed alike, unde r like circumstan ce s an d conditions both as tothe privile ge s confe rred and liabilitie s e nf orced . Thus , the eq ua l prot ec tion claus e doe s not abso lut ely f orbid classi f ications x x x. I f the classif ication is bas ed on r e al and substantia l diffe re nce s; is g e rman e to th e purpos e of the law; app lie s to a ll me mbe rs o f the sam e class; an d app lie s to curre nt as well as f utur e conditions , the classi f ication may not b e impugn ed asviolating th e Constitution 's eq ua l prot ec tion guarant ee . A distinction bas ed on r e al and

re asonab le conside rations r elat ed to a prop e r le gislative purpos e x x x is ne ithe r unr e asonab le, capricious nor un f ounded . ( Himagan v. P e op le , 237 SCRA 5 3 8 , Oct . 7, 1994 , En Banc [K apunan ] )

12 0. C ongress ena c te d R.A. N o . 8189 w hi c h provi d es , in S e c tion 44 thereo f, that "N o E l e c tion Off i c er sha ll ho ld o ff i c e in a parti c u l ar c ity or muni c ipa l ity f or more than f our ( 4) years . Any e l e c tion o ff i c er w ho , either at the time o f the approva l o f this Ac t or su bse q uent thereto , has serve d f or at l east f our ( 4) years in a parti c u l ar c ity or muni c ipa l ity sha ll automati c a ll y be reassigne d b y the C ommission to a ne w station outsi d e the origina l c ongressiona l d istri c t ." P etitioners , w ho are C ity an d M uni c ipa l E l e c tion Off i c ers , theorize that S e c tion 44 o f RA 8189 is vio l ative o f the " e q ua l prote c tion cl ause " o f the 1987 C onstitution be c ause it sing l es out the C ity an d M uni c ipa l E l e c tion Off i c ers o f the COM ELE C as prohi bite d f rom ho ld ing o ff i c e in the same c ity or muni c ipa l ity f or more than f our ( 4) years . T hey maintain that there is no su bstantia l d istin c tion bet w een them an d other COM ELE C o ff i c ia l s , an d there f ore , there is no va l i d cl assi f i c ation to j usti f y the o bj e c tive o f the provision o f l a w un d er atta ck. R eso l ve .

Held: The Court is not p e rsua ded by pe titione rs ' argum e nts. Th e "eq ua l prot ec tionclaus e " of the 1 9 87 Constitution p e rmits a va lid classi f ication un de r th e f ollowing conditions:

1 ) The classi f ication must r e st on substantia l distinction;2 ) The classi f ication must b e ge rman e to th e purpos e of the law;



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3) The classi f ication must not b e limit ed to ex isting conditions on ly; an d 4) The classi f ication must app ly eq ua lly to a ll me mbe rs o f the sam e class.

Af t e r a caref ul stu dy, the ineluctab le conclusion is that th e classi f ication un de r Sec tion 44of RA 81 89 satis f ie s th e af ore stat ed req uire me nts.

The singling out o f elec tion o ff ice rs in or de r to "e nsur e the impartia lity of elec tion o ff icialsby pr e ve nting th e m f rom de veloping f amiliarity with th e pe ople of the ir place of assignm e nt " doe s not vio lat e the eq ua l prot ec tion claus e of the Constitution.

In L ut z v. Arane ta (9 8 Phil. 1 48 , 1 5 3 [ 1 9 55 ]), it was h eld that "the le gislatur e is not req uired by th e Constitution to a dhe re to a po licy of 'all or non e' ". This is so f orunde rinclusive ne ss is not an argum e nt against a va lid classi f ication. It may b e true that a ll oth e roff ice rs o f COMEL EC refe rred to by p e titione rs ar e expos ed to th e sam e e vils sought to b e add re ssed by th e statut e . Howe ve r, in this case, it can b e disce rned that th e le gislatur e thought the nob le purpos e of the law would be suff icie nt ly se rved by br e aking an important link in th e chain o f corruption than by br e aking up e ach an d e ve ry link the re of . Ve rily, unde r Sec tion 3(n)of RA 81 89 , elec tion o ff ice rs ar e the highe st o ff icials or authori zed re pre se ntativ e s o f the COMEL EC in a city or muni cipality. It is sa fe to say that without th e comp licity of such o ff icials, larg e-scale anoma lie s in th e re gistration o f vot e rs can har dly be carried out. (Agripino A. D eG u z man, J r ., e t al . v. COMELEC ( G.R. No . 1 2 9118 , July 19 , 2000, e n Banc [ Purisima ] )

121. Are there su bstantia l d istin c tions bet w een print me d ia an d b roa dc ast me d ia to j usti f y the re q uirement f or the l atter to give f ree airtime to be use d b y the C ome l e c to in f orm the pu bl i c o f q ua l i f i c ations an d program o f government o f c an d i d ates an d po l iti c a l parties d uring the c ampaign perio d ? Dis c uss .

Held: The re are important diffe re nce s in th e chara ct e ristics o f the t wo m ed ia which justif y the ir diffe re ntia l tre atm e nt f or f ree speec h purpos e s. Becaus e of the physical limitations o f the broa dcast sp ec trum , the gove rnme nt must , of nece ssity , allocat e broa dcast f req ue ncie s tothos e wishing to us e the m. Th e re is no simi lar justi f ication f or gov e rnme nt a llocation an d re gulation o f the print m ed ia.

In th e allocation o f limit ed re sour ce s, rele vant conditions may va lidly be imposed on th e grant ee s or lice nsee s. Th e re ason f or this is that th e gove rnme nt sp e nds pub lic f unds f or th e allocation an d re gulation o f the broa dcast in dustry , which it doe s not do in th e cas e of print med ia. To r eq uire radio an d t ele vision broa dcast in dustry to provi de f ree airtime f or th e Comelec Time is a f air exchang e f or what th e industry g e ts.

From anoth e r point o f view, the SC has a lso h eld that b ecaus e of the unique and pe rvasive influe nce of the broa dcast m ed ia, [n]ece ssari ly x x x the f reed om o f t ele vision an d radio broa dcasting is som ewhat le sse r in s cope than th e f reed om a ccorded to n ew spap e r an d print m ed ia. (TELEBAP, Inc . v. COMELEC, 2 89 SCRA 337, Apri l 2 1 , 1998 [ Me n d o z a ] )

122. Does the d eath pena l ty l a w (R.A. N o . 76 5 9 ) vio l ate the e q ua l prote c tion cl ause c onsi d ering that , in e ff e c t , it punishes on l y peop l e w ho are poor , une d u c ate d, an d j o bl ess?

Held: R. A. N o. 76 5 9 sp ecif ically provide s that [T]he de ath p e na lty sha ll be impos ed if the crime of rape is committ ed x x x whe n th e victim is a r eligious or a child below se ve n (7)ye ars o ld. Appar e nt ly, the de ath p e na lty law make s no distinction. It app lie s to a ll pe rsons an d to a ll class e s o f pe rsons ri ch or poor , ed ucat ed or un ed ucat ed, religious or non -religious. N oparticular p e rson or class e s o f pe rsons ar e ide ntif ied by th e law against whom th e de ath p e naltysha ll be exclusively impos ed . The law punish e s with de ath a p e rson who sha ll commit rap e against a child below se ve n ye ars o f age . Thus , the pe rpe tration o f rape against a 5 -ye ar o ld girl doe s not abso lve or exe mpt an a ccused f rom th e imposition o f the de ath p e na lty by th e f act that he is poor , uned ucat ed, joble ss , and lacks cat eche tical instru ction. To ho ld othe rwise will not eliminat e but promot e ineq ua litie s.

In C ec ille ville Re alty an d S e rvice Corporation v. C A, 2 78 SC RA 819 [199 7]), the SC clarif ied that compassion f or th e poor is an imp e rative of e ve ry human e socie ty but on ly whe nthe rec ipie nt is not a ras cal claiming an un de se rved privile ge . (P e op le v. J immy Mijano y Tamora, G.R. No . 1 2 911 2, Ju ly 23, 1999 , En Banc [ P e r Curiam ] )

123. T he I nternationa l Sc hoo l All ian c e o f E d u c ators ( I SAE ) q uestione d the point - o f- hire cl assi f i c ation emp l oye d b y I nternationa l Sc hoo l, I n c. to j usti f y d istin c tion in sa l ary rates



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bet w een f oreign - hires an d l o c a l- hires , i .e ., sa l ary rates o f f oreign - hires are higher by 2 5% than their l o c a l c ounterparts , as d is c riminatory an d, there f ore , vio l ates the e q ua l prote c tion cl ause . T he I nternationa l Sc hoo l c onten d e d that this is ne c essary in or d er to enti c e f oreign - hires to l eave their d omi c i l e an d w or k here . R eso l ve .

Held: That pub lic policy abhors in eq ua lity an d discrimination is b e yond cont e ntion. Our

Constitution an d laws reflec t th e policy against th e se e vils. X x x

Int e rnationa l law, which springs f rom g e ne ral principle s o f law, likew ise pros cribe sdiscrimination x x x. The Unive rsa l Declaration o f Human Rights , the Int e rnationa l Cove nant onEconomi c, Social and Cultura l Rights , the Int e rnationa l Conve ntion on th e Elimination o f All Formsof Racial Discrimination , the Conve ntion against Dis crimination in E ducation , the Conve ntion (N o.111 ) Conce rning Dis crimination in Re spec t o f Employme nt an d Occupation - all e mbody the ge ne ral principle against discrimination , the ve ry antith e sis o f f airne ss an d justice . The Philippine s, through its Constitution , has in corporat ed this prin ciple as part o f its nationa l laws.

[I]t would be an a ff ront to both th e spirit an d le tt e r o f the se provisions i f the Stat e, inspit e of its primor dial obligation to promot e and e nsur e eq ua l e mployme nt opportuniti e s, close sits e ye s to un eq ua l and discriminatory t e rms an d conditions o f e mployme nt x x x.

Discrimination , parti cular ly in t e rms o f wage s, is f rowned upon by th e Labor Code . Article 1 35 , f or examp le, prohibits an d pe na lize s th e paym e nt o f le sse r compe nsation to a fe ma le e mployee as against a ma le e mployee f or work of eq ua l value . Article 2 48 declare s it an un f airlabor pra ctice f or an e mploye r to discriminat e in re gards to wage s in or de r to e ncourag e ordiscourag e me mbe rship in any labor organization. X x x

The f ore going provisions impr e gnab ly institutiona lize in this jurisdiction th e long honor ed le ga l truism o f "Equa l pay f or eq ua l work." Pe rsons who work with substantia lly eq ua l qua lif ications , skill, eff ort an d re sponsibi lity, unde r similar conditions, shou ld be paid similarsa larie s. This ru le app lie s to th e Schoo l (Int e rnationa l Schoo l, Inc.) , its "int e rnationa l chara ct e r" not withstan ding.

The Schoo l cont e nds that p e titione r has not a dduced e vide nce that local-hire s p e rf ormwork eq ua l to that o f f ore ign-hire s. Th e Court f inds this argum e nt a litt le cava lie r. I f ane mploye r a ccords e mployee s th e sam e position an d rank, the pre sumption is that th e se e mployee s p e rf orm eq ua l work. This pr e sumption is born e by logic and human expe rie nce . I f the e mploye r pays on e e mployee le ss than th e re st , it is not f or that e mployee to explain why h e rece ive s le ss or why th e othe rs r ece ive more . That would be add ing insu lt to in jury. Th e e mploye r has discriminat ed against that e mployee ; it is f or th e e mploye r to explain why th e e mployee is tre at ed unf airly.

The e mploye r in this case f ailed to discharg e this bur de n. Th e re is no e vide nce he re that f ore ign-hire s p e rf orm 2 5 % more eff icie nt ly or effec tively than th e local-hire s. Both groups hav e similar f unctions an d re sponsibi litie s, which th e y pe rf orm un de r similar working conditions.

The Schoo l cannot invo ke the need to e ntice f ore ign-hire s to le ave the ir domicile torationa lize the distinction in sa lary rat e s without vio lating th e principle of eq ua l work f or eq ua l pay.

X x x

While we recognize the need of the Schoo l to attra ct f ore ign-hire s, sa larie s shou ld not b e used as an e ntice me nt to th e prejudice of local-hire s. Th e local-hire s p e rf orm th e sam e se rvice sas f ore ign-hire s an d the y ought to b e paid the sam e sa larie s as th e latt e r. For th e sam e re ason , the "dislocation f actor" and the f ore ign-hire s' limit ed t e nure also cannot s e rve as va lid bas e s f orthe distinction in sa lary rat e s. Th e dislocation f actor an d limit ed t e nure affec ting f ore ign-hire sare adeq uat ely compe nsat ed by ce rtain b e nef its a ccorded the m which ar e not e n joyed by local-hire s, such as housing , transportation , shipping costs , taxe s an d home le ave trav el allowance s.

The Constitution e n joins th e Stat e to "prot ec t th e rights o f worke rs an d promot e the irwelf are ", "to a ff ord labor f ull prot ec tion. " The Stat e, the ref ore, has th e right an d duty to r e gulat e the relations b e t wee n labor an d capita l. The se relations ar e not m e rely contra ctua l but ar e soimpre ssed with pub lic int e re st that labor contra cts , collective bargaining agr ee me nts in cluded, must yi eld to th e common goo d. Shou ld such contra cts contain stipu lations that ar e contrary topub lic policy, courts will not h e sitat e to stri ke down th e se stipu lations.



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In this case, we f ind the point -of-hire classi f ication e mployed by re spon de nt School to justif y th e distinction in th e sa lary rat e s o f f ore ign-hire s an d local-hire s to b e an inva lid classi f ication. Th e re is no r e asonab le distinction b e t wee n th e se rvice s re nde red by f ore ign-hire sand local-hire s. Th e practice of the Schoo l of according high e r sa larie s to f ore ign-hire scontrav e ne s pub lic policy an d, ce rtain ly, doe s not de se rve the sympathy o f this Court.

(Int e rnational School Allianc e of Educators (ISAE) v. Hon . Le onardo A. Q uisum b ing, G.R. No . 1 2 8845 , Jun e 1 , 2000, 1 st Di v. [K apunan ] )

12 4 . Acc use d- appe ll ant R omeo G . J a l os j os f i l e d a motion be f ore the C ourt as k ing that he be a ll o w e d to f u ll y d is c harge the d uties o f a C ongressman , in cl u d ing atten d an c e at l egis l ative sessions an d c ommittee meetings d espite his having been c onvi c te d in the f irst instan c e o f a non -bai l a bl e o ff ense . Does being an e l e c tive o ff i c ia l resu l t in a su bstantia l d istin c tion that a ll o w s d i ff erent treatment? I s being a C ongressman a su bstantia l d i ff erentiation w hi c h removes the a cc use d- appe ll ant as a prisoner f rom the same cl ass as a ll persons va l i dl y c on f ine d un d er l a w ?

Held: In th e ultimat e ana lysis, the issue bef ore us boi ls down to a que stion o f constitutiona l eq ua l prot ec tion.

X x x

The pe rf orman ce of le gitimat e and e ve n e sse ntial dutie s by pub lic off ice rs has n e ve rbee n an excuse to f ree a p e rson va lidly in prison. Th e dutie s impos ed by th e mandat e of the pe ople are multif arious. Th e accused- app ellant ass e rts that th e duty to le gislat e ranks high e st in th e hie rarchy o f gove rnme nt. Th e accused- app ellant is on ly one of 2 50 me mbe rs o f the House of Re pre se ntativ e s, not to m e ntion th e 2 4 m e mbe rs o f the Se nat e, charg ed with th e dutie s o f le gislation. Congr e ss continu e s to f unction well in th e physical abs e nce of one or a few of itsme mbe rs. De pe nding on th e exige ncy o f Gove rnme nt that has to b e add re ssed, the Pre side nt orthe Supre me Court can a lso b e dee med the highe st f or that parti cular duty. Th e importan ce of af unction de pe nds on th e need f or its exe rcise . The duty o f a moth e r to nurs e he r in f ant is most compelling un de r th e law of natur e . A doctor with uni que skills has th e duty to sav e the live s o f thos e with a parti cular a ffliction. An elec tive gove rnor has to s e rve provincial constitu e nts. A police off ice r must maintain p e ace and orde r. N e ve r ha d the call of a parti cular duty lif t ed aprison e r into a diffe re nt classi f ication f rom thos e othe rs who ar e validly re strain ed by law.

A strict s crutiny o f classi f ications is e sse ntial le st wittingly or oth e rwise, insidiousdiscriminations ar e made in f avor o f or against groups or typ e s o f individua ls.

The Court cannot va lidat e badge s o f ineq ua lity. Th e nece ssitie s impos ed by pub lic welf are may justi f y exe rcise of gove rnme nt authority to r e gulat e e ve n i f the re by ce rtain groupsmay p lausib ly ass e rt that th e ir int e re sts ar e disre garded .

We, the ref ore, f ind that elec tion to th e position o f Congr e ssman is not a r e asonab le

classi f ication in crimina l law e nf orce me nt. Th e f unctions an d dutie s o f the off ice are not substantia l distinctions which lif t him f rom th e class o f prison e rs int e rrupt ed in th e ir f reed om an d re strict ed in libe rty o f move me nt. La wf ul arre st an d conf ine me nt ar e ge rman e to th e purpos e s o f the law and app ly to a ll thos e belonging to th e sam e class.

X x x

It can b e see n f rom th e f ore going that in carce ration , by its natur e, chang e s anindividua l s status in so cie ty. Prison o ff icials hav e the diff icult an d of t e n than kle ss job o f pre se rving th e security in a pot e ntially explosive se tting , as well as o f att e mpting to provi de re habi litation that pr e pare inmat e s f or r e-e ntry into th e social mainstr e am. N ece ssari ly, boththe se de man ds req uire the curtai lme nt an d elimination o f ce rtain rights.

Pre mise s conside red, we are constrain ed to ru le against th e accused- app ellant s claimthat r e-elec tion to pub lic off ice give s priority to any oth e r right or int e re st , including th e police powe r o f the Stat e . (P e op le v. J a losjos, 32 4 SCRA 6 89 , Feb. 3, 2000, En Banc [ Ynar e s -Santiago ] )

The Rig h t against Unr e asona ble S e arc he s an d S e izu r e s



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12 5 . Dis c uss the c onstitutiona l re q uirement that a j u d ge , in issuing a w arrant o f arrest , must d etermine pro ba bl e c ause persona ll y . Distinguish d etermination o f pro ba bl e c ause by the prose c utor an d d etermination o f pro ba bl e c ause by the j u d ge .

Held: It must b e stre ssed that th e 1 9 87 Constitution r eq uire s th e judge to de t e rmine probab le caus e pe rsona lly, a req uire me nt which doe s not app e ar in th e corre spon ding

provisions o f our pr e vious constitutions. This e mphasis e vince s th e int e nt o f the f ram e rs to p lace a gr e at e r de gree of re sponsibi lity upon tria l judge s than that impos ed unde r pr e viousConstitutions.

In So live n v. Makasiar , this Court pronoun ced:

What the Constitution un de rscore s is th e exclusive and pe rsona l re sponsibi lity of the issuing judge to satis f y hims elf of the exist e nce of probab le caus e . In satis f yinghimself of the ex ist e nce of probab le caus e f or th e issuan ce of a warrant o f arre st , the judge is not r eq uired to p e rsona lly examine the comp lainant an d his witne sse s.Following e stab lished doctrine and proced ure, he sha ll: (1 ) p e rsona lly e valuat e the re port and the supporting docume nts submitt ed by th e f iscal re garding th e ex ist e nce of probab le caus e and, on th e basis th e re of, issue a warrant o f arre st; or (2 ) i f in th e basisthe re of he f inds no probab le caus e, he may disre gard the f iscal s re port an d req uire the submission o f supporting a ff idavits o f witne sse s to ai d him in arriving at a conclusion asto th e ex ist e nce of probab le caus e .

H o v. P e ople (Ibid.) summariz e s existing jurispru de nce on th e matt e r as f ollows:

Le st we be too r e pe titive, we only wish to e mphasiz e three vital matt e rs on ce more: First , as h eld in Inting , the de t e rmination o f probab le caus e by th e pros ecutor isf or a purpos e diffe re nt f rom that which is to b e made by th e judge . Whe the r th e re isre asonab le groun d to b elie ve that th e accused is gui lty o f the offe nse charg ed and shou ld be held f or tria l is what th e pros ecutor pass e s upon. Th e judge, on th e othe r han d, de t e rmine s whe the r a warrant o f arre st shou ld be issued against th e accused, i.e ., whe the r th e re is a n ece ssity f or p lacing him un de r immed iat e custo dy in or de r not tof rustrat e the e nds o f justice . Thus , e ve n if both shou ld bas e the ir f indings on on e and the sam e proceed ing or e vide nce, the re shou ld be no conf usion as to th e ir distinct ob jective s.

S econd, since the ir ob jective s ar e diffe re nt , the judge cannot r ely so lely on th e re port o f the pros ecutor in f inding probab le caus e to justif y th e issuan ce of a warrant o f arre st. Obvious ly an d unde rstan dab ly, the cont e nts o f the pros ecutor s re port will support his o wn conclusion that th e re is re ason to charg e the accused f or an o ffe nse and hold him f or tria l. H owe ve r, the judge must dec ide inde pe nde nt ly. H e nce, he must hav e supporting e vide nce, othe r than th e pros ecutor s bare re port , upon which to le ga llysustain his o wn f indings on th e exist e nce (or non ex ist e nce ) o f probab le caus e to issu e anarre st or de r. This r e sponsibi lity of de t e rmining p e rsona lly an d inde pe nde nt ly the

ex ist e nce or non ex ist e nce of probab le caus e is lodged in him by no le ss than th e most basic law of the land. Par e nthe tically, the pros ecutor could e ase the burde n o f the judge and speed up th e litigation pro ce ss by f orwarding to th e latt e r not on ly th e inf ormationand his bar e re solution f inding probab le caus e, but a lso so mu ch o f the records an d the e vide nce on han d as to e nab le the H is H onor to mak e his p e rsona l and se parat e judicial f inding on whe the r to issu e a warrant o f arre st.

Last ly, it is not r eq uired that th e comp le t e or e ntire records o f the case duringthe preliminary inve stigation b e submitt ed to an d examined by th e judge . We do not int e nd to un duly bur de n tria l courts by ob liging th e m to examine the comp le t e records o f e ve ry cas e all the time simply f or th e purpos e of orde ring th e arre st o f an a ccused . What is req uired, rath e r, is that th e judge must hav e suff icie nt supporting docume nts (such asthe comp laint , aff idavits , count e r-aff idavits , sworn stat e me nts o f witne sse s or trans cript of st e nographi c not e s, if any) upon which to mak e his inde pe nde nt judgme nt or , at th e ve ry le ast , upon which to v e rif y th e f indings o f the pros ecutor as to th e ex ist e nce of probab le caus e . The point is : he cannot r ely so lely an d e ntirely on th e pros ecutor srecomme ndation , as Re spon de nt Court did in this case . Although th e pros ecutor e n joysthe le ga l pre sumption o f re gularity in th e pe rf orman ce of his o ff icial dutie s an d f unctions , which in turn giv e s his r e port th e pre sumption o f accuracy, the Constitution , we re pe at , comman ds th e judge to p e rsona lly de t e rmine probab le caus e in th e issuan ce of warrantsof arre st. This Court has consist e nt ly held that a judge f ails in his boun de n duty i f he



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relie s m e rely on th e ce rtif ication or th e re port o f the inve stigating o ff ice r. (Citationsomitt e d )

In th e cas e at b e nch, re spond e nt admits that h e issue d th e que stione d warrant as th e re was no re ason f or (him ) to doubt th e validity of the ce rtif ication mad e by th e Assistant Prosecutor that a pr eliminary inve stigation was condu ct e d and that probab le caus e was f ound to

ex ist as against thos e charg e d in th e inf ormation f ile d. The stat e me nt is an admission that re spond e nt r elie d so lely and comp le t ely on th e ce rtif ication mad e by th e f iscal that probab le caus e ex ists as against thos e charg e d in th e inf ormation and issu e d th e cha lle nge d warrant o f arre st on th e so le basis o f the pros ecutor s f indings and r ecomme ndations. H e adopt e d th e judgm e nt o f the pros ecutor r e garding th e ex ist e nce of probab le caus e as his o wn. (Ab dula v.G uiani, 326 SCRA 1 , Feb. 18 , 2000, 3 rd Di v. [G on z aga -Re y e s ] )

126. I n an app l i c ation f or sear c h w arrant , the app l i c ation w as a cc ompanie d b y a s k et c h o f the c ompoun d at 5 16 S an J ose d e l a M ontana S t ., M a bo l o , C e bu C ity , in d i c ating the 2- storey resi d entia l house o f private respon d ent w ith a l arge X en cl ose d in a s q uare . W ithin the same c ompoun d are resi d en c es o f other peop l e , w or k shops , o ff i c es , f a c tories an d w arehouse . T he sear c h w arrant issue d, ho w ever , mere l y in d i c ate d the a dd ress o f the c ompoun d w hi c h is 5 16 S an J ose d e l a M ontana S t ., M a bo l o , C e bu C ity . Di d this satis f y the c onstitutiona l re q uirement un d er S e c tion 2, Arti cl e III that the p l a c e to be sear c he d must be parti c u l ar l y d es c ri be d ?

Held: This Court has h eld that th e app licant shou ld particular ly de scribe the place to b e se arched and the pe rson or things to b e se ized, whe reve r an d whe neve r it is f e asib le . In th e pre se nt case, it must b e not ed that th e app lication for a s e arch warrant was a ccompani ed by aske t ch of th e compoun d at 5 16 San Jose de la Montana St. , Mabo lo, Ce bu City. Th e ske t chindicat ed the 2 -stor e y re side ntial hous e of priv at e re spon de nt with a larg e "X " e nclosed in asquare . Within th e sam e compoun d are re side nce s of oth e r p e ople, workshops , office s, factorie sand ware hous e . With this s ke t ch as th e guide, it could have bee n ve ry e asy to de scribe the re side ntial hous e of priv at e re spon de nt with suffi cie nt parti cularity so as to s e gre gat e it from th e othe r bui ldings or stru cture s inside the sam e compoun d. But th e se arch warrant m e relyindicat ed the add re ss of th e compoun d which is 5 16 San Jose de la Montana St. , Mabo lo, Ce buCity. This de scription of th e place to b e se arched is too g e ne ral and doe s not pinpoint th e spec ific hous e of priv at e re spon de nt. Thus , the inadeq uacy of th e de scription of th e re side nce of priv at e re spon de nt sought to b e se arched has chara ct e rized the que stioned se arch warrant as age ne ral warrant , which is v iolative of th e constitutiona l req uire me nt. (P e op le v. Estra d a, 2 9 6 SCRA 3 8 3, 4 00, [ Martin ez] )

12 7. C an the p l a c e to be sear c he d, as set out in the w arrant , b e amp l i f ie d or mo d i f ie d b y the o ff i c ers o w n persona l k no wl e d ge o f the premises , or the evi d en c e they a dd u c e in support o f their app l i c ation f or the w arrant?

Held: Such a chang e is pros cribed by th e Constitution which req uire s int e r alia th e se arch warrant to parti cularly de scribe the place to b e se arched as we ll as th e pe rsons or things

to b e se ized . It woul d concede to poli ce off ice rs th e powe r o f choosing th e place to b e se arched, e ve n if it not b e that de line at ed in th e warrant. It woul d ope n wide the door to abus e of the se arch pro ce ss , and grant to o ff ice rs exec uting a s e arch warrant that discre tion which th e Constitution has pr ec ise ly re moved f rom th e m. Th e parti cularization o f the de scription o f the place to b e se arched may prop e rly be done only by th e Judge, and only in th e warrant its e l f ; it cannot b e l ef t to th e discre tion o f the police off ice rs conducting th e se arch.

It is n e ithe r f air nor li cit to allo w police off ice rs to s e arch a pla ce diffe re nt f rom that stat ed in th e warrant on th e claim that th e place actually s e arched although not that sp ec if ied in th e warrant is exactly what th e y ha d in view whe n th e y applied f or th e warrant an d had de mar cat ed in th e ir supporting e vide nce . What is mat e rial in de t e rmining th e validity of a s e archis th e place stat ed in th e warrant its e l f, not what appli cants ha d in th e ir thoughts , or ha d re pre se nt ed in th e proo f s th e y submitt ed to th e court issuing th e warrant. (P e op le v. Court of App e a ls, 2 91 SCRA 4 00, Jun e 26, 1998 [ Nar v asa ] )

128. W hat is sear c h in c i d enta l to a l a wf u l arrest ? Dis c uss .

Held: While a cont e mporan e ous s e arch o f a p e rson arr e st ed may b e effec t ed todiscove r dang e rous we apons or proo f s or imp le me nts us ed in th e commission o f the crime and which s e arch may ext e nd to th e are a within his imm ed iat e contro l whe re he might gain



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poss e ssion o f a we apon or e vide nce he can de stroy , a va lid arre st must pr ecede the se arch. Th e proce ss cannot b e re ve rsed .

In a s e arch in cide nta l to a lawf ul arre st , as th e precede nt arr e st de t e rmine s th e validity of the incide nta l se arch, the le ga lity of the arre st is que stioned in a larg e ma jorityof the se case s, e .g. , whe the r an arr e st was m e rely used as a pr e t ex t f or conducting a

se arch. In this instan ce, the law req uire s that th e re be f irst a lawf ul arre st b ef ore ase arch can b e made the proce ss cannot b e re ve rsed . (Ma lacat v. Court o f Appe als, 283 SCRA 15 9 , 17 5 [1997] )

(P e opl e v. Chua Ho San, 30 8 SCRA 4 32, Jun e 1 7, 1999 , En Banc [ Da v id e , J r ., C .J.] )

129. W hat is the p l ain vie w d o c trine? W hat are its re q uisites? Dis c uss .

Held: 1 . Ob jects f alling in p lain view of an o ff ice r who has a right to b e in th e positionto hav e that vi ew are sub ject to s e izure e ve n without a s e arch warrant an d may b e introduced ine vide nce . The plain view doctrine app lie s whe n th e f ollowing r eq uisit e s concur: (a) th e law e nf orce me nt o ff ice r in s e arch o f the e vide nce has a prior justi f ication f or an intrusion or is in aposition f rom which h e can view a parti cular ar e a; (b) th e discove ry of the e vide nce in p lain view is inadve rt e nt; (c) it is imm ed iat ely appar e nt to th e off ice r that th e it e m h e obs e rve s may b e e vide nce of a crime, contraban d or oth e rwise sub ject to s e izure . The law e nf orce me nt o ff ice rmust lawf ully ma ke an initia l intrusion or prop e rly b e in a position f rom which h e can parti cularlyview the are a. In th e cours e of such lawf ul intrusion , he came inadve rt e nt ly across a pi ece of e vide nce incriminating th e accused . The ob ject must b e ope n to e ye and han d and its discove ryinadve rt e nt.

It is cle ar that an ob ject is in p lain view if the ob ject its elf is p lainly exposed to sight.The diff iculty aris e s whe n th e ob ject is insi de a closed contain e r. Wh e re the ob ject s e ized wasinside a closed package, the ob ject its elf is not in p lain view and the ref ore cannot b e se ized without a warrant. Ho we ve r, if the package proclaims its cont e nts , whe the r by its distinctive conf iguration , its transpar e ncy, or if its cont e nts ar e obvious to an obs e rve r, the n th e cont e ntsare in p lain view and may b e se ized . In oth e r words, if the package is su ch that an expe rie nced obs e rve r could infe r f rom its app e aran ce that it contains th e prohibit ed article, the n th e article isdee med in plain view . It must b e immed iat ely appar e nt to th e police that th e it e ms that th e yobs e rve may b e e vide nce of a crime, contraban d or oth e rwise sub ject to s e izure . (P e op le v.Doria, 30 1 SCRA 66 8 , Jan . 22, 1999 , En Banc [ Puno, J.] )

2 . For th e doctrine to app ly, the f ollowing ele me nts must b e pre se nt :

a) a prior va lid intrusion bas ed on th e valid warrant le ss arr e st in which th e police are le ga lly pre se nt in th e pursuit o f the ir off icial dutie s;

b) the e vide nce was ina dve rt e nt ly discove red by th e police who hav e the right to b e whe re the y are ; an d

c) the e vide nce must b e immed iat ely appar e nt; an d d) plain view justi f ied me re se izure of e vide nce without f urth e r se arch.

In th e instant case, recall that PO2 Balut t e stif ied that th e y f irst locat ed the mari juanaplants b ef ore app ellant was arr e st ed without a warrant. H e nce, the re was no va lid warrant le ssarre st which pr eceded the se arch o f app ellant s pre mise s. N ot e f urth e r that th e police t e am wasdispat ched to app ellant s kaingin prec isely to s e arch f or an d uproot th e prohibit ed flora. Th e se izure of e vide nce in plain view applie s on ly whe re the police off ice r is not s e arching f ore vide nce against th e accused, but ina dve rt e nt ly come s a cross an in criminating ob ject. Cle arly, the ir discove ry o f the cannabis p lants was not ina dve rt e nt. W e also not e the t e stimony o f SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at th e are a, the y f irst ha d to look aroun d the are a bef ore the y could spot th e ille ga l plants. Pat e nt ly, the se ized mari juana p lants we re not immed iat ely appar e ntand f urth e r s e arch was n eeded . In sum , the mari juana p lants in que stion we re not in p lainview or ope n to e ye and han d. The plain view doctrine, thus , cannot b e made to app ly.

N or can we sustain th e trial court s conclusion that just b ecaus e the mari juana p lantswe re f ound in an un fe nced lot , app ellant could not invok e the prot ec tion a ff orded by th e Chart e ragainst unr e asonab le se arche s by ag e nts o f the Stat e . The right against unr e asonab le se arche sand se izure s is th e immunity o f one s pe rson , which include s his r e side nce, his pap e rs, and othe rposs e ssions. Th e guarant ee refe rs to th e right o f pe rsona l security of the individua l. X x x, what is sought to b e prot ec t ed against th e Stat e s unlawf ul intrusion ar e pe rsons , not p lace s. Toconclude othe rwise would not on ly me an s wimming against th e stre am , it would also le ad to th e absur d logic that f or a p e rson to b e immun e against unr e asonab le se arche s an d se izure s, he



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must b e in his hom e or o ff ice, within a fe nced yard or a privat e place . The Bill of Rights b elongsas mu ch to th e pe rson in th e stree t as to th e individua l in th e san ctuary o f his b ed room.(P e opl e v. Abe Vald ez , G.R. No . 1 2 9 2 9 6, S e pt . 2 5 , 2000, En Banc [Q uisum b ing ] )

3. Conside ring its f actua l milie u, this cas e f alls s quarely un de r th e plain v ie w doctrine . X x x.

Whe n Spe nce r wr e nched himself f ree f rom th e gras p of PO2 Gav iola, he instinctively rantowar ds th e hous e of appellant. Th e me mbe rs o f the buy-bust t e am w e re justif ied in runningaf t e r him an d e nt e ring th e hous e without a s e arch warrant f or th e y w e re hot in th e heel s o f aflee ing criminal. Once inside the hous e, the p olice off ice rs corne red Spe nce r an d recove red the buy-bust mon e y f rom him. Th e y a lso caught a ppell ant in flagrant e delicto r ep acking th e mari juana bri cks whi ch w e re in f ull v ie w on to p of a tab le . X x x.

He nce, appell ant s subseq ue nt arr e st was like wise law f ul, coming as it is within th e p urv ie w of Sec tion 5 (a) o f Rule 11 3 of the 1 9 85 Rule s on Criminal Proced ure x x x.

Sec tion 5 (a) is common ly refe rred to as th e rule on in flagrant e delicto arr e sts. H e re twoele me nts must concur: (1 ) th e pe rson to b e arre st ed must exec ut e an o ve rt a ct indicating that h e has just committ ed, is actua lly committing , or is att e mp ting to commit a crime ; an d (2 ) su chove rt a ct is done in th e p re se nce or within th e v ie w o f the arre sting o ff ice r. Thus , whe nappellant was s ee n r ep acking th e mari juana , the p olice off ice rs w e re not on ly authoriz ed but a lsoduty-boun d to arr e st him eve n without a warrant. (P e opl e v. Elamparo, 32 9 SCRA 4 0 4 , 414-415 , March 3 1 , 2000, 2 nd Di v. [Q uisum b ing ] )

1 30. W hat is a stop - an d-f ris k sear c h?

Held: 1 . In th e landmar k cas e of T e rry v . Oh i o (20 L E d 2 d 889; 88 S Ct 1 868, 392 U S 1 , 900, J u ne 1 0, 1 968 ) , a stop -and-f ri sk was defi ned as th e ve rnacular de si gnat i on o f the ri ght o f a po lice office r to stop a ci t i ze n on th e stree t, i nt e rrogat e hi m, an d pat h i m f or we apon(s ) :

x x x (W ) he re a po lice office r obs e rve s an u nu su al conduc t which le ads h i mre asonab ly to conclude i n li ght o f hi s expe rie nce that cri mi na l act ivi t y may be af oot an d that th e pe rsons wi th whom h e i s de ali ng ma y be armed and pre se nt ly dang e rou s, whe re i n th e cou rse of i nve st i gat i ng th i s b e havi or h e ide nt ified hi mself as a po lice man an d make re asonab le i nqui rie s, an d whe re noth i ng i n th e i ni t i al stag e s o f the e ncou nt e r se rve s todi spel hi s re asonab le fe ar f or h i s o wn or oth e rs safe t y , h e i s e nt i t led f or th e prot ec t i on o f hi mself or oth e rs i n th e are a to conduc t a carefully li mi t ed se arch o f the ou t e r cloth i ng o f such p e rsons i n an att e mpt to di scove r we apons which m i ght b e u sed to assa ult h i m.S uch a s e arch i s a r e asonab le se arch u nde r th e Fou rth Ame ndme nt, an d any we aponsei zed may prop e rly be i ntro duced i n evide nce aga i nst th e pe rson f rom whom th ey we re take n. ( H e rre ra, A H andbook on Arre st, S e arch an d S ei zu re and C u sto di al Inve st i gat i on,1 99 5 ed ., p. 1 8 5 ; an d T e rry v . Oh i o, s u pra, p. 9 11 )

In a llowi ng s uch a s e arch, th e U ni t ed Stat e s S u pre me Cou rt h eld that th e i nt e re st o f effec t ive cri me preve nt i on an d de t ec t i on a llows a po lice office r to approa ch a p e rson, i nappropr i at e ci rcu mstan ce s an d mann e r, f or p u rpos e s o f i nve st i gat i ng poss i ble cri mi na l be havi oreve n tho u gh th e re i s i nsufficie nt probab le cau se to ma ke an a ct u al arre st.

In a dmi tt i ng i n evide nce t wo g u ns s ei zed du ri ng th e stop -and-f ri sk, th e U S S u pre me Cou rt h eld that what ju st ified the li mi t ed se arch was th e more i mmedi at e i nt e re st o f the police office r i n ta ki ng st e ps to ass u re hi mself that th e pe rson wi th whom h e was de ali ng was not armed wi th a we apon that could u nexpec t edly and f ata lly be u sed aga i nst h i m.

It did not, ho weve r, aban don th e rule that th e police mu st, whe neve r pra ct icab le , obta i nadv ance judici al appro v al of se arche s an d sei zu re s thro u gh th e warrant pro cedu re , excu sed only by exi ge nt ci rcu mstan ce s. (Mana li li v. CA, 2 8 0 SCRA 4 00, Oct . 9 , 199 7 [ Pangani b an ] )

2. We now proceed to th e ju st ificat i on f or an d allowab le scope of a stop-and-f ri sk as a li mi t ed prot ec t ive se arch o f ou t e r cloth i ng f or we apons, as laid down i n T e rry , th u s:

We me rely hold today that whe re a po lice office r obs e rve s u nu su al conduc t which le ads h i m re asonab ly to conclude i n li ght o f hi s expe rie nce that cri mi na l act ivi t y may be af oot an d that th e pe rsons wi th whom h e i s de ali ng ma y be arm ed and pre se nt ly dang e rou s, whe re i n th e cou rse of i nve st i gat i ng th i s b e havi or h e ide nt ifie s h i mself as a



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police man an d make s r e asonab le inquirie s, and whe re nothing in th e initial stag e s o f the e ncount e r s e rve s to dispel his re asonab le fe ar f or his o wn or oth e rs safe ty, he is e ntit led f or th e prot ec tion o f himself and othe rs in th e are a to conduct a caref ully limit ed se archof the out e r clothing o f such p e rsons in an att e mpt to discove r we apons which might b e used to assau lt him. Such a s e arch is a r e asonab le se arch un de r th e Fourth Ame ndme nt ( T e rry, at 911. I n f act , the Court not ed that th e sole justif ication f or a stop-an d- f risk

was th e prot ec tion o f the police off ice r an d othe rs n e arby ; while the scope of the se archconduct ed in th e case was limit ed to patting down th e out e r clothing o f pe titione r an d hiscompanions , the police off ice r did not p lace his han ds in th e ir pocke ts nor un de r th e out e r sur f ace of the ir garm e nts unti l he had felt we apons , and the n h e me rely re ached f or an d re moved the guns. T his did not constitut e a g e ne ral exploratory s e arch, I d. )

Othe r notab le points o f T e rry ar e that while probab le caus e is not r eq uired to conduct astop-and- f risk, it ne ve rthele ss ho lds that m e re suspi cion or a hun ch will not va lidat e a stop-

and- f risk. A ge nuine re ason must exist , in light o f the police off ice r s expe rie nce and surroun ding conditions, to warrant th e belief that th e pe rson de tained has we apons conce aled about him. Fina lly, a stop-an d- f risk se rve s a t wo- f old int e re st : (1 ) the ge ne ral int e re st o f effec tive crime pre ve ntion an d de t ec tion , which un de rlie s th e recognition that a po lice off ice rmay , unde r appropriat e circumstan ce s an d in an appropriat e mann e r, approa ch a p e rson f orpurpos e s o f inve stigating possib le crimina l be havior e ve n without probab le caus e ; an d ( 2 ) the more pre ssing int e re st o f sa fe ty an d self -pre se rvation which p e rmit th e police off ice r to ta ke st e ps to assur e himself that th e pe rson with whom h e de als is not arm ed with a de adly we aponthat could unexpec t edly an d f ata lly be used against th e police off ice r. (Malacat v. Court of App e als, 2 8 3 SCRA 159 , D e c . 1 2, 199 7 [ Da v id e] )

131. Are sear c hes at c he ck points va l i d ? Dis c uss .

Held: Accused- app ellants assai l the mann e r by which th e checkpoint in que stion wasconduct ed . The y cont e nd that th e checkpoint mann ed by ele me nts o f the Makati Police shou ld have bee n announ ced . The y a lso complain o f its having b ee n conduct ed in an arbitrary an d discriminatory mann e r.

We take judicial notice of the ex ist e nce of the COMELEC re solution imposing a gun banduring th e elec tion p e riod issued pursuant to Sec tion 5 2 (c) in r elation to Sec tion 26 (q) o f the Omnibus E lection Code (Batas Pambansa B lg. 88 1 ). Th e nationa l and local elec tions in 1 99 5 we re held on 8 May, the second Monday o f the month. Th e incide nt , which happ e ned on 5 April 1 99 5 , was well within th e elec tion p e riod.

This Court has ru led that not a ll checkpoints ar e ille gal. Thos e which ar e warrant ed bythe ex ige ncie s o f pub lic orde r an d are conduct ed in a way le ast intrusiv e to motorists ar e allowed . For , admitt edly, routin e checkpoints do intru de, to a ce rtain ext e nt , on motorists right to f ree passag e without int e rruption , but it cannot b e de nied that , as a ru le, it involve s on ly abrief de t e ntion o f travele rs during which th e ve hicle s occupants ar e req uired to ans we r a bri ef que stion or t wo. For as long as th e ve hicle is n e ithe r s e arched nor its o ccupants sub ject ed to a

body se arch, and the inspec tion o f the ve hicle is limit ed to a visua l se arch, said routin e checkscannot b e re garded as vio lative of an in dividual s right against unr e asonab le se arch. In f act , the se routin e checks, whe n conduct ed in a f ixed are a, are e ve n le ss intrusiv e .

The checkpoint h e re in conduct ed was in pursuan ce of the gun ban e nf orced by th e COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to imp le me nt th e ban i f its de putized age nts we re limit ed to a visua l se arch o f pede strians. It would also defe at th e purpos e f or which su ch banwas institut ed . Thos e who int e nd to bring a gun during sai d pe riod would know that th e y on lyneed a car to b e ab le to e asily pe rpe trat e the ir ma licious de signs.

The f acts a dduced do not constitut e a groun d f or a vio lation o f the constitutiona l rights o f the accused against i lle ga l se arch an d se izure . PO3 Suba a dmitt ed that th e y we re me relystopping cars th e y dee med suspi cious, such as thos e whos e windows ar e he avily tint ed just tosee if the pass e nge rs th e re of we re carrying guns. At b e st th e y would me rely direc t th e irflash lights insi de the cars th e y would stop , without op e ning th e car s doors or sub jecting itspass e nge rs to a bo dy s e arch. Th e re is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what th e situationde man ds.

We see no n eed f or checkpoints to b e announ ced x x x. N ot on ly would it be impractical, it would also f orewarn thos e who int e nd to vio lat e the ban. Ev e n so , badge s o f le gitima cy of checkpoints may sti ll be infe rred f rom th e ir f ixed location an d the re gularized mann e r in which



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the y are ope rat ed . (P e opl e v. Usana, 323 SCRA 7 54 , Jan . 2 8 , 2000, 1 st Di v. [ Da v id e , C J] )

132. Do the or d inary rights against unreasona bl e sear c hes an d seizures app l y to sear c hes c on d u c te d at the airport pursuant to routine airport se c urity pro c e d ures?

Held: Pe rsons may lose the prot ec tion o f the se arch an d se izure claus e by exposur e of the ir pe rsons or prop e rty to th e pub lic in a mann e r r eflec ting a lack of sub jective expec tation o f privacy, which expec tation so cie ty is pr e pared to r ecognize as r e asonab le . Such r ecognition isimplicit in airport s ecurity pro ced ure s. With in cre ased conce rn ov e r airp lane hi jacking an d t e rrorism has come incre as ed security at th e nation s airports. Pass e nge rs att e mpting to boar d an air craf t routin ely pass through m e ta l de t ec tors; th e ir carry-on baggag e as well as checked luggag e are routin ely sub ject ed to x-ray s cans. Shou ld the se proced ure s sugg e st th e pre se nce of suspi cious ob jects , physical se arche s ar e conduct ed to de t e rmine what th e ob jects ar e . The re islitt le que stion that su ch s e arche s ar e re asonab le, give n th e ir minima l intrusive ne ss , the gravity o f the sa fe ty int e re sts invo lved, and the red uced privacy expec tations asso ciat ed with air line trav el.Indeed, trav ele rs ar e of t e n noti f ied through airport pub lic add re ss syst e ms, signs , and notice s inthe ir airline ticke ts that th e y ar e sub ject to s e arch an d, if any prohibit ed mat e rials or substan ce sare f ound, such would be sub ject to s e izure . The se announ ce me nts p lace pass e nge rs on noti ce that or dinary constitutiona l prot ec tions against warrant le ss s e arche s an d se izure s do not app ly toroutin e airport pro ced ure s.

The packs o f me thamph e tamin e hydrochloride having thus b ee n obtain ed through a va lid warrant le ss s e arch, the y ar e admissible in e vide nce against th e accused- app ellant h e re in.Coro llarily, he r subs eq ue nt arr e st , although likew ise without warrant , was justif ied since it waseffec t ed upon th e discove ry an d recove ry o f shabu in he r p e rson in flagrant e del icto. (P e op lev. Le i la J ohnson, G.R. No . 1 3 8881 , D e c . 18 , 2000, 2 n d Di v. [ Me n d o z a ] )

133. M ay the c onstitutiona l prote c tion against unreasona bl e sear c hes an d seizures be exten d e d to a c ts c ommitte d by private in d ivi d ua l s?

Held: As h eld in P eople v . M art i (193 SCR A 5 7 [1991] ) , t he co ns t it ut io nal protect io na ga inst unrea so na ble searc he s a nd se izure s refer s to t he immuni t y of o ne' s per so n fro minterfere nce by gover nme nt a nd it ca nnot be exte nded to act s co mmitted by pr ivate indiv idualsso a s to br ing it wit hin t he a mbit of alle ged unlawf ul intr usio n. (P e op le v. Me n d o z a, 30 1SCRA 66, Jan . 18 , 1999 , 1 st Di v. [ Mel o ] )

13 4 . S hou ld the seize d d rugs w hi c h are pharma c euti c a ll y c orre c t but not proper l y d o c umente d su bj e c t o f an i ll ega l sear c h be c ause the app l i c ant f ai l e d to a ll ege in the app l i c ation f or sear c h w arrant that the su bj e c t d rugs f or w hi c h she w as app l ying f or sear c h w arrant w ere either f a k e , mis bran d e d, a d u l terate d, or unregistere d, be returne d to the o w ner?

Held: With th e Stat e' s ob ligation to prot ec t an d promot e the right to h e alth o f the pe ople and instill he alth cons ciousne ss among th e m (Article II , Sec tion 1 5 , 1987 Constitution ) , in

orde r to de velop a h e althy an d ale rt citize nry (Article X IV , Sec tion 19[1] ) , it b ecame mandatoryf or th e gove rnme nt to sup e rvise and contro l the prolife ration o f drugs in th e mar ke t. Th e constitutiona l man dat e that "the Stat e sha ll adopt an int e grat ed and compr e he nsive approa ch tohe alth de velopme nt which sha ll e nde avor to ma ke e sse ntial goods, h e alth an d othe r so cial se rvice s avai lab le to a ll pe ople at a ff ordab le cost " (Article X III , Sec tion 11 ) cannot b e ne glect ed .This is why "the Stat e sha ll e stab lish an d maintain an effec tive f ood and drug r e gu latory syst e m." (Article X III , Sec tion 12 ) The BFAD is the gove rnme nt ag e ncy ve st ed by law to ma ke aman datory an d authoritativ e de t e rmination o f the true the rape utic effec t o f drugs b ecaus e it involve s t echnical skill which is within its sp ec ial compe t e nce . The he alth o f the citize nry shou ld ne ve r be compromis ed . To th e layman, m ed icine is a cure that may le ad to b e tt e r he alth.

I f the se ized 5 2 bo xe s o f drugs ar e pharma ce utically correc t but not prop e rlydocume nt ed , th e y shou ld be prompt ly disposed of in th e mann e r provi ded by law in orde r toe nsur e that th e sam e do not f all into th e wrong han ds who might us e the drugs un de rgroun d.Privat e re spon de nt cannot r ely on th e stat e me nt o f the tria l court that th e app licant "f ailed toalle ge in th e app lication f or s e arch warrant that th e sub ject drugs f or which sh e was app lying f orse arch warrant we re e ithe r f ake , misbran ded , a dult e rat ed , or unr e gist e red " in orde r to obtain th e re turn o f the drugs. Th e policy of the law e nunciat ed in R.A. N o. 82 03 is to prot ec t th e consum e rs as well as th e lice nsed busine ssme n. For e most among th e se consum e rs is th e gove rnme nt its elf which pro cure s m ed icine s an d distribut e s th e m to th e local communiti e sthrough direc t assistan ce to th e local he alth ce nt e rs or through outr e ach an d charity programs.



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Only with th e prop e r gov e rnme nt san ctions can m ed icine s an d drugs circulat e the marke t. We cannot a ff ord to ta ke any ris k, f or th e life and he alth o f the citize nry ar e as pr ec ious as th e ex ist e nce of the Stat e . (P e opl e v. J udg e Estr e lla T . Estrada, G.R No . 1 2 44 6 1 , Jun e 26, 2000, Spcl . 2 nd Di v. [ Ynar e s -Santiago ] )

13 5 . Do R egiona l T ria l C ourts have c ompeten c e to pass upon the va l i d ity or regu l arity o f

seizure an d f or f eiture pro c ee d ings c on d u c te d b y the B ureau o f C ustoms an d to en j oin or other w ise inter f ere w ith these pro c ee d ings?

Held: In J ao v . C ourt o f Appea l s (2 4 9 SCRA 3 5 , 4 2- 4 3 [199 5 ] ) , t his C ourt , re iterat ing its ru lings x x x sa id:

There is no quest io n t hat R e gio na l Tr ia l C ourts are devo id o f a ny co mpete nce to pass upo n t he va lidit y or re gu l ar it y o f se izure a nd f or f e iture proceed ings co nducted byt he Bureau o f C usto ms a nd to e n jo in or ot herw ise inter f ere wit h t hese proceed ings . The C o ll ector o f C usto ms s itt ing in se izure a nd f or f e iture proceed ings has exc l us ive jur isd ict io n to hear a nd deter mine a ll quest io ns touc hing o n t he se izure a nd f or f e iture o f dut ia bl e goods . The R e gio na l Tr ia l C ourts are prec l uded f ro m assu ming co gniza nce over suc h matters eve n t hrou gh pet it io ns o f cert iorar i, pro hibit io n or ma nda mus .

It is likew ise we ll- sett l ed t hat t he prov is io ns o f t he Tar iff a nd C usto ms C ode a nd t hat o f R epu blic Act N o . 112 5 , as a me nded , ot herw ise known as An Act C reat ing t he C ourt o f Tax Appea l s , spec ify t he proper f ora a nd procedure f or t he ve nt il at io n o f a nyl e ga l o b ject io ns or issues ra ised co ncer ning t hese proceed ings . Thus , act io ns o f t he C o ll ector o f C usto ms are appea l a bl e to t he C o mmiss io ner o f C usto ms , whose dec is io n, intur n, i s su b ject to t he exc l us ive appe ll ate jur isd ict io n o f t he C ourt o f Tax Appea l s a nd f ro m t here to t he C ourt o f Appea l s .

The ru l e t hat R e gio na l Tr ia l C ourts have no rev iew powers over suc h proceed ings is a nchored upo n t he po licy o f p l ac ing n o u nnecessar y hindra nce o n t he gover nme nt s dr ive , n ot o nly to preve nt s mu ggling a nd ot her f rauds upo n C usto ms , b ut more importa nt ly, to re nder e ff ect ive a nd e fficie nt t he co ll ect io n o f import a nd export dut ies due t he S tate , which e na bl es t he gover nme nt to carr y out t he f u nct io ns it has bee ninst ituted to per f or m.

Eve n if t he se izure by t he C o ll ector o f C usto ms were ill e ga l, x x x we have sa id t hat suc h act does not depr ive t he Bureau o f C usto ms o f jur isd ict io n t hereo n.

R espo nde nts cite t he state me nt o f t he C ourt o f Appea l s t hat re gu l ar courts st ill reta in jur isd ict io n where , as in t his case , f or l ack o f pro ba bl e cause , t here is ser ious dou bt as to t he propr iet y o f p l ac ing t he art icl es u nder C usto ms jur isd ict io n t hrou gh se izure /f or f e iture proceed ings . The y over l ook t he f act , h owever , t hat u nder t he l aw , t he quest io n o f whet her pro ba bl e cause ex ists f or t he se izure o f t he su b ject sacks o f r ice is not f or t he R e gio na l Tr ia l C ourt to deter mine . The custo ms aut hor it ies do not have to prove to t he sat is f act io n o f t he court

t hat t he art icl es o n b oard a vesse l were imported f ro m a broad or are inte nded to be s hipped a broad be f ore t he y ma y exerc ise t he power to e ff ect custo ms searc hes , se izures , or arrests prov ided by l aw a nd co nt inue wit h t he ad ministrat ive hear ings . As t he C ourt he l d in P o nce Enr il e v . V inu ya (37 SCRA 381, 388-389 [1971], re iterated in J ao v . C ourt o f Appea l s , supra a nd Miso nv . N at iv idad , 213 SCRA 73 4 [1992] ) :

The gover nme nta l a ge ncy co ncer ned , t he Bureau o f C usto ms , is vested wit h exc l us ive aut hor it y. Eve n if it be assu med t hat in t he exerc ise o f suc h exc l us ive co mpete nce a ta int o f ill e ga lit y ma y be correct ly imputed , t he most t hat ca n b e sa id is t hat u nder certa in circu msta nces t he grave a buse o f discret io n co nf erred ma y oust it o f suc h jur isd ict io n. I t does not mea n h owever t hat correspo ndingly a court o f first insta nce is vested wit h co mpete nce whe n cl ear ly in t he light o f t he a bove dec is io ns t he l aw has not see n fit to do so . The proceed ing b e f ore t he C o ll ector o f C usto ms is not fina l. An appea l lies to t he C o mmiss io ner o f C usto ms a nd t herea f ter to t he C ourt o f Tax Appea l s . I t ma yeve n reac h t his C ourt t hrou gh t he appropr iate pet it io n f or rev iew . The proper ve nt il at io no f t he l e ga l issues ra ised is t hus indicated . C erta inly a court o f first insta nce is not t here in incl uded . I t is devo id o f jur isd ict io n.

(Bur e au of Customs v. Ogario, 32 9 SCRA 2 89 , 2 9 6 -2 98 , March 30, 2000, 2 n d Di v.[ Me n do z a ] )



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The Privacy of Communications and Correspondence

136. P rivate respon d ent R a f ae l S. Ortanez f i l e d w ith the R egiona l T ria l C ourt o f Q uezon C ity a c omp l aint f or annu l ment o f marriage w ith d amages against petitioner T eresita S a lc e d o - Ortanez , on groun d s o f l a ck o f marriage l i c ense an d/ or psy c ho l ogi c a l in c apa c ity o f the petitioner . Among the exhi bits o ff ere d b y private respon d ent w ere three (3 ) c assette tapes

o f a ll ege d te l ephone c onversations bet w een petitioner an d uni d enti f ie d persons . T he tria l c ourt issue d the assai l e d or d er a d mitting a ll o f the evi d en c e o ff ere d b y private respon d ent ,in cl u d ing tape re c or d ings o f te l ephone c onversations o f petitioner w ith uni d enti f ie d persons .T hese tape re c or d ings w ere ma d e an d o btaine d w hen private respon d ent a ll o w e d his f rien d s f rom the mi l itary to w ire tap his home te l ephone . Di d the tria l c ourt a c t proper l y w hen it a d mitte d in evi d en c e sai d tape re c or d ings?

Held: Re pub lic Act No. 4 2 00 e ntit led " An Act to Prohibit an d Pe na lize Wire Tapping an d Othe r Relat ed Violations o f the Privacy of Communi cation , and For Oth e r Purpos e s" expre sslymake s su ch tap e recordings ina dmissible in e vide nce . x x x.

Cle arly, re spon de nt tria l court an d Court o f Appe als f ailed to conside r th e af ore-q uot ed provisions o f the law in admitting in e vide nce the cass e tt e tap e s in que stion. Abse nt a cle arsho wing that both parti e s to th e t ele phon e conve rsations a llowed the recording o f the sam e, the inadmissibility of the sub ject tap e s is man datory un de r Re p. Act N o. 4 2 00 .

Add itionally, it shou ld be me ntioned that th e abov e-me ntioned Re pub lic Act in Sec tion 2 the re of impose s a p e na lty o f imprisonm e nt o f not le ss than si x (6 ) months an d up to si x (6 ) ye arsf or violation o f said Act. (Sa lc ed o -Ortan ez v. Court of App e a ls, 23 5 SCRA 111 , Aug . 4 , 1994 [ Pa di lla ] )

The Rig h t to Pri v ac y

137. I s there a c onstitutiona l right to priva c y?

Held: The e sse nce of privacy is th e right to b e le t a lone . In the 1 9 6 5 case of G riswold v. Conn ec ticu t (38 1 U .S. 4 79, 1 4 l. e d. 2 D 5 1 0 [ 1 9 6 5 ] ) , th e U nit e d Stat e s S u pre me Cou rt gav e more su bstan ce to th e right o f privacy whe n it r ule d that th e right has a constit u tiona l f ou ndation. It h eld that th e re is a right o f privacy which can b e f ou nd within th e pe nu mbras o f the First, Third, Fo u rth, Fi f th and N inth Ame ndme nts. In th e 1 9 6 8 case of Morfe v. M u t uc (22 SCR A 4 2 4 , 444 - 445) , w e adopt e d th e G riswold ruling that th e re is a constit u tiona l right toprivacy.

The SC clarif ie d that th e right o f privacy is recognize d and e nshrin e d in s e ve ra l provisionsof ou r Constit u tion. It is expre ss ly recognize d in S ec tion 3( 1 ) of the Bill of Rights. Oth e r f ace tsof the right to priva cy ar e prot ec t e d in vario u s provisions o f the Bill of Rights, i. e ., S ecs. 1 , 2, 6 ,8, and 1 7. (Op le v. Torr e s, G.R. No . 1 276 85 , Ju ly 23, 1998 [ Puno ] )

1 38. I d enti f y the zones o f priva c y re c ognize d an d prote c te d in our l a w s .

Held: The C ivi l C o d e provi d e s that [e ]ve ry pe rso n shall r e spec t th e d i gni ty, pe rso nal i ty, priv acy and p e ace of mi nd of hi s n ei ghbo rs and o the r p e rso ns and pun i she s as a ct io nabl e t o rtsseve ral a cts by a p e rso n of me ddl i ng and pry i ng i nt o the priv acy of ano the r. It als o ho lds apubl ic office r o r e mpl o yee o r any pr iv at e i nd ivi dual l i abl e fo r damag e s fo r any vio lat io n of the ri ghts and l i be rt ie s of ano the r pe rso n, and r eco gni ze s th e priv acy of l e tt e rs and o the r pr iv at e co mmun icat io ns. Th e R evi se d P e nal C o d e make s a cri me the vio lat io n of sec re ts by an office r, the reve lat io n of trad e and i ndustr i al s ec re ts , and tr e spass t o d we ll i ng. In v as io n of priv acy i s anoffe nse i n sp eci al laws l ike the Ant i-Wi re tapp i ng Law (R. A. 4 2 00 ), the Secrecy of Bank De po si ts(R. A. 1 405 ) and th e Int e ll ec tual Pr o pe rty C o d e (R. A. 82 9 3). Th e Rul e s of C o urt o n pr ivi l e ge d co mmun icat io n l ikewi se reco gni ze the priv acy of ce rta i n i nfo rmat io n (Sec t io n 2 4, Rul e 1 30[ c], R evi se d Rul e s o n E vi d e nce ). (Op le v. Torr e s, G.R. No . 1 276 85 , J u ly 23, 1998 [ Puno ] )

1 39. Dis c uss w hy Ad ministrative Or d er N o . 308 ( issue d b y the P resi d ent pres c ri bing f or a N ationa l I D system f or a ll c itizens to f a c i l itate business transa c tions w ith government agen c ies engage d in the d e l ivery o f basi c servi c es an d so c ia l se c urity provisions ) shou ld be d e cl are d un c onstitutiona l.



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Held: We pre scind f rom th e pre mise that th e right to priva cy is a f undame nta l right guarant eed by th e Constitution , he nce, it is th e burde n o f gove rnme nt to sho w that A.O. No. 308 is justi f ied by som e compelling stat e int e re st an d that it is narro wly drawn. A.O. N o. 308 ispred icat ed on t wo conside rations : (1 ) th e need to provi de our citize ns an d f ore igne rs with th e f acility to conve nie nt ly transa ct busin e ss with basi c se rvice and social security provi de rs an d othe r gov e rnme nt instrum e nta litie s an d (2 ) th e need to r ed uce, if not tota lly e radicat e, f raudule nt

transa ctions an d misre pre se ntations by p e rsons s eek ing basi c se rvice s. It is de batab le whe the rthe se int e re sts ar e compelling e nough to warrant th e issuan ce of A.O. N o. 308 . B ut what is not arguab le is the broa dne ss , the vagu e ne ss , the ove rbre adth o f A.O. N o. 308 which if imple me nt ed will put our p e ople s right to priva cy in cle ar an d pre se nt dang e r.

The he art o f A.O. N o. 308 lie s in its Sec tion 4 which provi de s f or a Popu lation Refe re nce N umbe r (PRN ) as a common r efe re nce numb e r to e stab lish a linkage among conce rned age ncie s through th e use of B iome trics Techno logy and comput e r app lication de signs.

It is not eworthy that A.O. N o. 308 doe s not stat e what sp ec if ic biological chara ct e risticsand what parti cular biom e trics t echno logy sha ll be used to ide ntif y pe ople who will seek itscove rage . Conside ring th e banqu e t o f options avai lab le to th e imple me ntors o f A.O. N o. 308 , the fe ar that it thr e at e ns th e right to priva cy of our p e ople is not groun dle ss.

A.O. N o. 308 shou ld also rais e our ant e nnas f or a f urth e r look will show that it doe s not stat e whe the r e ncoding o f data is limit ed to bio logical inf ormation a lone f or ide ntif icationpurpos e s. X x x. Cle arly, the indef init e ne ss o f A.O. No. 308 can giv e the gove rnme nt th e rovingauthority to stor e and re trie ve inf ormation f or a purpos e oth e r than th e ide ntif ication o f the individua l through his PRN .

The pot e ntial f or misus e of the data to b e gath e red unde r A.O. N o. 308 cannot b e unde rplayed x x x. The more f re que nt th e use of the PRN , the be tt e r th e chan ce of building ahuge and f ormidab le inf ormation bas e through th e elec tronic linkage of the f ile s. Th e data maybe gath e red f or gain f ul and usef ul gove rnme nt purpos e s; but th e ex ist e nce of this vast r e se rvoirof pe rsona l inf ormation constitut e s a cove rt invitation to misus e, a t e mptation that may b e toogre at f or som e of our authoriti e s to r e sist.

It is p lain an d we hold that A.O. N o. 308 f alls short o f assuring that p e rsona l inf ormationwhich will be gath e red about our p e ople will only be proce ssed f or un e quivocally sp ec if ied purpos e s. Th e lack of prop e r sa fe guar ds in this r e gard of A.O. N o. 308 may int e rfe re with th e individua l s libe rty o f abo de and trav el by e nab ling authoriti e s to tra ck down his mov e me nt; it may a lso e nab le uns crupu lous p e rsons to a cce ss conf ide ntia l inf ormation an d circumve nt th e right against s elf- incrimination; it may pav e the way f or f ishing exped itions by gove rnme nt authoriti e s an d e vade the right against unr e asonab le se arche s an d se izure s. Th e possibi litie s o f abus e and misus e of the PRN , biome trics an d comput e r t echno logy ar e acce ntuat ed whe n we conside r that th e individua l lacks contro l ove r what can b e re ad or p laced on his I D, much le ssve rif y th e correc tne ss o f the data e ncoded . The y thr e at e n th e ve ry abus e s that th e B ill of Rightsseek s to pr e ve nt.

The ability of a sophisti cat ed data ce nt e r to g e ne rat e a compr e he nsive cradle- to-grav e dossie r on an in dividua l and transmit it ov e r a nationa l ne t work is one of the most graphi c thre atsof the comput e r re volution. Th e comput e r is capab le of producing a compr e he nsive dossie r onindividua ls out o f inf ormation giv e n at diffe re nt tim e s an d f or vari ed purpos e s. X x x. Re trie val of stor ed data is simp le . Whe n inf ormation o f a privile ged chara ct e r f inds its way into th e comput e r, it can b e ex tra ct ed toge the r with oth e r data on th e sub ject. On ce ex tra ct ed, the inf ormation is putty in th e han ds o f any p e rson. Th e e nd of privacy be gins.

[T]he Court will not b e true to its ro le as th e ultimat e guar dian o f the pe ople s libe rty if it would not imm ed iat ely smoth e r th e spar ks that e ndang e r th e ir rights but would rath e r wait f orthe f ire that could consum e the m.

[ A]nd we now hold that whe n th e int e grity o f a f undame nta l right is at sta ke, this Court will give the cha lle nged law, administrative orde r, rule or r e gulation a stri ct e r scrutiny. It will not do f or th e authoriti e s to invo ke the pre sumption o f re gularity in th e pe rf orman ce of off icial dutie s.N or is it e nough f or th e authoriti e s to prov e that th e ir act is not irrationa l f or a basi c right can b e diminished, if not defe at ed, e ve n whe n th e gove rnme nt doe s not a ct irrationa lly. Th e y must satis f actorily sho w the pre se nce of compelling stat e int e re st an d that th e law, rule, or r e gulationis narro wly drawn to pr eclude abus e s. This approa ch is de man ded by th e 1 9 87 Constitutionwhose e ntire matri x is de signed to prot ec t human rights an d to pr e ve nt authoritarianism. In case



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of doubt , the le ast we can do is to le an to wards th e stan ce that will not put in dang e r th e rightsprot ec t ed by th e Constitution.

T he right to pri v acy is on e of the m ost thr e at e ned rights o f m an liv ing in a m ass so cie ty.T he thre ats em anat e f rom v arious sour ce s go ve rnme nts , journa lists , em ploye rs , social scie ntists , e t c. In th e cas e at bar , the thre at come s f rom the exec utive bran ch o f gove rnme nt

which by issuing A.O. N o. 308 pre ssur e s th e pe ople to surr e nde r th e ir priv acy by gi v inginf orm ation about th em selve s on th e pre t ex t that it will f acilitat e del ive ry of basic se rv ice s. G ive nthe record-k ee ping po we r o f the com put e r, only the indiffe re nt will f ail to p e rce ive the dang e rthat A.O. N o. 308 give s th e gove rnme nt th e powe r to com pile a dev astating dossie r against unsusp ec ting citize ns. X x x [W]e close with th e stat eme nt that th e right to pri v acy was not e ngra ved in our Constitution f or flatt e ry. (Opl e v. Torr e s, G.R. No . 1 276 85 , July 23, 1998 [ Puno ] )

14 0. S hou ld in c amera inspe c tion o f ban k a cc ounts be a ll o w e d ? I f in the a ff irmative , un d er w hat c ir c umstan c es shou ld it be a ll o w e d ?

Held: The issue is whe the r p e titione r may b e cit ed f or indirec t cont e mpt f or h e r f ailure to pro duce the docume nts r eq ue st ed by th e Ombudsman. And whe the r th e orde r o f the Ombudsman to hav e an in came ra insp ec tion o f the que stioned account is a llowed as anexce ption to th e law on s ec recy of ban k de posits (R. A. N o. 1 405 ).

An examination o f the sec recy of ban k de posits law (R. A. N o. 1 405 ) would re ve al the f ollowing exce ptions :

1 ) Whe re the de positor cons e nts in writing;2 ) Impe achme nt case s;3) By court or de r in brib e ry or de reliction o f duty case s against pub lic off icials;4) De posit is sub ject o f litigation;5 ) Sec . 8 , R. A. N o. 30 1 9 , in case s o f unexplained we alth as h eld in th e cas e of P NB v .

G ancayco ( 1 22 Phi l. 503 , 508 [ 1 96 5 ] ) .

The orde r o f the Ombudsman to pro duce f or in came ra insp ec tion th e sub ject a ccountswith th e Union B ank of the Philippine s, Julia Vargas B ranch, is bas ed on a p e nding inve stigationat th e Off ice of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdame o, e t. a l. f or v iolation o f R. A. N o. 30 1 9 , Sec . 3 ( e ) and (g ) relative to th e Joint Ve ntur e Agree me nt b e t wee n th e Public Estat e s Authorit y and AM ARI.

We rule that b ef ore an in came ra insp ec tion ma y be allowed, the re must b e a p e ndingcas e bef ore a court o f compe t e nt jurisdiction. Furth e r, the account must b e cle arly ide ntif ied, the inspec tion limit ed to th e sub ject matt e r o f the pe nding cas e bef ore the court o f compe t e nt jurisdiction. Th e ban k pe rsonn el and the account ho lde r must b e notif ied to b e pre se nt duringthe inspec tion , and such insp ec tion ma y cove r on ly the account i de ntif ied in th e pe nding case .

In Union B ank of the Philippine s v . Court o f Appe als, we held that Sec tion 2 o f the Law on Sec recy of B ank De posits , as am e nded, decl are s ban k de posits to b e absolut ely conf ide ntial exce pt :

1 ) In an examination ma de in th e cours e of a sp ec ial or g e ne ral examination o f a ban k that is sp ecif ically authoriz ed by th e Mone tary Boar d af t e r be ing satis f ied that th e re isre asonab le groun d to b elie ve that a ban k f raud or s e rious irr e gularity has b ee n or isbe ing committ ed and that it is n ece ssary to look into th e de posit to e stab lish su chf raud or irre gularity,

2 ) In an examination ma de by an in de pe nde nt au ditor hir ed by th e ban k to conduct itsre gular au dit provided that th e examination is f or au dit purpos e s on ly an d the re sultsthe re of sha ll be f or th e exclusive use of the ban k,

3) Upon writt e n pe rmission o f the de positor , 4) In cas e s o f impe achme nt , 5 ) Upon or de r o f a compe t e nt court in case s o f bribe ry or de reliction o f duty o f pub lic

off icials, or6 ) In cas e s whe re the mone y de posit ed or inve st ed is th e sub ject matt e r o f the

litigation .

In th e case at bar , the re is ye t no p e nding litigation b ef ore any court o f compe t e nt authority. What is existing is an inv e stigation by th e Off ice of the Ombudsman. In short , what



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the Off ice of the Ombu dsman would wish to do is to f ish f or a dd itional e vide nce to f orma llycharg e Amado Lagdame o, e t. a l., with th e Sandiganbayan. Cle arly, the re was no p e nding cas e incourt which would warrant th e ope ning o f the ban k account f or insp ec tion.

Zone s o f privacy ar e recognized and prot ec t ed in our laws. Th e Civil Code provide s that [e ]ve ry pe rson sha ll re spec t th e dignity, pe rsona lity, privacy an d pe ace of mind of his n e ighbors

and othe r pe rsons an d punish e s as a ctionab le torts s e ve ra l acts f or m eddl ing an d prying into th e privacy of anoth e r. It a lso ho lds pub lic off ice r or e mployee or any privat e individua l liable f ordamag e s f or any vio lation o f the rights an d libe rtie s o f anoth e r pe rson , and recognize s th e privacy of le tt e rs an d othe r privat e communi cations. Th e Re vised Pe na l Code make s a crime of the violation o f secre ts by an o ff ice r, re velation o f tra de and industria l secre ts , and tre spass todwelling. Invasion o f privacy is an o ffe nse in sp ec ial laws like the anti -Wire tapping La w, the Sec recy of B ank De posits Act , and the Int ellec tua l Prope rty Code . (Lourd e s T . Marqu ez v.Hon . Aniano A. D e si e rto, G.R. No . 1 3 588 2, Jun e 27, 200 1 , En Banc [ Pardo ] )

F r ee do m o f Exp r e ssion

14 1. Distinguish c ontent -base d restri c tions on f ree spee c h f rom c ontent - neutra l restri c tions , an d give examp l e o f ea c h .

Held: C ontent -base d restri c tions are i mpose d b e c a use of t he c ontent of t he s pee ch an d are, t herefore, s ub je c t to t he c lear - an d-present d an ger test . For exa mple, a r ule s uch as t hat in volve d in S ani d a d v. C o mele c (181 SCRA 5 29 [1990] ) , pro hi bitin g c olumnists, c o mmentators, an d anno un c ers fro m c a mpai gnin g eit her for or a gainst an iss ue in a ple bis c ite must ha ve c o mpellin g reason to s upport it, or it will not pass muster un d er stri c t s c r utin y. Th ese restri c tions are c ensorial an d t herefore t he y bear a hea vy pres ump tion of c onstit utional in vali d it y. I n a dd ition, t he y will be teste d for possi ble o ver brea d t h an d va gueness .

C ontent - ne utral restri c tions, on t he ot her han d , like S e c. 11(b ) of R.A. N o . 66 46 , whi chpro hi bits t he sale or d onation of print s pa c e an d air ti me to politi c al c an d i d ates durin g t he c a mpai gn perio d , are not c on c erne d wit h t he c ontent of t he s pee ch. Th ese re gulations nee d onlya s ubstantial go vern mental interest to s upport t he m. A d eferential stan d ar d of re view will s uffi c e to test t heir vali d it y. Th e c lear - an d-present d an ger r ule is ina ppro priate as a test for d eter minin gt he c onstit utional vali d it y of laws, like S e c. 11(b ) of R.A. N o . 66 46 , whi ch are not c on c erne d wit ht he c ontent of politi c al a d s but only wit h t heir in c i d ents . To a pply t he c lear - an d-present d an ger test to s uch re gulator y meas ures wo uld b e like usin g a sle dge ha mmer to d ri ve a nail when a re gular ha mmer is all t hat is nee d e d.

The test for t his d ifferen c e in t he le vel of justifi c ation for t he restri c tion of s pee ch is t hat c ontent -base d restri c tions d istort pub li c d e bate, ha ve i mpro per moti vation, an d are us uallyi mpose d b e c a use of fear of how peo ple will rea c t to a parti cular s pee ch. N o s uch reasons un d erlie c ontent - ne utral re gulations, like re gulation of ti me, pla c e an d m anner of hold in g pub li c asse mblies un d er B.P. Blg. 880 , t he Publi c Asse mbly Ac t of 198 5 . (Osm e na v. COMELEC, 2 88

SCRA 44 7, March 3 1 , 1998 [ Me n d o z a ] )

142. Does the c on d u c t o f exit po ll by AB S C B N present a cl ear an d present d anger o f d estroying the c re d i bi l ity an d integrity o f the e l e c tora l pro c ess as it has the ten d en c y to so w c on f usion c onsi d ering the ran d omness o f se l e c ting intervie w ees , w hi c h f urther ma k es the exit po ll high l y unre l ia bl e , to j usti f y the promu l gation o f a C ome l e c reso l ution prohi biting the same?

Held: Such argum e nts ar e purely sp eculative and cle ar ly unt e nab le . F irst, by th e ve rynatur e of a surv e y, th e int e rviewee s or parti cipants ar e selec t ed at ran dom, so that th e re su ltswill as mu ch as possib le be re pre se ntativ e or r eflec tive of the ge ne ra l se ntime nt or vi ew of the community or group po lled. Second, th e surve y re su lt is not m e ant to r e place or b e at par withthe off icial Comelec count. It consists m e rely o f the opinion o f the polling group as to who th e elec torat e in ge ne ral has probab ly vot ed f or, bas ed on th e limit ed data gath e red f rom po lled individua ls. F inally, not at sta ke are the cred ibility an d the int e grity o f the elec tions, which ar e exe rcise s that ar e se parat e and inde pe nde nt f rom th e ex it po lls. Th e holding an d the re portingof the re su lts o f exit po lls cannot un de rmine thos e of the elec tions, sin ce the f orme r is on ly part of the latt e r. I f at a ll, th e out come of one can on ly be indicative of the othe r.

The COMELEC s conce rn with th e possib le noncommuni cative effec t o f ex it po lls disorde r an d conf usion in th e voting ce nt e rs doe s not justi f y a tota l ban on th e m.



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Undoubt edly, the assai led Comelec Re solution is too broa d, since its app lication is without qua lif ication as to whe the r th e polling is disruptive or not. Th e re is no sho wing, howe ve r, that ex it po lls or th e me ans to int e rview vot e rs caus e chaos in voting ce nt e rs. N e ithe r has anye vide nce bee n pr e se nt ed proving that th e pre se nce of ex it po ll re port e rs n e ar an elec tion pr ec inct t e nds to cre at e disorde r or conf use the vot e rs.

More ove r, the prohibition in cide nta lly pre ve nts th e collection o f exit po ll data an d the iruse f or any purpos e . The valuab le inf ormation an d ide as that could be de rived f rom th e m, bas ed on th e vot e rs answe rs to th e surve y que stions will f ore ve r re main un known an d unexplored .Unle ss th e ban is r e strain ed, candidat e s, re se arche rs, social scie ntists an d the elec torat e inge ne ral would be de prived of stu die s on th e impact o f curre nt e ve nts an d of elec tion-day an d othe r f actors on vot e rs choice s.

The abso lut e ban impos ed by th e Comelec cannot , the ref ore, be justi f ied . It doe s not le ave ope n any a lt e rnativ e chann el of communi cation to gath e r th e type of inf ormation obtain ed through ex it po lling. On th e othe r han d, the re are othe r va lid and re asonab le ways an d me ans toachie ve the Comelec e nd of avoiding or minimizing disorde r an d conf usion that may b e brought about by ex it surv e ys.

With f ore going pr e mise s, it is concluded that th e int e re st o f the stat e in red ucingdisruption is out we ighed by th e drastic abridgme nt o f the constitutiona lly guarant eed rights o f the med ia an d the elec torat e . Quit e the contrary , inst e ad of disrupting elec tions , exit po lls prop e rly conduct ed and pub licized can b e vital too ls f or th e holding o f hone st , orde rly, pe acef ul and cred ible elec tions; an d f or th e elimination o f elec tion-f ixing, f rau d and oth e r elec tora l ills.(ABS -CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 33 48 6, Jan . 2 8 , 2000, En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

14 3. S e c tion 5 .4 o f R.A. N o . 9006 ( F air E l e c tion Ac t ) w hi c h provi d es : S urveys a ff e c ting nationa l c an d i d ates sha ll not be pu bl ishe d f i f teen (15) d ays be f ore an e l e c tion an d surveys a ff e c ting l o c a l c an d i d ates sha ll not be pu bl ishe d seven (7 ) d ays be f ore an e l e c tion . T he S o c ia l W eather S tations , I n c. (S W S ) , a private non - sto ck, non - pro f it so c ia l resear c h institution c on d u c ting surveys in various f ie ld s ; an d K amaha l an P u bl ishing C orporation , pu bl isher o f the M ani l a S tan d ar d, a ne w spaper o f genera l c ir c u l ation , w hi c h f eatures ne w s w orthy items o f in f ormation in cl u d ing e l e c tion surveys , c ha ll enge d the c onstitutiona l ity o f a f oresai d provision as it c onstitutes a prior restraint on the exer c ise o f f ree d om o f spee c h w ithout any cl ear an d present d anger to j usti f y su c h restraint . S hou ld the c ha ll enge be sustaine d ?

Held: For re ason h e re unde r give n, we hold that Sec tion 5 .4 o f R. A. No. 9 006 constitut e san un constitutiona l abridgme nt o f f reed om o f speec h, expre ssion , and the pre ss.

To b e sure, Sec tion 5 .4 lays a prior r e straint on f reed om o f speec h, expre ssion , and the pre ss by prohibiting th e pub lication o f elec tion surv e y re su lts a ffec ting candidat e s within th e pre scribed pe riods o f f if t ee n (1 5 ) days imm ed iat ely preced ing a nationa l elec tion an d se ve n (7)days b ef ore a local elec tion. Becaus e of the prefe rred status o f the constitutiona l rights o f

speec h, expre ssion , and the pre ss , such a m e asur e is vitiat ed by a we ighty pr e sumption o f invalidity. In deed, any syst e m o f prior r e straints o f expre ssion come s to this Court b e aring ahe avy pr e sumption against its constitutiona l validity x x x. The Gove rnme nt thus carrie s a h e avyburde n o f sho wing justif ication f or th e e nf orce me nt o f such r e straint. The re is thus a r e ve rsa l of the norma l pre sumption o f validity that inh e re s in e ve ry le gislation.

N or may it b e argu ed that b ecaus e of Art. IX -C, Sec . 4 o f the Constitution , which give sthe Comelec sup e rvisory po we r to r e gulat e the e n joyme nt or uti lization o f f ranchise f or th e ope ration o f med ia o f communi cation , no pr e sumption o f invalidity atta che s to a m e asur e like Sec . 5 .4. For as we have point ed out in sustaining th e ban on m ed ia po litical adve rtise me nts , the grant o f powe r to th e Comelec unde r Art. IX -C, Sec . 4 is limit ed to e nsuring eq ua l opportunity , time, spa ce, and the right to r e ply as well as uni f orm an d re asonab le rat e s o f charg e s f or th e use of such m ed ia f acilitie s f or public inf ormation campaigns an d f orums among candidat e s.

X x x

N or can th e ban on elec tion surv e ys be justif ied on th e groun d that th e re are othe rcountri e s x x x which simi larly impos e re strictions on th e pub lication o f elec tion surv e ys. At b e st this surv e y is inconclusive . It is not eworthy that in th e Unit ed Stat e s no r e striction on th e pub lication o f elec tion surv e y re sults exists. It cannot b e argu ed that this is b ecaus e the Unit ed



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Stat e s is a matur e de mocracy. N e ithe r ar e the re laws imposing an e mbargo on surv e y re su lts , e ve n f or a limit ed pe riod, in oth e r countri e s. X x x.

What t e st shou ld the n b e e mployed to de t e rmine the constitutiona l validity of Sec tion5 .4? Th e Unit ed Stat e s Supre me Court x x x held in Unit ed Stat e s v. O B rie n:

[ A] gove rnme nt r e gulation is su ff icie nt ly justif ied (1 ) if it is within th e constitutiona l powe r o f the gove rnme nt; (2 ) if it f urth e rs an important or substantia l gove rnme nta l int e re st; (3) if the gove rnme nta l int e re st is unr elat ed to th e suppr e ssion o f f ree expre ssion; an d (4) i f the incide nta l re striction on a lle ged First Ame ndme nt f reed oms (of speec h, expre ssion an d pre ss) is no gr e at e r than is e sse ntia l to th e f urth e rance of that int e re st (39 1 U.S. 367 , 2 0 L . E d. 2 d 69 2 , 680 [1 968 ] [brack e t ed numb e rs a dded ]).

This is so f ar th e most in flue ntia l t e st f or distinguishing cont e nt -bas ed f rom cont e nt -ne utra l re gulations an d is said to hav e become canoni cal in th e re view of such laws. It isnot eworthy that th e O B rie n t e st has b ee n app lied by this Court in at le ast t wo case s (Adiong v.Comelec, 2 07 SCR A 7 12 [1 99 2 ]; Osm e na v. Comelec, supra.).

Unde r this t e st , e ve n if a law f urth e rs an important or substantia l gove rnme nta l int e re st , it shou ld be invalidat ed if such gov e rnme nta l int e re st is not unr elat ed to th e suppr e ssion o f f ree expre ssion. More ove r, e ve n i f the purpos e is unr elat ed to th e suppr e ssion o f f ree speec h, the law shou ld ne ve rthele ss b e invalidat ed if the re striction on f reed om o f expre ssion is gr e at e r thanis nece ssary to a chie ve the gove rnme nta l purpos e in que stion.

Our inquiry shou ld accordingly f ocus on th e se t wo conside rations as app lied to Sec . 5 .4.

First. Sec . 5 .4 f ails to m ee t crit e rion (3) o f the O B rie n t e st b ecaus e the causa l connec tion o f expre ssion to th e ass e rt ed gove rnme nta l int e re st mak e s su ch int e re st not unrelat ed to th e suppr e ssion o f f ree expre ssion. B y prohibiting th e pub lication o f elec tion surv e yre su lts b ecaus e of the possibi lity that su ch pub lication might un de rmine the int e grity o f the elec tion , Sec . 5 .4 a ctua lly suppr e sse s a whole class o f expre ssion , while allowing th e expre ssionof opinion conce rning th e sam e sub ject matt e r by n ew spap e r columnists , radio an d TVcomme ntators , armchair th e orists , and othe r opinion mak e rs. In effec t , Sec . 5 .4 sho ws a bias f ora parti cular sub ject matt e r, if not vi ewpoint , by pr efe rring p e rsona l opinion to statisti cal re su lts.The constitutiona l guarant ee of f reed om o f expre ssion m e ans that th e gove rnme nt has nopowe r to r e strict expre ssion b ecaus e of its me ssag e, its ide as , its sub ject matt e r, or its cont e nts.The inhibition o f speec h shou ld be upheld only if the expre ssion f alls within on e of the few unprot ec t ed cat e gorie s de alt with in Chap linsky v. N ew H ampshir e (31 5 U.S. 5 68 , 5 7 1 -5 7 2 , 86 L .E d. 1 0 31 , 1 0 35 [1 942 ]), thus:

The re are ce rtain well-def ined and narro wly limit ed class e s o f speec h, the pre ve ntion an d punishm e nt o f which hav e ne ve r bee n thought to rais e any Constitutiona l prob le m. Th e se include the lewd and obs ce ne, the prof ane, the libelous , and the insu lting or f ighting words thos e which by th e ir ve ry utt e rance inflict in jury or t e nd to

incit e an imm ed iat e bre ach o f the pe ace . [S]uch utt e rance s ar e no e sse ntial part o f anyexposition o f ide as , and are of such s light so cial value as a st e p to truth that any b e nef it that may b e de rived f rom th e m is cle arly out we ighed by th e social int e re st in or de r an d mora lity.

N or is th e re justif ication f or th e prior r e straint which Sec . 5 .4 lays on prot ec t ed speec h.In N e ar v. Minne sota (2 8 3 U.S. 697 , 7 1 5 -7 1 6 , 7 5 l. E d. 1 35 7 , 1 367 [1 9 31 ]), it was h eld :

[T]he prot ec tion e ve n as to pr e vious r e straint is not abso lut ely un limit ed . B ut th e limitation has b ee n r ecognized only in exce ptiona l case s x x x. No on e would que stionbut that a gov e rnme nt might pr e ve nt a ctua l obstru ction to its r ec ruiting s e rvice or th e pub lication o f the sailing dat e s o f transports or th e numb e r an d location o f troops. Onsimilar groun ds, the primary r eq uire me nts o f dece ncy may b e e nf orced against obs ce ne pub lications. Th e security o f the community life may b e prot ec t ed against in cit e me nts toacts o f viole nce and the ove rthro w by f orce of orde rly gove rnme nt x x x.

Thus , x x x the prohibition impos ed by Sec . 5 .4 cannot b e justif ied on th e groun d that it is on ly f or a limit ed pe riod and is on ly incide nta l. The prohibition may b e f or a limit ed time, but the curtai lme nt o f the right o f expre ssion is direc t , abso lut e, and substantia l. It constitut e s atota l suppr e ssion o f a cat e gory o f speec h an d is not ma de le ss so b ecaus e it is on ly f or a p e riod



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of f if t ee n (1 5 ) days imm ed iat ely bef ore a nationa l elec tion an d se ve n (7) days imm ed iat ely bef ore a local elec tion.

This su ff icie nt ly distinguish e s Sec . 5 .4 f rom R. A. N o. 66 46 , Sec . 11 (b) , which this Court f ound to b e valid in N ationa l Pre ss Club v. Comelec (sup ra.) , and Osme na v. Comelec (sup ra.).For th e ban im p osed by R. A. N o. 66 46 , Sec . 11 (b) is not on ly authoriz ed by a s pec if ic

constitutiona l p rovision (Art. I X- C, Sec . 4) , but it a lso p rovided an a lt e rnativ e so that , as thisCourt p oint ed out in Osm e na , the re was a ctua lly no ban but on ly a substitution o f med iaadve rtise me nts by th e Comelec sp ace, and Comelec hour.

Second. Eve n if the gove rnme nta l int e re st sought to b e p romot ed is unr elat ed to th e supp re ssion o f speec h an d the re su lting r e striction o f f ree exp re ssion is on ly incide nta l, Sec . 5 .4none thele ss f ails to m ee t crit e rion (4) o f the O B rie n t e st , nam ely, that th e re striction b e not gre at e r than is n ece ssary to f urth e r th e gove rnme nta l int e re st. As a lre ady stat ed, Sec . 5 .4. aimsat th e p re ve ntion o f last-minut e p re ssur e on vot e rs, the cre ation o f ban dwagon effec t , junkingof we ak or losing candidat e s, and re sort to th e f orm o f elec tion che ating called dagdag- bawas. Praiseworthy as th e se aims o f the re gulation might b e, the y cannot b e attain ed at th e sacrif ice of the f undame nta l right o f exp re ssion , whe n su ch aim can b e more narro wly p ursu ed by p unishing un lawf ul acts , rath e r than s peec h b ecaus e of app re he nsion that su ch s peec hcre at e s th e dang e r o f such e vils. Thus , unde r th e Administrativ e Code of 1 9 87 (B k. V , Tit. I , Subtit. C, Ch 1 , Sec . 3[ 1 ]), the Comelec is give n th e p owe r:

To sto p any i lle ga l activity, or conf iscat e, t e ar down, and sto p any un lawf ul, libelous , misle ading or f alse elec tion p rop agan da, af t e r due notice and he aring.

This is sur ely a le ss r e strictive me ans than th e p rohibition contain ed in Sec . 5 .4.Pursuant to this p owe r o f the Comelec, it can conf iscat e bogus surv e y re sults calculat ed tomisle ad vot e rs. Candidat e s can hav e the ir own surv e ys conduct ed . N o right o f reply can b e invoked by oth e rs. N o p rinciple of eq ua lity is invo lved . I t is a f ree mar ke t to which e achcandidat e brings his i de as. As f or th e p urp ose of the law to p re ve nt ban dwagon effec ts , it isdoubt f ul whe the r th e Gove rnme nt can de al with this natura l- e nough t e nde ncy of som e vot e rs.Some vot e rs want to b e ide ntif ied with th e winne rs. Some are sus cep tible to th e he rd me nta lity. Can th e se be le gitimat ely p rohibit ed by su pp re ssing th e p ublication o f surve y r e sultswhich ar e a f orm o f exp re ssion? I t has b ee n h eld that [m e re ] le gislative p refe re nce s or b elief sre spec ting matt e rs o f p ublic conve nie nce may well supp ort r e gulation direc t ed at oth e r pe rsona l activitie s, but b e insuff icie nt to justif y su ch as diminishe s th e exe rcise of rights so vita l to th e maint e nan ce of de mocratic institutions.

To summariz e the n, we hold that Sec . 5 .4. is inva lid becaus e (1 ) it im p ose s a p riorre straint on th e f reed om o f exp re ssion , (2 ) it is a direc t an d tota l supp re ssion o f a cat e gory o f exp re ssion e ve n though su ch su pp re ssion is on ly f or a limit ed pe riod, and (3) th e gove rnme nta l int e re st sought to b e p romot ed can b e achie ved by me ans oth e r than th e supp re ssion o f f reed omof exp re ssion. (Social W e ath e r Stations, Inc ., v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 14 7 5 7 1 , May 5 , 200 1 , En Banc [ Me ndo z a ] )

144 . Dis c uss the "d o c trine o f f air c omment " as a va l i d d e f ense in an a c tion f or l i be l or s l an d er .

Held: Fair comme ntari e s on matt e rs o f public int e re st ar e privile ged and constitut e avalid defe nse in an a ction f or libel or s lande r. Th e doctrine of f air comme nt m e ans that while inge ne ral e ve ry discred itab le imputation pub licly ma de is dee med f alse, becaus e e ve ry man ispre sumed innoce nt unti l his gui lt is judicially prov ed, and e ve ry f alse imputation is dee med ma licious , ne ve rthele ss , whe n th e discred itab le imputation is direc t ed against a pub lic pe rson inhis pub lic capa city, it is not n ece ssari ly a ctionab le . In or de r that su ch discred itable imputation toa pub lic off icial may b e actionab le, it must e ithe r be a f alse alle gation o f f act or a comme nt bas ed on a f alse supposition. I f the comme nt is an expre ssion o f opinion, bas ed on e stab lished f acts , the n it is immat e rial that th e opinion happ e ns to b e mista ke n, as long as it might r e asonab ly be infe rred f rom th e f acts. (Borja l v. CA, 30 1 SCRA 1 , Jan . 14 , 1999 , 2 n d Di v. [ B ell osi llo ] )

145 . W hat is the raison d etre f or the N e w Y or k T imes v . S u ll ivan (376 U S 2 54) ho ld ing that honest c riti c isms on the c on d u c t o f pu bl i c o ff i c ia l s an d pu bl i c f igures are insu l ate d f rom l i be l

j u d gments?

Held: The guarant ee s o f f reed om o f speec h an d pre ss prohibit a pub lic off icial or pub lic f igure f rom r ecove ring damag e s f or a def amatory f alse hood relating to his o ff icial conduct un le ss



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he prove s that th e stat e me nt was ma de with a ctua l ma lice, i.e ., with knowled ge that it was f alse or with reckle ss disre gard of whe the r it was f alse or not.

The raison d etre for t he N e w Y or k Times d octrine w as t hat to req uire critics of official con duct to guarantee t he tr ut h of all t heir fact ual assertions on pain of li bel judgments w o uld lea d to self-censors hi p, since w o uld -be critics w o uld b e d eterre d from voicin g o ut t heir criticisms

e ven if s uch w ere belie ve d to be tr ue, or w ere in fact tr ue, beca use of d o ubt whet her it co uld b e pro ve d or beca use of fear of t he expense of ha vin g to pro ve it . (Borjal v. CA, 30 1 SCRA 1 , J an . 14 , 1999 , 2 nd Di v. [ B e llosillo ] )

14 6. W ho is a pu bl i c f igure , an d there f ore su bj e c t to pu bl i c c omment?

Held: [W]e dee m privat e re spon de nt a pub lic f igure within th e purview of the N ew York T ime s ru ling. At any rat e, we have also def ined public f igure in Aye rs Pro duction Pty. , L t d. v.Capu long ( G .R. Nos. 82380 an d 82398 , 29 April 1988 , 160 SCR A 861 ) as

X x x a p e rson who, by his a ccomplishme nts , f ame, mode of living, or byadopting a pro fe ssion or calling which give s th e pub lic a le gitimat e int e re st in his doings , his a ff airs an d his chara ct e r, has b ecome a public pe rsonag e . He is, in oth e r words, acele brity. Obvious ly, to b e included in this cat e gory ar e thos e who hav e achie ved some de gree of re putation by app e aring b ef ore the pub lic, as in th e case of an a ctor , aprofe ssiona l bas e ba ll playe r, a pugi list , or any oth e r e nt e rtaine r. T he list is , howe ve r, broa de r than this. It in clude s pub lic off ice rs, f amous inv e ntors an d explore rs, war h e roe sand e ve n or dinary so ldie rs, inf ant pro digy, and no le ss a p e rsonag e than th e G re at Exalt ed Rule r o f the lodge . It in clude s, in short , anyon e who has arriv ed at a positionwhe re the pub lic att e ntion is f ocused upon him as a p e rson.

T he FNC L T (First Nationa l Confe re nce on L and T ransportation ) was an un de rtakinginf used with pub lic int e re st. It was promot ed as a joint pro ject o f the gove rnme nt an d the privat e sec tor , and organiz ed by top gov e rnme nt o ff icials an d promine nt busin e ssm e n. For thisre ason , it attra ct ed med ia mile age and drew pub lic att e ntion not on ly to th e confe re nce itself but to th e pe rsona litie s b e hind as well. As its E xecutive Direc tor an d spok e sman , privat e re spon de nt cons eq ue nt ly assum ed the status o f a pub lic f igure .

But e ve n assuming ex-gratia argum e nti that privat e re spon de nt , de spit e the position h e occupied in th e FNC L T , would not qua lif y as a pub lic f igure, it doe s not n ece ssari ly f ollow that h e could not va lidly be the sub ject o f a pub lic comme nt e ve n if he was not a pub lic off icial or at le ast a pub lic f igure, f or h e could be, as long as h e was invo lved in a pub lic issue . I f a matt e r is asub ject o f pub lic or g e ne ra l int e re st , it cannot su dde nly become le ss so m e rely becaus e a privat e individua l is involved or b ecaus e in som e se nse the individua l did not vo luntari ly choos e tobecome involved . T he pub lic s primary int e re st is in th e e ve nt; th e pub lic f ocus is on th e conduct of the parti cipant an d the cont e nt , effec t an d signif icance of the conduct , not th e participant sprior anonymity or notori e ty. (Borja l v. CA, 30 1 SCRA 1 , Jan . 14 , 1999 , 2 n d Di v.[ B ell osi llo ] )

14 7. T he Off i c e o f the M ayor o f L as P inas re f use d to issue permit to petitioners to ho ld ra ll y a ra ll y in f ront o f the J usti c e H a ll o f L as P inas on the groun d that it w as prohi bite d un d er S upreme C ourt E n B an c R eso l ution d ate d J u l y 7,1998 in A.M. N o . 98-7-02-SC, entit l e d, "R e :G ui d e l ines on the C on d u c t o f Demonstrations , P i ck ets , R a ll ies an d Other S imi l ar G atherings in the V i c inity o f the S upreme C ourt an d All Other C ourts ." P etitioners thus initiate d the instant pro c ee d ings . T hey su bmit that the S upreme C ourt grave l y a buse d its d is c retion an d/ or a c te d w ithout or in exc ess o f j uris d i c tion in promu l gating those gui d e l ines .

Held: We sha ll f irst dwell on th e critical argum e nt ma de by pe titione rs that th e rule sconstitut e an abri dgme nt o f the pe ople's aggr e gat e rights o f f ree speec h, f ree expre ssion , pe acef ul ass e mbly an d pe titioning gov e rnme nt f or r ed re ss o f grie vance s citing Sec . 4 , Article IIIof the 1 9 87 Constitution that "no law sha ll be pass ed abridging" the m.

It is tru e that th e sa fe guar ding o f the pe ople's f reed om o f expre ssion to th e e nd that individua ls may sp e ak as th e y think on matt e rs vita l to th e m an d that f alse hoods may b e exposed through th e proce sse s o f ed ucation an d discussion , is e sse ntial to f ree gove rnme nt. But f reed omof speec h an d expre ssion de spit e its indispe nsabi lity has its limitations. It has n e ve r bee nunde rstoo d as th e abso lut e right to sp e ak whe ne ve r, howe ve r, and whe re ve r on e ple ase s, f or th e mann e r, place, and time of pub lic discussion can b e constitutiona lly contro lled. [T]he be tt e r



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We rejec t th e se low watts argum e nts. Public place s histori cally asso ciat e d with th e f ree exe rcise of expre ssive activitie s, such as str ee ts, sid ewalks, and par ks, are consid e re d , without more, to b e pub lic f ora. In oth e r words , it is not an y law that can imbu e such p lace s with th e pub lic natur e inhe re nt in th e m. But e ve n in su ch pub lic f ora , it is s e tt le d jurisprud e nce that th e gove rnme nt ma y re strict sp eec h p lus a ctivitie s and e nf orce re asonab le time, place, and mann e r

re gulations as long as th e re strictions ar e cont e nt -ne utra l, are narro wly tailore d to s e rve asignif icant gov e rnme nta l int e re st , and le ave ope n amp le alt e rnativ e chann els o f communi cation.

Contrar y the ref ore to p e titione rs impre ssion , B.P. B lg. 880 did not e stab lish str ee ts and sid ewalks, among oth e r p lace s, as pub lic f ora. A close look at th e law will re ve al that it in f act pre scribe s r e asonab le time, place, and mann e r re gulations. Thus , it req uire s a writt e n p e rmit f orthe holding o f pub lic ass e mblie s in pub lic place s sub ject , e ve n, to th e right o f the may or tomodi fy the place and tim e of the pub lic ass e mbly, to impos e a r e routing o f the parad e or str ee t march, to limit th e volume of loud sp e ake rs or sound s y st e m and to pr e scribe othe r appropriat e re strictions on th e condu ct o f the pub lic ass e mbly .

The ex ist e nce of B.P. Blg. 880 , howe ve r, doe s not pr eclud e this Court f rom promu lgatingrule s re gulating condu ct o f d e monstrations in th e vicinit y of courts to assur e our p e ople of animpartia l and ord e rly administration o f justice as mandat e d b y the Constitution. To insu lat e the judiciary f rom mob pr e ssur e, f rie nd ly or oth e rwise, and iso lat e it f rom pub lic hy st e ria, this Court me rely move d a way the situs o f mass a ctions within a 2 00 -me t e r radius f rom e ve ry courthous e .In f ine, B.P. B lg. 880 impose s g e ne ral re strictions to th e time, place and mann e r o f condu ctingconce rt e d a ctions. On th e oth e r hand , the re so lution o f this Court r e gulating d e monstrationsadds sp ec if ic re strictions as th ey involve judicial ind e pe nd e nce and th e ord e rly administration o f justice . The re is thus no dis cre pan cy be t wee n th e t wo s e ts o f re gulator y me asur e s. Simply put , B.P. Blg. 880 and th e assai le d r e solution comp le me nt e ach oth e r. We so ho ld f ollowing th e rule in le ga l he rme ne utics that an appar e nt conflict b e t wee n a court ru le and a statutor y provisionshou ld b e harmoniz e d and both shou ld b e give n effec t i f possib le . (In Re: P e tition to Annul En Banc Re solution A.M. 98- 7 -02 -SC - Ricardo C . Valmont e and Union of Lawy e rs and Ad v ocat e s for Transpar e ncy in G o ve rnm e nt [ ULAT ] , G.R. No . 1 3 4 62 1 , S e pt . 2 9 , 1998 )

14 9. S hou ld l ive me d ia c overage o f c ourt pro c ee d ings be a ll o w e d ?

Held: The propri e ty o f granting or de nying p e rmission to th e med ia to broa dcast , record, or photograph court pro ceed ings invo lve s we ighing th e constitutiona l guarant ee s o f f reed om o f the pre ss , the right o f the pub lic to in f ormation an d the right to pub lic trial, on th e one han d, and on th e othe r han d, the due proce ss rights o f the defe ndant an d the inhe re nt an d constitutiona l powe r o f the courts to contro l the ir proceed ings in or de r to p e rmit th e f air an d impartia l administration o f justice . Collat e rally, it a lso rais e s issu e s on th e natur e of the med ia, particular ly t ele vision an d its ro le in socie ty, and of the impa ct o f new t echno logie s on law.

The records o f the Constitutiona l Commission ar e be ref t o f discussion r e gar ding th e sub ject o f came ras in th e courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts hav e not ha d the opportunity to

rule on th e que stion s quar ely.

While we take notice of the Se pt e mbe r 1 99 0 re port o f the Unit ed Stat e s Judicial Confe re nce Ad Hoc Committ ee on Came ras in th e Courtroom , still the curre nt ru le obtaining inthe Fede ral Courts o f the Unit ed Stat e s prohibits th e pre se nce of t ele vision came ras in criminal tria ls. Rule 53 of the Fede ral Rule s o f Crimina l Proced ure f orbids th e taking o f photographsduring th e progr e ss o f judicial proceed ings or ra dio broa dcasting o f such pro ceed ings f rom th e courtroom. A tria l of any kind or in any court is a matt e r o f se rious importan ce to a ll conce rned and shou ld not b e tre at ed as a m e ans o f e nt e rtainm e nt. To so tr e at it de prive s th e court o f the dignity which pe rtains to it an d de parts f rom th e orde rly an d se rious que st f or truth f or which our judicial proceed ings ar e f ormu lat ed .

Courts do not discriminat e against ra dio an d t ele vision med ia by f orbidd ing th e broa dcasting or t ele vising o f a tria l while pe rmitting th e new spap e r re port e r a cce ss to th e courtroom , since a t ele vision or n ew s re port e r has th e sam e privile ge, as th e new s re port e r is not pe rmitt ed to bring his typ ew rit e r or printing pr e ss into th e courtroom.

In E st e s v. T exas ( 38 1 U.S. 532 ) , the Unit ed Stat e s Supre me Court h eld that t ele visioncove rage of judicial proceed ings invo lve s an inh e re nt de nial of due proce ss rights o f a criminal defe ndant. Voting 5 -4, the Court through M r. Justice Clark, ide ntif ied f our (4 ) are as o f pot e ntial



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prejudice which might aris e f rom th e impact o f the came ras on th e jury, witne sse s, the tria l judge and the defe ndant. Th e dec ision in part p e rtine nt ly stat ed:

"Expe rie nce likew ise has e stab lished the prejudicial effec t o f t elec asting onwitne sse s. Witn e sse s might b e f right e ned, play to th e came ra , or b ecome ne rvous.The y ar e sub ject to extraor dinary out -of-court in flue nce s which might a ffec t th e ir

t e stimony. Also , t elec asting not on ly incre ase s th e tria l judge's re sponsibi lity to avoi d actua l prejudice to th e defe ndant; it may as well affec t his o wn pe rf orman ce . Judge s ar e human b e ings a lso an d are sub ject to th e sam e psychological re actions as layme n. Forthe defe ndant , t elec asting is a f orm o f me nta l harassm e nt an d sub jects him to exce ssive pub lic exposur e and distra cts him f rom th e effec tive pre se ntation o f his defe nse .

"The t ele vision came ra is a po we rf ul we apon which int e ntiona lly or ina dve rt e nt lycan de stroy an a ccused and his case in th e e ye s o f the pub lic."

Re pre se ntativ e s o f the pre ss hav e no sp ec ial stan ding to app ly f or a writ o f man dat e tocompel a court to p e rmit th e m to att e nd a tria l, since within th e courtroom a r e port e r'sconstitutiona l rights ar e no gr e at e r than thos e of any oth e r me mbe r o f the pub lic. Massive intrusion o f re pre se ntativ e s o f the new s med ia into th e tria l itself can so a lt e r or de stroy th e constitutiona lly n ece ssary judicial atmosph e re and dec orum that th e req uire me nts o f impartia lityimposed by due proce ss o f law are de nied the defe ndant an d a defe ndant in a crimina l proceed ing shou ld not b e f orced to run a gaunt le t o f re port e rs an d photograph e rs e ach tim e he e nt e rs or le ave s th e courtroom.

Conside ring th e prejudice it pos e s to th e defe ndant 's right to due proce ss as well as tothe f air an d orde rly administration o f justice, and conside ring f urth e r that th e f reed om o f the pre ss an d the right o f the pe ople to in f ormation may b e se rved and satis f ied by le ss distracting , de grading an d prejudicial me ans , live radio an d t ele vision cove rage of court pro ceed ings sha ll not be allowed . Vide o f ootag e s o f court h e arings f or n ews purpos e s sha ll be re strict ed and limit ed toshots o f the courtroom , the judicial off ice rs, the parti e s an d the ir couns el take n prior to th e comme nce me nt o f off icial proceed ings. N o vide o shots or photographs sha ll be pe rmitt ed duringthe trial prop e r. (Supr e m e Court En Banc Re solution Re: Li ve TV and Radio Co ve rag e of th e H e aring of Pr e sid e nt Cora z on C . Aquino's Li be l Cas e , dat e d Oct . 22, 1991 )

15 0. S hou ld the C ourt a ll o w l ive me d ia c overage o f the anti c ipate d tria l o f the p l un d er an d other c rimina l c ases f i l e d against f ormer P resi d ent J oseph E . E stra d a be f ore the S an d igan bayan in or d er to assure the pu bl i c o f f u ll transparen c y in the pro c ee d ings o f an unpre c e d ente d c ase in our history as re q ueste d b y the K apisanan ng mga B ro dk aster ng P i l ipinas?

Held: The propri e ty o f granting or de nying th e instant p e tition invo lve the we ighing out of the constitutiona l guarant ee s o f f reed om o f the pre ss an d the right to pub lic inf ormation , onthe one han d, and the f undame nta l rights o f the accused, on th e othe r han d, along with th e constitutiona l powe r o f a court to contro l its pro ceed ings in e nsuring a f air an d impartia l trial.

Whe n th e se rights ra ce against on e anoth e r, jurispru de nce t ells us that th e right o f the accused must b e prefe rred to win.

With th e possibi lity of losing not on ly the prec ious libe rty but a lso th e ve ry life of anaccused, it be hoov e s a ll to ma ke abso lut ely ce rtain that an a ccused rece ive s a v e rdict so lely onthe basis o f a just an d dispassionat e judgme nt , a ve rdict that would come only a f t e r th e pre se ntation o f cred ible e vide nce t e stif ied to by unbias ed witne sse s uns wayed by any kind of pre ssur e, whe the r op e n or subt le, in pro ceed ings that ar e de void of histrionics that might de tra ct f rom its basi c aim to fe rre t v e ritab le f acts f ree f rom improp e r in flue nce, and dec reed by a judge with an unpr ejudiced mind, unbri dled by running e motions or passions.

Due proce ss guarant ee s th e accused a pr e sumption o f innoce nce unti l the contrary isproved in a tria l that is not lif t ed abov e its individual se ttings nor ma de an ob ject o f pub lic satt e ntion an d whe re the conclusions r e ached are induced not by any outsi de f orce or in flue nce but on ly by e vide nce and argum e nt giv e n in op e n court , whe re f itting dignity an d calm ambian ce is de man ded .

Witne sse s an d judge s may v e ry well be me n an d wome n o f f ortitu de, ab le to thriv e inhardy climat e, with e ve ry re ason to pr e sum e f irmne ss o f mind and re so lut e e nduran ce, but it must a lso b e conceded that t ele vision can work prof ound chang e s in th e be havior o f the pe ople



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it f ocuse s on. Eve n while it may b e diff icult to quanti f y th e influe nce, or pr e ssur e that m ed iacan bring to b e ar on th e m direc t ly an d through th e shaping o f pub lic opinion , it is a f act , none thele ss , that , indeed, it doe s so in so many ways an d in varying de gree s. Th e conscious oruncons cious effec t that su ch a cove rage may hav e on th e t e stimony o f witne sse s an d the dec ision o f judge s cannot b e e valuat ed but , it can likewise be said, it is not at a ll unlikely f or avot e of guilt or inno ce nce to yield to it. It might b e f arcical to bui ld aroun d the m an impr e gnab le

armor against th e influe nce of the most po we rf ul med ia of pub lic opinion.

To say that a ctua l prejudice shou ld f irst b e pre se nt would le ave to n e ar nirvana th e subt le thre ats to justice that a disturban ce of the mind so indispe nsab le to th e calm an d del ibe rat e dispe nsation o f justice can cre at e . The effec t o f t ele vision may e scape the ordinaryme ans o f proo f, but it is not f ar-fe t ched f or it to gra dua lly e rode our basa l conce ption o f a tria l such as we know it no w.

An a ccused has a right to a pub lic trial but it is a right that b elongs to him , more thananyon e else, whe re his life or libe rty can b e held critically in ba lance . A pub lic tria l aims toe nsur e that h e is f airly de alt with an d would not b e un just ly conde mned and that his rights ar e not compromis ed in sec re t conclave s o f long ago. A pub lic tria l is not synonymous withpub licized trial; it on ly implie s that th e court doors must b e ope n to thos e who wish to come, sit in th e availab le se ats , conduct th e mselve s with dec orum an d obs e rve the trial proce ss. In th e constitutiona l se nse, a courtroom shou ld have e nough f acilitie s f or a r e asonab le numb e r o f the pub lic to obs e rve the proceed ings , not too sma ll as to r e nde r th e ope nne ss n e gligible and not toolarg e as to distract th e tria l parti cipants f rom th e ir prop e r f unctions , who sha ll the n be tota lly f ree to r e port what th e y hav e obs e rved during th e proceed ings.

The courts r ecognize the constitutiona lly e mbodied f reed om o f the pre ss an d the right topub lic inf ormation. It a lso approv e s o f med ia sexalt ed powe r to provi de the most a ccurat e and compr e he nsive me ans o f conve ying th e proceed ings to th e pub lic and in acquainting th e pub lic with th e judicial proce ss in a ction; n e ve rthele ss , within th e courthous e, the ove rridingconside ration is sti ll the paramount right o f the accused to due proce ss which must n e ve r b e allowed to su ffe r diminution in its constitutiona l proportions. Justice Clark thus ly pronoun ced,

while a ma ximum f reed om must b e allowed the pre ss in carrying out th e important f unction o f inf orming th e pub lic in a de mocratic socie ty, its exe rcise must n ece ssari ly be sub ject to th e maint e nan ce of abso lut e f airne ss in th e judicial proce ss.

X x x

The Int e grat ed Bar of the Philippine s x x x expre ssed its o wn conce rn on th e live t ele vision an d radio cove rage of the criminal tria ls o f M r. Estra da; to paraphras e: Live t ele visionand radio cove rage can n e gat e the rule on exclusion o f witne sse s during th e he arings int e nded toassur e a f air tria l; at sta ke in th e crimina l tria l is not on ly the life and libe rty o f the accused but the ve ry cred ibility of the Philippine criminal justice syst e m, and live t ele vision an d radio cove rage of the tria l could allow the hooting throng to arrogat e unto th e mselve s th e tas k of judging th e guilt o f the accused, such that th e ve rdict o f the court will be acce ptab le only if popu lar; an d live

t ele vision an d radio cove rage of the trial will not subs e rve the e nds o f justice but will only pan de rto th e de sire f or pub licity of a few gran dstan ding lawye rs.

X x x

Unlike othe r gov e rnme nt o ff ice s, courts do not expre ss th e popu lar will of the pe ople inany s e nse which, inst e ad, are tas ked to on ly a djudicat e controv e rsie s on th e basis o f what a lone is submitt ed bef ore the m. A tria l is not a f ree tra de of ide as. N or is a compe ting mar ke t o f thoughts th e known t e st o f truth in a courtroom. (R e: Req u e st Radio -TV co ve rag e of th eTrial in th e Sandigan b ayan of th e Plund e r Cas e s against th e form e r Pr e sid e nt Jos e ph E . Estrada, A.M. No . 0 1-4- 03 -SC, Jun e 2 9 , 200 1 , En Banc [ Vitug ] )

F r ee dom of Re ligion

15 1. Dis c uss w hy the Ge rona ru l ing (j usti f ying the expu l sion f rom pu bl i c s c hoo l s o f c hi ld ren o f J ehovah s W itnesses w ho re f use to sa l ute the fl ag an d sing the nationa l anthem d uring fl ag c eremony as pres c ri be d by the F l ag S a l ute L a w ) shou ld be a ban d one d.



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Held: Our tas k he re is ex tre mely diff icult , f or th e 30 -ye ar o ld dec ision o f this court inG e rona upho lding th e flag sa lut e law and approving th e expulsion o f stu de nts who r ef use to ob e yit , is not light ly to b e trifled with.

It is som ewhat ironi c howe ve r, that a f t e r th e G e rona ru ling ha d rece ived le gislative cache t by its in corporation in th e Administrative Code of 1 9 87 , the pre se nt Court b elie ve s that

the time has come to r eex amine it. The ide a that on e may b e compelled to sa lut e the flag , singthe nationa l anth e m, and rec it e the patrioti c pledge, during a flag ce re mony on pain o f be ingdismissed f rom on e s job or o f be ing expelled f rom s choo l, is a lie n to th e cons cie nce of the pre se nt g e ne ration o f Filipinos who cut th e ir t ee th on th e Bill of Rights which guarant ee s th e irrights to f ree speec h (Th e flag sa lut e, singing th e nationa l anth e m an d rec iting th e patrioti c pledge are all f orms o f utt e rance s. ) and the f ree exe rcise of religious pro fe ssion an d worship.

Religious f reed om is a f undame nta l right which is e ntit led to th e highe st priority an d the amp le st prot ec tion among human rights , f or it invo lve s th e relationship o f man to his Cre ator( Chief Justice E nrique M. Fe rnan do s se parat e opinion in G e rman v. Barangan , 1 35 S CRA 5 1 4 , 530 -53 1 ) .

The right to r eligious pro fe ssion an d worship has a t wo-f old asp ec t , viz., f reed om to b elie ve and f reed om to a ct on on e s belief . The f irst is abso lut e as long asthe belief is conf ined within th e re alm o f thought. Th e second is sub ject to r e gulationwhe re the belief is trans lat ed into ex t e rna l acts that a ffec t th e pub lic welf are (J. Cruz, Constitutiona l L aw, 1 99 1 E d., pp. 1 76 -1 77) .

Pe titione rs str e ss x x x that while the y do not ta ke part in th e compu lsory flag ce re mony , the y do not e ngag e in ex t e rna l acts or be havior that would offe nd the ir countrym e n whobelie ve in expre ssing th e ir love of country through th e obs e rvance of the flag ce re mony. Th e yquie t ly stan d at att e ntion during th e flag ce re mony to sho w the ir re spec t f or th e rights o f thos e who choos e to parti cipat e in th e sole mn pro ceed ings. Sin ce the y do not e ngag e in disruptive be havior , the re is no warrant f or th e ir expulsion.

The sole justif ication f or a prior r e straint or limitation on th e exe rcise of religiousf reed om (a ccording to th e lat e Chief Justice Claudio Tee han kee in his disse nting opinionin G e rman v. Barangan , 1 35 S CRA 5 1 4 , 5 1 7) is th e ex ist e nce of a grav e and pre se nt dang e r o f a chara ct e r both grav e and immine nt , of a s e rious e vil to pub lic sa fe ty, pub lic mora ls, pub lic he alth or any oth e r le gitimat e pub lic int e re st , that th e Stat e has a right (an d duty ) to pr e ve nt. Abse nt su ch a thr e at to pub lic sa fe ty, the expulsion o f the pe titione rs f rom th e schools is not justi f ied .

The situation that th e Court direc t ly pred ict ed in G e rona that :

[T]he flag ce re mony will become a thing o f the past or p e rhaps conduct ed withve ry few parti cipants , and the time will come whe n we would have citize ns untaught an d uninculcat ed in an d not imbu ed with r e ve re nce f or th e flag an d love of country ,

admiration f or nationa l he roe s, and patriotism a path e tic, e ve n tragi c situation , and all becaus e a sma ll portion o f the schoo l popu lation impos ed its will, de man ded and wasgrant ed an exe mption.

has not come to pass. W e are not p e rsua ded that by exe mpting th e J e hovah s Witne sse s f romsa luting th e flag , singing th e nationa l anth e m an d rec iting th e patrioti c pledge, this r eligiousgroup which a dmitt edly compris e s a sma ll portion o f the schoo l popu lation will sha ke up ourpart o f the globe and sudde nly pro duce a nation untaught an d uninculcat ed in an d unimbu ed with r e ve re nce f or th e flag , patriotism , love of country an d admiration f or nationa l he roe s. Af t e rall, what th e pe titione rs s eek only is exe mption f rom th e flag ce re mony , not exclusion f rom th e pub lic schools whe re the y may stu dy the Constitution , the de mocratic way o f life and f orm o f gove rnme nt , and le arn not on ly th e arts , scie nce s, Philippine history an d culture but a lso r ece ive training f or a vo cation or pro fe ssion an d be taught th e virtue s o f patriotism, re spec t f or humanrights , appr ec iation f or nationa l he roe s, the rights an d dutie s o f citize nship , and mora l and spiritua l value s (S ec . 3[ 2 ], Art. XIV , 1 9 87 Constitution ) as part o f the curricula. E xpelling orbanning th e pe titione rs f rom Philippine schools will bring about th e ve ry situation that this Court had fe ared in G e rona. For cing a sma ll religious group , through th e iron han d of the law, toparticipat e in a ce re mony that vio lat e s th e ir religious b elief s, will hardly b e conducive to love of country or r e spec t f or duly constitut ed authoriti e s.

As Mr. Justi ce Jackson r e marked in We st V irginia v. Barn e tt e, 31 9 U .S. 62 4 ( 1 9 43) :



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x x x To b elie ve that patriotism will not flourish i f patrioti c ce re monie s ar e voluntary an d spontan e ous inst e ad of a compu lsory routin e is to ma ke an un flatt e ringstat e me nt o f the app e al of our institutions to f ree minds. x x x Whe n th e y (dive rsity) ar e so harm le ss to oth e rs or to th e Stat e as thos e we de al with h e re, the price is not toogre at. But f reed om to diffe r is not limit ed to things that do not matt e r mu ch. That

would be a m e re sha dow of f reed om. Th e t e st o f its substan ce is th e right to diffe r as tothings that tou ch th e he art o f the ex isting or de r.

Furthe rmor e, le t it b e not ed that coe rced unity an d loyalty e ve n to th e country , x x x assuming that su ch unity an d loyalty can b e attain ed through coe rcion is not agoa l that is constitutiona lly obtainab le at th e expe nse of religious libe rty. A de sirab le e nd cannot b e promot ed by prohibit ed me ans. (M e ye r v. N e bras ka, 262 U .S. 390 , 67 L . ed .10 4 2 , 10 4 6)

More ove r, the expulsion o f me mbe rs o f Je hovah s Witne sse s f rom th e schoo ls whe re the yare e nro lled will violat e the ir right as Philippine citize ns , unde r th e 19 87 Constitution , to r ece ive f ree ed ucation , f or it is th e duty o f the Stat e to prot ect an d promot e the right o f all citize ns toqua lity ed ucation x x x and to ma ke such ed ucation a cce ssible to a ll (Sec . 1 , Art. X IV ).

I n V ictoriano v. E lizalde Rope Worke rs U nion, 5 9 SCR A 54 , 72-7 5 , we upheld the exe mption o f me mbe rs o f the I gle sia Ni Cristo, f rom th e cove rage of a closed shop agr ee me nt be t wee n th e ir e mploye r an d a union b ecaus e it would violat e the t e aching o f the ir church not to join any labor group :

x x x I t is ce rtain that not e ve ry cons cie nce can b e accommo dat ed by a ll the laws o f the land; but whe n g e ne ral laws conflict with scrup le s o f cons cie nce, exe mptionsought to b e grant ed unle ss som e compelling stat e int e re sts int e rve ne s. (She rbe rt v.Be rne r, 37 4 U .S. 39 8 , 10 L . E d. 2 d 96 5 , 970 , 83 S. Ct. 1790).

We hold that a simi lar exe mption may b e accorded to th e Je hovah s Witne sse s withre gard to th e obs e rvance of the flag ce re mony out o f re spec t f or th e ir religious b elief s, howe ve r

bizarre those belief s may s ee m to oth e rs. N e ve rthele ss , the ir right not to parti cipat e in th e flagce re mony doe s not giv e the m a right to disrupt su ch patrioti c exe rcise s. Paraphrasing th e warning cit ed by this Court in Non v. D ame s II , 185 SCR A 5 23 , 5 3 5 , while the highe st r e gard must b e aff orded the ir right to th e f ree exe rcise of the ir religion, this shou ld not b e take n tome an that s choo l authoriti e s ar e powe rle ss to discipline the m if the y shou ld commit br e ache s o f the pe ace by a ctions that o ffe nd the se nsibilitie s, both r eligious an d patrioti c, of othe r pe rsons. I f the y quie t ly stan d at att e ntion during th e flag ce re mony while the ir classmat e s an d t e ache rssa lut e the flag , sing th e nationa l anth e m an d rec it e the patrioti c pledge, we do not s ee how suchconduct may possib ly disturb th e pe ace, or pos e a grave and pre se nt dang e r o f a s e rious e vil topub lic sa fe ty, public mora ls, pub lic he alth or any oth e r le gitimat e pub lic int e re st that th e Stat e has a right (and duty) to pr e ve nt. (E b ralinag v. The Di v ision Sup e rint e nd e nt of Schools of C eb u, 2 19 SCRA 2 5 6, 26 9- 273, March 1 , 199 3, En Banc [G rino - Aquino ] )

15 2. A pre - tape d T V program o f the I g l esia N i C risto ( I NC ) w as su bmitte d to the M T RC B f or revie w. T he l atter cl assi f ie d it as rate d X be c ause it w as sho w n to be atta ck ing another re l igion . T he I NC proteste d b y cl aiming that its re l igious f ree d om is per se beyon d revie w by the M T RC B . S hou ld this c ontention be uphe ld ?

Held: The right to r eligious pro fe ssion an d worship has a t wo-f old asp ec t , v iz ., f reed omto b elieve and f reed om to a ct on on e's b elief . The f irst is abso lut e as long as th e belief isconf ined within th e re alm o f thought. Th e second is sub ject to r e gulation whe re the belief istrans lat ed into ex t e rna l acts that a ffec t th e pub lic welf are .

The Igle sia N i Cristo's postu lat e that its r eligious f reed om is p e r s e be yond rev iew by th e MTRCB shou ld be rejec t ed . Its pub lic broa dcast on TV o f its religious programs brings it out o f the bosom o f int e rna l belief . Telev ision is a m ed ium that r e ache s eve n th e e ye s an d e ars o f childre n. Th e exe rcise of religious f reed om can b e re gulat ed by th e Stat e whe n it will bring about the cle ar an d pre se nt dang e r o f a substanti ve ev il which th e Stat e is duty-boun d to pr eve nt , i.e ., se rious de trime nt to th e more ove rriding int e re st o f pub lic he alth , pub lic mora ls, or pub lic welf are . A laissez f aire policy on th e exe rcise of religion can b e sed uctive to th e libe ral mind but history couns els th e Court against its b lind adoption as r eligion is an d continu e s to b e a v olatile are a o f conce rn in our so cie ty to day. "For sur e, we sha ll continu e to sub ject any a ct pin ching th e spa ce f or th e f ree exe rcise of religion to a h e ight e ned scrutiny but we sha ll not le ave its rationa l



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exe rcise to th e irrationa lity of man. For whe n r eligion divide s an d its exe rcise de stroys , the Stat e shou ld not stan d still." (Igl e sia Ni Cristo v. CA, 2 59 SCRA 5 2 9 , J uly 26, 199 6 [ Puno ] )

15 3. Di d the M T RC B a c t c orre c t l y w hen it rate d X the I g l esia N i C risto ' s pre - tape d T V program simp l y be c ause it w as f oun d to be " atta ck ing " another re l igion?

Held: The MTRCB may disagree with th e criticisms o f othe r religions by th e Igle sia N iCristo but that giv e s it no excuse to int e rdict su ch criticisms , howe ve r un cle an th e y may b e .Unde r our constitutiona l sche me, it is not th e tas k of the Stat e to f avor any r eligion by prot ec tingit against an atta ck by anoth e r religion. Religious dogma an d belief s ar e of t e n at war an d topre se rve pe ace among th e ir f ollowe rs, e specially the f anati cs, the e stab lishme nt claus e of f reed om o f religion prohibits th e Stat e f rom le aning to wards any r eligion. V is-à-vis r eligiousdiffe re nce s, the Stat e e n joys no ban que t o f options. N e utra lity alone is its f ixed and immovab le stan ce . In f ine, the MTRCB cannot s quelch th e speec h o f the IN C simp ly becaus e it atta cksanoth e r r eligion. In a Stat e whe re the re ought to b e no diffe re nce be t wee n th e app e aran ce and the re ality of f reed om o f religion, the re med y against ba d the ology is b e tt e r th e ology. Th e bed rock of f reed om o f religion is f reed om o f thought an d it is b e st s e rved by e ncouraging th e marke tp lace of dueling ide as. Wh e n th e luxury o f time pe rmits , the marke tplace of ide asde man ds that sp eec h shou ld be me t by mor e speec h f or it is th e spar k of opposit e speec h, the he at o f colliding ide as , that can f an th e e mbe rs o f truth. (Ig le sia Ni Cristo v. CA, 2 59 SCRA 5 2 9 , Ju ly 26, 199 6 [ Puno ] )

154 . I s so l i c itation f or the c onstru c tion o f a c hur c h c overe d b y P. D . N o . 1 5 6 4 an d, there f ore ,punisha bl e i f d one w ithout the ne c essary permit f or so l i c itation f rom the D S W D?

Held: F irst . Solicit ati on o f contri buti ons f or t he constr ucti on o f a church is not s olicit ati on f or "cha rit able or pub lic welf are pur pose " but f or a reli gi ous pur pose, and a reli gi ous pur pose is not necess arily a cha rit ab le or public welf are pur pose . A f und campa i gn f or t he constr ucti on o r re pa ir of a church is not like f und dri ves f or need y f am ilies or victi ms of calam it yor f or t he constr ucti on o f a ci vic ce nter and t he like . Like s olicit ati on o f s ubscri pti on t o reli gi ous magaz i nes, it is part of t he pr opaga ti on o f reli gi ous f ait h o r e vang eli zati on. Such s olicit ati on calls upon t he virt ue of f ait h, not of cha rit y, s ave as t hose s olicited f or mone y o r aid may no t belongt o t he s ame reli gi on a s t he s olicit or . Such s olicit ati on does not e ngag e t he philan t hr opic as muchas t he reli gi ous fer vor of t he pers on who is s olicited f or contri buti on.

Second. The pur pose of t he Decree is t o p r otect t he pub lic aga i nst fr aud i n v iew of t he pr olifer ati on o f f und campa i gns f or charit y an d ot her ci vic pr o jects . On t he ot her han d, si nce reli gi ous f und dri ves are us ua lly conducted among t hose belong i ng t o t he s ame reli gi on, t he need f or pub lic pr otecti on aga i nst fr audule nt s olicit ati ons does not exist i n a s gre at a de gree as does t he need f or pr otecti on wit h res pect t o s olicit ati ons f or charit y o r ci vic pr o jects as t o justif y st ate re gulati on.

Third. To req uire a gov er nme nt per mit bef ore s olicit ati on f or reli gi ous pur pose may b e allowed is t o lay a p ri or restr ai nt on t he free exercise of reli gi on. Such restr ai nt, if allowed, may

well justif y req uiri ng a p er mit bef ore a church can ma ke Sunday collecti ons or e nf orce tit hi ng.But i n American B i ble Societ y v. C it y o f Manila (101 Ph il. 386 [19 5 7] ) , we precisel y held t ha t anordi nan ce req uiri ng paym e nt of a lice nse fee bef ore one may e ngag e i n bu si ness could not be app lied t o t he app ellan t's s ale of bi bles because t ha t would i mpose a conditi on on t he exercise of a constit uti ona l ri ght . I t is f or t he s ame re as on t ha t reli gi ous r allies are exe mpted fr om t he req uire me nt of pri or per mit f or pub lic asse mblies and ot her uses of pub lic parks and streets (B.P.Blg. 880 , Sec . 3[a] ) . To re ad t he Decree, t heref ore, as i ncludi ng wit hi n its re ach s olicit ati ons f or reli gi ous pur poses would be t o constr ue it i n a mann er t ha t it vi olates t he F ree Exercise of Reli gi on C lause of t he Constit uti on x x x. (Concurring Opinion, Me n d o z a, V .V ., J. , in C e nt e no v. Vi lla lon -Porni llos, 236 SCRA 19 7, S e pt . 1 , 1994 )

155 . W hat is a pure l y e ccl esiasti c a l a ff air to w hi c h the S tate c an not me ddl e?

Held: An eccle siastical aff air is one that conce rns doctrine, creed, or f orm o f worship o f the church, or th e adoption an d e nf orce me nt within a r eligious asso ciation o f needf ul laws an d re gulations f or th e gove rnme nt o f the me mbe rship , and the powe r o f excluding f rom su chasso ciations thos e dee med not worthy o f me mbe rship. Based on this def inition, an eccle siastical aff air invo lve s th e relationship b e t wee n th e church an d its m e mbe rs an d relat e to matt e rs o f f aith , religious doctrine s, worship an d gove rnan ce of the congr e gation. To b e concre t e, examp le s o f this so -called eccle siastical aff airs to which th e Stat e cannot m eddle are proceed ingsf or excommuni cation , ordinations o f religious minist e rs, administration o f sa cram e nts an d othe r



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activitie s with atta ched religious signi f icance . (Pastor Dionisio V . Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No .1 2 4 3 8 2, Aug . 1 6, 1999 , 1 st Di v. [K apunan ] )

15 6. P etitioner is a re l igious minister o f the S eventh Day Ad ventist (S D A ) . H e w as d ismisse d be c ause o f a ll ege d misappropriation o f d enominationa l f un d s , w i llf u l brea c h o f trust , serious mis c on d u c t , gross an d ha bitua l neg l e c t o f d uties an d c ommission o f an o ff ense against the

person o f his emp l oyer s d u l y authorize d representative . H e f i l e d an i ll ega l termination c ase against the S D A be f ore the l a bor ar biter . T he S D A f i l e d a motion to d ismiss invo k ing the d o c trine o f separation o f C hur c h an d S tate . S hou ld the motion be grante d ?

Held: Whe re what is invo lved is th e relationship o f the church as an e mploye r an d the minist e r as an e mployee and has no r elation whatso e ve r with th e pra ctice of f aith , worship ordoctrine s o f the church, i.e ., the minist e r was not excommuni cat ed or expelled f rom th e me mbe rship o f the congr e gation but was t e rminat ed f rom e mployme nt , it is a pur ely secularaff air. Cons eq ue nt ly, the suit may not b e dismissed invoking th e doctrine of se paration o f churchand the stat e . (Pastor Dionisio V . Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No . 1 2 4 3 8 2, Aug . 1 6, 1999 , 1 st Di v. [K apunan ] )

The Rig h t o f t he P e op le to I n for m ation on Matt e rs o f Pu bl i c Con ce rn

15 7. Dis c uss the s c ope o f the right to in f ormation on matters o f pu bl i c c on c ern .

Held: In V a l mo nte v . B e l mo nte , J r ., t he Co urt em pha sized t hat t he informat io n s o ugh t m us t be matter s of public co ncer n, acce ss to which ma y b e lim ited by l aw . Sim il ar ly, t he state po licy of f ull public discl o sure exte nds o nly to tra nsact io ns invo l v ing publi c intere st a nd ma ya lso be sub ject to rea so na bl e co ndit io ns p re scr ibed by l aw . As to t he mea nings of t he term s

public intere st a nd public co ncer n, t he Co urt , in L e ga spi v . Civ il Serv ice Comm issio n,e lucidated:

In determ ining whet her or not a part icul ar informat io n is of public co ncer n t here is no r igid te st which ca n b e a pplied . Public co ncer n like public intere st isa term t hat e lude s exact def init io n. B ot h term s em brace a broad spectr um of sub ject s which t he public ma y wa nt to know, e it her beca use t he se direct ly affect t he ir live s, or sim plybeca use such matter s n at ura lly aro use t he intere st of a n ord inar y cit ize n. In t he f ina l a na lysis, it is for t he co urt s to determ ine o n a ca se by ca se ba sis whet her t he matter at issue is of intere st or im porta nce , a s it re l ate s to or affect s t he public.

Co nsidered a public co ncer n in t he a bove-me nt io ned ca se wa s t he l e git imate co ncer n of cit ize ns to e nsu re t hat gover nme nt po sit io ns req uir ing civ il serv ice e ligibilit y are occupied o nly byper so ns who are e ligibl e s. So wa s t he need to give t he ge nera l public adeq uate not if icat io n of var io us l aws t hat re gul ate a nd affect t he act io ns a nd co nduct of cit ize ns, a s h e l d in T a nada .L ikew ise did t he public nat ure of t he l oa na bl e f unds of t he GSIS a nd t he public off ice he l d by t he a ll e ged borrower s (mem ber s of t he def unct B ata sa ng Pam ba nsa ) qua lif y t he informat io n s o ugh t

in V a l mo nte a s matter s of public intere st a nd co ncer n. In Aquino-Sarm ie nto v . M orato (203 SCR A 5 15 , 5 22 -23, N ovem ber 13, 1991), t he Co urt a lso he l d t hat off icia l act s of public off icer sdo ne in pu r suit of t he ir off icia l f unct io ns are public in character ; h e nce , t he record s p erta ining to such off icia l act s a nd dec isio ns are wit hin t he am bit of t he co ns t it ut io na l r ight of acce ss to public record s.

Under R e public Act N o . 6 713, publi c off icia ls a nd em pl o yee s are ma ndated to prov ide informat io n o n t he ir po licie s a nd proced ure s in cl ear a nd under sta nda bl e l a ngua ge , [a nd] e nsu re o pe nne ss of informat io n, publi c co nsul tat io ns a nd hear ing whe never a ppro pr iate x x x, exce pt whe n ot herw ise prov ided by l aw or whe n req uired by t he public intere st . In part icul ar , t he l aw ma ndate s free public acce ss, at rea so na bl e ho ur s, to t he a nnua l performa nce re port s of off ice sa nd a ge ncie s of gover nme nt a nd gover nme nt-ow ned or co ntro ll ed cor porat io ns; a nd t he stateme nt s of a sset s, lia bilit ie s a nd f ina ncia l discl o su re s of a ll public off icia ls a nd em pl o yee s.

In g e nera l, wr it ings com ing in to t he ha nds of public off icer s in co nnect io n wit h t he ir off icia l f unct io ns m us t be acce ssibl e to t he public, co nsis te nt wit h t he po licy of tra nsp are ncy of gover nme nta l affa ir s. T his p r incipl e is a imed at afford ing t he peo pl e a n o pport unit y to determ ine whet her t ho se to whom t he y have e ntr us ted t he affa ir s of t he gover nme nt are ho ne st ly, fa it hf ullya nd com pete nt ly perform ing t he ir f unct io ns a s publi c serva nt s. Unde nia bly, t he e sse nce of democrac y lie s in t he free-f l ow of t ho ugh t ; bu t t ho ugh t s a nd idea s m us t be we ll -informed so t hat t he public wo ul d ga in a better per spect ive of v ita l issue s co nfro nt ing t hem a nd, t hus, b e a bl e to



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criticize as well as parti cipat e in th e aff airs o f the gove rnme nt in a r e sponsib le, re asonab le and effec tive mann e r. Ce rtain ly, it is by e nsuring an un fe tt e red and uninhibit ed exchang e of ide asamong a well-inf ormed pub lic that a gov e rnme nt r e mains r e sponsiv e to th e chang e s de sired bythe pe ople . (Cha vez v. PC GG , 2 99 SCRA 7 44 , D e c . 9 , 1998 , [ Pangani b an ] )

15 8. W hat are some o f the re c ognize d restri c tions to the right o f the peop l e to in f ormation on

matters o f pu bl i c c on c ern?

Held:

1 ) N ationa l security matt e rs an d int ellige nce inf ormation. This jurisdiction r ecognize sthe common law holding that th e re is a gov e rnme nta l privile ge against pub lic disclosur e with re spec t to stat e sec re ts r e garding mi litary, diplomati c and oth e rnationa l security matt e rs. Likew ise, inf ormation on int e r-gove rnme nt exchang e sprior to th e conclusion o f tre atie s an d exec utive agree me nts may b e sub ject tore asonab le sa fe guar ds f or th e sake of nationa l int e re st;

2 ) Trade or industria l sec re ts (pursuant to th e Int ellec tua l Prope rty Code [R. A. No.82 9 3, approv ed on June 6 , 1 99 7] and oth e r relat ed laws) an d ban king transa ctions(pursuant to th e Secrecy of Bank De posits Act [R. A. N o. 1 405 , as am e nded ]);

3) Criminal matt e rs, such as thos e relating to th e appr e he nsion , the pros ecution an d the de t e ntion o f criminals, which courts may not in quire into prior to su ch arr e st , de t e ntion an d pros ecution;

4) Othe r conf ide ntial inf ormation. Th e Ethical Stan dards Act (R. A. N o. 6 71 3, e nact ed onFe bruary 2 0, 1 9 89) f urth e r prohibits pub lic off icials an d e mployee s f rom using ordivulging conf ide ntia l or classi f ied inf ormation o ff icially known to th e m by r e ason o f the ir off ice and not ma de avai lab le to th e pub lic. (Sec . 7[ c], ibid.) Oth e racknowled ged limitations to in f ormation a cce ss include diplomati c corre spon de nce, closed door Cabine t m ee tings an d exec utive se ssions o f e ithe r hous e of Congr e ss , aswell as th e int e rna l delibe rations o f the Supre me Court.

(Cha vez v. PC GG , 2 99 SCRA 7 44 , D e c . 9 , 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

15 9. I s the a ll ege d i ll- gotten w ea l th o f the M ar c oses a matter o f pu bl i c c on c ern su bj e c t to this right?

Held: With su ch pronoun ce me nts o f our gov e rnme nt , whos e authority e manat e s f romthe pe ople, the re is no doubt that th e recove ry of the Marcose s' alle ged ill-gott e n we alth is amatt e r o f pub lic conce rn an d imbued with pub lic int e re st. W e may a lso a dd that ill-gott e nwe alth refe rs to ass e ts an d prop e rtie s purport edly acquired, direc t ly or in direc t ly, by f orme rPre side nt Marcos, his imm ed iat e f amily, relative s an d close asso ciat e s through or as a r e su lt o f the ir improp e r or i lle ga l use of gove rnme nt f unds or prop e rtie s; or th e ir having ta ke n un due advantag e of the ir pub lic off ice ; or th e ir us e of powe rs , influe nce s or r elationships , re su lting inthe ir un just e nrichme nt an d causing grav e damag e an d prejudice to th e Filipino p e ople and the Re pub lic of the Philippine s. Cle arly, the ass e ts an d prop e rtie s r efe rred to suppos edly originat ed f rom th e gove rnme nt its elf . To a ll int e nts an d purpos e s, the ref ore, the y belong to th e pe ople .

As su ch, upon r econve yance the y will be re turn ed to th e pub lic tre asury , sub ject on ly to th e satis f action o f positive claims o f ce rtain p e rsons as may b e adjudged by compe t e nt courts. Anoth e r decl ared ove rriding conside ration f or th e exped itious r ecove ry o f ill-gott e n we alth is that it may b e used f or nationa l economi c recove ry.

We belie ve the f ore going disquisition s e tt le s th e que stion o f whe the r pe titione r has aright to r e spon de nts ' disclosur e of any agr ee me nt that may b e arrived at conce rning th e Marcose s purport ed ill-gott e n we alth. (Cha vez v. PC GG , 2 99 SCRA 7 44 , D e c . 9 , 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

Freedom of Asso cia t i on

160. Does the right o f c ivi l servants to organize in cl u d e their right to stri k e? Cl ari f y .

Held: Spec if ically, the right o f civil se rvants to organiz e the mselve s was positiv elyrecognized in Association o f Cou rt o f Appe als E mployee s (ACAE ) v. F e rre r-Calle ja (203 SCRA5 96 , Nove mbe r 15 , 1991 ) . Bu t , as in th e exe rcise of the rights o f f ree expre ssion an d of ass e mbly, the re are stan dards f or a llowab le limitations s uch as th e le gitima cy of the pu rpos e s o f the asso ciation , the ove rriding conside rations o f nationa l secu rity an d the pre se rvation o f de mocratic instit u tions (P e ople v. F e rre r, 4 8 SCRA 382 , Dece mbe r 27 , 1972 , pe r Castro , J., whe re the Cou rt ,



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w hi l e upho ld ing the va l i d ity o f the Anti -S u bversion Ac t w hi c h out l a w e d the C ommunist P arty o f the P hi l ippines an d other " su bversive " organizations , cl ari f ie d, " W hatever interest in f ree d om o f spee c h an d f ree d om o f asso c iation is in f ringe d b y the prohi bition against k no w ing mem bership in the C ommunist P arty o f the P hi l ippines , is so in d ire c t an d so insu bstantia l as to be cl ear l y an d heavi l y out w eighe d b y the overri d ing c onsi d erations o f nationa l se c urity an d the preservation o f d emo c rati c institutions in this c ountry ." I t c autione d, though , that " the nee d f or pru d en c e an d

c ir c umspe c tion [c annot be overemphasize d] in [ the l a w' s ] en f or c ement , operating as it d oes in the sensitive area o f f ree d om o f expression an d be l ie f." )

As regar d s the right to stri k e , the C onstitution itse lf qua l i f ies its exer c ise w ith the proviso " in a cc or d an c e w ith l a w." T his is a cl ear mani f estation that the state may , b y l a w, regu l ate the use o f this right , or even d eny c ertain se c tors su c h right . Exe c utive Or d er N o . 1 80 ( I ssue d b y f ormer P resi d ent C orazon C. Aquino on J une 1 , 1 9 87 ) w hi c h provi d es gui d e l ines f or the exer c ise o f the right o f government w or k ers to organize , f or instan c e , imp l i c it l y en d orse d an ear l ier CSC c ir c u l ar w hi c h " enjoins un d er pain o f a d ministrative san c tions , a ll government o ff i c ers an d emp l oyees f rom staging stri k es , d emonstrations , mass l eaves , w a lk outs an d other f orms o f mass a c tion w hi c h w i ll resu l t in temporary stoppage or d isruption o f pu bl i c servi c e " (CSC M emoran d um C ir c u l ar N o . 6, s . 1 9 87, d ate d Apri l 2 1 , 1 9 87 ) by stating that the C ivi l S ervi c e l a w an d ru l es governing c on c erte d a c tivities an d stri k es in the government servi c e sha ll be o bserve d.

I t is a l so sett l e d in jurispru d en c e that , in genera l, w or k ers in the pu bl i c se c tor d o not enjoy the right to stri k e . All ian c e o f C on c erne d G overnment W or k ers v . M inister o f L a bor an d Emp l oyment ( 1 2 4 SCRA1 , August 3, 1 9 83, a l so per G utierrez , J r ., J. ) rationa l ize d the pros c ription thus:

"The genera l ru l e in the past an d up to the present is that the ' terms an d c on d itions o f emp l oyment in the G overnment , in cl u d ing any po l iti c a l su bd ivision or instrumenta l ity thereo f are governe d b y l a w.' X x x. S in c e the terms an d c on d itions o f government emp l oyment are f ixe d b y l a w, government w or k ers c annot use the same w eapons emp l oye d b y the w or k ers in the private se c tor to se c ure c on c essions f rom their emp l oyers . The prin c ip l e behin d l a bor unionism in private in d ustry is that in d ustria l pea c e c annot be se c ure d through c ompu l sion by l a w. R e l ations bet w een private emp l oyers an d their emp l oyees rest on an essentia ll y vo l untary basis . S u b je c t to the minimum requirements o f w age l a w s an d other l a bor an d w e lf are l egis l ation , the terms an d c on d itions o f emp l oyment in the unionize d private se c tor are sett l e d through the pro c ess o f c o ll e c tive bargaining . I n government emp l oyment , ho w ever , it is the l egis l ature an d, w here proper l y given d e l egate d po w er , the a d ministrative hea d s o f government w hi c h f ix the terms an d c on d itions o f emp l oyment . An d this is e ff e c te d through statutes or a d ministrative c ir c u l ars , ru l es , an d regu l ations , not through c o ll e c tive bargaining agreements ." ( I bi d., p . 1 3 )

Af ter d e l ving into the intent o f the f ramers o f the C onstitution , the C ourt a ff irme d the a bove ru l e in S o c ia l S e c urity S ystem Emp l oyees Asso c iation (SSSEA ) v . C ourt o f Appea l s ( 1 7 5 SCRA 6 86, J u l y 2 8, 1 9 89 ) an d exp l aine d :

" G overnment emp l oyees may , there f ore , through their unions or asso c iations ,either petition the C ongress f or the betterment o f the terms an d c on d itions o f emp l oyment w hi c h are w ithin the am bit o f l egis l ation or negotiate w ith the appropriate government agen c ies f or the improvement o f those w hi c h are not f ixe d b y l a w. I f there be any unreso l ve d grievan c es , the d ispute may be re f erre d to the P u bl i c S e c tor L a bor - M anagement C oun c i l f or appropriate a c tion . But emp l oyees in the c ivi l servi c e may not resort to stri k es , w a lk outs an d other temporary w or k stoppages , l i k e w or k ers in the private se c tor , to pressure the G overnment to a cc e d e to their d eman d s . As no w provi d e d un d er S e c. 4 , R u l e III o f the R u l es an d R egu l ations to G overn the Exer c ise o f the R ight o f G overnment Emp l oyees to S e lf-Organization , w hi c h too k e ff e c t a f ter the instant d ispute arose , '[ t ] he terms an d c on d itions o f emp l oyment in the government ,in cl u d ing any po l iti c a l su bd ivision or instrumenta l ity thereo f an d government - o w ne d an d c ontro ll e d c orporations w ith origina l c harters are governe d b y l a w an d emp l oyees therein sha ll not stri k e f or the purpose o f se c uring c hanges [ thereto ].'' ( I bi d., p . 69 8)

( J acinto v. Court of App e als, 2 81 SCRA 6 5 7, No v. 14 , 199 7, En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

161. P etitioners pu bl i c s c hoo l tea c hers w a lk e d out o f their cl asses an d engage d in mass a c tions d uring c ertain d ates in S eptem ber 1990 protesting the a ll ege d un l a wf u l w ithho ld ing o f their sa l aries an d other e c onomi c b ene f its . T hey a l so raise d nationa l issues , su c h as the remova l o f U S bases an d the repu d iation o f f oreign d e bts , in their mass a c tions . T hey



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re f use d to return to w or k d espite or d ers to d o so an d su bse q uent l y w ere f oun d gui l ty o f c on d u c t pre j u d i c ia l to the best interests o f the servi c e f or having a bsente d themse l ves w ithout proper authority , f rom their s c hoo l s d uring regu l ar s c hoo l d ays , an d pena l ize d. T hey d enie d that they engage d in stri k e but cl aime d that they mere l y exer c ise d a c onstitutiona ll y guarantee d right the right to pea c ea bl y assem bl e an d petition the government f or re d ress o f grievan c es - an d, there f ore , shou ld not have been pena l ize d. S hou ld their c ontention be

uphe ld ?

Held: Pe titione rs, who ar e pub lic schoolt e ache rs an d thus gov e rnme nt e mployee s, donot s eek to e stab lish that th e y hav e a right to stri ke . Rath e r, the y t e naciously insist that th e irabs e nce s during ce rtain dat e s in Se pt e mbe r 1 99 0 we re a va lid exe rcise of the ir constitutiona l right to e ngag e in pe acef ul ass e mbly to p e tition th e gove rnme nt f or a r ed re ss o f grie vance s.The y claim that th e ir gath e ring was not a stri ke, the ref ore, the ir parti cipation th e re in did not constitut e any o ffe nse . M PSTA v. L aguio ( Supra , pe r Narvasa , J. , now CJ. ) and ACT v. Carino( I bid. ) , in which this Court decl ared that "the se 'mass a ctions ' we re to a ll int e nts an d purpos e s astrike ; th e y constitut ed a conce rt ed and unauthoriz ed stoppag e of, or abs e nce f rom, work whichit was th e t e ache rs ' duty to p e rf orm , unde rta ke n f or e sse ntially economic re asons ," shou ld not principally re solve the pre se nt case, as th e unde rlying f acts ar e alle gedly not i de ntical.

Strike, as def ined by law, me ans any t e mporary stoppag e of work done by th e conce rt ed action o f e mployee s as a r e su lt o f an in dustria l or labor disput e . A labor disput e include s anycontrov e rsy or matt e r conce rning t e rms an d conditions o f e mployme nt; or th e asso ciation orre pre se ntation o f pe rsons in n e gotiating , f ixing, maintaining , changing or arranging th e t e rmsand conditions o f e mployme nt , re gar dle ss o f whe the r th e disputants stan d in th e proximat e relation o f e mploye rs an d e mployee s. With th e se pre mise s, we now e valuat e the circumstan ce sof the instant p e tition.

I t cannot b e de nied that th e mass a ction or ass e mbly stag ed by th e pe titione rs r e sult ed in th e non -holding o f class e s in s e ve ral pub lic schoo ls during th e corre spon ding p e riod.Pe titione rs do not disput e that th e grie vance s f or which th e y sought r ed re ss conce rned the alle ged f ailure of pub lic authoriti e s - e sse ntially, the ir "e mploye rs" - to f ully an d just ly imple me nt ce rtain laws an d me asur e s int e nded to b e nef it th e m mat e rially x x x. And probab ly to clothe the ir action with p e rmissible chara ct e r ( I n justif ying th e ir mass a ctions , pe titione rs like n th e iractivity to th e pro-bas e s ra lly led by f orme r Pre side nt Corazon C. Aquino on Se pt e mbe r 1 0, 1 99 1 , participat ed in, as well, by pub lic school t e ache rs who cons e que nt ly abs e nt ed the mselve s f romthe ir class e s. No a dministrative charg e s we re alle gedly institut ed against any o f the participants. ) , the y a lso rais ed nationa l issue s su ch as th e re mova l of the U.S. bas e s an d the re pudiation o f f ore ign de bt. I n B alingasan v. Court o f Appe als ( G .R. No. 1 2 4 678 , July 3 1 , 1 997 , pe r Re ga lado, J. ) , howe ve r, this Court sai d that th e f act that th e conve ntiona l t e rm "strike " wasnot us ed by th e parti cipants to de scribe the ir common cours e of action was insigni f icant , since the substan ce of the situation , and not its app e aran ce, was dee med contro lling.

More ove r, the pe titione rs h e re x x x we re not p e na lized f or th e exe rcise of the ir right toass e mble pe acef ully an d to p e tition th e gove rnme nt f or a r ed re ss o f grie vance s. Rath e r, the Civil

Se rvice Commission f ound the m gui lty o f conduct pr ejudicial to th e be st int e re st o f the se rvice f orhaving abs e nt ed the mselve s without prop e r authority , f rom th e ir schools during r e gular s choo l days , in orde r to parti cipat e in th e mass prot e st , the ir abs e nce ineluctab ly re sulting in th e non -holding o f class e s an d in th e de privation o f stu de nts o f ed ucation , f or which th e y we re re sponsib le . H ad pe titione rs avai led the mselve s o f the ir f ree time - rece ss , af t e r class e s, weeke nds or ho lidays - to dramatiz e the ir grie vance s an d to dialogue with th e prop e r authoriti e swithin th e boun ds o f law, no on e - not th e D E C S, the C SC or e ve n this Court - could have held the m liable f or th e valid exe rcise of the ir constitutiona lly guarant eed rights. As it was , the t e mporary stoppag e of class e s r e su lting f rom th e ir activity nece ssari ly disrupt ed pub lic se rvice s, the ve ry e vil sought to b e f ore sta lled by th e prohibition against stri ke s by gov e rnme nt worke rs.The ir a ct by th e ir natur e was e n joined by th e Civil Se rvice law, rule s an d re gulations , f or whichthe y must , the ref ore, be made ans we rab le . ( J acinto v. CA, 2 81 SCRA 6 5 7, No v. 14 , 199 7, En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

The Non- Imp ai rme nt C la use

1 62. I s the c onstitutiona l prohi bition against impairing c ontra c tua l o bl igations a bso l ute?

Held: 1 . N or is th e re me rit in th e claim that th e re solution an d me moran dum circularviolat e the contra ct claus e of the Bill of Rights.



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The exec utive orde r cre ating th e POE A was e nact ed to f urth e r imp le me nt th e social justice provisions o f the 1 9 73 Constitution , which hav e bee n gr e at ly e nhan ced and expan ded inthe 1 9 87 Constitution by p lacing th e m un de r a s e parat e Article ( Article X III) . The Article onSocial Justice was apt ly de scribed as th e "he art o f the new Chart e r" by th e Pre side nt o f the 1 9 86 Constitutiona l Commission , re tired Justice Cec ilia Munoz Palma. Social justice is ide ntif ied with

the broa d scope of the police powe r of the stat e and require s th e ex t e nsive use of such po we r. X x x.

The constitutiona l prohibition against impairing contra ctua l obligations is not abso lut e and is not to b e re ad with lit e ral exactne ss. I t is r e strict ed to contra cts with re spec t to prop e rtyor som e ob ject o f value and which confe r rights that may b e ass e rt ed in a court o f justice ; it hasno app lication to statut e s relating to pub lic sub jects within th e domain o f the ge ne ra l le gislative powe rs o f the Stat e and involving th e pub lic rights an d pub lic welf are of the e ntire communityaffec t ed by it. I t doe s not pr e ve nt a prop e r exe rcise by th e Stat e of its po lice powe r by e nactingre gulations r e asonab ly nece ssary to s ecure the he alth , sa fe ty, mora ls, comf ort , or g e ne ral welf are of the community , e ve n though contra cts may th e re by be affec t ed, f or su ch matt e rscannot b e placed by contra ct b e yond the powe r of the Stat e to r e gulat e and contro l the m.

Ve rily, the f reed om to contra ct is not abso lut e ; a ll contra cts an d all rights ar e sub ject tothe police powe r o f the Stat e and not on ly may r e gulations which a ffec t th e m b e e stab lished bythe Stat e, but a ll such r e gulations must b e sub ject to chang e f rom tim e to tim e, as th e ge ne ra l well-be ing o f the community may r eq uire, or as th e circumstan ce s may chang e, or as expe rie nce may de monstrat e the nece ssity. And unde r th e Civil Code, contra cts o f labor ar e explicit lysub ject to th e police powe r o f the Stat e becaus e the y are not or dinary contra cts but ar e impre ssed with pub lic int e re st. Article 1 700 the re of expre ss ly provide s:

Art. 1 700 . The relations b e t wee n capita l and labor ar e not m e rely contra ctua l.The y are so impr e ssed with pub lic int e re st that labor contra cts must yi eld to th e commongood. The ref ore, such contra cts ar e sub ject to th e spec ial laws on labor unions , collective bargaining , strike s an d lockouts , closed shop , wage s, working conditions , hoursof labor an d similar sub jects.

The cha lle nged re so lution an d me moran dum circular b e ing va lid imple me ntations o f E.O.N o. 79 7 ( Cre ating th e POE A ) , which was e nact ed unde r th e police powe r o f the Stat e, the ycannot b e stru ck down on th e groun d that th e y violat e the contra ct claus e . To ho ld othe rwise isto a lt e r long -e stab lished constitutiona l doctrine and to subor dinat e the police powe r to th e contra ct claus e . (Th e Conf e r e nc e of Maritim e Manning Age nci e s, Inc . v. POEA, 2 4 3 SCRA 666, April 2 1 , 1995 [ Da v id e , J r .] )

2 . Pe titione rs pray that th e pre se nt a ction shou ld be barr ed, becaus e privat e re spon de nts hav e voluntari ly exec ut ed quit claims an d rele as e s an d rece ived the ir se paration pay.Pe titione rs claim that th e pre se nt suit is a "grav e de rogation o f the f undame nta l principle that obligations arising f rom a va lid contra ct hav e the f orce of law be t wee n th e parti e s an d must b e

comp lied with in goo d f aith. "

The Court disagr ee s. Jurispru de nce holds that th e constitutiona l guarant ee of non -impairme nt o f contra ct is sub ject to th e police powe r o f the stat e and to r e asonab le le gislative re gulations promoting h e alth , mora ls, sa fe ty an d welf are . N ot a ll quit claims ar e pe r s e invalid oragainst pub lic policy, exce pt (1 ) whe re the re is cle ar proo f that th e waive r was wang led f rom anunsusp ec ting or gu llible pe rson , or (2 ) whe re the t e rms o f se tt le me nt ar e uncons cionab le on th e irf ace . In th e se case s, the law will st e p in to annu l the que stionab le transa ctions. Such quit claimand rele as e agree me nts ar e re garded as in effec tive to bar th e worke rs f rom claiming th e f ull me asur e of the ir le ga l rights.

In th e case at bar , the privat e re spon de nts agr eed to th e quit claim an d rele ase inconside ration o f the ir se paration pay. Since the y we re dismissed alle gedly f or busin e ss loss e s, the y are e ntit led to s e paration pay un de r Article 2 83 of the Labor Code . And since the re wasthus no ex tra conside ration f or th e privat e re spon de nts to giv e up th e ir e mployme nt , suchunde rta kings cannot b e allowed to bar th e action f or ille ga l dismissa l. (Bogo -Me d e llin Sugarcan e Plant e rs Association, Inc . v. NLRC, 2 9 6 SCRA 1 0 8 , 1 2 4 , [ Pangani b an ] )

3. On ly slight ly le ss abstra ct but non e thele ss hypoth e tical is th e cont e ntion o f CREB A that th e imposition o f the V AT on th e sa le s an d le ase s o f re al e stat e by virtu e of contra ctse nt e red prior to th e effec tivity of the law would violat e the constitutiona l provision that "N o law



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impairing th e obligation o f contra cts sha ll be pass ed ." It is e nough to say that th e parti e s to acontra ct cannot , through th e exe rcise of proph e tic disce rnme nt , fe tt e r th e exe rcise of the taxingpowe r o f the Stat e . For not on ly ar e existing laws r e ad into contra cts in or de r to f ix obligationsas b e t wee n parti e s, but th e re se rvation o f e sse ntial attribut e s o f sove re ign po we r is a lso r e ad into contra cts as a basi c postu lat e of the le ga l orde r. Th e policy o f prot ec ting contra cts against impairme nt pr e suppos e s th e maint e nan ce of a gov e rnme nt which re tains a deq uat e authority to

secure the pe ace and good orde r o f socie ty.

In truth , the Contra ct Claus e has n e ve r bee n thought as a limitation on th e exe rcise of the Stat e's po we r o f taxation sav e only whe re a ta x exe mption has b ee n grant ed f or a va lid conside ration. X x x. (Tol e ntino v. S e cr e tary of F inanc e , 23 5 SCRA 630, 6 85- 6 8 6, Aug .2 5 , 1994 , En Banc [ Me ndo z a ] )

4. Since timbe r lice nse s ar e not contra cts , the non -impairme nt claus e x x x cannot b e invoked .

X x x, e ve n if it is to b e assum ed that th e sam e are contra cts , the instant case doe s not involve a law or e ve n an exec utive issuan ce decl aring th e cancellation or mo dif ication o f existingtimbe r lice nse s. He nce, the non -impairme nt claus e cannot as y e t b e invoked . N e ve rthele ss , granting f urth e r that a law has a ctua lly bee n pass ed man dating cancellations or mo dif ications , the sam e cannot sti ll be stigmatiz ed as a vio lation o f the non -impairme nt claus e . This is b ecaus e by its v e ry natur e and purpos e, such a law could have only bee n pass ed in th e exe rcise of the police powe r o f the stat e f or th e purpos e of advancing th e right o f the pe ople to a ba lanced and he althf ul ecology, promoting th e ir he alth an d e nhan cing th e ir ge ne ral welf are . X x x.

In short , the non -impairme nt claus e must yi eld to th e police powe r o f the stat e .

Finally, it is diff icult to imagin e x x x how the non -impairme nt claus e could app ly withre spec t to th e pray e r to e n join th e re spon de nt Sec re tary f rom r ece iving, acce pting , proce ssing , re new ing or approving n ew timbe r lice nse f or, save in case s o f re newal, no contra ct would have as y e t exist ed in th e othe r instan ce s. More ove r, with r e spec t to r e newal, the holde r is not e ntit led to it as a matt e r o f right. (Oposa v. F actoran, J r ., 22 4 SCRA 7 9 2 [199 3 ] )

5 . Ane nt p e titione rs ' cont e ntion that th e f orcible ref und of ince ntive be nef its is anunconstitutiona l impairme nt o f a contra ctua l obligation , su ff ice it to stat e that "[n]ot a ll contra ctse nt e red into by th e gove rnme nt will ope rat e as a waive r o f its non -suabi lity; distinction must b e made be t wee n its sov e re ign an d propri e tary a cts. Th e acts invo lved in this cas e are gove rnme nta l. Be side s, the Court is in agr ee me nt with th e Solicitor Ge ne ral that th e ince ntive pay or b e nef it is in th e natur e of a bonus which is not a de man dab le or e nf orce ab le obligation.(Bla q u e ra v. Alcala, 2 95 SCRA 366, 44 6, S e pt . 11 , 1998 , En Banc [ Purisima ] )

T he I n -Custodial I n ve stigation Rig h ts of an Accus e d P e rson

163. S tate the pro c e d ure , gui d e l ines an d d uties w hi c h the arresting , d etaining , inviting , or investigating o ff i c er or his c ompanions must d o an d o bserve at the time o f ma k ing an arrest an d again at an d d uring the time o f the c usto d ia l interrogation .

Held: Last ly, conside ring th e he avy p e na lty o f de ath an d in orde r to e nsur e that th e e vide nce against an a ccused we re obtain ed through lawf ul me ans , the Court , as guar dian o f the rights o f the pe ople lays down th e proced ure, guidel ine s an d dutie s which th e arre sting , de taining , inviting, or inve stigating o ff ice r or his companions must do an d obs e rve at th e time of making an arr e st an d again at an d during th e time of the custo dial int e rrogation in a ccordance with th e Constitution , jurispru de nce and Re pub lic Act N o. 7438 ( An Act Def ining Ce rtain Rights o f P e rson Arre st ed, De tained or U nde r Custo dial I nve stigation as well as th e D utie s o f the Arre sting , De taining , and I nve stigating O ff ice rs an d Providing P e na ltie s f or V iolations T he re of ) . I t is high -time to ed ucat e our law-e nf orce me nt ag e ncie s who n e glect e ithe r by ignoran ce or indiffe re nce the so -called M iranda rights which ha d become insuff icie nt an d which th e Court must up dat e inthe light o f new le ga l de velopme nts :

1 ) The pe rson arr e st ed, de tained, invit ed or un de r custo dial inve stigation must b e inf ormed in a languag e known to an d unde rstoo d by him o f the re ason f or th e arre st and he must b e sho wn th e warrant o f arre st , if any. Ev e ry oth e r warnings , inf ormation or communi cation must b e in a languag e known to an d unde rstoo d bysaid pe rson;



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2 ) He must b e warned that h e has a right to r e main si le nt an d that any stat e me nt h e make s may b e used as e vide nce against him;

3) He must b e inf ormed that h e has th e right to b e assist ed at a ll time s an d have the pre se nce of an in de pe nde nt an d compe t e nt lawye r, prefe rab ly of his o wn choice ;

4) He must b e inf ormed that i f he has no lawye r or cannot a ff ord the se rvice s o f alawye r, one will be provided f or him; an d that a lawye r may a lso b e e ngag ed by any

pe rson in his b e ha lf, or may b e appoint ed by th e court upon p e tition o f the pe rsonarre st ed or on e acting on his b e ha lf ;5 ) That whe the r or not th e pe rson arr e st ed has a lawye r, he must b e inf ormed that no

custo dial inve stigation in any f orm sha ll be conduct ed exce pt in th e pre se nce of hiscouns el of af t e r a va lid waive r has b ee n ma de ;

6 ) The pe rson arr e st ed must b e inf ormed that , at any tim e, he has th e right tocommuni cat e or confe r by th e most exped ie nt m e ans - t ele phon e, radio, le tt e r orme sse nge r - with his lawye r (e ithe r re tained or appoint ed ), any m e mbe r o f hisimmed iat e f amily, or any m ed ical doctor , prie st or minist e r chos e n by him or by anyone f rom his imm ed iat e f amily or by his couns el, or b e visit ed by/ confe r with dulyaccred it ed nationa l or int e rnationa l non -gove rnme nt organization. It sha ll be the re sponsibi lity of the off ice r to e nsur e that this is a ccomplished ;

7) He must b e inf ormed that h e has th e right to waive any o f said rights provi ded it ismade voluntari ly, knowingly an d int ellige nt ly an d e nsur e that h e unde rstoo d the sam e ;

8) In a dd ition, if the pe rson arr e st ed waive s his right to a lawye r, he must b e inf ormed that it must b e done in writing an d in th e pre se nce of couns el, othe rwise, he must be warned that th e waive r is void e ve n if he insist on his waive r an d choos e s tospe ak;

9) That th e pe rson arr e st ed must b e inf ormed that h e may in dicat e in any mann e r at any tim e or stag e of the proce ss that h e doe s not wish to b e que stioned withwarning that on ce he make s su ch indication , the police may not int e rrogat e him if the sam e had not y e t comme nced, or th e int e rrogation must ce as e if it has a lre adybe gun;

1 0) The pe rson arr e st ed must b e inf ormed that his initia l waive r o f his right to r e mainsile nt , the right to couns el or any o f his rights doe s not bar him f rom invo king it at any tim e during th e proce ss , re gardle ss o f whe the r he may hav e ans we red some que stions or vo lunt ee red some stat e me nts;

11 ) He must a lso b e inf ormed that any stat e me nt or e vide nce, as th e case may b e, obtain ed in violation o f any o f the f ore going, whe the r in culpatory or exculpatory , inwhole or in part , sha ll be admissible in e vide nce .

(P e opl e v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 , Feb. 1 , 1999 , En Banc [ P e r Curiam ] )

16 4 . E xp l ain the k in d o f in f ormation that is re q uire d to be given by l a w en f or c ement o ff i c ers to suspe c t d uring c usto d ia l investigation .

Held: [I]t is s e tt led that on e s right to be inf ormed of the right to r e main si le nt an d tocouns el cont e mplat e s th e transmission o f me aning f ul inf ormation rath e r just th e ce re monia l and

pe rf unctory r ec itation o f an abstra ct constitutiona l principle . It is not e nough f or th e int e rrogatorto m e rely re pe at to th e pe rson un de r inve stigation th e provisions o f Sec tion 12 , Article III o f the 1 9 87 Constitution; th e f orme r must a lso explain th e effec ts o f such provision in pra ctical t e rms e .g. , what th e pe rson un de r inve stigation may or may not do an d in a languag e the sub ject f airly un de rstan ds. Th e right to b e inf ormed carrie s with it a correlative obligation on th e part o f the police inve stigator to explain, and cont e mplat e s effec tive communi cation which r e su lts in th e sub ject s unde rstan ding o f what is conve yed . Since it is compr e he nsion that is sought to b e attain ed, the de gree of explanation r eq uired will nece ssari ly vary an d de pe nd on th e ed ucation , int ellige nce, and othe r rele vant p e rsona l circumstan ce s o f the pe rson un de rgoing inv e stigation.In f urth e r e nsuring th e right to couns el, it is not e nough that th e sub ject is in f ormed of suchright; h e shou ld also b e asked if he wants to avai l of the sam e and shou ld be told that h e could ask f or couns el if he so de sired or that on e could be provided him at his r eq ue st. I f he dec ide snot to r e tain a couns el of his choice or avai l of one to b e provided f or him an d, the ref ore, choos e s to waive his right to couns el, such waive r, to b e valid and effec tive, must sti ll be made with th e assistan ce of couns el, who, unde r pr e vailing jurispru de nce, must b e a lawye r. (P e op lev. Canoy, 32 8 SCRA 3 85 , March 1 7, 2000, 1 st Di v. [ Da v i de , C J] )

1 6 5 . W hat is the meaning o f c ompetent c ounse l un d er S e c tion 12 o f the B i ll o f R ights?

Held: The me aning o f compe t e nt couns el was explained in P e ople v . De nie ga (2 5 1SCRA 626, 637 ) as f ollows:



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x x x [T]he lawye r called to b e pre se nt during su ch inve stigation shou ld be asf ar as r e asonab ly possib le, the choice of the individua l unde rgoing que stioning. I f the lawye r we re one f urnish ed in th e accused s be ha lf, it is important that h e shou ld be compe t e nt an d inde pe nde nt , i.e ., that h e is willing to f ully sa fe guar d the constitutiona l rights o f the accused, as distinguish ed f rom on e who would me rely b e giving a routin e,

pe re mptory an d me aning le ss r ec ital of the individua l s rights. In P e ople v. B asay (219 SCRA4 0 4 , 4 18 ) , this Court str e ssed that an a ccused s right to be inf ormed of the right tore main si le nt an d to couns el cont e mplat e s th e transmission o f me aning f ul inf ormationrath e r than just th e ce re monia l and pe rf unctory r ec itation o f an abstra ct constitutiona l principle .

Ide ally th e ref ore, a lawye r e ngag ed f or an in dividua l f acing custo dial inve stigation (i f the latt e r could not a ff ord one ) should be e ngag ed by th e accused (himself ) , or by th e latt e r s relative or p e rson authoriz ed by him to e ngag e an attorn e y orby th e court , upon prop e r p e tition o f the accused or p e rson authoriz ed by th e accused tof ile such p e tition. Lawye rs e ngag ed by th e police, what e ve r t e stimonia ls ar e give n asproo f of the ir probity an d suppos ed inde pe nde nce, are ge ne ra lly susp ec t , as in manyare as , the relationship b e t wee n lawye rs an d law e nf orce me nt authoriti e s can b e symbiotic.

x x x The compe t e nt or in de pe nde nt lawye r so e ngag ed shou ld be pre se nt f romthe be ginning to e nd, i.e ., at a ll stag e s o f the int e rview, couns eling or a dvising cautionre asonab ly at e ve ry turn o f the inve stigation , and stopping th e int e rrogation on ce in awhile e ithe r to giv e advice to th e accused that h e may e ithe r continu e, choos e to r e mainsile nt or t e rminat e the int e rview .

(P e opl e v. Espiritu, 302 SCRA 5 33, Feb. 2, 1999 , 3 rd Di v. [ Pangani b an ] )

166. C an a PAO l a w yer be c onsi d ere d an in d epen d ent c ounse l w ithin the c ontemp l ation o f S e c tion 12, Arti cl e III , 1987 C onstitution?

Held: In P eop l e v . Ora c oy , 22 4 SCRA 7 5 9 [1993]; P eop l e v . B a nd u l a , 232 SCRA 5 66 [199 4 ], th e SC ha s h e ld th a t a PAO l awyer c a n b e c o nsid ere d a n ind epe nd e nt c ou nse l within th e c o nt e mp l a tio n of the C o nstit u tio n c o nsid er ing th a t h e is no t a spe cia l c ou nse l, pu blic or pr iva t e pro se c u t or , c ou nse l of the po lic e , or a mu nicipa l a tt or ney who se int ere st is a dmitt e dl y a d ver se t o tha t of the a cc u se d -appe ll a nt. Th u s, th e a ssist a nc e of a PAO l awyer sa tisf ie s th e c o nstit u tio na l requ ire me nt of a c o mpe t e nt a nd ind epe nd e nt c ou nse l for the a cc u se d. (P e op le v. Bacor, 306 SCRA 5 22, Apri l 30, 1999 , 2 n d Di v. [ Me n d o z a ] )

167. I s the c on f ession o f an a cc use d given spontaneous l y , f ree l y an d vo l untari l y to the M ayor a d missi bl e in evi d en c e , c onsi d ering that the M ayor has operationa l supervision an d c ontro l over the l o c a l po l i c e an d may argua bl y be d eeme d a l a w en f or c ement o ff i c er?

Held: While it is tru e that a muni cipal mayor has op e rationa l sup e rvision an d contro l

ove r th e local police and may arguab ly be dee med a law e nf orce me nt o ff ice r f or purpos e s o f app lying Sec tion 12 (1 ) an d (3) o f Article III o f the Constitution , howe ve r, app ellant s confe ssionto th e mayor was not ma de in re spons e to any int e rrogation by th e latt e r. In f act , the mayor did not que stion th e app ellant at a ll. N o po lice authority or de red app ellant to ta lk to th e mayor. It was app ellant hims elf who spontan e ous ly, f reely an d voluntari ly sought th e mayor f or a privat e mee ting. Th e mayor did not know that app ellant was going to confe ss his gui lt to him. Wh e napp ellant ta lked with th e mayor as a conf idant an d not as a law e nf orce me nt o ff ice r, hisuncouns elled confe ssion to him did not vio lat e his constitutiona l rights. Thus , it has b ee n h eld that th e constitutiona l proced ure s on custo dial inve stigation do not app ly to a spontan e ousstat e me nt , not elicit ed through que stioning by th e authoriti e s, but giv e n in an or dinary mann e rwhe re by app ellant ora lly admitt ed having committ ed the crime . What th e Constitution bars is th e compu lsory disclosur e of incriminating f acts or confe ssions. Th e rights un de r Sec tion 12 are guarant eed to pr eclude the slight e st us e of coe rcion by th e Stat e as would le ad the accused toadmit som e thing f alse, not to pr e ve nt him f rom f reely an d voluntari ly t elling th e truth. (P e op lev. An d an, 26 9 SCRA 95 , March 3, 199 7)

1 68. Are c on f essions ma d e in response to q uestions by ne w s reporters a d missi bl e in evi d en c e?

Answer: Y e s. Confe ssions ma de in re spons e to que stions by n ew s re port e rs, not bythe police or any oth e r inve stigating o ff ice r, are admissible . In P e ople v. V izcarra , 115 S CRA 7 4 3 ,



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7 5 2 [1982], whe re the accused , un de r custo dy, gav e spontan e ous ans we rs to a t ele vised int e rview by s e ve ral pre ss r e port e rs in th e off ice of the chief of the CIS, it was h eld that stat e me nts spontan e ous ly ma de by a susp ec t to n ews re port e rs on a t ele vised int e rview are dee med voluntary an d are admissible in e vide nce . In P e opl e v. Andan, 26 9 SCRA 95 , March 3, 199 7 , it was h eld that app ellant s confe ssions to th e new s r e port e rs we re give n f ree f rom anyundue influe nce f rom th e police authoriti e s. Th e new s re port e rs a ct ed as n ew s re port e rs whe n

the y int e rviewed app ellant. Th e y we re not a cting un de r th e direc tion an d contro l of the police .The y did not f orce app ellant to grant th e m an int e rview and ree nact th e commission o f the crime .In f act, th e y as ked his pe rmission b ef ore int e rview ing him. Th e Supre me Court f urth e r ru led that app ellant s ve rba l confe ssions to th e new sme n ar e not cove red by Sec tion 12 (1 ) an d (3) o f Article III o f the Constitution an d, th e ref ore , a dmissible in e vide nce .

1 69. Dis c uss the t w o k in d s o f invo l untary or c oer c e d c on f essions un d er S e c tion 12, Arti cl e III o f the 1987 C onstitution . I ll ustrate ho w the C ourt shou ld appre c iate sai d invo l untary or c oer c e d c on f essions .

Held: The re are t wo kinds o f involuntary or coe rced confe ssions tr e at ed in thisconstitutiona l provision: (1 ) thos e which ar e the product o f third de gree me thods su ch as tortur e, f orce, viole nce, thre at , intimidation , which ar e de alt with in paragraph 2 of Sec tion 12 , and (2 )thos e which ar e give n without th e be nef it of M iranda warnings , which ar e the sub ject o f paragraph 1 of the sam e Sec tion 12 .

Accused- app ellant claims that his confe ssion was obtain ed by f orce and thre at. Aside f rom this bar e ass e rtion, he has sho wn no proo f of the use of f orce and viole nce on him. H e did not s eek med ical tre atm e nt nor e ve n a physi cal examination. His a lle gation that th e f act that h e was ma de to sign th e confe ssion f ive time s is proo f that h e ref used to sign it.

X x x

We disce rn no sign that th e confe ssion was invo luntari ly exec ut ed f rom th e f act that it was sign ed by a ccused- app ellant f ive time s.

X x x

Extra judicial confe ssions ar e pre sumed voluntary , and, in th e abs e nce of conclusive e vide nce sho wing th e decl arant s conse nt in exec uting th e sam e has b ee n vitiat ed, suchconfe ssion will be sustain ed .

More ove r, the confe ssion contains de tails that on ly the pe rpe trator o f the crime could have give n. X x x. It has b ee n h eld that vo luntarin e ss o f a confe ssion may b e infe rred f rom itsbe ing re ple t e with de tails which could possib ly be supp lied only by th e accused, reflec tingspontan e ity an d cohe re nce which cannot b e said of a min d on which viole nce and tortur e have bee n app lied . Whe n th e de tails narrat ed in an ex tra judicial confe ssion ar e such that th e y could not hav e bee n concoct ed by on e who did not ta ke part in th e acts narrat ed, whe re the claim o f

ma ltre atm e nt in th e extra ction o f the confe ssion is unsubstantiat ed and whe re abun dant e vide nce ex ists sho wing that th e stat e me nt was vo luntari ly exec ut ed, the confe ssion is a dmissible against th e decl arant. Th e re is gre at e r re ason f or f inding a confe ssion to b e voluntary whe re it iscorroborat ed by e vide nce aliunde which dove tails with th e e sse ntia l f acts contain ed in su chconfe ssion.

But what r e nde rs th e confe ssion o f accused- app ellant ina dmissible is the f act that accused- app ellant was not giv e n th e M iranda warnings effec tively. Unde r th e Constitution , anuncouns eled stat e me nt , such as it is called in th e Unit ed Stat e s f rom which Article III , Sec tion12 (1 ) was de rived, is pre sum ed to b e psychologically coe rced . Swe pt into an un f amiliare nvironme nt an d surroun ded by intimidating f igure s typi cal of the atmosph e re of police int e rrogation , the susp ec t re ally need s th e guiding han d of couns el.

N ow, unde r th e f irst paragraph o f this provision , it is req uired that th e susp ec t incusto dial int e rrogation must b e give n th e f ollowing warnings : (1 ) h e must b e inf ormed of hisright to r e main si le nt; (2 ) h e must b e warn ed that anything h e says can an d will be used against him; an d (3) h e must b e told that h e has a right to couns el, and that i f he is indige nt , a lawye rwill be appoint ed to r e pre se nt him.

X x x



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The re was thus on ly a p e rf unctory r e ading o f the M iranda rights to a ccused- app ellant without any eff ort to f ind out f rom him whe the r h e want ed to hav e couns el and, if so , whe the rhe had his o wn couns el or h e want ed the police to appoint on e f or him. This kind of giving o f warnings , in se ve ral dec isions o f this Court , has b ee n f ound to b e me rely ce re monia l and inadeq uat e to transmit m e aning f ul inf ormation to th e susp ec t. Esp ec ially in this case, care shou ld have bee n s crupu lous ly obs e rved by th e police inve stigator that a ccused- app ellant was

spec if ically as ked the se que stions conside ring that h e only f inished the f ourth gra de of the ele me ntary s choo l. X x x

More ove r, Article III, Sec tion 12 (1 ) req uire s that couns el assisting susp ec ts in custo dial int e rrogations b e compe t e nt an d inde pe nde nt. H e re, accused- app ellant was assist ed by Atty. D e los Re ye s, who, though pr e sumab ly compe t e nt , cannot b e conside red an inde pe nde nt couns elas cont e mplat ed by th e law f or th e re ason that h e was station comman de r o f the WPD at th e time he assist ed accused- app ellant. X x x.

This is e rror. As obs e rved in Pe ople v. B andula (2 3 2 SCRA 5 66 [ 1 99 4 ]), the inde pe nde nt couns el req uired by Article III , Sec tion 12 (1 ) cannot b e spec ial couns el, pub lic or privat e pros ecutor , municipal attorn e y, or couns el of the police whos e int e re st is a dmitt edly adve rse tothe accused . In this case, Atty. D e los Re ye s, as PC Captain an d Station Comman de r o f the WPD, was part o f the police f orce who could not b e expec t ed to hav e effec tively an d scrupu lous lyassist ed accused- app ellant in th e inve stigation. To a llow such a happ e nstan ce would re nde rillusory th e prot ec tion giv e n to th e susp ec t during custo dial inve stigation. (P e opl e v. O b r e ro, 332 SCRA 19 0, 220 20 8 , May 1 7, 2000, 2 nd Di v. [ Me ndo z a ] )

170. W hat are the re q uirements f or an extra -j u d i c ia l c on f ession o f an a cc use d to be a d missi bl e in evi d en c e?

Held: 1 . In jurispru de nce, no confe ssion can b e admitt ed in e vide nce unle ss it is giv e n:

1 ) Freel y an d voluntari ly, without compu lsion, induce me nt or tri cke ry;2 ) Knowingly bas ed on an effec tive communi cation to th e individua l unde r custo dial

inve stigation o f his constitutiona l rights; an d 3) Int ellige nt ly with f ull appr ec iation o f its importan ce and compr e he nsion o f its

cons eq ue nce s.

Once admitt ed, the confe ssion must inspir e cred ibility or b e one which th e norma l expe rie nce of man kind can a cce pt as b e ing within th e re alm o f probabi lity.

A confe ssion m ee ting a ll the f ore going r eq uisit e s constitut e s e vide nce of a high or de rsince it is support ed by th e strong pr e sumption that no p e rson o f norma l mind will knowingly, f reel y an d del ibe rat ely confe ss that h e is the pe rpe trator o f a crime unle ss prompt ed by truth an d cons cie nce . Whe n a ll the se req uire me nts ar e me t an d the confe ssion is a dmitt ed in e vide nce, the burde n o f proo f that it was obtain ed by un due pre ssur e, thre at or intimi dation r e sts upon th e accused . (P e opl e v. F a b ro, 277 SCRA 19 , Aug . 11 , 199 7 [ Pangani b an ] )

2 . N ume rous dec isions o f this Court ru le that f or an ex tra judicial confe ssion to b e admissible, it must b e: 1 ) vo luntary; 2 ) ma de with th e assistan ce of compe t e nt an d inde pe nde nt couns el; 3) expre ss; an d 4) in writing.

The mant le of prot ec tion a ff orded by th e abov e-q uot ed constitutiona l provision cove rsthe pe riod f rom th e time a p e rson is ta ke n into custo dy f or th e inve stigation o f his possib le participation in th e commission o f a crime or f rom th e time he is sing led out as a susp ec t in th e commission o f the offe nse although not y e t in custo dy. Th e exclusionary ru le is pre mised on th e pre sumption that th e defe ndant is thrust into an un f amiliar atmosph e re running throughme nacing po lice int e rrogation pro ced ure s whe re the pot e ntia lity f or compu lsion, physical orpsychological is f orcef ully appar e nt.

Howe ve r, the rule is not int e nded as a de t e rre nt to th e accused f rom confe ssing gui lt i f he voluntari ly an d int ellige nt ly so de sire s but to prot ec t th e accused f rom a dmitting what h e iscoe rced to a dmit a lthough untru e . (P e opl e v. Bas e , 32 9 SCRA 158 , 1 6 9-1 7 1 , March 30, 2000, 1 st Di v. [ Ynar e s -Santiago ] )

1 7 1 . I s the c hoi c e o f a l a w yer by a person un d er c usto d ia l investigation w ho c annot a ff or d the servi c es o f a c ounse l excl usive as to pre cl u d e other e q ua ll y c ompetent an d in d epen d ent attorneys f rom han dl ing his d e f ense?



94

Held: It must b e re me mbe red in this r e gard that while the right to couns el isimmutab le, the option to s ecure the se rvice s o f couns el de part e is not abso lut e . In deed

The phras e compe t e nt an d inde pe nde nt and prefe rab ly of his o wn choice we re explicit de tails which we re added upon th e pe rsist e nce of human rights lawye rs in

the 1 9 86 Constitutiona l Commission who point ed out cas e s whe re, during th e martia l law pe riod, the lawye rs ma de availab le to th e de tainee would be one appoint ed by th e military an d the ref ore be holde n to th e military. ( Citing I R ecord of the Constitutiona l Commission 73 1 -73 4 ; I B e rnas , The Constitution o f the R e pub lic of the Philippine s, 1 9 87 1 st ed ., p. 3 4 7 )

X x x x x x x x x

Witha l, the word prefe rab ly unde r Sec tion 12 ( 1 ) , Article 3 o f the 1 9 87 Constitution doe s not conve y th e me ssag e that th e choice of a lawye r by a p e rson un de rinve stigation is exclusive as to pr eclude othe r eq ua lly compe t e nt an d inde pe nde nt attorn e ys f rom han dling his defe nse . I f the rule we re oth e rwise, the n, the t e mpo o f acusto dial inve stigation will be so lely in th e han ds o f the accused who can imp ede, nay , obstru ct th e progr e ss o f the int e rrogation by simp ly selec ting a lawye r who f or on e re ason or anoth e r, is not avai lab le to prot ec t his int e re st. This absur d sce nario could not have bee n cont e mplat ed by th e f rame rs o f the chart e r.

While the initial choice in case s whe re a p e rson un de r custo dial inve stigation cannot aff ord the se rvice s o f a lawye r is natura lly lodged in th e police inve stigators , the accused re allyhas th e f inal choice as h e may r ejec t th e couns el chos e n f or him an d as k f or anoth e r on e . A lawye r provi ded by th e inve stigators is dee med e ngag ed by th e accused whe re he ne ve r rais ed any ob jection against th e f orme r s appointme nt during th e cours e of the inve stigation an d the accused the re af t e r subs cribe s to th e ve racity of his stat e me nt b ef ore the swe aring o ff ice r.

Ve rily, to b e an effec tive couns el [a] lawye r n eed not cha lle nge all the que stions b e ingpropoun ded to his clie nt. Th e pre se nce of a lawye r is not int e nded to stop an a ccused f romsaying anything which might in criminat e him but , rath e r, it was a dopt ed in our Constitution topreclude the slight e st coe rcion as would le ad the accused to a dmit som e thing f alse (P e ople v.L ayuso , 1 7 5 SCR A 4 7 [1 9 89 ] ) . The couns el, howe ve r, shou ld ne ve r pr e ve nt an a ccused f romf reel y an d voluntari ly t elling th e truth. (P e op le v. Bas e , 32 9 SCRA 158 , 1 6 9-1 7 1 , March 30, 2000, 1 st Di v. [ Ynar e s -Santiago ] )

1 7 2 . S hou ld c ourts be a ll o w e d to d istinguish bet w een pre l iminary q uestioning an d c usto d ia l investigation proper w hen app l ying the excl usionary ru l e?

Held: The exclusionary ru le sprang f rom a r ecognition that po lice int e rrogatoryproced ure s lay fe rtile groun ds f or coe rcion, physical and psychological, of the susp ec t to a dmit re sponsibi lity f or th e crime unde r inve stigation. It was not int e nded as a de t e rre nt to th e

accused f rom confe ssing gui lt , if he voluntari ly an d int ellige nt ly so de sire s but to prot ec t th e accused f rom a dmitting what h e is coe rced to a dmit a lthough untru e . Law e nf orce me nt ag e ncie sare req uired to effec tively communi cat e the rights o f a p e rson un de r inve stigation an d to insur e that it is f ully un de rstoo d. Any m e asur e short o f this r eq uire me nt is conside red a de nial of suchright. Courts ar e not a llowed to distinguish b e t wee n pr eliminary que stioning an d custo dial inve stigation prop e r whe n app lying th e exclusionary ru le . Any inf ormation or a dmission giv e n bya p e rson while in custo dy which may app e ar harm le ss or inno cuous at th e time without th e compe t e nt assistan ce of an in de pe nde nt couns el shou ld be stru ck down as ina dmissible . It hasbee n h eld, howe ve r, that an a dmission ma de to n ew s r e port e rs or to a conf idant o f the accused is not cove red by th e exclusionary ru le .

The admission a lle gedly ma de by th e app ellant is not in th e f orm o f a writt e n ex tra - judicial confe ssion; th e admission was a lle gedly ma de to th e arre sting o ff ice r during an in f orma l ta lk at the police station a f t e r his arr e st as a prim e susp ec t in th e rape and killing o f x x x. The arre sting po lice man t e stif ied that th e app ellant a dmitt ed that h e was with th e victim on th e e ve ning o f January 12 , 1 994 , the probab le time of the commission o f the crime and that h e carried he r on his shou lde r but that h e was too drunk to r e me mbe r what subs eq ue nt ly happ e ned .The arre sting po lice man a dmitt ed that h e did not in f orm th e app ellant o f his constitutiona l rightsto r e main si le nt an d to couns el. We not e that th e alle ged admission is in criminating b ecaus e it place s th e accused in th e company o f the victim at th e time the crime was probab ly committ ed .



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The exclusionary ru le app lie s.

The accused was un de r arr e st f or th e rap e and killing o f x x x and any stat e me nt alle gedly ma de by him p e rtaining to his possib le comp licity in th e crime without prior noti f icationof his constitutiona l rights is ina dmissible in e vide nce . The police man s appar e nt att e mpt tocircumve nt th e rule by insisting that th e admission was ma de during an in f orma l ta lk prior to

custo dial inve stigation prior is not t e nab le . The app ellant was not invit ed to th e police station aspart o f a g e ne ral inquiry f or any possib le le ad to th e pe rpe trators o f the crime unde rinve stigation. At th e time the alle ged admission was ma de the app ellant was in custo dy an d had bee n arr e st ed as th e prime susp ec t in th e rape and killing o f x x x. The exclusionary ru le pre sume s that th e alle ged admission was coe rced, the ve ry e vil the rule stan ds to avoi d.Supportiv e of such pr e sumption is th e abs e nce of a writt e n ex tra -judicial confe ssion to that effec t and the app ellant s de nial in court o f the alle ged ora l admission. Th e alle ged admission shou ld be stru ck down as ina dmissible . (P e opl e v. Bra v o, 3 18 SCRA 81 2, No v. 22, 1999 , En Banc [G on z aga -Re y e s ] )

173. E xp l ain the pro c e d ure f or out - o f-c ourt i d enti f i c ation o f suspe c ts an d the test to d etermine the a d missi bi l ity o f su c h i d enti f i c ation .

Held: 1 . In P eop l e v . T eeha nk ee , J r . (2 4 9 SCRA 54 , Oc to ber 6, 1 99 5) , the C o urt x x x exp l a ined the pro c ed ure for o ut-of- c o urt ide nt if ic at io n a nd the te st to deter mine the ad missibilit yof suc h ide nt if ic at io n. I t listed the fo ll ow ing wa ys of ide nt if ying the sus pe c t s dur ing cus tod ia l inve st igat io n: show- up , mug s hot s a nd line-up s. T he C o urt there r ul ed:

x x x. Ou t-of- c o urt ide nt if ic at io n is c o nduc ted by the po lic e in var io us wa ys. I t is do ne thr u s how- up s where the suspe c t a l o ne is b ro ught fa c e to fa c e with the wit ne ssfor ide nt if ic at io n. I t is do ne thr u mug s hot s where photo graph s are show n to the wit ne ssto ide nt if y the sus pe c t . I t is a lso do ne thr u line up s where a wit ne ss ide nt if ie s the sus pe c t fro m a gro up of per so ns lined up for the p urpo se . Sinc e c orr upt io n of o ut-of-c o urt ide nt if ic at io n c o nta minate s the inte gr it y of in c o urt ide nt if ic at io n dur ing the tr ia l of the c a se , c o urt s have fa sh io ned o ut r ul e s to a ssu re it s fa ir ne ss a nd it s c o mp lia nc e with the req uire me nt s of c o ns t it ut io na l due pro c e ss. In re so l v ing the ad missibilit y of a nd re lying o n o ut-of- c o urt ide nt if ic at io n of sus pe c t s, c o urt s have adopted the tota lit y of cir cums ta nc e s te st where the y c o nsider the fo ll owing fa c tor s, v iz: ( 1 ) the wit ne ss opport unit y to v iew the c r imina l at the t ime of the c r ime ; (2 ) the wit ne ss de gree of atte nt io n at that t ime ; ( 3) the a ccura cy of a ny pr ior de sc r ipt io n give n by the wit ne ss; ( 4) the l eve l of c erta int y de mo ns trated by the wit ne ss at the ide nt if ic at io n; ( 5) the l e ngth of t ime betwee n the c r ime a nd the ide nt if ic at io n; a nd (6 ) the sugg e st ive ne ss of the ide nt if ic at io n pro c ed ure . (Ibid., p . 9 5) (P e op le v. Timon, 2 81 SCRA 5 77, No v. 1 2, 199 7 [ Pangani b an ] )

2. x x x. T he tota lit y te st ha s b ee n fa sh io ned pre cise ly to a ssu re fa ir ne ss a s we ll a sc o mp lia nc e with c o ns t it ut io na l req uire me nt s of due pro c e ss in re gard to o ut-of- c o urt ide nt if ic at io n. T he se cited fa c tor s mus t be c o nsidered to preve nt c o nta minat io n of the inte gr it y

of in-c o urt ide nt if ic at io ns b etter . (P e op le v. G am e r, 326 SCRA 660, Feb. 2 9 , 2000, 2 n d

Di v.[Q uisum b ing ] )

1 7 4 . Does the prohi bition f or c usto d ia l investigation c on d u c te d w ithout the assistan c e o f c ounse l exten d to a person in a po l i c e l ine - up? C onse q uent l y , is the i d enti f i c ation by private c omp l ainant o f a cc use d w ho w as not assiste d b y c ounse l d uring po l i c e l ine - up a d missi bl e in evi d en c e?

Held: The prohibition x x x doe s not ex t e nd to a p e rson in a po lice line-up b ecaus e that stag e of an inv e stigation is not y e t a part o f custo dial inve stigation. It has b ee n r e pe at edly h eld that custo dial inve stigation comme nce s whe n a p e rson is ta ke n into custo dy an d is sing led out asa susp ec t in th e commission o f the crime unde r inve stigation an d the police off ice rs b e gin to as k que stions on th e susp ec t s participation th e re in an d which t e nd to elicit an a dmission. Th e stag e of an inv e stigation whe re in a p e rson is as ked to stan d in a po lice line-up has b ee n h eld to b e outside the mant le of prot ec tion o f the right to couns el becaus e it involve s a g e ne ral inquiry intoan unso lved crime and is pur ely inve stigatory in natur e . It has a lso b ee n h eld that anuncouns eled ide ntif ication at th e police line-up doe s not pr eclude the admissibility of an in -court ide ntif ication. Th e ide ntif ication ma de by th e privat e comp lainant in th e police line-up pointing toPavillare as on e of his ab ductors is a dmissible in e vide nce although th e accused- app ellant wasnot assist ed by couns el. X x x (P e op le v. Pa v i llar e , 32 9 SCRA 6 84 , 6 94- 6 95 , Apri l 5 , 2000, En Banc [ P e r Curiam ] )



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17 5 . P etitioner in a c ase x x x posits the theory that sin c e he ha d no c ounse l d uring the c usto d ia l investigation w hen his urine samp l e w as ta k en an d c hemi c a ll y examine d, E xhi bits

L an d M, x x x are a l so ina d missi bl e in evi d en c e sin c e his urine samp l e w as d erive d in e ff e c t f rom an un c ounse ll e d extra -j u d i c ia l c on f ession . P etitioner cl aims that the ta k ing o f his urine samp l e a ll ege dl y vio l ates Arti cl e III , S e c tion 2 o f the C onstitution x x x. S hou ld his

c ontentions be uphe ld ?

Held: We are not p e rsua ded . The right to couns el be gins f rom th e time a p e rson istake n into custo dy an d placed unde r inve stigation f or th e commission o f a crime, i.e ., whe n th e inve stigating o ff ice r starts to as k que stions to elicit inf ormation an d /or confe ssion or a dmissionsf rom th e accused . Such right is guarant eed by th e Constitution an d cannot b e waived exce pt inwriting an d in th e pre se nce of couns el. Howe ve r, what th e Constitution prohibits is th e use of physical or mora l compu lsion to extort communi cation f rom th e accused, but not an in clusion o f his bo dy in e vide nce, whe n it may b e mat e rial. In f act , an a ccused may va lidly b e compelled tobe photograph ed or m e asur ed, or his garm e nts or sho e s re moved or r e placed, or to mov e hisbody to e nab le the f ore going things to b e done, without running a f oul of the pros cription against t e stimonia l compu lsion. Th e situation in th e case at bar f alls within th e exe mption un de r th e f reed om f rom t e stimonia l compu lsion sin ce what was sought to b e examined came f rom th e bodyof the accused . This was a m echani cal act th e accused was ma de to un de rgo which was not me ant to un e arth un disclosed f acts but to as ce rtain physi cal attribut e s de t e rminab le by simp le obs e rvation. In f act , the record sho ws that p e titione r an d his co-accused we re not compelled togive samp le s o f the ir urine but th e y in f act vo luntari ly gav e the sam e whe n th e y we re req ue st ed to un de rgo a drug t e st. ( G utang v. P e op le , 33 5 SCRA 4 7 9 , Ju ly 11 , 2000, 2 n d Di v. [ D eLe on ] )

The Rig h t to Bai l

176. I n bai l app l i c ation w here the a cc use d is c harge d w ith a c apita l o ff ense , w i ll it be proper f or the j u d ge to grant bai l w ithout c on d u c ting hearing i f the prose c utor interposes no o bj e c tion to su c h app l i c ation? W hy?

Held: Jurispru de nce is re ple t e with dec isions compelling judge s to conduct th e req uired he arings in bai l app lications , in which th e accused stan ds charg ed with a capita l offe nse . The abs e nce of ob jection f rom th e pros ecution is n e ve r a basis f or th e grant o f bail in such cas e s, f orthe judge has no right to pr e sume that th e pros ecutor knows what h e is doing on a ccount o f f amiliarity with th e case . "Said re asoning is tantamount to ced ing to th e pros ecutor th e duty o f exe rcising judicial discre tion to de t e rmine whe the r th e guilt o f the accused is strong. Judicial discre tion is th e domain o f the judge bef ore whom th e pe tition f or provisiona l libe rty will be dec ided . The man dat ed duty to exe rcise discre tion has n e ve r bee n re pos ed upon th e pros ecutor. "

Impos ed in B aylon v. Sison (2 4 3 SCRA 28 4 , April 6 , 199 5) was this man datory duty to

conduct a h e aring de spit e the pros ecution 's ref usa l to a dduce e vide nce in opposition to th e app lication to grant an d f ix bail. ( J os el ito V . Narciso v. Fl or Mari e Sta . Romana -Cru z , G.R.No . 1 3 45 0 4 , March 1 7, 2000, 3 r d Di v. [ Pangani b an ] )

177. W hat are the d uties o f the j u d ge in c ases o f bai l app l i c ations w here the a cc use d is c harge d w ith c apita l o ff ense?

Held: B as c o v . R apata l o (269 SCRA 220, M ar c h 5 , 1997 ) e nunciated the fo ll ow ing dut ies of the tr ia l judge in s uc h pet it io n for ba il :

1 ) N otif y the pros ecutor o f the he aring o f the app lication f or bai l or r eq uire him tosubmit his r ecomme ndation;

2 ) Conduct a h e aring o f the app lication f or bai l re gardle ss o f whe the r or not th e pros ecution r ef use s to pr e se nt e vide nce to sho w that th e guilt o f the accused isstrong f or th e purpos e of e nab ling th e court to exe rcise its soun d discre tion;

3) Dec ide whe the r th e e vide nce of guilt o f the accused is strong bas ed on th e summaryof e vide nce of the pros ecution;

4) If the guilt o f the accused is not strong , discharg e the accused upon th e approva l of the bailbond. Oth e rwise, pe tition shou ld be de nied .



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The Court a dded: "The abov e-e nume rat ed proced ure shou ld now le ave no room f ordoubt as to th e dutie s o f the tria l judge in cas e s o f bail app lications. So basi c and f undame nta l isit to conduct a h e aring in connec tion with th e grant o f bail in th e prop e r case s that it would amount to judicial apostasy f or any m e mbe r o f the judiciary to disclaim knowled ge or a ware ne ssthe re of ."

Add itionally, the court 's grant or r ef usa l of bail must contain a summary o f the e vide nce f or th e pros ecution , on th e basis o f which shou ld be f ormu lat ed the judge' s o wn conclusion onwhe the r su ch e vide nce is strong e nough to in dicat e the guilt o f the accused . The summarythe re of is conside red an asp ec t o f proced ura l due proce ss f or both th e pros ecution an d the defe nse ; its abs e nce will invalidat e the grant or th e de nial of the app lication f or bai l. ( J os e lito V . Narciso v. F lor Mari e Sta . Romana -Cru z , G.R. No . 1 3 45 0 4 , March 1 7, 2000, 3 rd Di v.[ Pangani b an ] )

178. S hou ld the a cc use d w ho remaine d at l arge a f ter their c onvi c tion be a ll o w e d provisiona l l i berty? C an the bai l bon d that the a cc use d previous l y poste d b e use d d uring the entire perio d o f appea l ?

Held: De spit e an or de r o f arre st f rom th e tria l court an d t wo warnings f rom th e Court o f Appe als, pe titione rs ha d re mained at larg e . It is a xiomati c that f or on e to b e e ntit led to bai l, he shou ld be in th e custo dy o f the law, or oth e rwise, de prived of libe rty. Th e purpos e of bail is tosecure one s rele as e and it would be incongruous to grant bai l to on e who is f ree . Pe titione rs Comp liance and Motion x x x came short o f an un conditiona l submission to r e spon de nt court slawf ul orde r an d to its jurisdiction.

The tria l court correc t ly de nied pe titione rs motion that th e y be allowed provisiona l libe rtyaf t e r th e ir conviction , unde r th e ir re spec tive bail bonds. Apart f rom th e f act that th e y we re at larg e, Sec tion 5 , Rule 11 4 o f the Rule s o f Court , as am e nded by Supre me Court Administrativ e Circular 12 -94, provide s that :

X x x

The Court , in its discre tion , may a llow the accused to continu e on provisiona l libe rtyunde r th e sam e bail bond during th e pe riod to app e al sub ject to th e cons e nt o f the bondsman.

The bail bond that th e accused pre viously post ed can on ly be used during th e 1 5 -daype riod to app e al (Rule 122 ) an d not during th e e ntire pe riod of app e al. This is consist e nt withSec tion 2 (a) o f Rule 11 4 which provi de s that th e bail shall be effec tive upon approva l and re main in f orce at a ll stag e s o f the case, unle ss soon e r cancelled, unti l the promu lgation o f the judgme nt o f the Re giona l Trial Court , irre spec tive of whe the r th e case was origina lly f iled in orapp e aled to it. This am e ndme nt , introduced by SC Administrativ e Circular 12 -94 is a de partur e f rom th e old rule s which th e n provi ded that bai l sha ll be effec tive and re main in f orce at a ll stag e s o f the cas e unti l its f ull de t e rmination , and thus e ve n during th e pe riod of app e al.More ove r, unde r th e pre se nt ru le, f or th e accused to continu e his provisiona l libe rty on th e sam e

bail bond during th e pe riod to app e al, cons e nt o f the bondsman is n ece ssary. From th e record, it app e ars that th e bondsman x x x f iled a motion in th e tria l court x x x f or th e cancellation o f pe titione rs bail bond f or th e latt e r sf ailure to r e new the sam e upon its expiration. Obtaining th e cons e nt o f the bondsman was , thus , f oreclosed . (Magu dd atu v. Court of App e a ls, 326 SCRA 362, Feb. 23, 2000, 1 st Di v. [K apunan ] )

1 79. I s a c on d ition in an app l i c ation f or bai l that a cc use d b e f irst arraigne d b e f ore he c ou ld be grante d bai l va l i d ?

Held: In r eq uiring that p e titione r b e f irst arraign ed bef ore he could be grant ed bail, the tria l court appr e he nded that i f pe titione r we re rele ased on bai l he could, by be ing abs e nt , pre ve nt his e ar ly arraignm e nt an d the re by delay his tria l unti l the comp lainants got tir ed and lost int e re st in th e ir case s. He nce, to e nsur e his pr e se nce at th e arraignm e nt , approva l of pe titione r s bail bonds shou ld be defe rred unti l he could be arraign ed . Af t e r that , e ve n if pe titione r doe s not app e ar , tria l can pro ceed as long as h e is noti f ied of the dat e of the he aring an d his f ailure toapp e ar is un justif ied, since unde r Art. III , Sec . 1 4(2 ) o f the Constitution , tria l in abs e ncia isauthoriz ed . This s ee ms to b e the the ory o f the trial court in its x x x orde r conditioning th e grant of bail to p e titione r on his arraignm e nt.

This th e ory is mista ke n. In th e f irst p lace x x x in case s whe re it is authoriz ed, bail shou ld be grant ed bef ore arraignm e nt , othe rwise the accused may b e precluded f rom f iling a



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motion to quash. For i f the inf ormation is quash ed and the case is dismissed, the re would the nbe no n eed f or th e arraignm e nt o f the accused . In th e second place, the tria l court could e nsur e the pre se nce of pe titione r at th e arraignm e nt pr ec isely by granting bai l and orde ring his pr e se nce at any stag e of the proceed ings , such as arraignm e nt. Un de r Rule 11 4, Sec . 2 (b) o f the Rule s onCriminal Proced ure, one of the conditions o f bail is that th e accused sha ll app e ar b ef ore the prop e r court whe ne ve r so r eq uired by th e court or th e se Rule s, while unde r Rule 116 , Sec . 1 (b)

the pre se nce of the accused at th e arraignm e nt is r eq uired .

On th e othe r han d, to condition th e grant o f bail to an a ccused on his arraignm e nt would be to p lace him in a position whe re he has to choos e be t wee n (1 ) f iling a motion to quash an d thus delay his r ele as e on bai l becaus e unti l his motion to quash can b e re so lved, his arraignm e nt cannot b e held, and (2 ) f ore going th e f iling o f a motion to quash so that h e can b e arraign ed at once and the re af t e r be rele ased on bai l. The se sce narios ce rtain ly unde rmine the accused sconstitutiona l right not to b e put on tria l exce pt upon va lid comp laint or in f ormation su ff icie nt tocharg e him with a crime and his right to bai l. (La v id e s v. CA, 32 4 SCRA 32 1 , Feb. 1 , 2000, 2 nd Di v. [ Me ndo z a ] )

The Ri ght t o be I n fo rme d o f the N a ture and Ca u s e o f Accu sa t ion a g ains t the Accu s e d

180. W hat are the o bj e c tives o f the right to be in f orme d o f the nature an d c ause o f a cc usations against the a cc use d ?

Held: Instru ctive in this r e gard is Sec tion 6 , Rule 11 0 of the Rule s o f Court x x x.

The purpos e of the abov e-q uot ed rule is to in f orm th e accused of the natur e and caus e of the accusation against him , a right guarant eed by no le ss than th e f undame nta l law of the land (Article III , Sec tion 1 4 [2] , 1 987 Constitution ) . Elaborating on th e defe ndant s right to b e inf ormed, the Court h eld in P echo v. P e ople (2 6 2 SCR A 5 1 8 ) that th e ob jective s o f this right ar e:

1 ) To f urnish th e accused with su ch a de scription o f the charg e against him as will e nab le him to ma ke the defe nse ;

2 ) To avai l himself of his conviction or a cquitta l f or prot ec tion against a f urth e rpros ecution f or th e sam e caus e ; an d

3) To in f orm th e court o f the f acts a lle ged, so that it may dec ide whe the r th e y are suff icie nt in law to support a conviction , if one shou ld be had.

It is thus imp e rative that th e Inf ormation f iled with th e trial court b e comp le t e to th e e nd that th e accused may suitab ly pre pare f or his defe nse . Coro llary to this , an in dictme nt must f ully stat e the ele me nts o f the spec if ic offe nse alle ged to hav e bee n committ ed as it is th e rec ital of the e sse ntia ls o f a crime which del ine at e s th e natur e and caus e of accusation against th e accused .

X x x

In th e case unde r s crutiny , the inf ormation doe s not a lle ge the minority o f the victim x x x although th e sam e was prov e n during th e trial x x x. The omission is not m e rely f orma l innatur e since doctrina lly, an a ccused cannot b e held liable f or mor e than what h e is indict ed f or.It matt e rs not ho w conclusive and convincing th e e vide nce of guilt may b e, but an a ccused cannot b e convict ed of any o ffe nse, not charg ed in th e Comp laint or In f ormation on which h e istried or th e re in n ece ssari ly included . He has a right to b e inf ormed of the natur e of the offe nse with which h e is charg ed bef ore he is put on tria l. To convict an a ccused of an o ffe nse highe rthan that charg ed in th e Comp laint or In f ormation on which h e is tried would constitut e unauthoriz ed de nial of that right. (P e opl e v. Bayya, 327 SCRA 77 1 , March 1 0, 2000, En Banc [ Purisima ] )

Th e Ri g h t t o a Fair Trial

181. W hat is the purpose o f the ru l e barring tria l or senten c e o f an insane person? W hat are the reasons un d er l ying it?

Held: The rule barring tria l or s e nt e nce of an insan e pe rson is f or th e prot ec tion o f the accused, rath e r than o f the pub lic. It has b ee n h eld that it is inhuman to r eq uire an a ccused disabled by God to ma ke a just defe nse f or his life or libe rty. To put a le ga lly incompe t e nt pe rson on tria l or to convict an d se nt e nce him is a vio lation o f the constitutiona l rights to a f air



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tria l; an d this has s e ve ral re asons un de rlying it. For on e, the accuracy of the proceed ings maynot b e assur ed, as an in compe t e nt defe ndant who cannot compr e he nd the proceed ings may not appr ec iat e what in f ormation is r ele vant to th e proo f of his inno ce nce . More ove r, he is not in aposition to exe rcise many o f the rights a ff orded a defe ndant in a criminal cas e, e .g. , the right toeffec tively consu lt with couns el, the right to t e stif y in his o wn b e ha lf, and the right to conf ront opposing witne sse s, which rights ar e sa fe guar ds f or th e accura cy o f the tria l re su lt. S econd, the

f airne ss o f the proceed ings may b e que stioned, as th e re are ce rtain basi c dec isions in th e cours e of a criminal proceed ing which a defe ndant is expec t ed to ma ke f or hims elf, and one of the se ishis p le a. T hird, the dignity o f the proceed ings may b e disrupt ed, f or an in compe t e nt defe ndant islikely to conduct hims elf in th e courtroom in a mann e r which may de stroy th e dec orum o f the court. Ev e n i f the defe ndant r e mains passiv e, his lack of compr e he nsion f undame nta lly impairsthe f unctioning o f the trial proce ss. A criminal proceed ing is e sse ntially an a dve rsaria l proceed ing. I f the defe ndant is not a cons cious an d int ellige nt parti cipant , the adjudication lose sits chara ct e r as a r e ason ed int e raction b e t wee n an in dividua l and his community an d become sand invec tive against an ins e nsib le ob ject. Fourth , it is important that th e defe ndant knows whyhe is be ing punish ed, a compr e he nsion which is gr e at ly de pe nde nt upon his un de rstan ding o f what o ccurs at tria l. An in compe t e nt defe ndant may not r e alize the mora l re pre he nsibility of hisconduct. T he socie ta l goa l of institutiona lized re tribution may b e f rustrat ed whe n th e f orce of the stat e is brought to b e ar against on e who cannot compr e he nd its signi f icance . (P e opl e v.Estrada, 333 SCRA 6 99 , 7 18- 7 19 , Jun e 19 , 2000, En Banc [ Puno ] )

The Righ t to an Im part ial Tr ial

182. W hat are the t w o prin c ipa l l ega l an d phi l osophi c a l s c hoo l s o f thought on ho w to d ea l w ith the rain o f unrestraine d pu bl i c ity d uring the investigation an d tria l o f high pro f i l e c ases?

Held: The re are t wo (2 ) prin cipal le ga l and philosophi cal schools o f thought on ho w tode al with th e rain o f unre strain ed pub licity during th e inve stigation an d trial of high pro f ile case s.The B ritish approa ch th e prob le m with th e pre sumption that pub licity will prejudice a jury. Thus , English courts r e adily stay an d stop criminal trials whe n th e right o f an a ccused to f air tria l suffe rsa thr e at. Th e Ame rican approa ch is diffe re nt. U S courts assum e a sk e ptical approa ch about th e pot e ntia l effec t o f pe rvasive pub licity on th e right o f an a ccused to a f air tria l. The y hav e de veloped diffe re nt strains o f t e sts to r e solve this issu e, i.e ., substantia l probabi lity of irre parab le harm , strong lik elihood, cle ar an d pre se nt dang e r, e t c. (Estra d a v. D e si e rto, G.R. Nos .14 67 1 0 -15 , March 2, 200 1 , En Banc [ Puno ] )

183. S hou ld the Om bu d sman be stoppe d f rom c on d u c ting the investigation o f the c ases f i l e d against petitioner (f ormer P resi d ent ) E stra d a d ue to the barrage o f pre j u d i c ia l pu bl i c ity on his gui l t?

Held: Pe titione r x x x cont e nds that th e re spon de nt Ombu dsman shou ld be stopp ed f rom conducting th e inve stigation o f the cas e s f iled against him due to th e barrag e of prejudicial pub licity on his gui lt. He submits that th e re spon de nt Ombu dsman has de veloped bias an d is a ll

se t to f ile the crimina l case s in vio lation o f his right to due proce ss.

X x x

This is not th e f irst tim e the issue of trial by pub licity has b ee n rais ed in this Court to stopthe tria ls or annu l convictions in high pro f ile criminal case s. In Pe ople v. T ee hank ee , Jr. (2 4 9 S CRA 54 [199 5 ] ) , lat e r r e it e rat ed in th e cas e of L arranaga v. Court o f Appe als, e t a l. (287 S CRA5 81 at pp. 5 96- 5 97 [1998] ) , we laid down th e doctrine that :

We cannot sustain app ellant s claim that h e was de nied the right to impartia l tria l due to pr ejudicial pub licity. It is tru e that th e print an d broa dcast m ed ia gav e the case at bar p e rvasive pub licity, just lik e all high pro f ile and high stak e crimina l trials.The n an d now, we rule that th e right o f an a ccused to a f air tria l is not in compatib le to af ree pre ss. To b e sure , re sponsib le re porting e nhan ce s an a ccused s right to a f air tria l f or, as well point ed out, a r e sponsib le pre ss has a lways b ee n r e garded as th e han dmaide n o f effec tive judicial administration, e spec ially in th e criminal f ield x x x. The pre ss doe s not simp ly pub lish inf ormation about tria ls but guar ds against th e miscarriag e of justice by sub jecting th e police , pros ecutors, an d judicial proce sse s to ext e nsive pub lic scrutiny an d criticism.



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Pe rvasive pub licity is not p e r s e prejudicial to th e right o f an a ccused to f air tria l.The me re f act that th e trial of app ellant was giv e n a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel cove rage doe s not by its elf prove that th e pub licity so p e rme at ed the mind of the tria l judge and impaired his impartia lity. For on e, it is impossib le to s e al the minds o f me mbe rs o f the be nch f rom pr e- tria l and oth e r o ff-court pub licity of se nsationa l crimina l case s. Th e stat e of the art o f our communi cation syst e m brings n ews as th e y happ e n straight to our

bre akf ast tab le s an d right to our b ed rooms. Th e se news f orm part o f our e ve ryday m e nuof the f acts an d f ictions o f life . For anoth e r, our i de a o f a f air an d impartia l judge is not that o f a h e rmit who is out o f touch with th e world. We have not insta lled the jurysyst e m whose me mbe rs ar e ove rly prot ec t ed f rom pub licity le st th e y lose the irimpartia lity. x x x. Our judge s ar e le arned in th e law and train ed to disre gar d off-court e vide nce and on-came ra p e rf orman ce s o f parti e s to a litigation. Th e ir me re exposur e topub lications an d pub licity stunts doe s not p e r se f ata lly infect th e ir impartia lity.

At b e st , app ellant can on ly con jure possibi lity of prejudice on th e part o f the tria l judge due to th e barrag e of pub licity that chara ct e rized the inve stigation an d tria l of the case . In Mart elino, e t a l. v. Alejandro, e t a l., we rejec t ed this stan dard of possibi lity of prejudice and adopt ed the t e st o f actua l prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a f indingof prejudicial pub licity, the re must b e alle gation an d proo f that th e judge s hav e bee nunduly influe nced, not simp ly that th e y might b e, by th e barrag e of pub licity. In th e case at bar , the records do not sho w that th e trial judge de veloped actua l bias against app ellant as a cons eq ue nce of the ext e nsive med ia cove rage of the pre- tria l and tria l of his cas e . The tota lity of circumstan ce s o f the case doe s not prov e that th e tria l judge acquired a f ixed opinion as a r e sult o f prejudicial pub licity which is in capab le of chang e e ve n by e vide nce pre se nt ed during th e tria l. Appellant has th e burde n to prov e thisactua l bias an d he has not discharg ed the burde n.

We expoun ded f urth e r on this doctrine in th e subs eq ue nt case of We bb v. H on. Rau l de L e on, e t c. (2 4 7 SCR A 6 5 2 [199 5 ] ) and its companion case s, viz.:

Again , pe titione rs rais e the effec t o f prejudicial pub licity on th e ir right to due proce ss while unde rgoing pr eliminary inve stigation. W e f ind no pro ced ura l imped ime nt to its e arly invocation conside ring th e substantia l risk to th e ir libe rty whole unde rgoing apreliminary inve stigation.

X x x

The de mocratic se ttings , med ia cove rage of tria ls o f se nsationa l case s cannot b e avoided and of t e ntime s, its exce ssive ne ss has b ee n aggravat ed by kine tic de velopme ntsin th e t elec ommuni cations in dustry. For sur e, few case s can mat ch th e high vo lume and high v elocity of pub licity that att e nded the preliminary inv e stigation o f the case at bar.Our daily die t o f f acts an d f iction about th e case continu e s unabat ed e ve n to day.Comme ntators sti ll bombar d the pub lic with view s not too many o f which ar e sobe r an d sub lime . In deed, e ve n th e principal actors in th e cas e the N BI, the re spon de nts , the ir

lawye rs an d the ir sympathiz e rs hav e parti cipat ed in this m ed ia b litz. The possibi lity of med ia abus e s an d the ir thr e at to a f air tria l not withstan ding, crimina l tria ls cannot b e comp le t ely closed to th e pre ss an d pub lic. In th e se mina l case of Richmon d N ew spap e rs, Inc. v. V irginia, it was wisely held :

x x x

(a ) The historical e vide nce of the e volution o f the crimina l trial in Anglo- Ame rican justice de monstrat e s conclusively that at th e time this N ation s organic laws we re adopt ed, crimina l tria ls both h e re and in Eng land had long b ee npre sumptiv ely op e n, thus giving assuran ce that th e proceed ings we re conduct ed f airly to a ll conce rned and discouraging p e r jury, the misconduct o f parti cipants , or dec isions bas ed on s ec re t bias or partia lity. In a dd ition, the signif icant community th e rape utic value of pub lic tria ls was r ecognized : whe n a sho ckingcrime occurs , a community r e action o f outrag e and pub lic prot e st o f t e n f ollows, and the re af t e r th e ope n pro ce sse s o f justice se rve an important prophy lactic purpos e, providing an out le t f or community conce rn, hosti lity, and e motion. Towork effec tively, it is important that so cie ty s crimina l proce ss satisf y the app e aran ce of justice, Off utt v. Unit ed Stat e s, 348 US 11 , 14 , 99 L Ed 11 , 7 5 S Ct 11 , which can b e st b e provided by a llowing p e ople to obs e rve such pro ce ss.From this unbro ke n, uncontra dict ed history , support ed by r e asons as va lid today



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as in ce nturi e s past , it must b e concluded that a pr e sumption o f ope nne ssinhe re s in th e ve ry natur e of a crimina l tria l unde r this N ation s syst e m o f justice, Cf ., e .g. , Le vine v. Unit ed Stat e s, 362 US 61 0, 4 L Ed 2 d 9 89 , 80 S Ct 1 038 .

(b) Th e f reed oms o f speec h, pre ss , and ass e mbly, expre ss ly guarant eed by th e First Ame ndme nt , shar e a common core purpos e of assuring f reed om o f

communi cation on matt e rs r elating to th e f unctioning o f gove rnme nt. Inguarant ee ing f reed oms su ch as thos e of speec h an d pre ss , the First Ame ndme nt can b e re ad as prot ec ting th e right o f e ve ryone to att e nd trials so as giv e me aning to thos e explicit guarant ee s; th e First Ame ndme nt right to r ece ive inf ormation an d ide as m e ans , in th e cont ex t o f tria ls, that th e guarant ee s o f speec h an d pre ss , stan ding a lone, prohibit gov e rnme nt f rom summari ly closingcourtroom doors which ha d long b ee n op e n to th e pub lic at th e time the First Ame ndme nt was a dopt ed . More ove r, the right o f ass e mbly is a lso r ele vant , having b ee n r e garded not on ly as an in de pe nde nt right but a lso as a cata lyst toaugm e nt th e f ree exe rcise of the oth e r First Ame ndme nt rights with which it wasdel ibe rat ely linked by th e draf tsm e n. A trial courtroom is a pub lic place whe re the pe ople ge ne ra lly an d re pre se ntativ e s o f the med ia hav e a right to b e pre se nt , and whe re the ir pre se nce historically has b ee n thought to e nhan ce the int e grity an d qua lity of what ta ke s p lace .

(c) Eve n though th e Constitution contains no provision which by itst e rms guarant ee s to th e pub lic the right to att e nd criminal trials, variousf undame nta l rights , not expre ssly guarant eed, have bee n recognized asindispe nsab le to th e e n joyme nt o f e nume rat ed rights. Th e right to att e nd criminal tria l is implicit in th e guarant ee s o f the First Ame ndme nt : without th e f reed om to att e nd such tria ls, which p e ople have exe rcised f or ce nturi e s, important asp ec ts o f f reed om o f speec h an d of the pre ss could be e visce rat ed .

Be that as it may , we recognize that p e rvasive and prejudicial pub licity un de rce rtain circumstan ce s can de prive an a ccused of his due proce ss right to f air tria l. Thus , in Mart elino, e t a l. v. Alejandro, e t a l., we held that to warrant a f inding o f prejudicial pub licity th e re must b e alle gation an d proo f that th e judge s hav e bee n un duly influe nced, not simp ly that th e y might b e, by th e barrag e of pub licity. In th e case at bar , we f ind nothing in th e records that will prove that th e tone and cont e nt o f the pub licity that att e nded the inve stigation o f pe titione rs f ata lly infec t ed the f airne ss an d impartia lity of the DOJ Panel. Pe titione rs cannot just r ely on th e sub liminal effec ts o f pub licity on th e se nse of f airne ss o f the DOJ Panel, f or th e se are basically unb eknown an d be yond knowing. To b e sure, the DOJ Panel is compos ed of an Assistant Chief Stat e Prosecutorand Se nior Stat e Prosecutors. Th e ir long expe rie nce in criminal inve stigation is a f actorto conside r in de t e rmining whe the r th e y can e asily be blinded by th e klie g lights o f pub licity. In deed, the ir 26 -pag e Re solution carrie s no in dubitab le indicia o f bias f or it doe s not app e ar that th e y conside red any ex tra -record e vide nce exce pt e vide nce prop e rly adduced by th e parti e s. Th e le ngth o f time the inve stigation was conduct ed

de spit e it summary natur e and the ge ne rosity with which th e y accommo dat ed the discove ry motions o f pe titione rs sp e ak well of the ir f airne ss. At no instan ce, we not e, did pe titione rs s eek the disqua lif ication o f any m e mbe r o f the DOJ Panel on th e groun d of bias r e su lting f rom th e ir bombar dme nt o f prejudicial publicity.

Applying th e abov e ruling, we hold that th e re is not e nough e vide nce to warrant this Court toe n join th e preliminary inve stigation o f the pe titione r by th e re spon de nt Ombu dsman. Pe titione rneed s to o ffe r mor e than hosti le he adline s to discharg e his bur de n o f proo f . He need s to sho w more than we ighty so cial scie nce e vide nce to su cce ss f ully prov e the impaired capa city of a judge to r e nde r a bias -f ree dec ision. Well to not e, the cas e s against th e pe titione r ar e still unde rgoingpreliminary inve stigation by a sp ec ial pan el of pros ecutors in th e off ice of the re spon de nt Ombudsman. N o a lle gation whatso e ve r has b ee n ma de by th e pe titione r that th e minds o f the me mbe rs o f this sp ec ial pan el have alre ady bee n infec t ed by bias b ecaus e of the pe rvasive prejudicial pub licity against him. In deed, the spec ial panel has y e t to come out with its f indingsand the Court cannot s econd gue ss whe the r its r ecomme ndation will be unf avorab le to th e pe titione r. (Estrada v. D e si e rto, G.R. Nos . 14 67 1 0 -15 , March 2, 200 1 , En Banc [ Puno ] )

Th e Ri g ht a g ainst Self-I ncri m ination

18 4 . Dis c uss the types o f immunity statutes . W hi c h has broa d er s c ope o f prote c tion?



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Held: Our immunity statut e s ar e of Ame rican origin. In th e Unit ed Stat e s, the re are t wotype s o f statutory immunity grant ed to a witne ss. Th e y ar e the transa ctiona l immunity an d the use-and-de rivative-use immunity. Transa ctiona l immunity is broa de r in th e scope of itsprot ec tion. By its grant , a witne ss can no longe r be pros ecut ed f or any o ffe nse whatso e ve rarising out o f the act or transa ction. In contrast , by th e grant o f use-and-de rivative-use

immunity , a witne ss is on ly assur ed that his or h e r parti cular t e stimony an d e vide nce de rived f rom it will not b e used against him or h e r in a subs eq ue nt pros ecution. (Mapa, J r . v.San d igan b ayan, 23 1 SCRA 7 8 3, 7 9 7 -7 98 , Apri l 26, 1994 , En Banc [ Puno ] )

18 5 . I s the grant o f immunity to an a cc use d w i ll ing to testi f y f or the government a spe c ia l privi l ege an d there f ore must be stri c t l y c onstrue d against the a cc use d ?

Held: [W]e rejec t re spon de nt court s ruling that th e grant o f sec tion 5 immunity must be strict ly constru ed against th e pe titione rs. It simp listically chara ct e rized the grant as a sp ecial privile ge, as i f it was gi f t ed by th e gove rnme nt , ex gratia. In ta king this postur e, it misre ad the raison d e tre and the long p ed igree of the right against s elf-incrimination vis -à -vis immunitystatut e s.

The days o f inquisition brought about th e most de spicab le abus e s against human rights.N ot th e le ast o f the se abus e s is th e expe rt us e of coe rced confe ssions to s e nd to th e guillotine e ve n th e guilt le ss. To guar d against th e recurre nce of this tota litarian m e thod, the right against self-incrimination was e nsconced in th e f undame nta l laws o f all civilized countri e s. Ove r th e ye ars , howe ve r, came the need to assist gov e rnme nt in its tas k of containing crime f or p e ace and orde r is a n ece ssary matri x of pub lic welf are . To a ccommo dat e the need, the right against s elf-incrimination was stripp ed of its abso lut e ne ss. Immunity statut e s in varying shap e s we re e nact ed which would allow gove rnme nt to compel a witne ss to t e stif y de spit e his p le a o f the right against s elf- incrimination. To insu lat e the se statut e s f rom th e virus o f unconstitutiona lity, awitne ss is giv e n what has come to b e known as transa ctiona l or a us e-de rivative-use immunity x x x. Quit e cle arly, the se immunity statut e s ar e not a bonanza f rom gov e rnme nt. Thos e give nthe privile ge of immunity pai d a high pri ce f or it th e surr e nde r o f the ir prec ious right to b e sile nt. Our hi e rarchy o f value s de man ds that th e right against s elf-incrimination an d the right tobe sile nt shou ld be accorded gre at e r r e spec t an d prot ec tion. La ws that t e nd to e rode the f orce of the se pree mine nt rights must n ece ssari ly be give n a libe ral int e rpre tation in f avor o f the individua l. The gove rnme nt has a right to so lve crime s but it must do it , right ly. (Mapa, J r . v.San d igan b ayan, 23 1 SCRA 7 8 3, 8 0 5-8 06, Apri l 26, 1994 , En Banc [ Puno ] )

The Rig ht again st D ou ble Je opar d y

186. Dis c uss the t w o k in d s o f d ou bl e j eopar d y .

Held: Our Bill of Rights de als with t wo (2 ) kinds o f doub le je opar dy. Th e f irst s e nt e nce of Claus e 2 0, Sec tion 1 , Article III o f the Constitution or dains that no p e rson sha ll be t wice put

in je opar dy o f punishm e nt f or th e sam e offe nse . The second se nt e nce of said claus e provide sthat if an a ct is punishab le by a law and an or dinance, conviction or a cquitta l unde r e ithe r sha ll constitut e a bar to anoth e r pros ecution f or th e sam e act. Thus, the f irst s e nt e nce prohibitsdoub le je opar dy of punishm e nt f or th e sam e offe nse whe re as , the second cont e mplat e s doub le je opar dy of punishm e nt f or th e sam e act. Unde r th e f irst s e nt e nce, one may b e t wice put in je opar dy of punishm e nt o f the sam e act , provided that h e is charg ed with diffe re nt o ffe nse s, orthe offe nse charg ed in on e case is not in cluded in, or doe s not in clude, the crime charg ed in th e othe r case . The second se nt e nce app lie s, e ve n if the offe nse charg ed are not th e sam e, owing tothe f act that on e constitut e s a vio lation o f an or dinance and the othe r a vio lation o f statut e . I f the t wo charg e s ar e bas ed on on e and the sam e act , conviction or a cquitta l unde r e ithe r th e law or th e ordinance sha ll bar a pros ecution un de r th e othe r. In cide nta lly, such conviction oracquitta l is not in dispe nsab le to sustain th e ple a o f double je opar dy o f punishm e nt or th e sam e offe nse . So long as je opar dy has b ee n atta ched unde r on e of the inf ormations charging sai d offe nse, the defe nse may b e availed of in th e othe r case involving th e sam e offe nse, e ve n if the re has b ee n n e ithe r conviction nor a cquitta l in e ithe r case .

Elsewhe re stat ed, whe re the offe nse charg ed are pe na lized e ithe r by diffe re nt s ec tions o f the sam e statut e or by diffe re nt statut e s, the important in quiry relat e s to th e ide ntity o f offe nse scharg ed . The constitutiona l prot ec tion against doub le je opar dy is avai lab le only whe re anide ntity is sho wn to exist be t wee n th e e arlie r an d the subs eq ue nt o ffe nse s charg ed . The que stion o f ide ntity or lack of ide ntity o f offe nse s is a dd re ssed by examining th e e sse ntia l



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ele me nts o f e ach o f the t wo o ffe nse s charg ed, as su ch ele me nts ar e se t out in th e re spec tive le gislative def initions o f the offe nse s invo lved . (P e opl e v. Q uijada, 2 59 SCRA 191 , July 2 4 , 199 6)

187. W hat must be prove d to su bstantiate a cl aim o f d ou bl e j eopar d y? W hen may l ega l j eopar d y atta c h?

Held: To substantiat e a claim o f doub le je opar dy, the f ollowing must b e prove n:

(1 ) A f irst je opar dy must hav e atta ched prior to th e second; (2 ) th e f irst je opar dy must have bee n va lidly t e rminat ed ; (3) th e second je opar dy must b e f or th e sam e offe nse, or th e second offe nse include s or is n ece ssari ly included in th e offe nse charg ed in th e f irst in f ormation , or is an att e mpt to commit th e sam e or is a f rustration th e re of .

Le ga l je opar dy atta che s on ly: (1 ) upon a va lid indictme nt; (b) b ef ore a compe t e nt court;(c) a f t e r arraignm e nt; (d) whe n a va lid ple a has b ee n e nt e red ; an d (e ) th e cas e was dismissed orothe rwise t e rminat ed without th e expre ss cons e nt o f the accused . (Cuison v. CA, 2 89 SCRA 159 , Apri l 15 , 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

1 88. I n its d e c ision in a c rimina l c ase , the J u d ge promu l gate d on l y the c ivi l aspe c t o f the c ase ,but not the c rimina l. W i ll the promu l gation o f the c rimina l aspe c t l ater c onstitute d ou bl e

j eopar d y?

Held: Pe titione r cont e nds that "the promu lgation by Judge Ramos on April 4, 1 99 5 of the Re spon de nt Court 's dec ision o f June 30 , 1 99 1 by re ading its dispositive portion has effec tivelyt e rminat ed the crimina l case s against th e pe titione r x x x." In oth e r words, pe titione r claims that the f irst je opar dy atta ched at that point.

The Court is not p e rsua ded . As a ru le, a criminal pros ecution in clude s a civil action f orthe recove ry o f inde mnity. H e nce, a dec ision in su ch case dispose s o f both th e crimina l as well as th e civil liabilitie s o f an a ccused . He re, trial court promu lgat ed only the civil asp ec t o f the cas e, but not th e criminal.

[T]he promu lgation o f the CA Dec ision was not comp le t e . In f act an d in truth , the promu lgation was not m e rely incomple t e ; it was a lso void. In exce ss o f its jurisdiction, the trial judge re nde red a substantia lly incomp le t e promu lgation on April 4, 1 99 5 , and he re pe at ed hismista ke in his April 12 , 1 99 6 Orde r. We e mphasiz e that grav e abus e of discre tion r e nde red the af ore me ntioned act o f the tria l court voi d. Since the criminal cas e s hav e not y e t b ee nt e rminat ed, the f irst je opar dy has not y e t atta ched . He nce, doub le je opar dy cannot prosp e r as adefe nse .

We must str e ss that Re spon de nt Court 's que stioned Decision did not mo dif y or am e nd itsJuly 30 , 1 99 1 Dec ision. It m e rely orde red the promu lgation o f the judgme nt o f conviction an d the f ull exec ution o f the pe na lty it ha d e arlie r impos ed on p e titione r. (Cuison v. CA, 2 89 SCRA

159 , Apri l 15 , 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

The Rig ht agains t E x Pos t Fa ct o La w s an d B i lls of Att ain de r

1 89. W hat is a bi ll o f attain d er? I s P. D . 1866 a bi ll o f attain d er?

Held: [T]he Court , in P e op l e v . F e rre r ( G .R. Nos . L -32613-1 4 , De c em be r 27 , 1972 , 4 8 S CRA 382 ) , def ined a bill of attain de r a s a l e gis lative act which in f lict s p unis hme nt on in div idual s or mem be rs of a p articular grou p without a judicial trial. Esse ntial to a bill o f attain de r ar e aspe cif ication o f c e rtain in div idual s or a grou p of indiv idual s, the imp os ition o f a p unis hme nt , pe nal or oth e rwise, and the lac k of judicial trial. This las t e l eme nt , the total lac k of court int e rve ntionin th e f inding o f guilt an d the de t e rm ination o f the actual pe nalty to b e imp osed, is the m os t esse ntial. P. D . No. 1866 does not p ossess the e l eme nt s of a bill o f attain de r. It does not seek toinf lict p unis hme nt without a judicial trial. Nowhe re in th e me as ure is the re a f inding o f guilt an d an i mp os ition o f a corr esp onding p unis hme nt. What th e de cree does is to def ine the offe nse and p rov ide f or th e pe nalty that m ay b e imp osed, spe cif ying th e qualif ying circu ms tanc es that woul d aggra v at e the offe nse . The re is no e ncroach me nt on th e p owe r o f the court to de t e rm ine af t e rdue he aring whe the r th e p rose cution ha s p roved be yond re as onabl e doubt that th e offe nse of ill e gal p ossess ion o f f ire arms has bee n co mm itt ed and that th e qualif ying circu ms tanc es attach ed to it ha s bee n es tablis hed al s o b e yond re as onabl e doubt a s the Cons titution an d judicial



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precede nts r eq uire . (Misolas v. Panga, 181 SCRA 6 48 , 6 59- 660, Jan . 30, 199 0, En Banc [ Cort e s ] )

190. W hat is an ex post f a c to l a w ? I s R.A. N o . 82 4 9 an ex post f a c to l a w ?

Held: E x post f a c to law, ge ne rally, p ro hibits ret rospe c t ivit y o f pe nal laws . R. A. 82 49 i s

not a pena l l aw . It is a subst an tive l aw on jurisdiction which is n ot pena l in cha rac t e r. Pena l l aw s a re thos e ac ts o f the Le gisl a ture which p rohibit ce rt a in ac ts and e st a blish pena ltie s f or th e irviol a tion s; or thos e tha t def ine crime s, trea t o f the ir na ture, and p rovide f or th e ir p un ishmen t.R. A. 79 75 , which a mended P.D. 16 06 a s re ga rds th e Sand igan ba yan s jurisdiction, its mo de of appea l and othe r p roced ura l ma tt e rs, ha s b een dec l a red by th e Court a s n ot a pena l l aw, but cl ea rly a p roced ura l st a tut e, i.e ., one which p re scribe s rul e s o f p roced ure by which courtsapp lyin g l aw s o f a ll kind s can p rope rly ad min ist e r justice . N ot b e in g a pena l l aw, the re troac tive app lica tion of R. A. 82 49 cann ot b e cha ll en ged a s u ncon stitutio na l.

Pe titione r sand in t e rven ors con t en tion tha t th e ir right to a t wo-tie red appea l which th e yacq uired unde r R. A. 79 75 ha s b een dilut ed by th e enac tmen t o f R. A. 82 49 , is incorrec t. Th e sa me con t en tion ha s a lread y been rejec t ed by th e court s e ve ra l time s con side rin g th a t th e right to appea l is n ot a na tura l right but st a tutory i n na ture tha t can be re gul a t ed by l aw . The mode of p roced ure p rovided f or i n the st a tutory right o f appea l is n ot i ncluded in the p rohibition a ga in st ex p ost fac to l aws. R. A. 82 49 pe rt a in s o n ly to m a tt e rs o f p roced ure, and be in g m e re ly an a menda tory st a tut e it doe s n ot pa rt ake the na ture of an ex p ost facto l aw . It doe s n ot m e t e out a pena lty and, the ref ore, doe s n ot come within the p rohibitio n . More ove r, the l aw did n ot a lt e rthe rul e s o f e vidence or th e mode of tria l. It h a s b een rul ed tha t adjec tive st a tut e s m a y be made app lica bl e to ac tion s pend in g and un re solved a t th e time of the ir pa ssa ge .

At an y ra t e, R. A. 82 49 h a s p re se rved the accused s right to appea l to th e Sup re me Court to r e view que stion s o f l aw . On the re mova l of the in t e rmed ia t e re view of fac ts , the Sup re me Court still h a s th e p owe r o f re view to de t e rmine if the p re sump tion of inn ocence ha s b een con vincin gly ove rcome . (Panfilo M. Lacson v. Th e Exe cuti ve S e cr e tary, e t . al ., G.R. No .1 2 8 0 9 6, Jan . 20, 1999 [ Martin ez] )

ADMI N I STR AT IVE L AW

191. Des c ri be the Ad ministrative C o d e o f 1987

Held: The Code is a g e ne ral law and incorporat e s in a uni f ied docume nt th e ma jorstru ctura l, f unctiona l and proced ura l principle s o f gove rnan ce (Third W he re as Claus e,

Administrativ e Code of 1987 ) and e mbodie s chang e s in a dministrativ e stru cture s an d proced ure sde signed to s e rve the pe ople . ( F ourth W he re as Claus e, Administrative Code of 1987 ) The Code is divided into s e ve n (7 ) books. Th e se books contain provisions on th e organization , powe rs an d ge ne ral administration o f de partm e nts , bure aus an d off ice s un de r th e exec utive bran ch, the organization an d f unctions o f the Constitutiona l Commissions an d othe r constitutiona l bodie s, the

rule s on th e nationa l gove rnme nt bu dge t , as well as gui del ine s f or th e exe rcise by a dministrative age ncie s o f quasi -le gislative and quasi -judicial powe rs. Th e Code cove rs both th e int e rna l administration , i.e ., int e rna l organization , pe rsonn el and recruitme nt , sup e rvision an d discipline, and the effec ts o f the f unctions p e rf ormed by a dministrative off icials on privat e individua ls orpartie s outsi de gove rnme nt. (Op le v. Torr e s, G.R. No . 1 276 85 , Ju ly 23, 1998 [ Puno ] )

192. W hat is a d ministrative po w er?

Held: Ad ministrative po w er is concerne d w it h t he w ork of appl yin g policies an d enforcin g or d ers as d etermine d by proper governmental or gans . I t ena bles t he Presi d ent to fix a uniform stan d ar d of a d ministrative efficienc y an d check t he official con duct of his a gents . To t his en d , he can iss ue a d ministrative or d ers, r ules an d re gulations . (Op le v. Torr e s, G.R. No .1 276 85 , Ju ly 23, 1998 [ Puno ] )

193. W hat is an a d ministrative or d er?

Held: An a d mi nistrative or d er is a n or d i na nce iss ue d by t he Presi d e nt which relates to s pecific as pects i n t he a d mi nistrative o peratio n of gover nme nt . I t m ust be i n h armo ny wit h t he law a nd s ho uld b e for t he sole pur pose of im pleme nti ng t he law a nd carr yi ng o ut t he le gislative policy. (Op le v. Torr e s, G.R. No . 1 276 85 , Ju ly 23, 1998 [ Puno ] )



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19 4 . W hat is the G overnment o f the R epu bl i c o f the P hi l ippines?

Answer: The G overnment o f t he R epu bl i c o f t he Phi l ippines re f ers to t he c orpor ate government al entit y t hrou gh whi ch t he f un c tions o f t he government are exer c ised t hrou ghout t he Phi l ippines, in cl udin g, s ave as t he c ontr ar y appe ars f rom t he c ontext, t he v arious arms t hrou ghwhi ch po l iti cal a ut horit y is m ade e ff e c tive in t he Phi l ippines, whet her pert ainin g to t he

autonomous re gions, t he provin c i al , c it y, muni c ip al or ba r an gay su bdivisions or ot her f orms o f l o cal government . (S e c . 2 [1] , I n t roducto ry P ro v i s io ns , Exe cuti ve O rd er No . 2 9 2)

19 5 . W hat is a government instrumenta l ity? W hat are in cl u d e d in the term government instrumenta l ity?

Answer: A government instrumenta l ity refers to any agency of t he nationa l government, not integrated wit hin t he de partment framework, vested wit h s pecia l functions or jurisdiction by l aw, endowed wit h some if not a ll cor porate powers, administering s pecia l funds, enjoying o perationa l autonomy, usua ll y t hroug h a charter . The term incl udes regu l atory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or contro ll ed cor porations . (S e c . 2 [1 0 ] , I n t roducto ry P ro v i s io ns , Exe cuti ve O rd er No . 2 9 2)

196. W hat is a regu l atory agen c y?

Answer: A regu l atory agen c y refer s to any agen c y expre ssl y ve sted wit h jur isdic t ion to regu l ate, ad min ister or adjud ic ate matter s affe c t ing su bs tant ia l r ig ht s and intere st of pr ivate per son s, t he pr in cipa l power s of which are exer cised by a c o ll e c t ive body, su ch a s a c o mmission, board or c oun cil. (S e c . 2 [11] , I n t roducto ry P ro v i s io ns , Exe cuti ve O rd er No . 2 9 2)

197. W hat is a c hartere d institution?

Answer: A c hartere d institution refers to an y a gen cy or gani ze d or o peratin g un d er a s pe c ial c harter, an d veste d by law with fun c tions relatin g to s pe c ifi c c onstitutional poli c ies or o b je c ti ves . This ter m in c lu d es state uni versities an d c olle ges an d the monetar y authorit y of the State . (S e ctio n 2 [1 2 ] , I n t roducto ry P ro v i s io ns , Exe cuti ve O rd er No . 2 9 2)

198. W hen is a government - o w ne d or c ontro ll e d c orporation d eeme d to be per f orming proprietary f un c tion? W hen is it d eeme d to be per f orming governmenta l f un c tion?

Held: Gove rnme nt -owned or contro lled corporations may p e rf orm gov e rnme nta l orpropri e tary f unctions or both , de pe nding on th e purpos e f or which th e y hav e bee n cre at ed . I f the purpos e is to obtain sp ec ial corporat e be nef its or e arn p ecuniary pro f it , the f unction ispropri e tary. I f it is in th e int e re st o f he alth , sa fe ty an d f or th e advance me nt o f pub lic good and welf are, affec ting th e pub lic in ge ne ral, the f unction is gov e rnme nta l. Powe rs classi f ied as

proprie tary are thos e int e nded f or privat e advantag e and be nef it. (B la q u e ra v. Alca la, 2 95 SCRA 366, 4 2 5 , S e pt . 11 , 1998 , En Banc [ Purisima ] )

199. Does the petition f or annu l ment o f pro cl amation o f a c an d i d ate mere l y invo l ve the exer c ise by the COM ELE C o f its a d ministrative po w er to revie w, revise an d reverse the a c tions o f the boar d o f c anvassers an d, there f ore , j usti f ies non - o bservan c e o f pro c e d ura l d ue pro c ess , or d oes it invo l ve the exer c ise o f the COM ELE C' s q uasi -j u d i c ia l f un c tion?

Held: Taking cognizan ce of privat e re spon de nt 's p e titions f or annu lme nt o f pe titione r'sproclamation , COMELEC was not m e rely pe rf orming an a dministrativ e f unction. Th e administrativ e powe rs o f the COMELEC include the powe r to de t e rmine the numb e r an d locationof polling p lace s, appoint elec tion o ff icials an d inspec tors , conduct r e gistration o f vot e rs, de putize law e nf orce me nt ag e ncie s an d gove rnme nta l instrum e nta litie s to e nsur e f ree, orde rly, hone st , pe acef ul and cred ible elec tions , re gist e r po litical parti e s, organizations or coa lition, accred it citize n's arms o f the Commission , pros ecut e elec tion o ffe nse s, and recomme nd to th e Pre side nt the re mova l of or imposition o f any oth e r disciplinary a ction upon any o ff ice r or e mployee it hasde putized f or violation or disre gard of its direc tive, orde r or dec ision. In a dd ition, the Commission a lso has direc t contro l and sup e rvision ove r a ll pe rsonn el involved in th e conduct o f elec tion. Ho we ve r, the re solution o f the adve rse claims o f privat e re spon de nt an d pe titione r asre gards th e ex ist e nce of a mani fe st e rror in th e que stioned ce rtif icat e of canvass r eq uire s th e COMELEC to a ct as an arbit e r. It b e hoove s th e Commission to h e ar both parti e s to de t e rmine the ve racity of the ir alle gations an d to dec ide whe the r th e alle ged e rror is a mani fe st e rror. H e nce, the re so lution o f this issu e calls f or th e exe rcise by th e COMELEC of its quasi -judicial powe r. It has b ee n sai d that whe re a po we r r e sts in judgme nt or discre tion , so that it is o f judicial natur e



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or chara ct e r, but doe s not invo lve the exe rcise of f unctions o f a judge, or is confe rred upon anoff ice r oth e r than a judicial off ice r, it is dee med quasi -judicial. The COMELEC the ref ore, acting asquasi -judicial tribuna l, cannot ignor e the req uire me nts o f proced ura l due proce ss in r e solving th e pe titions f iled by privat e re spon de nt. ( Fe d e rico S . Sando v al v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 33 84 2,

J an . 26, 2000 [ Puno ] )

200. Dis c uss the Do c trine o f P rimary J uris d i c tion ( or P rior R esort ) .

Held: Courts cannot an d will not r e solve a controv e rsy invo lving a que stion which iswithin th e jurisdiction o f an a dministrative tribuna l, e spec ially whe re the que stion de man ds th e exe rcise of soun d administrative discre tion r eq uiring th e spec ial knowledge, expe rie nce and se rvice s o f the administrative tribuna l to de t e rmine t echnical and intricat e matt e rs o f f act.

In r ece nt y e ars , it has b ee n th e jurispru de ntial tre nd to app ly this doctrine to cas e sinvolving matt e rs that de mand the spec ial compe t e nce of administrative age ncie s e ve n if the que stion invo lved is a lso judicial in chara ct e r. It app lie s whe re a claim is origina lly cognizab le inthe courts , and come s into p lay whe ne ve r e nf orce me nt o f the claim r eq uire s th e re solution o f issue s which, unde r a r e gulatory s che me, have bee n p laced within th e special compe t e nce of anadministrativ e body; in su ch case, the judicial proce ss is susp e nded pe nding refe rra l of suchissue s to th e administrative body f or its vi ew .

In cas e s whe re the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is cle ar ly app licab le, the court cannot arrogat e unto its elf the authority to r e solve a controv e rsy, the jurisdiction ov e r which is lodged with an a dministrative body of spec ial compe t e nce . (Vi llaf lor v. CA, 2 8 0 SCRA 2 8 7)

201. Dis c uss the Do c trine o f E xhaustion o f Ad ministrative R eme d ies . E numerate exc eptions thereto .

Held: 1 . Bef ore a party is a llowed to s eek the int e rve ntion o f the court , it is a pr e-condition that h e shou ld have availed of all the me ans o f administrativ e proce sse s a ff orded him.He nce, if a r e med y within th e administrative machine ry can sti ll be re sort ed to by giving th e administrativ e off ice r conce rned e ve ry opportunity to dec ide on a matt e r that come s within his jurisdiction th e n su ch r e med y shou ld be exhaust ed f irst b ef ore the court s judicial powe r can b e sought. Th e pre matur e invocation o f court s jurisdiction is f ata l to on e s caus e of action. Accordingly, abs e nt any f inding o f waive r or e stopp el the cas e is sus ce ptib le of dismissa l f or lack of caus e of action. This doctrine of exhaustion o f administrativ e re med ie s was not without itspractical and le ga l re asons , f or on e thing , availme nt o f administrativ e re med y e ntai ls le sse rexpe nse s an d provide s f or a sp eed ie r disposition o f controv e rsie s. It is no le ss tru e to stat e that the courts o f justice f or r e asons o f comity an d conve nie nce will shy a way f rom a disput e unti l the syst e m o f administrative red re ss has b ee n comp le t ed and comp lied with so as to giv e the administrativ e age ncy conce rned e ve ry opportunity to correc t its e rror an d to dispose of the cas e .

This doctrine is disre garded:

1 ) whe n th e re is a vio lation o f due proce ss;2 ) whe n th e issue involved is pur ely a le ga l que stion;3) whe n th e administrativ e action is pat e nt ly ille ga l amounting to lack or exce ss o f

jurisdiction;4) whe n th e re is e stopp el on th e part o f the administrative age ncy conce rned ;5 ) whe n th e re is irre parab le in jury;6 ) whe n th e re spon de nt is a de partm e nt s ecre tary whos e acts as an a lt e r e go o f the

Pre side nt b e ars th e implied and assum ed approva l of the latt e r;7) whe n to r eq uire exhaustion o f administrative re med ie s would be unre asonab le ;8) whe n it would amount to a nu llif ication o f a claim;9) whe n th e sub ject matt e r is a privat e land in land case proceed ing;1 0) whe n th e rule doe s not provi de a p lain, speed y an d adeq uat e re med y, and 11 ) whe n th e re are circumstan ce s indicating th e urge ncy of judicial int e rve ntion.

(Paat v. CA, 266 SCRA 1 67 [199 7 ] )

2 . N on-ex haustion o f administrative re med ie s is not jurisdictiona l. It on ly re nde rs th e action pr e matur e, i.e ., claimed caus e of action is not rip e f or judicial de t e rmination an d f or that re ason a party has no caus e of action to v e ntilat e in court. (Caral e v. Ab arintos, 26 9 SCRA 1 32)



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THE LAW O F PUBLIC O FFICERS

202. De f ine Appointment . Dis c uss its nature .

Held: An appointm e nt to a pub lic off ice is the uneq uivocal act o f de signating orselec ting by on e having th e authority th e ref or o f an in dividua l to discharg e and pe rf orm th e

dutie s an d f unctions o f an o ff ice or trust. Th e appointm e nt is dee med comp le t e once the last a ct req uired of the appointing authority has b ee n comp lied with an d its a cce ptan ce the re af t e r by th e appoint ee in orde r to r e nde r it effec tive . Appointm e nt n ece ssari ly calls f or an exe rcise of discre tion on th e part o f the appointing authority. In Pamantasan ng L ungso d ng Mayni la v.Int e rmed iat e Appellat e Court (1 4 0 SCR A 22 ) , r e it e rat ed in F lore s v. D rilon (223 SCR A 5 68 ) , thisCourt has h eld:

The powe r to appoint is , in e sse nce, discre tionary. Th e appointing po we r hasthe right o f choice which h e may exe rcise f reely according to his judgme nt , dec iding f orhimself who is b e st qua lif ied among thos e who hav e the nece ssary qua lif ications an d eligibilitie s. It is a pr e rogativ e of the appointing po we r x x x. (At p. 5 79 )

Indeed, it may right ly be said that th e right o f choice is the he art o f the powe r to appoint. In th e exe rcise of the powe r o f appointm e nt , discre tion is an int e gra l the re of . (B e rmud ez v. Torr e s, 3 11 SCRA 733, Aug . 4 , 1999 , 3 rd Di v. [ Vitug ] )

203. M ay the C ivi l S ervi c e C ommission , or the S upreme C ourt , va l i dl y nu ll i f y an appointment on the groun d that some bo d y e l se is better q ua l i f ie d ?

Held: The he ad of an ag e ncy who is th e appointing po we r is th e one most knowled ge ab le to dec ide who can b e st p e rf orm th e f unctions o f the off ice . Appointm e nt is ane sse ntially discre tionary po we r an d must b e pe rf ormed by th e off ice r ve st ed with su ch po we raccording to his b e st lights , the only condition b e ing that th e appoint ee shou ld poss e ss th e qua lif ications r eq uired by law. I f he doe s, the n th e appointm e nt cannot b e f au lt ed on th e groun d that th e re are othe rs b e tt e r qua lif ied who shou ld have bee n pr efe rred . In deed, this is apre rogativ e of the appointing authority which h e alone can dec ide . The choice of an appoint ee f rom among thos e who poss e ss th e req uired qua lif ications is a po litical and administrativ e dec ision calling f or conside rations o f wisdom, conve nie nce, utility an d the int e re sts o f the se rvice which can b e st b e made by th e he ad of the off ice conce rned, the pe rson most f amiliar with th e organizationa l stru cture and e nvironme nta l circumstan ce s within which th e appoint ee must f unction.

As long as th e appoint ee is qua lif ied the Civil Se rvice Commission has no choice but toatt e st to an d re spec t th e appointm e nt e ve n if it be proved that th e re are othe rs with sup e riorcrede ntia ls. Th e law limits th e Commission s authority on ly to whe the r or not th e appoint ee sposs e ss th e le ga l qua lif ications an d the appropriat e civil se rvice eligibility, nothing else . I f the ydo th e n th e appointm e nts ar e approv ed becaus e the Commission cannot exceed its po we r bysubstituting its will f or that o f the appointing authority. N e ithe r can we . (Rimont e v. CSC, 2 44

SCRA 5 0 4-5 0 5 , May 2 9 , 1995 , En Banc [ B ell osi llo, J.] )

20 4 . Does the next - in - ran k ru l e import any man d atory or peremptory re q uirement that the person next - in - ran k must be appointe d to the va c an c y?

Held: The nex t -in-ran k rule is not abso lut e ; it on ly app lie s in case s o f promotion , aproce ss which de not e s a s calar as ce nt o f an o ff ice r to anoth e r position high e r e ithe r in ran k orsa lary. And e ve n in promotions , it can b e disre garded f or soun d re asons ma de known to th e nex t -in-rank, as th e conce pt doe s not import any man datory or p e re mptory r eq uire me nt that th e pe rson n ex t -in-ran k must b e appoint ed to th e vacancy. Th e appointing authority , unde r th e Civil Se rvice Law, is a llowed to f ill vacancie s by promotion , trans fe r o f pre se nt e mployee s, re instat e me nt , ree mployme nt , and appointm e nt o f outsi de rs who hav e appropriat e civil se rvice eligibility, not n ece ssari ly in that or de r. Th e re is no le ga l f iat that a va cancy must b e f illed onlyby promotion; th e appointing authority is giv e n wide discre tion to f ill a va cancy f rom among th e se ve ra l alt e rnativ e s provi ded by law.

What th e Civil Se rvice Law provide s is that i f a va cancy is f illed by promotion , the pe rsonholding th e position n ex t in ran k the re to sha ll be conside red f or promotion.

In Ta duran v. Civil Se rvice Commission (131 SCR A 66 [198 4 ] ) , the Court constru ed that phras e to m e an that th e pe rson n ex t -in-rank would be among th e f irst to b e conside red f or th e



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vacancy, if qua lif ied . In San t iago, J r . v. Civil S er vice C omm iss io n (178 SCRA 733 [1989] ) , t he C o urt elabor ated t he im port of t he r ule in t he following m ann er:

One who is next- in-r ank is e nt itled to prefere nt ial co ns ider at io n for promot io n to t he hig her vacancy bu t it does not necess ar ily follow t ha t he and no o ne else can b e app o inted . The r ule ne it her gr an ts a v ested r ig ht to t he holder nor im poses a m inister ial

dut y o n t he app o int ing au t hor it y to promote s uch p erso n to t he next hig her pos it io n x x x(Ab ila v. CSC, 198 SCRA 1 02, J un e 3, 1991 , En Banc [Fe liciano ] )

20 5 . T he P hi l ippine N ationa l R e d C ross (PNRC ) is a government - o w ne d an d c ontro ll e d c orporation w ith an origina l c harter un d er R.A. N o . 9 5 , as amen d e d. I ts c harter , ho w ever ,w as amen d e d to vest in it the authority to se c ure l oans , b e exempte d f rom payment o f a ll d uties , taxes , f ees an d other c harges , et c. W ith the amen d ment o f its c harter , has it been

imp l ie dl y c onverte d to a private c orporation ?

Held: The t e st to de t e rmine whe the r a corporation is gov e rnme nt o wned or contro lled, or privat e in natur e is simp le . Is it cre at ed by its o wn chart e r f or th e exe rcise of a pub lic f unction, or by in corporation un de r th e ge ne ral corporation law? Thos e with sp ec ial chart e rs ar e gove rnme nt corporations sub ject to its provisions , and its e mployee s ar e unde r th e jurisdiction o f the Civil Se rvice Commission. Th e PN RC was not impliedly conve rt ed to a privat e corporationsimp ly becaus e its chart e r was am e nded to v e st in it th e authority to s ecure loans , be exe mpt ed f rom paym e nt o f all dutie s, taxe s, fee s an d othe r charg e s, e t c. (Campor ed on d o v. NLRC, G.R.No . 1 2 9 0 49 , Aug . 6, 1999 , 1 st Di v. [ Par d o ] )

206. W hat is a primari l y c on f i d entia l position? W hat is the test to d etermine w hether a position is primari l y c on f i d entia l or not?

Held: A primari l y c on f i d entia l position is one whi ch d enotes not on l y c on f i d en c e in t he aptit ud e o f t he appointee f or t he duties o f t he o ff i c e but primari l y cl ose intima c y whi ch ens ures f ree d om f rom inter c o urse wit ho ut em barrassment or f ree d om f rom mis gi vin gs or betraya l s o f persona l tr ust or c on f i d entia l matters o f state . ( De l os S antos v. M a ll are , 87 Ph i l. 289 [19 5 0] )

Un d er t he proximity r ul e , t he o ccupant o f a parti cul ar position c o uld b e c onsi d ere d a c on f i d entia l emp l oyee i f t he pre d ominant reason why he was chosen by t he appointin g a ut hority was t he l atter s be l ie f t hat he c an s hare a cl ose intimate re l ations hip wit h t he o ccupant whi chens ures f ree d om o f d is cussion wit ho ut f ear or em barrassment or mis gi vin gs o f possi bl e betraya l o f persona l tr ust or c on f i d entia l matters o f state . Wit ha l, where t he position o ccupie d is more remote f rom t hat o f t he appointin g a ut hority , t he e l ement o f tr ust between t hem is no l on ger pre d ominant . (CSC v. Sa las, 27 4 SCRA 414 , Jun e 19 , 199 7)

207. Does the C ivi l S ervi c e L a w c ontemp l ate a revie w o f d e c isions exonerating o ff i c ers or emp l oyees f rom a d ministrative c harges?

Held: By this ru ling, we now expre ssly aban don an d ove rrule ex tant jurispru de nce that the phras e party adve rsely a ffec t ed by th e dec ision refe rs to th e gove rnme nt e mployee against whom th e administrativ e case is f iled f or th e purpos e of disciplinary a ction which may ta ke the f orm o f susp e nsion , de motion in ran k or sa lary , trans fe r, re mova l or dismissa l f rom o ff ice and not in cluded are case s whe re the pe na lty impos ed is susp e nsion f or not mor e than thirty (30 )days or f ine in an amount not exceed ing thirty days sa lary (Parede s v. Civil S e rvice Commission , 192 SCRA 8 4 , 8 5 ) or whe n r e spon de nt is exone rat ed of the charg e s, the re is no o ccasion f orapp e al. (M e ndez v. Civil S e rvice Commission , 2 04 SCRA 96 5 , 968) In oth e r words, we ove rrule prior dec isions ho lding that th e Civil S e rvice Law doe s not cont e mplat e a r e view of dec isionsexone rating o ff ice rs or e mployee s f rom a dministrative charg e s e nunciat ed in Parede s v. Civil S e rvice Commission (192 SCRA 8 4 ); M e ndez v. Civil S e rvice Commission (2 04 SCRA 96 5 );Magpa le v. Civil S e rvice Commission (215 SCRA 398); Navarro v. Civi l S e rvice Commission an d E xport Pro ce ssing Zon e Authority (226 SCRA 2 07) an d more rece nt ly Del Castillo v. Civil S e rvice Commission (2 37 SCRA 18 4 ). (CSC v. P ed ro O . Dacoycoy, G.R. No . 1 3 58 0 5 , Apri l 2 9 , 1999 , En Banc [ Par d o ] )

2 08. W hat is preventive suspension? Dis c uss its nature .

Held: Impos ed during th e pe nde ncy of an a dministrativ e inve stigation , pre ve ntive susp e nsion is not a p e na lty in its elf . It is m e rely a m e asur e of precaution so that th e e mployee who is charg ed may b e se parat ed, f or obvious r e asons , f rom th e sce ne of his a lle ged



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misfe asan ce while the sam e is be ing inve stigat ed . Thus pr e ve ntive susp e nsion is distinct f romthe administrative pe na lty o f re mova l f rom o ff ice such as th e one me ntioned in Sec . 8(d) o f P.D.N o. 807 . While the f orme r may b e impos ed on a r e spon de nt during th e inve stigation o f the charg e s against him , the latt e r is th e pe na lty which may on ly be me t ed upon him at th e t e rmination o f the inve stigation or th e f inal disposition o f the cas e . (B e ja, Sr . v. CA, 207 SCRA 6 89 , March 3 1 , 199 2 [ Rom e ro ] )

209. Dis c uss the k in d s o f preventive suspension un d er the C ivi l S ervi c e L a w. W hen may a c ivi l servi c e emp l oyee p l a c e d un d er preventive suspension be entit l e d to c ompensation?

Held: The re are t wo kinds o f pre ve ntive susp e nsion o f civil se rvice e mployee s who ar e charg ed with o ffe nse s punishab le by r e mova l or susp e nsion : (1 ) pr e ve ntive susp e nsion p e ndinginve stigation (Sec . 5 1 , Civil Se rvice Law, EO No. 2 9 2 ) an d (2 ) pr e ve ntive susp e nsion p e ndingapp e al if the pe na lty impos ed by th e disciplining authority is susp e nsion or dismissa l and, af t e rre view, the re spon de nt is exone rat ed (Sec tion 4 7 , par. 4 , Civil Se rvice Law, EO N o. 2 9 2 ).

Pre ve ntive susp e nsion p e nding inve stigation is not a p e na lty. It is a m e asur e int e nded toe nab le the disciplining authority to inv e stigat e charg e s against r e spon de nt by pr e ve nting th e latt e r f rom intimi dating or in any way influe ncing witne sse s against him. I f the inve stigation isnot f inished and a dec ision is not r e nde red within that p e riod, the susp e nsion will be lif t ed and the re spon de nt will automati cally be re instat ed . I f af t e r inve stigation r e spon de nt is f ound innoce nt o f the charg e s an d is exone rat ed, he shou ld be re instat ed . Howe ve r, no compe nsationwas due f or th e pe riod of pre ve ntive susp e nsion p e nding inve stigation. Th e Civil Se rvice Act o f 1 9 5 9 (R. A. N o. 226 0) provi ding f or compe nsation in su ch a case once the re spon de nt wasexone rat ed was r e vised in 1 9 75 and the provision on th e paym e nt o f sa larie s during susp e nsionwas dele t ed .

But a lthough it is h eld that e mployee s who ar e pre ve ntively susp e nded pe ndinginve stigation ar e not e ntit led to th e paym e nt o f the ir sa larie s e ve n if the y ar e exone rat ed, the yare e ntit led to compe nsation f or th e pe riod of the ir susp e nsion p e nding app e al if e ve ntua lly th e yare f ound innoce nt.

Pre ve ntive susp e nsion p e nding inve stigation x x x is not a p e na lty but on ly a m e ans o f e nab ling th e disciplining authority to conduct an unhamp e red inve stigation. On th e othe r han d, pre ve ntive susp e nsion p e nding app e al is actua lly punitiv e although it is in effec t subs eq ue nt lyconside red ille ga l if re spon de nt is exone rat ed and the administrativ e dec ision f inding him gui lty isre ve rsed . He nce, he shou ld be re instat ed with f ull pay f or th e pe riod of the susp e nsion. ( Gloria v. CA, G.R. No . 1 3 1 0 1 2, Apri l 2 1 , 1999 , En Banc [ Me n d oz a ] )

21 0. W hat is the d o c trine o f f orgiveness or c on d onation? Does it app l y to pen d ing c rimina l c ases?

Held: 1 . A pub lic off icial cannot b e re moved f or a dministrativ e misconduct committ ed during a prior t e rm, since his re-elec tion to o ff ice ope rat e s as a condonation o f the off ice r s

pre vious mis conduct to th e ex t e nt o f cutting o ff the right to r e move him th e ref or. Th e f ore goingrule, howe ve r, f inds no app lication to crimina l case s pe nding against p e titione r. (Aguina ld o v.Santos, 2 1 2 SCRA 76 8 , 773 [199 2 ] )

2 . A reelec t ed local off icial may not b e held administratively a ccountab le f or mis conduct committ ed during his prior t e rm o f off ice . The rationa le f or this ho lding is that whe n th e elec torat e put him ba ck into o ff ice, it is pr e sumed that it did so with f ull knowledge of his life and chara ct e r, including his past mis conduct. I f, armed with su ch knowled ge, it sti ll reelec ts him , the n su ch r eelec tion is conside red a condonation o f his past mis deed s. (Mayor Alv in B . G arcia v. H on . Arturo C . Mojica, e t a l. , G.R. No . 1 3 9 0 4 3, S e pt . 1 0, 1999 [Q uisum b ing ] )

211 . W hat are the situations c overe d by the l a w on nepotism?

Held: Unde r th e def inition o f ne potism , one is gui lty o f ne potism i f an appointm e nt isissued in f avor o f a r elative within th e third civil de gree of consanguinity or a ff inity of any o f the f ollowing:

a) appointing authority;b) recomme nding authority;c) chief of the bure au or o ff ice ; an d d) pe rson exe rcising imm ed iat e sup e rvision ove r th e appoint ee .



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Cle arly, the re are f our situations cove red . In th e last t wo m e ntioned situations , it isimmat e rial who th e appointing or r ecomme nding authority is. To constitut e a vio lation o f the law, it su ff ice s that an appointm e nt is ex t e nded or issu ed in f avor o f a r elative within th e third civil de gree of consanguinity or a ff inity of the chief of the bure au or o ff ice, or th e pe rsonexe rcising imm ed iat e sup e rvision ove r th e appoint ee . (CSC v. P e dro O . Dacoycoy, G.R. No .

1 3 58 0 5 , April 2 9 , 1999 , En Banc [ Pardo ] )

212. Distinguish term o f o ff i c e f rom tenure o f the in c um bent .

Held: In th e law of pub lic off ice rs, the re is a s e tt led distinction b e t wee n t e rm and t e nure . [T]he t e rm o f an o ff ice must b e distinguish ed f rom th e t e nure of the incumbe nt. Th e t e rm m e ans th e time during which th e off ice r may claim to ho ld off ice as o f right , and f ixe s th e int e rval af t e r which th e se ve ral incumbe nts sha ll succeed one anoth e r. Th e t e nure re pre se ntsthe t e rm during which th e incumbe nt a ctua lly ho lds th e off ice . The t e rm o f off ice is not a ffec t ed by th e hold-ove r. Th e t e nure may b e short e r than th e t e rm f or r e asons within or b e yond the powe r o f the incumbe nt. (Th el ma P . G amin de v. COA, G.R. No . 14 033 5 , D e c . 1 3, 2000, En Banc [ Par d o ] )

213. Dis c uss the operation o f the rotationa l p l an inso f ar as the term o f o ff i c e o f the C hairman an d M em bers o f the C onstitutiona l C ommissions is c on c erne d.

Held: In R epu bl i c v . I mperia l (96 P hi l. 770 [19 55 ] ) , we said t ha t t he opera t i on o f t he r ot a t i ona l p l a n require s t wo con di t i ons, bot h i ndi spe nsa bl e to i ts worka bi l i ty: (1 ) t ha t t he t erm s o f t he fir st t hree ( 3) Commi ss i oner s s h ou l d st ar t on a comm on da t e , a nd ( 2 ) t ha t a ny va c a ncy due to dea t h , re si gna t i on o r di sa bi l i ty b ef ore t he expira t i on o f t he t erm sh ou l d only be fi ll ed only f or t he u nexpired ba l a nc e of t he t erm .

Cons eque ntly, t he t erm s o f t he fir st Chairme n a nd Commi ssi oner s o f t he Const i t u t i ona l Commi ss i ons u nder t he 19 87 Const i t u t i on mu st st ar t on a comm on da t e , irre spe ct ive of t he varia t i ons i n t he da t e s o f app oi nt me nts a nd qua l ifi c a t i ons o f t he app oi nt ee s, i n o rder t ha t t he expira t i on o f t he fir st t erm s o f seve n, five a nd t hree year s s h ou l d l ead to t he re gu l ar re c urre nc e of t he t wo-year i nt erva l be t wee n t he expira t i on o f t he t erm s.

App lyi ng t he f ore goi ng con di t i ons x x x, we ru l e t ha t t he appr opria t e st ar t i ng p oi nt o f t he t erm s o f offi c e of t he fir st app oi nt ee s to t he Const i t u t i ona l Commi ss i ons u nder t he 19 87 Const i t u t i on mu st b e on F e bruar y 2 , 19 87, t he da t e of t he ad op t i on of t he 19 87 Const i t u t i on. Inc a se of a be l a t ed app oi nt me nt o r qua l ifi c a t i on, t he i nt erva l be t wee n t he st ar t o f t he t erm a nd t he a ct ua l qua l ifi c a t i on o f t he app oi nt ee mu st b e cou nt ed a gai nst t he l a tt er . (Th el ma P . G amin dev. COA, G.R. No . 14 033 5 , D e c . 1 3, 2000, En Banc [ Par d o ] )

2 14 . W hat is the ho ld- over d o c trine? W hat is its purpose?

Held: 1 . The conce pt o f holdove r whe n app lied to a pub lic off ice r imp lie s that th e off ice

has a f ixed t e rm an d the incumbe nt is ho lding onto th e succeed ing t e rm. It is usua lly provided by law that o ff ice rs elec t ed or appoint ed f or a f ixed t e rm sha ll re main in o ff ice not on ly f or that t e rm but unti l the ir succe ssors hav e bee n elec t ed and qua lif ied . Whe re this provision is f ound, the off ice doe s not b ecome vacant upon th e expiration o f the t e rm if the re is no su cce ssorelec t ed and qualif ied to assum e it , but th e pre se nt in cumbe nt will carry ov e r unti l his su cce ssor iselec t ed and qua lif ied, e ve n though it b e be yond the t e rm f ixed by law.

Abse nt an expre ss or imp lied constitutiona l or statutory provision to th e contrary , anoff ice r is e ntit led to stay in o ff ice unti l his su cce ssor is appoint ed or chos e n an d has qua lif ied .The le gislative int e nt o f not a llowing ho ldove r must b e cle ar ly expre ssed or at le ast imp lied in th e le gislative e nactme nt , othe rwise it is re asonab le to assum e that th e law-making bo dy f avors th e sam e .

Indeed, the law abhors a va cuum in pub lic off ice s, and courts g e ne rally indulge in th e strong pr e sumption against a le gislative int e nt to cre at e, by statut e, a condition which may r e su lt in an exec utive or a dministrativ e off ice becoming , f or any p e riod of time, wholly vacant orunoccupied by on e lawf ully authoriz ed to exe rcise its f unctions. This is f ounded on obviousconside rations o f pub lic policy, f or th e principle of holdove r is sp ecif ically int e nded to pr e ve nt pub lic conve nie nce f rom su ffe ring b ecaus e of a va cancy an d to avoi d a hiatus in th e pe rf orman ce of gove rnme nt f unctions. (Le caro z v. San d igan b ayan, 30 5 SCRA 3 9 7, March 2 5 , 1999 , 2 n d Di v. [ B ell osi llo] )



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2 . The rule is s e tt led that un le ss holding ov e r b e expre ss ly or imp liedly prohibit ed, the incumbe nt may continu e to ho ld ove r unti l some one else is elec t ed and qua lif ied to assum e the off ice . This rule is de man ded by th e most obvious r eq uire me nts o f pub lic policy, f or without it the re must f req ue nt ly be case s whe re, f rom a f ailure to elec t or a r ef usa l or n e glect to qua lif y, the off ice would be vacant an d the pub lic se rvice e ntirely susp e nded . Othe rwise stat ed, the

purpos e is to pr e ve nt a hiatus in th e gove rnme nt p e nding th e time whe n th e succe ssor may b e chos e n an d induct ed into o ff ice . ( G alarosa v. Val e ncia, 227 SCRA 72 8 , No v. 11 , 199 3, En Banc [ Da v id e , J r .] )

2 15 . W hat is resignation? W hat are the re q uisites o f a va l i d resignation?

Held: 1 . It is th e act o f giving up or th e act o f an o ff ice r by which h e decl ine s his o ff ice and re noun ce s th e f urth e r right to us e it. It is an expre ssion o f the incumbe nt in som e f orm , expre ss or imp lied, of the int e ntion to surr e nde r, re noun ce, and relinquish th e off ice and the acce ptan ce by compe t e nt an d lawf ul authority. To constitut e a comple t e and ope rative re signation f rom pub lic off ice, the re must b e: (a) an int e ntion to r elinquish a part o f the t e rm; (b)an a ct o f relinquishme nt; an d (c) an a cce ptan ce by th e prop e r authority. Th e last on e is req uired by re ason o f Article 2 38 of the Re vised Pe na l Code . (Sangguniang Bayan of San An d r e s, Catan duan e s v. CA, 2 84 SCRA 276, Jan . 1 6, 1998 )

2 . Re signation x x x is a f actua l que stion an d its ele me nts ar e be yond quibble: the re must b e an int e nt to r e sign an d the int e nt must b e coupled by a cts o f relinquishme nt (G onz ale sv. H e rnan dez, 2 S CRA 22 8 [ 1 96 1 ]). The validity of a r e signation is not gov e rned by any f orma l req uire me nt as to f orm. It can b e ora l. It can b e writt e n. It can b e expre ss. It can b e implied . As long as th e re signation is cle ar , it must b e give n le ga l effec t. (Estra d a v. D e si e rto, G.R.Nos . 14 67 1 0 -15 , March 2, 200 1 , e n Banc [ Puno ] )

21 6. W hat is a ban d onment o f an o ff i c e? W hat are its re q uisites? H o w is it d istinguishe d f rom resignation?

Held: Aban d onment o f an o ff i c e ha s b een d e f ine d a s t he volunta ry relinq ui shment o f an o ff i c e by t he hold e r, wit h t he intention o f te rminatin g h i s p o sse ss ion an d c ont rol t he reo f. I n d ee d , a ban d onment o f o ff i c e i s a spe c ie s o f re si gnation ; while re si gnation in gene ral i s a f o rmal relinq ui shment, a ban d onment i s a volunta ry relinqui shment t hro ugh non use r.

Aban d onment spr in gs fr om an d i s a cc om panie d by d eli be ration an d free d om o f choi c e .It s c on c omitant e ff e c t i s t hat t he f o rme r hold e r o f an o ff i c e c an no lon ge r le gally re po sse ss it e ven by f o rc i ble reo ccupan cy.

Clea r intention to a ban d on sho uld b e mani f e ste d by t he o ff i c e r c on c e rne d. Suchintention ma y be expre ss o r in f e rre d from hi s own c on duc t . Thus , t he f ailure to pe rf o rm t he dutie s p e rtainin g to t he o ff i c e m us t be wit h t he o ff i c e r sa c t ual o r im pute d intention to a ban d on

an d r elinq ui sh t he o ff i c e . Aban d onment o f an o ff i c e i s not wholly a matte r o f intention ; it re sult sfrom a c om plete a ban d onment o f du tie s o f such c ontin uan c e t hat t he law will in f e r a relinq ui shment . The re f o re, t he re a re two e ssential element s o f a ban d onment ; f i rst, an intention to a ban d on an d , se c on d , an o ve rt o r exte rnal a c t by whi ch t he intention i s c a rrie d into e ff e c t .(Sangguniang Bayan of San An d r e s, Catan d uan e s v. CA, 2 84 SCRA 276, Jan . 1 6, 1998 )

217. W hen may un c onsente d trans f ers be c onsi d ere d anathema to se c urity o f tenure?

Held: As h eld in S ta . M ar ia v . L opez (31 SCR A 637, 6 5 3 cit ing I ba nez v . C omm issio n o nE le c t io ns, L -26 55 8, Apr il 27, 1967, 19 SCR A 1002, 1012 a nd S e c t io n 12 o f t he T ax C ode ) .

"x x x t he r ule t hat o utlaw s unc o nse nted tra nsf er s a s a nat hema to se cur it y o f te nure appl ie s o nly to a n o ffic er who is appo inted - n ot merel y a ssig ned - to a part icular stat io n. Such a r ule doe s n ot pr [o ]sc r ibe a tra nsf er c arr ied o ut under a spe cific stat ute t hat empower s t he head o f a n age ncy to per iod ic ally rea ssig n t he emplo yee s a nd o ffic er sin order to improve t he serv ic e o f t he age ncy. x x x"

T he g uara ntee o f se cur it y o f te nure under t he C o nst it ut io n is n ot a g uara ntee o f perpet ual emplo yme nt . I t o nly mea ns t hat a n emplo yee c a nnot be dism issed ( or tra nsf erred ) f rom t he serv ic e f or c a use s ot her t ha n t ho se prov ided by law a nd a f ter due pro c e ss is a cc orded t he emplo yee . What it seek s to preve nt is c apr icio us exer cise o f t he power to dism iss. Bu t where it



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is th e law-making authority its elf which f urnish e s th e groun d f or th e trans fe r o f a class o f e mployee s, no su ch capriciousne ss can b e raised f or so long as th e re med y propos ed to cure ape rce ived e vil is g e rman e to th e purpos e s o f the law. (Agripino A. D e G u z man, J r ., e t al . v.COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 2 9118 , July 19 , 2000, En Banc [ Purisima ] )

218. Dis c uss Abo l ition o f Off i c e?

Held: The cre ation an d abo lition o f pub lic off ice s is primari ly a le gislative f unction. It isacknowled ged that Congr e ss may abo lish any o ff ice it cre at e s without impairing th e off ice r's right to continu e in th e position h eld and that su ch po we r may b e exe rcised f or various r e asons , suchas th e lack of f unds or in th e int e re st o f economy. Ho we ve r, in orde r f or th e abo lition to b e valid, it must b e made in goo d f aith , not f or po litical or p e rsona l re asons , or in or de r to circumve nt th e constitutiona l security o f t e nure of civil se rvice e mployee s.

An abo lition o f off ice connot e s an int e ntion to do a way with su ch o ff ice wholly an d pe rman e nt ly, as th e word "abo lished" de not e s. Wh e re one off ice is abo lished and re placed withanoth e r o ff ice ve st ed with simi lar f unctions , the abo lition is a le ga l nullity. Thus , in U .P. B oard of R e ge nts v. Rasu l (200 S CR A 68 5 [1991] ) we said:

It is tru e that a va lid and bona f ide abo lition o f an o ff ice de nie s to th e incumbe nt the right to s ecurity o f t e nure ( De la L lana v. Alba , 112 S CR A 29 4 [1982] ) . Howe ve r, inthis case, the re naming an d re stru cturing o f the PGH and its compon e nt units cannot give rise to a va lid and bona f ide abo lition o f the position o f PGH D irec tor. This isbecaus e whe re the abo lished off ice and the off ice s cre at ed in its p lace have similarf unctions , the abo lition lacks goo d f aith (Jos e L . Gue rre ro v. Hon. Antonio V . Ariz aba l, G.R. No. 81928 , June 4 , 1990 , 186 S CR A 108 [1990] ) . We he re by app ly the principle e nunciat ed in Cez ar Z. D ario v. Hon. Sa lvador M. Mison (176 S CR A 8 4 [1989] ) that abo lition which m e rely chang e s th e nome nclatur e of positions is inva lid and doe s not re su lt in th e re mova l of the incumbe nt.

The abov e not withstan ding, and assuming that th e abo lition o f the position o f the PGH D irec tor an d the cre ation o f a U P -PGH M ed ical Ce nt e r D irec tor ar e valid, the re mova l of the incumbe nt is sti ll not justif ied f or th e re ason that th e dutie s an d f unctionsof the t wo positions ar e basi cally th e sam e .

This was a lso our ru ling in Gu e rre ro v. Ariz aba l (186 S CR A 108 [1990] ) , whe re in we decl ared that th e substantia l ide ntity in th e f unctions b e t wee n th e t wo o ff ice s was in dicia o f bad f aith in th e re mova l of pe titione r pursuant to a r e organi z ation. (Ale xis C . Canoni z a d o, e t a l. v.Hon . Ale xan de r P . Aguirr e , e t a l. , G.R. No . 1 33 1 32, Jan . 2 5 , 2000, En Banc [G on z aga -Re y e s ] )

219. W hat is reorganization? W hen is it va l i d ? W hen is it inva l i d ?

Held: 1 . Re organization ta ke s p lace whe n th e re is an a lt e ration o f the ex isting stru cture

of gove rnme nt o ff ice s or units th e re in, including th e line s o f contro l, authority an d re sponsibi litybe t wee n th e m. It invo lve s a r ed uction o f pe rsonn el, conso lidation o f off ice s, or abo lition th e re of by re ason o f economy or r ed undancy of f unctions. N atura lly, it may r e su lt in th e loss o f one'sposition through r e mova l or abo lition o f an o ff ice . Howe ve r, f or a r e organization to b e valid, it must a lso pass th e t e st o f good f aith , laid down in D ario v. Mison ( 1 76 SC R A 8 4 [ 1 989] ) :

x x x As a g e ne ra l rule, a r e organization is carried out in "good f aith" if it is f orthe purpos e of economy or to ma ke bure aucracy mor e eff icie nt. In that e ve nt , nodismissa l (in case of dismissa l ) or s e paration a ctua lly occurs b ecaus e the position its elf ce ase s to ex ist. And in that case, security o f t e nure would not b e a Chine se wall. Be that as it may , if the "abo lition" which is nothing else but a s e paration or r e mova l, isdone f or po litical re asons or purpos ely to defe at s ecurity o f t e nure, or oth e rwise not ingood f aith , no va lid "abo lition" take s p lace and what e ve r "abo lition" is done, is void abinitio. The re is an inva lid "abo lition" as whe re the re is me rely a chang e of nome nclatur e of positions , or whe re claims o f economy ar e belied by th e ex ist e nce of amp le f unds.

(Ale xis C . Canoni z a d o, e t a l. v. H on . Ale xan de r P . Aguirr e , e t a l. , G.R. No . 1 33 1 32, J an . 2 5 , 2000, En Banc [G on z aga -Re y e s ] )

2 . While the Pre side nt s powe r to r e organiz e can not b e de nied, this doe s not m e anhowe ve r that th e re organization its elf is prop e rly ma de in accordance with law. Well-se tt led is



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the rule that r e organization is r e garded as va lid provided it is pursu ed in goo d f aith. Thus , inD ario v. Mison , this Court has ha d the occasion to clarif y that :

As a g e ne ral rule, a r e organization is carried out in good f aith if it is f or th e purpos e of economy or to ma ke the bure aucracy mor e eff icie nt. In that e ve nt no dismissa l orse paration a ctua lly occurs b ecaus e the position its elf ce as e s to exist. And in that case

the security o f t e nure would not b e a Chine se wall. Be that as it may , if the abo litionwhich is nothing else but a s e paration or r e mova l, is done f or po litical re asons orpurpos ely to defe at s ecurity o f t e nure, or oth e rwise not in goo d f aith , no va lid abo litiontake s p lace and what e ve r abo lition done is void ab initio. Th e re is an inva lid abo lition aswhe re the re is me rely a chang e of nome nclatur e of positions or whe re claims o f economyare belied by th e ex ist e nce of amp le f unds. (176 S CR A 8 4)

(Larin v. Ex e cuti ve S e cr e tary, 2 8 0 SCRA 7 1 3, Oct . 1 6, 199 7)

220. W hat are the c ir c umstan c es evi d en c ing ba d f aith in the remova l o f emp l oyees as a resu l t o f reorganization an d w hi c h may give rise to a cl aim f or reinstatement or reappointment ) ?

Held:

1 ) Whe re the re is a signi f icant in cre as e in th e numb e r of positions in th e new sta ff ingpatt e rn o f the de partm e nt or ag e ncy conce rned ;

2 ) Whe re an o ff ice is abo lished and anoth e r pe rf orming substantia lly the sam e f unctionsis cre at ed ;

3) Whe re incumbe nts ar e re placed by thos e le ss qua lif ied in t e rms o f status o f appointm e nt , pe rf orman ce and me rit;

4) Whe re the re is a r eclassi f ication o f off ice s in th e de partm e nt or ag e ncy conce rned and the reclassi f ied off ice s p e rf orm substantia lly the sam e f unctions as th e origina l off ice s;

5 ) Whe re the re mova l violat e s th e orde r of se paration provi ded in Sec tion 3 he re of . (S e c . 2, R. A. No . 66 5 6 ; Larin v. Exe cuti ve S e cr e tary, 2 8 0 SCRA 7 1 3, Oct . 1 6, 199 7)

ELEC TI ON LAWS

221. Dis c uss the reason behin d the prin c ip l e o f b a ll ot se c re c y . M ay the c on d u c t o f exit po ll s transgress the san c tity an d the se c re c y o f the ba ll ot to j usti f y its prohi bition?

Held: The re ason b e hind the principle of ba llot s ec recy is to avoi d vot e buying throughvot e r ide ntif ication. Thus , vot e rs ar e prohibit ed f rom exhibiting th e cont e nts o f the ir off icial ba llots to oth e r pe rsons , f rom ma king copie s th e re of, or f rom putting distinguishing mar ksthe re on so as to b e ide ntif ied . Also pros cribed is f inding out th e cont e nts o f the ba llots cast byparticular vot e rs or disclosing thos e of disab led or illit e rat e vot e rs who hav e bee n assist ed .Cle arly, what is f orbidde n is th e asso ciation o f vot e rs with th e ir re spec tive vot e s, f or th e purpos e of assuring that th e vot e s hav e bee n cast in a ccordance with th e instru ctions o f a thir d party.

This re sult cannot , howe ve r, be achie ved me rely through th e vot e rs ve rba l and conf ide ntia l disclosur e to a po llst e r of whom th e y hav e vot ed f or.

In ex it po lls, the cont e nts o f the off icial ba llot ar e not a ctua lly exposed . Furth e rmor e, the re velation o f whom an elec tor has vot ed f or is not compu lsory, but vo luntary. Vot e rs may a lsochoos e not to r e ve al the ir ide ntitie s. In deed, narro wly tai lored count e rme asur e s may b e pre scribed by th e Comelec, so as to minimiz e or suppr e ss in cide nta l prob le ms in th e conduct o f ex it po lls, without transgr e ssing th e f undame nta l rights o f our p e ople . (ABS -CBN Broa d casting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 33 48 6, Jan . 2 8 , 2000, En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

222. Dis c uss the meaning an d purpose o f resi d en c y re q uirement in E l e c tion L a w.

Held: 1 . The me aning an d purpos e of the re side ncy req uire me nt we re explained rece nt ly in our dec ision in Aquino v . Comelec (2 4 8 SCRA 4 00, 4 20- 4 2 1 [ 1 99 5 ] ) , as f ollows:

X x x [T]he place whe re a party a ctua lly or constru ctively has his p e rman e nt home , whe re he , no matt e r whe re he may b e f oun d at any gi ve n tim e , eve ntua llyint e nds to r e turn an d re main, i. e ., his domicile , is that to which th e Constitution r efe rswhe n it sp e aks o f re side nce f or th e purpos e s o f elec tion law. The mani fe st purpos e of this dev iation f rom th e usua l conce ptions o f re side ncy in law as explained in G alle go v .



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V era is to exclude st ra nger s o r newc omer s un fa miliar with th e conditions a nd need s o f the community fr om t ak ing ad va nt a ge of fa vora ble circumst a nce s ex isting in th a t community f or elec toral ga in. While there is nothing wr ong with th e prac tice of e st a blishing re side nce in a give n area f or mee ting elec tion law req uire me nts , thisnone thele ss defea ts th e e sse nce of re pre se nt a tion , which is to p lace thr ough th e a sse nt of vot er s thos e most cogniza nt a nd se nsitive to th e need s o f a par ticular dist r ict , if a

ca ndida t e falls sho r t o f the per iod of re side ncy ma nda t ed by law f or him to qualif y. Th a t pur pos e could be obvious ly be st m e t by in dividuals who h a ve e ither had ac tual re side nce in th e area f or a give n p er iod or who h a ve bee n domiciled in th e sa me area e ither byor igin or by choice .

(Marcita Mam b a P e r ez v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 33 944 , Oct . 2 8 , 1999 , En Banc [ Me ndo z a ] )

2 . The Constitution an d the law req uire s re side nce as a qua lif ication f or s eek ing an d holding elec tive pub lic off ice, in orde r to giv e candidat e s th e opportunity to b e f amiliar with th e need s, diff icultie s, aspirations , pot e ntia ls f or gro wth an d all matt e rs vita l to th e welf are of the irconstitu e ncie s; likew ise, it e nab le s th e elec torat e to e valuat e the off ice seeke rs qua lif ications an d f itne ss f or th e job th e y aspir e f or. Inasmu ch as Vi ce nt e Y . Emano has prov e n that h e, toge the rwith his f amily, (1 ) ha d actua lly re sided in a hous e he bought in 1 9 73 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2 )had actua lly held off ice the re during his thr ee t e rms as provin cial gove rnor o f M isamis Orie nta l, the provincial capito l be ing locat ed the re in; an d (3) has r e gist e red as vot e r in th e city during th e pe riod req uired by law, he could not b e dee med a strang e r or n ewc ome r whe n h e ran f or an d was ov e rwhelmingly vot ed as city mayor. E lection laws must b e libe rally constru ed to giv e effec t to th e popu lar man dat e . (Torayno, Sr . v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 5 7 4 , Aug . 9 , 2000, En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

3. Ge ne rally, in req uiring candidat e s to hav e a minimum p e riod of re side nce in th e are ain which th e y s eek to b e elec t ed, the Constitution or th e law int e nds to pr e ve nt th e possibi lity of a strang e r or n ewcome r una cquaint ed with th e conditions an d need s o f a community an d not ide ntif ied with th e latt e r f rom [seek ing] an elec tive off ice to s e rve that community. Suchprovision is aim ed at excluding outsi de rs f rom ta king a dvantag e of f avorab le circumstan ce sex isting in that community f or elec tora l gain. Estab lishing r e side nce in a community m e rely tomee t an elec tion law req uire me nt defe ats th e purpos e of re pre se ntation : to elec t through th e ass e nt o f vot e rs thos e most cognizant an d se nsitive to th e need s o f the community. Thispurpos e is be st m e t by in dividuals who hav e e ithe r ha d actua l re side nce in th e are a f or a giv e npe riod or who hav e bee n domiciled in th e sam e are a e ithe r by origin or by choice . (Torayno, Sr . v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 5 7 4 , Aug . 9 , 2000, En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

22 3. Does the f a c t that a person is registere d as a voter in one d istri c t proo f that he is not d omi c i l e d in another d istri c t?

Held: The f act that a p e rson is r e gist e red as a vot e r in on e district is not proo f that h e isnot domiciled in anoth e r district. Thus , in F ay pon v. Quirino (96 Phi l. 29 4 [19 54 ] ) , this Court held that th e re gistration o f a vot e r in a p lace othe r than his r e side nce of origin is not su ff icie nt

to conside r him to hav e aban doned or lost his r e side nce . (Marcita Mam b a P e r ez v.COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 33 944 , Oct . 2 8 , 1999 , En Banc [ Me n d o z a ] )

22 4 . W hat is the L one C an d i d ate L a w ? W hat are its sa l ient provisions?

Answer: The Lone Candidat e Law is Re pu b lic Act No . 8 2 95 , e nact ed on J u ne 6,1997. Se ction 2 the re of provide s that Upon th e expiration o f the de adline f or th e f iling o f the c e rtif icat e of candidacy in a sp e cial ele ction ca lled to f ill a vacancy in an ele ctive position oth e rthan f or Pre side nt an d Vic e-Pre side nt, whe n th e re is on ly one (1) qu alif ied candidat e f or s u chposition, th e lone candidat e sha ll be proc laimed ele ct ed to th e position by prop e r proc laimingbody of the Commission on E le ctions withou t ho lding th e spe cial ele ction u pon c e rtif ication by th e Commission on E le ctions that h e is th e only can didat e f or th e off ic e and is th e re by dee med ele ct ed .

Se ction 3 the re of provide s that the lone candidat e so proc laimed sha ll ass u me off ic e not e arlie r than th e scheduled ele ction day, in th e abs e nc e of any lawful grou nd to de ny due cou rse or canc el the c e rtif icat e of candidacy in or de r to pr e ve nt s u ch proc lamation, as provi ded f oru nde r Se ctions 69 an d 7 8 of Batas Pambansa Bi lang 88 1 a lso known as th e Omnibu s Ele ctionCode .

22 5 . W ho are d is q ua l i f ie d to run in a spe c ia l e l e c tion un d er the L one C an d i d ate L a w ?



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Answer: Sec tion 4 o f the Lone Candidat e Law provide s that In a dd ition to th e disqua lif ications m e ntioned in Sec tions 12 and 6 8 of the Omnibus E lection Code and Sec tion 4 0 of Re pub lic Act No. 716 0, othe rwise known as th e Local Gove rnme nt Code, whe ne ve r th e e vide nce of guilt is strong , the f ollowing p e rsons ar e disqua lif ied to run in a sp ec ial elec tion called to f ill the vacancy in an elec tive off ice, to wit :

a) Any elec tive off icial who has r e signed f rom his o ff ice by a cce pting an appointiv e off ice or f or what e ve r re ason which h e pre vious ly occupied but has caus ed tobecome vacant due to his r e signation; an d

b) Any p e rson who , direc t ly or in direc t ly, coe rce s, bribe s, thre at e ns, harass e s, intimidat e s or a ctua lly caus e s, inflicts or pro duce s any vio le nce, in jury, punishm e nt , tortur e, damag e, loss or disadvantag e to any p e rson or p e rsons aspiring to b ecome a candidat e or that o f the immed iat e me mbe r o f his f amily, his honor or prop e rtythat is m e ant to eliminat e all othe r pot e ntial candidat e .

226. W hat is the purpose o f the l a w in re q uiring the f i l ing o f c erti f i c ate o f c an d i d a c y an d in f ixing the time l imit there f or?

Held: The e vide nt purpos e of the law in req uiring th e f iling o f ce rtif icat e of candidacyand in f ixing th e time limit th e ref or ar e: (a) to e nab le the vot e rs to know, at le ast si xty daysbef ore the re gular elec tion , the candidat e s among whom th e y ar e to ma ke the choice, and (b) toavoid conf usion an d inconve nie nce in th e tabu lation o f the vot e s cast. For i f the law did not conf ine the choice or elec tion by th e vot e rs to th e duly re gist e red candidat e s, the re might b e asmany p e rsons vot ed f or as th e re are vot e rs, and vot e s might b e cast e ve n f or un known orf ictitious p e rsons as a mar k to i de ntif y th e vot e s in f avor o f a candidat e f or anoth e r o ff ice in th e sam e elec tion. (Miran d a v. Ab aya, G.R. No . 1 363 51 , Ju ly 2 8 , 1999 )

227. M ay a d is q ua l i f ie d c an d i d ate an d w hose c erti f i c ate o f c an d i d a c y w as d enie d d ue c ourse an d/ or c an c e l e d b y the C ome l e c be va l i dl y su bstitute d ?

Held: Eve n on th e most basi c and f undame nta l principle s, it is re adily unde rstoo d that the conce pt o f a substitut e pre suppos e s th e exist e nce of the pe rson to b e substitut ed, f or ho w can a p e rson ta ke the place of some body who doe s not ex ist or who n e ve r was. Th e Court hasno oth e r choice but to ru le that in a ll instan ce s e nume rat ed in Sec tion 77 of the Omnibus E lectionCode, the exist e nce of a va lid ce rtif icat e of candidacy se asonab ly f iled is a r eq uisit e sine qua non.

All told, a disqua lif ied candidat e may on ly be substitut ed if he had a va lid ce rtif icat e of candidacy in th e f irst p lace becaus e, if the disqua lif ied candidat e did not hav e a va lid and se asonab ly f iled ce rtif icat e of candidacy, he is an d was not a candidat e at a ll. I f a p e rson wasnot a candidat e, he cannot b e substitut ed unde r Sec tion 77 of the Code . (Miran d a v. Ab aya, G.R. No . 1 363 51 , Ju ly 2 8 , 1999 , e n Banc [ Mel o ] )

228. S hou ld the votes c ast f or the su bstitute d c an d i d ate be c onsi d ere d votes f or the su bstitute

c an d i d ate?

Answer: Re pu b lic Act No . 9 006, other w ise k no w n as the F air E l e c tion Ac t , p ro vides in Se c tion 12 thereof: In c ase of va l id s ubstit utions after the offi c ia l ba ll ots ha ve been printed ,the votes c ast for the s ubstit uted c andidates sha ll be c onsidered as stra y votes but sha ll not in va l idate the w ho l e ba ll ot . F or this pur pose , the offi c ia l ba ll ots sha ll pro vide s pa c es w here the voters ma y w rite the na me of the s ubstit ute c andidates if the y are votin g for the l atter: Pro vided ,ho w e ver , That if the s ubstit ute c andidate is of the sa me fa mi ly na me , this pro vision sha ll not a pply.

22 9. W hat is the e ff e c t o f the f i l ing o f c erti f i c ate o f c an d i d a c y by e l e c tive o ff i c ia l s?

Answer: COMELEC Res olutio n No . 3636 , promu l gate d M ar c h 1, 2001, imp l ementing the F air E l e c tion Ac t (R.A. N o . 9006 ) pro vi d e s in Se c tion 26 thereof: an y e l e c ti ve offi c ia l,whether nationa l or l o c a l, who ha s fi l e d a c ertifi c ate of c an d i d a cy for the same or an y other offi c e sha ll not be c on si d ere d re signe d from hi s offi c e .

N ote that Se c tion 6 7 of the Omni bu s E l e c tion Co d e an d the fir st pro vi so in the thir d paragraph of Se c tion 11 of R epu bl i c Ac t N o . 8436 whi c h mo d ifie d s ai d Se c tion 6 7, were expre sslyrepea l e d an d ren d ere d ineffe c ti ve , re spe c ti ve ly, by Se c tion 14 (R epea l ing Cl au se ) of The F air E l e c tion Ac t (R.A. N o . 9006 ) .



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230. W hat k in d o f materia l misrepresentation is c ontemp l ate d b y S e c tion 78 o f the Omni bus E l e c tion C o d e as a groun d f or d is q ua l i f i c ation o f a c an d i d ate? Does it in cl u d e the use o f surname?

Held: The ref ore, it may b e concluded that th e mat e rial misre pre se ntation cont e mplat ed

by Sec tion 78 of the (Omnibus E lection) Code refe rs to qua lif ications f or elec tive off ice . Thisconclusion is str e ngth e ned by th e f act that th e cons eque nce s impos ed upon a candidat e guilty o f having ma de a f alse re pre se ntation in his ce rtif icat e of candidacy are grav e to pr e ve nt th e candidat e f rom running or , if elec t ed, f rom s e rving, or to pros ecut e him f or vio lation o f the elec tion laws. It could not hav e bee n th e int e ntion o f the law to de prive a p e rson o f such a basi c and substantia l political right to b e vot ed f or a pub lic off ice upon just any inno cuous mista ke .

[ A]side f rom th e req uire me nt o f mat e riality, a f alse re pre se ntation un de r Sec tion 78 must consist o f a delibe rat e att e mpt to mis le ad, misinf orm , or hide a f act which would othe rwise re nde r a candidat e ineligible . In oth e r words, it must b e made with an int e ntion to dece ive the elec torat e as to on e squa lif ications f or pub lic off ice . The use of a surnam e, whe n not int e nded to mis le ad or dece ive the pub lic as to on e s ide ntity, is not within th e scope of the provision.(Victorino Sa lc ed o II v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 3 588 6, Aug . 1 6, 1999 , En Banc [G on z aga -Re y e s ] )

231. W ho has authority to d e cl are f ai l ure o f e l e c tions an d the c a ll ing o f spe c ia l e l e c tion? W hat are the three instan c es w here a f ai l ure o f e l e c tion may be d e cl are d ?

Held: The COMELEC s authority to decl are f ailure of elec tions is provi ded in our elec tionlaws. Sec tion 4 o f RA 7166 provide s that th e Comelec sitting e n ban c by a ma jority vot e of itsme mbe rs may dec ide, among oth e rs, the decl aration o f f ailure of elec tion an d the calling o f spec ial elec tion as provi ded in Sec tion 6 of the Omnibus E lection Code . X x x

The re are three instan ce s whe re a f ailure of elec tion may b e decl ared, nam ely, (a) th e elec tion in any po lling p lace has not b ee n h eld on th e dat e f ixed on a ccount o f f orce ma je ure, viole nce, t e rrorism , f raud or oth e r ana logous caus e s; (b) th e elec tion in any po lling p lace hasbee n susp e nded bef ore the hour f ixed by law f or th e closing o f the voting on a ccount o f f orce ma je ure, viole nce, t e rrorism , f raud or oth e r ana logous caus e s; or (c) a f t e r th e voting an d duringthe pre paration an d transmission o f the elec tion r e turns or in th e custo dy or canvass th e re of, such elec tion r e su lts in a f ailure to elec t on a ccount o f f orce ma je ure, viole nce, t e rrorism , f rau d or oth e r ana logous caus e s. In th e se instan ce s, the re is a r e su lting f ailure to elec t. This isobvious in th e f irst t wo s ce narios , whe re the elec tion was not h eld and whe re the elec tion wassusp e nded . As to th e third sce nario , whe re the pre paration an d the transmission o f the elec tionre turns giv e rise to th e cons eq ue nce of f ailure to elec t , it must x x x, be int e rpre t ed to m e an that nobo dy e me rged as a winne r. (Banaga, J r . v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 70 1 , Ju ly 3 1 , 2000, En Banc [Q uisum b ing ] )

232. W hat are the t w o c on d itions that must c on c ur be f ore the COM ELE C c an a c t on a veri f ie d

petition see k ing to d e cl are a a f ai l ure o f e l e c tion?

Held: Bef ore the COMELEC can a ct on a v e rif ied pe tition s eek ing to decl are a f ailure of elec tion t wo conditions must concur, nam ely: (1 ) no voting too k place in th e prec inct or pr ec inctson th e dat e f ixed by law, or e ve n i f the re was voting , the elec tion r e su lt ed in a f ailure to elec t;and (2 ) th e vot e s not cast would have affec t ed the re su lt o f the elec tion. N ot e that th e caus e of such f ailure of elec tion could only be any o f the f ollowing: f orce maj e ure, viole nce, t e rrorism , f raud or oth e r ana logous caus e s.

Thus , in Banaga, J r . v. COMELEC (336 S CRA 70 1 , July 3 1 , 2 000 , En Banc [Quisumbing]) , the S C held:

We have painsta kingly examined the pe tition f iled by p e titione r Banaga b ef ore the Comelec . But we f ound that p e titione r did not a lle ge at a ll that elec tions we re e ithe r not h eld or susp e nded . N e ithe r did he ave r that a lthough th e re was voting , nobo dy was elec t ed . Onthe contrary , he conceded that an elec tion too k place f or th e off ice of vice- mayor o f Parana que City, and that privat e re spon de nt was , in f act , proclaimed elec t ed to that post.While pe titione r cont e nds that th e elec tion was taint ed with wide spre ad anoma lie s, it must be not ed that to warrant a declaration o f f ailure of elec tion th e commission o f f raud must b e such that it pr e ve nt ed or susp e nded the holding o f an elec tion , or marr ed f ata lly the



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23 5 . W hat c on d itions must c on c ur be f ore the C ome l e c c an a c t on a veri f ie d petition see k ing to d e cl are a f ai l ure o f e l e c tion? I s l o w turn - out o f voters enough basis to grant the petition?

Held: Bef ore COMELEC can a ct on a v e rif ied pe tition s eek ing to declare a f ailure of elec tion , t wo (2 ) conditions must concur: f irst , no voting has ta ke n p lace in th e prec inct orprec incts on th e dat e f ixed by law or, e ve n if the re was voting , the elec tion n e ve rthele ss r e su lts

in f ailure to elec t; an d, second, the vot e s not cast would affec t th e re su lt o f the elec tion.

The re can b e f ailure of elec tion in a po litical unit on ly if the will of the ma jority has b ee ndef iled and cannot b e asce rtained . But , if it can b e de t e rmined, it must b e accorded re spec t. Af t e r a ll, the re is no provision in our elec tion laws which req uire s that a ma jority o f re gist e red vot e rs must cast th e ir vot e s. All the law req uire s is that a winning candidat e must b e elec t ed bya p lura lity of valid vot e s, re gardle ss o f the actua l numb e r o f ba llots cast. Thus , e ve n if le ss than2 5 % of the elec torat e in th e que stioned prec incts cast th e ir vot e s, the sam e must sti ll be re spec t ed . (Mitmug v. COMELEC, 230 SCRA 54 , Feb. 1 0, 1994 , En Banc [ B ell osi llo ] )

2 36. Distinguish a petition to d e cl are f ai l ure o f e l e c tions f rom an e l e c tion protest .

Held: While pe titione r may hav e int e nded to institut e an elec tion prot e st by praying that said action may a lso b e conside red an elec tion prot e st , in our vi ew, pe titione r s action is ape tition to decl are a f ailure of elec tions or annu l elec tion r e su lts. It is not an elec tion prot e st.

First , his p e tition b ef ore the Comelec was institut ed pursuant to Sec tion 4 o f Re pub lic Act N o. 7166 in r elation to Sec tion 6 of the Omnibus E lection Code . Sec tion 4 o f RA 7166 refe rs to

postpone me nt , f ailure of elec tion an d spec ial elec tions while Sec tion 6 of the Omnibus E lectionCode relat e s to f ailure of elec tion. It is simp ly caption ed as P e tition to Declare Failure of Elections an d /or For Annu lme nt o f Elections.

Second, an elec tion prot e st is an or dinary a ction while a p e tition to decl are a f ailure of elec tions is a sp ec ial action un de r th e 1 99 3 Comelec Rule s o f Proced ure as am e nded . An elec tionprot e st is gov e rned by Rule 2 0 on or dinary a ctions , while a p e tition to decl are f ailure of elec tionsis cove red by Rule 26 unde r sp ec ial actions.

In this case, pe titione r f iled his p e tition as a sp ec ial action an d paid the corre spon dingfee the ref or. Thus , the pe tition was docke t ed as SP A-9 8-383 . This conf orms to p e titione r scat e gorization o f his p e tition as on e to decl are a f ailure of elec tions or annu l elec tion r e su lts. Incontrast , an elec tion prot e st is assign ed a docke t numb e r starting with EP C, me aning elec tionprot e st cas e .

Third, pe titione r did not comp ly with th e req uire me nts f or f iling an elec tion prot e st. H e f ailed to pay th e req uired f iling fee and cash de posits f or an elec tion prot e st. Fai lure to pay f ilingfee s will not v e st th e elec tion tribuna l jurisdiction ov e r th e cas e . Such pro ced ura l laps e on th e part o f a p e titione r would cle arly warrant th e outright dismissa l of his a ction.

Fourth , an e n ban c dec ision o f Comelec in an or dinary a ction b ecome s f inal and exec utory a f t e r thirty (30 ) days f rom its promu lgation , while an e n ban c dec ision in a sp ecial action b ecome s f inal and exec utory a f t e r f ive (5 ) days f rom promu lgation , unle ss r e strain ed bythe Supre me Court (Comelec Rule s o f Proced ure, Rule 1 8 , Sec tion 1 3 [a] , [b]). For that r e ason , a p e tition cannot b e tre at ed as both an elec tion prot e st an d a p e tition to decl are f ailure of elec tions.

Fif th , the alle gations in th e pe tition dec isively de t e rmine its natur e . P e titione r a lle ged that th e local elec tions f or th e off ice of vice- mayor in Parana que City held on May 11 , 1 99 8 , de nigrat e s th e true will of the pe ople as it was marr ed with wide spre ad anoma lie s on a ccount o f vot e buying , flying vot e rs an d glaring discre pan cie s in th e elec tion r e turns. H e ave rred that thos e incide nts warrant th e decl aration o f a f ailure of elec tions.

Give n th e se circumstan ce s, pub lic re spon de nt cannot b e said to hav e grav ely e rred intre ating p e titione r s action as a p e tition to decl are f ailure of elec tions or to annu l elec tion r e su lts. (Banaga, J r . v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 70 1 , Ju ly 3 1 , 2000, En Banc [Q uisum b ing ] )

2 37 . W hat are pre - pro cl amation c ases , an d exc eptions thereto? W hat C ourt has j uris d i c tion over pre - pro cl amation c ases?



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Held: As a gener al ru l e, cand idat e s a nd reg ist ered political pa r tie s in volved in an e l ec tion are allowed to f il e pre- pr oclamatio n case s b ef ore the Come l ec . Pre- pr oclamatio n case srefer to a n y que stion per tain ing to o r affec ting the pr oceed ing s o f the boa rd of can vass er s whichmay b e r aised by a n y cand idat e or by a n y reg ist ered political pa r ty o r coalition of political pa r tie sbef ore the boa rd or direc tly with th e Commissio n, or an y matt er r aised under Sec tion s 2 33 , 2 34, 2 35 and 2 36 in re lation to th e pre pa r ation, t r an smission, rece ipt , cu sto dy and app rec iation of

e l ec tion re t urn s ( Sec tion 2 41, Omn ibu s E l ec tion Code ) . The Come l ec has exc l u sive jur isdiction over all pre- pr oclamatio n con t r over sie s ( Sec tion 2 42 , su pr a ) . As a n exce ption, howe ver, to th e gener al ru l e, Sec tion 15 of Re pu blic Act 7166 pr ohibits cand idat e s in the pre siden tial , vice-pre siden tial , sen ato r ial and congre ssion al e l ec tion s fr om f iling pre- pr oclamatio n cas e s. It stat e s:

Sec . 1 5 . Pre- Pr oclamation Case s Not Allowed in E l ection s f or Pre siden t , V ice-Pre siden t , Sen ato r, and M e mber s o f the H ou se of Re pre sen tative s. - For pur pose s o f the e l ec tion s f or Pre siden t , V ice- Pre siden t , Sen ato r and M e mber of the H ou se of Re pre sen tative s, n o p repr oclamatio n case s shall b e allowed on matt er s re lating to th e pre pa r ation, t r an smission, rece ipt , cu sto dy and app rec iation of e l ec tion re t urn s o r the cer tif icat e s o f can vass , as th e cas e may b e . H owe ver, this doe s n ot p rec l ude the au tho r ity of the app r opr iat e can vassing body mot u pr opr io or u pon wr itt en complai n t o f an in t ere st ed per son to correc t ma n ife st err or s in the cer tif icat e of can vass o r e l ec tion re t urn s b ef ore it.

The pr ohibition aims to avoi d de lay in the pr oclamatio n of the winner in the e l ec tion, which de laymig ht re su lt in a va cuu m in the se sen sitive posts. Th e law, n one the l e ss , pr ovide s a n exce ption to th e exce ption . The second sen t ence of Sec tion 15 allows th e f iling of pe tition s f or correc tion of man ife st err or s in the cer tif icat e of can vass o r e l ec tion re t urn s e ven in e l ec tion s f or pre siden t , vice- pre siden t a nd me mber s o f the H ou se of Re pre sen tative s f or the simpl e re aso n that th e correc tion of man ife st err or will n ot p r olong the pr oce ss o f can vassing n or de lay th e pr oclamatio n of the winner in the e l ec tion . The ru l e is con sist en t with a nd compl e men ts th e au tho r ity of the Come l ec under the Con stit u tion to "enf orce and admin ist er all laws a nd regu lation s re lative to th e conduc t o f an e l ec tion, pl e biscit e, in itiative, referendu m a nd rec all " ( Sec tion 2 [1] , Ar ticl e IX -C, 198 7 Con stit u tion ) and its po wer to "dec ide, exce pt thos e in volving the r ig ht to vot e, all que stion s a ffec ting e l ec tion s." ( Sec tion 2 [ 3] , Ar ticl e IX -C, su pr a ) ( Fe d e rico S . Sando v al v.COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 33 84 2, Jan . 26, 2000 [ Puno ] )

2 38. W ho has authority to ru l e on petitions f or c orre c tion o f mani f est error in the c erti f i c ate o f c anvass or e l e c tion returns?

Held: The authority to ru le on p e titions f or correc tion o f mani fe st e rror is v e st ed in th e Comelec e n ban c. Sec tion 7 of Rule 2 7 of the 1 99 3 COMELEC Rule s o f Proced ure (took effec t onFe bruary 1 5 , 1 99 3) provi de s that i f the e rror is discove red bef ore proclamation , the boar d of canvass e rs may motu proprio , or upon v e rif ied pe tition by any candidat e, political party , organization or coa lition o f political partie s, af t e r due notice and he aring , correc t th e e rrorscommitt ed . The aggri e ved party may app e al the dec ision o f the boar d to th e Commission an d said app e al sha ll be he ard and dec ided by th e Commission e n ban c. Sec tion 5 , howe ve r, of the

sam e rule stat e s that a p e tition f or correc tion o f mani fe st e rror may b e f iled direc t ly with th e Commission e n ban c provided that su ch e rrors could not hav e bee n discove red during th e canvassing de spit e the exe rcise of due dilige nce and proclamation o f the winning candidat e had alre ady bee n ma de . ( Fede rico S . San d o v a l v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 33 84 2, J an . 26, 2000 [ Puno ] )

2 39. Distinguish E l e c tion P rotest f rom P etition f or Q uo W arranto .

Held: In S ama d v . COM ELE C, we expla ine d th a t a pe tition f or q u o wa rra nto u nd e r th e Om nibu s E lection Cod e ra ise s in iss ue the disloyalty or in eligibility of the winning ca ndid a t e . It isa procee ding to u nsea t th e re spond e nt f rom off ice bu t not n ece ssa rily to inst all the pe titione r inhis p lace . An elec tion prot e st is a cont e st b e t wee n th e d efea t e d a nd winning ca ndid a t e s on th e grou nd o f f rau ds or irr e gula ritie s in th e ca sting a nd cou nting o f the ballots, or in th e pre pa ra tionof the re t u rns. It r a ise s th e q ue stion o f who ac t ually obt a ine d th e plu rality of the le gal v ot e s a nd the ref ore is e ntit le d to ho ld th e off ice . (Dumayas, Jr . v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos . 14195 2 -5 3, Apri l 20, 200 1 , En Banc [Q uisum b ing ] )

2 4 0. W hat is a c ounter - protest? W hen shou ld it be f i l e d ?

Held: Unde r th e Comelec Rule s o f Proced ure, the prot e st ee may in corporat e in hisans we r a count e r-prot e st. It has b ee n sai d that a count e r-prot e st is tantamount to a



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count e rclaim in a civil action an d may b e pre se nt ed as a part o f the ans we r within th e time he isreq uired to ans we r th e prot e st , i.e ., within f ive (5 ) days upon r ece ipt o f the prot e st , unle ss amotion f or ext e nsion is grant ed, in which cas e it must b e f iled bef ore the expiration o f the ex t e nded time .

As e arly as in th e cas e of Arrie ta v . Rodriguez ( 5 7 Phil. 717 ) , th e SC had f irmly se tt le d

the rule that th e cou nt e r-prot e st m u st b e f ile d within th e pe riod pro v id e d by law, oth e rwise , th e f oru m lose s its ju risdiction to e nt e rtain th e belat e d ly f ile d cou nt e r-prot e st. ( K ho v. COMELEC, 27 9 SCRA 4 63, S e pt . 2 5 , 199 7, En Banc [ Torr e s ] )

2 4 1. W hat is the e ff e c t o f d eath o f a party in an e l e c tion protest? S hou ld it w arrant the d ismissa l o f the protest?

Held: An elec tion prot e st invo lve s both th e privat e int e re sts o f the rival candidat e s an d the pub lic int e re st in th e f inal de t e rmination o f the re al choice of the elec torat e, and f or thisre ason , an elec tion cont e st n ece ssari ly survive s th e de ath o f the prot e stant or th e prot e st ee . It istrue that a pub lic off ice is pe rsona l to th e pub lic off ice r an d is not a prop e rty transmissib le to hishe irs upon de ath , thus , upon th e de ath o f the incumbe nt , no h e ir of his may b e allowed tocontinu e holding his o ff ice in his p lace . But while the right to a pub lic off ice is pe rsona l and exclusive to th e pub lic off ice r, an elec tion prot e st is not pur ely pe rsona l and exclusive to th e prot e stant or to th e prot e st ee such that a f t e r th e de ath o f e ithe r would oust th e court o f all authority to continu e the prot e st pro ceed ings. An elec tion cont e st , af t e r a ll, involve s not m e relyconflicting privat e aspirations but is imbu ed with paramount pub lic int e re sts. Th e de ath o f the prot e stant n e ithe r constitut e s a groun d f or th e dismissa l of the cont e st nor ousts th e trial court o f its jurisdiction to dec ide the elec tion cont e st. (D e Castro v. COMELEC, 267 SCRA 8 06, Feb.7, 199 7)

2 4 2. Does the f a c t that one or a f e w c an d i d ates in an e l e c tion got zero votes in one or a f e w pre c in c ts a d e q uate l y support a f in d ing that the e l e c tion returns are statisti c a ll y impro ba bl e?

Held: From expe rie nce s in past elec tions , it is possib le f or on e candidat e or e ve n a few candidat e s to g e t ze ro vot e s in on e or a few prec incts.

Stan ding a lone and without mor e, the bare f act that a candidat e f or pub lic off ice rece ived ze ro vot e s in on e or t wo pr ec incts can not a deq uat ely support a f inding that th e sub ject elec tionre turns ar e statisti cally improbab le . A no-vot e f or a parti cular candidat e in elec tion r e turns is but one stran d in th e we b o f circumstantia l e vide nce that thos e elec tion r e turns we re pre pared unde r dure ss , f orce and intimidation. In th e cas e of U na Kibad v. Com elec (23 SCR A 5 88 [1968] ) , the SC warned that th e doctrine of statisti cal improbabi lity must b e viewed re strictively, the utmost care be ing ta ke n le st in p e na lizing the f rau dule nt an d corrupt pra ctice s, innoce nt vot e rsbecome dise nf ran chised, a r e su lt which har dly comme nds its elf . More ove r, the doctrine of statisti cal improbabi lity involve s a que stion o f f act an d a mor e prude ntia l approa ch prohibits itsde t e rmination ex part e . (Arthur V . V el ayo v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 3 5 6 1 3, March 9 , 2000, En Banc [ Puno ] )

2 4 3. W hat C ourt has j uris d i c tion over e l e c tion protests an d q uo w arranto pro c ee d ings invo l ving S angguniang K a bataan (SK ) e l e c tions?

Held: Any cont e st r elating to th e elec tion o f me mbe rs o f the Sangguniang Kabataan(including th e chairman) whe the r p e rtaining to th e ir eligibility or th e mann e r o f the ir elec tion is cognizab le by MTCs, MCTCs, and M e TCs. Sec tion 6 of Comelec Re solution N o. 2 82 4 whichprovide s that case s invo lving th e eligibility or qua lif ication o f SK candidat e s sha ll be dec ided bythe City/Municipal Election O ff ice r whos e dec ision sha ll be f inal, app lie s on ly to pro ceed ingsbef ore the elec tion. Bef ore proclamation , cas e s conce rning eligibility of SK off ice rs an d me mbe rsare cognizab le by th e Election O ff ice r. But a f t e r th e elec tion an d proclamation , the sam e cas e sbecome quo warranto cas e s cognizab le by MTCs, MCTCs, and Me TCs. Th e distinction is bas ed on th e principle that it is th e proclamation which mar ks o ff the jurisdiction o f the courts f rom th e jurisdiction o f elec tion o ff icials.

The case of Jose M . Me rcado v. Boar d of Election Supe rvisors (2 43 SCRA 42 3 , G .R. N o.109713 , April 6 , 199 5 ), in which this Court ru led that elec tion prot e sts invo lving SK elec tions ar e to b e de t e rmined by th e Board of Election Supe rvisors was dec ided unde r th e ae gis o f Comelec Re so lution N o. 2 499 , which too k effec t on August 2 7 , 199 2 . Howe ve r, Comelec Re solution N o.2 82 4, which too k effec t on F e bruary 6 , 199 6 and was pass ed pursuant to R. A. 7 80 8 , in r elationto Arts. 2 5 2 -2 5 3 o f the Omnibus E lection Code, has sin ce trans fe rred the cognizan ce of such



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cas e s f rom th e Board of Election Supe rvisors to th e MTCs, M CTCs an d M e TCs. Thus , the doctrine of M e rcado is no longe r contro lling. ( F rancis K ing L. Mar q u ez v. COMELEC, G.R. No .1 273 18 , Aug . 2 5 , 1999 , En Banc [ Purisima ] )

THE LAW O F P UBLI C CORPORA TI ON S

2 44 . W hat is an autonomous region?

Answer: An auto nomous regio n co nsists of pro vi nces, cities, mu nici palities, a nd geogra phical areas s hari ng commo n a nd disti ncti ve historical a nd cultural heritage, eco nomic a nd social structures, a nd ot her rele va nt characteristics wit hi n t he framework of t he Co nstitutio n a nd t he natio nal so vereig nt y as well as t he territorial i ntegrit y of t he Re pu blic of t he Phili ppi nes .(S e c . 15 , Art . X, 198 7 Co ns titutio n )

2 45 . W hat are a d ministrative regions? Are they c onsi d ere d territoria l an d po l iti c a l su bd ivisions o f the S tate? W ho has the po w er to c reate a d ministrative regions?

Held: Administrativ e re gions ar e me re groupings o f contiguous provin ce s f oradministrativ e purpos e s. Th e y are not t e rritoria l and political sub divisions like province s, citie s, municipalitie s an d barangays. Whi le the powe r to m e rge administrative re gions is not expre sslyprovided f or in th e Constitution , it is a po we r which has tra ditionally bee n lodged with th e Pre side nt to f acilitat e the exe rcise of the powe r o f ge ne ral sup e rvision ove r local gove rnme nts. (Abb as v. COMELEC, 1 7 9 SCRA 2 8 7, No v. 1 0, 1989 , En Banc [ Cort e s ] )

2 4 6. I s there a c on fl i c t bet w een the po w er o f the P resi d ent to merge a d ministrative regions w ith the c onstitutiona l provision re q uiring a p l e bis c ite in the merger o f l o c a l government units?

Held: The re is no conflict b e t wee n th e powe r o f the Pre side nt to m e rge administrative re gions with th e constitutiona l provision r eq uiring a p le biscit e in th e me rge r o f local gove rnme nt units b ecaus e the req uire me nt o f a p le biscit e in a m e rge r expre ss ly app lie s on ly to provin ce s, citie s, municipalitie s or barangays , not to a dministrativ e re gions. (Abb as v. COMELEC, 1 7 9 SCRA 2 8 7, No v. 1 0, 1989 , En Banc [ Cort e s ] )

2 4 7. W hat is the M etropo l itan M ani l a Deve l opment Authority (MM D A ) ? I s it a l o c a l government unit or pu bl i c c orporation en d o w e d w ith l egis l ative po w er? M ay it va l i dl y exer c ise po l i c e po w er? H o w is it d istinguishe d f rom the f ormer M etro M ani l a C oun c i l (MMC ) c reate d un d er P D N o . 82 4 ?

Held: M etropo l itan or M etro M ani l a is a bo d y c ompose d o f severa l l o c a l government units i .e ., twe l ve (12 ) c ities an d f ive (5 ) muni c ipa l ities x x x. W ith the passage o f R epu bl i c Ac t N o . 79 2 4 in 1 99 5 , M etropo l itan M ani l a was d e cl are d as a spe c ia l d eve l opment an d a d ministrative region an d the Ad ministration o f metrowi d e basi c servi c es a ff e c ting the region p l a c e d un d er a

d eve l opment authority re f erre d to as the MM D A.

The governing boar d o f the MM D A is the M etro M ani l a C oun c i l. The C oun c i l is c ompose d o f the mayors o f the c omponent 12 c ities an d 5 muni c ipa l ities , the presi d ent o f the M etro M ani l a

Vi c e-M ayors League an d the presi d ent o f the M etro M ani l a C oun c i l ors League . The C oun c i l is hea d e d b y a C hairman who is appointe d b y the Presi d ent an d veste d with the rank o f c a binet mem ber . As the po l i c y-making bo d y o f the MM D A, the M etro M ani l a C oun c i l approves metro-wi d e p l ans , programs an d proje c ts , an d issues the ne c essary ru l es an d regu l ations f or the imp l ementation o f sai d p l ans ; it approves the annua l bu d get o f the MM D A an d promu l gates the ru l es an d regu l ations f or the d e l ivery o f b asi c servi c es , c o ll e c tion o f servi c e an d regu l atory f ees ,f ines an d pena l ties . X x x

Cl ear l y , the s c ope o f the MM D A s f un c tion is l imite d to the d e l ivery o f the seven (7) b asi c servi c es . One o f these is transport an d tra ff i c management x x x.

It wi ll be note d that the powers o f the MM D A are l imite d to the f o ll owing a c ts: f ormu l ation , c oor d ination , regu l ation , imp l ementation , preparation , management , monitoring ,setting o f po l i c ies , insta ll ation o f a system an d a d ministration . There is no sy ll a bl e in R.A. N o .79 2 4 that grants the MM D A po l i c e power , l et a l one l egis l ative power . Even the M etro M ani l a C oun c i l has not been d e l egate d any l egis l ative power . Un l ike the l egis l ative bo d ies o f the l o c a l government units , there is no provision in R.A. N o . 79 2 4 that empowers the MM D A or its C oun c i l



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Pre side nt exe rcise s g e ne ral sup e rvision ove r th e m, but on ly to e nsur e that local aff airs ar e administ e red according to law. He has no contro l ove r th e ir acts in th e se nse that h e cansubstitut e the ir judgme nts with his o wn.

De c entra l ization o f po w er , on t he ot her hand , in vo lve s an a bdi c ation o f po l iti c a l po w er in f a vor o f l o c a l go vern ment unit s de cl ared a utono mo us. I n t hat c a se , t he a utono mo us g o vern ment

i s f ree to chart it s o w n de stin y and shape it s o w n fut ure w it h m ini mum inter vention f ro m c entra l a ut horitie s. Acc ordin g to a c on stit utiona l a ut hor , de c entra l ization o f po w er a mo unt s to se lf -i mmo l ation , sin c e in t hat e vent , t he a utono mo us g o vern ment be c o me s a cc o unta bl e not to t he c entra l a ut horitie s bu t to it s c on stit uen cy. (Lim b ona v. Mang e lin, 1 70 SCRA 7 8 6, Feb. 2 8 , 1989 , En Banc [ Sarmi e nto ] )

2 4 9. W hat k in d o f l o c a l autonomy is c ontemp l ate d b y the C onstitution? W hat a bout the k in d o f autonomy c ontemp l ate d inso f ar as the autonomous regions are c on c erne d ?

Held: 1 . The principle of local autonomy un de r th e 1 9 87 Constitution simp ly me ans dece ntra lization. It doe s not ma ke local gove rnme nts sov e re ign within th e stat e or an impe rium in imp e rio. Re maining to b e an intra sov e re ign sub division of one sove re ign nation , but not int e nded, howe ve r, to b e an imp e rium in imp e rio, the local gove rnme nt unit isautonomous in th e se nse that it is giv e n mor e powe rs, authority , re sponsibi litie s an d re sour ce s.Powe r which us ed to b e highly ce ntra lized in Manila, is th e re by dec once ntrat ed, e nab linge spec ially th e pe riphe ral local gove rnme nt units to de velop not on ly at th e ir own pa ce and discre tion but a lso with th e ir own r e sour ce s an d ass e ts. (Alv ar ez v. G uingona, J r ., 2 5 2 SCRA 6 95 , Jan . 3 1 , 199 6, En Banc [He rmosisima ] )

2 . The constitutiona l guarant ee of local autonomy in th e Constitution r efe rs to th e administrativ e autonomy o f local gove rnme nt units or , cast in mor e t echnical languag e, the dece ntra lization o f gove rnme nt authority.

On th e oth e r han d, the cre ation o f autonomous r e gions in Muslim M indanao an d the Cordille ras , which is p eculiar to th e 1 9 87 Constitution , cont e mplat e s th e grant o f political autonomy an d not just a dministrative autonomy to th e se re gions. Thus , the provision in th e Constitution f or an autonomous r e giona l gove rnme nt with a basi c stru cture consisting o f anexec utive de partm e nt an d a le gislative ass e mbly an d spec ial courts with p e rsona l, f amily an d prop e rty law jurisdiction in e ach o f the autonomous r e gions. (Cor d i lle ra Broa d Coa lition v.COA, 181 SCRA 495 , Jan . 2 9 , 199 0, En Banc [ Cort e s ] )

2 5 0. W hether or not the I nterna l R evenue a ll otments ( I RAs ) are to be in cl u d e d in the c omputation o f the average annua l in c ome o f a muni c ipa l ity f or purposes o f its c onversion into an in d epen d ent c omponent c ity?

Held: Y e s. Th e IRAs ar e it e ms o f income becaus e the y f orm part o f the gross a ccre tionof the f unds o f the local gove rnme nt unit. Th e IRAs re gularly an d automati cally accrue to th e local tre asury without n eed of any f urth e r a ction on th e part o f the local gove rnme nt unit. Th e y

thus constitut e income which th e local gove rnme nt can invariab ly rely upon as th e sour ce of much needed f unds.

X x x

[T]o r e it e rat e, IRAs ar e a r e gular , recurring it e m o f income ; ni l is th e re a basis , too , toclassi f y the sam e as a sp ecial f und or trans fe r, since IRAs hav e a t echnical def inition an d me aning a ll its o wn as us ed in th e Local Gove rnme nt Code that un eq uivocally ma ke s it distinct f rom sp ec ial f unds or trans fe rs r efe rred to whe n th e Code spe aks o f f unding support f rom th e nationa l gove rnme nt , its instrum e nta litie s an d gove rnme nt -owned or contro lled corporations.

Thus , De partm e nt o f Finance Orde r N o. 35 -9 3 correc t ly e ncapsu lize s th e f ull import o f the abov e disquisition whe n it def ined ANN U AL IN COME to b e re ve nue s an d rece ipts r e alized byprovince s, citie s an d municipalitie s f rom r e gular sour ce s o f the Local Ge ne ral Fund i ncludi ng the i nte rna l reve nue allotme nt and othe r sh ares provided f or i n Secti ons 2 84, 2 9 0 and 2 9 1 of the Code, but exclusive of non -recurri ng recei pts, s uch as othe r na ti ona l aids, g ran ts, fi nan ci al assist ance, loan pro ceeds, s ales of fixed assets, and similar o the rs . Such orde r, constit uti ng exec utive or contem poran e ous const ructi on o f a st at ute by an a dmi nist rative age ncy ch arged with the t ask of i nte rpreti ng and app lyi ng the s ame, is e ntitled t o f ull res pect and sh ould be accorded g re at weight by the cour ts, unless s uch const ructi on is cle arly sh own t o b e i n sh arp



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conflict with th e Constitution , the gove rning statut e, or oth e r laws. (Al v ar ez v. G uingona, J r ., 2 5 2 SCRA 6 95 , Jan . 3 1 , 199 6, En Banc [ H e rmosisima, J r ., J.] )

2 5 1. S tate the importan c e o f d ra w ing w ith pre c ise stro k es the territoria l boun d aries o f a l o c a l government unit .

Held: The importan ce of drawing with pr ec ise stro ke s th e t e rritorial boun darie s o f alocal unit o f gove rnme nt cannot b e ove re mphasiz ed . The boun darie s must b e cle ar f or th e ydef ine the limits o f the t e rritorial jurisdiction o f a local gove rnme nt unit. It can le gitimat elyexe rcise powe rs o f gove rnme nt on ly within th e limits o f its t e rritorial jurisdiction. Be yond the se limits, its a cts ar e ultra vir e s. N eedle ss to stat e, any un ce rtainty in th e boun darie s o f local gove rnme nt units will sow cost ly conflicts in th e exe rcise of gove rnme nta l powe rs whichultimat ely will prejudice the pe ople swelf are . This is th e e vil sought to b e avoided by th e Local Gove rnme nt Code in req uiring that th e land are a o f a local gove rnme nt unit must b e spelled out in me t e s an d boun ds, with t echnical de scriptions. (Mariano, J r . v. COMELEC, 2 4 2 SCRA 2 11 , 2 1 7 -2 19 , Mar . 7, 1995 , En Banc [ Puno ] )

2 5 2. R.A. 78 54 w as ena c te d c onverting the M uni c ipa l ity o f M a k ati into a high l y ur banize d c ity .S e c tion 2 thereo f d i d not provi d e f or a c a d astra l type o f d es c ription o f its boun d ary but mere l y provi d e d that the boun d ary o f the ne w c ity o f M a k ati sha ll be the boun d ary o f the present muni c ipa l ity o f M a k ati . P etitioners c onten d e d in a petition brought the SC that R.A.78 54 w as d e f e c tive be c ause it d i d not c omp l y w ith the re q uirement in the L o c a l G overnment C o d e that the territoria l j uris d i c tion o f ne wl y c reate d or c onverte d c ities shou ld be d es c ri be d by metes an d b oun d s , w ith te c hni c a l d es c riptions . N ote that at the time the l a w w as ena c te d, there w as a pen d ing boun d ary d ispute bet w een M a k ati an d one o f its neigh bors ,T aguig , b e f ore the regu l ar c ourt . S hou ld the c ontention be uphe ld ?

Held: Give n th e f acts o f the cas e s at b e nch, we cannot p e rce ive how this e vil (unce rtainty in th e boun darie s o f local gove rnme nt units will sow cost ly conflicts in th e exe rcise of gove rnme nt po we rs which u ltimat ely will prejudice the pe ople swelf are ) can b e brought about by th e de scription ma de in Sec tion 2 of R. A. N o. 785 4. Pe titione rs hav e not de monstrat ed that the del ine ation o f the land are a o f the propos ed City of Makati will caus e conf usion as to itsboun darie s. We not e that sai d del ine ation did not chang e e ve n by an in ch th e land are apre viously cove red by Makati as a muni cipality. Section 2 did not a dd, subtra ct , divide, ormultiply th e e stab lished land are a o f Makati. In languag e that cannot b e any cle are r, Sec tion 2 stat ed that th e city sland are a sha ll compris e the pre se nt t e rritory o f the municipality.

The del ibe rations o f Congr e ss will re ve al that th e re is a le gitimat e re ason why th e land are a o f the propos ed City of Makati was not def ined by m e t e s an d boun ds, with t echnical de scriptions. At th e time of the conside ration o f R. A. N o. 785 4, the t e rritoria l disput e be t wee nthe municipalitie s o f Makati an d Taguig ov e r Fort Boni f acio was un de r court litigation. Out o f abecoming s e nse of re spec t to a co-eq ua l de partm e nt o f gove rnme nt , the le gislators felt that th e disput e shou ld be lef t to th e courts to dec ide . The y did not want to f oreclose the disput e bymaking a le gislative f inding o f f act which could dec ide the issue . This would have e nsu ed if the y

def ined the land are a o f the propos ed city by its exact m e t e s an d boun ds, with t echnical de scriptions. W e take judicial notice of the f act that Congr e ss has a lso r ef rained f rom using th e me t e s an d boun ds de scription o f the land are a o f othe r local gove rnme nt units with uns e tt led boun dary disput e s.

We hold that th e exist e nce of a boun dary disput e doe s not p e r se pre se nt aninsurmountab le diff iculty which will pre ve nt Congr e ss f rom def ining with r e asonab le ce rtitude the t e rritoria l jurisdiction o f a local gove rnme nt unit. In th e cas e s at b e nch, Congr e ss maintain ed the ex isting boun darie s o f the propos ed City of Makati but as an a ct o f f airne ss , made the m sub ject to th e ultimat e re solution by th e courts. Conside ring th e se peculiar circumstan ce s, we are not pre pared to ho ld that Sec tion 2 of R. A. N o. 785 4 is un constitutiona l. We sustain th e submissionof the Solicitor Ge ne ral in this r e gard, viz :

Going no w to Sec tions 7 and 450 of the Local Gove rnme nt Code, it is be yond cavil that th e req uire me nt start ed the re in, viz : the t e rritoria l jurisdiction o f newly cre at ed or conve rt ed citie s shou ld be de scribed by m e t e s an d boun ds, with t echnical de scriptions was ma de in orde r to provi de a m e ans by which th e are a o f said citie smay b e re asonab ly as ce rtained . In oth e r words, the req uire me nt on m e t e s an d boun dswas m e ant m e rely as a too l in th e e stab lishme nt o f local gove rnme nt units. It is not ane nd in itself . E rgo , so long as th e t e rritorial jurisdiction o f a city may b e re asonab lyas ce rtain ed, i.e ., by r efe rring to common boun darie s with n e ighboring muni cipalitie s, as



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in this case, the n, it may b e concluded that th e le gislative int e nt b e hind the law has b ee nsuff icie nt ly se rved .

Ce rtain ly, Congr e ss did not int e nd that laws cre ating n ew citie s must containthe re in de tailed t echnical de scriptions simi lar to thos e app e aring in Torr e ns tit le s, aspe titione rs s ee m to imp ly. To r eq uire such de scription in th e law as a condition sine qua

non f or its va lidity would be to defe at th e ve ry purpos e which th e Local Gove rnme nt Code seek s to s e rve . The mani fe st int e nt o f the Code is to e mpowe r local gove rnme nt units an d to giv e the m th e ir right f ul due . It s eek s to ma ke local gove rnme nts mor e re sponsiv e to th e need s o f the ir constitu e nts while at th e sam e time se rving as a vita l cog in nationa l de velopme nt. To inva lidat e R. A. N o. 785 4 on th e me re groun d that nocadastra l type of de scription was us ed in th e law would se rve the le tt e r but defe at th e spirit o f the Code . It th e n become s a case of the mast e r se rving th e slave, inst e ad of the othe r way aroun d. This could not b e the int e ndme nt o f the law. X x x

(Mariano, J r . v. COMELEC, 2 4 2 SCRA 2 11 , 2 1 7 -2 19 , Mar . 7, 1995 , En Banc [ Puno ] )

2 5 3. W hat is the meaning o f "d evo l ution " ?

Answer: The t e rm "de volution " refe rs to th e act by which th e N ationa l gove rnme nt confe rs po we r an d authority upon th e various local gove rnme nt units to p e rf orm sp ec if ic f unctions an d re sponsibi litie s. (S e c . 1 7 [e] , 2 n d pa r. , Local G o vern m en t Cod e )

2 54 . H ave the po w ers o f the L an d T ransportation Off i c e ( L TO ) to register , tri c y cl es in parti c u l ar , as w e ll as to issue l i c enses f or the d riving thereo f, b een d evo l ve d l i k e w ise to l o c a l government units?

Held: Only th e powe rs o f the Land Transportation Fran chising Re gulatory Boar d (LTFRB) to r e gulat e the ope ration o f tricycle s-f or-hire and to grant f ranchise s f or th e ope rationthe re of have bee n de volved to local gove rnme nts un de r th e Local Gove rnme nt Code . Cle arlyuna ffec t ed by th e Local Gove rnme nt Code are the powe rs o f the LTO unde r R. A. N o. 4 1 36 req uiring th e re gistration o f all kinds o f motor v e hicle s used or op e rat ed on or upon any pub lic highway in the country. This can b e gle aned f rom th e explicit languag e of the statut e itself, aswell as th e corre spon ding gui del ine s issu ed by th e DOTC. In f act , e ve n th e powe r o f LGUs tore gulat e the ope ration o f tricycle s an d to grant f ranchise s f or th e ope ration th e re of is still sub ject to th e guidel ine s pr e scribed by th e DOTC. (LTO v. City of Butuan, G.R. No . 1 3 151 2, Jan .20, 2000, 3 r d Di v. [ Vitug ] )

2 55 . Distinguish the po w er to grant a l i c ense or permit to d o business an d the po w er to issue a l i c ense to engage in the pra c ti c e o f a parti c u l ar pro f ession .

Held: Distinction must b e made be t wee n th e grant o f a lice nse or p e rmit to do busin e ssand the issuan ce of a lice nse to e ngag e in th e practice of a parti cular pro fe ssion. Th e f irst isusua lly grant ed by th e local authoriti e s an d the second is issued by th e Board or Commissiontas ked to r e gulat e the parti cular pro fe ssion. A busin e ss p e rmit authoriz e s th e pe rson , natura l or

othe rwise, to e ngag e in busin e ss or som e f orm o f comme rcial activity. A profe ssiona l lice nse, onthe othe r han d, is the grant o f authority to a natura l pe rson to e ngag e in th e practice or exe rcise of his or h e r pro fe ssion.

In th e cas e at bar , what is sought by p e titione r (Ace bed o Optical Company , Inc.) f romre spon de nt City Mayor is a p e rmit to e ngag e in th e busin e ss o f running an opti cal shop. It doe snot purport to s eek a lice nse to e ngag e in th e pra ctice of optom e try as a corporat e body ore ntity , although it doe s hav e in its e mploy, pe rsons who ar e duly lice nsed to pra ctice optom e tryby th e Board of Examine rs in Optom e try.

X x x

In th e pre se nt case, the ob jective of the imposition o f sub ject conditions on p e titione r sbusine ss p e rmit could be attain ed by req uiring th e optom e trists in p e titione r se mploy to pro duce a va lid ce rtif icat e of re gistration as optom e trists , f rom th e Board of Examine rs in Optom e try. A busine ss p e rmit is issu ed primari ly to r e gulat e the conduct o f busine ss an d the City Mayorcannot , through th e issuan ce of such p e rmit , re gulat e the practice of a pro fe ssion , like that o f optom e try. Such a f unction is within th e exclusive domain o f the administrative age ncyspec if ically e mpowe red by law to sup e rvise the profe ssion , in this case the Profe ssiona l Re gulations Commission an d the Board of Examine rs in Optom e try. (Ac ebed o Optica lCompany, Inc . v. CA, 32 9 SCRA 3 14 , March 3 1 , 2000, En Banc [ Purisima ] )



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2 5 6. M ay a l o c a l government unit va l i dl y authorize an expropriation o f private property through a mere reso l ution o f its l a w ma k ing bo d y?

Held: The Local Gove rnme nt Code expre ssly an d cle arly req uire s an or dinance or a local law f or that purpos e . A re so lution that m e rely expre sse s th e se ntime nt or opinion o f the Municipal Council will not su ff ice . The cas e of Province of Camarin e s Sur v. Court o f Appe alswhich h eld that a m e re re solution may su ff ice to support th e exe rcise of e mine nt domain by alocal gove rnme nt unit is not in point b ecaus e the app licab le law at that tim e was B.P. 337 , the pre vious Local Gove rnme nt Code, which ha d provided that a m e re re solution would e nab le anLGU to exe rcise e mine nt domain. In contrast , R. A. 716 0, the pre se nt Local Gove rnme nt Code, explicit ly req uired an or dinance f or this purpos e . (Municipa lity of Parana qu e v. V .M. Re a lty Corp ., 2 9 2 SCRA 67 8 , Ju ly 20, 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

2 57 . W hat are the re q uisites be f ore a L o c a l G overnment U nit c an va l i dl y exer c ise the po w er o f eminent d omain?

Held:

1 ) An or dinance is e nact ed by th e local le gislative council authorizing th e local chief exec utive, in b e ha lf of the LGU, to exe rcise the powe r o f e mine nt domain or pursu e expropriation pro ceed ings ov e r a parti cular privat e prop e rty;

2 ) The powe r o f e mine nt domain is exe rcised f or pub lic use, purpos e or welf are, or f orthe be nef it of the poor an d the landle ss;

3) The re is paym e nt o f just compe nsation , as r eq uired unde r Sec tion 9 , Article III o f the Constitution , and othe r pe rtine nt laws;

4) A valid and def init e offe r has b ee n pr e viously ma de to th e owne r o f the prop e rtysought to b e expropriat ed, but sai d offe r was not a cce pt ed .

(Municipality of Parana q u e v. V .M. Re alty Corp ., 2 9 2 SCRA 67 8 , July 20, 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

2 5 8. M ay the S angguniang P an l a l a w igan va l i dl y d isapprove a reso l ution or or d inan c e o f a muni c ipa l ity c a ll ing f or the expropriation o f private property to be ma d e site o f a F armers C enter an d O ther G overnment S ports F a c i l ities on the groun d that sai d expropriation is unne c essary c onsi d ering that there are sti ll avai l a bl e l ots o f the muni c ipa l ity f or the esta bl ishment o f a government c enter ?

Held: Unde r th e Local Gove rnme nt Code, the Sangguniang Pan lalawigan is grant ed the powe r to decl are a muni cipal re solution inva lid on th e so le groun d that it is b e yond the powe r o f the Sangguniang Bayan or Mayor to issu e . As h eld in V elazco v. B las (G.R. No. L-30 45 6 , July 30 , 1982 , 115 SCR A 54 0 , 544 - 545) , The only groun d upon which a provin cial boar d may decl are anymunicipal re solution , ordinance or or de r inva lid is whe n su ch re so lution , ordinance, or or de r is

be yond the powe rs confe rred upon th e council or pr e side nt ma king th e sam e . A strict ly le ga l que stion is b ef ore the provincial boar d in its conside ration o f a muni cipal re solution , ordinance, or

orde r. Th e provincial boar d s disapprova l of any r e so lution , ordinance, or or de r must b e pre mised spec if ically upon th e f act that su ch r e so lution , ordinance, or or de r is outsi de the scope of the le ga l powe rs confe rred by law. I f a provin cial boar d pass e s th e se limits, it usurps th e le gislative f unctions o f the municipal council or pr e side nt. Such has b ee n th e consist e nt cours e of exec utive authority. (Mo d ay v. CA, 26 8 SCRA 58 6, Feb. 20, 199 7)

2 5 9. U n d er S e c tion 8, Arti cl e X o f the C onstitution , "[ T ] he term o f o ff i c e o f e l e c tive l o c a l o ff i c ia l s x x x sha ll be three years an d no su c h o ff i c ia l sha ll serve f or more than three c onse c utive terms ." H o w is this term l imit f or e l e c tive l o c a l o ff i c ia l s to be interprete d ?

Held: The t e rm limit f or elec tive local off icials must b e take n to r efe r to th e rig ht to b e elec t e d as well as th e rig ht to s e rve in th e sam e elec tive p osition. Cons eq ue nt ly, it is not e noug hthat an individua l has s e rve d thr ee cons ecutive t e rms in an elec tive local off ice, he must a lsohave bee n elec t e d to th e sam e p osition f or th e sam e numb e r o f time s b ef ore the disqua lif icationcan a pply. (Borja, J r . v. COMELEC an d Capco, J r ., G.R. No . 1 33 495 , S e pt . 3, 1998 , 2 95 SCRA 15 7, En Banc [ Me n d o z a ] )

Cas e No . 1 . Supp ose A is a vice -mayor who b ecome s mayor by r e ason o f the d e ath o f the incumbe nt. Si x months b ef ore the nex t elec tion, he re sig ns and is t wice elec t e d th e re af t e r.Can h e run a g ain f or mayor in th e nex t elec tion?



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Answ e r: Y e s, becaus e although h e has a lre ady f irst s e rved as mayor by su cce ssion an d subs eq ue nt ly r e signed f rom o ff ice bef ore the f ull t e rm expired, he has not a ctua lly s e rved three f ull t e rms in a ll f or th e purpos e of app lying th e t e rm limit. Unde r Art. X , Sec . 8 , voluntaryre nunciation o f the off ice is not conside red as an int e rruption in th e continuity o f his s e rvice f orthe f ull t e rm on ly if the t e rm is on e f or which h e was elec t ed . Since A is on ly comp le ting th e se rvice of the t e rm f or which th e dece ased and not h e was elec t ed, A cannot b e conside red to

have comp le t ed one t e rm. His r e signation constitut e s an int e rruption o f the f ull t e rm.

Cas e No . 2 . Suppos e B is elec t ed Mayor an d, during his f irst t e rm, he is t wice susp e nded f or mis conduct f or a tota l of 1 ye ar. I f he is t wice reelec t ed af t e r that , can h e run f orone more t e rm in th e nex t elec tion?

Answ e r: Y e s, becaus e he has s e rved only t wo f ull t e rms su cce ssively.

I n both cas e s, the mayor is e ntit led to run f or r eelec tion b ecaus e the t wo conditions f orthe app lication o f the disqua lif ication provisions hav e not concurred, nam ely, that th e local off icial conce rned has b ee n elec t ed three consecutive time s an d that h e has f ully se rved three cons ecutive t e rms. I n th e f irst case, e ve n i f the local off icial is conside red to hav e se rved three f ull t e rms not withstan ding his r e signation b ef ore the e nd of the f irst t e rm, the f act r e mains that he has not b ee n elec t ed three time s. I n th e second cas e, the local off icial has b ee n elec t ed three cons ecutive time s, but h e has not f ully se rved three consecutive t e rms.

Cas e No . 3 . T he case of vice -mayor C who b ecome s mayor by su cce ssion invo lve s atota l f ailure of the t wo conditions to concur f or th e purpos e of app lying Art. X , Sec . 8. Suppos e he is t wice elec t ed af t e r that t e rm, is he qua lif ied to run again in th e nex t elec tion?

Answ e r: Y e s, becaus e he was not elec t ed to th e off ice of mayor in th e f irst t e rm but simp ly f ound himself thrust into it by op e ration o f law. N e ithe r ha d he se rved the f ull t e rmbecaus e he only continu ed the se rvice, int e rrupt ed by th e de ath , of the dece ased mayor.(Borja, J r . v. COMELEC and Capco, J r ., G.R. No . 1 33 495 , S e pt . 3, 1998 , 2 95 SCRA 15 7, En Banc [ Me ndo z a ] )

260. W hat are the po l i c ies em bo d ie d in the c onstitutiona l provision barring e l e c tive l o c a l o ff i c ia l s , w ith the exc eption o f barangay o ff i c ia l s , f rom serving more than three c onse c utive terms?

Held: To pr e ve nt th e e stab lishme nt o f political dynasti e s is not th e only po licy e mbodied in th e constitutiona l provision in que stion (barring elec tive local off icials, with th e exce ption o f barangay o ff icials, f rom s e rving mor e than thr ee consecutive t e rms). Th e othe r po licy is that o f e nhan cing th e f reed om o f choice of the pe ople . To conside r, the ref ore, only stay in o ff ice re gardle ss o f how the off icial conce rned came to that o ff ice whe the r by elec tion or bysucce ssion by op e ration o f law would be to disre gard one of the purpos e s o f the constitutiona l provision in que stion. (Borja, J r . v. COMELEC an d Capco, J r ., G.R. No . 1 33 495 , S e pt . 3, 1998 , 2 95 SCRA 15 7, En Banc [ Me n d oz a ] )

261. L onzani d a w as previous l y e l e c te d an d serve d t w o c onse c utive terms as mayor o f S an Antonio , Zam ba l es prior to the M ay 199 5 mayora l e l e c tions . I n the M ay 199 5 e l e c tions he again ran f or mayor o f S an Antonio , Zam ba l es an d w as pro cl aime d w inner . H e assume d o ff i c e an d d is c harge d the rights an d d uties o f mayor unti l M ar c h 1998 w hen he w as or d ere d to va c ate the post by reason o f the C O M ELE C d e c ision on the e l e c tion protest against him w hi c h d e cl are d his opponent J uan Al vez the d u l y e l e c te d mayor . Al vez serve d the remaining portion o f the 199 5 -1998 mayora l term . I s L onzani d a sti ll q ua l i f ie d to run f or mayor o f S an

Antonio , Zam ba l es in the M ay 1998 l o c a l e l e c tions?

Held: The t wo req uisit e s f or th e app lication o f the three t e rm ru le was abs e nt. F irst,Lonzanida cannot b e conside red as having b ee n duly elec t ed to th e post in th e May 1 99 5 elec tions, an d second, h e did not f ully se rve the 1 99 5 -1 99 8 mayora l t e rm by r e ason o f involuntary r elinquishme nt o f off ice . Af t e r a r e-appr ec iation an d re vision o f the cont e st ed ba llotsthe COMELEC itself decl ared by f inal judgme nt that Lonzani da lost in th e May 1 99 5 mayora l elec tions an d his pr e vious pro clamation as winne r was declared null and void. His assumption o f off ice as mayor cannot b e dee med to hav e bee n by r e ason o f a va lid elec tion but by r e ason o f avoid proclamation. It has b ee n r e pe at edly held by th e SC that a pro clamation subs eq ue nt lydecl ared void is no pro clamation at a ll and while a pro claimed candidat e may assum e off ice onthe stre ngth o f the proclamation o f the Board of Canvass e rs h e is on ly a pr e sumptiv e winne r whoassum e s o ff ice sub ject to th e f inal out come of the elec tion prot e st. Lonzani da did not s e rve a



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t e rm as mayor o f San Antonio , Zamba le s f rom May 1 99 5 to March 1 99 8 becaus e he was not dulyelec t ed to th e post; h e me rely assum ed off ice as pr e sumptiv e winne r, which pr e sumption waslat e r ove rturn ed by th e COMELEC whe n it dec ided with f inality that Lonzani da lost in th e May1 99 5 mayora l elec tions.

S e c on d, Lon zan ida ca nno t b e d ee me d t o have se rve d th e May 1 99 5 t o 1 99 8 t e rm

be caus e he was o rd e re d t o vacat e his p o st b efo re the expirati on of the t e rm. His o pponen ts ' c on t en tion that L on zan ida sh o uld b e d ee me d t o have se rve d one f ull t e rm f ro m May 1 99 5 -1 99 8 be caus e he se rve d th e gre at e r p o rtion of that t e rm has no le ga l basis t o supp o rt it; it disr e gardsthe se c on d r eq uisit e fo r th e app lication of the disqua lif ication , i. e ., that h e has f ully s e rve d thr ee c on se cutive t e rms. Th e se c on d s en t en c e of the c on stitution al pro vision un d e r scruti n y stat e s," Volun tary r en un ciation of off ic e fo r a n y len gth of time sha ll no t b e c on sid e re d as a n in t e rrupti on in the c on tin uity of se rvic e fo r th e f ull t e rm fo r which h e was ele ct e d." The c le ar in t en t of the f rame rs of the Con stituti on t o bar a n y att e mpt t o circumven t th e three- t e rm limit by a v olun taryren un ciation of off ic e an d at th e sam e time re spe ct th e peo ple's ch o ic e an d gra n t th e ir ele ct e d off icial f ull se rvic e of a t e rm is e vid en t i n this pr o vision . Volun tary r en un ciation of a t e rm d oe sno t ca n c el the reno un c e d t e rm in the c o mputati on of the three t e rm limit; c on ve rsely, in volun taryse ve ran c e f ro m off ic e fo r a n y len gth of time sho rt of the f ull t e rm pr o vid e d by law amo un ts t o an in t e rrupti on of c on tin uity of se rvic e . Lon zan ida vacat e d his p o st a few mon ths b efo re the nex t mayo ra l ele ction s, no t by v olun tary r en un ciation but i n c o mplian c e with th e le ga l pro c e ss of writ of exe cution issue d by th e COMELEC t o that effe ct. Such i n volun tary s e ve ran c e f ro m off ic e is a n in t e rrupti on of c on tin uity of se rvic e an d thus, L on zan ida did no t f ully se rve the 1 99 5 -1 99 8 mayo ra l t e rm.

In sum, L on zan ida was no t th e duly ele ct e d may o r a n d that h e did no t h old off ic e fo r th e f ull t e rm; h en c e , his assumpti on of off ic e f ro m May 1 99 5 t o March 1 99 8 canno t b e c o un t e d as at e rm fo r purp o se s of c o mputi n g th e three t e rm limit. (Lon z anida v. COMELEC, 3 11 SCRA 602, July 2 8 , 1999 , En Banc [G on z aga -Re y e s ] )

262. M ay the P resi d ent va l i dl y w ithho ld a portion o f the interna l revenue a ll otments o f L o c a l G overnment U nits l ega ll y d ue them by a d ministrative f iat?

Held: The Constitution v e sts th e Pre side nt with th e powe r o f sup e rvision, not contro l, ove r local gove rnme nt units (LGUs). Such po we r e nab le s him to s ee to it that LGUs an d the iroff icials exec ut e the ir tas ks in a ccordance with law. While he may issu e advisorie s an d seek the ircoope ration in so lving economi c diff icultie s, he cannot pr e ve nt th e m f rom p e rf orming th e ir tas ksand using avai lab le re sour ce s to a chie ve the ir goa ls. He may not withho ld or a lt e r any authorityor po we r give n th e m by th e law. Thus , the withho lding o f a portion o f int e rna l re ve nue allotme nts le ga lly due the m cannot b e direc t ed by a dministrativ e f iat.

X x x

Sec tion 4 o f AO 37 2 cannot x x x be upheld . A basi c fe atur e of local f iscal autonomy isthe automati c rele ase of the shar e s o f LGUs in the N ationa l int e rna l re ve nue . This is man dat ed

by no le ss than th e Constitution. Th e Local Gove rnme nt Code (Sec . 2 86[a]) sp ec if ie s f urth e r that the rele as e sha ll be made direc t ly to th e LGUconce rned within f ive (5 ) days a f t e r e ve ry quart e rof the ye ar an d shall not b e subj ec t to any lie n or ho ldback that may b e imposed by th e nationa l gove rnme nt f or what e ve r purpos e . As a ru le, the t e rm sha ll is a word of comman d that must be give n a compu lsory m e aning. The provision is , the ref ore, impe rative .

Sec tion 4 o f AO 37 2 , howe ve r, orde rs th e withho lding, effec tive January 1 , 1 998 , of 1 0 pe rce nt o f the LGUs IRA pe nding th e ass e ssm e nt an d e valuation by th e De velopme nt Budge t Coordinating Committ ee of the e me rging f iscal situation in th e country. Such withho lding cle arlycontrav e ne s th e Constitution an d the law. Although , t e mporary , it is eq uivale nt to a ho ldback, which m e ans som e thing h eld back or withheld . Of t e n t e mporari ly. He nce, the t e mporary natur e of the re t e ntion by th e nationa l gove rnme nt doe s not matt e r. Any re t e ntion is prohibit ed .

In sum , while Sec tion 1 of AO 37 2 may b e upheld as an a dvisory effec t ed in time s o f nationa l crisis, Sec tion 4 th e re of has no color o f validity at a ll. The latt e r provision effec tivelye ncroache s on th e f iscal autonomy o f local gove rnme nts. Concededl y, the Pre side nt was well-int e ntioned in issuing his Or de r to withho ld the LGUs IRA, but th e rule of law req uire s that e ve nthe be st int e ntions must b e carried out within th e param e t e rs o f the Constitution an d the law.

Ve rily, laudab le purpos e s must b e carried out by le ga l me thods. (Pim e nt e l, J r . v. Aguirr e , G.R. No . 1 32 988 , 336 SCRA 20 1 , July 19 , 2000, En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )



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263. W hat is meant by f is c a l autonomy o f L o c a l G overnments? Does it ru l e out in any manner nationa l government intervention by w ay o f supervision in or d er to ensure that l o c a l programs are c onsistent w ith nationa l goa l s?

Held: Unde r existing law, local gove rnme nt units , in add ition to having a dministrative autonomy in th e exe rcise of the ir f unctions , e n joy f iscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy

me ans that local gove rnme nts hav e the powe r to cre at e the ir own sour ce s o f re ve nue in a dd itionto th e ir eq uitab le shar e in th e nationa l taxe s r ele ased by th e nationa l gove rnme nt , as well as th e powe r to a llocat e the ir re sour ce s in a ccordance with th e ir own prioriti e s. It ext e nds to th e pre paration o f the ir budge ts , and local off icials in turn hav e to work within th e constraintsthe re of . The y ar e not f ormu lat ed at th e nationa l le vel and impos ed on local gove rnme nts , whe the r th e y are rele vant to local need s an d re sour ce s or not. H e nce, the nece ssity o f aba lancing o f viewpoints an d the harmonization o f proposa ls f rom both local and nationa l off icials, who in any case are partn e rs in th e attainm e nt o f nationa l goa ls.

Local f iscal autonomy doe s not , howe ve r, rule out any mann e r o f nationa l gove rnme nt int e rve ntion by way o f sup e rvision, in orde r to e nsur e that local programs , f iscal and othe rwise, are consist e nt with nationa l goa ls. Signif icant ly, the Pre side nt , by constitutiona l f iat , is th e he ad of the economi c and planning ag e ncy of the gove rnme nt ( Sec tion 9 , Article XII of the Constitution ) , primari ly re sponsib le f or f ormu lating an d imple me nting continuing , coordinat ed and int e grat ed social and economi c policie s, plans an d programs ( Sec tion 3 , Chapt e r 1 , Subtit le C , Tit le II, B ook V , E O 292 [Administrative Code of 1987] ) f or th e e ntire country. Ho we ve r, unde rthe Constitution , the f ormu lation an d the imple me ntation o f such po licie s an d programs ar e sub ject to consu ltations with th e appropriat e pub lic age ncie s, various privat e sec tors , and local gove rnme nt units. Th e Pre side nt cannot do so uni lat e ra lly. (Pim e nt e l, J r . v. Aguirr e , 336 SCRA 20 1 , July 19 , 2000, En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

26 4 . W hat are the re q uisites be f ore the P resi d ent may inter f ere in l o c a l f is c a l matters?

Held: x x x [T]he Local Gove rnme nt Code provide s (S ec . 28 4 . S ee also Art. 379 of th e R ule s an d R egul ations I mple me nting the Local Gove rnme nt Code of 1991 ) :

x x x [I ]n th e e ve nt th e nationa l g ove rnme nt in cu rs an u nmana ged pu blic sec torde ficit , the Pre side nt of th e Philippine s is h e re by a u thoriz ed, u pon th e recomme ndationof [the ] S ecre tary of Finan ce, S ec re tary of th e I nt e rior an d Local Gove rnme nt an d S ecre tary of B udge t an d Mana ge me nt , and su b ject to cons ultation with th e pre siding office rs of both Ho u se s of Cong re ss an d the pre side nts of th e lig a, to ma ke the nece ssaryadju stm e nts in th e int e rna l re ve nue allotme nt of local g ove rnme nt u nits b u t in no cas e sha ll the allotme nt b e le ss than thirty p e rce nt (3 0% ) of th e collection of nationa l int e rna l re ve nue taxe s of th e third fiscal ye ar pr eced ing the cu rre nt fis cal ye ar x x x

The re are the re fore se ve ral requ isit e s b e fore the Pre side nt may int e rf e re in local fiscal matt e rs: (1 ) an u nmana ged pu blic sec tor de ficit of th e nationa l g ove rnme nt; (2 ) cons ultationswith th e pre siding office rs of th e S e nat e and the Hou se of R e pre se ntativ e s an d the pre side nts of

the variou s local le ague s; an d (3 ) the corre spon ding recomme ndation of th e secre tarie s of th e De partm e nt of Finan ce, I nt e rior an d Local Gove rnme nt , and Budge t an d Mana ge me nt.Fu rthe rmor e, any a dju stm e nt in th e allotm e nt sha ll in no cas e be le ss than thirty p e rce nt (3 0% ) of th e collection of nationa l int e rna l re ve nue taxe s of th e third fiscal ye ar pr eced ing the cu rre nt one . (Pim e nt el , J r . v. Aguirr e , 336 SCRA 20 1 , Ju ly 19 , 2000, En Banc [ Pangani b an ] )

26 5 . Distinguish an or d inan c e f rom a mere reso l ution .

Held: A municipal ordinance is diffe re nt f rom a r e so lution. An or dinance is a law, but are so lution is m e rely a decl aration o f the se ntime nt or opinion o f a lawmaking bo dy on a sp ec if ic matt e r. An or dinance poss e sse s a g e ne ral and pe rman e nt chara ct e r, but a r e so lution ist e mporary in natur e . Add itionally, the t wo ar e e nact ed diffe re nt ly a thir d re ading is n ece ssaryf or an or dinance, but not f or a r e so lution , unle ss dec ided othe rwise by a ma jority o f all the Sanggunian m e mbe rs. (Municipa lity of Parana q u e v. V .M. Re a lty Corporation, 2 9 2 SCRA 67 8 , Ju ly 20, 1998 [ Pangani b an ] )

266. O n its f irst regu l ar session , may the S anggunian transa c t business other than the matter o f a d opting or up d ating its existing ru l es or pro c e d ure?

Held: We cannot in fe r th e man dat e of the (Local Gove rnme nt) Code that no oth e rbusine ss may b e transa ct ed on th e f irst r e gular s e ssion exce pt to ta ke up th e matt e r o f adopting



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or up dating ru le s. All that th e law req uire s is that on th e f irst r e gular s e ssion x x x the sanggunian conce rned sha ll adopt or up dat e its ex isting ru le s or pro ced ure s. The re is nothing inthe languag e the re of that r e stricts th e matt e rs to b e take n up during th e f irst r e gular s e ssionme rely to th e adoption or up dating o f the hous e rule s. I f it we re the int e nt o f Congr e ss to limit the busine ss o f the local council to su ch matt e rs, the n it would have done so in cle ar an d uneq uivocal t e rms. But as it is , the re is no su ch int e nt.

More ove r, adopting or up dating o f hous e rule s would nece ssari ly e ntai l work be yond the day o f the f irst r e gular s e ssion. Do e s this m e an that prior th e re to, the local council's han ds we re tied and could not a ct on any oth e r matt e r? That would ce rtain ly be absur d f or it would re su lt ina hiatus an d a para lysis in th e local le gislatur e' s work which could not hav e bee n int e nded by th e law. (Malon z o v. Z amora, 3 11 SCRA 22 4 , July 27, 1999 , En Banc [ Rom e ro ] )

267. M ay an in c um bent V i c e - G overnor , w hi l e c on c urrent l y the Ac ting G overnor , c ontinue to presi d e over the sessions o f the S angguniang P an l a l a w igan (SP ) ? I f no , w ho may presi d e in the meantime?

Held: Be ing th e acting gov e rnor , the Vice- gove rnor cannot continu e to simu ltan e ous lyexe rcise the dutie s o f the latt e r o ff ice, since the natur e of the dutie s o f the Provincial Gove rnorcalls f or a f ull-time occupant to discharg e the m. Such is not on ly consist e nt with but a lsoapp e ars to b e the cle ar rationa le of the new (Local Gove rnme nt) Code whe re in th e policy of pe rf orming dua l f unctions in both o ff ice s has a lre ady bee n aban doned . To r e pe at , the cre ation o f a t e mporary va cancy in th e off ice of the Gove rnor cre at e s a corre spon ding va cancy in th e off ice of the Vice- Gove rnor whe ne ve r th e latt e r a cts as Gov e rnor by virtu e of such t e mporary va cancy.This e ve nt constitut e s an inability on the part o f the re gular pr e siding o ff ice r ( Vice- Gove rnor) topre side during th e SP se ssions , which thus calls f or th e ope ration o f the re med y se t in Article 49 (b) o f the Local Gove rnme nt Code conce rning th e elec tion o f a t e mporary pr e siding o ff ice r.The continuity o f the Acting Gove rnor s ( Vice- Gove rnor) po we rs as pr e siding o ff ice r o f the SP issusp e nded so long as h e is in su ch capa city. Unde r Section 49 (b) , in th e e ve nt o f the inability of the re gular pr e siding o ff ice r to pr e side at th e sanggunian s e ssion , the me mbe rs pr e se nt an d constituting a quorum sha ll elec t f rom among th e mselve s a t e mporary pr e siding o ff ice r.( G am b oa, J r . v. Aguirr e , J r ., G.R. No . 1 3 4 2 1 3, Ju ly 20, 1999 , En Banc [ Ynar e s -Santiago ] )

268. W hat is re c a ll ?

Held: Recall is a mo de of re mova l of a pub lic off ice r by th e pe ople bef ore the e nd of hist e rm o f off ice . The pe ople's pr e rogativ e to r e move a pub lic off ice r is an in cide nt o f the irsove re ign po we r an d in th e abs e nce of constitutiona l re straint , the powe r is imp lied in a ll gove rnme nta l ope rations. Such po we r has b ee n h eld to b e indispe nsab le f or th e prop e radministration o f pub lic aff airs. N ot un de se rvedly, it is f req ue nt ly de scribed as a f undame nta l right o f the pe ople in a r e pre se ntativ e de mocracy. ( G arcia v. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 1 0 8 , Oct .5 , 199 3, En Banc [ Puno ] )

269. W hat is the groun d f or re c a ll ? I s this su bj e c t to j u d i c ia l in q uiry?

Held: Forme r Se nator Aquilino Pime nt el, Jr. , a ma jor author o f the sub ject law in hisbook T he L ocal G ove rnme nt Cod e of 1991: T he K ey to Nationa l Develop me nt , stre sse d th e sam e re ason why the substanti ve cont e nt o f a v ot e of lack of conf id e nce is bey ond an y inquiry, thus:

T he re is on ly one ground f or r ecall of local gove rnme nt o ff icials: loss o f conf id e nce . T his m e ans that th e pe ople may pe tition or th e Prep arator y Recall Asse mbly may re solve to r ecall any local elec tive off icial without s pec ify ing an y p articular ground excep t loss o f conf id e nce . T he re is no n ee d f or th e m to bring u p any charg e of abus e orcorru p tion against th e local elec tive off icials who ar e sub ject o f any recall pe tition.

In th e case of E v ardon e v . Commission on E lections , e t a l., 20 4 SC RA 4 6 4 , 4 72 (1991 ) , the Court ru le d that loss o f conf id e nce as a ground f or r ecall is a p olitical que stion. In th e words o f the Court , 'whe the r or not th e elec torat e of the municip alit y of Sulat has lost conf id e nce in th e incumbe nt ma y or is a p olitical que stion.

( G arcia v. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 1 0 8 , Oct . 5 , 199 3, En Banc [ Puno ] )

270. T he mem bers o f the P reparatory R e c a ll Assem bl y (PRA ) o f the provin c e o f B ataan a d opte d a reso l ution c a ll ing f or the re c a ll o f G overnor G ar c ia . I t w as a d mitte d, ho w ever , b y the proponents o f the re c a ll reso l ution that on l y those mem bers o f the assem bl y in cl ine d to



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agree w ere noti f ie d o f the meeting w here sai d reso l ution w as a d opte d as a matter o f strategy an d se c urity . T hey j usti f ie d these se l e c tive noti c es on the groun d that the l a w ( L o c a l G overnment C o d e ) d oes not spe c i f i c a ll y man d ate the giving o f noti c e . S hou ld this su bmission be sustaine d ?

Held: We rejec t this submission o f the re spon de nts. Th e due proce ss claus e of the

Constitution r eq uiring noti ce as an ele me nt o f f airne ss is invio lable and shou ld always b e conside red part an d parcel of e ve ry law in case of its sile nce . The need f or noti ce to a ll the me mbe rs o f the ass e mbly is a lso imp e rative f or th e se me mbe rs r e pre se nt th e diffe re nt s ec tors o f the elec torat e of Bataan. To th e ex t e nt that th e y ar e not noti f ied of the mee ting o f the ass e mbly, to that ex t e nt is th e sove re ign voice of the pe ople the y re pre se nt nu llif ied . The re so lution to r ecall shou ld articulat e the ma jority will of the me mbe rs o f the ass e mbly but th e ma jority will can b e ge nuinely de t e rmined only a f t e r a ll the me mbe rs o f the ass e mbly hav e bee ngive n a f air opportunity to expre ss th e will of the ir constitu e nts. N eedle ss to str e ss , the req uire me nt o f notice is man datory f or it is in dispe nsab le in de t e rmining th e collective wisdom o f the me mbe rs o f the Pre paratory Recall Asse mbly. Its non -obs e rvance is f ata l to th e validity of the re so lution to r ecall pe titione r Garcia as Gov e rnor o f the province of Bataan. ( G arcia v.COMELEC, G.R. No . 111511 , S e pt . 2 1 , 199 3 ; 227 SCRA 1 00, Oct . 5 , 199 3, En Banc [ Puno ] )

271. W i ll it be proper f or the C ommission on E l e c tions to a c t on a petition f or re c a ll signe d b y j ust one person?

Held: A pe tition f or r ecall signed by just on e pe rson is in vio lation o f the statutory 2 5 % minimum r eq uire me nt as to th e numb e r o f signatur e s supporting any p e tition f or r ecall. Sec .6 9 (d) o f the Local Gove rnme nt Code of 1 99 1 expre ssly provide s that 'recall of any elec tive x x x municipal x x x off icial may a lso b e validly initiat ed upon p e tition o f at le ast t we nty-f ive pe rce nt (2 5 % ) o f the tota l numb e r o f re gist e red vot e rs in th e local gove rnme nt unit conce rned during th e elec tion in which th e local off icial sought to b e recalled was elec t ed . ' The law is plain an d uneq uivocal as to what constitut e s r ecall proceed ings : only a p e tition o f at le ast 2 5 % of the tota l numb e r o f re gist e red vot e rs may va lidly initiat e recall proceed ings. (Ango b ung v. COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 26 5 76, March 5 , 199 7)

2 7 2 . S e c tion 7 4 o f the L o c a l G overnment C o d e provi d es that no re c a ll sha ll ta k e p l a c e w ithin one year x x x imme d iate l y pre c e d ing a regu l ar l o c a l e l e c tion . W hat d oes the term regu l ar l o c a l e l e c tion , as use d in this se c tion , mean?

Held: The t e rm re gular local elec tion unde r Sec . 74 o f the Local Gove rnme nt Code of 1 99 1 which provi de s that no r ecall sha ll take place within on e (1 ) ye ar x x x immed iat elypreced ing a r e gular local elec tion refe rs to on e whe re the position o f the off icial sought to b e recalled is to b e actua lly cont e st ed and f illed by th e elec torat e (Paras v. Comelec , G.R. No.1 23 1 69, Nov. 4, 1 996). Th e one-ye ar tim e bar will not app ly whe re the local off icial sought to b e recalled is a Mayor an d the approa ching elec tion is a barangay elec tion. (Ango b ung v.COMELEC, G.R. No . 1 26 5 76, March 5 , 199 7)

2 73. Does the w or d R e c a ll in paragraph (b ) o f S e c tion 7 4 o f the L o c a l G overnment C o d e in cl u d e the c onvening o f the P reparatory R e c a ll Assem bl y an d the f i l ing by it o f a re c a ll reso l ution? Dis c uss .

Held: Pe titione r cont e nds that th e t e rm recall in Sec . 74 (b) r efe rs to a pro ce ss , incontrast to th e t e rm recall elec tion f ound in Sec . 74 (a) , which obvious ly refe rs to an elec tion.He claims that whe n s e ve ral barangay chairme n me t an d conve ned on May 1 9 , 1 999 an d unanimous ly re solved to initiat e the recall, f ollowed by th e taking o f vot e s by th e PRA on May 2 9 , 1 999 f or th e purpos e of adopting a r e so lution to initiat e the recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor o f Pasay City f or loss o f conf ide nce, the proce ss o f recall be gan an d, since May 2 9 , 1 999 was le ssthan a y e ar a f t e r he had assum ed off ice, the PRA was i lle gally conve ned and all proceed ings h eld the re af t e r, including th e f iling o f the recall pe tition on July 2 , 1 999 , we re null and void.

The COMELEC, on th e othe r han d, maintains that th e proce ss o f recall starts with th e f iling o f the pe tition f or recall and e nds with th e conduct o f the recall elec tion , and that , since the pe tition f or r ecall in this case was f iled on July 2 , 1 999 , exact ly one ye ar an d a day a f t e rpe titione r s assumption o f off ice, the recall was va lidly initiat ed outsi de the one-ye ar prohibit ed pe riod.



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Held: N o. Such re pre se ntation will be violative of Section 1 9 83 of the old Administrative Code . This stri ct cohe re nce to th e le tt e r o f the law app e ars to hav e bee n dictat ed by th e f act that the municipality shou ld not b e burde ned with expe nse s o f hiring a privat e lawye r and that the int e re sts o f the municipality would be be st prot ec t ed if a gov e rnme nt lawye r han dle s itslitigations.

Privat e lawye rs may not r e pre se nt muni cipalitie s on th e ir own. N e ithe r may th e y do soe ve n in collaboration with authoriz ed gove rnme nt lawye rs. This is an chored on th e principle that only a ccountab le pub lic off ice rs may a ct f or an d in b e ha lf of pub lic e ntitie s an d that pub lic f undsshou ld not b e expe nded to hir e privat e lawye rs. (Ramos v. CA, 26 9 SCRA 3 4 , March 3, 199 7)

27 8. M ay a muni c ipa l ity a d opt the w or k a l rea d y per f orme d in goo d f aith by a private l a w yer ,w hi c h w or k prove d bene f i c ia l to it?

Held: Although a muni cipality may not hir e a privat e lawye r to r e pre se nt it in litigations , in th e int e re st o f substantia l justice, howe ve r, it was h eld that a muni cipality may a dopt th e work alre ady pe rf ormed in goo d f aith by su ch privat e lawye r, which work is be nef icial to it (1 ) provi ded that no in justice is th e re by he aped on th e adve rse party an d (2 ) provi ded f urth e r that nocompe nsation in any guis e is paid the ref or by sai d municipality to th e privat e lawye r. Un le ss soexpre ssly a dopt ed, the privat e lawye r swork cannot bin d the municipality. (Ramos v. CA, 26 9 SCRA 3 4 , March 3, 199 7)

2 79. M ay the P unong B arangay va l i dl y appoint or remove the barangay treasurer , the barangay se c retary , an d other appointive barangay o ff i c ia l s w ithout the c on c urren c e o f the ma j ority o f a ll the mem bers o f the S angguniang B arangay?

Held: The Local Gove rnme nt Code explicit ly ve sts on th e pu nong baran g ay, u ponapprova l by a ma jority o f all the me mbe rs o f the san ggu niang baran g ay, the powe r to appoint orre place the baran g ay tr e as u re r, the baran g ay s ecre tary , and othe r appointiv e baran g ay o ff icials.

Ve rily, the powe r o f appointm e nt is to b e exe rcised con joint ly by th e pu nong baran g ay an d ama jority o f all the me mbe rs o f the san ggu niang baran g ay. Witho u t s uch con joint a ction , ne ithe ran appointm e nt nor a r e place me nt can b e effec t u al.

Applying the rule that th e powe r to appoint in clude s th e powe r to r e move, the que stioned dismissa l f rom o ff ice of the baran g ay o ff icials by th e pu nong baran g ay withou t th e concu rre nce of the ma jority o f all the me mbe rs o f the Sanggu niang B aran g ay cannot b e leg ally ju stif ied . To r ule othe rwise could also cre at e an abs u rd sit u ation o f the Sanggu niang B aran g ayme mbe rs r efu sing to g ive the ir approva l to th e re place me nts s elec t ed by th e pu nong baran g aywho has u nilat e ra lly t e rminat ed the se rvice s o f the incu mbe nts. It is likely that th e leg islat u re did not int e nd this abs u rdity to f ollow f rom its e nactme nt o f the law. (Ramon Alq ui z o la, Sr . v.G a llar d o Oco l, G.R. No . 1 32 41 3, Aug . 27, 1999 , 3 r d Di v. [ Vitug ] )

PUBLIC I N TERNATI ONAL L AW

280. W hat is the d o c trine o f in c orporation? H o w is it app l ie d b y l o c a l c ourts?

Held: Unde r th e doctrine of incorporation , rule s o f int e rnationa l law f orm part o f the law of the land and no f urth e r le gislative action is n eeded to ma ke such ru le s app licab le in th e dome stic sph e re .

The doctrine of incorporation is app lied whe ne ve r muni cipal tribuna ls (or local courts) ar e conf ront ed with situations in which th e re app e ars to b e a conflict b e t wee n a ru le of int e rnationa l law and the provisions o f the Constitution or statut e of the local stat e . Eff orts shou ld f irst b e exe rt ed to harmoniz e the m, so as to giv e effec t to both sin ce it is to b e pre sumed that muni cipal law was e nact ed with prop e r r e gard f or th e ge ne ra lly a cce pt ed principle s o f int e rnationa l law inobs e rvance of the Incorporation Claus e in Sec tion 2 , Article II o f the Constitution. In a situationhowe ve r, whe re the conflict is irr econcilab le and a choice has to b e made be t wee n a ru le of int e rnationa l law and municipal law, jurispru de nce dictat e s that muni cipal law shou ld be upheld by th e municipal courts f or th e re ason that su ch courts ar e organs o f municipal law and are accordingly boun d by it in a ll circumstan ce s. Th e f act that int e rnationa l law has b ee n ma de part of the law of the land doe s not p e rtain to or imp ly th e primacy o f int e rnationa l law ove r nationa l or muni cipal law in th e municipal sph e re . The doctrine of incorporation , as app lied in most



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of the Papa l Stat e s an d the limitation o f the t e rritory un de r th e Holy See to an ar e a o f 1 08 .7 acre s, the position o f the Holy See in Int e rnationa l Law became controv e rsial.

In 1 9 2 9 , Ita ly an d the Holy See e nt e red into th e Lat e ran Tr e aty , whe re Ita ly recognized the exclusive dominion an d sove re ign jurisdiction o f the Holy See ove r th e Vatican City. It a lsorecognized the right o f the Holy See to r ece ive f ore ign diplomats , to s e nd its o wn diplomats to

f ore ign countri e s, and to e nt e r into tr e atie s a ccording to Int e rnationa l Law.

The Lat e ran Tr e aty e stab lished the stat e hood of the Vatican City f or th e purpos e of assuring to th e Holy See abso lut e and visible inde pe nde nce and of guarant ee ing to it in disputab le sove re ignty a lso in th e f ield of int e rnationa l relations.

In view of the wordings o f the Lat e ran Tr e aty , it is diff icult to de t e rmine whe the r th e stat e hood is ve st ed in th e Holy See or in th e Vatican City. Some writ e rs e ve n sugg e st ed that th e tre aty cre at ed t wo int e rnationa l pe rsons - the Holy See and Vatican City.

The Vatican City f its into non e of the e stab lished cat e gorie s o f stat e s, and the attributionto it o f sove re ignty must b e made in a s e nse diffe re nt f rom that in which it is app lied to oth e rstat e s. In a community o f nationa l stat e s, the Vatican City re pre se nts an e ntity organiz ed not f orpolitical but f or eccle siastical purpos e s an d int e rnationa l ob jects. D e spit e its size and ob ject , the

Vatican City has an in de pe nde nt gov e rnme nt o f its o wn, with th e Pope, who is a lso h e ad of the Roman Catho lic Church, as th e Holy See or He ad of Stat e, in conf ormity with its tra ditions, and the de man ds o f its mission in th e world. In deed, the world-wide int e re sts an d activitie s o f the

Vatican City ar e such as to ma ke it in a s e nse an int e rnationa l stat e .

One authority wrot e that th e recognition o f the Vatican City as a stat e has signi f icant implication - that it is possib le f or any e ntity pursuing ob jects e sse ntia lly diffe re nt f rom thos e pursu ed by stat e s to b e inve st ed with int e rnationa l pe rsona lity.

Inasmu ch as th e Pope prefe rs to conduct f ore ign relations an d e nt e r into transa ctions asthe Holy See and not in th e nam e of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in th e Pope' s o wnview, it is th e Holy See that is th e int e rnationa l pe rson.

The Re pub lic of the Philippine s has a ccorded the Holy See the status o f a f ore ignsove re ign. Th e Holy See, through its Ambassa dor, the Papa l N uncio, has ha d diplomati c re pre se ntations with th e Philippine gove rnme nt sin ce 1 9 57 . This app e ars to b e the unive rsa l practice in int e rnationa l relations. (Holy S ee , Th e v. Rosario, J r ., 23 8 SCRA 5 2 4 , 5 33 -5 3 4 , D e c . 1 , 1994 , En Banc [Q uiason ] )

28 4 . W hat are internationa l organizations? Dis c uss their nature .

Held: I nternationa l organizations are instit utions constit uted by internationa l agree ment between two or more States to acco mpl is h co mmon goa l s . The l ega l persona l it y of t hese internationa l organizations has been recognized not on ly in munici pa l l aw, but in internationa l l aw

as we ll.

Per manent internationa l co mmissions and ad ministrati ve bodies ha ve been created byt he agree ment of a considera bl e n umber of States for a variet y of internationa l pur poses, econo mic or socia l and main ly non- po l itica l. I n so far as t he y are a utono mo us and be yond t he contro l of an y one State, t he y ha ve distinct juridica l persona l it y inde pendent of t he munici pa l l aw of t he State where t he y are sit uated . As s uch, t he y are dee med to possess a s pecies of internationa l persona l it y of t heir own . (SEA F DEC - AQD v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 2 8 3, Feb. 14 , 199 2)

28 5 . Dis c uss the basi c immunities o f internationa l organizations an d the reason f or a ff or d ing them su c h immunities .

Held: One of the basi c immunitie s o f an int e rnationa l organization is immunity f romlocal jurisdiction , i.e ., that it is immun e f rom le ga l writs an d proce sse s issu ed by th e tribuna ls o f the country whe re it is f ound. The obvious r e ason f or this is that th e sub jection o f such anorganization to th e authority o f the local courts would aff ord a conve nie nt m ed ium through whichthe host gov e rnme nt may int e rfe re in th e ir ope rations or e ve n influe nce or contro l its po licie s an d dec isions; b e side s, such sub jection to local jurisdiction would impair th e capa city of such bo dy todischarg e its re sponsibi litie s impartia lly on b e ha lf of its me mbe r-stat e s. (SEA F DEC - AQD v.NLRC, 206 SCRA 2 8 3, Feb. 4 , 199 2)



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286. Dis c uss the t w o c on fl i c ting c on c epts o f sovereign immunity f rom suit .

Held: The re are t wo conflicting conce pts o f sove re ign immunity , e ach widely held and f irmly e stab lished . According to th e classical or abso lut e the ory, a sov e re ign cannot , without itscons e nt , be made a r e spon de nt in th e courts o f anoth e r sov e re ign. According to th e newe r or

re strictive the ory, the immunity o f the sove re ign is r ecognized only with re gard to pub lic acts oracts jur e impe rii of a stat e, but not with r e gard to privat e acts or a cts jur e ge stionis.

Some stat e s pass ed le gislation to s e rve as gui del ine s f or th e exec utive or ju dicial de t e rmination whe n an a ct may b e conside red as jur e ge stionis. Th e Unit ed Stat e s pass ed the Fore ign Sove re ign Immuniti e s Act o f 1 9 76 , which def ine s a comme rcial activity as e ithe r are gular cours e of comme rcial conduct or a parti cular comme rcial transa ction or a ct.Furthe rmor e, the law declared that th e comme rcial chara ct e r o f the activity sha ll be de t e rmined by r efe re nce to th e natur e of the cours e of conduct or parti cular transa ction or a ct , rath e r thanby refe re nce to its purpos e . The Cana dian Par liame nt e nact ed in 1 9 82 an Act to Provide ForStat e Immunity in Cana dian Courts. Th e Act def ine s a comme rcial activity as any parti culartransa ction , act or conduct or any r e gular cours e of conduct that by r e ason o f its natur e, is o f a comme rcial chara ct e r.

The re strictive the ory, which is int e nded to b e a so lution to th e host o f prob le msinvolving th e issue of sove re ign immunity , has cre at ed prob le ms o f its o wn. Le ga l tre atis e s an d the dec isions in countri e s which f ollow the re strictive the ory hav e diff iculty in chara ct e rizingwhe the r a contra ct o f a sov e re ign stat e with a privat e party is an a ct jur e ge stionis or an a ct jur e impe rii.

The re strictive the ory came about b ecaus e of the e ntry o f sove re ign stat e s into pur elycomme rcial activitie s re mot ely connec t ed with th e discharg e of gove rnme nta l f unctions. This isparticular ly tru e with r e spec t to th e Communist stat e s which too k contro l of nationa lized busine ssactivitie s an d int e rnationa l tra ding. ( Ho ly S ee , Th e v. Rosario, J r ., 23 8 SCRA 5 2 4 , D e c . 1 , 1994 , En Banc [ Quiason ] )

2 87 . C ite some transa c tions by a f oreign state w ith private parties that w ere c onsi d ere d b y the S upreme C ourt as a c ts j ure imperii an d a c ts j ure gestionis .

Held: This Court has conside red the f ollowing transa ctions by a f ore ign stat e withprivat e parti e s as a cts jur e im pe rii: (1 ) th e le ase by a f ore ign gov e rnme nt o f apart me nt bui ldingsf or us e of its m ilitary o ff ice rs (Syquia v. L opez , 8 4 Phil. 3 1 2 [ 1 9 4 9]); (2) th e conduct o f pub lic bidd ing f or th e re pair o f a whar f at a Unit ed Stat e s N ava l Station (Unit ed Stat e s o f Ame rica v.Ruiz , supra.); an d (3) th e chang e of em ployme nt status o f bas e em ployee s (Sande rs v.V e ridiano, 1 62 S CRA 88 [ 1 988]).

On th e oth e r han d, this Court has conside red the f ollowing transa ctions by a f ore ignstat e with privat e parti e s as a cts jur e ge stionis : (1 ) th e hiring o f a cook in th e rec re ation ce nt e r,

consisting o f three re staurants, a cafe t e ria, a ba ke ry, a stor e , an d a coffee and pastry shop at th e John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cat e r to Ame rican s e rviceme n an d the ge ne ral pub lic (Unit ed Stat e s o f Ame rica v. Ro drigo, 1 82 S CRA 6 44 [ 1 990]; an d (2) th e bidd ing f or th e ope ration o f barb e r shops in Clark Air Base in Angele s City (Unit ed Stat e s o f Ame rica v. G uinto,1 82 S CRA 6 44 [ 1 990]). Th e ope ration o f the re staurants an d othe r f acilitie s op e n to th e ge ne ral pub lic is un doubt edly f or pro f it as a comme rcial and not a gov e rnme nta l activity. By e nt e ringinto th e em ployme nt contra ct with th e cook in th e discharg e of its propri e tary f unction, th e Unit ed Stat e s gov e rnme nt im pliedly dive st ed itself of it sove re ign imm unity f rom suit. ( Ho ly S ee , Th e v. Rosario, J r ., 23 8 SCRA 5 2 4 , D e c . 1 , 1994 , En Banc [ Quiason ] )

288. W hat shou ld be the gui d e l ines to d etermine w hat a c tivities an d transa c tions sha ll be c onsi d ere d c ommer c ia l an d as c onstituting a c ts j ure gestionis by a f oreign state?

Held: In th e abs e nce of le gislation def ining what a ctivitie s an d transa ctions sha ll be conside red comme rcial and as constituting a cts jur e ge stionis, we have to come out with ourown gui del ine s, t e ntativ e the y may b e .

Ce rtain ly, th e me re e nt e ring into a contra ct by a f ore ign stat e with a privat e party cannot be the ultimat e t e st. Such an a ct can on ly be the start o f the inquiry. Th e logical que stion iswhe the r th e f ore ign stat e is e ngag ed in th e activity in th e re gular cours e of busine ss. I f the f ore ign stat e is not e ngag ed re gular ly in a busin e ss or tra de , th e parti cular a ct or transa ction



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must th e n b e t e st ed by its natur e . I f the act is in pursuit o f a sov e re ign a ctivity, or an in cide nt the re of, the n it is an a ct jur e impe rii, e spec ially whe n it is not un de rta ke n f or gain or pro f it.

As h eld in U nit ed Stat e s o f Ame rica v. G uinto (supra. ) :

The re is no que stion that th e U nit ed Stat e s o f Ame rica, like any oth e r stat e, will

be dee med to hav e impliedly waived its non -suabi lity if it has e nt e red into a contra ct inits propri e tary or privat e capa city. It is on ly whe n th e contra ct invo lve s its sov e re ign orgove rnme nta l capa city that no su ch waive r may b e implied .

(Holy S ee , Th e v. Rosario, J r ., 23 8 SCRA 5 2 4 , D e c . 1 , 1994 , En Banc [ Quiason ] )

289. M ay the H o l y S ee be sue d f or se ll ing the l an d it a cq uire d b y d onation f rom the Ar c h d io c ese o f M ani l a to be ma d e site o f its mission or the Aposto l i c N un c iature in the P hi l ippines but w hi c h purpose c annot be a cc omp l ishe d as the l an d w as o cc upie d by s q uatters w ho re f use d to va c ate the area?

Held: In th e case at b e nch, if pe titione r (Holy See ) has bought an d sold lands in th e ordinary cours e of a r e al e stat e busin e ss , surely th e said transa ction can b e cat e gorized as an a ct

jure ge stionis. Ho we ve r, pe titione r has de nied that th e acquisition an d subs eq ue nt disposa l of Lot 5 - A we re made f or pro f it but claimed that it a cquired said prop e rty f or th e sit e of its missionor th e Aposto lic N unciature in th e Philippine s. X x x

Lot 5 - A was a cquired by p e titione r as a donation f rom th e Archdioce se of Manila. Th e donation was ma de not f or comme rcial purpos e, but f or th e use of pe titione r to constru ct th e re onthe off icial place of re side nce of the Papa l N uncio. The right o f a f ore ign sov e re ign to a cquire prop e rty, re al or p e rsona l, in a r ece iving stat e, nece ssary f or th e cre ation an d maint e nan ce of itsdiplomati c mission , is recognized in th e 1 9 61 Vie nna Conve ntion on Dip lomati c Relations. Thistre aty was concurred in by th e Philippine Se nat e and e nt e red into f orce in th e Philippine s onN ove mbe r 1 5 , 1 9 6 5 .

In Article 31 (a) o f the Conve ntion , a diplomati c e nvoy is grant ed immunity f rom th e civil and administrativ e jurisdiction o f the rece iving stat e ove r any r e al action r elating to privat e immovab le prop e rty situat ed in th e t e rritory o f the rece iving stat e which th e e nvoy ho lds onbe ha lf of the se nding stat e f or th e purpos e s o f the mission. I f this immunity is provi ded f or adiplomati c e nvoy, with a ll the more re ason shou ld immunity b e recognized as r e gards th e sove re ign its elf, which in this cas e is the Holy See .

The dec ision to trans fe r th e prop e rty an d the subs eq ue nt disposa l the re of are likew ise clothed with a gov e rnme nta l chara ct e r. Pe titione r did not s ell Lot 5 - A f or pro f it or gain. It me rely want ed to dispose off the sam e becaus e the squatt e rs living the re on ma de it a lmost impossib le f or p e titione r to us e it f or th e purpos e of the donation. ( Holy S ee , Th e v. Rosario,

J r ., 23 8 SCRA 5 2 4 , D e c . 1 , 1994 , En Banc [ Quiason ] )

290. H o w is sovereign or d ip l omati c immunity p l ea d e d in a f oreign c ourt?

Held: In Public Int e rnationa l Law, whe n a stat e or int e rnationa l age ncy wishe s to p le ad sove re ign or diplomati c immunity in a f ore ign court , it req ue sts th e Fore ign Off ice of the stat e whe re it is su ed to conve y to th e court that sai d defe ndant is e ntit led to immunity.

In th e Unit ed Stat e s, the proced ure f ollowed is the proce ss o f sugg e stion , whe re the f ore ign stat e or th e int e rnationa l organization su ed in an Ame rican court r eq ue sts th e Sec re taryof Stat e to ma ke a de t e rmination as to whe the r it is e ntit led to immunity. I f the Sec re tary o f Stat e f inds that th e defe ndant is immun e f rom suit , he, in turn , asks th e Attorn e y Ge ne ral tosubmit to th e court a sugg e stion that th e defe ndant is e ntit led to immunity. In Eng land, asimilar pro ced ure is f ollowed, only th e Fore ign Off ice issue s a ce rtif ication to that effec t inst e ad of submitting a sugg e stion .

In th e Philippine s, the practice is f or th e f ore ign gov e rnme nt or th e int e rnationa l organization to f irst s ecure an exec utive e ndorse me nt o f its claim o f sove re ign or diplomati c immunity. But ho w the Philippine Fore ign Off ice conve ys its e ndorse me nt to th e courts vari e s.In Int e rnationa l Catho lic Migration Commission v. Ca lle ja , 190 SCR A 130 (1990 ) , the Sec re tary o f Fore ign Aff airs just s e nt a le tt e r direc t ly to th e Sec re tary o f Labor an d Employme nt , inf orming th e latt e r that th e re spon de nt -e mploye r could not b e sued becaus e it e njoyed diplomati c immunity.In W orld H e alth Organization v. Aquino , 4 8 SCR A 2 4 2 (1972 ) , the Secre tary o f Fore ign Aff airsse nt th e tria l court a t ele gram to that effec t. In Ba e r v. T izon, 5 7 SCR A 1 (197 4) , the U.S.



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Embassy as ked the Secre tary o f Fore ign Aff airs to r eq ue st th e Solicitor Ge ne ral to ma ke, in be ha lf of the comman de r o f the Unit ed Stat e s N ava l Base at O longapo City, Zamba le s, a sugg e stion tore spon de nt Judge . The Solicitor Ge ne ral e mbodied the sugg e stion in a Manife station an d Me moran dum as ami cus curiae .

In th e cas e at b e nch, the De partm e nt o f Fore ign Aff airs , through th e Off ice of Le gal

Aff airs mov ed with this Court to b e allowed to int e rve ne on th e side of pe titione r. Th e Court allowed the said De partm e nt to f ile its m e moran dum in support o f pe titione r sclaim o f sove re ignimmunity.

In som e case s, the defe nse of sove re ign immunity was submitt ed direc t ly to th e local courts by th e re spon de nts through th e ir privat e couns els. In case s whe re the f ore ign stat e sbypass th e Fore ign Off ice, the courts can in quire into th e f acts an d make the ir own de t e rminationas to th e natur e of the acts an d transa ctions invo lved . (Holy S ee , Th e v. Rosario, J r ., 23 8 SCRA 5 2 4 , D e c . 1 , 1994 , En Banc [ Quiason ] )

291. I s the d etermination o f the exe c utive bran c h o f the government that a state or instrumenta l ity is entit l e d to sovereign or d ip l omati c immunity su bj e c t to j u d i c ia l revie w, or is it a po l iti c a l q uestion an d there f ore , c on cl usive upon the c ourts?

Held: The issue of pe titione r s(The Holy See ) non -suabi lity can b e de t e rmined by th e tria l court without going to tria l in light o f the ple adings x x x. Be side s, the privile ge of sove re ignimmunity in this cas e was su ff icie nt ly e stab lished by th e M e moran dum an d Ce rtif ication o f the De partm e nt o f Fore ign Aff airs. As th e de partm e nt tas ked with th e conduct o f the Philippine s f ore ign relations , the De partm e nt o f Fore ign Aff airs has f orma lly int e rve ned in this cas e and off icially ce rtif ied that th e Embassy o f the Holy See is a duly accred it ed diplomati c mission to th e Re pub lic of the Philippine s exe mpt f rom local jurisdiction an d e ntit led to a ll the rights , privile ge sand immuniti e s o f a diplomati c mission or e mbassy in this country. Th e de t e rmination o f the exec utive arm o f gove rnme nt that a stat e or instrum e nta lity is e ntit led to sov e re ign or diplomati c immunity is a po litical que stion that is conclusive upon th e courts. Wh e re the ple a o f immunity isrecognized and aff irmed by th e exec utive bran ch, it is th e duty o f the courts to a cce pt this claimso as not to e mbarrass th e exec utive arm o f the gove rnme nt in conducting th e country s f ore ignrelations. As in I nt e rnationa l Catho lic M igration Commission an d in Wor ld He alth O rganization , we abide by th e ce rtif ication o f the De partm e nt o f Fore ign Aff airs. ( Ho ly S ee , Th e v. Rosario,

J r ., 23 8 SCRA 5 2 4 , D e c . 1 , 1994 , En Banc [ Quiason ] )

292. W hat is extra d ition? T o w hom d oes it app l y?

Held: It is th e proce ss by which pe rsons charg ed with or convict ed of crime against th e law of a Stat e and f ound in a f ore ign Stat e are re turn ed by th e latt e r to th e f orme r f or tria l orpunishm e nt. It app lie s to thos e who ar e me rely charg ed with an o ffe nse but hav e not b ee nbrought to tria l; to thos e who hav e bee n tri ed and convict ed and have subs eq ue nt ly e scaped f rom custo dy; an d thos e who hav e bee n convict ed in abs e ntia. It doe s not app ly to p e rsonsme rely susp ec t ed of having committ ed an o ffe nse but against whom no charg e has b ee n laid or

to a p e rson whose pre se nce is de sired as a witne ss or f or obtaining or e nf orcing a civil judgme nt. (W e ston, F a lk, D' Amato, Int e rnationa l Law an d Or de r, 2 n d ed. , p . 630 [199 0 ] , cit ed in Diss e nting Opinion, Puno, J. , in S e cr e tary of Justic e v. H on . Ra lph C .Lantion, G.R. No . 1 3 94 6 5 , Jan . 18 , 2000, En Banc)

293. Dis c uss the basis f or a ll o w ing extra d ition .

Held: Extra dition was f irst pra cticed by th e Egyptians , Chine se, Chalde ans an d Assyro -Babylonians but th e ir basis f or a llowing ex tradition was un cle ar. Some time s, it was grant ed due to pa cts; at oth e r time s, due to p lain goo d will. The classical comme ntators on int e rnationa l law thus f ocused the ir e ar ly view s on th e natur e of the duty to surr e nde r an ex tradit ee --- whe the rthe duty is le ga l or mora l in chara ct e r. Grotius an d Vatt el led the school of thought that int e rnationa l law impos ed a le ga l duty called civitas ma xima to extra dit e criminals. In sharpcontrast , Puffe ndorf and Billot led the school of thought that th e so-called duty was but an"impe rfec t ob ligation which could become e nf orce ab le only by a contra ct or agr ee me nt b e t wee nstat e s.

Mode rn nations ti lt ed towards th e view of Puffe ndorf and Billot that un de r int e rnationa l law the re is no duty to ex tra dit e in th e abs e nce of tre aty , whe the r bilat e ra l or mu ltilat e ral. Thus , the US Supre me Court in U S v. Raus che r (119 U S 4 07 , 4 11 , 7 S Ct. 23 4 , 236 , 30 L . ed . 4 2 5 [1886] ) , held: x x x it is on ly in mo de rn tim e s that th e nations o f the e arth hav e impos ed upon



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the mselve s th e obligation o f delive ring up th e se f ugitive s f rom justice to th e stat e s whe re the ircrime s we re committ ed, f or tria l and punishm e nt. This has b ee n done ge ne ra lly by tr e atie s x x x Prior to th e se tre atie s, and apart f rom th e m th e re was no well-def ined obligation on on e countryto del ive r up su ch f ugitive s to anoth e r; an d though su ch del ive ry was o f t e n ma de it was upon th e principle of comity x x x. (Diss e nting Opinion, Puno, J. , in S e cr e tary of Justic e v. Hon .Ralph C . Lantion, G.R. No . 1 3 94 6 5 , Jan . 18 , 2000, En Banc)

29 4 . W hat is the nature o f an extra d ition pro c ee d ing? I s it a k in to a c rimina l pro c ee d ing?

Held: [ A]n ex tra dition pro ceed ing is s u i ge ne ris. It is not a crim inal pro ceed ing whichwill call into op e ration all the rights o f an a ccu sed as g u arant eed by th e Bill of Rights. To b e ginwith, the proce ss o f ex tra dition doe s not in v ol ve the de t e rm ination o f the gu ilt or inno ce nce of anaccu sed . His g u ilt or inno ce nce will be adjud ged in th e cou rt o f the stat e whe re he will be ex tra dit ed . He nce, as a r u l e, constit u tional rights that ar e only re l ev ant to de t e rm ine the gu ilt orinnoce nce of an a ccu sed cannot b e inv oked by an ex tradit ee e spec ially by one whose extra ditionpap e rs ar e still u nde rgoing ev al u ation. As h e l d by th e US Su preme Cou rt in Unit ed Stat e s v .G alanis:

An ex tra dition pro ceed ing is not a crim inal pros ecu tion, and the constit u tional sa fe gu ards that a ccom pany a crim inal trial in this cou ntry do not shi e l d an a ccu sed f rom ex tra dition p u rsu ant to a v alid tre aty. ( W ie hl , E xtra dition L aw at th e Crossroa ds: Th e Tre nd Toward E xt e nding G re at e r Constit u tional Pro cedu ral Prot ec tions To F u gitive sF ighting E xtra dition f rom the Unit ed Stat e s, 19 Michigan Jo u rnal o f Int e rnational L aw 729 , 7 4 1 [1998 ], citing Unit ed Stat e s v . G alanis , 4 29 F . Su pp. 121 5 [D . Conn. 1977 ] )

The re are othe r diffe re nce s b e t wee n an extra dition pro ceed ing an d a crim inal pro ceed ing. Anex tra dition pro ceed ing is s umm ary in nat u ral whil e crim inal pro ceed ings in v ol ve a fu ll -blown trial.In contra distinction to a crim inal pro ceed ing, the ru l e s o f ev ide nce in an ex tradition pro ceed ingallow adm ission o f ev ide nce u nde r l e ss string e nt stan dards. In t e rm s o f the qu ant um of ev ide nce to b e satis f ied, a crim inal cas e requ ire s proo f be yond re asonabl e dou bt f or conv iction whil e afu gitive m ay b e orde red ex tra dit ed u pon sho wing o f the exist e nce of a pri m a f acie case .F inally, u nlike in a crim inal case whe re judgme nt b ecome s execu tory u pon b e ing re nde red f inal , in an ex tra dition pro ceed ing, ou r cou rts m ay a djud ge an in div idu al ex tra ditabl e bu t th e Pre side nt has th e f inal discre tion to extra dit e him . The Unit ed Stat e s a dhe re s to a si m ilar pra ctice whe re bythe Sec re tary o f Stat e exe rcise s wide discre tion in balan cing th e equ itie s o f the cas e and the dem ands o f the nation 's f ore ign r e lations b ef ore m aking th e u ltim at e dec ision to ex tra dit e .

As an ex tra dition pro ceed ing is not crim inal in chara ct e r an d the ev al u ation stag e in anex tra dition pro ceed ing is not a kin to a pr e lim inary inve stigation , the due proce ss sa fe gu ards inthe latt e r do not n ece ssarily apply to th e f orme r. This we hol d f or th e procedu ral due proce ssrequ ired by a gi ve n s e t o f circum stan ce s mu st b e gin with a de t e rm ination o f the prec ise nat u re of the gove rnme nt fu nction in v ol ved as we ll as th e priv at e int e re st that has b ee n a ffec t ed bygove rnme ntal a ction. The conce pt o f due proce ss is f l ex ibl e f or not all sit u ations calling f orprocedu ral sa fe gu ards call f or th e sa me kind of procedu re . (S e cr e tary of Justic e v. H on .

Ra lph C . Lantion, G.R. No . 1 3 94 6 5 , Oct . 1 7, 2000, En Banc [ Puno ] )

29 5 . W i ll the retroa c tive app l i c ation o f an extra d ition treaty vio l ate the c onstitutiona l prohi bition against " ex post f a c to " l a w s?

Held: The prohibition against ex post facto law app lie s on ly to crimina l le gislation whichaff e cts th e substantia l rights of th e accus ed . This b e ing so , the re is no m e rit in th e cont e ntionthat th e ruling sustaining an ex tra dition tr e aty s re troactiv e app lication vio lat e s th e constitutiona l prohibition against ex post facto laws. Th e tre aty is n e ithe r a pi e c e of crimina l le gislation nor acriminal proc ed ura l statut e . (Wright v. CA, 23 5 SCRA 3 41 , Aug . 15 , 1994 [K apunan ] )

296. Dis c uss the ru l es in the interpretation o f extra d ition treaties .

Held: [ A]ll tre atie s, including th e RP-US Extra dition Tre aty , shou ld be int e rp re t ed in light of th e ir int e nt. N othing le ss than th e V ie nna Con ve ntion on th e L aw of Tr e atie s to whi ch th e Philipp ine s is a signatory p rov ide s that a tr e aty sha ll be int e rp re t ed in goo d faith in a ccordance with th e ordinary m e aning to b e give n to th e t e rms of th e tre aty in th e ir cont ex t an d in light of itsobj ec t an d p urp ose . X x x. It cannot b e gainsai d that to day, countri e s like the Philipp ine s forg e ex tra dition tr e atie s to arr e st th e dramati c rise of int e rnationa l and transnationa l crime s like t e rrorism an d drug traffi cking. Extradition tr e atie s p rov ide the assuran ce that th e p unishm e nt of the se crime s will not b e frustrat ed by th e frontie rs of t e rritorial sove re ignty. Im plicit in th e



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tre atie s shou ld be the unbe nding commitm e nt that th e pe rpe trators o f the se crime s will not b e coddled by any signatory stat e .

It ought to f ollow that th e RP-US Extra dition Tre aty calls f or an int e rpre tation that will minimize if not pr e ve nt th e e scape of ex tra dit ee s f rom th e long arm o f the law and exped it e the irtria l. X x x

[ A]n eq ua lly compelling f actor to conside r is th e unde rstan ding o f the parti e s th e mselve sto th e RP-US Extra dition Tre aty as well as th e ge ne ral int e rpre tation o f the issue in que stion byothe r countri e s with similar tr e atie s with th e Philippine s. Th e rule is recognized that while courtshave the powe r to int e rpre t tr e atie s, the me aning giv e n th e m by th e de partm e nts o f gove rnme nt particular ly charg ed with th e ir ne gotiation an d e nf orce me nt is a ccorded gre at we ight. Th e re ason f or th e rule is laid down in Santos III v. North we st O rie nt Airline s, e t a l. (210 SC RA 2 5 6 , 261 [1992 ] ) , whe re we stre ssed that a tr e aty is a joint exec utive-le gislative act which e n joys th e pre sumption that it was f irst caref ully stu died and de t e rmined to b e constitutiona l bef ore it wasadopt ed and give n th e f orce of law in th e country. (S e cr e tary of Justic e v. Hon . Ralph C .Lantion, G.R. No . 1 3 94 6 5 , Oct . 1 7, 2000, En Banc [ Puno ] )

297. W hat is a T reaty? Dis c uss .

Held: A tre aty , as def ined by th e V ie nna C o nve ntio n o n th e L aw of T re atie s, is anint e rnatio na l instrum e nt co ncluded be tw ee n Stat e s in writt e n fo rm an d gove rned by int e rnati o na l law , whe the r e mbod ied in a sing le instrum e nt o r in tw o o r mo re relat ed instrum e nts , and what eve r its parti cular de signati o n. T he re are many o the r t e rms us ed fo r a tr e aty o rint e rnatio na l agree me nt , so me of which ar e: act , pro t ocol, agree me nt , co mpro mis d' arbitrag e, co nco rdat , co nve ntio n, declarati o n, exchang e of no t e s, pact , statut e, chart e r an d modus v ive ndi. All writ e rs, f ro m Hug o Gro tius o nwar d, have po int ed o ut that th e nam e s o r tit le s of int e rnati o na l agree me nts in cluded unde r th e ge ne ra l t e rm tr e aty ha ve litt le o r n o signif icance . C e rtain t e rmsare usef ul, but th e y f urnish litt le mo re than m e re de scriptio n

Article 2 (2 ) of the V ie nna C o nve ntio n pr ov ide s that the prov isio ns of paragraph 1 re garding th e use of t e rms in th e pre se nt C o nve ntio n ar e witho ut pr ejudice t o the use of tho se t e rms , o r t o the me anings whi ch may b e give n t o the m in th e int e rna l law of the Stat e .(BAYAN [ Bagong Alyansang Maka b ayan ] v. Exe cuti ve S e cr e tary Rona ld o Z amora, G.R.No . 1 3 85 70, Oct . 1 0, 2000, En Banc [ Bu e na ] )

2 98. Dis c uss the bin d ing e ff e c t o f treaties an d exe c utive agreements in internationa l l a w.

Held: [I]n int e rnationa l law, the re is no diffe re nce be t wee n tr e atie s an d exec utive agree me nts in th e ir binding effec t upon stat e s conce rned, as long as th e f unctionari e s hav e re mained within th e ir powe rs. Int e rnationa l law continu e s to ma ke no distinction b e t wee ntre atie s an d exec utive agree me nts : the y ar e eq ua lly binding ob ligations upon nations. (BAYAN [ Bagong Alyansang Maka b ayan ] v. Exe cuti ve S e cr e tary Rona ld o Z amora, G.R. No .1 3 85 70, Oct . 1 0, 2000, En Banc [ Bu e na ] )

299. Does the P hi l ippines re c ognize the bin d ing e ff e c t o f exe c utive agreements even w ithout the c on c urren c e o f the S enate or C ongress?

Held: In our jurisdiction , we have recognized the binding effec t o f exec utive agree me nts e ve n without th e concurre nce of the Se nat e or Congr e ss. In Commission e r o f Customs v. E ast e rn Se a T rading (3 SCRA 3 5 1, 3 5 6-3 5 7 [1961] ) , we had occasion to pronoun ce:

x x x the right o f the E xecutive to e nt e r into bin ding agr ee me nts without th e nece ssity o f subs eq ue nt Congr e ssiona l approva l has b ee n conf irmed by long usag e .From th e e arlie st days o f our history we have e nt e red into exec utive agree me ntscove ring su ch sub jects as comme rcial and consu lar r elations , most- f avored -nation rights , pat e nt rights , tra de mark and copyright prot ec tion, posta l and navigation arrang e me ntsand the se tt le me nt o f claims. T he validity of the se has n e ve r b ee n s e rious ly que stioned by our courts. "

(BAYAN [ Bagong Alyansang Maka b ayan ] v. Exe cuti ve S e cr e tary Rona ld o Z amora, G.R.No . 1 3 85 70, Oct . 1 0, 2000, En Banc [ Bu e na ] )

300. W hat is a " proto c o l d e cl oture " ? W i ll it re q uire c on c urren c e by the S enate?



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Held: A f ina l a c t, someti me s c a ll ed pr ot ocol de cloture, i s an in stru ment whi ch re cordst he windin g up of t he pr oc eedin gs of a dip lomati c con f eren c e and u sua lly in cl ude s a repr odu c ti on of t he text s of treatie s, con venti on s, re comm endati on s and ot her a c t s a greed up on and si gned byt he p l enip otentiarie s attendin g t he con f eren c e . I t i s n ot t he treat y it se lf. It i s rat her a su mmar yof t he pr oc eedin gs of a pr otra c ted con f eren c e whi ch ma y ha ve taken p l a c e over se vera l year s. I t wi ll n ot require t he con c urren c e of t he Senate . The doc u ment s co ntained t herein are dee med

ad opted wit hout need for rati f i c ati on . (Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 , May 2, 199 7 [ Pangani b an ] )

301. W hat is the most -f avore d- nation cl ause? W hat is its purpose?

Answer: 1 . The most -f avored- nation claus e may b e def ined, in ge ne ral, as a p ledge bya contra cting party to a tr e aty to grant to th e othe r party tr e atm e nt not le ss f avorab le than that which has b ee n or may b e grant ed to th e most f avor ed among oth e r countri e s. Th e claus e hasbee n common ly included in tr e atie s o f comme rcial natur e .

The re are ge ne rally t wo typ e s o f most -f avored- nation claus e, nam ely, conditional and unconditiona l. According to th e claus e in its un conditiona l f orm , any a dvantag e of what e ve r kind which has b ee n or may in f utur e be grant ed by e ithe r o f the contra cting parti e s to a thir d Stat e sha ll simultan e ous ly an d unconditiona lly b e ext e nded to th e othe r un de r th e sam e or eq uivale nt conditions as thos e unde r which it has b ee n grant ed to th e third Stat e . (Salo n ga & Yap, Pu b lic I n t ern atio n al La w , 5 th Editio n , 199 2, pp . 141-14 2)

2 . The purpos e of a most f avored nation claus e is to grant to th e contra cting partytre atm e nt not le ss f avorab le than that which has b ee n or may b e grant ed to th e "most f avored " among oth e r countri e s. Th e most f avor ed nation claus e is int e nded to e stab lish th e principle of eq ua lity of int e rnationa l tre atm e nt by provi ding that th e citize ns or sub jects o f the contra ctingnations may e n joy th e privile ge s a ccorded by e ithe r party to thos e of the most f avored nation(Commi ss io ner of I n t ern al Reven u e v. S .C . J oh ns o n a n d So n , I n c ., 30 9 SCR A 8 7, 1 07 -1 0 8 , Ju ne 2 5 , 1999 , 3 rd Di v. [G o nz aga -Re y es] )

30 2 . W hat is the essen c e o f the prin c ip l e behin d the " most -f avore d- nation " cl ause as app l ie d to tax treaties?

Held: The e sse nce of the principle is to a llow the taxpaye r in on e stat e to avai l of more libe ral provisions grant ed in anoth e r ta x tre aty to which th e country o f re side nce of such ta xpaye ris a lso a party provi ded that th e sub ject matt e r o f taxation x x x is th e sam e as that in th e tax tre aty un de r which th e taxpaye r is liable .

In Commission e r of Int e rna l Reve nu e v. S .C . J ohnson an d Son, Inc ., 30 9 SCRA 8 7, Jun e 2 5 , 1999 , the SC did not grant th e claim f iled by S.C. Johnson an d Son, Inc., a non -re side nt f ore ign corporation bas ed in th e USA, with th e BIR f or r ef und of ove rpaid withho ldingtax on roya ltie s pursuant to th e most -f avored- nation claus e of the RP-US Tax Tre aty in r elation tothe RP-We st Ge rmany Ta x Tre aty. It h eld:

Give n th e purpos e unde rlying ta x tre atie s an d the rationa le f or th e most f avor ed nation claus e, the conce ssiona l tax rat e of 1 0 pe rce nt provi ded f or in th e RP-Ge rmanyTax Tre aty shou ld app ly on ly if the taxe s impos ed upon roya ltie s in th e RP-US Tax Tre atyand in th e RP-Ge rmany Ta x Tre aty ar e paid unde r similar circumstan ce s. This would me an that privat e re spon de nt (S.C. Johnson an d Son, Inc.) must prov e that th e RP-US Tax Tre aty grants simi lar ta x relief s to r e side nts o f the Unit ed Stat e s in r e spec t o f the taxe s imposab le upon roya ltie s e arned f rom sour ce s within th e Philippine s as thos e allowed to th e ir Ge rman count e rparts un de r th e RP-Ge rmany Ta x Tre aty.

The RP-US and the RP-We st Ge rmany Ta x Tre atie s do not contain simi larprovisions on ta x cred iting. Article 2 4 o f the RP-Ge rmany Ta x Tre aty x x x expre sslyallows cred iting against G e rman in come and corporation ta x of 2 0% of the gross amount of royaltie s pai d unde r th e law of the Philippine s. On th e othe r han d, Article 2 3 of the RP-US Tax Tre aty , which is th e count e rpart provision with re spec t to r elief f or doub le taxation , doe s not provi de f or simi lar cred iting o f 2 0% of the gross amount o f roya ltie spaid. X x x

X x x The e ntit le me nt o f the 1 0% rat e by U.S. f irms de spit e the abs e nce of mat ching cred it (2 0% f or roya ltie s) would de rogat e f rom th e de sign b e hind the most f avored nation claus e to grant eq ua lity of int e rnationa l tre atm e nt sin ce the tax burde n



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laid upon th e income of the inve stor is not th e sam e in th e t wo countri e s. Th e similarityin th e circumstan ce s o f paym e nt o f taxe s is a condition f or th e e n joyme nt o f most f avored nation tr e atm e nt pr ec isely to un de rscore the need f or eq ua lity of tre atm e nt.

303. W hat is rati f i c ation? Dis c uss its f un c tion in the treaty - ma k ing pro c ess .

Held: Ratif ication is g e ne ra lly held to b e an exec utive act , unde rta ke n by th e he ad of stat e or o f the gove rnme nt , as th e case may b e, through which th e f orma l acce ptan ce of the tre aty is pro claimed . A Stat e may provi de in its dome stic le gislation th e proce ss o f ratif ication o f a tr e aty. Th e conse nt o f the Stat e to b e boun d by a tr e aty is expre ssed by rati f ication whe n: (a)the tre aty provi de s f or su ch rati f ication , (b) it is oth e rwise e stab lished that th e ne gotiating Stat e sagreed that rati f ication shou ld be req uired, (c) th e re pre se ntative of the Stat e has sign ed the tre aty sub ject to rati f ication , or (d) th e int e ntion o f the Stat e to sign th e tre aty sub ject toratif ication app e ars f rom th e f ull powe rs o f its re pre se ntativ e, or was expre ssed during th e ne gotiation. (BAYAN [ Bagong Alyansang Maka b ayan ] v. Exe cuti ve S e cr e tary Rona ld o Z amora, G.R. No . 1 3 85 70, Oct . 1 0, 2000, En Banc [ Bu e na ] )

30 4 . E xp l ain the pa c ta sunt servan d a ru l e .

Held: One of the olde st an d most f undame nta l rule s in int e rnationa l law is p acta sunt se rv anda int e rnationa l agree me nts must b e pe rf ormed in goo d f aith. A tre aty e ngag e me nt isnot a m e re mora l obligation but cr e at e s a le ga lly binding ob ligation on th e p artie s x x x. A stat e which has contract ed v alid int e rnationa l obligations is boun d to ma ke in its le gislations suchmodif ications as may b e ne c e ssary to e nsur e the f ulf illme nt o f the obligations un de rta ke n.(Tana da v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 , May 2, 199 7 [ Pangani b an ] )

30 5 . E xp l ain the " re bus si c stanti bus " ru l e ( i .e ., things remaining as they are ) . Does it operate automati c a ll y to ren d er a treaty inoperative?

Held: According to J essup, the doctrine cons tit u t es an att e mp t to f ormulat e a le ga l p rinciple which would jus tif y non -pe rf orman ce of a tr e aty ob ligation i f the conditions with relationto which th e p arties contra ct ed have chang ed s o mat e rially an d s o u nexpec t edly as to cre at e as it u ation in which th e exaction o f pe rf orman ce would be u nre as onab le . The ke y ele me nt o f this doctrine is the vital chang e in th e condition o f the contra cting p arties that th e y could not hav e f oresee n at th e time the tre aty was concluded .

The doctrine of re bus s ic s tantib us does not o pe rat e au tomati cally to r e nde r th e tre atyinope rative . The re is a n ecess ity f or a f orma l act o f rejec tion , usu ally ma de by th e he ad of s tat e, with a s tat e me nt o f the re as ons why compliance with th e tre aty is no longe r r equ ired . (Santos III v. Northw e st Ori e nt Air lin e s, 2 1 0 SCRA 2 5 6, Jun e 23, 199 2)

306. W hat is the d o c trine o f e ff e c tive nationa l ity ( genuine l in k d o c trine ) ?

Held: This prin ciple is expre ssed in Art icle 5 of t he H ague Conve nt ion o f 1930 on t he

Conflict of N at ionality L a ws a s f ollows:

Art . 5 . Wit hin a t hird State a pe rson h av ing more t ha n on e nat ionality shall be t reated a s i f he had only one . Wit hout prejud ice t o t he a pplicat ion o f it s la w in m atte rsof pe rson al statu s a nd of a ny conve nt ion in f orce, a t hird State shall, of t he nat ionalit ie swhich a ny such p e rson poss e sse s, recog nize exclu sively in it s te rrit ory e it he r t he nat ionality of t he cou nt ry in which h e is ha bitually a nd principally re side nt or t he nat ionality of t he cou nt ry wit h whi ch in t he circu ms ta nce s h e a ppea rs t o b e in fact mos t closely connected . ( F ri v a ld o v. COMELEC, 1 7 4 SCRA 2 45 , Jun e 23, 1989 )

306 political law rev sandoval

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