LAWYERS DUTIES IN HANDLING CASES

1. A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants, vs.ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, respondent.FACTS:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege: (1) That the said attorney without informing us the reason why and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita Capulong; (2) That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order, that he answered the complaint when he never did; (3) That because of Atty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost the Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals.

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer, but alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that the case was a "losing cause" for the complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final decision. He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.

The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.

ISSUE:

WoN respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer.

RULING:

A lawyer has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. The complainants, however, want to impress

upon this Court that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.

We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.

Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other commitments.

Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.

All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.

2. A.M. Case No. 3195. December 18, 1989MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, complainant, vs.ATTY. HUMBERTO V. POTENCIANO, respondent.

FACTS:

Complainant herein is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an action for "ejectment" before the MTC of Manila. Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was then pending before the RTC of Pasig for "reconveyance with damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit being rented by complainant and her sister.

Peregrina came out the losing party in both. Thus, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan, on the matter. Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them to herein respondent. After such introduction, the parties "impliedly agreed" that respondent would handle their case.

Thereafter, the complainant was made to sign by respondent what she described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed petition for annulment of judgment. Complainant alleges that respondent promised her that the

necessary restraining order would be secured if only because the judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close friend). When the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the presiding judge asked respondent to withdraw as counsel in the case on the ground of their friendship. Here, respondent asked for P1,000 as attorneys fees.

Later on, respondent went to the house of complainant and asked her to be ready P 2,000 to be given to another judge who will issue the restraining order in the ejectment case. Only P1,000 was given. However, respondent informed them that he could not anymore locate the judge. They went instead to Maxs Restaurant where respondent ordered some food - including two plastic bags of food allegedly to be given to the judge who would issue the restraining order. At this juncture, respondent asked for the remaining balance of the P2,000 which he earlier demanded. Complainant gave her last money- 10-dollar bill.

Sometime after the filing of the civil case, respondent informed complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to file another case with the RTC to enable them to retain possession of the apartment. Thus, he asked complainants to prepare again P10,000 to be deposited to the Pasig Treasurers Office and another P1,000 to cover the suits expenses. Out of the kindness of their friends, complainants were able to raise said amounts.

At the hearing of the preliminary injunction, respondent, contrary to his promise that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046 was eventually enforced and executed.

Complainants thereafter discovered that the P11,000-deposit was not really necessary. They thus sent a demand letter to respondent which was never answered.

Respondent in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done in good faith and that the allegations of complainant relative to the administrative charge against him are all lies, product of one's imagination and only intended to harrass him.

ISSUE:

WoN respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his clients interests.

RULING:

This Court agrees that the petitions appear to be poorly prepared and written. Likewise, complainant reposed full faith in him. His first duty was to file the best pleading within his capability. Apparently respondent was more interested in getting the most out of the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests. Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact. Even assuming that respondent had no previous knowledge

that he would be asked to withdraw, the record is quite clear that four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction, respondent already filed a motion therein withdrawing as complainant's counsel interposing as reason therefor his frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void, respondent failed to find a replacement. He did not even ask complainant to hire another lawyer in his stead. His representation that there was an immediate need to file Civil Case No. 55210 when he already knew that he could no longer physically handle the same is an act of deception of his client. It shows lack of fidelity to his oath of office as a member of the Philippine bar.

The allegation of respondent that the P 10,000.00 was given to him as fee for his services is simply incredible. Such amount is grossly disproportionate with the service he actually rendered.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law. Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to complainant herein the sum of P11,000.00 with legal interest from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned.

3. A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, vs.ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the MTC of Bangued, Abra which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case. Co, through respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the RTC, Bangued, Abra. She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The CA dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines. According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal.

On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for Co, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment.

ISSUE:

WoN respondent should be suspended as per recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

RULING:

SC holds that they have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives

of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.

Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions. Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications.

Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Implementing said Canon are the following rules:

Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.

It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment.

The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud."

Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution.

Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:

(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;

(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra;

(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals;

(4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court;

(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and,

(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.

Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping.

By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).

WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.

4. [Syllabus]THIRD DIVISION[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063. February 9, 1996]

ALFONSO C. CHOA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S. CHIONGSON, respondent.R E S O L U T I O NDAVIDE, JR., J.:

In the complaint signed by Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz as counsel for the complainant and verified by the latter, the respondent is charged with grave misconduct, gross bias and partiality, and having knowingly rendered an unjust judgment in Criminal Case No. 50322 entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso C. Choa.

Criminal Case No. 50322 was for Perjury and initiated by the complainants wife, Leni L. Ong-Choa, through the filing of a letter-complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City. This complaint arose from the alleged untruthful statements or falsehoods in the complainants Petition for Naturalization dated 30 March 1989 which was docketed as Case No. 5395, of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.

In due course, an Information was filed, in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City by the Office of the Prosecutor, charging the complainant herein with perjury allegedly committed

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was assigned to Branch III thereof where the respondent is the presiding Judge.

After trial, the respondent Judge rendered judgment on 21 February 1995 and found the complainant herein guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of perjury. The respondent Judge accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.

The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment.

The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in an order dated 31 March 1995.

The complainant filed the instant complaint on 14 July. 1995 and prayed for the removal of the respondent fudge from office.

The respondent Judge refutes the charge in his Comment dated 12 September 1995, thus:

He denies being the next-door-neighbor of Leni Ong Choa there being a house, belonging to the Sia family, separating his house and that of Leni Choa; he and the rest of the members of his family are not acquainted with Leni Choa or any member of her family and had not exchanged greetings nor is he even a nodding acquaintance of Leni Choa or any member of her family.

He asserts that if the allegations in the Information do not constitute an offense, the complainant should have filed a Motion to Quash but he did not. Just the same, when the complainant stated in the Petition that he together with his wife and children lived at 46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City, he committed a falsehood under oath because the truth is two (2) years before the filing of the Petition, his wife and two (2) children were not living with him anymore, making him liable for perjury.

Respondent also avers that the complainant is not of good moral character contrary to what he stated in the Petition for Naturalization since he is conducting an extra-marital relationship with Stella Flores Saludar, his former employee, with whom he has begotten two (2) children. As a matter of fact, a case for concubinage against complainant was filed and is now pending in Court.

According to the respondent, a reading of the Order granting the Motion to Withdraw the Petition will show that the Prosecutor representing the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the Motion to Withdraw the Petition for the reason that the complainant had abandoned his wife and two (2) children, is not giving them support and is now living with his paramour.

The respondent Judge then prays for the dismissal of the complaint for being patently without merit and for the censure and reprimand of the complainants counsel with a warning to refrain from filing similar harassment suits.

In the Evaluation contained in a Memorandum dated 17 November 1995 and duly approved by the Court Mministrator, Hon. Zenaida N. Elepao, Deputy Court Administrator, makes the following findings and conclusion: A careful study of the records shows that the allegations of the complainant are devoid of any merit.

ISSUE: whether there is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.

RULING: As shown by the records Alfonso C. Choa declared in his petition dated 30 March 1989 that his wife Leni Ong Choa resides at 46 Ma!aspina St. Bacolod City while in the administrative complaint he filed against respondent Judge, he stated that his wife Leni Ong Choa left their family residence (46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City) in the latter part of 1984 . This simply means that when he filed his petition for naturalization, Leni Ong Choa was not residing at the abovementioned address anymore.

It was also proven that Alfonso C. Choa had a child with a woman not his wife and he himself signed the birth certificate as the father of that child. This is contrary to what he declared in his petition that he is of good moral character which is required under the Naturalization Law.

There was therefore a deliberate assertion of falsehood by Alfonso C.. Choa to warrant conviction for perjury as found by Judge Chiongson.

As earlier stated, the foregoing discussion is in no way the final appreciation of the Courts decision which is on appeal, but is made only to illustrate the utter lack of merit of this charge. Counsel for the complainant must be reprimanded for assisting in the filing of this complaint.

Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo then recommends:

Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson be DISMISSED for lack of merit. It is further recommended that Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz be REPRIMANDED for assisting in the filing of a patently unmeritorious complaint.

We fully agree with Deputy Court Administrator Elepaflo that the allegations in the complaint are utterly devoid of merit. Good faith and good motive did not seem to have inspired the filing of the complaint.

The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did not and cannot amount to a recall of the questioned untruthful statements. Neither could it extinguish any offense which may have been committed by reason of such untruthful statements.

As to the respondent Judges being a next-door neighbor of the complainants wife - the complainant in the perjury case - it must be stressed that that alone is not a ground for either a mandatory disqualification under the first paragraph or for a voluntary disqualification under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the complainant has failed to disclose in his complaint that he had raised this matter at any time before the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the summary of the grounds of his motion for reconsideration in the respondents order denying the said motion does not include this matter. If indeed the complainant honestly believed in the justness of this grievance, he would have raised it in an appropriate pleading before the trial court.

Finally, the nature and character of the complainants grievances relative to the respondents judgment finding the former guilty of perjury. May only be properly ventilated in an appropriate judicial proceeding, such as an appeal from the judgment.

This kind of recourse, whether made in addition to a regular appeal from the judgment, or in lieu thereof, if none had been made, is clearly without any basis and cannot be tolerated for it robs Judges of precious time which they could otherwise devote to the cases in their courts or to the unclogging of their dockets.

Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must have been aware of the utter lack of merit of the charges against the respondent. As a Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by his oath, not to, wittingly or willingly, promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; (2) by Section 20(c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to counsel or maintain such action or proceedings only as appear to him to be just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional

Responsibility. It was incumbent upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the complainants case (Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of Professional Responsibility) with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes (Canon 1, Id.). He should, therefore, be required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and responsibilities.

WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.

For the reasons above stated, Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz is hereby directed to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for his apparent failure to comply with his duties and responsibilities above stated.

SO ORDERED.

5.COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. ALVAREZ, petitioners, vs.LO BU and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Filemon G. Alvarez for petitioners.

Yolando F Busmente for respondent Lo Bu.

FERNANDO, J.

The facts show that on January 16, 1973, petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor.

Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Mario Abiog of Manila, who was especially deputized to serve the writ, did so on January 17 and 18, 1973 levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale.

It was then that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, a point stressed in another motion dated February 2, 1973, on the further ground that petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union failed to put up an indemnity bond. The Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated February 23, 1973 denied his motions. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration, as shown in its order dated March 23, 1973.

Private respondent appealed by certiorari such order to this Court. However it was denied. In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by private respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila covering the same properties. Upon receipt of the order from this Court denying certiorari, petitioner labor union filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint. It was therein alleged that private respondent has no cause of action, he being a fictitious buyer based on the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations in its order dated June 22, 1970 and affirmed by the Supreme Court in its resolution dated July 17, 1973. The lower court dismissed the complaint. That is the decision elevated to the Court of Appeals,

and it is precisely because of its obvious character as a further delaying tactic that this petition is filed.

ISSUE. Whether or not certiorari may issue

It was set forth in the Petition that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion with the Court of Industrial Relations to recall the writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry Shop, followed by another motion praying for the return of the levied properties this time asserting that petitioner labor union failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third, this time to allow the sheriff to keep the levied properties at his factory, all of which were denied by the Court en banc in its order of March 23, 1973, assailed in the certiorari proceeding, dismissed by this Court for lack of merit.

Counsel Yolando F. Busmente in his Answer to this petition, filed on February 20, 1975, had the temerity to deny such allegations.

Such conduct on the part of counsel is far from commendable. He could, of course, be casuistic and take refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition, which he denied, was, in addition to being rather poorly and awkwardly worded, also prolix, with unnecessary matter being included therein without due regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. He could add that his denial was to be correlated with his special defenses, where he concentrated on points not previously admitted.

That is the most that can be said of his performance, and it is not enough. For even if such be the case, Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. He was of course expected to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of December 19, 1974 of respondent Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, respondent Court of Appeals being perpetually restrained from taking any further action on such appeal, except that of dismissing it. Triple costs.

6. A.C. No. 3695 February 24, 1992

DOMINGO C. GAMALINDA, complainant, vs.AYTYS. FERNANDO ALCANTARA and JOSELITO LIM, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In his verified letter-complaint dated June 19, 1991, 1 complainant Domingo Gamalinda charges retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim with grave abuse of their profession ("labis nilang pag-abuso sa kanilang propesyon"), deception, threats, dishonoring and injuring the reputation of said complainant and bringing about the loss of his land.

ISSUE: whether or not the respondents are guilty

RULING:The Court finds the charges to be without basis and accordingly dismisses them.

The administrative complaint against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara is a futile attempt to resurrect the charges filed against him for having become moot and academic. It was filed only on July 22, 1987, or five (5) months after the respondent judge's retirement from the service on February 3, 1987. No motion for reconsideration having been seasonably filed by complainant, that resolution has become final and executory. It serves as a bar to a relitigation of the same charges against respondent judge. 2 That those charges are now being brought against respondent judge in his capacity as an attorney does not help the cause of complainant, for the change in the form of action or remedy pursued does not bar the application of the rule of res judicata. 3

On the other hand, the record establishes that Atty. Lim was merely performing his duty as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3827 when he did what is now complained of. 4

In Civil Case No. 3827 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch LXIII, Salud Balot and Felicidad Balot had sued the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda 5 for reconveyance, with damages, of the eastern half of Lot No. 3217 of the cadastral survey of Victoria, Tarlac, which was allegedly inadvertently included in the original certificate of title of Apolinario Gamalinda.

The questioned acts of Atty. Lim were all done in line with his duty to prosecute his clients' cause in Civil Case No. 3827. The first motion was filed to protect his clients' possessory rights over the property in dispute while the second motion was made to procure execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 3827.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 13 He shall serve his client with competence and diligence, 14 and his duty of entire devotion to his client's cause not only requires, but entitles him to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter's cause to succeed. 15 An attorney's duty to safeguard the client's interests commences from his retainer until the effective release from the case 16 or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. 17 During that period, he is expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his client's interests may require.

This is precisely what Atty. Lim was doing when he filed the motions complained of. He should be commended, not condemned, for diligently and competently performing his duties as an attorney;

With respect to the complainant's contention that the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land relied upon by the lower and appellate courts in Civil Case No. 3827 is a forged or fake instrument, suffice it to say that this is a matter that should have been litigated in said case instead of being raised for the first time in these proceedings. In any case, there being no showing that Atty. Lim was aware of any defect in that deed, the charge of deception against him will not lie. Absent, too, is any showing that Atty. Lim had anything to do with the preparation of the criminal information, and for the same reason he cannot be called to account for it.

ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

7.G.R. No. L-25137 J.P. Juan and Sons Inc. v. Lianga Industries Inc., 28 SCRA 807

Facts: In a complaint originally filed with the City Court of Manila on October 30, 1963, plaintiff (J.P juan and sons Inc.) sought recovery from defendant (Lianga industries inc.) of the sum of P900.00, representing the unpaid balance of office equipment amounting to P1,890.00 sold and delivered on October 15, 1962 by plaintiff to defendant under a purchase order, copy of which was duly annexed to the complaint. Plaintiff also asked for the payment of legal interests and costs and P200.00 for attorney's fees.

Defendant filed its Answer on January 27, 1964, where it "denied specifically all the allegations of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint", which are the material allegations referring to its purchase of the office equipment, its partial payment and refusal and failure to pay the unpaid balance of P900.00 despite repeated demands of plaintiff and alleged as a "special and affirmative defense" that "defendant has no obligation to pay to the plaintiff the amount or sum of money claimed in the complaint." Defendant did not deny under oath the authenticity of the purchase order annexed to the complaint, as required by Rule 8, section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Summing up, the lower Court found that "Said material allegations deemed admitted by the defendant establish that on October 15, 1962, the defendant purchased from the plaintiff office equipment listed in the Purchase Order No. 001/62, a photostatic copy of which was attached to the complaint as Annex A, the authenticity of which has not been denied under oath. The equipments therein listed, with a total selling price of P1,890.00, were delivered to the defendant which paid only the amount of P990.00, thereby leaving an unpaid balance of P900.00. Notwithstanding the fact that said purchase was payable in thirty days from October 15, 1962, the defendant failed and refused to pay the outstanding balance of P900.00 despite repeated demands for payment. It therefore rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, although it made no award for attorney's fees for lack of proof.

Defendant filed its notice of appeal from the lower Court's decision, on the ground that the same is 'contrary to law and the evidence" and asked that its appeal be elevated to the Court of Appeals. CA rules in favour of plaintiff.

Issue: W/N there was specific denial done by the defendant.

W/N the attorney of the defendant should be subjected to disciplinary action for causing unnecessary delay in contrast to the right to speedy trial.

Held:

We find defendant's appeal to be frivolous. No error was committed by the Court below in ruling that defendant-appellant's "specific denials" are in law general denials amounting to admissions of the material allegations of the complaint and in rendering judgment on the pleadings, in accordance with the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction based on the provisions of Rule 8, section 10 and Rule 9, section 1 in relation to Rule 19, section 1 and Rule 20, section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Cases such as this contribute to the needless clogging of the court dockets. The Rules of Court were devised to limit the

issues and avoid unnecessary delays and surprises. Hence, the mandatory provisions of Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court for a pre-trial conference for the simplification of the issues and the consideration of all matters which may aid in the prompt disposition of an action. The Rules further require in Rule 7 section 5 that "every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name" and that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" with the express admonition that "for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action." The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that the salutary objectives of these Rules may be attained.

8.

[A.C. No. 1054. March 25, 1975.]

JUAN AZOR, Complainant, v. ATTORNEY EUSTAQUIO BELTRAN, Respondent.

Facts:

Beltran was accused of taking or causing to be detached from the rollo of Special Proceedings No. 667 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the financial report of complainant Juan Azor as executor, as well as the order of the court terminating the same; of thereafter filing a motion to require complainant to render an accounting and to deliver the property left in the will to the beneficiaries; and of having instructed his client Lorelie Bornales and the latter's mother, Aniana Sadol-Escriba to enter forcibly a parcel of land forming a part of the estate when he knew of its having been previously sold, thus necessitating a complaint for forcible entry. The answer with supporting documents of respondent did present an entirely different picture. What motivated complainant to file this administrative case became apparent as respondent represented clients with opposing interest. With the allegations of facts in the complaint thus being controverted, the matter was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

Issue:

W/N Beltran is liable for malpractice and gross misconduct.

Held:

No. Solicitor general Estelito Mendoza and Assistant Sol Gen Smpio Diy recommended for the dismissal of the charges. The records are entirely bereft of any direct, positive and competent evidence to support the charge that respondent detached and removed official records from the Office of the Clerk of Court of Camarines Sur, particularly the financial report in, and the order of closure of, Special Proceeding No. 667. If at all, complainant appears to have merely assumed that because, when he was allegedly shown by the clerk of court the records of said case, the same purportedly contained at the time only the probated will and respondent's motion for an accounting therein ... then respondent must have spirited away the financial report filed therein by complainant and the order of the court for the closure of said proceedings. On the other hand, respondent did not only vigorously deny the imputation that he took said records from the expediente of the case, ... but he also submitted in evidence a certification of the branch clerk of the Court of First Instance of

Camarines Sur attesting to the fact that the records of the aforecited probate proceedings, including the allegedly missing financial report and order, are all intact and unaltered ... . Needless to state, mere assumptions cannot be the basis of any finding against any member of the bar who, as an official of the court, is presumed to act with the utmost decorum and good faith in all his dealings. This presumption in favor of the respondent in the probate proceedings in question can not be overcome by complainant's aforesaid mere assumption or imputation without any evidence in support of the same."

The Court accepts such recommendation. The investigation appeared to be thorough and the appraisal of the evidence both meticulous and correct. Respondent should he absolved of the charges hurled against him. Complainant ought to have displayed a greater sense of responsibility. He should have refrained from imposing on this Court or the Office of the Solicitor General a needless burden and inconvenience. Apparently what motivated him in filing his complaint was the zeal with which respondent fought for the interests of his client. Complainant should be aware that this Court does not look with favor upon accusations arising from dissatisfaction and resentment at the mode in which a lawyer diligently and tenaciously prosecutes matters entrusted to him. Instead of being condemned under the circumstances, he should be commended. Nor is this all. There are intimations in the record that the ill-will of complainant was aroused by respondent coming into possession of information that did cause a reflection on the discharge of his trust as executor. Incensed, he would utilize what appeared to be a dominant economic position in the community to make things difficult for respondent. Such an actuation, meriting disapproval then, is even more reprehensible now under the temper of the present dispensation that seeks to do away with every vestige of malodorous practices indulged in by the rich and the powerful in the community.Fairness to both complainant and respondent compels the observation that the latter, as a member of the bar, is called upon to be much more careful and meticulous in examining the records of a case and noting every pleading, even if as has happened in not a few cases, the papers are not kept in as orderly a manner as is both proper and desirable

9.

Visitacion vs. Manit

27 SCRA 523, March 28, 1969

J. Teehankee

Facts:

Alfonso Visitacion, plaintiff-appellee, filed a case against defendant Victor Manit to hold him liable subsidiarily as employer for the death of his son, Delano Visitacion, as a result of injuries sustained in vehicular collision involving Manits driver, Rudolfo Giron, who was found insolvent after being convicted and sentenced. The case was heard without defendant or his counsel being present which resulted in plaintiff presenting evidence and the case was submitted for decision. The defendant filed a motion for new trial which was granted and the proceeding continued with the defendants presenting their evidence. On October 14, 1958, Atty. Garcia, defendants counsel, manifested that Victor Manit had recently died and the plaintiffs counsel amended the complaint by impleading the widow and heirs of the deceased. On January 27, 1960, Atty. Garcia filed a motion to withdraw as counsel alleging that Manits heirs did not hire him to represent them and both counsel and his client failed to appear at the trial the next day. The

Court considered them having renounced their right to appear and present evidence to contest plaintiffs claim and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Atty. Garcias motion to withdraw was not passed upon and his subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, he filed this present appeal

Issue/s:

Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to continue the case without the defendants brought to it by summons and without informing said defendants that they have become parties to the case?

Whether or not the lower court erred in ignoring the motion to withdraw filed by Atty. Garcia?

Whether or not the new defendants were not given their day in court?

Held:

Appealed judgment affirmed w/ double costs to be paid by attorney for defendants.

No error was committed because the record shows that Atty. Garcia had acknowledged the receipt of the amended complaint substituting the defendant heirs as counsel for defendants. They were impleaded and submitted to the Courts jurisdiction through their counsels acknowledgment of the amended complaint; the issuance of a summons was unnecessary.

The last-hour motion to withdraw filed one day before the hearing came too late and was properly ignored. The motion was not verified and also carried no notice to his clients on record which was in violation of the Rules of Court (Rule 15, Sec. 4 and Rule 138, Sec. 26, respectively). An attorney who could not get the written consent of his client must make an application to the court, for the relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record. The decision rendered by the lower court, upon failure of defendants and counsel to appear, despite notification was in effect a denial of counsels application for withdrawal. Atty. Garcias failure to appear was unexcusable and he had no right to assume that the Court would grant his application. Counsel had no right to presume that the court would grant his withdrawal and therefore must still appear on the date of hearing. The attorneys duty to safeguard the clients interests commences from his retainer until his defective release from the case or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. The circumstances had lead the Court to believe that the last-hour application to withdraw was merely a device to prolong the case and delay execution of judgment.

There was no premature judgment rendered because the record shows that the defendant heirs were shown to be aware of the existence of the case. Leonarda Manit was called upon as witness during the deceaseds lifetime by Atty. Garcia and submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Court. Neither her nor her 3 children of age can claim ignorance of the pendency of the case.

10. De roy v ca

De Roy was the owner of a burnt building. The firewall of said building collapsed on the house of Luis Bernal thereby killing his daughter. Bernal sued De Roy. Bernal won in the trial court. Eventually, De Roy appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. De Roy received a copy of the

decision on August 25, 1987. Under the Rules, they have 15 days to file a motion for reconsideration.

On September 9, 1987, the last day for them to file said MFR, De Roys counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.

ISSUE: Whether or not De Roys contention is correct.

HELD: No. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

11. Cuaresma v daquis

An order to demolish the property where Cuaresma was staying was issued by a trial judge pursuant to a civil case filed by Daquis. Cuaresmas lawyer, Atty. Macario Directo, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court where he alleged that they had no knowledge of the said civil case hence the order of demolition is unjust. The Supreme Court however later found out that Cuaresma and his lawyer in fact knew of the existence of said civil case. The Supreme Court then directed Directo to show cause why he should not be disciplined.

In his explanation, Directo stated that what he meant was that he and his client belatedly learned of the civil case; that had there been a mistake committed, it had been an honest one, and would say in all sincerity that there was no deliberate attempt and intent on his part of misleading this Honorable Court, honestly and totally unaware of any false allegation in the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Directo should be subject to disciplinary actions.

HELD: No. But he was reprimanded by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gave Directo the benefit of the doubt although it did say that Directos reasoning could very well be just an afterthought. The Supreme Court also stated that Directo is presumed to be in good faith especially so that the misstatements in his petition could be attributed either to his carelessness or his lack of English proficiency. The Supreme Court admonished Directo to prepare pleadings carefully in the future so that the least doubt as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained. Every member of the bar should realize that candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in the profession.

12. AURORA CAMARA VDA. DE ZUBIRI, vs.WENCESLAO ZUBIRI alias BEN, ET AL.,

FACTS:

Aurora Camara Vda. de Zubiri, filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte a complaint for the recovery of her alleged share in two commercial lots situated in Iligan City against Wenceslao Ben Zubiri,

and the Standard Vacuum Oil Co., the occupant of portions of the said properties. The plaintiff alleged that the said lots were conjugal, having been purchased by her and her late husband during their marriage, so that at least one-half of the same belonged to her "plus the equal share of the heir or heirs of the decedent." Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that the said parcels were in the possession of the defendant who, "unless he can prove before this Honorable Court that he is a duly recognized natural child of the late Jesus Zubiri, [he] has no right, interest, and participation whatsoever over the abovementioned two lots."

Four (4) pleadings were filed namely: 1) the herein appellant's answer which showed on its face that it was signed by the latter in his own behalf and unassisted by counsel; 2) a Stipulation of Facts, signed by the plaintiff, assisted by counsel, and the defendant, without such assistance; 3) a motion to render judgment on the pleadings, again signed by the plaintiff, duly assisted by counsel, and the defendant- appellant herein, signing alone, without benefit of counsel; and 4) the defendant Standard Vacuum Oil Company's answer to the above complaint.

Trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the aforementioned Stipulation of Facts. Since in both the answer of the herein defendant-appellant and the stipulation of facts the latter admitted practically all

the allegations of the complaint, the decision rendered in accordance therewith was actually in favor of the plaintiff.

Wenceslao Zubiri for the first time thru counsel, filed with the trial court a petition to set aside judgment upon two grounds, to wit: first, the three pleadings filed namely: appellant's answer, the stipulation of facts and the motion to render judgment on the pleadings were all prepared by the plaintiff's counsel and that he, the appellant, was made to sign all of them when he was ill and incapable of realizing the full consequences of the act. Wenceslao seeks annulment of judgment based on the allegations to wit: that it was the plaintiff's counsel who prepared and induced the defendant to sign all the pleadings upon which the assailed decision was based, including and particularly the said defendant's answer, that the dismissal of the same, in the absence of the petitioner and without affording him the chance to be heard thereon, indeed was incompatible with the exercise of sound judicial discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyer of the plaintiff can communicate with the defendant directly and testify upon the

signing of documents

HELD:

The active participation of a lawyer in one party's affairs relating to a pending case in which the said lawyer is the counsel for the opposing party is brazenly unethical to say the least. The Canons of Legal Ethics very explicitly declare that "it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests" (No. 6), and command that

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal

only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.

(No. 9)

As we have already said in the case of Cantorne v. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23, the simultaneous representation by a lawyer of both parties to a suit constitutes malpractice which should be severely condemned and the lawyer corrected by disciplinary action. If but for this consideration alone, the court below should have allowed the motion for postponement pleaded by the appellant and heard the merits of the latter's petition to set aside judgment.

Moreover, the affidavits of merit appended to the petition to set aside judgment recited that the defendant- appellant was seriously sick at the time he was made to sign and swear to the above three repudiated pleadings. To be sure, no less than the officer before whom the said pleadings were subscribed and sworn to admitted that this verification was conducted at the appellant's residence in Cebu where the latter was confined "suffering from fever, with an ice cap on his head and profusely perspiring." Under the circumstances, therefore, the mental capacity of the appellant to responsibly assent to commitments set forth in the same three pleadings became doubtful and the trial court should have exerted its earnest efforts to resolve the doubt. Especially so when account is taken of the fact that the subject matter of the suit was not just an insubstantial sum but properties allegedly worth some P165,000.00.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the court below denying the appellant's petition to set

aside judgment is hereby revoked and set aside.

13. INOCENCIA DELUAO and FELIPE DELUAO vs. NICANOR CASTEEL and JUAN DEPRAG.R. No. L-21906 December 24, 1968 CASTRO, J.

FACTS: Nicanor Casteel filed several fishpond applications for a big tract of swampy land in Davao, which applications were disapproved for equal times. Meanwhile, several applications were submitted by other persons for portions of the area covered by Casteel's application, one of which was herein plaintiff-appellee Felipe Deluao, who was also Casteels uncle. Sometime in 1949, Inocencia Deluao (wife of Felipe Deluao) and Casteel executed a "contract of service" whereby it was agreed that Deluao will finance (as she has financed) the improvements on the fishpond made by Casteel, who renders only his services for the construction of the improvements. Subsequently, the Director of Fisheries rejected the application filed by Felipe Deluao. The application of Casteel was then reinstated and given due course. Thereafter, Casteel forbade Inocencia Deluao from further administering the fishpond. Alleging violation of the contract of service, Felipe Deluao and Inocencia Deluao filed an action for specific performance and damages against Casteel.

The case was set for trial, after several issues were joined. Then came a series of postponements.

The lower court (Branch I, presided by Judge Enrique A. Fernandez) finally issued an order on March 21, 1956, in open court, that the hearing of this case was transferred to May 2 and 3, 1956 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. And that since the case was filed on April 1951, the court will not entertain any

other transfer of hearing of this case under any circumstance and if the parties will not be ready on that day set for hearing, the court will take the necessary steps for the final determination of this case.

The defendants' counsel received a notice of hearing (dated April 21, 1956) issued by the office of the Clerk of Court, setting the hearing of the case for May 2 and 3, 1956 before Judge Amador Gomez of Branch II. The defendants, thru counsel, filed a motion for postponement, which was denied by Judge Gomez (and held that case should be referred back to Branch I since that the case has been under advisement of the Judge Fernandez).

On the scheduled date of hearing, that is, on May 2,

1956, the lower court (Branch I, with Judge Fernandez presiding), when informed about the defendants' motion for postponement, issued an order reiterating its previous order handed down in open court and directing the plaintiffs to introduce their evidence ex parte, there being no appearance on the part of the defendants or their counsel. The defendant Casteel filed a petition for relief from the foregoing decision, alleging, inter alia, lack of knowledge of the order of the court a quo setting the case for trial.

ISSUE: WON the lower court committed gross abuse of discretion when it ordered reception of the appellees evidence in the absence of the appellant at the trial on May 2, 1956.

HELD: NO. The record indisputably shows that in the order given in open court, the lower court set the case for hearing on May 2 and 3, 1956 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. An order given in open court is presumed received by the parties on the very date and time of promulgation, and amounts to a legal notification for all legal purposes. The order given in open court, was a valid notice to the parties, and the notice of hearing dated April 21, 1956 was a superfluity.

Moreover, as between (a) the order of March 21, 1956, duly promulgated by the lower court, thru Judge Fernandez, and (b) the notice of hearing dated April 21, 1956 signed by a "special deputy clerk of court" setting the hearing in another branch of the same court, the former's order was the one legally binding. This is because the incidents of postponements and adjournments are controlled by the court and not by the clerk of court

It is of no moment that the motion for postponement had the conformity of the appellees' counsel. The postponement of hearings does not depend upon agreement of the parties, but upon the court's discretion.

The record further discloses that Casteel was represented by a total of 12 lawyers, none of whom had ever withdrawn as counsel. Notice to one of his counsel, Atty. Ruiz, of the order dated March 21, 1956 was sufficient notice to all the appellant's eleven other counsel of record. This is a well-settled rule in our jurisdiction.

It was the duty of Atty. Ruiz, or of the other lawyers of record, not excluding the appellant himself, to appear before Judge Fernandez on the scheduled dates of hearing Parties and their lawyers have no right to presume that their motions for postponement will be granted. For indeed, the appellant and his 12 lawyers cannot pretend ignorance of the recorded fact the case has been under the advisement of Judge Fernandez who presided over Branch I. There was, therefore, no necessity to "reassign" the same to Branch II because Judge Fernandez had exclusive control of said case, unless he was legally inhibited to try the case and he was not.

There is truth in the appellant's contention that it is the duty of the clerk of court not of the Court to prepare the trial calendar. But the assignment or reassignment of cases already

pending in one sala to another sala, and the setting of the date of trial after the trial calendar has been prepared, fall within the exclusive control of the presiding judge.

The appellant does not deny the appellees' claim that on May 2 and 3, 1956, the office of the clerk of court was located directly below Branch I. If the appellant and his counsel had exercised due diligence, there was no impediment to their going upstairs to the second storey of the Court of First Instance building in Davao on May 2, 1956 and checking if the case was scheduled for hearing in the said sala. The appellant after all admits that on May 2, 1956 his counsel went to the office of the clerk of court.

14. HEIRS OF ELIAS LORILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 118655 April 12, 2000 QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS: Private respondent Commercial Credit Corporation (now known as Pentacapital Finance Corporation or PENTACAPITAL) filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati for a sum of money against Sanyu Machineries Agencies, Inc. and several other defendants, among whom was Elias Lorilla, (now deceased) who had acted as sureties for the two corporate debtors. PENTACAPITAL sought for, and obtained a writ of attachment on the real property of defendant Elias L. Lorilla and which levy was duly annotated on the certificate of title. During the pendency of the case, Elias L. Lorilla executed a dacion en pago over the property attached in favor of the Joint Resources Management Development Corporation (JRMDC). The levy caused to be made by PENTACAPITAL over the property was carried over to the new certificate of title of JRMDC.

The Makati Court, after due hearing, rendered judgment in favor of PENTACAPITAL and against the defendants therein, including Elias L. Lorilla. Despite receipt of a copy of the aforesaid decision by Alfredo Concepcion, then counsel of record of defendant Elias L. Lorilla, no appeal whatsoever was interposed from said judgment by said lawyer in behalf of defendant Lorilla.

Upon motion of PENTACAPITAL, the Makati Court issued a writ of execution and PENTACAPITAL thereafter proceeded against the property in the name of defendant Lorilla.

Petitioners herein as heirs of Elias L. Lorilla, filed a motion to quash the writ of execution arguing that since defendant Elias L. Lorilla passed away on January 15, 1988, or one year and three months before the Makati Court rendered decision, the case should have been dismissed insofar as Elias L. Lorilla is concerned (in keeping with Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

ISSUES:1. WON the judgment should be final and executory against petitioners.2. WON petitioners were denied due process of law as there was no substitution due to Atty. Concepcions fault.

HELD:1. YES. No notice of death was filed by Atty. Alfredo Concepcion, counsel of record of Elias Lorilla before the Makati Court. Thus, neither the Makati Court nor PENTACAPITAL were made aware of the death of Elias Lorilla. The trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice of the death of Lorilla, absent such notice.

Apparently, Lorilla's counsel failed in his duty to promptly inform the court of the death of his client, as the Rules require. As far as the Makati Court was concerned, until the Writ of Execution was issued and the levy thereof, Lorilla continued to be represented by counsel of record, Atty. Concepcion; and that upon service of a copy of the decision on said counsel at the latter's address, Lorilla was deemed to have been validly served notice of

the judgment. The failure of Atty. Concepcion to serve notice on the court and the adverse parties regarding his client's death binds herein petitioners as much as the client himself could be so bound. Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a client is bound by the conduct, negligence and mistakes of his counsel.

2. NO. While petitioners were not properly substituted for Elias Lorilla as defendants, absent any notice of his death, it could not be said that petitioners were deprived of due process of law, for as far as the trial court was concerned, they were not parties to the case. To rule otherwise would be, in fact, a more obvious and grievous transgression of due process. Moreover in this case, the property which petitioners claim as their lawful inheritance was no longer part of the estate of Elias Lorilla at the time of his death. For Elias Lorilla had earlier executed a dacion en pago over this property in favor of JRMDC. The subject property was validly transferred to JRMDC already. Hence petitioners could not claim that they were deprived of their lawful inheritance without due process of law.

15. VALENTIN AVELINO vs. ATTY. PEDRO K. PALANAA.M. No. 405 May 31, 1971 DIZON, J.

FACTS: Respondent Atty. Pedro Palana was engaged by the petitioner to be their counsel in a civil case where the petitioner is one of the defendants (case regarding the ownership and possession of a property).

Respondent alleged that he verbally advised the petitioner of the hearing of the aforestated case on November 15, 1957, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning at least three days before the scheduled hearing.

When the scheduled hearing of the case arrived, the respondent failed to be present in court or appear thereat because: "at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of that day, I had a severe stomach ache followed by constant moving of bowel and vomiting. As a consequence I became very weak and I felt that I was about to die," as shown by a medical certificate which is attached to the "motion for new trial" filed by the respondent.

He also alleged: (a) that the failure of the defendants to appear in court when their case was set for hearing despite the verbal notice to them by the herein respondent is not until the present known to herein respondent; and (b) that when the herein respondent was appointed Administrative Officer in the Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, sometime in March 1958, he already advised the petitioner to look for another lawyer to represent him.

A complaint was filed by Valentin Avelino against Atty. Pedro K. Palaa. The latter was charged with malpractice in connection with his professional conduct as the complainant's counsel, which malpractice gave rise to the rendition of judgment against said complainant and his wife.

The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation report and recommendation. The Office found, among others, that Atty. Palaa did not duly inform his client of the date of the trial scheduled for November 15, 1957 when the evidence shows that he received notice of such hearing on October 11, 1957. And that the filing of the motion for new was made out of time, exactly 40 days after the decision was received. The delay in the filing of the said motion remains unexplained in the record.

On the basis of such findings the Solicitor General found the respondent "guilty of negligence in the performance of his duties as a member of the Bar" and consequently recommended "that he be suspended from the practice of law for at least six months."

ISSUE: WON Atty. Palana is guilty of negligence in the performance of his duties as a member of the Bar.

HELD: YES. As regards respondent's failure to appear in court on the day set for the trial, the Court inclined to accept his claim that it was due to the fact that early in the morning of that date he had "a severe stomach ache, followed by constant moving of bowel and vomiting and that as a consequence he became very weak."

But while this might be, to a certain extent, a good excuse for his non-appearance in court, it is obviously not sufficient to explain his failure to notify his clients in due time of the date of the trial. Had he done so, his clients would probably have tried to contact him in due time, and upon discovering that he was sick they would have either gone to court to ask for the postponement of the trial, or they would have looked for another lawyer to represent them in court.

The Court also found no sufficient exculpatory evidence for respondent filing a motion for new trial "out of time," exactly forty days after notice of the decision rendered by the court.

The respondent, was found guilty as charged in the report and complaint filed by the Solicitor General, and considering all the circumstances of the case, he was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months.

16. CRISTINA DIMAN et.al.vs. HON. FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRESG.R. No. 131466. November 27, 1998

Related to PALE

FACTS:The petition for review on certiorari in this case was initially dismissed by Resolution dated January 14, 1998; but after deliberating on petitioners' Motion for reconsideration dated February 23, 1998, the private respondents' comment thereon, the reply to the comment, as well as the record of the case itself, the Court was convinced that the order of dismissal should be reconsidered and the petition reinstated. It accordingly promulgated a resolution requiring the respondents to file their Comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. The private respondents' attorney filed a motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days to file comment. The Court granted the extension sought, but only for fifteen (15) days. However, the comment was filed late for five days. Counsel's explanation is that he had sought an extension of 30 days due to the volume of legal works similarly situated and school work, being a professor of law and dean of the University of Manila, and had entertained "the honest belief" that it would be granted. However, he learns, belatedly that only a 15-day extension had been conceded.

ISSUE:Whether or not the contention of the private respondents attorney proper.

HELD:No. Although the Court admits the late comment, it takes this occasion to reiterate the familiar doctrine that no party has a right to an extension of time to comply with an obligation within the period set therefor by law; motions for extension are not granted as a matter of course; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exercised in accordance with the attendant circumstances; the movant is not justified in assuming that the extension sought will be granted, or that it will be granted for the length of time suggested by him. It is thus incumbent on any movant for extension to exercise due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's action on his motion, by timely inquiry of the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs

the risk of time running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame.

FACTS:

The case began in the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias, where a complaint for "Quieting of Title and Damages" was filed by the Heirs of Veronica V. Moreno Lacalle (represented by Jose Moreno Lacalle) against Cristina Diman, Clarissa Diman, GeorgeDiman. Felipe Diman and FlorinaDiman. The Lacalle heirs claimed that their motherwas the owner of a "parcel of land situated at Brgy. PulangLupa Uno, Las Pias, and had acquired the land in 1959 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale, and retained as caretakers the persons she found in occupancy of the lot at the time of the sale. The later, a case for "ejectment with damages" filed by the Dimans against the Narios, the caretaker, judgment in which, commanding the Nario's ouster, had supposedly been affirmed by the Makati Regional Trial Court.

The REQUEST FOR ADMISSION was received by Jose Lacalle himself through registered mail on February 6, 1995, and copy thereof by the latter's lawyer (Atty. Cesar T. Ching) on February 4, 1995. However no response whatever was made to the request by Lacalle, his lawyer or anyone else, despite the lapse of the period therefor fixed by Section 2 of Rule 26. The Dimans thereupon filed with the Court, a "MANIFESTATION WITH MOTION TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO ANSWER REQUEST FOR ADMISSION," dated March 28, 1995, 10 giving the Heirs ten (10) more days to file their answer to the request for admission, a copy of which was personally delivered to the latter's lawyer; but again, no response whatever was made.

The Dimans then submitted a "MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT", thatheirs' failure to file any Pre-Trial Brief, and the several instances when the Heirs failed to appear at scheduled hearings resulting in the dismissal of their complaint, which was however later reinstated. They argued that because the Heirs had failed to respond to their REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, each of the matters of which an admission was requested, was deemed admitted pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26.

The Trial Court denied the Dimans' motion for summary judgment. It stressedthat a summary judgment "is not proper where the defendant presented defenses tendering factual issues which call for the presentation of evidence." The case proceeded to trial in due course. The Heirs closed their evidence as party plaintiffs and the Dimans moved to dismiss on ground of insufficiency of the Heirs' evidence. Both parties exchanged oppositions and reconsiderations. The trial court, however, the Trial Judge commanded to dismiss the case before it. On appeal, the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment decreeing that their petition be "DENIED due course and DISMISSED."

ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court refusal to render a summary judgement proper.

HELD:No. The Trial Judge was charged with the duty to assess the evidence to ascertain whether or not "upon the facts and the law the plaintiff have shown no right to relief." It was in the first place incumbent on to hold the Heirs bound to their admissions appearing in the record, express and implied. In accordance with Section 2, Rule 26 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Heirs were impliedly, but no less indubitably, deemed to have admitted the

facts on which admissions had been duly requested by reason of their failure to reply thereto.

A Trial Court has no discretion to determine what the consequences of a party's refusal to allow or make discovery should be; it is the law which makes that determination; and it is grave abuse of discretion for the Court to refuse to recognize and observe the effects of that refusal as mandated by law. Particularly as regards requests for admission under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the law ordains that when a party is served with a written request that he admit: (1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request, or (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request, said party is bound within the period designated in the request, 27 to file and serve on the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either (1) denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or (2) setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. If the party served does not respond with such a sworn statement, each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.

The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 9, 1997 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE

17. LUCIANO A. SAULOG vs. CUSTOMBUILT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, ET AL.G.R. No.L-29612. November 15, 1968

FACTS:

On September 12, 1961, plaintiff Luciano A. Saulog sued in the City Court of Manila for damages and attorneys' fees against defendants Custombuilt Manufacturing Corporation, and the City Sheriff of Manila. The plaintiff complained that Custombuilt caused to be sold on execution of certain properties belonging to him which he leased to one Adriano Go. Plaintiff filed a third-party claim thereon to stave off levy. But Custombuilt posted a P1,200.00-bond issued by Northwestin favor of the City Sheriff. This paved the way for the execution sale of said properties on July 29, 1961.

On March 3, 1962, the City Court of Manila rendered judgment on plaintiff's evidence introduced ex-parte against Custombuilt, the City Sheriff, and the defaulting Northwest all of whom failed to appear on the date set for the trial despite due notice.

On November 5, 1964, pre-trial was had. Custombuilt's counsel was in the courtroom that day, but left before the case was called. On plaintiff's motion, the judge, on the same day, dismissed the appeal and revived the city court's judgment, without costs.Custombuilt's counsel filed a petition for relief. On November 19, plaintiff opposed. On November 27, the court below denied the petition for lack of merit. Custombuilt appealed.

The city court's judgment as revived by the Court of First Instance must be sustained.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial courts denial of defendants petition for relief from judgement proper.

HELD:

Yes. At the start of pre-trial on November 5, Custombuilt's attorney was present. But he unceremoniously left the courtroom for the reason that he was summoned home all too suddenly as his pregnant wife had been having labor pains and later finally delivered on November 10, 1964. Counsel did not have the foresight required of him. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, both client and counsel must appear at the pre-trial. This is mandatory. Failure of the client to appear is ground for dismissal. If one representing his client a corporation was present, counsel could have easily left word for the former to tell the judge that he was suddenly summoned to his home. If the client were not present, then the case just the same would have been dismissed. But, the point is that allegedly someone summoned said attorney to go back home. If this were true, then it would have been quite easy for the lawyer to have asked that man to stay around and tell the judge or the clerk or the branch deputy clerk of court of his predicament.

All of these facts point to one conclusion: lack of interest on the part of appellant to defend itself against the complaint. Rather, the pattern of conduct discloses a desire to delay disposal of the present case. Failure to prosecute is a ground for dismissal of the appeal and revival of the judgment of the city court under Section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.

For, the appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila has already been dismissed by the latter court. All that is left is to execute the city court's judgment.

For the reasons given, the trial court's order of November 5, 1964 is hereby affirmed.

18. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HILARION CASIMIRO, ET AL. G.R. No.L-33416. June 29, 1972

FACTS:

Respondent Manuel N. Sanglay was administratively proceeded against for failure to file the brief within the reglementary period for appellants Benjamin Icalla, Rodolfo Soriano and Benjamin Cinco. He explained that upon receiving the notice from the Court advising him to file the brief for the appellants, he immediately contacted the parents of the three appellants. Pablo Icalla and the father of Benjamin Cinco came but the mother of Rodolfo Soriano failed to appear. At that time Rodolfo Soriano was already at large for he escaped from prison at the La Union Provincial Jail. In the conference with the parents, the father of Benjamin Cinco reiterated his former desire not to appeal the case of his son. But later on, Pablo Icalla, father of appellant Benjamin Icalla prevailed on the father of Benjamin Cinco that they continue the appeal. According to Pablo Icalla they had already engaged the services of a good lawyer to prepare their brief. Atty. Sanglay reminded them that failure to file the brief within the period prescribed by law would mean automatic withdrawal of the appeal. The parents of the appellants disauthorized Atty. Sanglay to prepare and file the brief for the appellants by engaging another lawyer to do the same.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Atty. Sanglay is liable for failure to comply with his duty as officer of the Court.

HELD:Yes. It is true that the appellant's failure to file the brief was not a willful act on his part. At least his good faith cannot be impugned. Atty. Sanglay knew that the period for filing the brief was running.

He was equally aware that the Court expected that the matter will be taken care of by him, as he was the counsel of record. However, under the circumstances, the least that was expected of him was that he would inform the Tribunal of the developments set forth in his explanation and as that he be allowed to withdraw as counsel. He should not wait until after the resolution of February 3, 1972. It did not wipe out the previous manifestation of negligence on his part. He cannot therefore escape liability. If this sad state of affairs came to pass, he had only himself to blame. Respondent Manuel N. Sanglay is reprimanded.

19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELEGIO NADERA, JR. Y SADSAD, accused-appellant.Facts: On May 17, 1992, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, while Daisy, wife of accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, was away working as a domestic helper in Bahrain, Elegio pulled Oleby, his daughter, then nine years of age, towards a bed, removed her panties and shorts and ordered her to keep quiet. He then placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. He proceeded to make an up and down motion while on top of his daughter. All the while, Oleby was crying, pleading with her father, "Huwag po!", "Huwag po!". On another occasion, on April 17, 1995, accused-appellant again raped her. Oleby was 12 years old at that time. Oleby was raped again by her father for the third time on April 24, 1995.

Maricris also testified that accused-appellant placed himself on top of Maricris and inserted his penis into her vagina. Maricris pleaded "Papa, huwag po, maawa naman kayo sa amin." Ignoring his daughter's pleas, accused-appellant continued raping her by making a pumping motion and threatened to kill all of them if she cried

On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita Macalalad, told their mother that they had been raped by their father, herein accused-appellant. Thereupon, they went to the police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against accused-appellant.[4]

After preliminary examination, on June 6, 1996, four informations charging accused-appellant with rape of her two daughters on various dates were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro.

The accused initially pleaded not guilty to the charges but after the prosecution presented its witness Dr. Fesalbon, appellants two daughters and his wife, accused pleaded guilty to all information. Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his defense. Thereafter, the trial court convicted him of 4 counts with the crime of rape.

Issue: Whether the Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, is negligent in the performance of his duty to defend the cause of accused-appellant.

Held: The cavalier attitude of accused-appellant's counsel, Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, cannot go unnoticed.

Only faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his client can give meaning and substance to the accused's right to due process and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Hence, a lawyer's duty, especially that of a defense counsel, must not be taken lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor at his command to protect and safeguard the accused's fundamental rights.

As the court enunciated in the case of People vs Bermas:

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections.

The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.

Measured by this standard, the defense counsels conduct in this case falls short of the quality of advocacy demanded of him, considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the penalty. A glaring example of his manifest lack of enthusiasm for his client's cause is his decision not to cross examine Oleby Nadera, It may be so that defense counsel personally found Oleby's testimony to be believable. Nonetheless, he had the bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant's testimony to ensure that the accused's constitutional right to confront and examine the witnesses against him was not rendered for naught. The same may be said of defense counsel's treatment of Maricris' testimony. While she was cross examined by defense counsel, the examination was at best a half-hearted attempt to comply with a lawyer's obligation, lacking the rigor and zeal required considering that a man's life is at stake

Lastly, not only did defense counsel fail to object to the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, according to the trial court's decision, he even expressed his conformity to the admission of the same. Neither did he present any evidence on behalf of accused-appellant.[37] Worse, nowhere in the records is it shown that accused-appellant was informed, either by his counsel or by the court, of his right to present evidence, if he so desires. Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty was all the more imperative because the life of accused-appellant hangs in the balance. His duty was no less because he was counsel de oficio.

The criminal cases are remanded to the trial court.

20. JOSE TOPACIO NUENO, complainant,vs.PASCUAL SANTOS, respondent.

Facts: Judge Anacleto Diaz of the Court of First Instance made a special investigation of the conditions in the city government of Manila. In the course of the investigation, a complaint was filed by Jose TopacioNueno, a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila, against Pascual Santos, another member of municipal board, it being alleged that the latter had interested himself in prohibited games. Santos denied the charges and hearing ensued. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Diaz made a report to the Secretary of the Interior, in which he recommended the removal of the respondent from his offic