2nd Day Discussion

8/12/2019 2nd Day Discussion

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THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ARTICLE XII

Section 14. The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists,

entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and

craftsmen in all fields shall be promoted by the State. The State shall encourage appropriate technology

and regulate its transfer for the national benefit.

Congress of the Philippines

Twelfth Congress

Third Regular Session

28 of July, 2003

Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP

PERMANENT.

AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHERPURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Titlethis act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of

2003."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of

another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this

Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby

deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the

Republic:

"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution of

the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted

authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of

the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation

upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign

country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,

below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this

Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.


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Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship

under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and

responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1,

Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting

Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public

office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of

candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public

officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office:

Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authorityfor a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be

exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized

citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the

country which they are naturalized citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid,

any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the

provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity ClauseThis Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in

the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

Approved,

FRANKLIN DRILON

President of the Senate

JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130 and House Bill No. 4720 was finally passed by

the House of Representatives and Senate on August 25, 2003 and August 26, 2003, respectively.

OSCAR G. YABES Secretary of Senate ROBERTO P. NAZARENO Secretary General House of

Represenatives Approved: August 29, 2003GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO President of the Philippines


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In Re Arthur Castillo Reyes (1993)****

Residency

Residency Rule 138 Sec 2

Age

Residency Rule 138 Sec 2

Good Moral Character

Narag v. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, June 29, 1998

FACTS:

Mrs. Julieta Nunag filed several cases against his husband, Atty. Dominador Nunag, for his alleged affair

with Gina Espita who happens to be a former studentof the respondent back when Ms. Espita was a

first-year college student. Finally, inthe most recent case filed by Mrs. Nunag, the complainant had her

seven childrensign the appeal for disbarment of Atty. Nunag. Mrs. Nunag presented as evidencethe

pictures of the respondent and Ms. Espita together, love letters, testimony of Mr. Charlie Espita, thebrother of Ms. Espita and the source of the mentioned pictures and love letters, and the testimony of

the children of Atty. And Mrs Nunag. In the proceedings, Atty. Nunag has been engaged in an affair with

Ms.Espita, and being live-in partners, have had two children with the latter. Atty. Nunag denied the

allegations by presenting

Argumentum ad Misericordia

ISSUE:

Should Atty. Nunag be disbarred even if he denied the allegations against him?

RULING: Atty. Nunag was not able to invalidate the authenticity of the pieces of evidence presented

against him, but instead, presented an argument to pity. He is, by order of the honorable court, being

disbarred by virtue of The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility which provides:Rule 1.01

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.CANON 7

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the

activities of the Integrated Bar.Rule 7.03

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects onhis fitness to practice law, nor should he,

whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.


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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998

JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a

lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or

her privilege to practice law.

On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment against

her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule

1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. 2

The complainant narrated:

The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador M. Narag in the early

seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as a professor in the

Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a first year college student, enrolled in

subjects handled by Atty. Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of

the legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted

Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until the student acceded to his wishes.

They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the community, but which theymanaged to from me. It therefore came as a terrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief

and pain when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous

circumstances.

It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan

of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the Department of Trade and Industry Central

Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with

Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.

It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag has abandoned us, his

family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level[.] 3

This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 4

On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from complainant another

letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated

the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the

respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from "emotional confusion arising


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from extreme jealousy." The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and

responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous relationship

with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family. 5 Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of Desistance 6

and a Motion to Dismiss, 7 attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP commission on

bar discipline. 8 In a Decision dared October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors 9 dismissed the

complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure to prosecute. 10

The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this Court 11 received another letter

12 from the complainant, with her seven

children 13 as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained that she

had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous threats against her. 14

In his Comment on the complainant's letter of November 11, 1991, filed in compliance with this Court's

Resolution issued on July 6, 1992, 15 respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be

affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had

voluntarily executed her Affidavit of Desistance 16 and Motion to Dismiss, 17 even appearing before the

investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath "that she prepared the Motion to

Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and affirmed the contents thereof."

In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied abandoning his family to live

with his paramour. However, he described his wife as a person emotionally disturbed, viz:

What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and possessive woman, and

every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off letters or complaints against her husband in

every conceivable forum, all without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming

demands of her "loving" jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy

cools off, she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the

Letter of November 11, 1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy. 18

On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of respondent to the

IBP. 19 In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, respondent alleged the following: 20

2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a square meter of

land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and meaningful education. Complainant comes

from what she claims to be very rich parents who value material possession more than education and

the higher and nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor.

3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love, forgiveness,

humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and raised in an entirely different

environment. Her value system is the very opposite.

4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in thirty-eight (38) years

of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave his family sustenance, a comfortable home, love,

education, companionship, and most of all, a good and respected name. He was always gentle and

compassionate to his wife and children. Even in the most trying times, he remained calm and never

inflicted violence on them. His children are all now full-fledged professionals, mature, and gainfully

employed. . . .


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xxx xxx xxx

Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution.

On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant has been systematically

and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their marriage and their family. Their marriage has

become a torture chamber in which Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED,

BRUTALIZED, TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally, by the

Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a nightmare.

For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of his misfortune with

dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve their family and their marriage. But this is

not to be. The Complainant never mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In

fact, she became more fierce and predatory.

Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not seem in sight. The

darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial landscape.

Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in

"Death and the Maiden", can the torturer and the tortured co-exist and live together?

Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind whose only obsession

now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with perpetual regret and with great sorrow,

filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. . . .

5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your Respondent never

revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He preserved the good name and dignity of his

wife. This is in compliance with the marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for

worse, in sickness and in health . . . Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed anythingderogatory to his wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to defend himself.

On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells everyone, everywhere,

that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes to colleges and universities,

professional organizations, religious societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them how

evil, bad and immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as Counsel, or any

other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is this love? Since when did love become

an instrument to destroy a man's dearest possession in life his good name, reputation and dignity?

Because of Complainant's virulent disinformation campaign against her husband, employing every

unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your Respondent has been irreparably and irreversibly

disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he who has been

mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the Complainant. 21

To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent presented as evidence the

following list of the complaints she had filed against him and Gina Espita:

3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty . . .


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3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. . . .

3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. . . .

3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage. OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-

0083. . . .

3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061. DISMISSED.

3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109.

DISMISSED. (. . .). Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration. DENIED. (. . .).

3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (. . .) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (. . .). DISMISSED by IBP

Board of Governors (. . .). Re-instituted (. . .).

3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (. . .). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.

3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (. . .). Third MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela. Pending. . . . 22

In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:

I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (. . .), picture (. . .) are inadmissible in evidence as

enunciated by the Supreme Court in "Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, et.al.", G.R. No. 107383,

February 20, 1996. (. . .).

xxx xxx xxx

II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina Espita in the Saint

Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the employment of said woman in the DTI. He never hador is having any illicit relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as husband

and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays, or in any other place.

He never begot a child or children with her. Finally, respondent submits that all the other allegations of

Mrs. Narag are false and fabricated, . . .

xxx xxx xxx

III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons forcibly drove

respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty. Narag tried to return to the conjugal home

many times with the help of mutual friends to save the marriage and the family from collapse. He tried

several times to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment case, he

offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag refused all these efforts of

respondent Narag. . . .

IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive, scandalous, virulent

and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage, who incessantly beat, battered, brutalized,

tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally,

emotionally, and psychologically, . . .


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V. Complainant Julieta Narag's claim in her counter-manifestation dated March 28, 1996, to the

effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27, 1996 was obtained through force

and intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and absolutely

without force or intimidation, as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of

Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case

No. 12439, People vs. Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man a senior citizen of 63 years sickly, abandoned,

disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to

earn his own keep. His very physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions render him unfit

and unable to do the things attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the attached medical

certificates, . . ., among many other similar certificates touching on the same ailments. Respondent is

also suffering from hypertension. 23

On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report, 24 recommending the indefinite

suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions of said report read as follows:

Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the contending

parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case, namely:

a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of respondent's own family

and [whether he was] living with his paramour, Gina Espita;

b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina Espita (Aurelle Dominic

and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of respondent's Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten

love letters, the due execution and contents of which, although he objected to their admissibility for

being allegedly forgeries, were never denied by him on the witness stand much less presented andoffered proof to support otherwise.

Except for the testimonies of respondent's witnesses whose testimonies tend to depict the complaining

wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and possessive woman suffering everytime with streaks of

jealousy, respondent did not present himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on

his sworn comment; much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the

adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten their illegitimate children, namely:

Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse, respondent's denial that he is the father

of the two is a ground for disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).

Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to disciplinary action as a

member of the legal profession. 25

In its Resolution 26 issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the investigating

commissioner's recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the respondent. 27 Subsequently the

complaint sought the disbarment of her husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20,

1997. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied

respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.


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After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented by the parties, we

find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and

support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice

law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of

the legal profession.

Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent 28 to the practice of law, but a continuing

qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct,

he may be suspended or disbarred. 29

Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show

indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 30 Furthermore, such

conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a

criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree 31 or committed under such

scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 32

We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol 33 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be

of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in

accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar

and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of

mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief thathe is flouting those moral standards."

Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with Gina

Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary

power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 34

Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself. 35 were: Charlie Espita, 36 Magdalena

Bautista, 37 Bienvenido Eugenio, 38 Alice Carag, 39 Dr. Jervis B. Narag, 40 Dominador Narag, Jr., 41 and

Nieves F. Reyes. 42

Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated complainant's charge against

respondent in these categorical statements he gave to the investigating officer:

Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?

A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.

Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?

A Yes, sir.

(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)


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Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?

ATTY. NARAG:

Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.

CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT

A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together as husband

and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador.

xxx xxx xxx

During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita repeated his account that

his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom she had two children:

Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband and wife. You

claim that?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you say that?

A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have already two

children and I know that is really an immoral act which you cannot just allow me to follow since my

moral values don't allow me that my sister is living with a married man like you.

Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in the house?

A Yes, si[r].xxx xxx xxx

Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle

Dominador, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?

A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family. 44

In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the love letters

respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade him from appearing at the

disbarment proceedings. 45

Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this wise:

Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?

A I know him very well, sir.

Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?

A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of Charlie Espita.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?

A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.

Q And this is located where?

A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.

Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of Atty. Narag?

A Yes, sir.

xx xxx xxx

Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as husband and

wife, is it not?

A Yes, sir. 46


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Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that she learned from the

Narag children Randy, Bong and Rowena that their father left his family, that she and her husband

prodded the complainant to accept the respondent back, that the Narag couple again separated when

the respondent "went back to his woman," and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife. 47

On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to establish that

respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Absent any evidence showing that

these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed

worthy of belief.

Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In

these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he

acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant, also submitted as evidence the cards that she

herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a

comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we

affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by one and the same person. 48 Besides, respondent

did not present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he merely

denied that he wrote them.

While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also

to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice.

Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished

profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of

the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. 49

This he failed to do.

Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the same time, he

depicts his wife as a "violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending," and as an "insanely and

pathologically jealous woman," whose only obsession was to "destroy, destroy and destroy" him asshown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita). To prove his

allegation, he presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence 50 and ten (10) witnesses. 51

We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not establish the fact that he

maintained that moral integrity required by the profession that would render him fit to continue

practicing law. Neither did their testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had

abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children. Some of them

testified on matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information from

either respondent himself or other people, while others were presented to impeach the good character

of his wife.

Respondent may have provided well for his family they enjoyed a comfortable life and his children

finished their education. He may have also established himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned

politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a

member of the noble profession of law.

We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties e.g., to support, educate and

instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love,

companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. 52 As a husband, he is also


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obliged to live with his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and

support. 53

Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from home. But the evidence

shows that he was away not only because of his work; instead, he abandoned his family to live with her

paramour, who bore him two children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a

good husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of their mother, must

have scarcely felt the warmth of their father's love.

Respondent's son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his father's moral frailties in his

testimony:

Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there a fault that is

so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?

A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional part of myself,

I suppose I cannot forgive a person although am a God-fearing person, but I h[av]e to give the person a

lesson in order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes, sir.

xx xxx xxx

COMR. JOSE:

I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the worst, hardened

criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have him disbarred? That is the question.

CONTINUATION.

A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a lesson. At this

point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all the pains that we have also

suffered for quite sometime.

Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your flesh, his bones

are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst man on earth, is that what you are

saying.A Sort of, sir.

Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has sinned, you have

no more father, am I correct?

A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid because my

father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say that? Yes, he gave me life, why not?

But for sure, sir, you did not give me love. 54

Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the trauma he went

through:

Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your father is

maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission the effect on you?

A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters, especially my

married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts

to say that I and my wife parted ways. This is one reason that affected us.

Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?

A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could not face the

people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a well-known family in our community.

Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those.


13/38

A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so well that my

mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Why did your wife leave you?

A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.

Q In your wife's family?

A In our family, sir.

Q And what do you mean by that?

A What meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went to the extent

of scolding my wife and calling my wife a "puta" in provincial government, which my mother-in-law

hated him so much for this, which really affected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father

has an illicit relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic

and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your Honor. 55

Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove otherwise. A

husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly

sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death.

We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova 56: "The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a

member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral

standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social

institution of marriage."

In Toledo vs. Toledo, 57 the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his

lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan, 58 the respondent was disbarred after the complainant proved that he

had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This Court

declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of amember of the bar.

In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that

respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.

As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 59 "a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his

professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity

and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."

WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the

Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record of Respondent Narag; and

furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar

Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Paganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.


14/38

Olbes v Deciembre 457 SCRA 341

DIGEST

Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBREAC-5365. April 27, 2005

Facts: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan. Afterthe loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 withdifferent maturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa againstthe spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre

with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the report, Commissioner Dulay recommended thatrespondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.

Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault.

Held: Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowedupon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. A

lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms oflaw and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which hehas sworn to be a fearless crusader. By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truthand the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, inorder to promote the publics faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code ofProfessional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks

by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge thatthe loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsificationof a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful anddishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied byconduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of theoffense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two

years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentationis reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner isloathsome. Thus, he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective immediately.

Olbes v Deciembre 457 SCRA 341

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the malevolent act of

respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing on those

checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge that the loan they were

meant to secure had already been paid.

The Case

Before us is a verified Petition[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by Spouses

Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners charged

respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a


15/38

member of the Bar. After he had filed his Comment[2] on the Petition, the Court referred the case to

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held several

hearings. During those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003,[3] the parties were able to

present their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. After the filing of the parties respective

formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners Memorandum,*4+ the case was considered submitted

for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation dated

January 30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution

No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.

The Facts

In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the Central

Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and

Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.[5]

Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela Loans,Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to respondent five

Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the

approved loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the future.[6]

On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan plus

surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt,[7] herein quoted as follows:

August 31, 1999

Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes

Olbes.(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre

8-31-99

P10,000.00

PNB Check No. 462418/15/99*8+

Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks

(Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of

maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively.[9]

On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-

Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein

that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached

him and requested that he immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241

and 0046242 totaling P100,000.[10]

Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit-

Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15,

1999, around two oclock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him and requested

that he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000.[11]


16/38

Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to

Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as

shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been physically impossible for them to transact

business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially

considering the heavy traffic conditions in those places.[12]

Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta

and Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent.[13]

In his Comment,[14] respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called baseless and devoid of any

truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring their

commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had

allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to

ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed that the checks had already

been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that he had given

them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his previous satisfactory transactions with

them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.

Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which were not in

any way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly

private actions intended to vindicate his rights against their deception and violation of their obligations.

He maintained that his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended

from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay

rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:

In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial Prosecution

Office of Rizal respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN

A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and

then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their

business venture.

Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES

E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with

cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by

them in their business venture.


17/38

The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony

before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:

ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)

Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed two

separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that correct?

A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.

Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is that

correct?

A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two

checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).

COMM. DULAY:

Which are the first two checks?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And Check No. 46243 and

46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with number 0046241

and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you?

A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00.

Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?

A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.

Q. Is that your house?

A. No, its not my house?

Q. What is that, is that your law office?

A. That is my retainer client.

Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:


18/38

Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you these checks have

been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. Thats why I am asking your client

COMM. DULAY:

The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued here in Pasig. What

building?

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.

COMM. DULAY:

What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office?

ATTY. PUNZALAN:

Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The place, Your

Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is that client?

COMM. DULAY:

Your answer.

ATTY. DECIEMBRE:

A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.

Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and

0046244, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in the place of

your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?

A. That is correct, sir.

Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the complainants. As

between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of complainant[s] more

credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the transaction

involving the four checks took place. Such distortion on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt

on his version of the transaction with complainants.


19/38

Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also

obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public

prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of respondents version of the transaction.

Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of a

loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed upon

appears to be more credible. Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post Office in

Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been paid x x x.

Respondent does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous transaction

between the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell due such that

they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by giving them another

P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the amounts under the

circumstances described by respondent does not appear credible given the background of the previous

transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would not

even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask

them what businesses they would use the money for contributes further to the lack of credibility of

respondents version. These circumstances really cast doubt as to the version of respondent with regardto the transaction. The resolution of the public prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is

clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed

as a result of respondents filing of the criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also

filed similar cases against the co-employees of complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent is

facing similar complaints in the IBP for his actions.*15+

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by the IBP

Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP recommended.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.[16] It is bestowed

upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral

character.*17+ A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by

inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth

and justice, for which he *or she+ has sworn to be a fearless crusader.*18+

By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an

indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.[19] Lawyers should act and

comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the

publics faith in the legal profession.*20+

The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promoterespect for law

and legal processes.

x x x x x x x x x


20/38

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support

the activities of the Integrated Bar.

x x x x x x x x x

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice

law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of

the legal profession.

A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the bar.[21] Such

conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in their private

lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the highest

degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with

truth and honor.[22]

The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree

of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust that mustbe upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in

their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be

officers of the court.[23]

In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said that they

had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security for

the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondents assertionthat

they had filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a

careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these findings.

Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitableconclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners. According

to Franklin Olbes testimony on cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank checks after the

loan had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with him,[24] he was not

able to return them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in

him by petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him

with their blank checks.[25]

It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his

malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all

and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had

already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his

material gain.

And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent had the

temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to

have them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist

on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months[26]

because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional


21/38

misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly

unbecoming, a member of the bar.

Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is

equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and the

exercise of the privilege.[27] Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[28] No moral

qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor.[29] The rigorous

ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Lawyers

must be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any

artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.[31]

Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and

dishonorable;[32] they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied

by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws.[33]

Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended

by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for

employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led tothe detention of one petitioner is loathsome.

In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,[34] the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to make

it appear that he was authorized to sell anothers property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious

inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the

SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct of

herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for maliciously indicting petitioners

and thereby caused the detention of one of them.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01

and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from thepractice of law effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the

Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to respondents personal record. Let

another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

In re: Argosino A.M No. 712 July 13, 1995

Digest

FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant.

Argosinowas previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was

sentenced withhomicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was

sentenced with 2 yearsimprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was

granted by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not

allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to allowhim to take the attorneys oath of office

averring that his probation was already terminated. The court notethat he spent only 10


22/38

months of the probation period before it was terminated.ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath

of office.RULING: The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar

members, keeping inmind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and

the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning.

Hence he was asked by the court to produceevidence that would certify that he has reformed

and have become a responsible member of thecommunity through sworn statements ofindividuals who have a good reputation for truth and who haveactually known Mr. Argosino for

a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession.

The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to thefamily/relatives of

Raul Camaligan.

In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR

APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

R E S O L U T I O N

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the

crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991.

The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him

in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino

and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result ofsuch bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence.

This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the

fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging

from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with

the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993

issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two

(2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to

supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the

1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his

then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En

Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,

allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.


23/38

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the

attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T.

Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We

note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the

Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino

has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone

who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral

character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The

essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following

excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's

right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to

other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a

character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which

the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It

means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or

should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of

least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the

resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider fora moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its

ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the

recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his

life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to

aid the administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx 4

In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW

710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from thestraight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of

profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to

possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar

examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the

moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument,

therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as

to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil


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must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has

once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far

more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for

disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan: 6The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry

on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those

who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may

aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been

set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only

those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the

standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss: 7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and

professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to

punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning,

is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect

the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet

what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to

be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may

not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible

consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who,having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the

administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater

importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned,

than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the lawunless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more

important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal

learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold

of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and

that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead of a

benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a

Ruffin. 9


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All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking

admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than

inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to

practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the

court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been

guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained;

that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may

receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty,

integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not

establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to

the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members

of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into

the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of

such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their

courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the

required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or

inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the

unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of thosewho inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral

duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the

fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would

not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged

and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of

that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that

the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is

prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purgedhimself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good

moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the

time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly,

at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,

evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral


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character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter

alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good

reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,

particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show

to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the

family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in otherwords, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become

morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written

manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,

brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a

copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul

Camaligan.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

BM No 712 March 19, 1997EN BANC

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

R E S O L U T I O N

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however

deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In

Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte

during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other

accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later

withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing

on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and

one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.


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On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994

submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's

oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a

resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now

be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those

seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)

certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and

six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship

foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint

efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment

on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son

was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder

since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence,

taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one

of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992,

literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him

that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's

involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.

However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his

law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesomemanner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar.

He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and

moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient


28/38

administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who

have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to

prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of

lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons forallowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings

inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for

admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible

a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral

character."[1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the

question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character

referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert

Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering

becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other

than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then

becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is noless than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the

circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now

morally fit to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino

to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the

following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not

inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a

devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul

Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the

general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.


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We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for

practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn

promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly

according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration

of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been

giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and

other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the

lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to

practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Education

ROC Rule 138 Sec 6

Republic Act No 7662 Legal Education Act

Rule 138 Sec 5-16

In re Telesforo Diao, A.C No 244 March 29 1963

ISSUE:

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO VS. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ,

AC No. 244, March 29, 1963

FACTS:

Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to the Bar. Two years later,

Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying theinformation in his application for such Bar Examination.

Upon further investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his high school training, and neitherdid

he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College in 1941. Diao practi

2nd Day Discussion

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