2JB

CHAPTER IV

SEARCH FOR A NEt·! roLigy

Thore existed a 'Widespread belief in Iran that the

smm. d'etat of 21 Febl'Ual"J" 1921 had been orgardsed and

supportod by tho British government. (1) Indications

were not lacking to provo that tho British of:f'icem

serving with the Persian Cossack Division had a hand in

the movement of Cossack troops from Kazvin to Tehran and

the Brl tish Hinister' s key role in tho fateful happenings

at Tehran was quite well lmown. The British government,

however, denied that the Persian Cossacks, who over­

threw the Iranian government of Sipahda.r A.zam at Tehran

had been assisted or instigated by the British officers.

(2) The truth was, however, self-evident in spite of

official deniaJ.s. (J) It was a well knotm fact that

Syod Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai had pro-British leanings. (4)

Sitnilarly, the Cossack troops were 1mder en obligation

1 H.Nonnsn Tehran to Lord Olrzon London, 31st I-1arch 1921, 29 Hnrch 1921 1 928-N ( 1923) •

2 OK, Com.ons, Parliamentary Debates, series 5, vol.1JS, session 1921, o01.28).

3 Britmi.lnt Tehran to W.O.London- C/39/17 25 14ay 1921, 92S-N ( 1923). He confimed that all troop movet11ents originated from the British officers.

4 General Hasoan Arta, !lm:!m: ~~(London, 1964), p.11~

2J9

to the Br:f. tish Legation ror their messing end other

arraneemonts after tho departure or fussian or:f'lcers,

vhen they bad practically been neglected by the central

gowmment at Tehran. (5) British opinion as to vhether

Roza Khan, tho nero Cosaack commander, could be trusted

or not to do their bidding was still divided. ( 6)

The policy declaration of the nev government on

26 Februar.r 1921 denounced tho Anglo-Persian .Agreement

of 1919 blt the reform schGme given in that declaration

followed broadly tho lines set forth in that Agreement

so far as foreign loans 1 customs tariff, mlli tar,y and

fintmoial advisers and raUwq construction were con­

cerned. To satiety the national aspirations or tho

people, promise was made to expropriate those fotmd

guilty of defalcntions, reconsider past concessions,

ratif.y lrano-Soviet Treaty of Febl'll8.1'7 1921 and ensure

withdrawal of foreign troops ~m Iranian soU.

The Iranians soon carne to dislike Zia-ed-Din and

opposed him vhen he ordered wholesale arrests of Iranian

notables. A1 though drastic measures had been promised

5 J .M.Balfour, Recent Ifaxmeninga 1:!1 feraiB (London, 1922) p.22A,.

6 lfurl.ster Tehran toF.O.Iondon, 312 dated 25 Mq 1921, 92S-N (1923). Mr Norman thought that Reza Khan was not trustwrtey. Hinistor Tehran to F.O .London, dated 25 Mq 1921, ~. Sir Sydney Armitage Smith thought that ReY.a lilian uas trustm>rtey-.

220

in the policy dec1aration of the new government, but the

. manner of the arrests showed that he uas self-v.Uled and

arrogant. The Shah smelt a strong Bolshevik nawur in

Zia's reforms end tumed against him. He began to rely

wholly on ~m Khan. (7) Ho was also upset at the

reduction of his QivU List and suspected that he might

suffer the same fate as tho notables. Zia-ed-lli.n wanted

an inte~natioMl guarantee to save Iran .f'.rom Bolshevik

attacks. (g)

A clash betueon the civilian and m:Uita.ry leaders

of smm. d'etat ua.s becoming inevitable. Reza Khan was

no longer atraid of the Brl tish and he desired that the

Prime Minister should neither be pro-British nor pro­

Russian. He had an unbounded al!lbi tion and equally

ubboundafl distaste for Bolshevism.·

The first breach bctueen them on 25 April 1921

was healed through a compromise allowing Reza Khan to

become l-Iar 14inister in addition to his duties as Sardar

Sepah. The second breach on 6 May 1921 also resulted

in Rezn Khan's triumph inasmuch as Gendru;merie was

transferred by the Interior lti.nister to the 11ar Minis-

7 Norman Tehran to F.O.London, 84 dated 6 J'tme 1921, Ibid.

g 'fla.nister Tehran to F.O.London, 247, dated 2.3 April 1921, Il?JJ!.

221

tr.r. (9) The third breach on 21 May 1921 proved decisive

and Sycd Zia-ed-Din bad to quit as Iranian Prime Minister

and leave the cotmtry for Baghdad on 25 Mq 1921. The

issue at stake vas the powers and position of British

milita17 officers serving with the Persian Cbsoack DiVision.

Zia-ed.-Din wanted executive powers to be given to these

officers, but Reza Khan wanted to have them only as

instructors. ( 10} Reza Khan gave an ultimatum to Zia-ed-Din

on 2.3 May 1921 to resign and leave Iran. Zia resigned,

but wanted to eliminate Reza Khan also. Reza 'ihan ordered

Zia' s arrest while he was at Kazv.in on his ~ to Baghdad,

but the British Minister got these orders cancelled and

also obtained an assurance from the Shah that he ( Zia)

would not be molested on the Wlzy'.

The Soviet Minister, Theodore Rothstein, vho was on

his vay to Tehran ~ fl.feshed had been told by the outgoing

Iranian Prime Minister in consultation with British

Legation to ~e withd.rallal of Bolshevik troops already

in Iran, before he could be allowed to contirme his

joumey. ( 11) Rothstein assured the Iranian government

9 Britmilat Tehran to D.H.I.London, D/4/1 dated 15 f·fey 1921, ~·

10 J.M.Baltour, n.S, p.2SO.

11 Minister Tehran to F.O.I.ondon, 24.3 dated 21 April 1921, 928-N ( 192.3) •

222

that the Bolshevik troops had entered Iran lrl.thout the

kllOl-lledge of Soviet government in J.!oocow ond hostilities

would soon be stopped. ( 12) He, howevor, contirnled the

journey and presented his credentials to tho Shah on

28 April 1921 • ( 13)

Reza Khan had left Iranian finances and military

accounts in British htl.nds. The British J·finister desired

that supply of munitions for the Iranian 8.l'ley' should be

stopped in viet~ of the recent events. British Financial

Adviser had also stopped tho supply or money, but he

knew that it supply of money was not forthcoming through

the Imperial Banlc and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Coillp8.ey, he

would have to withdr81-1 from bis post. (14) In that ease,

Reza Khan might turn to lbssians for help and Bolshevism

would gain an upper hand in Iran. (15) The Soviet

Minister was firmly established in Iran and he was taking

£u1l advantage of these developments.

Heamrhile, the rebellion in Qi.lan was increasing

in intensity. The Soviet troops in Iran encouraged

12 l,H.nister Tehran to F.O.Iondon, 252 dated 23 Aprll 1921, MS·

13 Norman Tehran to Iord Curzon London, 63 dated 5 t-hy 1921, Ibid.

14 Minister Tehran to F.O.Iondon, 312 dated 25 May 1921, Ibi~.

15 B:ritmUat Tehran to W.O .. London, C.)9/17 dated 25 May 1921, lS!:S·

223

other rebellious elements in Azerbaijan. (16) Kurds

wore already in revol.t. The appointment o£ Qg.vtm-es­

Sul:taneh as the Iranian Prime t·anioter in succession to

Zia-ed-D:ln provoked yet another rebellion in Khora.san

by Col Mohamad Taqi Khan~ the Gend.armerie Q)mmandant.

( 17) When Zia-ed-Di.n had ordered mass arrests o£ Irenitm

notables, Taqi Khan had been ordered to arrest QavaiDo.Os­

Sul taneh, who at that time was serving as the Govemol'­

General of Khorasan. Now that Qavam emerged £rom the

prison as the net:r Prime f·Hr.d.ster Taqi Khan was dismissed

and recalled to Tehran. The rebellions in every region of

North Iran had resulted in the suspension of the evacu­

ation o£ Bolshevik troops from Iran and in consequence,

British offl.cers serving with the Persian Cossack Division

were asked to stay on, although they had been shom of

their exocuti ve functions and instructional duties. ( 1S)

In this critical situation, when the futuro of the

country hl.mg in the balance, the British Plnsncial.

16 BritmUat Tehran to D.M.I. London, 0/37/7 dated 25 May 1921 , ;Ibid.

17 Britmilat J-toshed to C.G.S.Simla, tm •. o5253 dated 31 l·fay 1921' !big.

1S Minister Tehran to F.O.Iondon, 323 dated 2 June 1921, lht!!· Britm:l.lat Tehran to D.J'f.I.London, C/39/23 dated Z7 Ka,y 1921, Ibid.

22~

Adviser bluntly told the nev Iranian Prime Minister that

the financiers in London would not advance money unless

they were fUlly satisfied that he vas in complete control

of finances in Iran. { 19) He demanded acceptance of his

re-organisation scheme and also its enforcement in its

entirety. (20) I£ his conditions were .fulfilled, he

promised to arrange money from the Imperial Bank and the

Anglo-Iranian OU Company on the guarantee of land revenue.

It was obvious that naked Bri. tish control over the

entire range of Iranian finances would be impracticable

and would oftend the Iranian sentiments in addition to

provoking the hostUity of Soviet I-1inister, H.Rothstein.

A watered down formula was suggested by the Br:l. tish lfinister

that an assurance should be given by the Iranian govern­

ment that their F.i.nanoe l.finister would be bound to accept

the advice of the British Financial Adviser, who now

came forward uith another demand that Mudir-ul-l,fulk

should be appointed as the· Iranian Finance l·furl.ster. (21)

19 Minister Tehran to F.O.London1 324 dated 2 June 1921 1 lhM· .

20 Norman Tehran to Icrd Chrzan Iondon, 63 dated 5 t·~ 1921 , 975-f·lid Asia ( 1923).

21 He served as Foreign t·;inister in Zia-ed-Din 's cabinet formed on 1 March 1921.

225

This again was an unacceptable proposition.

The Iranian army could not :f'\metion without finances

and in sheer desperation, Reza Khan asked Theodore

Rothstein for help !"rom Soviet sources. The Soviets

having no funds to spare,Ibthste:l.n refused to make any

commitment td thout mclting a reference to J.toscov. The

British Plnanciol Adviser catered for the requirements

of South Persia Rifles, but promised small doles from

oil royalties for the Iranian 8.l"my and these too would

depend on the attitude of the Iranian government towards

Great Brl tain.

Syed ?da-ed-Din was still in Baghdad and was watching

these developments closely. He informed the Br.l tish

Minister in Tehran that there was a grave danger of North

Iran passing under Bolshevik control and in that event

the Iranian Craun Prince Mohammad Hassan Mirza was

tdlling to head a separate sovereign state in South Iran.

( 22) The Crown Prince was prepared to go to london direct

to settle this deal with Lord Corzon through Vossuq-ed­

Ibwleh1 but ata-ed-Din had advised him to sta.v for the

time being in India and await further developments. The

British Minister who understood the situation better

22 H. C.Baghdad to Pbreign Simla, 820-S dated 1 July 1921, 92S-N(1923) .

226

replied that any plot for the dethronement of Shah wul.d

result in immediate disruption ot Iran; this vas against

the presont policy ot the British government. (23) The

situation in South Iran was no better than in the north,

owing to the proposed disbandment ot South Persia

Ri.fies. (24) The Government of India, therefore, viewed

the activities of the Crotm Prince in India \lith dis-

favour. ( 25)

It was obvious that erry scheme for the so-called

liberation ot Iran should be indigenous in origin and

character. (26) Association of the British govemment

and tho Government of India would prejudice the scheme

in Iranian eyes. Syed Zia-ed-Din, who had gone to Tndia

to join the Crown Prince, was persuaded to leave for

Constantinople. (27) H.Nonnan suggested that Zia. should

be brought back to Iran for trial. The Crow Prince,

however, could not be asked to leave, bllt his activities

23 H. C.Baghdad to Foreign Simla, 830-S dated 5 July 1921 1

Ibid.

24 Britm:f.lat Tehran to D.H.I.London, C/37/'36 dated 25 June 19~1 , Ibid.

25 R.P.G.Buah:l.re to Fbreicn Simla, 1114 dated 10 July 1921, Ibid.

26 l'dnim;er Tehran to Politicel Basra, dated 16 July 1921 1 lb;!d o

27 Viceroy Simla to I.O.U>ndon, 1905-S dated 7 August ,~,,~

uore discreetly curbed.

The Britioh government was o£ the vieu that rebellious

propaeanda promoted by the Bolsheviks in r..brt.h Iran

should be prevented from penetrating into South Iran.

The first pre-requisite to effect this was the continued

m..~ of money to the Iranian government to enable the

British Mlnister to exert his infiumee in Tehran.

Secondly, it. was proposed not to disband the South Persia

Rifles in a precipitate manner. Another suggestion \las

made to lodge a to:nnaJ. protest at l<foseow in aecordllnco

with the preamble of Anglo-Russian Q)nmercial Treaty of

16 March 1921 against the ha:rm:ful effects or Bolahovilt

sponsored propagandll. .for British interests in Iran. (28)

The dif'f'ieul ty about the last suggestion was that the

protest could only be in general terms, as T. Rothatoin

had refrained .from communist propaganda and actively

supported anti-British propaganda of the Iranians.

The prevailing situation made it imperatiw for

the British government to take some steps to ensure the

safety of tlle oUf'ields. (29) The ImperlaJ. Bank had

agreed to release 200,000 tomans (approximately £50,000)

28 J3rt. tish and Foreien Str,te Pa:oers 1921, vo.l. CXIV, (London, 1924l p.'J74.

29 I1inister Tehran to F.O.London, 341 dated 15 Jtme 1921, 92S-N (1923).

226

a month for f'i ve months unconditionally against adequate

eecuri ty. That 1 hovevcr 1 was insu.r.ficicnt .for the Br.l tiah

Minister to have some influence over the Iranian cabinot.

The amount was el.so insufficient to meet the curront

neods of the army. The British t4inister, therefore,

suggested that a detachment of South Persia Rifles must

be retained at Ispahan to enable es much of' central and

southern Iran as was possible to be kept undor Brl tish

control as long as possible to protect the oilfields

and the telegraph system. ( 30) The communicntion system

of Iraq \-rae dependent on the telegraph lines in South

Iran and the British High Cbmmissioner in Iraq, Sir

Percy Cox, wanted to maintain British telegraph lines in

South Iran intact. ( 31)

l-1ea:rruhile, situation in I~orth Iran showed some

signs of improvement on account of the Rothstein • s

promise to Reza Khan that Bolshevik troops .from Enzeli and

Qllan l-rould be t:d thdrawn and a settlement ooul.d be worlted

out betl:reon Kuchik Khan and the Iranian government. ( 32)

30 t-1:1.nister Tehran to F.O.IDndon, 363 dated 1 July 1921,

~-31 H.C.Baghdad to C.O.London, 851-S dated 14 July 1921, !big.

32 Britmilat Tohran to D.H.I.London, 114 dated 19 July 1921 and 115 dated 23 July 1921' Ibi_d.

229

The rebellion in Khorasan, houever, continued and

negotiations for peacefUl settlement between the rebel

Taqi and Tehran were going on through the good offices

of the British Consul General., Mes..l-ted. (33)

lord CUr ;on t e Grgf\fm

lord <brzon had been discomfited at the failure of

Anglo-Persian Agreement in both its nakoo end camouflaged

rom. He was now enraged that the Iranian government had

entered into treaty relationship 'With the Soviet Union.

Vlhat w.s more, Irano-Soviet Treaty charted a neu course •

for Iran's relations \dth foreign powers. Iran was sure

to demand that Anglo-Iranian relations should also be

placed on a new fboting in conf'ormi ty with the Soviet

model.

In a tit of' impotent rage, he reminded the Iranians

that British 'blood and treasure had protected them against

Tur.kish attacks and German encroachments. ( 34) In an

attempt to explain away the failure of British policy

underlying the Anglo-Persian Agreement, he taunted

that the Iranian cabinets had continually been succeeding

33 c. G. Meshed to Hinister Tehran, 151 dated 19 August 1921, Ibid.

34 lord Curzon Is speech in the House or IDrds on 26 July 1921 as quoted in file 922-l.ad Asia ( 1923) •

230

each other and charged that the Iranians had thrown

themselves into the Sov.l.et arms.

The Iranian government we forced to give him a

fitting reply. ( 35) The Iranian reply to Iord Cllrzon' s

first accusation was that the presence of British troops

in Iran was responsible for attackD from Turkey and

encroachments from Germans. The resultant damage to

Iran would last for years.

To lord <hrzon' s second point, the Iranian reply was

equally sarcastic. It was pointed out that British

actions were responsihl.e for the instability of Iranian

government. If a government acccpta.b1o to some foreign

government was formed, it was not liked by the Iranians

and if a government acceptable to the Iranians was

formed, it was not liked by some or the other foreign

Power and was, therefore, toppled •. (36) tiiser course

for British policy would have been to strengthen the

Iranian government to enable it to protect British

interests, but British actions actually weakened the

Iranian cabinets. ( 37)

35 Iranian Foreign Minister to Iranian Minister Ior.don, dated 14 Aug 1921, 92S-N (192J).

36 lfurl.ster Tehran to F .0 .London, 182 dated 16 September 1921, 922-Mid Asia ( 192.3).

37 Sitrah-i-Iran (Tehran) 10 August 1921.

On the last point of Icrd Cllrzon, the Iranians

vere even more specific and outspoken. They replied

that Russians had offered them terms which were

acceptable from geographical, economic and political

points of v.tew. The Ib.ssians did not demand employment

of their advisers for Iranian amy and finances, nor

did they ask for surrender of Iranian mines Ol'ld resources

to lbssia. (38) It was pointed out that British govom­

ment wao also negotiating a settlement uith Soviet

Union to normalise British relations with that country.

Whero then was the ham, if Iran did the same? As for

lord Curzon' s charge that the Iranians were fiekl.e­

minded, he was told that Iran had a constitutional

monarchy and British policies could not be imposed on the

country against the declared will of the people. { 39)

There was actuBl.ly no reason for this controversy.

lbrman had fUl.1y briofed lord Chrzon on the Irano-Soviet

Treaty. (40) libnnan had pointed out that lord CUrzon 's

guarantee to defend Iran against Bolshevik invasion bad

proved hollow and with Bolshevik troops .f.'irmly on Iranian

38 ~ .. 11 August 1921.

39 Ibid •. 14 .August 1921 •

40 Nomen Tbhran to Curzon london, 66 dated 7 May 1921, 16-M of 1923.

soU, there uas no al. temati ve for Iran but to come to

terms \d.th the Soviet Union. (41) t!onnan felt that Ira.:nians

should be given the credit for starting negotiations

't1i th prior British consent. Subsequent progress o£ the

negotiations was also advised to the British Iegation

at every stage. There was thus no reason tor L:>rd Chrzan

to get ilTi ta~ed on this score.

Ponul,ar Resentment against Great Bd.tf!in

The Iranian Hajlis had started assembling from

Februa:ry 1921, but began fUnctioning formally from 24

July 1921 a.f'tcr scrutiny of the credentials. An hlti-Br:i.tish

party under the leadership of Prince F.Lruz ( Nosrat-ed­

Ihwleh) emerged as the strongest. As co-a:uthor of the

Anglo-Persian Agreement he had played a leading role in

promoting British interests; but his incarceration

along with other Iranian notables by Syed Zi.a-ed-Uin

had turned him violently anti-British. The Press and

the stalwards of the Majlis including Syed Hassan Hudarris

supported him. His strength in the Majlis enabled him

to have infl.uence over the cabinet.

The Iranian Press had been mch influenced by the

41 F.O.I.Dndon to 11inistor Tehran, 23 dated 13 J8IllllU",Y'

1920, ~·

Indian national move,..,ent; and subsequent to the fall of

Syed Zia-ed-Din, the campaign against Great Britain

vas unleashed in all its terooi ty. ( 42)

Bolshevism had brought a new message tor the doun­

trodden East; and nationalism in Iran greu in strel\;.ITth

due to Bolshevik influences. The British Empire bad

lost its previous strength and the British policico of

supporting some tribes and punishing others uore

bitterly assailed. (43) A charge o:rten r~eated in the

Iranian Press ws that tho British authorities had uon over

large number of Iranian nationals through enchantment,

n.attery and f'riendliness to turn them against their

own government. {~) The appointment of Sir Arnold T.

Hilson as the Resident Director of Anglo-Iranian OU

Co. and the expulsion of Shia lvfujtehids from Ire.q

all served as convenient sticks to beat. the British

with. (45) !Drd Curzon 's speech in the Fbuse of wrds

on 26 July 1921 , poor performance of the British Finan-

42 Brit.m:U.at Tehran to D.r.f.I. London, 0/37/7 dated 25 May 1921 and 0/37/10 dated 27 Mey 1921, 92S-N ( 1923) •

43 Asr-i-Azadi (Shiraz) 12 J8l'Jllary 1922. Asr-i-Azadi (Shiraz) No.16 dated 29 l1areh 1921. Guliistan (Shiraz) l!o. 28 dated 2S August 1921. ---r 44 Adalat (Shiraz) No.7 dated 2S September 1921. ShafJI. i-Sorkh, No .6o dated 15 August 1922. (Tehran) ·

45 Asri-i-Azadi (Shiraz) No.12 dated 15 October 1921.

eia1. Adviser, disbandment of South Persia Rifles and

the activities of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in

arriving at local agreements v.itb the Iranian tribes

combined to inflame Iranian .feelings against the

British government. British government blamed the

Soviet Legation for provoking this anti-British propa­

ganda, but in actual. tact, Kemal.ist victories in Turkey

and national. upsurge in India also influenced Iranian

opinion against Great Br! tain. (46) Additional factors

were the perfb:rmance of Lord Curzon and Norman, which

were also severely criticised in Iran.

At one time, the fury of the Iranian Press against

Great Britain ws roused to such a high pitch that Sir

Percy Loraine, who succeeded Norman at the British

Legation, felt persona.lly insulted and stopped all

monetary advances to the Iranian government through the

Imperia1 Bank of Persia. The British Minister bluntJ.y

to1d the Shah that if popular resentment against Great

Britain in Hajlis and Press attacks contimed, no pay­

ments from Brl tish sources wou1d ever be made and in

46 Zemindar an Urdu daily of Labore was libera.lly quoted in the Irsnian newspapers. That paper appealed to the 1-fu.alims to throw off the British yoke.

that case t:roops uould not get their pay. That could

result in the deposition of Qajar ~. (47} The

strategy o.t Bri tieh Legation at Tehran was to use every

artifice to divert tho press f\u:y in Iran against the

Soviet Legation and in this it succeeded by the end of

1922. (48) This was not, hcmevor, a lasting solution.

As a permanent remedy, it vas suggested that either

the Br:f.. tish govermnmt should organise counte!'-propaganda

to protect British position against Iranian press attacks

or press the Iranian governnont to resort to restrictive

and Sllppressive measures against anti-British press.

At3 a result of Brl tish representations against Iranian

neuspapers, Iranian gove:r.nment was forced to suppress

nine newspapers. (49) In addition, en emergency press

la'd was passed by the ~1ajlis on 2 November 1922 tenable

till 21 Narch 192.3 for trial of editors by jury. (50}

The possibility fbr Anglo-Iranian OU Company and

the Imperial Bank to have publicity sections of their

own or to subsidise and :f.'inance newspapers to counter

anti-British propaganda was also considered. Another I

47 Minister Tehran to F .O.Lorxlon, 478 dated 29 August 1921 , 92B-N ( 192.3) •

48 Minister Tehran to F.O.Iondon, 719 dated 11 December 1922, .35~ (192.3).

49 Ninister Tehran to Iranian Prime Minister, 2S August 1922' 2Q-1.{ ( 192.3) •

50 Ministe-r Tehran to F .. O.London, 714 dated 10 December 1922, ~.

step considered was that the British Hillister should

be l:T! thdraun if' the press f\noy continued against Great

Britain. Although the British Foreign Office had approved

this stop, Sir Percy !Draine did not make use of this

device.

!rnnian ArmY

Before the tre.nsfer of C-endam.erio to the t-!ar

Ministry under Reza Khan, proposals for mnalgatm.ting

Coooack Division, Genda:gnerio and South Persia Rifles

had envisaged the e:nplo:yment of somo British officers.

(51) However, when Qmd.a:rmerJ.e was placed under the

Iranian War Hinistry, situation changed, as Reza. 1(han

did not want to give executive pouera to the British

of.r.l.cers ser'Ving in Iran. (52 ) He vas not willing to

take ovor Bri. tish and Indian otf'icers of South Persia

Rifles, but was uUling to pey for arms, ammunition and

stores of this force at agreed rates in easy instahlents.

(53) The same policy was applied to the Gendarmerie and

51 C.G.S.Simla to Britmilat Tehran, 1311,-H.0.1 dated 1 April 1921, 92S-N(1923), Pros n.).

52 Britmilat Tehran to D.H.I. !Dndon, 0/4/1 dated 15 May 1921, Ibid.

53 l4inister Tehran to F.O.London, 471 dated 25 .August 1921, IQ!S..

Stredish officers ttere replaced by the Iranian ofticers.

(54)

lbnnan recommended acceptance of the Iranian terms

for the transfer of South Persia Rl..f.l.es, but the British

~-overmnent ruled that the force should be disbanded

and surp1us arms and ammunition destroyed at site. (55)

The Iranian govel"tlment badly needed these ams and m!lm11oot

ni tion for use of the disbanded personnel of South Persia

Ri.f'les, who were re-enlisted in the Persian ·Cossack

Di. vision and tho British Hinistor tully supported the

Iranian view. (56) The British government stuck to

their or.l.ginel. viet:r, but agreed to sell only seven hundred

rifles to I!fln for protection of trade routes. (57)

Lord Curzon did not want to oblige the Iranian govel'!l!Ilent,

unless Iranian po1icy was changed in 13ri tish favour.

The destruction of British arms and ammunition in:f\ni.ated

54 Minister Tehran to F .o .london, 670 dated 6 Tiecember 1921, 35-M (1923), 1-2)6.

55 Norman Tehran to F.O.Iondon, 490 dated 3 September 1921, 16-M (1923). F.O.London to lofi.nister Tehran, 367 dated 12 September 1921, Ibid. F.O.wndon to r.finister Tehran, 371, dated 21 September 1921, Ibid.

56 Minister Tehran to F.O.Lomon, 568 dated 12 October 1921, Pros 928-N ( 1923).

57 F .o.wndon to Minister Tehran, 400 dated 6 October 1921, 16-M (1923). F.O.I.ondon to I•1i.nister Tehran, 575 dated 14 October 1921, Ibid,

Iranian feelings against Great Britain.

Sardar Sepah had, from the beg:l.nning, been imbued

with the idea of a national army and the British Legation

fully endorsod this view. Accordingly, all the fighting

forces under the \"ar l•H.nistr.y were amalgamated and

transformed into a national army ( Qllshun) on S December

1921 comprising of five divisions located at Tehron,

Tabriz, Hamadan, Ispahan and l.eshed. Their total strongth

at that time was 34,000. (58) Subsequantl.y, an

Independent Brigade was formed for l'Torth Iran directly

under the War Ministry. The total strength grew to

40,000 with the eventual aim o£ raising it to 50,000.

Prince Amanullah Mirza was promoted as Chief' or the

General Staff' of the new forco.

The creation of a national army was an event of

unique importance in Iranian histor.y. So far, Iranian

tribes on the borders fonned a part of the countr.r's

defence a.r.rangement end arming the tribes was accepted

as en integral part of tho country's defence mechanism.

The tribal armies vere called 1#J.sbkar: and some of the

tribes enjoyed a semi-autonomous status in the Iranian

p6li ty. The central amy was no match for the combined

SB HinistGr Tehran to F.O.I.ondon, 21 dated 11 Janu.ar.r 1922, 35-H (1923).

tribal amies, but intel'-tribal jealousies prevented

their unity and Reza Khan took the opportunity to sub­

jugate them one by one. (59)

The tribes were supposed to meet the first on-

alaught of the enemy till the central a1"i!zy" arrived. Tho

strength and expenditure of the central army was, thereby,

kept at the minimum level eommensurate with the defence

requirements of the eoW'lt:cy. Under the nw arrangement

of Reza Khan, only' the army under the Crow wul.d be

armed and the rest of the civUian popul.ation wuld

have to be dis-anned. ( 60)

This vas a eolossal task and the means at the die-

posa1 of the nev force were, to sa;r the least, inade­

quate. Fbr its tinaneia1 requirements, the new torce

vas dependent wholly on British sources and the arms

and ammunition at its disposal were obsolete and in­

adequate. The va.r.l.ety of rifles and guns in possession

of the Iranian troops vas prodigal. This made the

maintenanee problem difficult and most of the arms were \

not f\illy serviceable. Supplies from British sources

had been stopped since the fell of the pro-British

59 The total tribal force in South Iran was 215,750 and the Iranian army had a strength of 40,000.

6o Lt.<hl. M.Sa:rmders, Bri'bnllat Tehran, 5/6 dated 5 OCtober 1923, 35(III}(1923), 1-302.

2~0

cabinet of Syed Zia-ed-Din. (61)

The whole of North Iran was in a state of fe:nnent

due to the withdrawal of British troops end the presence

of Soviet forces in that region. The J angalis controlled

QUan. (62) Ismail Agha Simko, the Kurdish chief con­

trolled the whole torrltocy west of Lake U:rumia £rom

T\hoi in the north to Sainkaleh end Slkizin in the

south. ( 63) Col. Mohammed Taqi Khan held the whole of

Khorasan def'.ying central authority. On top of that,

inspired ru.mours vere going round thnt Russian troops

might force entry into Iran, if' war between Allied

governments and 'furkey broke out and Russia entered on

the side of Turltey. (64) Turldsb encroachments

weN also reported. In the f'aee of these heavy odds,

Iranian army relied solely on the determination and

daring of Reza Khan, the Sa.rdar Sepah.

The rebellion of Kuchik Khan was crushed and after

61 Britmilat Tehran to G.O.C.Baghdad, 0/39/14 dated 23 May 1921, 92S-N( 1923) •

62 Britmilat Tehran to D.M.I.London, 125 dated 26 tugust 1922, 35-M( 1923).

63 lfurl.ster Tehran to F.O.London, 566 dated 11 September 1922, Ibid.

64 !-1inister Tehran to F.O.London, 438 dated 12 December 1922, ~., 1-111.

initial reverses in the campaign against Simko, Iranian

army m>n a decisive victory over the Kurds. ( 65)

Iranian victory over the Kurds was doubly welcome to

the British govomment, because it opened the uestem.

trade route and prevented the Kurdish revolt 1"rom

spread:ing into Ireq. ( 66) <h1. M:>hammad Taqi Khan had

been killed in a chance afi:'ray on 3 October 1921 and

af'ter sporadic fighting peace was restored in Khorasan.

( 67) t.Jhen Reza Khan wo.s busy in the pacification pro­

granme in the north he received encouragement and support

from both the Russian and Brl tish Legations.

By the end or 1922, Reza Khan had completed sub­

jugation of the Shahsevan tribe in Azerbaijan and he

was nov in a position to tum his attention to the

thorny problem of disarmine the tribes in South Iran.

(6S) Here the British interests predominated and he

was careful not to offend these vosted interests.

65 l"inister Tehran to F.O.London, 5'7S17, dated 17 October 1921, 92S-N (1923). 14inlstor Tehran to F.O. London, 340 dated 9 June 1922, 35-M(1923), 1-236. l[nister Tehran to F.O.London, .48 dated 15 August 1922, Ibid.

66 f.!inister Tehran to F.O.London, 566 dated 11 September 1922, 35-M(1923).

67 t-:inister Tehran to F.O.London, 56o dated 6 October 1921, 928-N( 1923).

68 Hinister Tehran to F .o .:London, 100 dated 7 .Aprll 1923, ~-

2~2

Rumours vera current in Tehran that Reza Khan would not

be nble to curl> the southern tribes for fear of British

opposition. (69) Re felt stultified at these sugiJCS'tions.

He, therefbro, sent a token fbrce of 200 infantry, sixty

cavalry and a couplo of maehine guns to Shuster, but

at the same time he uao anxious to e.sounge the ruffled

feelings of the fhaikh of l1ohammerah v.i.th assurances

that his autonomy, special rights on taxation and

jurisdiction would be respected if he cleared his

arrears of revenue p!cy!llente. (70)

Next to this uas the issue of evacuation of the

British troops t:rom South Iran. British government vas

reacy to order evacuation hom Bushire, but Lord

CUrzon stipulated that evacuation of British troops

:f'rom the Gulf ports would depend on satisfactory settJ.e­

ment of tho British desiderata. (71)

The army no doubt was a unified force, but it

was not yet properly fed, clothed and paid. Its finances

were in a bad shape and Reza Khan had to seize part of

69 Hinister Tehran to F.O.London, 169 dated 1 June 1923, 35-M {1923).

70 11inister Tehran to F.O.London, 469 dated 16 October 1923, 29-M (1923).

71 F.O .IDndon to J.fi:n:l.ster Tehran, 124 dated 12 Jtme 1923, 35-M (1923).

2~3

postal and provincial rovcrmes to pay for the campaigns

against the rorthem tribes. He could not ensure regu­

lar pa;yments and the troops were in heavy arrears and

discontented. Vi wed in this backgromd, the achieve..

ments of the Iranian amy were really splendid.

During 192.3~ expenditure on the army totalled

£2,~01000, which was a bit too high for the slender

resources of Iran. The army now started giving a h5lping

hand to the American Financial Advisers in the collection

of revenue arrears from tho provinces. General conscrip-

tion vas also introduced during 192.3 and Ai.rcra.f't and

teclmicians were obtained from France.

Iranian Ftnapces

The Brl tish government had ceased to supply mney

.from October 1920, when it was all over with the Anglo­

Persian Aereement, but complete stoppage from British

government sources took place in 1921, af'ter the fall of

Zia-ed-Dln's pro-British cabinet. (72) This coupled

with the stoppage of the supply or ammunition was cal­

culated to prevent the Iranian govemment £rom taking

72 Hinister Tehran to F.O.London, 459 dated 17 August 1921, 92B-N (192.3). Minister Tehran to F.O.London, .312, dated 25 May 1921, 928-N(192.3).

an anti-Bl'i.tieh course. There was, however, a tear in

the British mind that Reza Khan could tum to lbso:l.a

tor help it supply' of money from British sources dried

up completely. Tho Imperial Bank o£ Persia had been

persuaded to give an lm.dertaking by the British govern­

ment that no edvaneea ot money uould be all.owed to the

Iranian govemment during 1921 on the security o£ the

oil royalties.

OU royalty from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Q:mlpany

was in the region of £6oo ,000 a year and the revenues

from other sources onounted. only to £101000 a month.

This vas attributable to tho chaotic state of attairs

prevailing in Iran at that time. The oU royalty t-~as

doposited by the Anglo-Iranian OU Company in london

but the Imperial Bank had frozen all Iranian cradi ts

in london Dgainst ovor-dro.tts in Tehran. (73) Unless.,

thereforo, the Imperial Bank aJJ.owed overdraf'ts to the

Iranian gove:mnent as· a no mal customer the uhole state

machiner.v, including the operations ot the Iranian amy,

was suro to come to a standstill. The Iranian government

was in need of an immediate advance of 150 to 200

thousand sterling to clear the arrears and £100,000

73 J .H.Belfour, n.5, p.241 ...

2~5

a month therea.fter till the situation improved and the

Iranian resources consequently increased. The local

bank manager favoured this advance as a normal commercial.

arrangement, but the Imperial Bank London 'tlanted to

give an advance of £150,000 as a commercial arrangement

to keep the army in operational readiness. (74) The

Iranian Prime Minister 'tlanted an additional sum of

£1,000,000 for refOrms. (75) British government sanctioned

only £So ,000 and £100.,000 a.fter a great delay. (76)

Iranians could not understand 'tlhy they could not

make use of their oil royalty to draw advances from

their State Bank or raise loans f'ioom any source they

liked. This gave rise to the .feeling in Iran that

Russian Discount and Loan Bank, which had been placed

at the disposal. of the Irazrl.an govemtlent by the Soviet

Union, should be converted into another State Bank for

the countcy. (77) British government vas assured that

74 Minister Tehran to F.O.umdon, 561 dated 6 October 1921, 92S-N (1923).

75 Minister Tehran to F.O.London, 591, dated 24 October 1921, Ibid.

76 F.O.London to Imperial Bark London, dated 10 August 1922, 35-M(1923) ancl 21 Septenber 1922.

7f Minister Tehran to F.O.London, 249 dated 23 Aprll 1921, 928-N ( 1923) •

the British capital would be free to participate in the

establishment of the proposed state Bank. (78)

The Br.i. tish government desired that all advances

from the Imperial Bank to the Iranian government should

be cleared by the British Fbreign Office beforehand,

so that political benefits to be achieved could be

l-teighed before granting clearance. (?9 ). This Tt18S a

grave risk for the Bank, as the Iranian govomment was

free to attach its charter, if it failed to f\mction

as the state Bank of the country. Lord <llrzon, theroforo,

gave a waming that the British government would not

fail to act in that eventuality. (So)

CUrzon, h0t1ever1 realised the gravity of the

position and allowed small advances of short duration

without prior concurrence and specific author.i. ty from

the British government. ( 81) These small overdra.tta

could be adjusted against Cllstoms receipts paid into

78 H:Lnister Tehran to F.O.London, 2169 dated 30 Apr.l.l 1921 I 928-N ( 1923) •

79 F.O.Ic:ndon to Minister Tehran, 425 dated 28 October 1921, 928-N ( 1923) •

So F.O.Iondon to 1-H.nister Tehran, 468 dated 5 December 1921, 35-M (1923).

81.F.O.London to l4ir.d.ster Tehran, 120 dated 5 May 1922, 35-M (1923).

the Bank. (82) The British Treasury also agreed that

those small advances to meet the day-to-day requirements

of the Iranian government vero customar.Y between a

banker and his client. (83) It was, however, stipulated

that advances against specitic securities would have

to be approved by the Btitish government.

The Imperial Bank' o lien on the customs revenues

ot Kermanshah, Sistan, lhzdap (now Zahedan} and Persian

Gulf ports for servicing cf British loans was d:ue to

lapse on 8 November 1922. The British Fbreign O.tf'ica

argued that the Iranian government had taken no steps to

pay interest an1 annual amortisation against the debt

it owed to Great Britain. It, therefore, reoomrn.ended

that the pledge for these revenues should be extended

till 8 July 1923. (84) The real reason, however, vas

that these revenues should not be allowed to fall in the

hands of the Iranian !~ar 1-H.n:i.ster and the f.fajlis for

82 l>finister Tehran to F.O.London, 337 dated 7 June 1922, 35-l.f ( 1923) •

83 British Treasury to F.O.London, S-550/01/2 dated 22 August 1922, F-35-l~( 1923) •

84 F.O.Iondon to British Treasury, E-9038-7-34 dated 13 September 1922. Finally 1 extension only up to 8 Harch 1923 was approved. 35-M(1923).

for utilisation against British interests. (S5) These

revenues were paid into the Imperial Bank and it was

their duty as the State Bank of the country to utilise

the:n for servicing the Bri. tish loans and make over

the surpluses to the Iranian government. The Iranian

finnnces were in a completely dis-organised state and

the British government tte!"e making the best of this

state of affairs to deny Iran the use of its revenues.

The British Financial Adviser had· been 1mabl.e to

do anything to re-organise the Iranian finances. The

Hajlis and the people were against h:im and it was tm­

likely that he would ever prove effective. His contract

was, accordingly, cancelled on 1st September 1921.

( S6) The British Legation suspected that the Soviet

Legation was responsible for this decision ot the

Iranian govemment to give a serious sot-back to the

British interests, prestitta and influence in Iran. (S7)

negotiations for employing Dr A. C.l-H.llspaugh as

Financial .Adviser from USA had been going on and a bill

8; 1-Hnist,er Tehran to F.O.London, 316 dated 25 August 1922, Ibid.

86 Minister Tehran to F.O.London, 492 dated 3 September 1921, 92S-'fiJ ( 1923) •

S7 f.H.nister Tehran to F.O.I.ondon, 494 dated 4 September 1921, Ibid.

2~9

on this subject came up beforo the l:ajlis on 26 July

1922 and vas approved. ( SS) The tenns offered to

Millspaugh shoved that the Iranian government placod

:f\il.l reliance on the US :fo:o:- financial regeneration ot

their country. He uas given a five year te:m tdth powers

next only to the Iranian Finance Hinister. (S9)

US Stato Department was assured of British diplo:natic

support tor Dr A. C .Millspa118h. ( 90) The British

Military Attacha Tehran went so far as to suggest

that in case Reza J\."han ever C':lllle in con£lict td th

l.fillspaugh, the ll"tter should be £ully supported and

prevented from resigning. ( 91 )

The British government stood in the uay of a

loan amounting to £200,000 :from the Imporial ottoman

Bank of!ran, but allo•..red the Imperial Bank of Persia

to advance this amount to the Iranian government

through the f'acUities provided by the Anglo-Iranian

Oll Company. (92) The J.merlcan F.i.nancial Adviser was on

SS Minister Tehran to F.O.London, 503 dated 30 July 1922, :35-l-f( 192:3) •

S9 Iran ('fehran) 27 July 1922.

90 US State Ihpart!llent Meo:>randum dated 22 August 1922, 35-M ( 1923)

91.Minister Tehran to F.O.London, :355 dated 24 September 1922' !Q.;JA.

92 Minister Tehran to F.O.Icndon, :366 dated 5 October 1922. F.O.IondOn to M:i.nister Tehran, 251 dated 7 October 1922, Ibid.

250

his wey to Iran and lack of ar:tr condi tiona to the_ above

loan showed that the previous practice of using monetary

advances as part; of pressure tactics at Tehran would

be given up by the British govemment and an era of

frui t.ful co-opemti on through the .i oint efforts of

British Legation and the American Financial Hi.ssion

had dawned. {93)

The uorld.ng of the American Financial 1,1ission gave

a. neu promise to the country. All revenue resources,

receipts and apendi ture were centralised at. Tehran.

Budgets were regularly prepared and placed before the

Ma.jlis. Tile Americans and the Hajlis worked in close

eo-operation. There was no need for foreign loans not-7

and the previous Majlis authorisations for loans from

USA tie~ not utilised. { 94)

Reza Khan was given a lump sum allocation of tomans

800,000 (approximately £200,000) a month for the Army

expenditure and the British power to pressurlse Reza

Khan through control of purse strings thus came to an

end. (95)

I~grthem OU Q;mcerudon

Reza Khan's centralising programme had been seriously

93 He arrived in December 1922.

94 Mi.nister Tehran to F.O.London, 309 dated 1 October 1923, 49-M( 1923) •

95 i.finister Tehran to F~O.Iondon, 41:3 datEd 4 October- "¥723, 35-M ·( 1923).

251

handicapped due to short886 of funds. The British

govemment had stopped su;pply of funds and supply 1'rom

non-government oources t<:Ta.s inadequate ond behind time.

· Soviet Union had no funds to sparo for Iran. Tho

Iranians, thorofore, turned to USA, ulrl.ch llP..d plenty

or money and uas also an ardent advocate of" tho policy

of open door.

Fbllowing thE:l I1ajlis r&tification on 15 lhcembor

1921 of Irano-Soviet Treaty dated 26 February 1921,

the Iranian government f'alt that it could nov tum

to tho devol.opocmt of oil resources in 1-!orth Iran. Tho

northern oil ccnceSDion. previously held by a Russian

subject (Khoshtarla),. was nullified following the

ratification of the I:reno-Soviet Treaty. In Fcbrua.r:y

1900, the .Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had purchased the

Khoshtaria concession for oil exploitation in northern

provinces but it had becooe def\mct on account of

Soviet remmciation of all p3Bt concessi.ons owned by

the Russian subj ccto in Iran. ( 96) The Iranian govern­

ment had never recognised its validity because it had

not been approved by the l·Iajlis. The British government

96 Iran-i-Azad (Tehran) 1 52 dated 6 Jrme 1922.

252

had nlso accepted this position. (97) Lord Ourmn,

hovevor, gave nn assurance to the Anglo-Iranian Oll

Company in AprU 1920 that the Brl tish government would

support the validation of this concession. The British

govornment stuck to its stand that the concession was

legally the property of Anglo-Iranian OU Company and

instructed the British l·1inister Tehran to reserve

British rights to it. (9S) at

A French firm, La Heurthoet Hoin based.LParis 1 had

olso applied for this conc~csion in 1920. This firm

also now started pressing for its claims on the ground

that its earlier application had been pending for a

long time. (99)

The US government regnrded the Khoshtaria concession

as invalid as it had not been approved by the Hajlis

in accordance uith the Iranian constitution. (100) The

97 Sir Percy O:>x British Legation Tehran to Vossuq-ed­Dowleh, Iranian Prime Hinister dated 3 December 1919, 49-H ( 1923).

9S F. 0. London to British Ambassador Uashington 1 590-R dated 4 October 1921. F.O.London to f.finister Tehran, 397 dated 4 October 1921 , Mil•

99 1-finister Tehran to F. 0. London, 489 dated 3 September 1921, 49~ (1923).

100 British Ambassador Hasbingt;on to F.O.Iondon1 67o-R dated 20 October 1921, Ibid.

253

Iranian government were keen to give the northem oU

concession to an American Oil Group. The aim was to put

an end to British domination over Iranian eeonotny" and

to introduce heal tey competition 137 inviting the American

capital to take interest in all the fields of Iranian

reconstruction. This policy inc.luded engagement of

American finaneial advisers and floating of loans in

the American money marlcet tor economic regeneration ot

Iran. The mmory or I-ir 1-forgan Shuster was still alive

in Iranian minds and the idea of engaging American

financial advisers was unanimously wlcomed in Iran as

the harbinger or a new era of U. S. -Iranian co-operation

in the economic field.

The Bri tioh arguments to substantiate their claim

to the Khoshtaria concession appeared puerile. Their f1rSt

argument was that the concession was privately owed

because l':hoshtaria had purchased it from Sipah Sa:lar

Azam. ( 101) Seeond.ly, it was argued that the concession

did not stipulate that it vould have to be ratified

by the Hajlis. Thirdly, it was pointed out that

101 Sipah Salar had owned this concession since 1895, when no ¥~jlis was in existence.

255

:for an oU concession to standard Vacuwn Oil Company

for Azorbaijnn, Glla.n, Astrabad, Hazandersn and

Khora.aan and approved it. (103) The British and the

French goverrnnents dutifull.y protested against this

1•1ajlis resol.ution. ( 104)

.. '\s a corollary to the above resolution, the Iranian

government finalised ita proposal for the engagement

of a.l'l American financial adviser and it was stipulated

that Standard Vacuum Oil Company would start its opel\oo

ations o~ when the American financial advisor

assumed office. (105) The Iranians did not anticipate

Russian opposition to this proposal, because Soviet

Union was also attracting American capital for re­

construction and devolopment in Russia.

The British government had seen the futility of

its opposition to the Iranian proposal for granting

northern oU concession to some US firm. It now 1'olmd

10:3 l.f:l.nister Tehran to F.O.London, 648 dated 22 November 1921, :prl.d.

104 F.O.London to l·linister Tehran, 461 dated 24 November 1921. Hinister Tehran to F .0 .London, 655 dated 25 November 1921, ~. ·

105 British Charge d'Affaires Tehran to F. 0 .London, 294 dated 26 November 1921.

256

virtuo in J..ngl.o-American co-operation in the new

venture. (106) The tems o£ the concession woro being

uorkcd out in l!ashington and the British gove:mt!lent

persuaded the US government to accept collaboration of

the Anglo-Iranian Oil thmpany. ( 1C11) It was also aereed

that the prop,scd loon wuld be jointJ.y raised by the

British and Anor.ican compe.nies, secured on the oil rcyal­

ty of the British co!:ip;my •

.An ilnporta.nt foaturo o£ thG concession uas that

the Standard Vacuum OU Com.pc.ny reserved tho right to

'Hi thdraw trom the concession after one year. In the event

of its withdra.mil, the whole concession would revert

to the lu:Ig].o-Iranion Oil Company. This militated against

the Iranian policy of bm.3lti.ng the monopozy ot Bri tieh

control over its oil rcso'i.ll'CCS by bringing in American

capi to.l in the northern provinces. The Iranian govern­

ment uas opposed to these terms, because in that va:y

the Br:i. tish compacy- could gein the northern concession

through ·che back door. The Brl tish government retaliated

by re:f\udng to allow the oU royalty to be pledged

106 l.£i.nister Tehran to F .0 .London, 97 dated 10 February 1922, Ibid.

107 F.O.Inndon to :tJ.nister Tehran, 54 dated 13 February 1922, lliS·

257

against the proposed loan. (10S) In .fa.ct, the British

govermnent did not want US enterprise to enter Iran as

a rival to British interests.

The US government also did not want American

capital to enter Iran as a rival to Great Britain as

that would ruin the chances of American entexprise in

othAr British possessions. The Amorican Oil companies

had their eyes specially on Iraq and Palestine - both

of them British mandates. Sensing American hesitation

to come in as rivals to Great Britain, tho British

government now began to oppose the engagement of American

financial advisers with the a:rgt.men·t. that the Iranians

were working for ri val.ry between UK and US and were

not interested in equality of opportunity. (109) At the

same time, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company de:nandcd that

the Standard Vaemrm Oil Company should pay haJ.f' the

price paid by the former tor purchase ot Khoshtarln

concession. The US company thought that tho purchase

price paid by the British company was too high and it

refUsed to share it half-half. ( 110 )

10S British Ambassador B'ashington to F.O.London, 17 dated 16 January 1922, !J2ig.

109 British Ambassador 1-!ashington to F.O.IA:>nd.on, 80 dated 23 January 1922, ~.

110 British Ambassador P.ashington to F.O.London, dated 1 Febraa-ey 1922; ~-

25§

The Iranians had aluw-s believed that British oppo­

sition to the industrial development of their countxy

had resulted in economic stagnation, unemployment and

distress. This belief was now reinforced by the frus­

tration of their efforts for economic recovery through

American eo-operation. ( 111 ) The Soviet Union had al.\otays

objected to British participation in the norll1ern oil

concession and the Hajlis agreed with it. ( 1 12) Tho

Majlis now came to know that the concession was actually

a joint Anglo-American enterprise and that the British

government had stalled the negotiations for a loan from

US by refusing to allow oil royalty to be utilised as

security for the loan. On top of that, the British

government turned dow the suggostion from the British

Legation Tehran that a bank advance should be authorised

to meet the prevailing crisis. The British Fbreign

Office uanted to use it as a weapon to force the Iranian

government to approve the joint oU concession for the

norlhem Iranian provinces.

The Iranian government '1<188 not basically ag:rlnst

Anglo-American co-operation, but they wanted to main-

111 Iren-i-Azad (Tehran) !-!o.52 dated 6 June 1922.

112 F.O.Iondon to Minister Teh.ran, 66 dated 2 March 1922, 49-M ( 1923).

259

tain American facade of the company to be formed to

exploit the northern oil. This device was suggested

to enable the Majlis to approve the concession in accord­

ance with its previous resolution. However, the Anglo­

Iranian Oil Cbmpany objected to this device, because

if Standard Vacmmt Oil Company eventually wi thdrru,

its share would, in that case, rovort to the Iranian

government. The trend of the negotiations showed that

the British government was opposed to the Iranian ownel'­

sbip of their oil resources. This was a suicidal policy,

as Iranian resentment against the British policy would

make it difficult for the D'Arcy concession to be

reneued. { 113) The resentment in the Majlis had rison

so high that another American company was brought into

the field to take up the northem oil concession

single-handed. ( 114)

The new of the entr.r of Sinclair Oil Company into

the arena produced a sobGring ortect on the Anglo­

Iranian Oil Cbmpany and the standnrd Vacuum Oil Company.

Both of then nov agreed to share the loan of .f'i ve million

113 r.1inister Tehran to F.O.London, 111 dated 15 February 1922, Ibid.

114 l,H.nister Tehran to F.O.London, 162 dated 22 March 1922, 49-M (1923). ,

260

dollars. ( 115) One million dollars were actually paid

straightawq and the remaining four million dollars

were promised on the ratification of the concession.

The British govei"tltlent hinted that Iranian acceptance

of the f'irot instalment of the loan wuld ipso t:actg

be acceptance o£ the joint oil concession. The Hajlis

refused to aocept this position saying that its resolutions

on oU concession and loan were quite separate, a1 though

both formed part o£ the same scheme of introducing Ameri­

can inte:reats in Iranian develop:nent. ( 116)

This time egain, the Soviet Hf.nister egreed uith

the !~jlis end objected to British participation on the

ground that the French and British engineers serving

near RuE:sia.n borders would constitute a threat to

Soviet security. ( 117) He mado an offer that Russia

vould take up the concession and provide funds. He \las

prepared fbr a joint concession l:r.i.th some other party.

Reza Khan desired that Russian offer sb:nild be considered.

115 Anglo-Iranian Oil. Compa.ey London to F. 0. wndon dc.ted 17 February 1922, Ibid.

116 F.O.wndon to British &nba.ssa.dor t-!ashington, S4 dated 2S February 1922, Ibid.

117 l<linister Tehran to F.O.London, 157 dated 15 J:larch 1922, ~.

26i

He uas obcesscd trl.th the foar that tho Soviet Union

might intervene, if the British government insisted on

British participation in the northom concession.

He wanted to lmow what support could UK and USA give

if that actual.l7 happened.

The Majlis nov took a bold stand tho.t its earlier·

resolution lmd ruled out British porticipation, o.s it

had approved only Standard Vacuum 0!1 Co~ fbr tho

oU concession. ( 1 18) Bec811Bo tho American CO!!tplley'

ncm insisted on British participation, tho Majlis modi­

fied its earlier resolution by stipulating that the

conceoaion should be g.f. ven to any American oU eompaey

that came foruard and accepted the l•fajl1s conditions.

Sincle.ir COnsolidated OU Cbmpany ncm entorod the field

as a competitor to both tho Anglo-Iranian Oil Compaey

end the standard Vectm:11 OU Company. ( 119)

Both theso componies now realised they had bl\llldorod

and in the eha!lgcl situation• they agreed that the eon­

cession cl.QlSo relating to the 1dthdrat-~el of Standard

118 t.anister Tehran to F.O.Iondon, 247 dated 12 June 1922, ~.

119 lanister Tehran to F.O.Iondon, 212 dated 7 Hq 1922 anti 248 dated 13 Juno 1922, Ibid..

262

Vo.cuum Oil ~ ·shoul.d be deleted. They also agreed

to doloto 8lV' mention of An:tJ.o-Iranian Oil. Conlporv' in

the concession. (120) h British government also became

reconcUed to an exclusive concession in the ruma ot

Standard Va.cnmm Oil Compmy. They wro not" hot10Wr,

prepared to al.low the oU royalty to bo ple~Jaod tor tho

loan of f'!ve mUlion dollars. ( 121) i'he Iranian Pr.lno

f.l'inister uas prepared to revive tho proposal for

concession in the name of Standard Vacnru:n Oil. ~

provided Iranian nationalo could al.so bo al.la'.1ed to

purchase shares and tho oU produced waD sold in Iran

tor intemal. consumption at special rates.

However, the Sinelo.ir offer of concession proved

attractive as they ott'erad a royalty ot sixteon per

cent initial.:cy' rising to tuanty f'i.va por cent of net

prot! to and they proposed a loan of ten r>:d.llion dollars.

(122) i'he US Legation previously shm1ed no praforence

tor any American compmy, but they :no:t:r supported tho

120 F.O.London to Minister Tehran, 165 dated 2S June 1922, Ibid. A.I.O. C. London to Standard Vacuum OU Co. t-!ashington dated ~ Apr:U 1922, MS.·

121 F.O.Iondon to Minister Tehran, 1;1 dated 12 Juno 1922' Ibig.

122 l·H.nister Tehran to F.O.London 261 dated 2S Jlm3 1922, ~·

263

Sinclair ot:rsr. It nott became apparent to the Anglo­

Iranian Oil Comp::rrJ;y that it would have to uash its hands

of the Northam oU concoasion. Tho Standard Vacuum

Oil. Company uo.s willirJs to sham the concession uith

thG British compaey, provided tho latter's neme uns not

mentioned ond E0%1:3 crunouf'l.nga vas us..."'ti to conceal ito

part,icipation. Th.9 Anglo-Iranian OU Cow.pa.ny did not

accept this formula, becauso it teared that tho Iranian

govemment uoul.d cancel tho concesoion, uhcn tho dis­

guised participation b3cemo lmoun to them. It, theroforo,

opposed the prlnoipl.o that tho Iranien eovemment could

cancel any concession it liked ..

Yhe company vanten the British government to lodge

a protest to the Iranian govern:nent against their pol.iay

on Northem oU eoncession, but the British Legation

advised that Anglo-Iranian OU ComparJY shmild lib

lou for the time being and vo.tch 1\lrthor devalopments.

(123)

· !be Iranian J..!ajlis approved ths Rorthem oU

concession bill la;ying dcMl the termo tmd conditions

of the concession for af13' .tmer!can COI!lpalV'. ( 124)

123 F.O.!Dndon to 1-Hni.stcr Tehran, 11 dated 15 Jmma.r.y 1923, ~.

124 l·finistor Tehran to F.O.London, 200 dated 20 Juno 1923, Ibi_t\.

26~

It uas apparent that tho Iranian l-1ajlis t:ras agninst

participation of the British oU COJllpalzy'. !he ci>mpaey

also t100 unable to invest a largo amunt in tho northem

oU enterprise, as it had doubto it oU in comercial

quantities eoul.d be produced. Even if oU could be

produced, its marketing would have to bo arranged

through Russia. ActuaJ.l.y · oll in Ibrlh Iran ua.s beyond

the Deneb of a British company, but it uoo mthin tho

reach of P.ussia, vho bed agreed that only an !Jmnrieon

CO!J.P8DY could exploit ths Iranian oU rocou:rces in tho

northem regions, Wol\3 US..Rusaian participation waa

possiblop bu.t not an .Anglo-boricm co-operation. ( 125)

British etf'orts were nOW' eoncentmted on toiling

the Sinclair Oll Company on the Northem oil concession,

bttt Iranian opinion supported the Sinclair offer. ( 126)

The company had good relations vi th Husoia end hod

participated in Baku oU operations td. th Bamodale

Corporation. ( 127)

125 Minister Tehran to F.O.London, 541 dated 22 li.Tovember 1923, p,id.

126 l'anister Tehran to F.O.Iondon, 425 dnted 23 Daeember 1923, !ei4· 127 J.anioter Tehran to F.O.London, 428 dated 24 Dacenber 1923, ~.

265

Hhen the lfajlls was debatil'l8 tho terms of the con­

coosion and appeared to ba in a mood to appro-ae it, Uajor

I. tt.Imbrio, the US Consul, Tehran, uas murdor:xl on 18

July 1924 by some fanatics in Tehran. The Sincloir rapro­

eentati ve had theretoro to leave Teh.ran in h!loto and

the Jl.ajlis had to g.f. va up discussion ot thio cO&-wossion.

(128)

fmr }blip:y in tho l1eJtiM

lho traditional Br!tioh policy had Clll along been

to dofend British poDi tion in India against possiblo

atta.elc tmm or through Iron. ( 129) Promotion of e:x;port/

import trade betveen Great Britain and Iran csm::l noxt

to this pr.f.mary objective. It bad, theraf'ore, been tho

axiOl!l ot British policy not to aJ.lot,t an inimical paver

to consolidate its position in Iran and it needed Il!l1V

years ot hard uolk and huge m:pend.iture to build up the

British position in Iran. In course ot time, the imperial

coneom uas transf'o:rmed into important politicnl. ami

corm~rcial interests.

The Har had brought many changes in the internal

and exttml8l. situation or Iran snd British policy t:mS,

therefore 1 requ1red to bo JiWdif'iod to keep pace td th

128 l.a.rtister Tehran to F.O.London, M4 dated 12 Septembsr 1924. Pros 49-l·tl.d Asia, 1-155.

129 I.O.Lm.don to_ F.O.London, P.)135-22 dated 7 l·farch 1923, 756-M ( 1923).

266

tho ti.:mes. Iran t:res notr a member ot the League of

P.ations and had attained a defini to intomational

status. Tho Soviet pcr.:1er bnd emerged in the north in

spite ot Allied military intervontion; and aftor the

evacuation ot British troops from. Iran, tre.di tional

mUi ta.17 confrontation between Great Br1 tain nnd Rtlssia

t:rtuJ transtomed into a political conflict. In Iran, Soviet

Legation promoted onti-Bri tish propagando to force Groat

Britain to ch.ange its attitudo touardo Iran and tho

Soviet Union. Iran had concluded o. treaty t:rith Soviet

Union on 26 Febl'llal7 1921, which was ratified by tho

l·lnjlis on 15 Decembor 1921. I~gotintiono tor a comercial

treaty betooan tha draggod on tor a long time Cl'ld broko

doun in December 1922. ( 130)

Atgharlistan, another neighbour ot Iran in tho north,

had cast ott tho age-old Brltish tutGl.ego. Iran con­

eluded a treaty vith that ccnmtry on 22 Jurw 1921. ( 131)

Turltey uas aerging triumphant against Greooo and Iran

had started negotiations with that C01D'Jtry also tor

putting Irano-1\uid.sh relations on a good-ne:t.ghbour.J.y'

130 t-amster Tehran to F.O.Iondon, 746 dated 23 Dacember 1922, ~.

131 Minister Kabul to Viceroy Siml~ mo9 dated 9 July 1921 , 49-l·t ( 1923).

267

basis. Iraq had emercrod aa o; separate sovereign entity

from the ruins of tho ottoman e::1pire but was stU1 umor

a British nmndnte. Ircn tma theroforo in no hurry to

enter into treaty relo.tiolW w.f.th Iraq on the conclusion

of LauS3nne troa.ty betweon tho Allied Pooors end i\1rkey

on 24 July 1923. ( 132)

As a result of the introduction of Hontford rofomo,

the poli tico.l situation in India had alao undorgom a

change. India \:1QS now a me:nber of the Leaeue of r:at:Lons.

The British govemnent 's commereial strategiCQl an1

political interosts were no longer regarded as conduciva

t.o the atteinment of India's political am1 otlwr

aspirations. India was now disposed more and moro to

regard external political intonate from a para1..y Indian

rather than t.rom an impsricl. ~int of vie:~.

Iran considerad itself suporior, raeial.ly- and

culturally, to all its neighbours and folt n na1:lu:ral

urgo to seek n chmgo in ito extomal and intemol

policies. Cultural nationalism alreacy dominated Iranim

th:ln.'d.ng, but political nationalism bad ooen or meent

origin. The Bol.shev.Ut propaganda also touched a ros-

132 lanister Tehran to F.O.London, 10 do.ted 6 JOJliU\17 1923, 35-11 (1923).

268

ponsi ve chord in Iran. Provioucl.y, Iran, alonz 1rl. th

too rest of Asia, had beon daul.ed. by the cuperiorJ. t;y

of militar.y and mercantile ordor ot Hestom onpitali.Sl!l.

Howver, the savagery of tha Europetlll var had convinced

Iranf.ans of the morol inferiority of lfeatem civil­

isation and had 1n£us3d a nou sense of nationol ool£­

contidence. AU this combined to produco a uidooproad

restiveness in the country aaa:J.rur~ British dordnation.

~British policy under Cbnon cli.d not_ hot.''OWr, chcngo

to cope 'tlith the requil'E:!l<mts of tho neu oitua.tion.

A:f'tor the S2!m ~'etat, tOO ~or balance in Iran bad

~. Zie-ed-DJ.n, the Prim f.anistor, and Resn Khan,

the Har Mtnister, bad not oome to pouer as a remil.t of

a regal dispensation from the Palace. Tho British

govornm:mt developed :tr.i.a1dly ratat:f.ons uith them both

and also lrl.th tlw Shah. Syed Zio.-ed-DJ.n' s uneere:nonious

exit had demonstrated that Rsza Khan had coms to stq

as an enduring factor in Iranian political life. The

British legation cse to· look upon biD as the only

visible cl.c:neut of stabUity in the country. H9 was a

Shi • a Moslem and Bolshevism WBB an anathema to him.

British Legation supJ):)rted lW:J. unreeorvcdly to trustrato

Bol.shevilc propaganda in Iron.

Q:J.w.m-oe-Sul.taneh the nea Iranim Pr.iJae l•1iniotor uo.s

269

cs pro-British o.s his predecosoor, Zic-ed-Din. Qa'Vam's

fam:l1.y had DD unbroken record ot British friendship.

i"he Shah also served Br.l. tish interc=Jto .fft>a the

beg:iruling. Hs hnd a. pschent tor foreign travels end

uhon he vao mzay his brother Cr01:.'ll Prince 14ohcnmad

Hasson l-1irzn acted as Voli Ahd. The Crotm Prince desired

that tho Bri tioh Legntion' a view should be Dado lcnot:m

to him throuBh tfl.shmat-ea-Sultanoh, the Grand l.faatar

ot Cere:nonieo. ( 133) He also und01~k to impose

British viCt:rs on the cabinet as his Ol:lll. The British

gove:mment offoctively used the pouer ot purm to in­

fluence the situation in Tehran in their favour. (1.34)

The aim was not cmly to defend cadDtill3 British

interests blt to include the northern rogian also uithin

the British spbere. ihe Soviet Union 1:TaS firm.l.y opposed

to these British moves because they had wlu.ntarily

given up their influence and could not, t.'leretore,

tolerato British encroachoezrts in that rogion. i'hg uar

ot intervention f'ougbt by the British f'orces from their

foothold in North Iran vas still fresh in tho Soviet

133 J.finister Tehran to F.O.London, 462 dated 9 July 1922, 35-M (1923).

134 l·H.nister Tehran to F.O.I.ond.on, 18S dated 1S April 1922, ~-

270

mind and they uere naturall:y- opposed to tho ro­

catablishnent or British infl.uenco near thoir bordoro.

l'fw Soviot ta.nicter mado a good start by daveloping

good relations uith !mao Khan. ( 13S) Tho Iranians

believod that tho British Legation had clovorly divortod

popular hatred against the Soviet Legntion. The tido

ll0\:1 tum.ed against the British govemiJent. Tho Ironia.ns

also looked upon the Soviets to holp the:n to ovorcomo

the prevailing economic distress in tho country. At one

time, Reza Khan l:18B ullling to grant northorn oil con­

cossion to the ~oviet Union to obtain Soviet f\mds, but

tho latter uas in no position to provide monetlll7 aooio­

ta.nce to Iran. (136) The Soviet govemment believed

that by liberating Iran f'rom the shackles or tho past,

it had contributed more than its ohara tor Iranian

regeneration.

The British legation uo:rked with rare diplomatic

skill to gain its ends. The Shah t-~as already against the

Soviet regime. Rcza. Khan hed shol:m some inclination

touards the Soviot Hillister ond suspicion betveen the

135 BritmUnt Tehran to D.H.I. London, 125 dated 26 August 1921, 92S-l.f (1923).

136 t.furl.stor Tehran to F.O.London, 89 dated 10 Juno 1921, Ibid.

2 711

Shah and Rem Khan vas wrtted up to isolato tho lo.ttor

from the mainatreom. ( 137) Reno IDum uns, as a reGU.lt,

much handicapped in his programme for the ro-orrJaniso.tion

of the army and contra.lizotion ot o.tttlwri ty in Tehran.

This frw:Jtration led Reza KM.n to think of rooigrrl.ng.

( 138) Tho British efforts to tlu:art the policy of Soviet

Legation al.so proved succoosfUl. am tho Soviet Union

thraatened to break off relations uith Iran. (139)

fhe Shah, Qavo.m-es-Sultaneh tll'ld Roza Ithnn not-r

fearad that the Soviet Union might uso force if the trcnc!o

ago.inst that country uare lll.1m1ed to dritt too tar.

( 140) Resa Khan patched up hia ~ 1:11 th the Hajlis

and appealed to the British envemment for f'intmci.t:ll

assistance. ( 141) The Britioh govomment oleo ccceptcd

the policy of non-intertorcnco in tho ~otic a.f'fairo

of Iran tmd ueleomod Rem Khan's ad:vont to pouor. (142)

137 1-finioter Tehmn to F.O.Iondon, S40 dated 28 Ssptc:noor 1921 , !!?i:S· 138 Vdnister Tehran to F.O.London; 369 &ted 7 October 1922, .35-H( 1923).

139 l•furl.ster Tehran to F.O.Iondon, 4Z1 dated 28 l~veabor 1922, IbiS,.

140 l.finistor Tehran to F.O.London, 432 dated 7 ~ 1922, ond 465 dated 27 Dacabor 1922, }hid.

141 lanistor Tehran to F.O.London, 372 tinted 10 Octobor 1922. l~oter Tehran to F.O.London, 375 dated 11 Octobor 1922, Ib!,q.

1~ F.O.London to Minister Tehran, 252 dated 10 October 1922' -Ibid-.

272

Ptlrouant to this policy the Iranisn decision to engage

advioers for thoir govam:::~ent departments .f'rotl non­

limi trophe countries \:!aD accopted and Iranton policy

ot giv.l.ng oU concession to tho US and of' engagina hneri­

can f.'ina.minl advisers tme supported. (143) Although

tho British government did not 't!ODt intimacy of' re­

lations uitb Iran, but clooo co-oporation wao maintnin9d.

The international confo:roncoo at Lausmmo and

Cbnoa bad gloomy forebodings for the Iranian govelTllii!SDt.

They teared that it tho British aovornmant would bavo

its t:70.y' at both theso conferences, they uould ride

roughshod in Iran tdthout let or hindrance. ( 144) If' the

contorGnco at Lausnnne tailed ond hostUitios broko out

bet1:10en Turkey and tho Allied Pouero, Iran could egoin

beccme a battle1'1eld tor rival armios. (145) Rlmoura

showed that Soviot Union uns world.ng on a schano for

union ot Islamic countries and Soviets uoul.d not keep

143 Hiniotor Tehran to F.O.London, 472 dated 25 IJlgust 1921 1 q28-M(lq23).

144 Ministor Tehran to F. 0 .IDndon, 218 datod 15 Apr:iJ. 1922, 35-H( 1923).

145 F.O.London to t.finister Tehran, 12 dated 16 January 1923. British govommont uas suro that Soviet a1'm3' voul.Cl not c.ntGr Iran. 3S-H( 1923) •

273

aloof if a con£l.ict botueen tho Allies and Tu.rlcey

ensued. ( 146) Hints U3re given to th3 Iranian gov3l'Z!:!Emt

that Soviet troop!3 eight dcand right of pascago through

hmian torr! tory.

Tho Iranians uer0 careM not to g:i. ve any concosoiGls

to Great Britain for fear that Soviet Union might not

demand oimilar concessions tor itself'. &eon.cD.y, the

Soviet pressure uas having ito e:f'tect and (!:wm-os­

SUJ.tanoh had to resign. (147) He uw suceoedcd by

Jlfostouti-ul-l•lamalek, \:Jho previously had pro-Turkish

lea.nings, but nm.r bad f'riGndly disposition toliS.l'ds tho

British Legation.

i'h.e British policy bad so f'ar to.wurod tho procooo

of centralization in Iran through Reza "Chan end tho

f'inancial regenorotion through tho Lmericon P.i.n!'.ncial

Advisers. h only condition goveminz this po1iey ue.s

that tho cormti tutional. tom of gowmr:t1ent ahoulc1 bo

reapectod. by Reza Khan. ( 148) Secondly, apprehenoiorm

had gl'(T.m that in pursuit of his centralising drive,

146 Hinieter Tohra.n to F.O.Imldon, 633 da.tod 16 Ootobor 1922, 20-l<I ot 1923, 1-54.

147 l·anioter Tehron to F .o .U>ndon, SS dated 24 February 1923, 35-H(1923).

148 Hinioter Tehran to F.O.London, 1 dated 1 Jatrual'Y 1923, Ihi._d,

2 7~

Rozo. Khon might come in conflict uith British intarasts.

He wul.d not, of course, damage the property of tho

Anglo-Iranian OU Chmpany, but he could come in clach

with Bakhtiari Khans and tho Shaikh of Hohsmmercll, uho

had, so far, felt sate undor Britioh guarantees.

U:>rd <hrzon deprecated the rigid determination of

Rena Kbc.n and desired that ua.rning should bo given to

the latter that his centraliai113 policy ahould r.:ot

come in colliston uith the Br:l. tish intereoto in South

Iran.

H:ouever, Sir Percy U:>raine, who had a better vi.C:J

of the situation, realised that British policy had been

handicapped by its connectiol'..s ui th the reactionary

olcoonts snd the Soviet policy made n headuoy du3 to

ito support to the dc:mcrnts snd nationalists. fb suagootod

~hat Reza. KhDn should be supporled in his ambitions

to become the Iranian Prime !li:inister, as he had given

a mi. tten nsS'I.U'QDCe that ho uoul.d not intertera td th '

Shailch KhDrol of J.!ohcmerah. fhe arrangement l'Gga.rding

the Shaikh~ l.ika1.y to run into difficulty, because

he uas a-voiding peyment of hio ravcm.e ~ end

vas in contact m th King Pbiccl. of Iraq; both thcis:1

275

f'actoro uould enraee Reza Khan. ( 149) The si ~tion

in Tehran was also not entirQJ.y in f'a.wur of Qreat

Britain as Hostoufi-ul-Mamalek had a pro-Tu.rldsh bias

and thG Turldsh Ebtbassy had been re-opened shortly Mter

he became the Iranian Prime Minister. Tho situation Has

relieved a bit for Ore2.t Britain wlwn he was replaced

by M~ed-O,Wleh on 13 Juno 1923. (150) Houever, the

anti-British agitation vas again ravived by the arrival

of nine leo.ding ~ trom Iraq headed by l.fahdi-al.­

Khalisi. They bad beon eJq>elled from Iraq bocanse the

l:fabdi had issued a »xtlfa against elections in that

country. (151) The political atmosphere in Iran Has

further complicated by the unexpected demand :f)'om the

Soviet gowmment that reilwfcy' buU t by the Czars at

Enzeli should be retumed to them. They also d~ed

rwi val of right to navigation in Lake Urumia and to the

f'isheries ·in caspian. They sent a gtmboat with f'ittoon

Soviet soldiel'B to seize the Caspian f'isher.ies. (152)

149 lJfinister Tehran to F.O.IDndon, 379 dated 27/28 November 1923. RPG Busbire to Fbreign Simla, 278-S dated 13 June 1923, 35(l-t)(iii)(1923}, 1-236.

150 1·2ini.stor Tehran to F.O.wndon, 196 dated 18 June 1923, Ibi,S.

151 Hinister Tehran to F.O.London, 2m dated 8 July 1923, 3~f(iii)(1923), 1-)02. .

152 l.finister Tehran to F.O.London, 441 dated 3 October 1923, Mel·

276

The trend began aloW_y to turn against tho Soviet Union

tmd the Ira.nions expected that tho Soviets wuld demand

the ~vivnl ot their capitulatol'Y rights.

Tho inevitable nou took place on 23 October 1923

vhen Reza Khan became tho Iranian Prime l.anister. ( 1.53)

Hhile many Iranians looked up to him tor leadership

the Shah and the protossional ~ ticinns looked upon

him as an intruder. (1.54) The Shah uas most unhappy.

At ono stage he uented to leave Iran ui thout appointing

arry Prime 1-a.nister but Reze. Khan l'Gfusod to run tho

gove:rnmont in his capacity as tho Har t.anister. At last

a compromise troB uorked out bet\:reen the::n and the Shah

signed the royal rescript appointing Reza Khan as the

Prime Minister. Reza Khan issued a communique stating

that Shah was proceeding abroad tor raasons of health. (155)

The Shah feared that either he woul.d be dothl'Oned

or tho Qajar eynasty wuld be abolished. (1.56) In the

153 HJ.nistor Tehran to F. 0 .London, 343 dated 24 October 1923, Ibid. '

154 lti.nistGr Tehran to F.O.Lond.on, 530 dated 20 November 1923, ~·

15S raniotor Tehran to F.O.Iondon, 48.5 dated 31 October 1923, Ibid.· The Shah left :rz.an on 4 November 1937 af'ter Rosa Khan's. cabinet U$8 tanned on 29 October 1923.

· 156 l«nister Tehran to F.O.L:>ndon, 482 dated 31 October 192) 1 Ibiq,

277

latter case, either n ropublic mmld be established

to replace the monarclzy- in Inm or Rezn Khan uould

:!bund a nea ~ of his oun.

Hl.th the coming into pooer of Reza Khan, stabilit,'

uas finnly established in Iran and tho era of ·Uto

spheres of inf'luenco ot foreign potrers was owr fbr

good. The Irano-Soviet relations vere,. no doubt, strained;

but Reza Khan expressed his keen desire to mneliornte

Anglo-Iranian relations.

Shortly artezvnrds, the government in the Ur:dted

Kingdom changed and J. Rams~zy MacDonald, the nw Labour

Primo Minister, took over the foreign portfolio on

22 January 1924. His first o.ct uas to reverso Lord

Curzon • s policy tcruards Russia by according ~ .1Y:l:2

recognition to the Soviet regime on 1 Februaey 1924.

This in.£l.uenced the situation in Iran where hopes that

British policy uould take a dramatic turn touards Iran

as well ran h:iah. (157) Sir POl'Cy Loraine's visit to

!Dndon tor consul. taiiona strcmgtb.Emed such hopes. ( 158)

It was beliewd. that tho sympathetic attitude of Sir

157 Minister Tehran to F.O.!Dndon, 42 dated 2 Februnr,y 1924, Ibid.

158 Hillister Tehran to F.O.London, 62 dated 13 February 1924, !llt.si·

Percy and Eroeet reasonableness of Remsey t·ta.cDonal.d

would pavo the woy for a br.f.aht fUturo for Anglo­

Iranian relations.

Qs>n9lusion

The failure of Antf.o-Persian Agreement and tho

~ g • ~ prov.ided. an opporluni ty to Grt-.at Br.f. tain

27B

to rev-amp end reshape its Iranian policy to suit the

changed conditions. The Iranian deoiro to br.l.ng in tho

US capital through the Oil Concession in the J~rthern

regions of Iran, dollar loan for the development of

commerce and industry and the American Advisers af'f'orded

another opportunity to <h-eat Britain to mend its fences

t:rith Iran and intmduee Anglo-Saxon co-operative en­

deavour in Iran to keep the Soviet inf'l.ueneo mtrq from

the Indian borders. However, the oU negotintions between

Iran and US 1:1ero sabotaaed. on account o£ the amdety

of the Anglo-Irania.'l OU Compaey to have a ahara in

the Northam OU Concesoion. The main purpose ot

British v.l.llingness to facilitate the American Financial

Mission under Dr A. C.UU.lspaugh. ti'S.S to vi ti~tc Irano­

Soviet relations with the eventual aim or exterminating

communist influence vhich had infiltrated into Iran.

Thus the underlying purpose ot British policy had not

changed; only the tactics changed. The soothing touch

ot Sl.r Percy loraine did have some ef'f'ect but 1'3al

279

improvement in Anglo-Iranian ral.ations could not be

achioved because British goverment nt»1 expected tha

neu goverument of Iran and tho American F.i.nancial

l1iosion to serve British interesto. Tho intontion

't1tlG to give up the age-old priv:f.legoo for sono gy!g

Em. 9l3e. and not fbr the sake or improving tho lot or tho Iranian people.

1hus, the Irenian suspicions against Qreat

Britain and foo.r or Russia contil'lU.ed ao boforo and

bi ttemess on account or those factoro cast its sha.dou

on the :f\rture relations bett:resn the tt10 countries.