25Great - Higher Education | Pearson · “new deal for the American people” and particularly...
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LEARNING OBJECTIVES 25.4 25.5 25.6 How did the major accomp- lishments of the Second New Deal affect America’s social and economic life? p. 25-48 Why did the New Deal lose momentum after 1936? p. 25-59 How did Roosevelt respond to the rise of fascism in Europe? p. 25-60 Extraordinarily popular, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reached out to ordinary Americans in his political campaigns and use of the radio in his “fireside chats,” promising a “new deal” that would provide the “greatest good for the greatest number of citizens.” What were the goals of the early New Deal? p. 25-43 25.3 How did Herbert Hoover respond to the depression; why did his policies fail? p. 25-40 25.2 What triggered the Great Depression? p. 25-33 25.1 Listen to Chapter 25 on MyHistoryLab One American Journey The Great Depression and the New Deal 1929–1939 25 e are bringing order out of the old chaos with a greater certainty of labor at a reasonable wage and of more business at a fair profit. These governmental and industrial devel- opments hold promise of new achievements for the nation. Our first problem was, of course, the banking situa- tion because, as you know, the banks had collapsed. Some banks could not be saved but the great majority of them, either through their own resources or with government aid, have been restored to complete public confidence. This has given safety to millions of depositors in these banks. The second step we have taken in the restoration of normal business enterprise has been to clean up thoroughly unwholesome conditions in the field of investment… . The country now enjoys the safety of bank savings under the new banking laws, the careful checking of new securities under the Securities Act and the curtailment of rank stock specula- tion through the Securities Exchange Act. I sincerely hope that as a result people will be discouraged in unhappy efforts to get rich quick by speculating in securities. The average person almost always loses. Only a very small minority of the people of this country believe in gambling as a substitute for the very old philosophy of Benjamin Franklin that the way to wealth is through work. W
Transcript of 25Great - Higher Education | Pearson · “new deal for the American people” and particularly...
L e a r n i n g O b j e c t i v e s
25.4 25.5 25.6
How did the major accomp- lishments of the second New Deal affect America’s social and economic life? p. 25-48
Why did the New Deal lose momentum after 1936? p. 25-59
How did Roosevelt respond to the rise of fascism in europe? p. 25-60
extraordinarily popular, President Franklin D. Roosevelt reached out to ordinary Americans in his political campaigns and use of the radio in his “fireside chats,” promising a “new deal” that would provide the “greatest good for the greatest number of citizens.”
What were the goals of the early New Deal? p. 25-43
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How did Herbert Hoover respond to the depression; why did his policies fail? p. 25-40
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What triggered the Great Depression? p. 25-33
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Listen to Chapter 25 on MyHistoryLab
One american Journey
The Great Depression and the new Deal 1929–1939
25e are bringing order out of the
old chaos with a greater certainty of labor at a reasonable wage and of more business at a fair
profit. these governmental and industrial devel-opments hold promise of new achievements for
the nation.Our first problem was, of course, the banking situa-
tion because, as you know, the banks had collapsed. some banks could not be saved but the great majority of them, either through their own resources or with government aid, have been restored to complete public confidence. this has given safety to millions of depositors in these banks.
the second step we have taken in the restoration of normal business enterprise has been to clean up thoroughly unwholesome conditions in the field of investment… . the country now enjoys the safety of bank savings under the new banking laws, the careful checking of new securities under the securities Act and the curtailment of rank stock specula-tion through the securities exchange Act. i sincerely hope that as a result people will be discouraged in unhappy efforts to get rich quick by speculating in securities. the average person almost always loses. Only a very small minority of the people of this country believe in gambling as a substitute for the very old philosophy of benjamin Franklin that the way to wealth is through work.
W
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those, fortunately few in number, who are frightened by boldness and cowed by the neces-sity for making decisions, complain that all we have done is unnecessary and subject to great risks. Now that these people are coming out of their storm cellars, they forget that there ever was a storm.
[but] nearly all Americans are sensible and calm people. We do not get greatly excited nor is our peace of mind disturbed, whether we be businessmen or workers or farmers, by awesome pronouncements concerning the unconstitutionality of some of our measures of recovery and relief and reform. We are not frightened by reactionary lawyers or political editors. All these cries have been heard before.
i still believe in ideals. i am not for a return to that definition of Liberty under which for many years a free people were being gradually regimented into the service of the privileged few. i pre-fer and i am sure you prefer that broader definition of Liberty under which we are moving for-ward to greater freedom, to greater security for the average man than he has ever known before in the history of America.
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library. excerpted from President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s radio address entitled “On Moving Forward to Greater Freedom and Greater security,” september 30, 1934.
The Great Depression & The New Deal: 1929 – 1940 This introductory video provides an overview of key events of the Great Depression of the 1930s, which was the most severe economic challenge that the United States has ever endured. On the heels of the 1929 stock market crash, a three-year spate of bank failures further weakened the nation’s financial system while the Dust Bowl plunged the middle of the country into an agricultural crisis.
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Watch the Video Series on MyHistoryLabLearn about some key topics related to this chapter with the MyHistoryLab Video Series: Key Topics in U. S History
The Great Depression This video probes deeper into the hardships facing the nation during the 1930s. In the 1920s, the United States avoided the general malaise that had afflicted the international economy following the conclusion of World War I. However, with the Stock Market Crash of 1929, the “Roaring 20s” gave way to an economic depression that quickly spread across the United States and led to widespread unemployment.
2 Watch on MyHistory Lab
The New Deal President Roosevelt set out immediately to address an ailing nation. This video chronicles FDR’s presidency from its first 100 days and the rise of New Deal programs, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), to a successful bid for re-election in 1936 and the second wave of New Deal initiatives that followed.
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Presidential Responses to the Depression This video explains how President Herbert Hoover’s response to the nation’s economic woes differed from Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s promise of a “New Deal” for America. When elected President in 1932, FDR brought renewed hope to a country that sorely needed it.3
Watch on MyHistory Lab
Watch on MyHistory Lab
Watch on MyHistory Lab
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Personal journeys Online • Letter from Eleanor Roosevelt to Walter White, 1936. Roosevelt writes against
lynching.• PaulTaylor,“AgaintheCoveredWagon,”SurveyGraphic,July1935.Articleonthe
migrationof“Okies”toCaliforniaduringtheDustBowl.
s President Franklin D. Rooseveltacknowledgesinthis1934radioaddress,theU.S.economyhadutterlycollapsed.Men,women,childreneverywheresawtheir
familiesanddreamsshattered,watchedtheir lifesavingsvanishinfaultybanks,andfeltthestingofhumiliationastheystoodinbreadlinesorbeggedforclothesorfoodscraps.Thewinterof1932–1933hadbeenparticularlycruel:unemploymentsoaredand stories of malnutrition and outright starvationmade headlines in newspapersthroughoutthenation.TheelectionofFranklinD.Rooseveltin1932had,however,liftedthespiritsandhopesof joblessAmericans throughout thenation.They enthusiastically responded tohis“newdealfortheAmericanpeople”andparticularlyembracedhisuseoftheradiotoaddressthenation.Inthese“firesidechats,”thepresidentofferedreassuranceabouttheeconomiccrisis,compassionatelyexplaininghisdecisionsandpolicies,ashedidinthis1934address.Andhepromisedabrighterfuture,chartinganewjourney,hepredicted,thatwouldrestoreconfidenceamongdespairingAmericansandprovidegreatereco-nomicsecurityforthenation’scitizens.“Amongourobjectives,”Rooseveltinsisted,“Iplacethesecurityofthemen,women,andchildrenoftheNationfirst.”
TheleadershipofFranklinandEleanorRooseveltandtheprogramsoftheNew Deal connectedAmericans to theWhiteHouse as never before. To be sure, FDR’sbold rhetoricoccasionallyoutdistancedhis legislativeagenda,andcertainprogramshardlyworkedagainstwhathetermedthe“privilegedfew.”Moreover,hispoliciesoftenfailedtochallengetheracismandsexismthatprecludedanewdealforallAmericans.Still, theunprecedentedfederalactivismofthe1930seffectivelyrestoredconfidencetomanyAmericansandpermanently transformed thenation’s responsibility for thewelfareofitscitizens.
Hard times in Hooverville
25.1 What triggered the Great Depression?
heprosperity of the 1920s ended in a stockmarket crash that revealed theflawshoneycombingtheeconomy.Asthenationslidintoacatastrophicdepres-sion,factoriesclosed,employmentandincomestumbled,andmillionslosttheir
homes, hopes, and dignity. Some protested and took direct action; otherslookedtothegovernmentforrelief.
crash!ThebuoyantprosperityoftheNewEra,moreapparentthanrealbythesummerof1929,collapsedinOctober,whenthestockmarketcrashed.Duringtheprecedingtwoyears,themarkethadhitrecordhighs,stimulatedbyoptimism,easycredit,andspecu-lators’manipulations.ButafterpeakinginSeptember,itsufferedseveralsharpchecks,andonOctober29,“BlackTuesday,”panickedinvestorsdumpedtheirstocks,wipingoutthepreviousyear’sgainsinoneday.Confidenceintheeconomydisappeared,andtheslidecontinuedformonths,andthenyears.ThemarkethitbottominJuly1932.Bythen,thestockofU.S.Steelhadplungedfrom$262to$22,MontgomeryWardfrom
a
New Deal the economic and political policies of the Roosevelt administration in the 1930s.
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25.1 Great Depression the nation’s worst economic crisis, extending throughout the 1930s, producing unprecedented bank failures, unemployment, and industrial and agricultural collapse and prompting an expanded role for the federal government.
$138to$4.MuchofthepaperwealthofAmericahadevaporated,andthenationsankintotheGreat Depression.
TheWall Street crashmarked the beginning of the depression, but it did notcauseit.ThedepressionstemmedfromweaknessesintheNewEraeconomy.Mostdamagingwastheunequaldistributionofwealthandincome.Workers’wagesandfarmers’incomeshadfallenfarbehindindustrialproductivityandcorporateprofits;by1929,therichest0.1percentofAmericanfamilieshadasmuchtotalincomeasthebottom42percent(seeFigure25.1).Withmorethanhalfthenation’speoplelivingatorbelowthesubsistencelevel,therewasnotenoughpurchasingpowertomaintaintheeconomy.
AsecondfactorwasthatoligopoliesdominatedAmericanindustries.By1929,the200largestcorporations(outof400,000)controlledhalfthecorporatewealth.Theirpowerledto“administeredprices,”priceskeptartificiallyhighandrigidratherthandeterminedbysupplyanddemand.Becauseitdidnotrespondtopurchasingpower,thissystemnotonlyhelpedbringoneconomiccollapsebutalsodimmedprospectsforrecovery.
Weaknesses in specific industries had further unbalanced the economy.Agri-culture suffered fromoverproduction,decliningprices, andheavydebt; sodid the
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FIGURe 25.1 Distribution of income in the United states, 1929–1946 An unequal distribution of income contributed to the Great Depression by limiting purchasing power. Only slight changes occurred until after World War ii, but other factors gradually stabilized the national economy.DAtA sOURce: U.s. bureau of the census.
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coal and textile industries.Thesedifficulties left the economydependenton a fewindustriesforexpansionandemployment,andtheseindustriescouldnotcarrytheburden.Bankingpresentedotherproblems.Poorlymanagedandregulated,bankshadcontributedtotheinstabilityofprosperity;theynowthreatenedtospreadthepanicanddepression.
Internationaleconomicdifficultiesspurredthedepressionaswell.ShutoutfromU.S.marketsbyhigh tariffs,EuropeanshaddependedonAmerican investments tomanagetheirdebtsandreparationpaymentsfromtheGreatWar.ThestockmarketcrashdrieduptheflowofAmericandollarstoEurope,causingfinancialpanicsandindustrialcollapseandmakingtheGreatDepressionglobal.Inturn,EuropeannationscurtailedtheirimportsofAmericangoodsanddefaultedontheirdebts,furtherdebili-tatingtheU.S.economy.
Governmentpoliciesalsoboresomeresponsibilityforthecrashanddepression.Failure to enforce antitrust laws had encouraged oligopolies and high prices; fail-ure to regulatebanking and the stockmarkethadpermitted financial recklessnessandirresponsiblespeculation.Reducingtaxratesonthewealthyhadalsoencouragedspeculationandcontributed to themaldistributionof income.Oppositionto laborunionsandcollectivebargaininghelpedkeepworkers’wagesandpurchasingpowerlow.Theabsenceofaneffectiveagriculturalpolicyandthehightariffsthatinhibitedforeigntradeandreducedmarketsforagriculturalproductshurtfarmers.Inshort,thesamegovernmentalpoliciesthatshapedthebooming1920seconomyalsoledtoeconomicdisaster.
Stateand local fiscalpoliciesalsopointed toeconomicproblems for the1930s.Theexpansionofpubliceducationandroadconstructionledtohigherpropertytaxesthroughoutthenation,andalthoughpercapitataxcollectionatthefederallevelactu-allydeclinedbetween1920and1929,thetaxburdeninstatesandcitiesincreaseddra-matically.Indeed,stateandlocaltaxesrosefasterthanpersonalincomesinthe1920s.Therealestateindustryreportedadeclineasearlyas1926,andhomeownerssteadilyprotestedtheirhigherpropertytaxes.Butthecrashdidmorethanexposetheweak-nessesoftheeconomy.Businesslostconfidenceandrefusedtomakeinvestmentsthatmighthavebroughtrecovery.Instead,bankscalledinloansandrestrictedcredit,anddepositorstriedtowithdrawtheirsavings,whichwereuninsured.Thedemandforcashcausedbanks to fail,dragging theeconomydown further.And theFederalReserveBoardprolongedthedepressionbyrestrictingthemoneysupply.
the Depression spreadsByearly1930,theeffectsoffinancialcontractionwerepainfullyevident.Factoriesshutdownorcutback,andindustrialproductionplummeted.By1932,one-fourthofthelaborforcewasoutofwork(seeFigure25.2),andthewagesofthoseAmericansluckyenoughtoworkfellsharply.Personalincomedroppedbymorethanhalfbetween1929and1932.Moreover,thedepressionbegantofeedonitselfinaviciouscircle:shrinkingwagesandemploymentcutintopurchasingpower,causingbusinessestoslashproduc-tionagainandlayoffworkers,therebyfurtherreducingpurchasingpower.
Thedepressionparticularlybatteredfarmers.Commoditypricesfellby55percentbetween1929and1932,stiflingfarmincome.Unabletopaytheirmortgages,manyfarmfamilieslosttheirhomesandfields.Thedispossessedroamedthebyways,high-ways,andrailwaysofatroubledcountry.
Urbanfamilieswerealsoevictedwhentheycouldnotpaytheirrent.Somemovedinwithrelatives;otherslivedinHoovervilles—thenamereflectsthebitternessdirectedatthepresident—shackswherepeopleshivered,suffered,andstarved.OklahomaCity’svastHoovervillecovered100squaremiles.
Soupkitchensbecamestandardfeaturesoftheurbanlandscape,withlinesofthehungrystretchingforblocks.Butcharitiesandlocalcommunitiescouldnotmeetthemassiveneeds,andneitherthestatesnorthefederalgovernmenthadwelfareorunem-ploymentcompensationprograms.
Hooverville shantytown, sarcastically named after President Hoover, in which unemployed and homeless people lived in makeshift shacks, tents, and boxes. Hoovervilles cropped up in many cities in 1930 and 1931.
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“Women’s jobs” and “Men’s jobs”Thedepressionaffectedwage-earningwomen incomplexways.Although theysuf-fered20percentunemploymentby1932,womenwerelesslikelythanmentobefired.Gendersegregationhadconcentratedwomenin low-paidservice,sales,andclericaljobsthatwerelessvulnerablethantheheavyindustrieswheremenpredominated.Butwhiletraditionalattitudessomewhatinsulatedworkingwomen,theyalsoreinforcedoppositiontofemaleemployment,especiallythatofmarriedwomen.Three-fourthsofthenation’sschoolsystemsrefusedtohiremarriedwomenasteachers,andtwo-thirdsdismissedfemaleteacherswhomarried.Manyprivateemployers,especiallybanksandinsurancecompanies,alsofiredmarriedwomen.
Firingwomen,however,rarelyproducedjobsformen,becausefewmensoughtpositionsinfieldsdominatedbywomen.Mendiddisplacewomenasteachers,socialworkers,andlibrarians,butfiringwomensimplyaggravatedthesufferingoffamilies.Disapprovaloffemaleemploymentimpliedthatwomendidnotdeserveequaloppor-tunitiesandstiffenedtheoppositiontoopening“men’sjobs”towomenwhenwomenweredesperateforwork.Despitesuchhostility,theproportionofmarriedwomenintheworkforceincreasedinthe1930saswomentookjobstohelptheirfamiliessurvive,andaboutone-thirdofworkingmarriedwomenprovidedthesolesupportfortheirfamilies.
Families in the Depression“I have watched fear grip the people in our neighborhood around Hull House,”wrote JaneAddams as the depression deepened in 1931.Divorce declined becauseitwasexpensive,butdesertionincreased,andpeoplepostponedmarriage.Birthratesfell.Husbandsandfathers, the traditionalbreadwinners,wereoftenhumiliatedanddespondentwhenlaidoff fromwork.Unemployedmen,sociologistsreported,“lostmuchoftheirsenseoftimeanddawdledhelplesslyanddullyaboutthestreets,”dread-ingtoreturnhome.
Women’sresponsibilities,bycontrast,oftengrew.Thenumberoffemale-headedhouseholdsincreasedsharply.Notonlydidsomewomenbecomewageearners,buttheirtraditionalroleashomemakersalsogainednewsignificance.Tomakeendsmeet,
FIGURe 25.2 Unemployment, 1925–1945 Unemployment soared in the early 1930s, spreading distress and overwhelming charities and local relief agencies. Federal programs improved conditions, but only America’s entry into World War ii really ended the problem.DAtA sOURce: U.s. bureau of the census.
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Explore the Great Depression on MyHistoryLab
HOW BAD WAS THe GReAT DePReSSION?Although alternating boom and bust cycles have proven an integral part of modern capitalism, the economic hard times that prevailed throughout the 1930s stand out as an exceptional case. Never before, and never since, have environmental, political, and economic factors combined to create so deep and so prolonged an economic catastrophe as that which Americans experienced during the era of the Great Depression. In the graph below, notice the extremely high rates of unemployment that American workers endured during the 1930s compared to other, more moderate, spikes in unemployment that occurred during other periods of economic distress.
Cause How did financial sector instability contribute to the Great Depression?Map the spread of bank failures in the U.s. from 1928-1933.
Consequence Where did the Depression hit the hardest?Map the differences in regional economic impacts over time.
Choices How did geographic mobility help Americans facing economic hardship?Map the migration of Americans into and out of areas during the Depression.
breadlines like this one were a common sight during the Great Depression.
Use MyHistoryLab Explorer to answer these questions:K e Y Q U e S T i O n S
UNEMPLOYED PERSONS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE
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manywomensewedtheirownclothingandraisedandcannedvegetables,reversingthetrendtowardconsumerism.Somealsotookonextraworkathome.InSanAntonio,oneineverytenfamilieshadboarders,andinAlabama,housewivestookinlaundryat10centsforaweek’swashload.
The depression also affected children. Some parents sacrificed their ownwell-beingtoprotecttheirchildren.Butchildrenfeltthetensionandfear,andmanywentwithoutfood.InNewYorkCity,139people,mostofthemchildren,diedofstarvationandmalnutritionin1933.Boysandgirlsstayedhomefromschoolandchurchbecausetheylackedshoesorclothing.Ashopefaded,familyconflictsincreased.TheCalifor-niaUnemploymentCommissionconcludedthatthedepressionhadlefttheAmericanfamily“morallyshattered.Thereisnosecurity,nofoothold,nofuture.”
“Last Hired, First Fired”Thedepressionparticularlyharmedracialminorities.Withfewerresourcesandoppor-tunities,theywerelessablethanothergroupstoabsorbtheeconomicpain.AfricanAmericanswerecaughtinadoublebind,reportedasociologistatHowardUniversityin1932:Theywere“thelasttobehiredandthefirsttobefired.”Blackunemploymentratesweremore thantwice thewhiterate, reflecting increased jobcompetitionandpersistentracism.
Homeless Americans gathered in squalid Hoovervilles like this one in seattle and struggled to survive.
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Racism also limited the assistance African Americans received. Religious andcharitableorganizationsoftenrefusedtocareforblackpeople.Localandstategovern-mentssethigherreliefeligibilityrequirementsforblacksthanforwhitesandprovidedthemwithlessaid.Outofworkforlongerperiodsoftimeandwithoutevenmodestreliefassistance,AfricanAmericanswereforcedtocrowdtogetherinalreadycrampedapartments,whilestillpayingexorbitantrentstowhitelandlords.AnAfrican-Amer-icansocialworkerdescribedthedespairandpovertyofHarlem’sresidents:“Packedindamp,rat-riddendungeons,theyexistedinsqualornottoodifferentfromthatofArkansassharecroppers.”TheUrbanLeagueaffirmed,“AtnotimeinthehistoryoftheNegrosinceslaveryhashiseconomicandsocialoutlookseemedsodiscouraging.”
HispanicAmericansalsosuffered.Asmostlyunskilledworkers,theyfacedincreas-ingcompetitionfordecreasingjobspayingdecliningwages.TheyweredisplacedevenintheCaliforniaagriculturallaborforce,whichtheyhaddominated.Bythemid-1930s,theymadeuponlyatenthofthestate’smigratorylaborforce,whichincreasinglycon-sistedofwhitepeoplewhohadfledtheSouthandtheGreatPlains.OtherjobswerelostwhenArizona,California,andTexasbarredMexicansfrompublicworksandhighwayconstructionjobs.VigilantesthreatenedemployerswhohiredMexicansratherthanwhiteAmericans.
EconomicwoesandracismdrovenearlyhalfamillionMexicanimmigrantsandtheirAmerican-bornchildrenfromtheUnitedStates.LocalauthoritiesintheSouthwest,withtheblessingoftheDepartmentofLabor,urgedallMexicans,regardlessoftheircitizenshipstatus,toreturntoMexicoandfreeupjobsandreliefassistanceforwhiteAmericans.TointimidateMexicanresidents,theU.S.ImmigrationServiceconductedseveralraids,roundinguppeopleanddemandingimmediateproofofcitizenship.
ProtestBewildered and discouraged,mostAmericans reacted to the crisiswithout protest.Influencedbytraditionalindividualism,manyblamedthemselvesfortheirplight.Butothersdidact,especiallytoprotecttheirfamilies.Protestsrangedfromsmalldesperategestureslikestealingfoodandcoaltomoredramaticdeeds.InLouisiana,womenseizedatraintocallattentiontotheneedsoftheirfamilies;inNewJersey,inthe“bloodlessbattleofPleasantville,”100womenheldthecitycouncilhostagetodemandassistance.
the Great Depression made more desperate the plight of Mexican Americans; they faced discrimination and feared deportation. As migrant laborers, they also struggled with the forces of nature as they traveled from field to field in search of work. Here a young woman picks carrots in rural texas in 1939.Library of congress
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Communists,socialists,andotherradicalsorganizedmoreformalprotests.Com-munists led the jobless into “unemployment councils” that stagedhungermarches,demonstratedforrelief,andblockedevictions.Socialistsbuiltsimilarorganizations,includingthePeople’sUnemploymentLeagueinBaltimore,whichhad12,000mem-bers.Groupsofthiskindprovidedprotectionandassistance.However,localofficialsoftensuppressedtheirprotests. In1932,police firedontheDetroitUnemploymentCouncilasitmarchedtodemandfoodandjobs,killingfourmarchersandwoundingmanymore.
Ruralprotestsalsobrokeout.Again,communistsorganizedsomeofthem,asinAlabama,wheretheCroppers’andFarmWorkers’Unionmobilizedblackagriculturallaborers in1931todemandbetter treatment.IntheMidwest, theFarmers’HolidayAssociation,organizedamongfamilyfarmersin1932,stoppedtheshipmentofpro-ducetourbanmarkets,hopingtodriveupprices.Aguerrillawarbrokeoutasfarmersblockedroadsandhaltedfreighttrains,dumpedmilkinditches,andfoughtbloodybattleswithdeputysheriffs.Midwesternfarmersalsotriedtopreventforeclosureoftheirfarms.InNebraska,aFarmers’Holidayleaderwarnedthatifthestatedidnothaltforeclosures,“200,000ofusarecomingtoLincolnandwe’lltearthatnewStateCapitolBuildingtopieces.”
Herbert Hoover and the Depression
25.2 How did Herbert Hoover respond to the depression; why did his policies fail?
heGreatDepressionchallengedtheoptimism,policies,andphilosophythatHerbertHooverhadcarriedintotheWhiteHousein1929.Thepresidenttookunprecedentedstepstoresolvethecrisisbutshrankbackfromtheinterventionist
policiesactivistsurged.Hisfailures,personalaswellaspoliticalandeconomic,ledtohisrepudiationandtoamajorshiftingovernmentpolicies.
the Failure of voluntarismHooverfoughteconomicdepressionmorevigorouslythananypreviouspresident,buthebelievedthatvoluntaryprivatereliefwaspreferabletofederalintervention.Theroleof thenationalgovernment,hethought,wastoadviseandencouragethevoluntaryeffortsofprivateorganizations,individualindustries,orlocalcommunities.
Hooverobtainedpledgesfrombusinessleaderstomaintainemploymentandwagelevels.Butmostcorporationssoonrepudiatedthesepledges,slashedwages,andlaidoffworkers.Hooverhimselfcomplained,“Youknow,theonlytroublewithcapitalismiscapitalists;they’retoodamngreedy.”Still,herejectedgovernmentaction.
Hooveralsodependedonvoluntaryeffortstorelievethemiserycausedbymassiveunemployment.HecreatedthePresident’sOrganizationforUnemploymentRelieftohelpraiseprivatefundsforvoluntaryreliefagencies.Charitiesandlocalauthorities,hebelieved,shouldhelptheunemployed;directfederalreliefwouldexpandgovernmentpowerandunderminetherecipients’character.Hevetoedcongressionalattemptstoaidtheunemployed.
ThedepressionrenderedHoover’sbeliefsmeaningless.Privateprogramstoaidtheunemployedscarcelyexisted.Onlyafewunions,suchastheAmalgamatedCloth-ingWorkers,hadunemploymentfunds,andtheseweresoonspent.Companyplansforunemploymentcompensationcoveredlessthan1percentofworkers,revealingthecharadeofthewelfarecapitalismofthe1920s.PrivatecharitablegroupsliketheSalvation Army, church associations, and ethnic societies quickly exhausted theirresources.Norcouldlocalgovernmentscope,andtheireffortsdeclinedasthedepres-siondeepened.By1932,more than100citiesmadeno relief appropriationsat all.
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Onlyeightstategovernmentsprovidedeventokenassistance.Constitutionalrestric-tionsontaxesand indebtednessstoppedsomefromrespondingto thereliefcrisis.Otherslackedthewill.
Asthedepressionworsened,Hooveradoptedmoreactivistpolicies.HepersuadedCongresstocuttaxestoboostconsumers’buyingpower,andheincreasedthepublicworksbudget.TheFederal FarmBoard lentmoney to cooperatives and spentmil-lionstryingtostabilizecropprices.Unabletocontrolproduction,however,theboardconcededfailurebylate1931.MoresuccessfulwastheReconstructionFinanceCorpo-ration(RFC).EstablishedinJanuary1932,theRFClentfederalfundstobanks,insur-ancecompanies,andrailroadssothattheirrecoverycould“trickledown”toordinaryAmericans.Hooverstillopposeddirectaidtothegeneralpublic,althoughhefinallyallowedtheRFCtolendsmallamountstostateandlocalgovernmentsforunemploy-mentrelief.
Farmoreactionwasnecessary,butHooverremainedcommittedtovoluntarismandabalancedbudget.Hoover’sideologicallimitationsinfuriatedAmericanswhosawhimasindifferenttotheirsufferingandareactionaryprotectorofprivilegedbusinessinterests—animagehispoliticalopponentsencouraged.
Repudiating Hoover: the 1932 electionHoover’streatmentoftheBonus Armysymbolizedhisunpopularityandsetthestageforthe1932election.In1932,unemployedveteransofWorldWarIgatheredinWash-ington,demandingpaymentof servicebonusesnotdueuntil1945.Hoover refused
Hands in their pockets, hungry men stand numbly in one of New York city’s 82 breadlines. said one observer: “the wretched men, many without overcoats or decent shoes, usually began to line up soon after six o’clock, in good weather or bad, rain or snow.”
Bonus Army A group of unemployed veterans who demonstrated in Washington for the payment of service bonuses, only to be dispersed violently by the U.s. Army in 1932.
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tomeetwith them,andCongress rejected theirplan.But10,000veteranserectedashantytownattheedgeofWashingtonandcampedinvacantpublicbuildings.Hooverdecidedtoevicttheveterans,butGeneralDouglasMacArthurexceededhiscautiousordersandonJuly28ledcavalry,infantry,andtanksagainsttheraggedBonusMarch-ers.Thetroopsclearedthebuildingsandassaultedtheshantytown,dispersingthevet-eransandtheirfamiliesandsettingtheircamponfire.
Thisassaultprovokedwidespreadoutrage.TheadministrationtriedtobrandtheBonusMarchersascommunistsandcriminals,but subsequent investigationsrefutedsuchclaims.The incidentconfirmedHoover’spublic imageasharshandinsensitive.
Inthesummerof1932,withnoprospectsforvictory,RepublicansrenominatedHoover.ConfidentDemocratsselectedGovernorFranklinD.RooseveltofNewYork,whopromised“anewdealfortheAmericanpeople.”FDRhadpreparedforthepresi-dency,butin1921,hecontractedpolio,whichparalyzedhimfromthewaistdown.Hisstrugglewiththisordealgavehimgreatermaturity,compassion,anddeterminationandhis continued involvement inpoliticsowedmuch tohiswife,Eleanor, a socialreformerandDemocraticactivist.
The1932 campaigngave scant indicationofwhatRoosevelt’sNewDealmightinvolve.TheDemocraticplatformdifferedlittlefromthatoftheRepublicans,andRoo-seveltspokeinvagueorgeneralterms.Still,observersfoundcluesinRoosevelt’srecordinNewYork,wherehehadcreatedthefirststatesystemofunemploymentreliefandsupportedsocialwelfareandconservation.Moreimportantwashisoutgoingpersonal-ity,whichradiatedwarmthandhopeincontrasttoHoover’sgloom.
bonus Marchers battling police in Washington, Dc in 1932. Police and military assaults on these homeless veterans infuriated Americans and prompted Democratic Presidential nominee Franklin D. Roosevelt to declare, “Well, this will elect me.”
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FDRcarriedevery state southandwestofPennsylvania (seeMap25.1). Itwastheworst routof aRepublicancandidate ever (except in1912,when thepartyhadsplit).YetHooverwouldremainpresidentforfourmoremonths,astheConstitutionthenrequired.Andinthosefourmonths,thedepressionworsened,spreadingmiserythroughoutAmerica.ThefinalblowcameinFebruary1933,whenpanicstruckthebankingsystem.Nearly6,000bankshadalreadyfailed,robbing9milliondepositorsoftheirsavings.DesperateAmericansrushedtowithdrawtheirfundsfromtheremainingbanks,pushingthemtothebrink.WiththefederalgovernmentunderHooverimmo-bilized,stategovernmentsshutthebankstopreventtheirfailure.ByMarch,aneeriesilencehaddescendedonthenation.
Launching the New Deal
25.3 What were the goals of the early New Deal?
n the midst of this national anxiety, Franklin D. Roosevelt pushed forward anunprecedentedprogramtoresolvethecrisesofacollapsingfinancialsystem,crip-plingunemployment,andagriculturaland industrialbreakdownand topromotereform.TheearlyNewDealachievedsuccessesandattractedsupport,butitalsohad
limitationsandgeneratedcriticismthatsuggestedtheneedforstillgreaterinnovations.
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FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT(Democrat)
472(89)
22,809,638(57)
Electoral Vote(%)
Popular Vote(%)
Herbert Hoover(Republican)
59(11)
15,758,901(40)
Minor parties – 1,153,306(3)
113 3
MAP 25.1 tHe eLectiON OF 1932 in the midst of the Great Depression, only the most rock-ribbed Republican states failed to turn to Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Democrats for relief. the election of 1932 was a landslide.
i
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Action Now!OnMarch4,1933,FranklinDelanoRooseveltbecamepresidentandimmediatelyreas-suredtheAmericanpeople.Heinsistedthat“theonlythingwehavetofearisfearitself”andhepromised“action,andactionnow!”SummoningCongress,Rooseveltpressedforwardonabroadfront.Inthefirstthreemonthsofhisadministration,thefamousHundredDays of theNewDeal, theDemocraticCongress passedmany importantlaws.(SeeTable25.1,MajorLawsoftheHundredDays.)
Roosevelt’sprogramreflectedamixofideas,somefromFDRhimself,somefromadiversegroupofadvisers,includingacademicexpertsdubbedthe“braintrust,”politi-cians,andsocialworkers.Italsoincorporatedprinciplesfromtheprogressivemove-ment,precedentsfromtheGreatWarmobilization,andevenplansfromtheHooveradministration.Aboveall, theNewDealwasapracticalresponsetothedepression.FDRhadsetitstoneinhiscampaignwhenhedeclared,“Thecountryneeds,and,unlessImistakeitstemper,thecountrydemandsbold,persistentexperimentation….Aboveall,trysomething.”
FDRfirstaddressedthebankingcrisis.OnMarch5,heproclaimedanationalbankholiday, closingall remainingbanks.Congress thenpassedhisEmergencyBankingAct,aconservativemeasurethatextendedgovernmentassistancetosoundbanksandreorganizedweakones.Promptgovernmentaction,coupledwithareassuringfireside chatovertheradiobythepresident,restoredpopularconfidenceinthebanks.WhentheyreopenedonMarch13,depositsexceededwithdrawals.InJune,CongresscreatedtheFederal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)toguaranteebankdepositsupto$2,500.
Thefinancialindustrywasalsoreformed.TheGlass-SteagallActseparatedinvest-mentandcommercialbankingtocurtailriskyspeculation.TheSecuritiesActreformedthesaleofstockstopreventtheinsiderabusesthathadcharacterizedWallStreet,andin1934theSecurities and Exchange Commission (SEC)wascreatedtoregulatethestockmarket.Twootherfinancialmeasuresin1933createdtheHomeOwnersLoanCorporationandtheFarmCreditAdministration,whichenabledmillionstorefinancetheirmortgages.
tAbLe 25.1 MAjOR LAWs OF tHe HUNDReD DAYs
Law Objective
emergency banking Act stabilized the private banking system
Agricultural Adjustment Act established a farm recovery program based on production controls and price supports
emergency Farm Mortgage Act Provided for the refinancing of farm mortgages
National industrial Recovery Act established a national recovery program and authorized a public works program
Federal emergency Relief Act established a national system of relief
Home Owners Loan Act Protected homeowners from mortgage foreclosure by refinancing home loans
Glass-steagall Act separated commercial and investment banking and guaranteed bank deposits
tennessee valley Authority Act established the tvA and provided for the planned development of the tennessee River valley
civilian conservation corps Act established the ccc to provide work relief on reforestation and conservation projects
Farm credit Act expanded agricultural credits and established the Farm credit Administration
securities Act Required full disclosure from stock exchanges
Wagner-Peyser Act created a U.s. employment service and encouraged states to create local public employment offices
fireside chats speeches broadcast nationally over the radio in which President Franklin Roosevelt explained complex issues and programs in plain language, as though his listeners were gathered around the fireside with him.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Government agency that guarantees bank deposits, thereby protecting both depositors and banks.
Securities and exchange Commission (SeC) Federal agency with authority to regulate trading practices in stocks and bonds.
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creating jobsRoosevelt alsoprovided relief for theunemployed.TheFederalEmergencyReliefAdministration(FERA)furnishedfundstostateandlocalagencies.HarryHopkins,whohadheadedRoosevelt’s reliefprograminNewYork,became itsdirectorandoneoftheNewDeal’smostimportantmembers.FERAspentover$3billionbeforeitendedin1935,andbythenHopkinsandFDRhaddevelopednewprogramsthatprovidedworkratherthanjustcash.Workrelief,theybelieved,preservedboththeskillsandthemoraleofrecipients.Inthewinterof1933–1934,Hopkinsspentnearly$1 billion to create jobs for 4millionmen andwomen through theCivilWorksAdministration(CWA).TheCWAhiredlaborerstobuildroadsandairports,teach-ers tostaff ruralschools,andsingersandartists togivepublicperformances.ThePublicWorks Administration (PWA) provided work relief on useful projects tostimulatetheeconomythroughpublicexpenditures.DirectedbyHaroldIckes,thePWAspentbillionsfrom1933to1939tobuildschools,hospitals,courthouses,dams,andbridges.
OneofFDR’spersonalideas,theCivilianConservationCorps(CCC),combinedworkreliefwithconservation.Launchedin1933,theCCCemployed2.5millionyoungmentoworkonreforestationandflood-controlprojects,buildroadsandbridgesinnationalforestsandparks,restoreCivilWarbattlefields,andfightforestfires.Themenlivedinisolatedcampsandearned$30amonth,$25ofwhichhadtobesenthome.OneofthemostpopularNewDealagencies,theCCClasteduntil1942.
Helping some FarmersBesidesproviding relief, theNewDealpromotedeconomic recovery. InMay1933,CongressestablishedtheAgriculturalAdjustmentAdministration(AAA)tocombatthedepressioninagriculturecausedbycropsurplusesandlowprices.TheAAAsub-sidized farmerswhoagreed to restrictproduction.Theobjectivewas toboost farmpricestoparity,alevelthatwouldrestorefarmers’purchasingpowertowhatithadbeenin1914.
Agriculturalconditionsimproved.Farmpricesrosefrom52percentofparityin1932to88percentin1935,andgrossfarmincomeroseby50percent.Notuntil1941,however,wouldincomeexceedthelevelof1929,apooryearforfarmers.Moreover,some of the decreased production and increased prices stemmed from devastatingdroughtsandduststormsontheGreatPlains.TheAAAitselfharmedpoorfarmerswhileaidinglargercommercialgrowers.Assouthernplantersrestrictedtheiracreage,theydismissedtenantsandsharecroppers,andwithAAApayments,theyboughtnewfarmmachinery,reducingtheirneedforfarmlabor
the Flight of the blue eagleTheNewDealattemptedtoreviveU.S.industrywiththeNationalIndustrialRecoveryAct(NIRA),whichcreatedtheNationalRecoveryAdministration(NRA).TheNRAsoughttohalttheslideinprices,wages,andemploymentbysuspendingantitrustlawsand authorizing industrial and trade associations to draft codes setting productionquotas, price policies,wages andworking conditions, andother business practices.Thecodespromotedtheinterestsofbusinessgenerallyandbigbusinessinparticular,butSection7aoftheNIRAguaranteedworkerstherightstoorganizeunionsandbar-gaincollectively—aprovisionthatJohnL.LewisoftheUnitedMineWorkerscalledanEmancipationProclamationforlabor.
Hugh Johnson became director of theNRA.He persuaded business leaders tocooperateindraftingcodesandthepublictopatronizeparticipatingcompanies.TheNRABlueEagleinsigniaanditsslogan“WeDoOurPart”coveredworkplaces,store-fronts,andbillboards.BlueEagleparadesmarcheddownthenation’smainstreetsandclimaxedinamassivedemonstrationinNewYorkCity.
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SupportfortheNRAwaned,however.Corporateleadersusedittoadvancetheirowngoalsandtodiscriminateagainstsmallproducers,consumers,andlabor.Busi-nessesalsoviolatedthelaborrightsspecifiedinSection7a.Defiantemployersrejectedcollectivebargainingandevenusedviolencetosmotherunions.TheNRAdidlittletoenforceSection7a.Workersfeltbetrayed.RoosevelttriedtoreorganizetheNRA,buttheactremainedcontroversialuntiltheSupremeCourtdeclareditunconstitutionalin1935.
critics Right and LeftTheearlyNewDealdidnotendthedepression.Recoverywasfitfulanduneven;mil-lions of Americans remained unemployed. Nevertheless, theNewDeal’s efforts tograpplewithproblems, its successes in reducingsufferingand fear,andRoosevelt’sownskillscarriedtheDemocraticPartytovictoryinthe1934elections.ButNewDealpoliciesalsoprovokedcriticism, fromboththoseconvincedthat too littlehadbeenachievedandthosealarmedthattoomuchhadbeenattempted.
Despite the earlyNewDeal’s pro-business character, conservatives complainedthattheexpansionofgovernmentactivityanditsregulatoryroleweakenedtheauton-omyofAmericanbusiness.Theyalsocondemnedtheeffortstoaidnonbusinessgroupsas socialistic,particularly the“excessive” spendingonunemployment reliefand the“instigation”oflabororganizing.Thesecriticsattractedlittlepopularsupport,how-ever,andtheirselfishnessantagonizedRoosevelt.
A coal miner greeting Franklin D. Roosevelt in West virginia in 1932. Roosevelt’s promise of a New Deal revived hope among millions of Americans trapped in hard times.
Listen to the Audio
FDR’s First Inaugural Address
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Morerealisticcriticismcamefromtheleft.In1932,FDRhadcampaignedfor“theforgottenman at the bottomof the economicpyramid,” and some radicals arguedthattheearlyNewDealhadforgottentheforgottenman.Communistsandsocialistsfocusedpublicattentiononthepoor,especiallyinthecountryside.InCalifornia,com-munists organizedMexican, Filipino, and Japanese farmworkers into theCanneryandAgriculturalWorkersUnion;inArkansasandTennessee,socialistsin1934helpedorganizesharecroppersintotheSouthernTenantFarmersUnion,protestingthe“RawDeal” theyhad received from theAAA.Bothunions encounteredviolent reprisals.GrowerskilledthreepicketersinCalifornia’sSanJoaquinValley;inArkansas,land-lordsshotunionorganizersandledvigilanteraidsonsharecroppers’shacks.Thister-rorism,however,createdsympathyforfarmworkers.
Increasedlabormilitancyin1934pressedRoosevelt.Thenumberofworkerspar-ticipatinginstrikesleapedfrom325,000in1932(abouttheannualaveragesince1925)to1.5million in1934.Fromdockworkers inSeattleandcopperminers inButte tostreetcardrivers inMilwaukeeandshoemakers inBoston,workersdemanded theirrights.Textileworkerslaunchedthelargestsinglestrikeinthenation’shistory,shut-tingdowntheindustryin20states.
RebuffingFDR’spleasforfairtreatment,employersmovedtocrushthestrikes,oftenusingcomplaisantpoliceandprivatestrikebreakers.InMinneapolis,policeshot67teamsters,almostallintheback,astheyfledanambusharrangedbyemployers;inToledo,companypoliceandNationalGuardsmenattackedautoworkerswithteargas,bayonets,andriflefire;andinthetextilestrike,policekilledsixpicketersinSouthCar-olina.Againstsuchpowerfulopponents,workersneededhelptoachievetheirrights.HarryHopkins and otherNewDealers realized that labor’s demands couldnot beignored.
FourprominentindividualsmobilizedpopulardiscontenttodemandgovernmentactiontoassistgroupsneglectedbytheNewDeal.RepresentativeWilliamLemkeofNorthDakota,anagrarianradicalleaderoftheNonpartisanLeague,calledattentiontoruraldistressandrejectedtheNewDeal’slimitedresponsetofarmerscrushedbythedepression.Inhisownstate,nearlytwo-thirdsofthefarmershadlosttheirlandthroughforeclosures.
FrancisTownsend, aCaliforniaphysician,proposed toaid thenation’s elderly,manyofwhomweredestitute.TheTownsendPlancalledforagovernmentpensiontoeveryAmericanovertheageof60,providedthattherecipientretiredfromworkandspenttheentirepension.Thisschemepromisedtoextendrelieftotheelderly,openjobsfortheunemployed,andstimulateeconomicrecovery.
FatherCharlesCoughlin,aCatholicpriest in theDetroit suburbofRoyalOak,threatenedtomobilizeanotherlargeconstituencyagainstthelimitationsoftheearlyNewDeal.ThirtymillionAmericanslistenedeagerlytohisweeklyradiobroadcasts,whichmixedreligionwithanti-Semitismanddemandsforsocialjusticeandfinancialreform.CoughlininitiallywelcomedtheNewDealas“Christ’sDeal.”Butaftercon-cluding thatFDR’spolicies favored“thevirileviciousnessofbusinessand finance,”CoughlinorganizedtheNationalUnionforSocialJusticetolobbyforhisgoals.Withsupportamonglower-middle-class,heavilyCatholic,urbanethnicgroups,CoughlinposedarealchallengetoRoosevelt’sDemocraticParty.
RooseveltfoundSenatorHueyP.LongofLouisianastillmoreworrisome.Alter-nately charming and autocratic, Longhadmodernizedhis statewith taxation andeducationalreformsandanextensivepublicworksprogramafterhiselectionasgov-ernor in1928.Moving to theSenateandeyeing theWhiteHouse,LongproposedmorecomprehensivesocialwelfarepoliciesthantheNewDealhadenvisaged.In1934,heorganizedtheShare-Our-WealthSociety.Hisplantoendpovertyandunemploy-mentcalledforconfiscatorytaxesontherichtoprovideeveryfamilywithadecentincome,healthcoverage,education,andold-agepensions.Long’sappealwasenor-mous.Withinmonths,hisorganizationclaimedmorethan27,000clubsand7millionmembers.
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Watch the Video Migrant Mother
Thesedissidentmovementsraisedcomplexissuesandsimplefears.Theybuiltonconcerns about theNewDeal, bothdemandinggovernment assistance and frettingaboutgovernmentintrusion.Theirprogramswereoftenill-definedorimpractical—Townsend’splanwouldcostmorethanhalfthenationalincome;andsomeofthelead-ers,likeCoughlinandLong,approacheddemagoguery.Nevertheless,theirpopularitywarnedRooseveltthatgovernmentactionwasneededtosatisfyreformdemandsandensurehisreelectionin1936.
consolidating the New Deal
25.4 How did the major accomplishments of the second New Deal affect America’s social and economic life?
esponding to thepersistenceof thedepression andpolitical pressures,Roos-eveltin1935undertookeconomicandsocialreformsthatsomeobservershavecalledtheSecondNewDeal.Thenewmeasuresshiftedgovernmentactionmoretowardreformevenastheystilladdressedreliefandrecovery.NordidFDR’s
interestinreformsimplyreflectcynicalpolitics.Hehadchampionedprogressivemea-suresinthepast,andmanyofhisadvisershaddeeprootsinreformmovements.After
the New Deal enabled photographers and artists to take to the road to capture images of the nation’s dispossessed. this photograph by Dorothea Lange of an 18-year old mother and her child in a migrant labor camp in 1937 illustrates both despair and detachment and conveys the grinding poverty of the Great Depression.
R
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the1934electionsgavethepresidentanevenmoreDemocraticCongress,HarryHop-kinsexulted:“Boys—thisisourhour.We’vegottogeteverythingwewant—aworksprogram,socialsecurity,wagesandhours,everything—nowornever.”
Weeding Out and Lifting Up“Inspiteofoureffortsandinspiteofourtalk,”RoosevelttoldthenewCongressin1935,“wehavenotweededouttheoverprivilegedandwehavenoteffectively lifteduptheunderprivileged.”Todoso,hedeveloped“must”legislation.Oneofthenewlawsprotectedlabor’srightstoorganizeandbargaincollectively.TheWagnerNationalLaborRelationsAct,dubbed“Labor’sMagnaCarta,”guaranteedworkerstherighttoorganizeunionsandprohibitedemployersfromadoptingunfairlaborpractices,suchasfiringunionactivistsandformingcompanyunions.ThelawalsosetuptheNationalLaborRelationsBoard(NLRB)toenforcetheseprovisions,protectworkersfromcoer-cion,andsuperviseunionelections.
Social Security. Ofgreaterlong-rangeimportancewastheSocialSecurityAct.Otherindustrialnationshadestablishednationalsocialinsurancesystemsmuchearlier,butonlytheGreatDepressionmovedtheUnitedStatestoaccepttheideathatthefederalgovernmentshouldprotectthepoorandunemployed.Evenso,thelawwasacompro-mise,framedbyanonpartisancommitteeofbusiness,labor,andpublicrepresentativesandthenweakenedbycongressionalconservatives.Itprovidedunemploymentcom-pensation,old-agepensions,andaidfordependentmothersandchildrenandtheblind.
Theconservativenatureofthelawappearedinitsstingybenefitpayments,itslackofhealthinsurance,anditsexclusionofmorethanone-fourthofallworkers,includ-ingmany indesperateneedofprotection, suchas farm laborers anddomestic ser-vants.Moreover,unlikeinothernations,theold-agepensionswerefinancedthrougharegressivepayrolltaxonbothemployeesandemployersratherthanthroughgeneraltaxrevenues.Thusthenewsystemwasmorelikeacompulsoryinsuranceprogram.
Despiteitsweaknesses,theSocialSecurityActwasoneofthemostimportantlawsinAmericanhistoryanditprovided,asRooseveltpointedout,“atleastsomemeasureofprotectiontotheaveragecitizenandtohisfamilyagainstthelossofajobandagainstpoverty-riddenoldage.”Moreover,byestablishingfederalresponsibilityforsocialwel-fare,itinauguratedawelfaresystemthatsubsequentgenerationswouldexpand.
Money, Tax, and Land Reform. Another reformmeasure, theBankingAct of 1935,increasedtheauthorityoftheFederalReserveBoardoverthenation’scurrencyandcreditsystemanddecreasedthepoweroftheprivatebankerswhoseirresponsiblebe-haviorhadcontributedtothedepressionandtheappealofFatherCoughlin.TheRev-enueActof1935,passedafterRooseveltassailedthe“unjustconcentrationofwealthandeconomicpower,”providedforgraduatedincometaxesandincreasedestateandcorporatetaxes.OpponentscalledittheSoaktheRichTax,butwithitsmanyloop-holes itwas scarcely that, and itwas certainlynot a redistributivemeasure such asHueyLonghadproposed.Nevertheless,itsetaprecedentforprogressivetaxationandattractedpopularsupport.
TheSecondNewDealalsorespondedbelatedlytotheenvironmentalcatastrophethathadturnedmuchoftheGreatPlainsfromTexastotheDakotasintoaDustBowl(seeMap25.2).SinceWorldWarI,farmershadstrippedmarginallandofitsnativegrasses toplantwheat.Whendroughtandhighwindshit theplains in1932,cropsfailed,andnothingwaslefttoholdthesoil.Duststormsblewawaymillionsoftonsoftopsoil,despoilingthelandanddarkeningtheskyathousandmilesaway.Familiesabandonedtheirfarmsindroves.Manyofthesepoor“Okies”headedforCalifornia,theirplightcapturedinJohnSteinbeck’snovelThe Grapes of Wrath(1939).
In1935,RooseveltestablishedtheResettlementAdministrationtofocusonlandreform and help poor farmers. Under Rexford Tugwell, this agency initiated soil
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erosionprojectsandattemptedtoresettle impoverishedfarmersonbetter land,buttheproblemexceededitsresources.Congressmovedtosavetheland,ifnotitspeople,bycreatingtheSoilConservationServicein1935.
expanding ReliefIfreformgainedpriorityintheSecondNewDeal,reliefremainedcritical.Withmil-lions stillunemployed,Rooseveltpushed throughCongress in1935 theEmergencyReliefAppropriationAct,authorizing$5billion—atthetimethelargestsingleappro-priationinAmericanhistory—foremergencypublicemployment.RooseveltcreatedtheWorksProgressAdministration(WPA)underHopkins,whosetupworkreliefprograms toassist theunemployedandboost theeconomy.Before itsend in1943,theWPAgavejobsto9millionpeople(morethanafifthofthelaborforce)andspent
Watch the Video The Plough that Broke the Plains
Pecos River
Arkansas River
Canadian River
Red River
Brazos River
Rio
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Most severe wind erosion,1935–38
Severe wind erosion, 1935–36
Severe wind erosion, 1938
Severe wind erosion, 1940
MAP 25.2 tHe DUst bOWL Years of overcultivation, drought, and high winds created the Dust bowl, which most severely affected the southern Great Plains. Federal relief and conservation programs provided assistance, but many residents fled the area, often migrating to california.
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our problems; government is the problem.” citing long-term concerns about the program’s solvency, these critics call for privatizing the system, enabling contributors to invest their social security accounts in the stock market, for example.
Former President George W. bush made revamping social secu-rity the centerpiece of his 2005 state of the Union Address and launched a 60-day nationwide tour to drum up support for social security re-form. but the American people over-whelmingly rejected his plans for privatization and the subsequent collapse of Wall street further stiff-
ened their resolve. the election in 2008 of Democratic President barack Obama—an opponent of privatiza-tion—reassured many Americans of continued federal support for what they regard as the “most successful program in our country’s history.” Questions about the future of so-cial security and privatization have, however, reemerged in the presi-dential campaign of 2012 and once again the public reaction against changing the program has been swift and strong.
Question for Discussion
• Why does the vast majority of Americans continue to support social security despite the critics of “big government?”
o politician will “ever scrap my social security pro-gram.” so predicted FDR
when he signed the social security Act in 1935. He based his confidence on the provisions in the act that linked benefits to payroll deductions. because workers contributed to the program, they would feel a “right to collect their pensions and unem-ployment benefits.” but Roosevelt could not have imagined just how successful the social security pro-gram would become as time went on. it now assists over 50 million Americans, and, over the next two decades, nearly 80 million Ameri-cans will be eligible for benefits. the nation’s first “baby boomer,” Kathleen casey-Kirschling, who was born one second after midnight on january 1, 1946, filed to receive social secu-rity payments that began in january 2008. And many baby boomers have followed her.
but the successful expansion of the program has also called its fu-ture into question. critics of the pro-gram may not propose “scrapping” social security, but they do advocate a major overhaul. in part, their oppo-sition stems from a backlash against “big government” that emerged in the 1960s and ultimately found its champion in Republican Presi-dent Ronald Reagan, who declared, “Government is not the solution to
From then to Now
Social SecurityN
Americans eagerly embraced the social security program in the 1930s proudly displaying their social security cards and even having their numbers tattooed on their bodies.
President George W. bush’s campaign to reform social security stirred angry protest throughout America.
nearly$12billion.Three-fourthsofitsexpenditureswentonconstructionprojectsthatcouldemploymanuallabor:TheWPAbuilt125,000schools,postoffices,andhospi-tals;8,000parks;nearly100,000bridges;andenoughroadsandsewersystemstocircletheearth30times.TheWPAlaidmuchofthebasicinfrastructureonwhichthenationstillrelies.
TheWPAalsodevelopedworkprojectsforunemployedwriters,artists,musicians,andactors.“Whynot?”saidFDR.“Theyarehumanbeings.Theyhavetolive.”WPAprogramsallowedpeopletousetheirtalentswhilesurvivingthedepression,increasedpopularaccesstoculturalperformances,andestablishedaprecedentforfederalsup-portofthearts.
TheNational YouthAdministration (NYA), anotherWPA agency, gave part-timejobstostudents,enabling2millionhighschoolandcollegestudentstostayinschool,learnskills,anddoproductivework.AtDukeUniversity,lawstudentRichardM.Nixonearned35centsanhourdoingresearchinthelibrary.LyndonJohnson,aTexasNYAofficial, believed that “if theRoosevelt administrationhadneverdone
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anotherthing, itwouldhavebeenjustifiedbytheworkofthisgreat institutionforsalvagingyouth.”
the Roosevelt coalition and the election of 1936The1936electiongaveAmericansanopportunitytojudgeFDRandtheNewDeal.Conservatives alarmed at the expansion of government, business people angeredbyregulationand labor legislation,andwealthyAmericans furiouswith taxreformdecriedtheNewDeal.Buttheywereaminority.Eventhepresidentialcandidatetheysupported,RepublicanGovernorAlfLandonofKansas,endorsedmuchoftheNewDeal,criticizingmerelytheinefficiencyandcostofsomeofitsprograms.
TheprogramsandpoliticiansoftheNewDealhadcreatedaninvinciblecoalitionbehindRoosevelt.Despiteambivalenceaboutlarge-scalegovernmentintervention,theNewDeal’sagriculturalprogramsreinforcedthetraditionalDemocraticallegianceofwhitesouthernerswhileattractingmanywesternfarmers.Laborlegislationclinchedtheactivesupportofthenation’sworkers.Middle-classvoters,whosehomeshadbeensavedandwhosehopeshadbeenraised,alsojoinedtheRooseveltcoalition.
Sodidurbanethnicgroups,whohadbenefitedfromwelfareprogramsandappreci-atedtheunprecedentedrecognitionRoosevelt’sadministrationgavethem.FDRnamedthefirstItalianAmericantothefederaljudiciary,forexample,andappointedfivetimesasmanyCatholicsandJewstogovernmentpositionsasthethreeRepublicanpresidentshadduringthe1920s.AfricanAmericansvotedoverwhelminglyDemocraticforthe
eleanor Roosevelt campaigns with FDR. A visible activist for social and economic reform, she was also politically important in building the powerful Roosevelt coalition. “Previously,” said the journalist Ruby black, “a President’s wife acted as if she didn’t know that a political party existed.”
Read the Document
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, September 6 (1936)
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firsttime.Women,too,wereanimportantpartoftheRooseveltcoalition,andEleanoroftenattractedtheirsupportasmuchasFranklindid.
Thispoliticalrealignmentproducedalandslide.Rooseveltpolled61percentofthepopularvoteandthelargestelectoralvotemargineverrecorded,523to8.DemocratsalsowonhugemajoritiesinCongress.Roosevelt’spoliticalcoalitionreflectedaman-dateforhimselfandtheNewDeal;itwouldenabletheDemocratstodominatenationalelectionsforthreedecades.
Thelandslideof1936revealedtheimpactoftheNewDealonAmericans.Indus-trialworkersmobilizedtosecuretheirrights,womenandminoritiesgainedincreased,ifstilllimited,opportunitiestoparticipateinAmericansociety,andsouthernersandwesternersbenefitedfromgovernmentprogramstheyturnedtotheirownadvantage.Governmentprogramschangeddailylife,andordinarypeopleoftenhelpedshapethenewpolicies.
Labor on the MarchThelaborrevivalinthe1930sreflectedbothworkers’determinationandgovernmentsupport.Workerswantedtoimprovetheirwagesandbenefitsaswellastogainunionrecognition andunion contracts thatwould allow them to limit arbitrarymanage-rialauthorityandachievesomecontrolovertheworkplace.Thislargergoalprovokedoppositionfromemployersandtheiralliesandrequiredworkerstoorganize,strike,andbecomepoliticallyactive.Theirachievementwasremarkable.
TheSecondNewDealhelped.Byguaranteeinglabor’srightstoorganizeandbar-gain collectively, theWagnerAct sparked awaveof labor activism.But if the gov-ernmentultimatelyprotectedunionrights,theunionsthemselveshadtoformlocals,recruitmembers,anddemonstrateinfluenceintheworkplace.
Atfirst,thosetasksoverwhelmedtheAmericanFederationofLabor(AFL).Itsreli-anceoncraft-basedunionsandreluctancetoorganizeimmigrant,black,andwomenworkers left it unprepared for the rush of industrialworkers seeking unionization.Moreprogressive labor leaderssawthat industry-wideunionsweremoreappropri-ateforunskilledworkersinmass-productionindustries.FormingtheCommitteeforIndustrialOrganization(CIO)withintheAFL,theycampaignedtounionizeworkersinthesteel,auto,andrubberindustries,allnotoriouslyhostiletounions.AFLlead-ersinsistedthattheCIOdisbandandthenin1937expelleditsunions.ThemilitantsreorganizedastheseparateCongress of Industrial Organizations.(In1955,thetwogroupsmergedastheAFL-CIO.)
ThesplitrousedtheAFLtoincreaseitsownorganizingactivities,butitwasprimar-ilythenewCIOthatputlaboronthemarch.Itinspiredworkerspreviouslyneglectedbyorganized labor.TheCIO’s interracialunioncampaign in theBirminghamsteelmills,saidoneorganizer,was“likeasecondcomingofChrist”forblackworkers,whowelcomedtheunionasachanceforsocialrecognitionaswellaseconomicopportunity.TheCIOalsoemployednewandaggressivetactics,particularlythesit-downstrike,inwhichworkers,ratherthanpicketingoutsidethefactory,simplysatinsidetheplant,therebyblockingbothproductionandtheuseofstrikebreakers.
TheCIOwonmajorvictoriesdespitebitteroppositionfromindustryanditsallies.Theissuewasnotwagesbutlabor’srighttoorganizeandbargainwithmanagement.Sit-downstrikesparalyzedGeneralMotors in1937after it refused to recognize theUnitedAutoWorkers.GMtriedtoforcethestrikersoutofitsFlint,Michigan,plantsbyturningoff theheat,usingpoliceandteargas, threateningstrikers’ families,andobtainingcourtorderstocleartheplantbymilitaryforce.ButthegovernorrefusedtoorderNationalGuardsmentoattack,andthestrikersheldout,aidedbytheWomen’sEmergency Brigade, working-class women who picketed the building, heckled thepolice,andsmuggledfoodtothestrikers.Aftersixweeks,GMsignedacontractwiththeUAW.Chryslersoonfollowedsuit.Fordrefusedtorecognizetheunionuntil1941,oftenviolentlydisruptingorganizingefforts.
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) An alliance of industrial unions that spurred the 1930s organizational drive among the mass-production industries.
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Steel companies also used violence against unionization. In theMemorialDayMassacreinChicagoin1937,policeguardingaplantoftheRepublicSteelCompanyfiredonstrikersand their families,killing tenpeopleas they tried to flee.ASenateinvestigation found thatRepublic and other companies hadhired private police toattackworkersseekingtounionize,stockpiledweaponsandteargas,andcorruptedofficials.Federalcourtordersfinallyforcedthecompaniestobargaincollectively.
NewDeallaborlegislation,governmentinvestigationsandcourtorders,andthefederal refusal to use force against strikes helped the labormovement secure basicrightsforAmericanworkers.Unionmembershipleapedfromunder3millionin1932to9millionby1939,andworkerswonhigherwages,betterworkingconditions,andmoreeconomicdemocracy.
Women and the New DealNewDealreliefprogramshadamixedimpactonworkingwomen.Formalgovern-mentpolicyrequiredequalconsiderationforwomenandmen,butlocalofficialssofloutedthisrequirementthatEleanorRoosevelturgedHarryHopkinsto“impressonstateadministratorsthatthewomen’sprogramsareasimportantasthemen’s.Theyaresoapttoforgetus!”Womenonreliefwererestrictedtowomen’swork—morethanhalfworkedonsewingprojects,regardlessoftheirskills—andwerepaidscarcelyhalfwhatmenreceived.WPAtrainingprogramsalsoreinforcedtraditionalideasaboutwomen’swork;blackwomen, forexample,were trained tobemaids,dishwashers,andcooks.Althoughwomenconstitutednearlyone-fourthof the labor force, theyobtainedonly19percentof the jobscreatedby theWPA,12percentof thosecre-atedbytheFERA,and7percentofthosecreatedbytheCWA.TheCCCexcludedwomenaltogether.Still,reliefagenciesprovidedcrucialassistancetowomenduringthedepression.
OtherNewDealprogramsalsohadmixedbenefitsforwomen.DespitedemandsbytheLeagueofWomenVotersandtheWomen’sTradeUnionLeaguefor“equalpayforequalworkandequalopportunityforequalabilityregardlessofsex,”manyNRAcodesmandatedlowerwagescalesforwomenthanformen,whichofficialsjustifiedasreflectinglong-establishedcustoms.Butbyraisingminimumwages,theNRAbroughtrelativelygreaterimprovementtowomen,whowereconcentratedinthelowestpaidoccupations, than tomaleworkers.TheSocialSecurityActdidnot coverdomesticservants,waitresses,orwomenwhoworkedinthehome,butitdidhelpmotherswithdependentchildren.
Stillmoresignificant,theSocialSecurityActreflectedandreinforcedprevailingnotionsaboutproperrolesformenandwomen.Thesystemwasbasedontheideathatmenshouldbewageearnersandwomenshouldstayathomeaswivesandmothers.Accordingly,ifawomanworkedoutsidethehomeandherhusbandwaseligibleforbenefits,shewouldnotreceiveherownretirementpension.Andifawomanhadnohusbandbuthadchildren,welfareauthoritieswouldremoveherfromwork-reliefjobsregardlessofwhethershewantedtocontinuetowork,andwouldgiveherassistancefromtheAidtoDependentChildren(ADC)program,whichwasalsocreatedunderthe Social Security Act. These new programs, then, while providingmuch-neededassistance, also institutionalized amodernwelfare system that segregatedmen andwomeninseparatespheresandreaffirmedthethenpopularbeliefthatthesuccessofthefamilydependedonthatseparation.
WomenalsogainedpoliticalinfluenceundertheNewDeal,althoughMollyDew-son,thedirectoroftheWomen’sDivisionoftheDemocraticParty,exaggeratedwhensheexclaimed,“Thechangefromwomen’sstatusingovernmentbeforeRooseveltisunbelievable.”Dewsonherself exercised considerablepolitical power andhelped toshapetheparty’scampaigns.AroundDewsonrevolvedanetworkofwomen,linkedbyfriendshipsandexperiencesintheNationalConsumers’League,Women’sTradeUnionLeague,andotherprogressivereformorganizations.Appointedtomanyposi-tionsintheRooseveltadministration,theyhelpeddevelopandimplementNewDeal
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sociallegislation.SecretaryofLaborFrancesPerkinswasthefirstwomancabinetmem-berandakeymemberofthenetwork;otherwomenwereintheTreasuryDepartment,theChildren’sBureau,andreliefandculturalprograms.
EleanorRooseveltwastheirleader.DescribedbyaWashingtonreporteras“acabi-netmemberwithoutportfolio,”sheroaredacrossthesocialandpoliticallandscapeofthe1930s,pushingforwomen’srights,demandingreforms,travelingacrossthecoun-try,writingnewspapercolumnsandspeakingontheradio,developingplanstohelpunemployedminersinWestVirginiaandabolishslumsinWashington,andlobbyingbothCongressandherhusband.FDRusedherashiseyesandearsandsometimeshisconscience.Herebuffedhercriticswitha jaunty, “Well, that ismywife; I can’tdoanythingabouther.”Indeed,EleanorRoosevelthadbecomenotmerelythemostprominentfirstladyinhistorybutaforceinherownrightandasymbolofthegrowingimportanceofwomeninpubliclife.
Minorities and the New DealDespite themoveofAfricanAmericans into theDemocraticParty, theNewDeal’srecordonracialissueswaslimited.AlthoughRooseveltdeploredracialabuses,heneverpushedforcivilrightslegislation,fearingtoantagonizesoutherncongressionalDemo-cratswhosesupportheneeded.Forsimilarreasons,manyNewDealprogramsdis-criminatedagainstAfricanAmericans.Andracistofficialsdiscriminatedinallocatingfederalrelief.Atlanta,forinstance,providedaveragemonthlyreliefchecksof$32.66towhitesbutonly$19.29toblacks.
Nonetheless, disproportionately poor and unemployed African Americans didbenefitfromtheNewDeal’swelfareandeconomicprograms.W.E.B.DuBoisassertedthat“largenumbersofcoloredpeopleintheUnitedStateswouldhavestarvedtodeathif it had not been for the Roosevelt policies,” adding that theNewDeal served tosharpentheirsenseofthevalueofcitizenshipbymakingclearthe“directconnectionbetweenpoliticsandindustry,betweengovernmentandwork,[and]betweenvotingandwages.”AndkeyNewDealerscampaignedagainstracialdiscrimination.EleanorRoosevelt prodded FDR to appoint black officials, wrote articles supporting racialequality,andfloutedsegregationistlaws.Attackedbywhiteracists,shewaspopularintheblackcommunity.HarryHopkinsandHaroldIckesalsopromotedequalrights.Asblackvotesinnortherncitiesbecameimportant,pragmaticNewDealersalsobegantopayattentiontoblackneeds.
AfricanAmericansthemselvespressedforreforms.Civilrightsgroupsprotesteddiscriminatorypolicies,includingtheunequalwagescalesintheNRAcodesandtheCCC’s limited enrollmentofblackyouth.AfricanAmericansdemonstratedagainstracialdiscriminationinhiringandtheirexclusionfromfederallyfinancedconstruc-tionprojects.
Inresponse,FDRtookmoreinterestinblackeconomicandsocialproblems.Heprohibited discrimination in theWPA in 1935, and theNYA adopted enlightenedracialpolicies.Rooseveltalsoappointedblackstoimportantpositions,includingthefirstblackfederaljudge.ManyoftheseofficialsbeganmeetingregularlyatthehomeofMaryMcLeodBethuneoftheNationalCouncilofNegroWomen.DubbedtheBlackCabinet,theyworkedwithcivilrightsorganizations,foughtdiscriminationingovern-ment,influencedpatronage,andstimulatedblackinterestinpolitics.
TheNewDealimprovedeconomicandsocialconditionsformanyAfricanAmeri-cans.Blackilliteracydroppedbecauseoffederaleducationprojects,andthenumberofblackcollegestudentsandgraduatesmorethandoubled,inpartbecausetheNYAprovidedstudentaid toblackcolleges.NewDeal relief andpublichealthprogramsreducedblackinfantmortalityratesandraisedlifeexpectancyrates.Conditionsforblackpeoplecontinuedtolagbehindthoseforwhitepeople,anddiscriminationper-sisted,buttheblackswitchtotheRooseveltcoalitionreflectedtheNewDeal’sbenefits.
NativeAmericansalsobenefitedfromtheNewDeal.Thedepressionhadimposedfurthermiseryonagroupalreadysufferingfrompoverty,wretchedhealthconditions,
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andthenation’slowesteducationallevel.ManyNewDealprogramshadlimitedappli-cabilitytoIndians,buttheCCCappealedtotheirinterestsandskills.Appointedcom-missioneroftheBureauIndianAffairsin1933,JohnCollierpromotedconservationworkamongNativeAmericans,callingtheCCCa“creativeforce”forIndiancommu-nities.Ultimately,morethan80,000NativeAmericansreceivedtraininginagriculture,forestry, and animal husbandry, alongwith basic academic subjects.CCCprojects,togetherwiththoseundertakenbythePWAandtheWPA,builtschools,hospitals,roads,andirrigationsystemsonreservations.NewDealofficialsalsorefocusedgovern-mentIndianpolicy,whichhadunderminedtribalauthorityandpromotedassimilationbyreducingIndianlandholdingandattackingIndianculture.Collierprohibitedinter-ferencewithNativeAmericanreligiousorculturallife,directedtheBureautoemploymoreNativeAmericans,andpreventedIndianschoolsfromsuppressingnativelan-guagesandtraditions.
CollieralsopersuadedCongresstopasstheIndianReorganizationActof1934,oftencalledtheIndians’NewDeal.Theactguaranteedreligiousfreedom,reestab-lished tribal self-government, and halted the sale of tribal lands. It also providedfundstoexpandIndianlandholdings,supportIndianstudents,andestablishtribalbusinesses.Butsocialandeconomicproblemspersistedontheisolatedreservations,andwhitemissionaries andbusiness interests attackedCollier’s reformsas atheis-tic and communistic. And not all Native Americans supported Collier’s reforms,
With an appointment in the National Youth Administration, the educator Mary McLeod bethune was the highest-ranking African-American woman in the Roosevelt administration. she advised FDR on all racial matters and envisioned “dozens of Negro women coming after me, filling positions of trust and strategic importance.”
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assertingthathe,too,stereotypedIndiansandtheirculture,andlabelinghiseffortsas“back-to-the-blanket”policiesdesignedtomakeNativeAmericancultureshistori-calcommodities.
HispanicAmericansreceivedlessassistancefromtheNewDeal.ReliefprogramsaidedmanyHispanicsinCaliforniaandtheSouthwestbutignoredthosewhowerenotcitizens.Moreover,localadministratorsoftendiscriminatedagainstHispanics,espe-ciallybyprovidinghigherreliefpaymentstoAnglos.Finally,byexcludingagriculturalworkers,neithertheSocialSecurityActnortheWagnerActgaveMexicanAmericansmuchprotectionorhope.Farmworkersremainedlargelyunorganized,exploited,andatthemercyofagribusinesses.
the New Deal: North, south, east, and West“Wearegoingtomakeacountry,”PresidentRooseveltdeclared,“inwhichnooneisleftout.”Andwiththatstatement,alongwithhisbeliefthatthefederalgovernmentmusttaketheleadinbuildinganew“economicconstitutionalorder,”FDRensuredthathisNewDealprogramsandpoliciesfannedoutthroughoutthenation.
The New Deal in the South. The New Deal’s agricultural program boosted farmprices and incomemore in the South than anyother region.By controlling cottonproduction, it also promoted diversification; its subsidies financedmechanization.The resultingmodernization helped replace an archaic sharecropping systemwithanemergentagribusiness.Theruralpoorweredisplaced,buttheSouth’sagriculturaleconomyadvanced.
TheNewDealalsoimprovedsoutherncities.FERAandWPAbuilturbansewersystems, airports, bridges, roads, andharbor facilities.Whereasnorthern citieshadalready constructed such facilities themselves—and were still paying off the debtsthesehad incurred—thefederalgovernment largelypaid forsuchmodernization intheSouth,givingitscitiesaneconomicadvantage.
Federalgrantsweresupposedtobeawardedtostatesinproportiontotheirownexpenditures, but although southern politicians welcomed New Deal funds, theyrefused to contribute their share of the costs.Nationally, the federal proportion ofFERAexpenditureswas62percent;intheSouth,itwasusually90percentandneverlowerthan73percent.
Federalmoneyenabledsoutherncommunitiestobalancetheirbudgets,preachfis-calorthodoxy,andmaintaintraditionalclaimsoflimitedgovernment.FederalofficialscomplainedabouttheSouth’s“parasitic”behaviorinacceptingaidbutnotresponsi-bility, andeven southerners acknowledged thehypocrisyof the region’s invocationof state’s rights. “Werecognize stateboundarieswhencalledon togive,”noted theHouston Press,“butforgetthemwhenUncleSamisdoingthegiving.”
ThefederalgovernmenthadaparticularlypowerfulimpactontheSouthwiththeTennessee Valley Authority (TVA), launched in1933 (seeMap25.3).Coordinat-ingactivitiesacrosssevenstates,theTVAbuiltdamstocontrolfloodsandgeneratehydroelectricpower,producedfertilizer,fosteredagriculturalandforestrydevelop-ment, encouragedconservation, improvednavigation, andmodernized schoolandhealthsystems.PrivateutilitycompaniesdenouncedtheTVAassocialistic,butmostsouthernerssupportedit.Itsmajordrawbackwasenvironmentaldamagethatonlybecameapparent later.OveravastareaoftheSouth, itprovidedelectricityforthefirsttime.
TheNewDealfurtherexpandedaccesstoelectricitybyestablishingtheRuralElec-trificationAdministration (REA) in1935.Private companieshad refused to extendpowerlinesintothecountrysidebecauseitwasnotprofitable,consigning90percentofthenation’sfarmstodrudgeryanddarkness.TheREArevolutionizedfarmlifebysponsoring rural nonprofit electric cooperatives. By 1941, 35 percent of Americanfarmshadelectricity;by1950,78percent.
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Federal regional planning agency established to promote conservation, produce electric power, and encourage economic development in seven southern states.
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The New Deal in the West. TheNewDealalsochangedtheWest.Westernersreceivedthemostfederalmoneypercapitainwelfare,reliefprojects,andloans.Likesouthern-ers,theyacceptedfederalaidandclamoredformore.
TheBureauofReclamation,establishedin1902,emergedasoneofthemostimpor-tantgovernmentagenciesintheWest.Itbuilthugedamstocontrolthewesternriversystemsandpromotelarge-scaledevelopment.Byfurnishingcapitalandexpertise,thegovernmentsubsidizedandstimulatedwesterneconomicdevelopment,particularlythegrowthofagribusiness.
Westernerswelcomedsuchassistancebutrarelysharedthefederalgoalsofrationalresourcemanagement. Instead, theyoftenwanted tocontinue toexploit the landandresented federal supervisionas colonial control. Inpractice,however, thegovernmentworkedinpartnershipwiththeWest’sagribusinessesandtimberandpetroleumindustries.
the New Deal and Public ActivismDespiteHoover’sfearthatgovernmentresponsibilitywoulddiscouragelocalinitia-tive,the1930switnessedanupsurgeinactivism.NewDealprograms,infact,oftenencouraged or empowered groups to shape public policy.Moreover, because theadministration worried about centralization, some federal agencies fostered whatNewDealerscalled“grassrootsdemocracy.”TheAAAsetupcommitteesthatulti-matelyincludedmorethan100,000peopletoimplementagriculturalpolicyandheldreferendumsoncropcontrols;localadvisorycommitteesguidedthefederalmanage-mentoftheWest’spublicgrasslandsandmandatedcooperationwithassociationsoflivestockraisers.
Attimes,localadministrationofnationalprogramsenabledgroupstoexploitfed-eral policy for their ownadvantage.Wealthyplanters shapedAAApractices at theexpenseofpoor tenant farmers; local control ofTVAprojects excludedblackpeo-ple.But federalprogramsoftenallowedpreviouslyunrepresentedgroupstocontest
MAP 25.3 tHe teNNessee vALLeY AUtHORitY by building dams and hydroelectric power plants, the tvA controlled flooding and soil erosion and generated electricity that did much to modernize a large region of the Upper south.
Read the Document Tennessee Valley Authority Act (1933)
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traditionallydominantinterests.Oftenseeinggreateropportunitiesforparticipationand influence in federal programs than in city and state governments, communitygroupscampaignedtoexpandfederalauthority.Inshort,depressionconditionsandNewDealprogramsactuallyincreasedcitizeninvolvementinpublicaffairs.
ebbing of the New Deal
25.5 Why did the New Deal lose momentum after 1936?
fterhisvictoryin1936,Rooseveltcommittedhimselftofurtherreforms.“Iseeone-thirdofanationill-housed,ill-clad,ill-nourished,”hedeclaredinhissec-ondinauguraladdress.“Thetestofourprogressisnotwhetherweaddmoretotheabundanceofthosewhohavemuch;itiswhetherweprovideenoughfor
thosewhohavetoolittle.”Butdeterminedopponents,continuingeconomicproblems,andthepresident’sownmisstepsblockedhisreformsanddeadlockedtheNewDeal.
challenging the courtRoosevelt regarded the Supreme Court as his most dangerous opponent. Duringhis first term, theCourthaddeclared several importantmeasuresunconstitutional.Indeed,mostofthejusticeswereelderlyconservatives,appointedbyRepublicansandunsympathetictoanactivistfederalgovernment.ItseemedthattheCourtwouldalsostrikedowntheSecondNewDeal.
Emboldenedbythe1936 landslide,Rooseveltdecidedtorestructure the federaljudiciary.Inearly1937,heproposedlegislationauthorizingthepresidenttonameanewjusticeforeachoneservingpasttheageof70.Additionaljustices,hesaid,wouldincreasejudicialefficiency.Buthisrealgoalwastoappointnewjusticesmoresympa-thetictotheNewDeal.
HisCourtplanledtoadivisivestruggle.Theproposalwasperfectlylegal:Congresshadtheauthority,whichithadusedrepeatedly,tochangethenumberofjusticesontheCourt.ButRepublicansandconservativeDemocratsattackedtheplanasaschemeto“pack”theCourtandsubverttheseparationofpowersamongthethreebranchesofgovernment.Someconservativescalledthepresidentadictator,butevenmanyliberalsexpressedreservationsabouttheplanorFDR’slackofcandorinproposingit.
TheCourt itself undercut support for FDR’s proposal by upholding the SocialSecurityandWagneractsandminimum-wagelegislation.Moreover,theretirementofaconservativejusticeallowedRoosevelttonameasympatheticsuccessor.CongressrejectedRoosevelt’splan.
Roosevelt’schallengetotheCourthurttheNewDeal.Itworriedthepublic,splittheDemocraticParty,andrevivedconservatives.OpponentspromptlyattackedotherNewDealpolicies,fromsupportforunionstoprogressivetaxation.Henceforth,acon-servativecoalitionofRepublicansandsouthernDemocratsinCongressblockedFDR’sreforms.
More Hard timesAsharprecession,beginninginAugust1937,addedtoRoosevelt’sproblems.TheNewDeal’sdeficitspendinghadreflectedhisdesiretoalleviatesuffering,notaconvictionthatitwouldstimulateeconomicrecovery.Astheeconomyimprovedin1936,Roo-seveltdecidedtocutfederalexpendituresandbalancethebudget.Butprivateinvest-mentandemploymentremainedstagnant,andtheeconomyplunged,producingwhatRepublicansdubbedthe“Rooseveltrecession.”
In 1938, Roosevelt reluctantly increased spending.New appropriations for thePWAandothergovernmentprogramsrevivedthefalteringeconomy,butneitherFDR
A
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25.1norCongresswouldspendwhatwasnecessarytoendthedepression.OnlythevastexpendituresforWorldWarIIwouldbringfullrecovery.
Political stalemateTherecessioninterruptedthemomentumoftheNewDealandstrengtheneditsoppo-nents.Inlate1937,theirleadersinCongressissueda“conservativemanifesto”decry-ingNewDeal fiscal, labor,andregulatorypolicies.Holdingseniority inaCongressmalapportionedintheirfavor,theyblockedmostofRoosevelt’sreforms.NoneofhismustlegislationpassedaspecialsessionofCongressinDecember.In1938,Congressrejectedtaxreformsandreducedcorporatetaxes.
Congressalsoheavilyamendedthefewmeasuresthatpassedbutthoseactswerenotinsignificant.TheNationalHousingActof1937createdtheUnitedStatesHousingAuthority,madepublichousingapermanentfederalprogram,providedrentsubsidiestolow-incomefamilies,andfinancedslumclearance.TheFairLaborStandardsActof1938establishedthefirstnationalminimumwageandafortyhourworkweekforallworkersengagedininterstatecommerce,anditsetstrictlimitationsonchildlabor.
Toprotect theNewDeal,Roosevelt turned again to thepublic,withwhomheremained immensely popular. In the 1938 Democratic primaries, he campaignedagainsttheNewDeal’sconservativeopponents.ButFDRcouldnottransferhisper-sonalpopularitytothepoliticalnewcomershesupported.Whathisfoesattackedasapurgefailed.RooseveltlostfurtherpoliticalleveragewhentheRepublicansgained75seatsintheHouseand7intheSenateand13governorships.
The1938electionsdidnotrepudiatetheNewDeal,fortheDemocratsretainedmajoritiesinbothhousesofCongress.ButtheRepublicanrevivalandthesurvivaloftheconservativesouthernDemocratsguaranteedthattheNewDealhadgoneasfarasiteverwould.WithRooseveltintheWhiteHouseandhisopponentscontrollingCongress,theNewDealendedinpoliticalstalemate.
Good Neighbors and Hostile Forces
25.6 How did Roosevelt respond to the rise of fascism in europe?
venbeforeFDR’sconservativeopponentsderailedtheNewDeal,thepresidentfelttheirimpactintheareaofforeignpolicy.IsolationistsinCongresscounseledagainstanyU.S.involvementinworldaffairsandappealedtothegrowingnationaldisillusionmentwithAmerica’sparticipationintheGreatWartosupporttheir
position.Moreover,Roosevelthimself,althoughnotanisolationist,believedthatthegravityof thenation’seconomicdepressionwarrantedaprimaryfocusondomesticrecovery,andintheearlyyearsofhispresidency,tookfewinternationalinitiatives.
TheactionshedidtakerelateddirectlytosalvagingAmerica’sdesperateeconomy.Asthedepressionworsenedin1933,Americanbusinessessearchedfornewmarketsthroughouttheworld,andkeybusinessleadersinformedFDRthattheywouldwel-cometheopportunitytoexpandtradetotheSovietUnion.MoscowwasalsoeagertorenewtiestotheUnitedStates,andPresidentRooseveltextendedformalrecognitionoftheSovietUnioninNovember1933.
Enhancing trade opportunities and rescuing the economy from the damagewrought by high tariffs figured prominently inRoosevelt’s policies in theWesternHemisphere.Inlargemeasure,RooseveltmerelyextendedtheGoodNeighborpolicybegunbyhispredecessor.ButtheGreatDepressionstrainedU.S.andLatinAmericanrelations,sendingeconomicshockwavesthroughoutCentralandSouthAmericaand,inseveral instances,helpingpropel topowerruthlessdictatorswhoruledwith ironfistsandU.S.support.
e
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25.1Neutrality and FascismOutside thehemisphere,duringhis first termaspresident,Roosevelt generally fol-lowedthepolicyofavoidinginvolvementinEurope’spolitical,economic,andsocialproblems.ButtheaggressiveactionsofAdolfHitlerinGermanyultimatelyledRoo-sevelttoadifferentposition,andinthelatterpartofthedecade,hefacedthetaskofeducating theAmericanpublic, still resentfulofU.S.participation inWorldWarI,aboutthefascistdangerthatwasspreadinginEurope.
Hitlercametopowerin1933,shortlybeforeFDRenteredtheWhiteHouse,andhepledgedtorestoreGermanprideandnationalismintheaftermathoftheVersaillesTreaty.AstheleaderoftheNationalSocialistWorkersParty,orNazis,Hitlerestab-lishedafascist government—aone-partydictatorshipcloselyalignedwithcorporateinterests,committedtoa“biologicalworldevolution,”anddeterminedtoestablishanewempire,theThirdReich.HevowedtoeliminateBolshevikradicalismandpurifytheGerman“race”throughtheeliminationofthosehedeemedundesirable,especiallytargetingJews,thegroupHitlerblamedformost,ifnotall,Germany’sills.
Others aided the spread of fascism. Italian leader BenitoMussolini, who hadassumedpowerin1922andenvisagedemulatingthepowerandprestigeoftheRomanEmpire,brutallyattackedEthiopiain1935.Thefollowingyear,ayoungfascistmili-taryofficer,FranciscoFranco, ledanuprising inSpain,andwith theassistanceofItalyandGermany,successfullyoustedtheSpanishRepublicanditsloyalistsupport-ersby1939tocreateanauthoritariangovernment.Meanwhile,Hitlerimplemented
On November 9, 1938, Nazi Germany launched an attack on jews, destroying their businesses and burning their synagogues. this street scene in berlin shows the shattered windows of jewish businesses. Nazi leader joseph Goebbels recorded the event, known as Kristallnacht, in his diary: “Yesterday: berlin. there, all proceeded fantastically. One fire after another. it is good that way… . 100 dead. but no German property damaged.”
fascist government subscribing to a philosophy of governmental dictatorship that merges the interests of the state, armed forces, and big business; associated with the dictatorship of italian leader benito Mussolini between 1922 and 1943 and also often applied to Nazi Germany.
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25.1hisplanofconquest:heremilitarizedtheRhinelandin1936,andin1938heannexedAustria.
TheaggressiveactionsofGermanyandItalyfailedtoeclipseU.S.fearsofbecom-inginvolvedinanotherEuropeanwar.CongresspassedNeutralityActsdesignedtocontinueAmerica’stradewithitsworldpartnersbutprohibitthepresidentfromtakingsidesinthemountingEuropeancrisis.Appeasement and More Neutrality. After annexingAustria,Hitler pushed again in1938whenhedemandedtheSudetenlandfromCzechoslovakia.TheFrenchandtheBritishrefusedtostanduptoHitler,followinginsteadapolicyofappeasement.Meet-inginMunichinSeptember1938,theleadersofEnglandandFranceabandonedtheirsecurityobligationstotheCzechs,yieldingtheSudetenlandtoHitlerinexchangeforaweakpromiseofnomoreannexations.
InAmerica,too,thesentimentwasforpeaceatallcosts.Isolationismcompoundedby anti-Semitism andby the divisions between the leaders of theAmerican Jewishcommunity combined to ensure that theUnited Stateswouldnot become a havenforJewssufferingunderNazibrutality.NewsofNaziatrocitiesagainstAustrianJewsin1938shockedtheAmericanpress,andHitler’sviolentpogrom,knownasKristall-nacht(“NightoftheBrokenGlass”),conductedagainstJewsthroughoutGermanyinNovember1938,addedfreshproofofNazicruelty.AlthoughtheUnitedStatesrecalleditsambassadorfromBerlintoprotestthepogrom(inresponse,GermanyrecalleditsambassadorfromWashington),itdidnotalteritsrestrictiveimmigration-quotasys-temtoproviderefugeforGermanJews.
AsEuropeedgedcloser towar, the relationshipbetween theUnitedStatesandJapan becamemore strained. Japan resented U.S. economic interests in East AsiaandwasoffendedbythepolicyofexcludingJapaneseimmigrants.TheUnitedStatesregardedJapan’sdesiresforempireasthreateningbutalsoneededJapanasatradingpartner,especiallyintheeconomicallydepressed1930s.Consequently,inSeptember1931,whenJapanseizedManchuria,theUnitedStatesdidlittlemorethandenouncetheaction.Againin1937,afterJapanesetroopsattackedChineseforcesnorthofBei-jingandoutrightwarbeganbetweenJapanandChina,theUnitedStatesmerelycon-demnedtheaction.Thatsameyear,PresidentRooseveltdenounced“theepidemicofworldlawlessness,”indictingtheaggressivenessofItaly,Germany,andJapanandcall-ingfora“quarantine”ofaggressors,buthecontinuedhispolicyofrefusingtoriskwarwithJapan.
edging toward involvementAftertheMunichagreement,PresidentRooseveltmovedawayfromdomesticreformtoward preparedness for war, fearful that conflict in Europe was unavoidable anddetermined to revise theneutrality laws. InhisStateof theUnionaddress in Janu-ary1939,FDRexplainedthatAmerica’sneutralitylawsmight“actuallygiveaidtoanaggressoranddenyittothevictim.”Bythefallofthatyear,hehadwonsupportforeliminatingtheprohibitiononarmssalesandaddingarmamentstothelistofcash-and-carryitems—arevisionthatwouldenabletheUnitedStatestoprovideimportantassistancetoBritainandFranceinthewinterof1939–1940.Hitler’sdefianceoftheMunich agreement inCzechoslovakia, overrunningPrague byMarch 1939,merelyanticipatedhisnextmovetowardPolandandalsoconvincedtheBritishandtheFrenchthatwarwasimminent.
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25.1conclusionTheGreatDepressionandtheNewDealmarkamajordivideinAmericanhistory.Thedepressioncastdoubtonthetraditionalpractices,policies,andattitudesthatunderlaynotonlythenation’seconomybutalsoitssocialandpoliticalinstitutionsandrelation-ships.TheNewDealbroughtonlypartialeconomicrecovery.However,itseconomicpolicies,frombankingandsecuritiesregulationtounemploymentcompensation,farmpricesupports,andminimumwages,createdbarriersagainstanotherdepression.Thegradualadoptionofcompensatoryspendingpoliciesexpandedthegovernment’sroleintheeconomy.Respondingtothefailuresofprivateorganizationsandstateandlocalgovernments,thefederalgovernmentassumedtheobligationtoprovidesocialwelfare.
Roosevelt alsoexpanded the roleof thepresidency.AshisWhiteHouse tooktheinitiativefordefiningpublicpolicy,draftinglegislation,lobbyingCongress,andcommunicatingwiththenation,itbecamethemodelforallsubsequentpresidents.Notonlywasthepresident’spowerincreased,butRooseveltmadethefederalgov-ernment, rather than state or local governments, the focus of public interest andexpectations.
Roosevelt and the New Deal also revitalized the Democratic Party, drawingminorities, industrial workers, and previously uninvolved citizens into a coalitionwithwhitesoutherners.Thetensionsinsobroad-basedacoalitionsometimespre-ventedeffectivepublicpolicies,butthecoalitionmadetheDemocratsthedominantnationalparty.
Bytheendofthe1930s,asinternationalrelationsdeteriorated,FDRwasalreadyconsideringashift,ashelatersaid,fromDr.NewDealtoDr.Win-the-War.Reluctanttomovebeyondpublicopinionthatdidnotwantwarandlimitedbyneutralitylegisla-tion,FDRcautiouslyledthenationtowardwar—thistimeagainstanenemyfarmorethreateningthantheGreatDepression.Ironically,onlythenwouldPresidentRooseveltendthedepressionthathadravagedthenationfornearlyadecade.
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25-64
On MyHistoryLab
chapter Review
Study and Review on MyHistoryLab
Hard times in Hooverville
25.1 What triggered the Great Depression? p. 25–33
SystemicweaknessesintheeconomyproducedadevastatingcollapsethatchallengedtheveryfabricofAmericaandmadethedepressionglobal.RiskyspeculationonWallStreetandamongbankers,weak-nessesinagriculture,coal,andtextiles,alongwithastaggeringdis-parityinwealthandfaultyfiscalpoliciesfueledthedecline.
Herbert Hoover and the Depression
25.2 How did Herbert Hoover respond to the depression; why did his policies fail? p. 25–40
Achampionofprivate initiative,PresidentHooverrefusedtoyieldfrom his belief that voluntary efforts could and should relievethe misery of mass unemployment. The scope of the depression,however, exhausted the resources of private charities and localgovernments.
Launching the New Deal
25.3 What were the goals of the early New Deal? p. 25–43
WhenFDR took office, he promised action and his first 100 daysillustrated his determination to “try something.” He tackled thebankingcrisis,revivingbanksandrestoringconfidence;heprovidedrelieftotheunemployed;headdressedtheagriculturalcrisis;andheattempted to revive industry by regulating prices andwages alongwithallowingworkerstherighttoorganize.
consolidating the New Deal
25.4 How did the major accomplishments of the second New Deal affect America’s social and economic life? p. 25–48
Byreachingouttonewconstituencies,theSecondNewDealbroughtgreatereconomicsecurity tomanyAmericans.TheSocialSecurityAct,despiteit limitations,helpedtheelderlyandthejobless.LaborwontherighttounionizeandthejoblessfoundworkwiththeWPA.AmericansrespondedbyvotingforFDRin1936.
ebbing of the New Deal
25.5 Why did the New Deal lose momentum after 1936? p. 25–59
After his 1936 victory, FDR attempted to expand both the NewDealandtheSupremeCourt—thelattermovealienatedfriendsandfoesalike.Hisdecisiontoreducespendingin1937contributedtoadownturnhiscriticscalledthe“RooseveltRecession.”CapitalizingonFDR’smistakes,Congressionalconservativesstallednewlegislation,effectivelyendingtheNewDealby1938.
Good Neighbors and Hostile Forces
25.6 How did Roosevelt respond to the rise of fascism in europe? p. 25-60
AlthoughFDRworriedaboutHitlerandtheriseofNazism,hereluc-tantlychallengedtheisolationistsentimentsofmanyAmericans.Hedenounced the aggressornations in 1937 andmoved towardmili-tarypreparednessintheU.S.ToaidtheBritishandFrench,hewonrevisions in theneutrality legislationandcontinued to educate theAmericanpublicaboutthefascistmenace.
19321932
Hoover—bonus Army routed in Washington, Dc
1933
1933Hostile Forces—Adolf Hitler comes to power in Germany
1934
1934New Deal—securities
and exchange commission (sec)
established
New Deal—Franklin D. Roosevelt elected
president
New Deal—Many New Deal laws passed dur-ing FDR’s first 100 days
1937New Deal—Roosevelt Recession begins
1937
1935New Deal—social
security Act establishes a federal social insur-
ance system
1935
1936New Deal—Roosevelt
reelected presidentAmerican Life—sit Down strike begins
1936
1938
timeline1929Hoover—stock market crashes
1929
New Deal—Works Progress Administration (WPA) created
1938American Life—
congress of industrial Organizations (ciO)
foundedHostile Forces—
Kristallnacht, violent pogrom against jews,
occurs in Germany
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