25393788-A-Kurdish-Nurcu-Group

A Kurdish Islamist Group in Modern Turkey: Shifting IdentitiesAuthor(s): Fulya AtacanSource: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), pp. 111-144Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284176Accessed: 11/01/2010 21:21

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A Kurdish Islamist Group in Modern Thrkey: Shifting Identities

FULYA ATACAN

Islamic movements have traditionally defended the idea of the broader Islamic community (ummet) while rejecting various forms of nationalism. However, since the formation of nation-states in the Middle East, nationalism has become a latent or open component of Islamic discourse. One form of this is official Islam, which is interpreted and supported by the state. Islamic movements which oppose the existing political system of their own countries, on the other hand, have developed another form of this discourse while rejecting nationalism on the grounds that it is based in Western ideology and thus is alien to Islam. Such ideas have emerged even while twentieth-century Islamic movements flourish in the context of nation-states. Many examples of such movements offer evidence of the significant role of the nation-state context in the formation of Islamic ideology during the twentieth century. Nationalist versions of the Islamic point of view can be found in the discourses of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt' and of various Islamic groups in Turkey (for example, some Nurcu groups, the Suileymancis, and the so-called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis movement).2 The evolutionary development of Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) from an Islamic movement to a nationalist-Islamic movement provides another interesting example of shifting identities.3

Islam plays an important role in the lives of Kurds and has always been used as an ideological tool in Kurdish mobilization. Major Kurdish revolts during the 1920s in Turkey were primarily Islamic in nature with varying degrees of Kurdish nationalist ideology; that is, while the intellectual cadres of these revolts were Kurdish nationalists, they used Islam as a mobilizing force. The Kurdish nationalist movements of the 1960s and 1970s which flourished among leftist groups were, however, shown no sympathy by the anti-Communist Islamist Kurds. In 1984, the Marxist-Leninist Kurdish Labour Party (PKK) started a guerrilla war against the Turkish state in the southeastern part of Turkey, which intensified in the early 1990s.

Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims and strict adherents of the Uafi rite. In the Ottoman Empire, the rulers of the Kurdish emirates established their

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.37, No.3, July 2001, pp.111-144 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

112 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

own medreses since the official mezhep (school of jurisprudence) of the Empire was Hanefi. There were also schools attached to some of the village mosques and led by mollas who had a reputation for learning. These medreses played a prominent role in the development of the Kurdish language and literature. They functioned until the 1970s even though medreses were officially closed down in 1924 in Turkey. Legal experts of Islam, educated in state and independent Kurdish medreses, have played a significant role in the lives of Kurds. Sufi orders have also been active and widespread among the Kurds. Although various Sufi orders were represented, it seems that the Qadiriyya and Naqshbandiyya orders dominated Sufi Islam in the region.4

Said Nursi (1876-1960), by product of the Kurdish medrese system, is not only the author of the original and pious writings but also the originator of Nurcu movement in Turkey. As will be discussed below, this religious movement has fragmented and the ethnic origin of Nursi has become controversial among the members of the movement. Med-Zehra is a split from the Nurcu movement and it emphasizes Nursi's Kurdish background. It openly criticizes Turkish nationalist interpretation of Nursi's writings. In other words, Med-Zehra is not only an important Nurcu group in Turkey but also an important representative of Kurdish Islamic movements. This article will analyze the Med-Zehra group's interpretation of Islam as it is reflected in their journal, Dava.5

First appearing in April-May 1989, Dava strongly emphasizes Med-Zehra's dual Kurdish and Islamic identities. The group is highly critical of the mainstream Nurcu movement for its neglect - or even denial - of the Kurdish origins of Nursi, generally recognized as the Nurcu movement's founder. Med-Zehra has tried to restore the balance by, among other things, publishing uncensored versions of those works by Nursi that embrace a Kurdish viewpoint. The Kurdish Nurcu group appears to have widespread support in the provinces of Bingol, Van, Diyarbakir, Mardin, lirnak, Siirt, Batman, and Malatya (all in eastern and southeastern Turkey), as well as in Ankara and Istanbul.

The group is frequently referred to as the Med-Zehra ecole or simply Med-Zehra - an abbreviation for Medresetii'z Zehra, the name of the university Nursi had dreamed of establishing in Van, in eastern Turkey - by the other Islamic groups. In the first issue of the journal, the group defined itself with another name, hizb-iil Kur'an or 'the party of the Quran'.6 At that time, the group's leader, Ueyhanzade,7 rejected the designation of Med- Zehra as a 'school' in the following terms:8

A KURDISH ISLAMIST GROUP IN MODERN TURKEY 113

What we established is not a 'school'. Med-Zehra is a group of believers who strive to be both faithful to the Quran and useful to Islam. We believe in the unity of Islam (tevhid), and that by reading the Risale-i Nur, following its method, and serving the mehdiyet movement, we are useful to humanity ... This is a renewal (tecdid) movement that will produce a new understanding of the Quran ... This movement will make the Quran understandable to others and promote it as a form of state in the political sense. The Med-Zehra, on the other hand, was the name of a university planned to be built by Bediuizzaman [another name for Said Nursi - FA] in Van; the university's official language, Arabic, was to have been learned by all Muslims. The university would have permitted all races, including Kurds and Turks, to be united within the consciousness of ummet. Med-Zehra would have symbolized the realization of Islamic unity. (This is why) we have established a publishing company and a trust under the name of Med-Zehra.9

The name Dava derives from an anecdote about Nursi. At one point in his life while on retreat in a cave near Van, he slipped and fell about five metres to a lower level of the cave, fortunately without getting seriously hurt. As he fell, he cried out 'Ah! My struggle [Davaml', suggesting that he cared more about the cause for which he struggled than about his personal safety. This devotion to Islam impressed the journal's founder and he made Nursi's cause that of the journal. The journal defined this struggle as raising the flag of Islam and making it dominant throughout the world.'"

Among Dava's primary aims was that of promoting unity under the banner of tevhid in order to overcome the artificial fragmentation of Islamic groups in Turkey, which it considered to be a consequence of provocations by external powers." Other goals included correcting what it viewed as errors in thought encouraged by other Nurcu groups, and responding to 'unfair' criticisms of the Nurcu movement.

Said Nursi'2 was born in 1873 to a Kurdish clerical family in the village of Nurs, near Bitlis in eastern Anatolia. At the age of nine he attended a local medrese, receiving his education from Sheikh Abdurrahman Tagi. He studied at several medreses and received his diploma in 1888 when he was fifteen. He then travelled widely and engaged in wide-ranging discussions with members of the ulema (Islamic scholars). At thirty-two he left Van and came to Istanbul seeking support for his dream of establishing the Medresetii'z Zehra University in Van. He presented a petition on this subject to Sultan Abdulhamid 11 (1876-1909), in the course of the presentation criticizing the Sultan's passivity as Caliph. This unusual behaviour caused


officials to question his mental health, and he was sent to the Topba?1 asylum for observation.

Nursi returned to Istanbul in 1907 but was again disappointed with the Ottoman capital. He then went to Thessaloniki, where he met with members of the Union and Progress Party (Ittihad ve Terraki Flrkasl), and supported them in their struggle against the Sultan's absolutist regime. He was in Thessaloniki during the Young Turk revolution of 1908.

After returning to Istanbul, he participated in establishing the Muslim Union Society (Ittihad-i Muhammedi Cemiyeti) and wrote articles in Volkan, a newspaper published by Dervi? Vahdeti, a founder of the Muslim Union. In a short time, the Society became the leading voice for those opposing the Committee of Union and Progress. His connection with the Society led to the accusation that he was involved in anti-Union and Progress Party activities and part of the reactionary Islamist uprising of 31 March 1909 - one in which the Muslim Union played an important role - and he was arrested. However, he was acquitted and returned to Van in 1910. He travelled to Damascus in 1911, then returned to Istanbul to participate in the Sultan's journey to the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. He was also able to obtain funds for the founding of Medresetu'z Zehra, but the project was postponed with the beginning of the Balkan War.

Nursi returned to Van in 1913, but in 1915 was sent to Tripoli by the Young Turks to support the Sanusiyya order in their resistance against the Italian occupation. In August of that year he returned to Turkey and joined a local militia fighting against the Russians on the eastern front. He was taken prisoner and lived through the Russian Revolution of 1917, but managed to escape and return to Turkey via Europe.

In 1922, Nursi met Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Turkish Republic, in Ankara. No doubt he was aware of the secular tendencies of Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues, and in 1923 he circulated a declaration in parliament that the political regime of the Turkish Republic should be based on Islamic principles. He left Ankara later that year, and remained in Van until 1925, when he was accused of having links with the revolt of Sheikh Said, an Islamist and Kurdish nationalist. He was arrested and exiled to Barla, a small town in Isparta, where he wrote his treatise, the Risale-i Nur (Treatise of Light). He was arrested, imprisoned, and exiled several times between 1925 and 1950.

A new era for Nursi and his disciples opened with the Democrat Party victory in the 1950 elections. In spite of accusations brought against Nursi and his followers in various courtrooms, the Risale-i Nur was legally published in the Latin alphabet for the first time in 1956. At the same time the Democrat Party was making use of Islamic rhetoric during its election campaign; however, it soon became clear that this rhetoric would not be put


into practice. Nursi spent most of the rest of his life in Isparta experiencing continued police harassment.

Said Nursi died on 23 March 1960, while on a journey to Urfa, and he was buried there. After the military coup of 1960, which overthrew the Democrat Party, his remains were disinterred and his bones were buried at an unknown location in the mountains around Isparta. This was done in the belief that his tomb might become a centre of attraction and a meeting point for his followers.

Since the death of Said Nursi, the movement has experienced many internal conflicts and splits. Leadership and party politics were two main sources of conflict during the 1960s. Leaders such as Huisrev Altinba?ak,'3 Mehmet Kayalar (1920-94),'4 and Hulusi Yahyagil (1895-1986) '5 constituted a group apart from the original Nurcu followers. Kayalar and Yahyagil were military officers who, like Altinba?ak, were followers of Said Nursi. Although each had his own interpretation of the Risale-i Nur, they shared a common stance toward party politics. They were not against politics as a method of changing the existing socio-political structure of Turkey; however, they did not consider party politics to be a suitable vehicle for changing society as a whole into an Islamic one. Ultimately, their beliefs led to a rejection of Turkey's existing socio-political system. While sharing the conviction that the Nurcu movement should be headed by a single leader, they were unable to achieve this aim since each put forth personal claims regarding the leadership of the larger Nurcu movement.'6

A group called the Copyists, led by Husrev Altinba?ak (1899-1977), was the first to split from the original Nurcu movement in 1962. 7 The Copyists' (Yazicilar) name referred to the fact that they copied the original text of the Risale-i Nur by hand, and Altinba?ak was considered by his group to be the second 'Master' (Ustad-i sani) within this scribal tradition associated with the Risale-i Nur. However, whereas Said Nursi had permitted the publication of the Risale in the Latin alphabet while he was alive, Altinba?ak insisted that it should be published only in the Arabic script; indeed, he had disagreed with Said Nursi on this subject while Nursi was alive. After Nursi's death, Altinba?ak considered himself to be the sole leader of the Nurcu movement; anyone who disputed his leadership was considered to be a traitor and in opposition to the Risale-i Nur.'8 The Copyists became fewer in number over time and lost their importance by the end of the 1970s.'9

In the early 1970s, the main sources of conflict within the original - by this time more or less 'mainstream' - Nurcu movement included publication of a newspaper in the name of Nurcus,20 party politics, and


financial disputes. During this period, the Nurcu movement can be discussed in terms of two main positions comprising various factions. One point of view defended publication of the newspaper, and many of its adherents were openly involved in politics. The other main tendency consisted in rejecting newspaper publishing and political involvement. This division was further widened by financial controversies.2'

Among the fractions under these two main groupings which emerged during the 1970s and 1980s, the following might be cited: the Yeni Asya movement, under the leadership of Ziibeyir Guinduizalp and later Mehmet Kutlular, supported the (centre right) Justice Party and True Path Party. Med-Zehra, led by ~eyhanzade, argued that the Yeni Asya group had distorted the meaning of the Risale-i Nur, and began publishing Dava in 1989. Med-Zehra produced another group that established the Zehra Egitim Kultur Vakfi (Zehra Education and Cultural Foundation).22 This group supported none of Turkey's political parties, although it had some sympathy for the (Islamist) Welfare Party. Another group called Kurdoglu or Emek, led by Mehmet Kurdoglu, at first refused to support any party. This group at first withdrew from the community to concentrate their attention on the Risale; however, they supported the (centre right) Motherland Party through most of the 1980s and in recent years have been sympathetic to the (Islamist) Welfare and Virtue Parties.

In a development having major consequences not only for the Nurcu movement but also for Islamist movements and Turkish politics more generally, in 1974, a group led by Fetullah Gulen left the Yeni Asya movement, claiming that Yeni Asya was too busy with politics to serve the people.23 Interestingly, Guilen's group has always been careful not to identify itself with any Islamic group or political party. Thus, although he was once a Nurcu member, Guilen has neither identified himself with the Nurcu movement nor openly referred to the Risale-i Nur.24 His group became powerful after the 1980s, while his ideology evolved toward that of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis,25 the official ideology of the military government which followed the 1980 coup d'etat. In spite of an intellectual and spiritual background in the Nurcu movement, in his speeches Giilen never referred to the movement's founder but rather made references to his own works and ideas, in a sense placing himself at the centre of a movement whose inspiration is more probably traceable to another source. His own ideas, drawn from over 30 published works, shaped the group's ideology, generating differences between his and the other Nurcu groups. Because of these differences, some Nurcu groups deny that Guilen and his group have anything to do with the larger Nurcu movement. In the meantime, since Guilen has become powerful in the political life of Turkey today, other Nurcu groups insist that his group does indeed represent the Nurcu


movement. Giilen's group is known for its private educational establish- ments, located both in Turkey and in the Turkic republics of central Asia.26

After the military coup on 12 September 1980, the Nurcu movement underwent another phase of fragmentation. In 1982, a group supporting the military coup and led by Mehmet Kirkinci split from the Yeni Asya group, which had not supported the coup. Kirkinci's group believed that the coup was necessary because it saved Turkey from social and political disintegration. Kirkinci defined General Kenan Evren, leader of the military coup, as commander of the faithful (ulu-l emr) and claimed that it was a religious duty to obey Evren's rules. Thus the group is also called 'supporters of the [post-coup] revolutionary council' (Konseyciler).27 They reject Med-Zehra's claims that the Risale-i Nur have been distorted.

In 1986, Muslim Guindtiz, who received a Nurcu education from Mehmet Feyzi Pamukqu and Hulusi Yahyagil, established the Aczimendi Tarikati group, a Nurcu group in the form of a Sufi order.28 The aim of the Aczimendis was to bring about a state governed by Islamic law and headed by a caliph.29 Also, in 1990 and 1993 two other groups abandoned the Yeni Asya group; Yeni Asya's active support given to Siileyman Demirel (President of the Republic from 1993 to 2000) and his party (True Path) appears to be the only issue of conflict.30

Med-Zehra refers to major conflicts in Islamic history to explain events occurring since the death of Said Nursi. For example, the first conflict in the Islamic world emerged after the death of the Prophet Muhammad over the election of the first caliph, and remains unresolved to this day. A second major conflict was that which took place between Ali and Muawiya. Interpreted within the historical context as a struggle between caliphate and sultanate; the former represents an Islamic religious-based state system, while the latter is seen as an arbitrary regime with its own raison d'etre. The third conflict, between Hussein and Yezid, is understood as a contest between religious and nationalist values. Hussein stands as the defender of Islamic law for the Caliphate, while Yezid figures as the supporter of racist Arab nationalism for his sultanate. Med-Zehra believes that if one views Nurcu movement developments following the death of Said Nursi from the perspective of these historical events, the meaning of the fragmentation within the movement may be grasped by analogy.3

According to Dava,

The death of Said Nursi was announced to the world via radios and newspapers. Thousands of Muslims rushed into Urfa for the funeral. After the funeral, students of Nursi who were present in Urfa consulted among themselves. During the meeting, Mehmet Kayalar,


Hiisrev Agabey (Altlnba?ak), and Feyzi Agabey (Pamukqu) 32 insisted that both a leader and a leadership committee should be elected. Others reacted against this idea, saying that no caliph or leader figured in the Risale-i Nur and that each should serve according to his or her capacity. They argued that there should be no hierarchy in the group and the movement should consist only of spiritual service.33

The decision reached at the meeting favoured the second group, that is, those who rejected a hierarchical organization for the Nurcu movement. This issue appears to have created a Gordian knot since, according to an article in Dava, '... those who claimed that there should be no leader or rank in the Nurcu movement themselves became the leaders of different groups'.3 No Nurcu group leaders left today are direct students of Said Nursi. It seems that the decision not to form a hierarchical organization, made after the death of Nursi, has provided many students of the Nur movement with the inspiration to establish their own leadership and their own groups. Med-Zehra, for its part, believes that a hierarchical movement is better suited to Islam.

According to Dava, the Nurcu groups which distorted Risale-i Nur used the oppressive measures of the post-1960 military coup government as an excuse to justify their publication of the Risale in the Latin alphabet. More- over, publication efforts were undertaken because in the course of preparing the text in the Latin alphabet 'they could easily make changes that were impossible to make in the Arabic version'.3 Dava also claimed that certain individuals with political ambitions and a nationalist approach had tried to dominate the Nur movement in 1969 and 1970. Med-Zehra held that the Nurcu movement, with its political newspaper, its books and its journals, had started to depart from the movement's original line of thought. Referring to Islamic history, the Med-Zehra group believed that this event was a crossroad, arguing that, 'The struggle has begun between the real Nurcu movement, which is based on vahy (revelation of God) and tries to establish the caliphate with all its institutions, and the pseudo Nurcu group, which is based on the arbitrary rule of the sultanate and believes that every principle can be sacrificed for the fatherland.'36

Since the death of Said Nursi many Nurcu groups have claimed his heritage. As one of the major groups, Med-Zehra has had many differences of opinion with these other groups. According to Med-Zehra, the school of thought created by Nursi is an alternative to the existing regime, which is afraid of the power of Nursi's movement and has used many strategies to prevent its ideas from being realized. Those more closely associated with the regime, according to Med-Zehra, have departed from the Islamic


perspective regarding social and political problems and have adopted a European perspective, understood as man-made and thus contrary to Nursi's ideas.37

Med-Zehra has argued that political parties are a by-product of European philosophy, and that involvement in everyday politics prevents one from focusing on the real aim, which is to make Islam the dominant force in all areas of life. The group's spokespersons further hold that Said Nursi made a distinction between Islamic politics and human politics. The first is based on vahy and the second on human thought. They believe that Nursi considered human politics to be synonymous with Satan, whereas Islamic politics are a part of Islam.38 Islam cannot be separated from politics because Islam determines every aspect of one's life. Med-Zehra further argued that Nursi was against party politics both in the Ottoman Empire and in the Turkish Republic, since 'Said observed that sincere Muslims working for political parties accused each other of creating divisions after the Young Turk revolution of 1908'.39 Nursi considered this development un-Islamic because it created factions among Muslims, and as a result he was never again directly involved in party politics.

During the 1950s Said Nursi expressed his political views in letters that he sent to members of Parliament and the Prime Minister.40 Although his stated objective was to secure publication of the Risale-i Nur, he also stated his support for some of the Democrat Party's actions. Although such support or criticism of politicians' actions could be considered as political involvement, Med-Zehra suggested that such guidance was just a part of his responsibility as an Islamic scholar. They claimed that there were two main themes in Nursi's letters: the first was that some aspects of the regime were based on Turkish racism (Turkism), which contradicted fundamental principles of the Quran and should be abandoned immediately. The second theme in his letters was that the political party structure introduced by the Europeans was contrary to Islamic principles and that, instead, the Quran should be the model for political organization.4'

Med-Zehra has criticized other Nurcu groups, particularly Yeni Asya, because of their active involvement in day-to-day politics. Yeni Asya, for example, supported the Justice Party - for the most part the governing party between 1965 and 1980--and the True Path Party after 1983. Med-Zehra claimed that Yeni Asya defended Western principles, including the democratic parliamentary system. The group was, moreover, criticized for pursuing short-term material interests and compromising its Islamic identity.42 In general, Med-Zehra held that Islamic communities should not participate in politics, although some individuals may do so in order to disseminate ideas from the Risale-i Nur and to help the development of Islam. That is, the existing system may be used by some as a means to reach Islamic goals.43


Today, some Nurcu groups claim that Said Nursi was a defender of democracy as far back as the Ottoman period.4' In contrast, Med-Zehra insists that Nursi never used the word democracy in his writings. They argue that he deliberately avoided this term because democratic rules created by humans prevent the rules of God from being fully realized. They point out that some Nurcu groups use the concept of democracy and meErutiyet (constitutional monarchy) interchangeably. Although democracy is not consistent with the laws of God, Med-Zehra claims that meErutiyet is based on consultation (mepveret) and includes an assembly (meclis), institutions which fall within the framework of Islamic law. Thus when Nursi used the concept of meErutiyet, it was a reference consistent with Islamic law.45 Discussing these nuances, Seyhanzade writes:

Some people assume that democracy allows people to live decently, that it dominates the Turkish people's spirit and way of life. Democratic Islamists, who claim that nothing can change this fact, must understand that they cannot convince people with conscious thought and reason that these ideas are true; they cannot persuade anyone. Because Islam dominates our spirits, it is all-encompassing and our only goal. As people who belong to the Mehdiyet School [discussed below - FA], our first duty is to publish the truth. Our goal should be to make Islamic law dominant and to establish Islamic unity.46

According to Seyhanzade, anyone who accepts democracy as a governing system should be considered a non-believer. This is because democracy was created as a reaction to the Quran, Islamic law, and vahy. The main aim of a democracy is to give the right of governing to human beings. Acceptance of this kind of government is un-Islamic.47 Seyhanzade lists various reasons why some Nurcus have cooperated with the current political regime in Turkey. These include fear of Turkish national weakness, attachment to the past, and personal frailties. Such Nurcu members in fact support and empower the political parties, and in doing so, have abandoned Islamic law as a primary goal. They claim that they are not in a position to revolt against a head of state and that their approach is in conformity with the Hanefi law, which traditionally supports the concept of obedience to the state on the basis that 'any order is better than disorder'. Seyhanzade argues that this un- Islamic approach actually drives people away from Islam and the Quran.48

Taking a slightly different approach, ~eyhanzade claims that every movement in the world has a plan and a programme. If a movement does not have power and yet attempts to use force, it will lose its case. Citing Said Nursi, ~eyhanzade points out, 'We can neither accept nor reject the current regime. Rejection requires power that we do not yet have. Thus


Islamic scholars agree that if conditions are not ripe, that is, if one does not have power, action cannot be taken. If one acts from a powerless position, a major suppression of Muslims may result, which could block future development of the Islamic movement.'49 Thus, Med-Zehra insists that the duty of Nur students is to create conditions favouring the hegemony of Islamic Law. In order to do so, according to Said Nursi, they must belong to the 'party of the Quran' (hizb-ul Kur'an) that is, 'on the side of Allah' in the broad sense.

The right to publish and disseminate Said Nursi's works is another disputed issue. In his lifetime, Nursi determined who could publish the Risale and how the income should be spent.50 Ibrahim Hulusi Yahyagil (1895-1986), M. Feyzi Pamukqu (1912-90), Huisrev Altinbasak (1899-1977), Tahiri Mutlu (1900-1977), and Rafet Barutqu (1886-1975) were among Said Nursi's first students and were referred to as the has talebeleri (original, as in first, true students) of Nursi. They were educated by Nursi and were with him at the beginning of the Nurcu movement. Pamukqu, Altinba?ak, Mutlu, and Barutqu were arrested, tried, and sentenced in the 1930s and 1940s along with Nursi.5' They were considered by Nurcu members to be the spiritual inheritors of the Risale-i Nur. Mehmet Kayalar, Mustafa Acet, Bayram Yuiksel, Hiisnui Bayram, Abdullah Yegin, Mustafa Sungur, Ahmet Aytimur, and Said Ozdemir were also in Nursi's service. Some members of this second group were appointed by Nursi to supervise publication of the Risale-i Nur. It has become an established custom (orj) within the Nurcu movement that permission to publish the Risale must be first obtained from a member of this group.52 Also, Nursi had stipulated that twenty per cent of the income generated through publication must be allocated to a scholarship fund for Nur students.53 Thus, in order to publish the Risale in their publishing house, Med-Zehra had to obtain permission from a member of this group. Because they believed that the Risale-i Nur had been distorted, it was very important for Med-Zehra to publish its own version.

In the 1970s there were two Nurcu publishing houses. One of them, Sozler Yayinevi, was headed by Mustafa Sungur54 for a time, before being replaced by Mehmet Firinci. Said Ozdemir manages the other publishing house, Ihlas Nur Ne?riyat, in Ankara. Although both the original publishers were members of the second group in the service of Nursi, Ueyhanzade claims to have agreed with Abduilkadir Badilli,55 who is also a Kurd, that both publishing houses distorted the Risale and pursued political activities to the detriment of service to the Nurcu community.

In 1979, the Envar Ne?riyat publishing house was established with the approval of Husnu Bayram (among the second group of Nursi's direct


students), but in the name of Abdulkadir Badilli. Although Badilli was one of Nursi's students, he did not belong to either group of close followers and was not approved as a publisher of the Risale.56 Ueyhanzade started to work with Badilli in the publishing house. According to ~eyhanzade, Envar NeEriyat lost its viability after three years because it lacked funding and because Husnu Bayram wanted to control publication of the Risale.57 It became impossible for 5eyhanzade to continue in Envar Ne?riyat.58 ~eyhanzade then went to Mustafa Acet (1924-90), a member of the second group who had Nursi's approval to publish the Risale-i Nur. Acet provided 5eyhanzade with an original text corrected by Nursi himself, and gave his approval for publication of the Risale. In 1982 *eyhanzade established Tenvir Ne,riyat and started to publish the works of Said Nursi.

Dava published the original letter of Mustafa Acet in which he clearly stated that he had given 5eyhanzade the right to publish the Risale. In his will, Mustafa Acet enjoined the group to follow moral and spiritual principles found in the Quran in all details of publishing activities, as Nursi had wished. He explained how exacting Said Nursi had been in the preparation of the text and how fervently he looked forward to its publication. Acet further criticized some publishers for using the Risale for their own political purposes, or for trying to prevent others from publishing the text.59 While Acet gave 5eyhanzade approval to publish the Risale, he insisted on certain conditions: Ueyhanzade was to publish the Risale in their original form, and to donate one fifth of the profit towards meeting the daily needs of students who devoted their lives to the service of Nur. In addition, the publishing staff was to keep meticulous records and be able to answer all questions concerning financial matters.' In this way, Med-Zehra has had its own publishing house, the Tenvir Nesriyat, since 1982, and has published its own version of the Risale based on original copies.

Med-Zehra insisted that some Nurcu communities had distorted the Risale-i Nur in various editions over time,6' generally among those printed in the Latin alphabet.62 One of the allegedly distorted versions had been published by Hizmet Vakfi, a foundation led by Mustafa Sungur and Said Ozdemir, both of whom had Nursi's approval to publish the Risale. In response to Med-Zehra's allegation, and also inspired by financial considerations connected to sales rights, Hizmet Vakfi had taken Med-Zehra to the sharia court, claiming that they did not have the legal right to publish the Risale-i Nur Although both sides accepted litigation in the sharia court, the action was later moved to a civil court.63 While sharia courts were abolished in 1924 in Turkey, some individuals chose to use them on a non- official basis. Sharia courts are generally formed by trusted, learned Muslims in order to try specific cases if both sides chose to resort to such a court, although they have no legal binding force. If one of the two parties is not


satisfied with the decision, he or she may take the case to a legal, secular court. For its part, the Hizmet Vakfi counter-claimed that Tenvir Ne?riyat had distorted the Risale-i Nur in such a way as to propagate Kurdish separatism. In the end, the Hizmet Vakfi lost its cases in both the sharia and civil courts.'

Med-Zehra insists that some Nurcu groups have removed certain words such as Kurd and Kurdistan from the original text, replacing them with such words as 'peasant', 'people from the east', and 'tribe'. They also claim that certain paragraphs, most of which were concerned with the political regime of Turkey, have been removed from the original text.65

Another subject of dispute between Med-Zehra and other Nur groups was the question of mehdiyet. Originally a Shia concept and rejected by many Sunni scholars, the mehdi tradition has always been popular among the Sunni faithful. The mehdi is generally conceived as a descendant of the Prophet or one sent by God as a foreordained leader to restore the rule of God and establish justice on earth. A controversy arose over whether or not Said Nursi may be considered such a leader. This issue is closely related to the ethnic origins of Said Nursi, since a Kurd could not be a biological descendent of the Prophet. Some Nurcu groups appeared both to accept and ignore the fact that Nursi was Kurdish. This was possible because his principal cause was that of Islam, thus making his ethnic origins irrelevant to his status. Other groups, however, denied his Kurdish origin, claiming that he was Turkish or Arabic. Some groups did in fact believe that Said Nursi was the mehdi and thus was a seyyid - a descendant of the Prophet66 - while others denied this possibility. As will be mentioned below, Med- Zehra's position was that Said Nursi did not consider mehdiyet as a personal cause but as a community cause and as a process. Concerning the issue of being seyyid, Med-Zehra claimed that Said Nursi posited two groups within the ehl-i beyt (people of the House); the first group traces its biological genealogy back to the Prophet's family line, whereas the second group consisted of the Prophet's spiritual heirs who closely followed the Prophet's teachings. The critical assertion is made that biological heirs to the Prophet who did not show respect to Sunnet (the practice of the Prophet), such as King Hussein of Jordan, could not be counted among the ehl-i beyt. Departing from this distinction, Med-Zehra shows that Said Nursi clearly indicates in his books that he was not a biological heir to the Prophet. Consequently he was not an Arab. Med-Zehra holds that the belief in Nursi's being seyyid was a consequence of the need to settle the issue of Nursi's ethnic origins. According to Dava, 'Those people who could not accept that Nursi was a Kurd first turned him into a Turk, but when faced with resistance to this idea, they nominated him as seyyid and mehdi'.67

Nursi's ethnic origin became an important subject among Islamist groups in Turkey by the end of 1980s and through the 1990s. These groups,


which emphasize ethnicity (whether Kurd or Turk), are greatly concerned with a redefinition of their identity. It could even be suggested that the new impetus in Kurdish and Turkish nationalism, which have mutually reinforced nationalist interpretations of Islam, was accelerated by these disagreements over Nursi's ethnic identity.

According to *eyhanzade, the Risale-i Nur informs a school of thought that will re-establish the asr-i saadet (era of felicity) based on vahy (revelation of God); The Quran is undoubtedly the last word of God, intended to organize both the society of man and the life of the individual and to determine every aspect of life, from the heart of an individual and extending to the rulings of state. In this context, Med-Zehra viewed the Risale-i Nur as not only the name for Said Nursi's collected works, but also as the school of thought and the movement that constitutes the Islamic world view.68 Asr- 1 saadet refers to the beginning of Islamic history when the prophet Muhammad and the four rightly guided caliphs ruled the Islamic community; this period represents the ideal example of Islamic society. According to many Islamists, including Med-Zehra, it should be the aim of Muslims to establish an Islamic society similar to that of the asr-1 saadet. Med-Zehra believes that the asr-i saadet will ultimately materialize, and its spokespersons identify the process by which this will happen as mehdiyet. Mehdi, usually defined as the 'foreordained leader', in this case refers to a process. Med-Zehra's leader, ~eyhanzade, states that the subject of mehdi has been widely discussed ever since the end of asr-1 saadet. Although the status of mehdi has been claimed by or attributed to numerous individuals over time, it is generally agreed that the mehdi has not yet arrived. Ueyhanzade points out that Said Nursi discussed this subject from a unique perspective, positing that 'mehdiyet is not a personal cause but a community cause' which was to be headed by a spiritual personality.69

According to Ueyhanzade, the mehdi 'process' has three tasks. The first is to explain and disseminate correct belief as set forth in the Risale-i Nur; this task thus constitutes the avant-garde of mehdi and is more important than the following two tasks. The second task is to establish and practise Islamic law, and the third is to establish an Islamic union. These three tasks can be viewed as three steps. The first is to improve one's piety and consciousness at the individual level. The second is to establish an Islamic state based on the Quran in each nation, based on its people's will and strengths. As a third step of mehdiyet, Islamic unity is to be established in the form of a federation. Each Islamic country would have its own administrative body and an assembly that would allow it to form a federation of Islamic republics. The nations would have a common


assembly at the federal level that would elect a leader for the entire federation. This person could be called the caliph, or head of state.70 Med- Zehra believes that, according to Islamic practice, it is not appropriate for a person or a community to achieve all three of these steps at the same time.7'

Ueyhanzade claims that Said Nursi, as the individual who achieved the first step of mehdiyet, worked for Islamic unity (ittihad-i Islam) in the world. The concept of Islamic unity actually has a very broad meaning. At the individual level, Islamic unity means that Muslims must support one another and create a close community. This is a requirement in accordance with the rule of the Quran. At the societal level, solidarity among various Islamic groups and communities must be achieved under the banner of the Quran, following the beliefs of the Prophet Muhammad.72

According to Ueyhanzade, Islam does not rule out a republican system; such a system allows each Islamic republic to represent a nation or an ethnic group.73 Islamic republics, as representatives of Islamic communities, should be based on the Quran and consultation. In this sense, Islam approves of the republican system while making it necessary for Turkish Muslims to have a wider vision of the Islamic republic. In this sense, the concept of 'misak-i milli', which refers to the current borders of the Republic of Turkey and consequently to the territorial integrity of Turkey, falls short of the idea of an Islamic republic and should not be permitted.74 Med-Zehra believes that every ethnic group should have its own state and these states, in turn, should form an Islamic federation. This approach would ultimately lead to some changes in the existing borders of Turkey by establishing a Kurdish Islamic Republic.

Additionally, ~eyhanzade is aware that mezhebs (school offiqh, or jurisprudence) may create problems with respect to a universalist view of Islam. Sunni Muslims accept four mezheps (Hanefi, ~afi, Hanbeli and Maliki) as legitimate; Shiis and Kharijies have their own mezheps. Each Muslim must choose which mezhep he will follow, although Muslims generally belong to the mezheps prevalent in their regions. Considering some historically deep- rooted conflicts among mezheps, it seems that Med-Zehra tries to overcome this problem by letting the members of each mezhep practice its own system of fiqh, that is, that the mezhep of every country or group in the Islamic federation must be free to follow its own practise. Implementation of this view would increase the value of the federation.75

The aim of Med-Zehra is to make sharia the dominant law of Islamic societies, with the Risale-i Nur as a school of thought being the best guide to achieve this goal. Med-Zehra is also in favour of establishing the caliphate with the understanding of God as the sole maker of laws. Ueyhanzade uses the concept of tevhid (unity) to draw these issues together; presenting the example of the Prophet who controlled every level of the


state administration by assuming the functions of head of the Islamic state as well as that of messenger of God and military commander.76

Like other radical groups, Med-Zehra insists that simple belief in Islam does not make one a Muslim. If one believes in God, prays five times a day and fasts, but does not support the goals of the Islamic state, he or she can be a believer but is nonetheless not a Muslim. If one wants to make Islam the dominant force - even if he or she does not pray five times each day - he or she may be a non-believer, but is a Muslim. Ueyhanzade explains that Said Nursi clearly defined these states of belief.77

Med-Zehra argues that Said Nursi was in favour of an Islamic unity in which each nation or ethnic group would be able to maintain its own language, customs, and culture. Islam would provide a framework in which every group of people would be able to preserve their own identity.

Med-Zehra holds that Said Nursi was well aware of his Kurdish identity and was very much concerned with the problems of the Kurds in the Ottoman Empire. At that time religious sciences were taught in the native tongue and Arabic, while in the new secular schools teaching positive sciences, Turkish was the teaching language. Nursi's writings on this issue include a letter to Abdiilhamid 11 (1876-1909), subsequently published in the newspaper Dogu ve Kiirdistan (The East and Kurdistan), under the title, 'Once again Kurds are in need'.78 In the letter, Nursi indicated that Kurds, like other peoples of the Empire, need education and other kinds of assistance from the government: 'Even though it is pleasant to see the opening of new schools in towns and villages with help from the government, only the children who know Turkish can benefit from them. Kurdish children learn only religious sciences, which are thought in the medreses to be the source of progress. Teachers in the new schools do not know the local language and the children therefore do not receive an education in other subjects. This situation lays the grounds for brutality, chaos, and Western intervention ... and leads to suspicion among the people' .7 In order to solve this problem, Nursi proposed the establishment of secondary schools in three different regions of Kurdistan in which both theology and sciences would be taught.80

According to Nursi, language was an important determinant of human fate (Insanda kaderin sikkesi lisandir). Thus he wanted to establish a university, Medreset-iil Zehra, to improve the level of education provided to the Kurdish people. At this university, three languages were to be used. Arabic was obligatory (vacip), Kurdish was permissible (caiz), and Turkish was necessary (lazim). He said that Kurds had three advantages: the first was Islam, for which thousands of Muslims died (~ehid); the second was


humanity, which had to be proven before the masses; the third was nationality, which was inherent. He also said that the Kurds had three enemies: poverty, illiteracy, and animosity. In order to overcome these enemies three weapons could be used. First were justice and education; second were unity and love of nation; and third was self-achievement without help from the powerful.8'

Nursi apparently had good reason for personal interest in education and language issues, since Med-Zehra cited the memories of individuals connected with Said Nursi who claimed that Nursi could not read and write proper Turkish during his youth, and only became literate in Turkish after the age of 30. Thus although he was educated in Kurdish and Arabic as a youth, he produced his masterwork in Turkish.82

Med-Zehra has also published passages from the Risale-i Nur (Nursi's complete works) which reveal his approach to nationalism. In these writings, Nursi states that the West has fomented nationalistic feelings in order to divide the Muslims. However, he made a distinction between negative and positive forms of nationalism. Negative forms of nationalism harm people by benefiting from the destruction of others. They have created many problems for Muslims historically (Ummayad, French, and other nationalisms), and remain a great danger for the Muslim world today. In contrast, positive nationalism emanates from the needs of a society, and carries the potential to improve the solidarity and strength of the Muslim brotherhood. Thus, positive nationalism could work to serve and defend Islam.83

Said Nursi warned against the separation of Islam from the Turkish state, recalling the basic fact that Turks are Muslims: 'Turkish people can have no other religion than Islam. Islam is an integral and inseparable part of the Turkish nation. If Turks separate their nation from their religion they will be ruined.'84 He also criticized Turkish nationalists who defended ethnic nationalism, censuring those who believed that all Turkish citizens must speak Turkish; he pointed out that he had nothing in common with this group. He asked how one could offer Turkish to the millions of Kurdish people who had not forgotten their own language or nationality for thousands of years, who were citizens of Turkey, and who had supplied support and manpower to the Ottoman and Turkish regimes' jihads throughout their long history. Nursi believed that forcing the Turkish language on the Kurds was either arbitrary or a kind of brutality, and that one should not obey such unjust measures.85

It has been widely argued by some Nurcu groups that Med-Zehra has put too much emphasis on Kurdishness and Kurdish identity, and that their


interpretation of Nursi was racist, which is antithetical to Nursi's thought. Although the Med-Zehra group consists mainly of Kurds and its leading cadre is Kurdish, it has a considerable number of Turkish followers.86 This unbalanced ethnic mix may have been used to justify the accusations of racism. This criticism has been made ever since Dava first appeared.87

Ueyhanzade's reply to accusations of racism requires an understanding of Islam and nation. He argues that, according to the Quran, God created people of different nations and ethnic groups not for the purpose of fighting with each other, but to meet, understand, and help one another. Therefore no nation or ethnic group should be viewed as superior to another. If one denies the existence of different nations or ethic groups and their languages, then he or she denies the word of God. Attributing a sacred meaning to any particular ethnic group puts one in danger of recreating the cahlilliye (pre- Islamic ignorance) period. Ueyhanzade explains that his group defends the concept of ummet, rather than that of nationalism. He also emphasizes that Islam has been their main guide in solving this problem.88

A contributor to Dava, Mustafa Unal, points out that Said Nursi was accused of being a Kurdish nationalist, although racism was forbidden in the Quran and hadis. Said Nursi could never accept what was forbidden by Islamic law, had stated clearly that he belongs to Islamic ummet and was not a Kurdish nationalist. Unal also shared the opinion that Europeans incited nationalism in the Islamic world in order to divide it.89 Ueyhanzade also wrote on the issue of Nursi's Kurdishness, pointing out that when Nursi talked about Kurdistan, he referred to it as a geographical place during the reign of Abduilhamid II. This region had been independent since Ayyubid times, and while Selim I was engaged in his eastern campaign in 1514, he had made an agreement that gave the Kurds a special status. Over the course of history, however, this agreement was occasionally broken. But Ueyhanzade emphasized that in order to understand fully the concept of Kurdistan, it must be considered from the Islamic perspective.90

eyhanzade believed that even when Nursi was young, he had a special interest in the Kurdish problem and wanted to improve education in Kurdistan. He offered solutions to the Kurdish problems of backwardness and poverty, as mentioned above. His main concern was the actions of rulers that had the effect of keeping Kurds illiterate and poor, as well as their attempts to destroy Kurdish culture through assimilation. He opposed the denigration of Kurds since Islamic law states that all ethnic groups are equal, and defended Muslim brotherhood on the basis of absolute equality and justice. Nursi believed that the main reason behind separatism and conflict was the failure to believe in equality, as well as in the special privileges held by some groups. He believed that as long as such ideas prevail, one could not speak of Muslim brotherhood and unity. *eyhanzade


himself argues that people in disadvantaged groups are now awakening and that they will increasingly react against this inequality. He believes that true brotherhood and unity can only be achieved when each nation and group has cultural and administrative autonomy, as well as the same rights within the framework of Islamic law; otherwise conflicts will continue.9'

Med-Zehra underscores the similarities between Sheikh Said, a Naqshbandi sheikh who led the Kurdish revolt of 1925 in Turkey, and Said Nursi. The group considers both individuals as true representatives of Islam within their own distinctive contexts. While Med-Zehra was not associated with the Naqshbandi order, nor did it discern any particular significance in Sheikh Said's Naqshbandi origins, it did place importance on the ethnic origins of the two Saids, as well as on both their struggles against the Turkish state.

Med-Zehra holds that although the Sheikh Said revolt took place in Kurdish areas and under the leadership of a Kurdish alim (scholar), it was purely an Islamic revolt.92 Seyhanzade analyzed this case both through written documentation and by speaking with people who had participated in the revolt. He came to the conclusion that it was not a nationalist revolt, but that had it been successful, it would have brought about the independence of a nation.

Dava has published many interviews with members of Sheikh Said's family.93 Med-Zehra believed that the two men shared similar ideas and opinions, besides belonging to the same land, the same nation, and being nourished by the same culture (Kurdish territory, ethnicity, and culture). Moreover, they both lived as believers in God and fighters for Islam (mucahid). With the abolition of the caliphate on 4 March 1924 and the establishment of the Turkish Republic's taguti (false god) regime, Sheikh Said was convinced that an Islamic revolt had to materialize immediately; he lost his life (~ehadet) in this jihad.

Said Nursi was able to benefit from Sheikh Said's experiences. Joining his observations of Said's life and struggle to his own familiarity with the sciences, philosophy and politics of his time, he analyzed events from a perspective different from that of Sheikh Said. Med-Zehra's position is that both Saids carried out their duties appropriately, albeit in their own ways. Both had dual identities as Muslim and Kurd, identities that the current political system of Turkey considers as inimical to the state and appropriate targets for all methods of aggression. These methods include attempts to attract followers away from the two Saids and to prevent the development of opposition to the regime. Ultimately, however, Med-Zehra is confident that true followers of the two Saids will be successful.94


Med-Zehra's understanding is that Sheikh Said's revolt was one against injustice, unfairness and oppression; and that his beliefs made it impossible for him to keep silent about the un-Islamic character of the Turkish Republic. But even as he met with others and planned his actions, the Turkish state provoked the revolt before the movement was ready to take action, thereby rendering Sheikh Said's revolt unsuccessful.95 Med-Zehra supports this claim as follows: during a meeting in 1960 between Said Nursi and the sons of Sheikh Said in an Ankara hotel,96 Nursi said that he discussed the uprising plans with Sheikh Said in Erzurum. When the revolt started before the planned date, Said Nursi was in Van and was not informed. Following a sudden raid at his residence in Van, he was exiled to the western part of Turkey.97

Med-Zehra explains that the Sheikh Said revolt was primarily Islamic in nature. According to their understanding, the existing regime failed to grasp the universalism of Islam and actually saw the revolt as anti-Islamic in nature. Med-Zehra pointed out that the liberation of one nation was considered by some Islamic groups as anti-Islamic, even if that nation publicly stated its support for the principle of Islam.98

Said Nursi is said to have characterized Sheikh Said and his followers as '... the real Eehits who died for Islam. I have avenged them with my pen'.99

Opinions are divided over the degree and nature of Said Nursi's involvement in the Sheikh Said rebellion. Some Nurcus have argued that Said Nursi would not have participated in the revolt, out of a loyalty to the Turkish state, expressed in such statements as, 'We cannot fight this noble (Turkish) nation with our swords'." Another thesis is that Said Nursi plainly opposed the revolt, and even wrote a letter to Sheikh Said in an attempt to stop him. Indeed, in response to a request for help with the revolt, Nursi had written that, 'We cannot use our swords against the army of a nation that has carried the banner of Islam for centuries and has produced many saints'."' Notwithstanding these statements, Med-Zehra disputes the claims of Said Nursi's opposition to the revolt, pointing out that although he did not take an active part in it, he was interrogated in connection with it and exiled.'02 For example, discussing these claims in Dava, Mustafa Unal writes that Nursi was not involved in the revolt because at the beginning he was not informed about it. Only after learning of it was Nursi sent into exile on the suspicion that he may have been involved.'03

Unal also discussed Nursi's alleged refusal to fight against the Turkish republican army. He cited from Nursi's book, Mudafalar, to explain the historical context of the author's statement, 'We cannot fight with our swords against this noble [Turkish] nation'. According to Unal, 'Just before World War I, certain religious individuals reported to Nursi that some of the [Turkish army] officers were disbelievers, therefore these individuals had


decided to rise up against these officers in Bitlis. But Nursi indicated that such non-belief was the concern and responsibility of the offending officers and that the rest of the army could not be held responsible for them. He said that there might be thousands of saints in this army (who did deserve to be respected according to Islam) and he therefore would not participate in it.' Unal insists that these sentences were used in reference to the Ottoman (pre- First World War) army rather than the Turkish republican army,'" and concludes that revolt against the Turkish republican army is legitimate in the framework of Nursi's ideas.

Med-Zehra's approach combines a historical perspective with a great sensi- tivity regarding the fate of the Kurds in the context of the Middle East. For example, a contributor to Dava, Osman Resulan, wrote that the Kurds have always been manipulated by imperialist powers for their own purposes: 'The Kurds, who live in their own land like foreigners, have put their hopes and efforts into every small opportunity for improving their situation. But the European unbelievers and Asian sowers of discord have always used the Kurds for their own ends.' Thus, during the First World War the Kurds were hopeful about possibilities held out by the 'Wilson Principles'. Yet at the end of the War, they were left without help in applying these principles to their own case. Promises of administrative autonomy and even of 'independence' written into the treaty document of Sevres in 1920 were forgotten, and the Kurds were left in isolation to fight for themselves. The Sheikh Said revolt of 1925, the struggle of Sheikh Mahmud in Suleymaniye in the 1930s, the establishment of the Mahabad Kurdish Republic in Iran in 1946, and the revolt of Molla Mustafa Barzani in Iraq in 1961 are all examples of the Kurds' struggle for autonomy and freedom. However, after each revolt the Kurds faced exile, forced settlement, killings and genocide. 105

According to Resulan, the Empire was a mosaic of different races and ethnic groups during the Ottoman period, yet everyone was a member of a single empire. Kurds could speak their language and live according to their traditions, and the term Kurdistan was used in official language to designate the region most densely populated by Kurds. With the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were one of many groups within the Empire whose fates were influenced by European interventions. Turkish nationalism also played a major role in the process of the Empire's dissolution. Actions taken in the name of Turkish nationalism not only pushed forward the division of the Empire, but also stimulated nationalism among other groups as well. In this context, Kurdish intellectuals asserted what they believed to be their natural rights. While Lebanon, Jordan,


Kuwait and many other states gained their independence, the Kurdish nation - with a population of 20 million - was denied this benefit. Resulan believes this was the result of three key problems. First, Europeans wanted the freedom to use the Kurds against their neighbouring countries and thus did not want them to have an independent state. Second, the Kurds did not have an elite that could bring about national consciousness. Third, Kurdish social structure was organized on the basis of tribes, easily allowing intertribal conflicts and animosities to be provoked.'06

Resulan claims that the Kurds have these same problems in the 1990s, and lists three possible solutions. The first two, independent statehood and recognition of cultural rights, are dismissed either as too difficult to achieve or for being only partial solutions. The third option is to form some sort of federation among the countries in which the Kurds live. This may be the best solution and the easiest to implement since the states in which Kurds currently live are neighbours and have common borders. Further, this solution would support Islamic unity through the formation of a federation, a concept that is consistent with Islamic principles.'07 However Resulan does not make clear whether he is describing a federation within the existing states (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria) or an independent federated state of all Kurds.

Med-Zehra states that while the Kurdish problem today is ultimately a problem of Islamic ummet, its historical roots are largely traceable to Turkish republican history. Problems began during the Ottoman Empire, since although the Ottoman Empire was not founded on the basis of race, it was not founded on the basis of justice and equality either; thus it permitted repression of the Kurds.'08 However, these problems worsened during the Republican period because of the underlying element of racism within the Turkish republic.

Med-Zehra notes that, after the Arabs, the Kurds were the first nation to have accepted Islam. As they were favoured with the institution of Islam, the Kurds, in return, have served Islam with their scholars and soldiers. As mentioned above, Med-Zehra used Islamic history to explain the Kurds' current situation as an extension of the power struggle between Hussein and Yazid in which the Kurds participated on the side of Hussein." According to Med-Zehra, Hussein represents the defender of Islamic law on the side of the caliphate, while Yezid supported racist Arab nationalism. As a parallel to that struggle, Med-Zehra sees the Kurds as the defenders of Islam fighting against racist Turkish nationalists today.

Med-Zehra holds that, in a true Islamic order, every nation or ethnic group should have the right to speak and be educated in its own language.


Every nation should be able to follow its own traditions on the condition that they do not conflict with Islamic principles. No nation should have special privileges, and each should have its own rulers. Citing Said Nursi, Med-Zehra claims that religion is the common tie unifying nations which should otherwise exist as unique and independent entities."0

Another contributor to Dava, Osman Serwan, claims that the Ottomans not only fought against Christians, but also against Muslims, and that all were viewed as jihad by the Ottoman administration. In their conflicts with other Muslims, the Ottomans even invaded their countries. Although Serwan now considers this to have been a crime, the Ottomans thought of themselves as protectors of the Muslim masses. He also points out that the Ottomans founded universities only in Istanbul, Bursa, and Konya; further, they did not build medreses or factories in other parts of the Empire, and roads and caravanserais built by the Ottomans mostly functioned to transfer wealth from other lands. Ottoman rulers turned conquered peoples into slaves and forced many to become warriors. In the long history of the region none of the earlier regimes betrayed the Muslim community in such a fashion, and Serwan maintains that this mentality continued into the republican period in Turkey. For example, Kurds fought against Turkey's enemy in the name of Islam during the Independence War, yet, because of their Islamic beliefs, many of these same Kurds were opposed to the reforms of Mustafa Kemal, and thousands were killed as a result. Serwan points out, however, that Kemal was not the only person to have killed Kurds in recent times."' This article by Serwan created considerable reaction against Med-Zehra and its journal among some Islamic groups, to which Seyhanzade (as editor and assumed author of unsigned editorials) responded by critiquing what he called the nationalistic spirit of the article's critics. His editorial stated Med-Zehra's position that the Ottoman system was not perfect, that it made mistakes as did all other Islamic regimes since the end of the asr-i saadet period, during the establishment of the Ummayad dynasty. "2

Between 1992 and 1995, Turkey witnessed an intensification of the armed struggle between the PKK and the Turkish army. The army was given full authority in combating the PKK from 1993. Although Med-Zehra has always been aware of its Kurdish identity, 1992 appears to have been a turning point; since then, Med-Zehra has put more emphasis on its distinctive Kurdish identity and has interpreted Islam in a more nationalist manner. In 1993, Dava published reports from the Islamist human rights organization Mazlum-Der concerning events in the Kurdish region,"'3 and began publishing some poems and articles in Kurdish starting in late 1994.

In 1993, Selim Amedi wrote in Dava that the conflicts in southeastern Turkey amounted to a 'dirty' civil war. He claimed that Kurds are now in


total revolt against the existing regime and ideology and that there are now thousands of armed people in the mountains. It was time, he wrote, to ask why the Kurds have been forced into an armed struggle. In answering that question, Amedi argues that the Turkish republic and its official ideology have denied the existence of Kurds and terrorized them, republican regimes have attempted to dismiss the material and cultural values of Kurds, such as their music, folklore and way of life, by Turkifying them. Amedi further maintained that the Turkish state has recently begun to practise racist, fascist and imperialist policies to a degree not previously observed, while Turkish public opinion, whether rightist, leftist, or Islamist, was being brainwashed with state ideology. Both leftists, in the name of Communist internationalism, and Islamists, in the name of Islamic community, rejected Kurdish identity despite the fact that, as Amedi states, the Quran makes it clear that God has given every nation the right to live. Amedi explains that the Kurds have awakened to claim their own national identity, and have been revolting against the regime and its official ideology for the past decade in an attempt to gain recognition of that identity."4

Another unsigned article from Dava (1993) reports that ordinary peasants have been placed in the middle of the fight between the state and the PKK, such that they are forced to choose between becoming korucu (state militia) or PKK members. Many villages have been burned and villagers forced to migrate, and there have been reports of torture, oppression, killings and the disappearance of many individuals. One example of these incidents involved Sheikh Emin Bingol, reported to have thousands of followers. He and six friends were taken into police custody for ten days; their bodies were found later. Their beards had been torn out, their fingers cut off, and they had been shot in the head. Naturally, people in the region feel insecure and anxious at hearing of such incidents."5

Another Dava article from 1993 asserted that a determination of right and wrong in the Kurdish struggle would depend on the answers to the following questions: 'What exactly are these armed forces, state institutions, and government representatives doing in Kurdistan? Why have individuals with racist backgrounds become the governors and police chiefs of this nation? Why would a young man, applying for a substitute teacher position, be asked by the governor how many people he had denounced?' 116 Another contributor to Dava, M. Said Bakan, argues that the Turkish administration has oppressed the Kurds while allowing Turkish people to live peacefully, yet there is a widespread refusal to acknowledge the fact of Kurdish oppression. He sums up by asking, 'Why have the Kurds and Turks, who have lived together for centuries, become enemies?' "'

In another Dava article from 1993, 5eyhanzade reports that his own observations and the testimony of eyewitnesses shocked him during a recent


visit to eastern Turkey and caused him to wonder what actions the Islamic communities are planning to take in the face of this injustice. Repeating that Muslims from different races should learn to live together under Islamic justice and law, he cites a Kurdish friend's opinion that 'Our Muslim Turkish friends understand everything from an Islamic point of view except when it comes to the Kurdish issue. Then they think like a Turk.' Ueyhanzade believes that this statement needed to be turned around; that Turkish people need to start thinking about the Kurdish issue through the framework of Islam."8

As mentioned above, some Kurdish and even Turkish Islamists have com- plained about the continued insensitivity of Turkish Muslims toward the Kurds and the Kurdish problem in general. Ueyhanzade indicates that 'Many people in Turkey had no response to the Halepje [where Iraq used chemical weapons in March 1988, killing thousands of Kurdish civilians], yet the same people were vociferous against suppression of the Muslim minority in Bulgaria.' This inconsistency suggests to Ueyhanzade that many people behave according to national affiliations rather than the criteria of Islam."9

One reader of Dava, a teacher from Batman, wrote that there were two groups of Muslims in Turkey. The first was composed of Turkish Muslims who were racist and imperialist; this group made up about 95 per cent of the population. The second group comprised Kurds. The author believed that, unfortunately, 95 per cent of Kurds had no national consciousness and thus were likely to imitate Turks and treat them well. These Kurds had the 'soul of slaves' and could easily betray their own people.'20 Another reader criticized Dava for publishing the teacher's letter, which he felt to be insulting, and rejected this approach altogether. In answering this second reader's criticism, Dava explained that simply publishing a reader's letter did not necessarily mean that the editors or publishers shared the letter writer's views; at the same time, they found some degree of truth in it. In this connection, a Dava editorial asked, 'Did not Muslim communities, in denying the existence of Kurds, refuse to accept spoken or written Kurdish? ... [even] in religious classes and medreses ... [did they not] scold, punish, or isolate those ... who speak Kurdish? Even today, many ... Muslim communities do not view such events from within the framework of Islamic law, community, and fairness. We are faced here with a mentality that criticizes the claim of Kurdish independence while this criticism has not existed for Turks and Iranians'.'2'

Writing for Dava in 1994, A. Incekan criticizes the double standard of Turkish Muslims with respect to minorities. While many devout Turks


vigorously support the ethnic and religious rights of Turkish minorities outside Turkey, they turn a deaf ear to similar demands made by Kurds in Turkey. Incekan further describes how the denial of Kurdish language and life-ways has affected their lives, and suggests some immediate steps in compliance with Islam in order to address the Kurdish issue. First, the existence of Kurds and their language, as well as the existence of a Kurdish problem, must be acknowledged. Second, Turkish people must fight against the oppression of Kurds in their own country. In other words, assistance must be extended to Kurdish urban migrants; institutions and funds must be established in order to support the use of the Kurdish language in magazines and books; and Muslims should send letters to Islamic journals stating that oppression of the Kurds is not consistent with Islamic teachings. Further, in pursuing these goals the Muslims of Turkey must refuse to give concessions to the current regime.'22

A Dava contributor, Osman Uervan, related his experiences as a Kurd in the Nurcu movement in a 1992 article. He wrote that he met Nurcus and learned about the Risale-i Nur in 1972 in Ankara, then attended classes in which students read the Risale-i Nur and prayed. Over time, the use of Kurdish was banned in the classes. Students who continued to speak Kurdish were punished by having to read extra pages or by having to contribute more money for food expenses. In 1974 some Kurdish students were even beaten and expelled from classes. Uervan and his friends visited students of Said Nursi to discuss these occurrences. The answer they received was as follows: students who had been removed from the classes were from the eastern part of Turkey and they had spoken Kurdish in class in defiance of the rules; this had frightened Turkish students. While Beditizzaman (Nursi) was originally from Isparta, which meant he was a Turk, the Kurdish students insisted that he was a Kurd and the school directors insisted that Kurds only understood the language of violence.'23 2ervan explained that when Med-Zehra was formed, it was accused of being a Kurdish nationalist group. Today, he wrote, even the president of Turkey recognizes the existence of Kurds, and various groups have begun publishing newspapers and magazines in Kurdish. The word 'Kurd' is heard now more than ever before. Some groups have even tried to translate the Risale-i Nur into Kurdish. *ervan claims that Med-Zehra is the only group that keeps Islam alive within the framework of ummet in the cities of Mardin, Diyarbakyr, Uirnak, and Siirt, while other Islamic groups have shown little interest in the populations of these cities. The Turkish state, and Turkish nationalists, and even Islamic groups have charged Med-Zehra with Kurdish nationalism, and have accused the group of attempting to divide the country. ~ervan


argues that since most people accept the Kurdish reality, Islamic groups which have failed in this regard owe Med-Zehra an apology.'24

It is fair to say that the Nurcu movement in modem Turkey is divided into two main currents. One is an inclusive form in which various Nurcu groups have been integrated into the existing socio-political system of Turkey. The other is a rejectionist form in which different Nurcu groups have rejected the republican socio-political structure of Turkey. As heirs to Said Nursi, Huisrev Altinba?ak, Mehmed Kayalar, and Hulusi Yahyagil represented the rejectionist form of the Nurcu movement, as does Med-Zehra.

Med-Zehra places Said Nursi and the Risale-i Nur at the centre of their movement. However, Med-Zehra interprets Nursi's ideas within the context of Republican Turkey. Indeed, interpretations of history constitute an important divergence between Med-Zehra and other Islamist groups. While the latter tend to exaggerate the Islamic content of the Ottoman Empire, Med-Zehra criticizes the Ottoman Empire for being oppressive and for its resemblances to other imperialist Western states; in short, the Empire was far from a perfect Islamic society. Another important distinction lies in Med-Zehra's definition of the 'real' Muslim - not a simple believer of Islam but the supporter of the goal of Islamic state - a conviction which brings the group closer to radical Islamic movements.

Med-Zehra wants to establish an Islamic state based on the model of asr-i saadet. The group believes that reaching this aim will require a long process called mehdiyet. The Risale-i Nur of Said Nursi achieved the first stage of mehdiyet, but the second, which would be the establishment of Islamic states, and the third, the achievement of Islamic unity in the form of federation, have to be brought about by the Muslims of today. The group believes that Kurds should have their own Islamic state within this Islamic federation.

Med-Zehra severely criticizes the policies of the Turkish state regarding the Kurds in Turkey. Its members argue that the only common tie between Kurds and Turks is Islam. Because of this, a solution to the Kurdish problem must be developed within the framework of Islam and should provide Kurds with national rights of their own. Problems involved in providing Kurds with national rights will be solved through the establishment of an Islamic federation.

Med-Zehra's approach to history is ambivalent. On the one hand the group rejects the interpretation of history from a nationalist perspective and on the other, it interprets Islamic history as a struggle between religion and nationalism. In doing so, they have developed a clearly nationalistic perspective. Nonetheless, they believe that the main elements of their


approach are conceived through the framework of Islam. The group resists the idea of racism with its concept of 'positive nationalism'. This means that each nation should maintain the positive aspects of nationalism, such as solidarity within the Muslim brotherhood. Med-Zehra believes that Kurds must ultimately have their own independent Islamic state which supports Kurdish language, culture and traditions, and that this will occur in a future Islamic federation.

In conclusion, Med-Zehra's approach may be considered as a reaction to the Turkish nationalist perspective that Turkish groups have used to interpret Islam. Developments similar to this may be seen in many other countries where both ethnic and religious identities have imposed themselves on Islamic movements. Ethnicity and religion in different forms have played a significant role in the formation of Kurdish identity and in their overlap, they appear to have strengthened one another. As a reaction to the Turkish nationalist interpretation of Islam, Med-Zehra represents one example of this tendency in the context of modern Turkey. Although the roots of nationalist Islam among the Kurds can be traced back to the turn of the twentieth century, it is safe to argue that the civil strife that has claimed many lives over the last fifteen years has sharpened their ethnic identity and facilitated a conscious and active re-definition of their Islamic identity.

NOTES

I would like to thank Professor Kennali Sayba,ili and Associate Professor Gencer Ozcan for their valuable contributions during the preparation of this article.

1. See R. P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (London, 1969). 2. See B. Guivenc, G. Zaylan, I. Tekeli, E: Turan, Turk - Islam Sentezi (Istanbul, 1991);

E. Copeaux, Turk Tarih Tezinden TUrk-Islam Sentezine (Istanbul, 1998); and F. Atacan, 'Anadolu Gazetesi ve "Siileymancilar"', Toplumbilim, No.2 (1993), pp.135-52.

3. M. Litvak, 'The Islamization of Palestinian Identity: The Case of Hamas', Data and Analysis (Tel Aviv, 1996); and G. Usher, 'What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories', in J. Beinin and J. Stork (eds.), Political Islam (California, 1997), pp.339-54.

4. M. van Bruinessen, 'The Kurds and Islam', Les Annales de lAutre Islam, No.5 (1998), pp. 13-35.

5. Issues from April-May 1989 (first issue) to August-September 1997 of the journal Dava were examined. Originally appearing every other month, Dava became a monthly journal in 1991, then reverted to publication every other month in January 1995 because of financial difficulties.

6. 'Davam (ikarken', Dava, No.1 (April-May 1989), p.3. 7. Qeyhanzade's official name is Siddik Dursun but within the movement he is mostly

referred to as Qeyhanzade rather than by the Turkish and non-Islamic family name of Dursun. Siddik Dursun (~eyhanzade) was born in Bingol and studied at Ankara University's Faculty of Theology. After graduation, he refused to work in any state institution because of his religious convictions. He was introduced to the Risale in 1958 by

erif Nazli, who was sent to Bingol by Mehmet Kayalar to open the first Nurcu medrese there. He met prominent members of the Nurcu movement in 1962 when his brother was


in prison for Nurcu activities. In 1965 he met Hiisrev Altinba?ak and finally joined the Bayram Yuksel group in Ankara. He stayed with this group from 1969 to 1974. When Bayram Yuksel supported the publication of the Yeni Asya newspaper, he left the group and went back to Bingol. In 1982 he came to Istanbul and established the publishing house Tenvir Ne?riyat. M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Miisluiman Genc Degisi Sorularina Cevaplar', Dava, No.31 (Oct. 1992), p. 18; and 'Bediuzzamanin Qileke? Hizmetkari Bayram Yuksel Agabey', Dava, No.82 (Oct.-Nov. 1997), pp.5-6.

8. 'School' (Turkish: ekol, from the French ecole) is the term used for religious movements which, like that of the Nurcus, are neither a sect nor a Sufi order. 5eyhanzade rejects the claim that Med-Zehra represents a distinct 'school'.

9. 'Nurculuk, Risale-i Nur ve Bediuzzaman Hakkinda Sorular ve Cevaplar', Dava, No.70-71 (Feb.-March, 1996), p.13.

10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. On Said Nursi, see 5. Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey, The Case of

Bediuizzaman Said Nursi (Albany, 1989); a. Mardin, 'Bediuzzaman Said Nursi 1873-1960, The Shaping of a Vocation', in J. Davis (ed.), Religious Organization, Religious Experience (London, 1982), pp.65-79; H. Algar, 'Said Nursi and Risala-i Nur, An Aspect of Islam in Contemporary Turkey', in K. Ahmad and L.I. Ansari (eds.), Islamic Perspectives, Studies in Honour of Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi (Leicester, 1980), pp.313-33; N. 5ahiner, Son fahitler Beditizzaman Said Nursi'yi Anlatiyor (Istanbul, 1993-94), 4 Vols.; and I. I1ik, Beditizzaman Said Nursi ve Nurculuk (Istanbul, 1990).

13. Altinba?ak was one of Said's 'original students' (has talebeleri). For more on Altinba?ak, see N. 5ahiner, Son fahitler Bediuizzaman Said Nursi'yi Anlatiyor (Istanbul, 1993), Vol.1, pp.398-9.

14. Mehmed Kayalar was an officer as well as serving as an assistant to Said Nursi and his movement. On Kayalar, see N. 5ahiner, Son .ahitler Beditizzaman Said Nursi'yi Anlatlyor (Istanbul, 1994), Vol.3, pp.234-7; N. 5ahiner, .ahitlerin Dilinden Bediuizzaman (Istanbul, 1997), pp.30-46; and M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Nur Kahramani Mehmet Kayalar', Dava, No.52-3 (July-Aug. 1994), pp. 19-20. Badilli writes that Kayalar favoured an alternative, resistant form of politics. He also claims that Kayalar considered himself to be the true leader of the Nurcu movement. Badilli feels that this approach ran counter to Nursi's method and was detrimental to the movement. Badilli claims that, of all Nurcu leaders, he was the most harmed by the 1960 military government. A. Badilli, Bediuizzaman Said-i Nursi, Mufassal Tarih e-i Hayati (Istanbul, 1990), Vol.3, pp. 1793-4.

15. Hulusi Yahyagil was an officer when he met Said Nursi, but retired from the army as colonel in 1950. For more on Yahyagil, see see N. 5ahiner, Son fahitler Bediiizzaman Said Nursi'yi Anlatiyor (Istanbul, 1993) Vol.1, pp.318-59; and I. Giilec (ed.), Sohbet ve Mektuplariyla Hulusi Yahyagil (Istanbul, 1994).

16. Badilli severely criticizes this approach and its defenders, among them Altinba?ak and Kayalar. A. Badilli, Bediuizzaman Said-i Nursi, Mufassal Tarih(e-i Hayati (Istanbul, 1990), Vol.3, pp.1793-6.

17. The Yeni Asya group claims that the Turkish intelligence agency, on the orders of ismet Inonui, played an important role in this split. I. Yasar, Muhabbet Fedaileri (Istanbul, 1997), pp.77, 141-3. Yasar wrote a fictional account of the history of the Nurcu movement from the perspective of the Yeni Asya group. In it he recounts that, after the death of Said Nursi, the intelligence office sought to exacerbate leadership disputes among Husrev Altinba?ak, Mehmed Kayalar, and others, and to create factionalism within the Nurcu movement. Yasar further claims that, as part of these efforts, Alparslan Tuirkes, a member of the Revolutionary Council in the 1960 military coup and later leader of the ultra-right National Action Party, supported Hiisrev Altinba?ak (I. Ya?ar, Ibid., pp.141-3, 290-91, 412).

18. A. Badilli, op. cit., pp.1794-5. 19. With the death of Altinba?ak in 1977, Said Oztiirk, from Isparta, assumed leadership of the

group. M.H. Okutucu, Istikamet feriat, Refah Partisi (Istanbul, 1996), p.147. 20. On the initiative of Salih Ozcan and with the approval of Zubeyir Gunduzalp (1920-71),

the Nurcus decided to publish a newspaper. Salih Ozcan (1929- ) served as National


Salvation Party deputy in 1977. He was a co-founder of the Muslim World League, which is sponsored by Saudi Arabia, and acted as a representative of Turkey in the League. He also co-founded the Faisal Islamic Bank in Turkey in 1984. See U. Mumcu, Rabita (Istanbul, 1987), pp.173-80; and N. 5ahiner, Son .ahitler Bedijizzaman Said Nursi'yi Anlatiyor (Istanbul, 1994), Vol.3, pp.238-44. Zuibeyir Gunduzalp was in the personal service of Said Nursi from 1948 up to Nursi's death. On Gunduzalp, see N. 5ahiner, Ibid., pp.15-30; and A. Badilli, Ibid., pp.11388-9, 1796, 1801. Gunduzalp prepared a document listing the members of a consultation assembly, and Gundizalp and Ozcan signed it before the publication of the newspaper. They agreed that the relation of the Nurcus with the newspaper would not be made public and in case their secret was revealed, the assembly would deny it. They also agreed that this document would be kept secret among the members of Said's original students. This agreement was later published by Abdulkadir Badilli. See A. Badilli, op. cit., pp.1797-9. The members of the consultation assembly listed in the agreement were Salih Ozcan, Mustafa Polat, Abdurrahman Nursi, Halil KUici,k, Ahmed 5ahin, Rus,tu Tafrall, Mehmet Kutlular, Mehmet Firinci and Mehmet Birinci. Badilli later claimed that Zubeyr Gunduzalp himself crossed off the names of Halil Kuc,uk, Mehmet Firinci and Mustafa Birinci. The first issue of the bi-monthly newspaper, named Ittihad (Unity), appeared on 24 October 1967. For details on the history of the newspaper from the perspective of the Yeni Asya group, see I. Yasar, op. cit., pp.228-39. The newspaper was closed down following the 12 March 1971 military coup.

21. Mustafa Sungur and Bayram Yuiksel, who were the spiritual inheritors of the Risale-i Nur and had the right to give permission for its publication, supported the first group, while Tahiri Mutlu, Abdullah Yegin and Husnu Bayram, who also had the right to give publication approval, supported the second group. A. Badilli, op. cit., p.1801.

22. This group, led by Izettin Yildirim, rejected the leadership of Siddik Dursun. It claims that a committee must be set up to govern the group and the leader of this committee must be elected in every three or four year. It also claims that some distortions have been made in the Risale. The leader of the group, Izettin Yildirim, was kidnapped by the Turkish Hizbullah and was found dead in Istanbul, in 28 January 2000. About Turkish Hizbullah see F. Bulut and M. Farac, Kod Adi: Hizbullah, Tiirkiye Hizbullahi'nin Anatomisi (Istanbul, 1999).

23. K. Kocoglu, 'Said Nursi ve Nurculuk', unpublished thesis, Ankara Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakiiltesi, 1996, p.77.

24. Yasar claims that in mid- 1950s Fetullah Gulen was introduced to the Risale-i Nur and the Nurcu movement by Muzaffer Aslan, Mehmed Kirkinci and Osman Demirci, who were also from Erzurum where Gulen was born and grew up. Gulen's talents apparently did not flourish within the Nurcu environment, although he subsequently became popular as a speaker among the religious communities of Edirne and Kirklareli. At that time, he put a distance between himself and the Nurcu movement. But when he was appointed as an imam to Kestane Pazari mosque in Izmir in 1966, he resumed working for the Nurcu movement and began to advance within it. Yasar reports that by the 1970s Gulen had ceased to participate in the social and political activities of the Nurcus. Yasar also accuses Gulen of hiding his Nurcu identity during a military court trial in 1971, in Izmir (I. Yasar,op. cit., pp.223-4, 307-8, 319-22, 434-5).

25. See note 2. 26. For more on Fethullah Gulen see F. Bulut, Kim Bu Fethullah Gulen (Istanbul, 1998); R.

(akir, Ayet ve Slogan, Tiirkiye'de islami Olusumlar (Istanbul, 1990), pp.99-113; L. Erdogan, Fethullah Giilen Hocaefendi 'Kilgiuk Dunyam' (Istanbul, 1995); and C. Kozanoglu, Internet, Dolunay, Cemaat (Istanbul, 1997).

27. K. Kocoglu, op. cit., 1996, pp.92-4. 28. The Aczimendi group believed that the Nurcu movement had reached a second stage in its

evolution, one which required conformance with the structure of a Sufi order. According to the Aczimendis, each step takes sixty years, and the first phase of Nurcu movement lasted from its inception in 1925 or 1926 until 1985 or 1986. Hulusi Yahyagil and Mehmet Feyzi both died in these years, which meant that none of Said's 'original students' remained alive as of that time. Aczimendis claim that the Nurcu movement has fallen away


from the Risale-i Nur, meaning that it must either vanish or adopt a new method. Since annihilation can hardly be possible, the group's methodology must be changed. See Risale- i Nurda Usul ve Program, Aczimendilik (Istanbul, no date), pp.11-12.

29. Ibid., p.10. 30. In 1990, a Nurcu group, called Yeni Nesilciler, under the leadership of Mehmet Firinci

abandoned the Yeni Asya group. Yeni Nesilciler criticized publication of the Yeni Asya's Encyclopedia of Current History (Yakin Tarih Ansiklopedisi), in which Turkey's recent history was severely criticized. There are no major differences between the Yeni Nesilciler and the Yeni Asya. Yeni Nesilciler has three leaders: Mehmet Firincl, who is mainly engaged in publication activities; Mehmet Emin Birinci, who is engaged in the financial administration of the group's companies; and Yavuz Bahadiroglu, who is the chief adviser to these companies. In 1993, another group of Nurcu, called Ittihad-i Islamcilar led by Rustu Tafrali, split from the Yeni Asya. This group views the various interpretations of the Risale as the main reason for the fragmentation of the Nurcu movement. It rejects the claims of distortion in Risale. K. KoNoglu, op. cit., pp.82-3; 91; and M.H. Okutucu, op. cit., p.150.

31. 'Bediiizzaman'in Olumunden Sonra Geli?en Nur Ekolui', Dava, No.36 (March 1993), p.12.

32. Pamukqu's full name is Mehmed Feyzi Pamukqu (1912-90); he was another 'original student' of Said Nursi. For more on Pamukqu see N. 5ahiner, Son fahitler Bediuizzaman Said Nursi'yi Anlatiyor (Istanbul, 1993), Vol.2, pp.126-32.

33. 'Bediiizzaman'in Olumunden Sonra Geli?en Nur Ekolui', Dava, No.36 (March 1993), p.13. The Yeni Asya group has also confirmed that this meeting took place. See I. Ya?ar, Ibid., pp.45-6.

34. 'Bedijizzaman'in Olumunden Sonra Geli?en Nur Ekolui', Dava, No.36 (March 1993), p.13.

35. Ibid.p.14. 36. Ibid., p.14. 37. 'Dava'nin Tarihqesi', Dava, No.26 (May 1992), p.43. 38. The column 'Serkelam' has always been written by Siddik Dursun 5eyhanzade; in it, Med-

Zehra's leader sets forth the group's position on major issues. 'Serkelam, Demokrasi ve Siyaset ...', Dava, No.19 (Oct. 1991), p.5.

39. Ibid., pp.10-13. 40. One of Nursi's letters was to Adnan Menderes, Democratic Party leader and Prime

Minister from 1950 to 1960. 41. 'Siyaset, Politika ve Tavrimiz', Dava, No.66-67 (Oct.-Nov. 1995), pp.3-4. 42. For this criticism, see 'Ittihad-i Islam'a dogru', Dava, No.3 (Aug.-Sept. 1989), pp.3-4;

and 'Risale-i Nur Sahabi Mesleginin Bu Zamanki Bir Cilvesidir', No.7 (April-May 1990), pp.20-21. For examples of defenders of political parties as legitimate partners with the Nurcu movement, see S. Mursel, Siyasi Diuiince Tarihi 4Itinda Bediuizzaman Said Nursi (Istanbul, no date), pp.165-92; and I.E. Deveci, Ben Dindar Bir Cumhuriyetciyim (Istanbul,1994), pp.80-5.

43. 'Siyaset, Politika ve Tavrlmlz', Dava, No.66-7 (Oct.-Nov. 1995), p.4. 44. For one example see I.E. Deveci, Ben Dindar Bir Cumhuriyet iyim (Istanbul,1994). 45. 'Serkelam, Demokrasi ve Siyaset ...', Dava, No. 19 (Oct. 1991), p.3. 46. Ibid., p.4. 47. 'M.Siddik 5eyhanzade'ye Dinleyiciler Tarafindan Sorulan Sorular ve Cevaplar', Dava,

No.64-5 (Aug.-Sept. 1995), p.14. 48. M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Deccal-Mehdi, Deha-yi Fenni ile Hiidaya-yi 5er'i Muvazeneleri',

Dava, No.76 (Oct.-Nov. 1996), pp.18-19. 49. 'M.Siddik 5eyhanzade'ye Dinleyiciler Tarafindan Sorulan Sorular ve Cevaplar', Dava,

No.64-5 (Aug.-Sept. 1995), p.12. 50. Bediiizzaman Said Nursi, Emirdag Lahikasi-II (Istanbul, 1991), pp.204-5. 51. Htisrev Altinba?ak and Rafet Barutsu were imprisoned in Eski?ehir (1935), Denizli (1943)

and Afyon (1948) with Said Nursi. M. Feyzi Pamukqu and Tahiri Mutlu were imprisoned with Said in Denizli (1943) and Afyon (1948).


52. It is claimed that Ceylan Cali?kan also had a letter from Said Nursi which indicated that he had a right to publish Said's works, but he never used this permission.

53. Interview with Siddik Dursun (5eyhanzade) on 6 Nov. 1997. S. Nursi, Emirdag Lahikasi- II (Istanbul, 1991), pp.204-5.

54. Mustafa Acet points out that at the beginning, Sozler Yayinevi was run by Abdullah Yegin, but later it was given over to Mustafa Sungur. 'Ustadin Varisinden Vasiyet Mektubu', Dava, No.41 (Aug. 1993), p.9.

55. Abdulkadir Badilli is a Kurd from the Badilli tribe in Urfa. He first met Said Nursi in 1953. See N. 5ahiner, Son .ahitler Bediuzzaman Said Nursi'yi Anlatlyor (Istanbul, 1994), Vol.4, pp.169-84.

56. M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Nurani Miidafa', Dava, No.46 (Jan. 1994), pp.8-9, 'Miunazarat Uzerine', Dava, No.42 (Sept. 1993), pp.22-3. Acet reports that Envar Ne?riyat was established without consultation. 'Ustadyn Varisinden Vasiyet Mektubu', Dava, No.41 (Aug. 1993), p.9.

57. Ibid. 58. 5eyhanzade claims that Badilli forced him to buy Envar Nesriyat, saying, 'If you do not

buy the publishing house, the blame will be on you if I have to sell it to someone in Beyaz Saray (a section of a shopping area where mainly nationalist publications are sold).' Husnu Bayram said the same thing. Although they signed a contract, Badilli later decided not to sell. M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Nurani Miudafa', Dava, No.46 (Jan. 1994), p.9.

59. 'Ustadin Varisinden Vasiyet Mektubu', Dava, No.41 (Aug. 1993), pp.9-10. 60. 'Vesikalarl Aciklamaya Devam Ediyoruz', Dava, No.41 (Aug. 1993), p.5. 61. 'Risale-i Nurlari Gerqek Manasiyla Anlamak ... (Dava)', Dava, No.5 (Dec.-Jan. 1990),

pp.15-17, 'Risale-i Nur Sahabi ..., pp.23-4. 62. Dava published excerpts from the Risale-i Nur in both Ottoman Turkish and transcribed

into modern Turkish. For articles citing and explaining various distortions, see 'Zaruri Bir Aqiklama ... I?aratti'l I'caz', Dava, No.40 (July 1993), pp.6-13; and 'Vesikalari Aqiklamaya Devam Ediyoruz', Dava, No.41 (Aug. 1993), pp.5-24.

63. The Med-Zehra group severely criticized this practise. 'When they were displeased with the final decision of the sharia court, they turned their backs on it. Taking the case to a secular court of the Turkish republic clearly shows the level of sincerity of their belief', Mim Silopi, 'Tagutun Onunde Muhakeme Olmak', Dava, No.41 (Aug. 1993), p.32.

64. M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Muvafakatname ve Yazilan Vasiyet Mektubu Uzerine', Dava, No.41 (Aug. 1993), pp.25-6, 'Risale-i Nur'un Degistirilmesi', Dava, No.40 (July 1993), pp.3-5, 'Risale-i Nur Davasini tenvir nesriyat kazandi', Dava, No.66-7 (Oct.-Nov. 1995), p.19.

65. On this issue, see M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Hutbe-i 5amiye', Dava, No.43-4 (Oct.-Nov. 1993), pp.27-47; 'Tarihce-i Hayat', Dava, No.45 (Dec. 1993), pp.37-47; M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Nurani Miudafa', Dava (Jan. 1994), pp.5-12, 29-48; 'Tarihce-i Hayat-2', Dava, No.47 (Feb. 1994), pp.34-43; 'Eskisehir Hayati-9', Dava, No.48 (March 1994), pp.47-62; 'Kastamonu Hayati', Dava, No.50 (May 1994), pp.38-48; and 'Denizli Hayati', Dava, No.51 (June 1994), pp.24-32.

66. Hekimoglu Ismail, for example, claims that Said knew Kurdish, Turkish, Arabic and Persian, and that he was thought to be a Kurd since his mother tongue was Kurdish, while in fact he was a Seyyid. Ismail also claims that Osman (;ali?kan, Mehmed Cali?kan, Ceylan (;ali?kan, Zubeyir Giindiizalp, Tahiri Mutlu and Mustafa Sungur, 'original students' and assistants to Said, all confirmed this claim. H. Ismail, 100 Soruda Bediuizzaman Said Nursi, Risale-i Nur Kiilliyati ve Risale-i Nur Talebeleri (Istanbul, 1997), p.15.

67. 'Mehdi meselesine kisa bir aciklama', Dava, No.66-7 (Oct.-Nov. 1995), pp.10-1. 68. 'Selam Gazetesi'nin Suallerine Cevaplar', Dava, No.47 (Feb. 1994), p.9. 69. 'Almanya'da PANEL Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (R.A.) Anildi', Dava, No.16 (July 1991),

p.23; M. S. 5eyhanzade, 'Bediuzzaman ve Miicadelesi Adli Konferansta Sorulan Sorulara Verilen Cevaplar', Dava, No.17 (Aug. 1991), p.18.

70. M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Bediuizzaman ve Ittihadi Islami', Dava, No.70-71 (Feb.-March 1996), p.6.

71. 'Mehdi meselesine kisa bir aqlklama', Dava, No.66-7 (Oct.-Nov. 1995), p. 1.


72. M.S. 5ehanzade, 'Bediuzzaman ve Ittihadi Islami', Dava, No.70-71 (Feb.-March 1996), p.4.

73. The concepts of nation and ethnic group are used interchangeably in the journal. 74. M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Bediuzzaman ve Ittihadi Islami', Dava, No.70-71 (Feb.-March 1996),

pp.6-7. 75. Ibid., pp.6-7. 76. 'M.Siddik 5eyhanzade'ye Dinleyiciler Tarafindan Sorulan Sorular ve Cevaplar', Dava,

No.64-5 (Aug.-Sept. 1995), pp.13-14. 77. M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Bediuzzaman ve Ittihadi Islami', Dava, No.70-71 (Feb.-March 1996),

p.9. 78. Ubeydullah Vusfanli, 'Bediuzzaman Said Nursi'nin Abdtilhamid'e Gonderdigi Mektubun

5erh ve Izahl', Dava, No.3 (Aug.-Sept. 1989), pp.13-14. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. Molla Said, 'Bediuzzaman Molla Said-i Kuirdi'nin Nesayihi', Dava, No.33 (Dec. 1992),

p.18, 'Bediuzzaman Said Nursi'den Kiirt Sorununa Islami ,ozumler, Tesbitler ve Receteler', Dava, No.33 (Dec. 1992), p.10-14.

82. Muistehir Karakaya, '5eyh Mazhar Efendi (Rh.a)', Dava, No.3 (Aug.-Sept. 1989), p.30. 83. 'Bediuzzaman'a Gore Irk,llik ve Milliyetcilik', Dava, No.4 (Oct.-Nov. 1989), pp.5-6. 84. Ibid. p.7. 85. Ibid., pp.12-13. 86. I have been told that about 80 per cent of the group members are Kurdish and 20 per cent

of them are Turkish. 87. 'Serkelam', Dava, No.4 (Oct.-Nov. 1989), p.3, 'Okuyucu Mektuplary', Dava, No.16 (July

1991), p.2. 88. 'Serkelam', Dava, No.4 (Oct.-Nov. 1989), p.4. 89. M.Unal, 'Bediuzzaman'a Yapilan Ktirtiiluk Ithami ve 5eyh Said Hadisesi', Dava, No.16

(July 1991), pp.28-9. 90. 'Buitiin Yonleriyle Bediuzzaman ve Asr-i Saadet Metodu', Dava, No.5 (Dec.-Jan. 1990),

p.24. 91. M.S. Xeyhanzade, 'Bediuizzaman ve Kurt Sorunu, Islami QMizumler', Dava, No.33 (Dec.

1992), pp.6-9. 92. On the Sheikh Said revolt see M. van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State, The Social and

Political Structures of Kurdistan (London, 1992), pp.281-99; M. van Bruinessen, Kiirdistan Uzerine Yazilar (Istanbul, 1992), pp.123-71; M. Tuncay, Tuirkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti YBnetimi'nin Kurulmasi (1923-1931) (Ankara, 1981), pp.126-49; and U. Mumcu, Kurt-Islam Ayaklanmasi (Ankara, 1997).

93. See, for example, interview with Kasim Firat, '5eyh Said Hadisesinin Tarihcesi', Dava, No.8 (June-July 1990), pp.8-16; also, 'Abduilmelik Firat ile 5eyh Said Uzerine Mulakat', Dava, No.16 (July 1991), pp.9-18; and an interview with Melik Firat, 'Roportaj', Dava, No.28 (July 1992), pp.5-15; as well as '5eyh Said Kiyaminin Canli 5ahidi', Dava, No.28 (July 1992), pp.16-18; and '5eyh Said Direnisinin 72. Yildonumu Muinasebetiyle Melik Firat Ile Miilakat', Dava, No.74 (June-July 1996), pp.5-9.

94. 'Serkelam, Saideyn ve Gelinen Nokta', Dava, No.62-3 (June-July 1995), pp.3-4. 95. 'Kuird Soru?turmasina Islami Czitimler', Dava, No.27 (June 1992), p.18. 96. Abdullillah Firat, who was present at this historic meeting, discussed it with Dava writers

('Saideyn Molla Said-i Kurdi ve 5eyh Said-i Palevi', Dava, No.16 (July 1991), pp.19-21. 97. 'Kuird Soru?turmasina Islami (5ztimler', Dava, No.27 (June 1992), p.18. 98. 'Serkelam', Dava, No.28 (July 1992), p.4. 99. 0. Horasani, 'Zamane Bedi'i', Dava, No.62-3 (June-July 1995), p.6.

100. For one example of this argument, see Z. Yildiz, Kurt Ger egi, Olaylar; Oyunlar, fiiziimler (Istanbul, 1992), pp.237-41; Z. Yildiz, Bediuizzaman ve MilliyetCilik (Istanbul, 1995), pp.151-3.

101. Z. Yildiz, Bediuzzaman ve Milliyetfilik (Istanbul, 1995), p.152. M. Unal claims that a letter written by Said Nursi to Sheikh Said does not exist. 'If he had sent a letter, it would mean that he was informed about the revolt.' He also believes that if Said had written a letter, he


would have explained why he had done so and would have used this letter as proof of his innocence in court. M. Unal, 'Bediuzzaman'a Yapilan Kurtc,uluk Ithami ve Eeyh Said Hadisesi', Dava, No.16 (July 1991), p.30.

102. 0. Horasani, 'Zamane Bedi'i', Dava, No.62-3 (June-July 1995), pp.5-6. 103. M. Unal, 'Bediuzzaman'a Yapilan Kurtc,uluk Ithami ve 5eyh Said Hadisesi', Dava, No.16

(July 1991), p.30. 104. Ibid., p.31. 105. 0. Resulan, 'Kurtlerin Trajedisi', Dava, No.15 (June 1991), p.13. 106. Ibid., pp. 14-15. 107. Ibid. 108. 'Hak Soz Dergisinden Dava Dergisine Sorulan Kurt Sorunu Soru?turmasina Cevaplar',

Dava, No.26 (May 1992), pp.16-17. 109. 'Kuirt Sorusturmasyna Islami Cizzimler', Dava, No.27 (June 1992), pp.14-15. 110. Ibid., pp.16-17. 111. 0. 5erwan, 'Bitmeyen Simsarlhk', Dava, No.30 (Sept. 1992), pp.26-7. A reader from

Erzurum criticized this article in his letter, writing that Qerwan unfairly slanders the Ottoman Empire, which represented Islamic unity for 600 years. 'Who made Islam superior after the Prophet Muhammad? How can you deny the contributions of Alparslan, Mehmed the Conqueror, Osman Gazi or Suleyman the Magnificent? Do you work for Islamic unity or fragmentation? The Turks have perpetrated wrongs against the Kurds. Leave these issues alone, try to work for Islam, and we will support you. But do not divide people according to their race. A verse from the Quran reads, "O believers, hold the string of God and do not get divided". Why do you behave in this way ... while hiding yourself behind the Risale-i Nur? Said Nursi was severely against racism, which you are perpetuating' ('Okuyucu Mektuplari', Dava, No.32 (Nov. 1992), p.47). 5erwan answered these criticisms with the assertion that many are overwhelmed with love for the Ottoman Empire, viewing it as if it were the society of asr-i saadet, and its sultans as if they were the caliphs of that age. This approach to the Ottomans, he writes, is incorrect. Another prevalent mistake, 5erwan thinks, is to identify the Ottomans with the Turks. In fact, 'Ottoman' was the common name of peoples who belonged to different ethnic groups but lived in the borders of the Empire. He holds that the Ottomans did nothing to improve the educational level of the Muslims in the Empire, particularly in Kurdistan. Islam, he writes, is one nation; but there are many different races in this nation, and God created them all. Thus if someone denies the existence of one of these races, he will be denying the word of God. (O. aerwan, 'Elestiri Uzerine', Dava, No.33 (Dec. 1992), pp.33-7.)

112. 'Osmanli ve Osmanlicilik', Dava, No.33 (Dec. 1992), pp.24-5. 113. 'KUrt Sorunu (;erqevesinde Lice'nin Yakilmasi ile Ilgili MAZLUM-DER'in Raporu',

Dava, No.45 (Dec.-Jan. 1993), pp.12-15. 114. S. Amedi, 'Kirli Savas', Dava, No.40 (July 1993), p.39. 115. 'Dogu ve GUineydogu'da Son Durum', Dava, No.45 (Dec. 1993), p.6. 116. 'Gizli Tahrifat', Dava, No.80 (June-July 1997), pp.24-5. 117. M. Said Bakan, 'Sistem ve Bizler', Dava, No .81 (Aug. 1997), p.7. 118. M.S. 5eyhanzade, 'Aci Gercekler Tarih Tekerrur Ediyor', Dava, No.45 (Dec. 1993),

pp.4-5. See also from the same issue: N. Etdoger, '70 Yillhk Zehirin Sancilari', p.8; A. Kiluc ve Arkada?lari, 'Mazlumlarin 5ikayeti', pp.9-10; A. Akba?, 'Yeter Artik', p. 11; and from the June 1994, No.51 issue, '5ark'in Izdirabi, p.4-5. M.A. Nur wrote from Diyarbakir to argue that nationalism could not be defended within the framework of Islam. But, he wrote, if you accepted Turkish nationalism as legitimate you had to accept Kurdish nationalism as well. He criticized both the Turkish army and the PKK. M.A. Nur, 'Kisi Sevdigi ile Beraberdir', Dava, No.62-3 (June-July 1995), pp.13-15.

119. 'Serkelam', Dava, No.16 (July 1991), pp.3-4. 120. 'Okuyucudan Gelenler', Dava, No.48-9 (March-April 1994), p.2. 121. 'Okuyucudan Gelenler', Dava, No.51 (June 1994), p.2. 122. A. Incekan, 'Mazlumlar Agliyor Duyuyor musun?', Dava, No.54 (Sept. 1994), pp.30-31. 123. 0. 5ervan, 'Zaman Olur ki ... !', Dava, No.24 (March 1992), p.24. 124. Ibid., pp.24-6.

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