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Individualism, Communitarianism and ConsensusAuthor(s): Keith LehrerSource: The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2001), pp. 105-120Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115683Accessed: 10/03/2009 21:54

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KEITH LEHRER

INDIVIDUALISM, COMMUNITARIANISM AND CONSENSUS*

(Received 27 October 2000; accepted 15May 2001)

ABSTRACT. There is a contemporary conflict between individualistic and communitarian

conceptions of rationality. Robert Goodin describes it as a conflict between an enlightenment individualistic conception of a "sovereign artificer" and "a socially unencumbered

self as contrasted with the communitarian conception of a "socially embedded self

whose identity is formed by his or her community. Should we justify and explain rationalityindividualistically or socially? This is a false dilemma when consensus is reached by a

model articulated by Keith Lehrer and Carl Wagner. According to this model, the con

sensus results from the positive weights individuals give to others and use to continually

average and, thus, aggregate their allocations. Aggregation converges toward a consensus

in which the social preference and the individual preferences become identical. The truth

of communitarianism is to be found in the aggregate and the truth of individualism in the

aggregation. The original conflict dissolves in rational consensus.

KEY WORDS: aggregation, communitarianism, connectedness, consensus, convergence,

Enlightenment, individualism, interpersonal unity, liberalism, Robert Gordin, self, weights

There is a contemporary conflict concerning the role of the individual and

society in the theory of rationality. On one side there is the enlightenment account of individualistic rationality. Robert Goodin describes it as

follows:1

The Enlightenment model of social life is a seductive one. It depicts rational (or anyway

reasoning) individuals choosing goals and plans and projects for themselves, with those

autonomous individuals then coming together, of their own volition, in pursuit of shared

interests and common goals. ... From Pico della Mirandola through Kant and the early

Rawls, this vision of modern man as a "sovereign artificer" has reigned supreme throughoutmainstream Western moral and political thought.2

*This paper was presented to the World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, 1998, under

the title "Individualism versus Communitarianism: A Consensual Compromise." It was

written while the author was a fellow of the Australian National University, Institute for

Advanced Study. A version of this paper was presented to the Society for Ethics in 1999.1

Robert E. Goodin, "Review Article: Communities of Enlightenment," British Journalof Political Science 28 (1998), p. 531. All quotations from Goodin are to this article and

footnotes within quotations are due to Goodin.2 Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment?" The Philosophy of Kant, trans, and ed.

Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Random House, 1949; originally published 1784), pp. 132139, esp. Section 2. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard

?* The Journal of Ethics 5: 105-120,2001.^T ? 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands.

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106 KEITH LEHRER

This Goodin describes as the enlightenment view of the unencumbered

self.Goodin describes the opposing communitarian view as follows:

Familiar old Hegelian themes have recently been refashioned into a full-dress "communi

tarian critique" of liberalism and, through it, of the Enlightenment conception of man

as a whole.3 In place of the socially "unencumbered self of Enlightenment mythologyand Kantian ethics, we are asked to substitute a 'socially embedded' self. In place of the

autonomous individual, we are asked to substitute an agent constituted and constrained in

important respects by communal attachments and cultural formations.4

The communitarian view is, as Goodin remarks, the view of the socially

embedded self.Both enlightenment and the communitarian views concern the correct

perspective to take on the individual but also on society. According to the

enlightenment view as Goodin elaborates it:

Ex hypothesi, there are no affective sentiments binding them together. Ex hypothesi, each

is indifferent to the well-being of the other. Ex hypothesi, each is pursuing his or her own

goals to the exclusion of all else.

Despite their utter indifference to one another in all those respects, such individuals do

nonetheless find themselvesembedded in

"communitiesof interests".

Theyshare certain

concerns which can be better pursued jointly than separately. Each finds that others have

something s/he wants or needs. Without coordination, they find themselves cutting across

one another unnecessarily, or they find themselves missing opportunities for mutually

beneficial collaboration.

University Press, 1971) and "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," The Journal of

Philosophy 11 (1980), pp. 515-572. Theodor W Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic

of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso/New Left Books, 1979).3 The Enlightenment conception was indeed a conception of man, and man alone,

however.4

Goodin, p. 532. For some articulations of communitarianism, see Michael Sandel,

Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)and "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory 12 (1984),pp. 81-96. Alasdair C. Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame,

Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989). Cf. also, Michael Walzer,

Thick and Thin (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The

communitarian argument has been reviewed effectively in many other places already, e.g.:

Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs

14 (1985), pp. 308-322; Will Kymlicka, "Communitarianism," Contemporary Political

Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 199-237; Stephen Mulhall and Adam

Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and Elizabeth

Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the Liberal

Communitarian Debate (Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1993). See also two important

compilations collecting key contributions to this debate: Michael J. Sandel (ed.), Liber

alism and Its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); and Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit

(eds.), Communitarianism and Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

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INDrVIDUALISM, OMMUNITARIANISM ND CONSENSUS 107

That story is as familiar as Hobbes and Locke and the Scottish Enlightenment. Some

times those stories are presented in terms of an overarching social contract;5 other times

they are couched in terms of more diffuse conventions underlying social institutions or

particularised exchange relations.6 What all those stories nonetheless have in commonis that they all depict a "community of interests" arising among individuals without any

antecedent communal sentiments. Interests, and interests alone, here beget community.7

By contrast, Goodin avers, the communitarian argues that we belong to

communities of meaning, experience, regard and subsumption to socialnorms. To quote Goodin again, the communitarian view is characterised in

terms of identity as follows:

Communitarian critics of the Enlightenment model are looking for something beyond anyof that, however. Their talk of communities of generation, or meaning, experience or even

of regard points to something that stands above and before any calculation of enlightenedself-interest. Communitarians themselves would phrase this in terms of the social construc

tion of identity, of the communal "sources of the self."8 Whereas the Enlightenment fiction

is that sovereign artificers make communities, the communitarian emphasis is upon the

various ways in which communities make individuals: literally, in the case of communities

of generation; figuratively, in communities of meaning, experience and regard.9

He continues later as follows:10

So too, for communitarians, are our collective conversations and deliberations partlyconstitutive of who we are and what we want.11 Where the Enlightenment model sees

conversations among independently constituted interlocutors, who through the poolingof information come to some shared judgments, the communitarian model sees conver

sations constituting and reconstituting interlocutors who are partly made and remade

through them. Where the Enlightenment model sees independent assessors converging on

certain facts and values, premises and conclusions, the communitarian model sees inter

dependent agents constituted at least in part by that which they share in the course of their

conversations.12

Goodin examines the conflict in detail and after noting the various

ways in which the unencumbered self of the enlightenment will inevi

5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651). John Locke, Second

Treatise of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960;

originally published 1690).6 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, eds.

R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner and WB. Todd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976; originally

published 1776). David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: John Noon, 1739)

and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (London: Cadell, 1777).7

Goodin, p. 535.8

Taylor, Sources of the Self, Part I.9

Goodin, p. 551.10

Goodin, p. 554.11

Taylor, p. 181.12

Thus, Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1958), pp. 175-181.

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INDIVIDUALISM, COMMUNITARIANISM ND CONSENSUS 109

ideal case, that there is a chicken and the egg problem of whether the

egg of individualism comes before the chicken of communitarianism or

viceversa.

The individual and society fry and fly together.The

societyis defined by a consensus aggregated by individuals and individuals are

defined by the consensus they aggregate. The truth of communitarianism is

to be found in the aggregate, the truth of individualism in the aggregation.I shall construe the problem as the problem of individualism versus

communitarianism. It is clear, as Goodin illustrates, that the conflict

between individualism and communitarianism is an ongoing ethical and

political conflict. The resolution of it, if one is to be found, is more thana

solution ofan

abstract logical puzzle. We may, however, finda

solutionby means of an abstract logical or mathematical representation of it, and

that is what I shall suggest. Before turning to mathematical representation,we shall need as much clarification of the problem that we can obtain, and

that requires that we distinguish different problems that may be confusedunder a single heading. We may murder to dissect, but some confusions

must meet their justified demise before precise articulation is possible.The first distinction is between a conflict of fact and methodology, on

onehand,

and conflict of value anddeontology,

on the other. Some value

individualism above communitarianism and think we all ought to, while

others value communitarianism above individualism and think we all oughtto. This dispute of value and deontology is easily confused with one of fact

and methodology. The latter dispute concerns whether, on one hand, we are

to explain the thought and action of an individual in terms of the influenceof social groups or communities to which he or she belongs or whether, on

the other hand, we are to explain the thought and action of social groups interms of the individuals

belongingto them.

Of course, most of us are inclined to the latitudinarian view that some

times we can explain the thought and actions of an individual in terms

of the social groups to which he or she belongs and sometimes we can

explain the thought and actions of social groups in terms of the individuals

belonging to them, but that does not end the dispute. For the questionremains as to which explanations are basic. The individualistically oriented

psychologist or economist may be committed to the methodology- the

individual is basic forexplanation

- while thesocially

orientedsociologistor political scientist may be committed to the methodology

- the social

group is basic for explanation. The first may think of the goals and interestsof individuals as providing the basic explanation of why social groupsthink and act as they do in terms of the personal minds of individuals

belonging to the group. The second may think of the goals and interestsof groups as providing the basic explanation of why individuals think and

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110 KEITH LEHRER

act as they do in terms of the social mind of the individuals belongingto the social group. Both kinds of explanations are useful, but the ques

tion remains-

what is basic to explanation in the social sciences-

theindividual or society?

There is a parallel dispute when we turn from the explanation of what

is the case to the question of what ought to be the case. Ought the interests

and goals of the social groups be derived from the interests and goals of

the individuals belonging to them, or ought the goals and interests of indi

viduals be derived from the interests and goals of the groups to which they

belong? Again, it is clear that sometimes an individual should respect the

goals and interests of a group to which he or she belongs, and sometimesa groups should respect the goals and interests of an individual belongingto them, but the question is - what is basic to justification? Are the goalsand interests of individuals basic to justifying what ought to be pursued

by individuals and groups, or are the goals and interests of groups basic to

justifying what ought to be pursued by groups and individuals?

The similarity of the form of the questions suggests that there maybe a similarity in the form of the answer, and so there is. Moreover, the

answer is the same in both cases. There is an ideal case in which neitherthe individual nor the society is basic, namely, the case in which the goalsand interests are consensual, for in that case the individual and social goalsand interests are identical with the consensual goals and interests. There is

a fundamental mistake in both the perspective of individualism and that of

communitarianism, namely, the assumption that one must be basic, just as

there is a common insight in both, namely, that each is essential. But how

can consensus resolve the conflict of individualism and communitarianism

in either the domain of explanation or justification? Either the consensusis formed by individuals consenting to some common interest or goal

expressing nothing more than their individual interests and goals, which

is individualism, or commitment to the consensual goals and interests is

required of the individuals, which is communitarianism. How can we slipbetween the horns of the dilemma?

The crux of the answer is that ideal consensus is a commitment of

consenting individuals to consensual goals and interests. The commitment

to the consensual goals and interests is what the communitarian requiresfor social identity, but because it is the consensus of consenting individuals,it is formed from their individual goals and interests as the individualist

requires. The consensus is the consensus of individuals, and, therefore,the individual and communal goals and interests coincide within it. What

we require to solve the two problems of explanation and justification is a

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theory of a consensus that articulates the double solution. Let us turn to the

articulation of it.

As a first step toward the solution to the problem, let us consider conflictbetween two persons. One favourite articulation of a two person problem is

the prisoners dilemma, but it is a poor model for social intercourse between

two people because it precludes communication and negotiation between

them to solve the problem. Let us instead consider a problem where two

people need to resolve their conflict and see how a consensus might arise.

George and Mary are left $1,000 in a will which they may divide amongtheir favourite charities provided they can agree on how to divide the

money. George wishes to give $1,000 to the American Cancer Society, A,because his father died of cancer. Mary wishes to give $1,000 to Planned

Parenthood, P, because of her commitment to that cause. How are they to

reach agreement? One way, would be for each to think of himself or herselfas having a unit of weight to divide between himself or herself and the

other. Suppose that George gives a weight of 0.1 toMary, 0.9 to himself,and Mary does the same. Consistency requires that each modify his or

her allocation in terms of the weight assigned to himself or herself and the

other, and the way to do so is to average or aggregate the allocations, so thatGeorge modifies his allocation to 0.9 X $1,000 to A and 0.1 X $1,000 to P

with result that he now agrees to allocate $900 to A and $100 to P, while

Mary agrees to allocate $900 to P and $100 to A. They have not reached

agreement by a single aggregation, but suppose they continue to give a

weight of 0.1 to the other, 0.9 to themselves, and average or aggregate

again. They will continue to move closer to each other in their allocations,and iterated aggregation will drive them to converge toward the allocation

of $500 to each charity. This will then become the consensual allocationof the group consisting of George and Mary.

This is a very simple example of consensus. The process of forminga consensus violates the principles of extreme individualism. It is not thecase that each is pursing his or her goals to the exclusion of all others.Each is giving some weight to the goal of the other. The motive might be

egoistic, or it might not be. There may be an affective sentiment bindingthem which influences what weight each gives to the goal of the other,

and they may be concerned about the well-being of each other. We cannotexclude the possibility that George and Mary have arrived at consensus

by exercising pure egoism, but once the aggregation process begins each

party is sacrificing the egoistically preferred position of giving $1,000 tohis or her favourite charity. Moreover, once that aggregation begins, each

party begins to form a preference that is partly social in nature. George and

Mary may begin by assigning an allocation without concern for the other.

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It is important to notice that the allocation of $500 to each charity

might have resulted from different processes without consensus. One

possibilityis

Georgeand

Mary mighthave been told that if

theydid not

reach consensus about the allocation, the allocation would be randomlychosen by an unidentified third party. Suppose that they do not reach

consensus, each refusing to give positive weight to the other in the negotiation, and the third party chooses the allocation of $500 to each charity.The actual allocation is the same as in the case of consensus, but the

allocation, though it is to some extent the result of a failure of the pairto reach consensus, is neither an individual nor a communal allocation

butis, instead, imposed. They

are subsumed under animposed

allocation.

Neither of them is committed to that allocation communally or individu

ally, though they each bear some responsibility for the outcome and willhave to accept the result. Finally, suppose that instead of aggregating to

consensus, George and Mary each guess at an allocation they think theother will accept without negotiation or aggregation, and they each pick the

allocation of $500 to each charity. Each of them is individually committedto that allocation, but there is no communal commitment to that allocation

because it is not the result of social consensus.

In the example of George and Mary we can solve our two problems,the problem of fact and methodology, on one hand, and the problem of

value and deontology, on the other. Consider first of all the problem of

fact and methodology. Should we explain the allocations in our examplein terms of the goals and purposes of the individuals or in terms of the

goals and purposes of the group when George and Mary reach consensus?Are we to explain the thought and action of an individual, George or Mary,

in terms of the influence of the socialgroup

to which he or shebelongsor are we to explain the thought and action of the social group composed

of George and Mary in terms of them? We certainly can explain the first

step of aggregation in terms of the preferences of George and Mary andthe weights they give to each other. The movement from the initial state,state 0, to the next state, state 7, is fully explained in terms of individual

preferences, goals and interests. The transition from state 1 to state 2, thesecond step of aggregation, brings in a social factor, however. Considera formal

representationof

George's aggregationfrom state 0 to state 1

and from state 1 to state 2, where the subscripts mark the person andthe superscripts mark the state, followed by the representation of Mary'saggregations for these states:

George,

AG-

AMWGM + AGWGG

AG=

AMWGM + AGWGG;

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114 KEITH LEHRER

and Mary,

Al _ A0 0 ,A0 0AM

-AGWMG + AMWMM

AM = ^G^MG + AMWMM'

I assume as in the example that George holds the weights he assignsconstant from state / to state 2 as does Mary, but that is for them to decide

in each state. It is clear, however, that even at state 1, the allocations of

George and Mary are already socially embedded. The allocation of each

is embedded in the allocation of the other and a social factor is introduced

into the allocations of the individuals.

Themost

important social element is introduced in the second aggregation, however, and extreme individualism vanishes therein. This is revealed

when we substitute in the state 2 allocations what the state 1 allocations

equal. We obtain the following for George:

A%=

(AGw?MG + A0Mw?MM)wGM +

(A?MwGM+AGwGM)wGG.

Now when we consider this formula, it is clear that the weight that George

gives toMary in state 2 reflects his evaluation of the weight that Mary gaveto his allocation as well to her own in the original state. So the weight that

he gives to her is, in part, an evaluation of the weight that she gave to him.

Similarly, the weight that Mary gives to George in state 2 reflects her evalu

ation of the weight he gave to her in the original state. Moreover, when the

aggregation progresses to state 3, the weight that George gives toMary will

reflect his evaluation of the weight that she gave to the weight he gave to

her just as the weight that she gives to him will reflect her evaluation of the

weight that he gave to the weight she gave to him. Thus, though the weights

might remain constant from state to state, what is evaluated by the assigned

weight changes and becomes socially more complicated from state to state.

The allocations of George and Mary at state 2 are already a mixture of

social and individual factors. The allocation of each is socially embedded

in the allocations of the other, the weights the other has assigned, and the

weight one assigns to those weights. At this point, George's allocation is

encumbered with Mary's allocations and evaluations and hers with his. The

innocence of the unencumbered self is lost.

Should we explain the allocations of the individuals in terms of

consensus toward which they have converged and to which they have

agreed? It seems that we must. Neither would allocate $500 to each charity

except as a member of a group who has amalgamated his or her preferences and interests with the other to form a consensus. It is commitment

to the consensus which explains the $500 allocations that each makes.

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But there remains a caveat. Each of them has allocated $500 to each

charity as a result of a process of aggregation that each engaged in to

reach hisor

her goal. Theconsensus

is the solution toa

coordinationproblem that each confronts as an individual. However, to reach the solu

tion, each must amalgamate his or her interests with the other to reach a

consensus that is communal and commit themselves to it. The sovereignartifice is immediately lost in the second state of aggregation, and the

individuals become socially encumbered. Moreover, once they are sociallyencumbered, the distinction between the communal allocation and the

individual allocations vanishes in magic of mathematics. The individual

allocation of each"sovereign

artificer" becomes the "communal norm" ofconsensus. Individual interests become communal interests and communal

interests remain individual. The individual allocations and the communal

allocations are identical and symmetrical.To turn from fact and methodology to value and deontology, should

we agree that the interests and goals of the group ought to be derived

from the interests and goals of the individuals justified by them, or oughtthe interests and goals of the individuals be derived from the interestsand

goalsof the

groupand

justified bythem?

Aswe

have formulatedthe example, the interests and goals of the group require that $500 be

allocated by each individual to each charity, for it is in the interests and

goals of the group that a fixed sum be consensually allocated to each

charity and, therefore, that the individuals allocate $500 to each charity.The individual allocations are justified by the consensual allocations of

the group. The individuals ought to conform to the consensual allocationsas a social or communitarian norm. On the other hand, the interests and

goalsof the

groupare

justified byand derived from the

interestsand

goalsof the individuals, namely, to do what they must to obtain an allocationfor their preferred charity by reaching consensus. What is and what oughtto be coincide in the symmetry and identity of individual and communal

interests.

There is an ambiguity in the meaning of "derive" that should not leadus astray. The word is here used in the senses of both explanation and

justification. We have argued for the symmetry of individual and social

explanationand

justification.There

is,of

course,also a

temporalnotion

of derivation in which to say that one thing is derived from another is to

imply that the derived thing was caused by the antecedent occurrence ofthe thing from which it was derived. In our example, one has the impression that the consensus is derived in this sense from the earlier statesof aggregation. Though this might be the case, it need not be, and the

justification for the consensual allocation does not depend upon it. We

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116 KEITH LEHRER

need only imagine that state 1 is a state in which each individual modifies

his or her allocation by aggregating his and her original allocation on the

basis of assigning 0.5 to himself and herself. The individuals reach theirown modified allocations at the same time that they create a consensual

allocation. The symmetry of the individual and the communal allocation

is instantaneous and synchronic. Thus, temporal symmetry and identity of

the individual and social allocation may be conjoined to that of explanationand justification.

The two person example that we have described above can be extended

to larger groups with more interesting results. The introduction of a third

person, Jean, into the decision making group would exhibit most of theconsequences of the extension of the model to groups of any finite size.

The most interesting consequence of introducing a third party is that such

a person might mediate conflict between the other two. For example, if

George and Mary each refuse to assign positive weight to each other and

each, consequently, assigns zero weight to the other, then each will remain

stubbornly fixed with his or her original allocation. If, however, Jean is

added to the group, and Jean assigns positive weight to each of them and

is assigned positive weight by each them, then aggregation will convergetoward consensus as a result of Jean's role when the weights assigned bythe three remain constant through iterated aggregation. So a third partycan connect parties who are otherwise disconnected. This is a powerfulalteration of the original example.

Moreover, as more parties are added the possibility of more indirect

connection arises. If every pair of members of the group is connected bysome sequence of members each of whom assigns positive weight to the

next, then, again, convergence will result from constancy through iteratedaggregation. This means, for example, that if all members of the groupare thought of as forming a circle in which each person assigns positive

weight to the person to his or her left and to no one else except himself

or herself, convergence would result from constancy of weight throughiterated aggregation. This allows for the creation of a communal allocation

in a large group where each person's individual allocation is identical to the

communal allocation even though each person in the group gives positive

weight to onlyone

other member of the group!Let us consider a more formal representation of the addition of more

parties. Each person, y, would assign a weight, w^,to each other person, k,

at each state s. Thus the allocation for person j resulting from aggregatingfrom state s to s + 1 is as follows:

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The consensual allocation Ac is the value to which the aggregationconverges for all j as s goes to infinity. The major implication of addinga third

personis that it

permitsus to obtain

convergencetoward consensus

even when some members of the group assigns a weight of 0 to other

members of the group. If all members of the group assign some positive

weight to themselves and all are connected by vectors of positive weightand all remain constant in the weights they assign through iterated aggregation, convergence toward consensus will result (these conditions are not

necessary for convergence, but they are sufficient).14 Two members of the

group j and k are connected in this way just in case there is a sequenceof members of the

groupsuch that

jis the first member and k is the last

member and each member in the sequence assigns positive weight to thenext member in the sequence. It is possible for all members to be connectedin this way even though each member gives positive weight to only one

other member of the group. Ifmembers of the group are connected, iterated

positive aggregation will converge toward a consensual allocation when

weights are held constant.

There is obviously no reason to suppose that weights will remainconstant

throughthe

processof

aggregation. However,it is

plausibleto

suppose that after extended aggregation weights would remain constant,

and, assuming that members of the group are connected at that state,iterated aggregation will again converge toward consensus. Nevertheless,it should not be assumed that connectedness is assured, for the process as

described in the example, and as assumed so far, allows for an individual to

opt out of the process by assigning all others a weight of zero. This insuresthat the individual cannot be co-opted by other members of the group, andit is

necessarythat he not be

co-optedif the consensual allocation is to

carry moral commitment. If an individual assigns all others a weight of

zero, then either they must reciprocate or face the prospect of making thatindividual a dictator by converging toward his or her allocation. Of course,as a result of individuals assigning others zero weight the group may

decompose into a major group and an outsider or into various subgroupshaving diverse allocations.

We may now define a basic difference between an individualistic and a

communalperspective.

The individualisticperspective

is one thatrequiresthe right of the individual to opt out of the consensual process and to

become an outsider to the group. A communal perspective might mandatesome weighting procedure requiring individuals to give positive weight to

14 For weaker sufficient conditions for convergence, see Keith Lehrer and Carl Wagner,Rational Consensus in Science and Society: A Philosophical and Mathematical Study

(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidel Publishing Co., 1980).

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118 KEITH LEHRER

others to insure convergence toward consensus. Such a perspective mightbe democratic requiring that each assign at least some minimal weight to

all the others or more autocratic requiring that each member assign somespecified weight to some leader or leading subgroup. The required weight

assignment might be a condition of communal membership.

Assuming that membership is not coerced, however, there remains the

argument that the individual allocation and the communal allocation are

the same, though in the case in which an individual assigns positive weightto others as a condition of membership in the community, he or she may

be aware of an alternative allocation representing the allocation he or she

would make as an outsider. Nevertheless, having chosen to meet the condition of group membership by assigning a positive weight to others and

participating in the aggregation process, the allocation of the individual

will, through aggregation, converge toward the communal allocation. Even

in this case, the communal allocation and the individual allocation will be

identical. The commitment to the communal allocation will coincide with

the communal allocation at the time at which each emerges as the outcome

of aggregation.

The foregoing reflections provide us with an understanding of howindividual and communal justification and explanation can be symmetricaland identical. They show us how disparate individual allocations can be

aggregated toward consensus by means of the constancy of positive weight

given to others in a group. A question arises, however, since the model

does not appear to describe actual behaviour. What light can the model

of aggregation shed on actual conflict between individual and communal

interests, goals, thought and action? First of all, the aggregation model

can be applied to arrive at consensus concerning anything that can berepresented mathematically. So if interests, for example, can be represented by utilities, the model can be applied to them. Moreover, the use

of the model avoids the usual problems resulting from an attempt to find

some interpersonal or intersubjective measure of utility. It is not needed.

The personal utilities of members of the group need not conform to any

interpersonal measure. The reason is that each individual can correct for

differences in the way others represent their utilities in terms of the weights

they assign. Thus, for example, if I think that the utility assignment ofanother exaggerates his intensity of interest in comparison to others, I can

assign him a proportionately lower weight to discount the exaggeration in

his utility assignment. Moreover, the model might be indirectly applied to

cases where a conflict could be first concerned with question of how much

weight to give to each person in the dispute, and once that is resolved

by finding consensual weights to be assigned to each person, the weights

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could be used as votes to resolve a conflict that is represented qualitatively.It must be conceded, however, that the model as articulated above can be

directly applied only in cases in which the dimension of conflict can berepresented mathematically.

The second and more important reply to the question of what light themodel can shed on actual conflict is that the model may be realised bymany instances of actual conflict without members to the dispute reflec

tively assigning weights to others. Their behaviour might be explained bythe assumption that they give weight to others and modify their positionin terms of these weights even though they do not do so reflectively or

in a way that introspection reveals. Moreover, as is apparent from ourexample of George and Mary, the convergence point may be obvious to all

parties after only one or two aggregations rendering the extended iteration

unnecessary. The intention to continue giving a positive weight to othersin a constant manner will be seen to commit one to a consensual point of

convergence.

There are many features of actual negotiation that are well explainedby the model. The first is the role of mediators in reaching consensus.

That is explained by their role in connecting members that are a partyto the dispute. Another feature is the rejection of the influence of medi

ators when one or more parties to a dispute does not want to compromise.That is explained by the need to assign zero weight to those mediating in

order to avoid being connected to others and driven to agreement by the

connection. Yet another feature is that increasing the size of a group mayfacilitate reaching consensus. That is explained by an increase in waysin which individuals can be connected by adding individuals to the group.

Perhaps most important is the fact that respect for a central figure or mutualrespect among parties to a conflict is so important in reaching agreementand maintaining community. That is explained by the way in which such

respect connects the members permitting aggregation toward consensus.

There is also the fact that negotiated agreement is so much more satis

factory than imposed agreement. That is explained by the identification of

individual and social commitment resulting from connection, constancyand aggregation toward consensus. By contrast, there is the anger thatis

displayed when negotiation failsto

reachconsensus.

That is explainedby the assignment of zero weight to others needed to avoid being slowlydriven to consensus. Finally, there is the happy occurrence of consensus

yielding surprising shifts in norms and social paradigms arising in a groupwith dissenting subgroups. That is explained by mutually respected individuals who connect the dissenting group with others in the aggregation toconsensus.

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120 KEITH LEHRER

We began by considering the contrast Goodin described between the

enlightenment view of individuals as socially unencumbered sovereign

artificers and the communitarian view of individuals socially embeddedin communities which require commitment from them. The consensual

model I have proposed provides an alternative that shares something with

both views. It shares the fundamental idea of the enlightenment view

that social agreement and community can be explained by the action of

individuals seeking to further their goals and interests, namely, by giving

positive weight to others and aggregating toward consensus. It shares the

fundamental idea of the communitarian that there should be an iden

tification of the interests and goals of the individual with those of thecommunity.

On the other hand, the model departs in an equally fundamental wayfrom each view. It departs from the fundamental idea of the individual

istic model that the individual interests and goals, though they may be

coordinated with others belonging to a community, are not identical to

them. It departs from the fundamental idea of the communitarian model

that communal commitment to the goals and interests of the community

can not be the result of individuals pursuing their own goals and interests.The model is, however, closer to the enlightenment view and the positionGoodin espouses because the process of aggregation to consensus is based

on individuals pursuing their goals and interests. My own view, however,is that egoism, however enlightened, would fail to produce harmony and

commitment within a community without social interests and goals within

the individuals motivating them to give positive weight to others with suffi

cient constancy to form a community among them. We are social beings,

as Thomas Reid noted in the Scottish enlightenment, and were we not,life would, in spite of occasional short-term coordination of small groups

seeking some common interest, remain what it is when the social impulsefails in times of war, namely, hostile, hateful and horrific. Benevolence and

respect are the engines of the vehicle of social aggregation.

Department of Philosophy

University of ArizonaTucson AZ 85721

USAE-mail: [email protected]

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