2.12 Emergency management for lifelines and rapid response after L’Aquila

8/13/2019 2.12 Emergency management for lifelines and rapid response after LAquila

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Effects on structures and infrastructures

2.12.1 IntroductionPerformance of lifelines during the April 6 eventmay be considered generally good if comparedto the extended losses related to buildings(Verderame et al., 2009), nevertheless damagesand service downtime, which required recoveryand emergency management, occurred. In thefollowing, for each of the main lifelines in theLAquila area (i.e., road network, water distribu-tion, gas distribution, power distribution, waterdistribution and treatment, telecommunicationsand post-event aid to population), the emer-gency management strategies adopted to

recover the systems and restore their functional-ity in the shortest possible time are described.Finally, criteria adopted to define priorities andto allocate resources for the temporary housingcamps are discussed. From the reported investi-gations it is concluded that the emergency man-agement of the lifelines networks provided arapid and resilient response to the earthquake.The emergency management procedures imple-mented for the physical and functional restora-tion of lifelines, after a proper codification maybecome a reference model for the Civil Defenceat international level.

2.12 Emergency management for lifelines and rapid response after LAquilaearthquake

M. Dolce1-3, S. Giovinazzi2, I. Iervolino3, E. Nigro3, A. Tang4

1 Ufficio Rischio Sismico, Dipartimento della Protezione Civile, Roma. www.protezionecivile.it2 Department of Civil and Natural Resources Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch. www.civil.canterbury.ac.nz3 Dipartimento di Ingegneria Strutturale, Universit degli Studi di Napoli Federico II. www.unina.it4 Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers, US. www.asce.org/instfound/techcomm_tclee.cfm

2.12.2 Road NetworkANAS S.p.A. is the agency that manages in theAbruzzo Region, as well as in the rest of thenational territory, the state road network. Theresidual functionality and safety investigation ofthe road network were the first priorities identi-

fied by ANAS for the management of the firstphase of the emergency. Physical and humanresources were deployed to achieve the follow-ing goals: 1) rapid survey of the road network toensure, at the largest possible extent, theregional mobility; 2) activation of emergencycontracting procedures (somma urgenzaagreements) to immediately begin, where possi-ble, activities for the restoration of normal mobil-ity conditions; 3) damage survey of the road-network components; 4) short term planning forthe repair of damaged components.

At the same time, physical and human resourceswere deployed in support of the Civil Defencefor a first partial debris removal and for theexcavations works necessary for the installationof relief campsites. It worth mentioning that, fur-ther to the local resources, additional ones wereused to manage the emergency. These resources

were available from few ANAS Regional com-partments differently located on the national ter-ritory, with an average daily commitment of 80men and 70 vehicles.

Rockfalls (Fig. 1a) and landslides triggered bythe earthquake and aggravated by the heavyrain that hit the area in the days following theevent, were identified as the most problematicsituations affecting the network mobility. How-ever, the rock falls and landslides occurred

mainly in mountainous areas around LAquila,while the main road network in the city was notaffected by the aforementioned phenomena. Inthe urban area, mobility limitations were causedby debris following damaged and/or unsaferesidential and monumental buildings adjacentto the roads.Immediate activities for the restoration of normalmobility conditions included: 1) removal of rocksand soil from the roads; 2) rock slope consolida-tions; 3) enhancement of soil slope stability.These activities were conducted employing,

where possible, internal resources or activating,alternatively, emergency contracting procedures

with external organisations. Securing of unsafebuildings adjacent to roads was carried out byfiremen.Temporary traffic management measures wereextensively implemented in order to minimizeroad closures; these measures included trafficflow restrictions; alternating one-way; lane and

velocity restrictions (Fig. 1b).The only significant damages occurred to the


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from the Gran Sasso Acqua headquarters. In

particular, electromagnetic sensors, measuringinput low pressure, and electromagnetic gauges(or Clamp on), measuring output differentialpressures, are installed in the tanks. The remotecontrol service allows furthermore the assess-ment of the water level in the tanks.The equipment connected to the remote controlsystem revealed, on the morning of April 6, asignificant and sudden change in the water flowfor a main pipeline in Paganica. The immediateclosure of the relative shutters for that pipe was

operated directly from the GSA headquarters,before the technician team reached the affectedsite. The cause of the rupture was identified inthe fault crossing the Paganica pipe. Because ofthat, the steel joint of the pipeline (diameter =600cm; pressure 25-30atm) slip-off, causing a

violent escape of water (Fig. 2a).A connection portion at the joint, however, wasstill grasped for a length of 6cm. In order toquickly respond to the emergency, the repair waslimited to the welding of the pipes at the joint.Exception made for the aforementioned joint slip-

off, no significant damage was observed to themain distribution and storage system. Followingthe repair of the damaged joint it was, therefore,possible to restart the provision of potable waterfor all municipalities administered by the G.S.A.SpA since the evening of April 6. As a lot of rup-tures were expected in the minor water distribu-tion system, in order to prevent flooding anddeterioration in the buildings already damaged,the decision was made, not to restore the waterdistribution in LAquila historical centre and in the

most affected villages. For these areas, therestoration of the water provision was graduallyoperated starting from the less affected zonesand/or the zones with a strong need for reacti-

vation; priority was given to the strategic serv-

ices, secondly to the commercial and industrial

activities, including the hotels to be reopened forthe G8 meeting, and finally to the residentialbuildings classified safe, after the specific AeDESsurvey. The partial restoration of the water distri-bution was possible because of secondary net-

works and of a shutter system that allowed theexclusion of areas where the water supply wasnot urgently needed. A few days after the earth-quake (19 April), due to a further slip of the fault,the welded joint of Paganica pipe broke, requir-ing a further repair intervention.

The priorities identified in the second phase ofthe emergency management were, on one hand,the provision of the water service to the reliefcampsites and, on the other hand, the manage-ment of all the activities for restoring the waterprovision in LAquila City. To carry out the worksfor the water network connection in the reliefcampsites, the technical staff of the company(fully operative since the third day after theearthquake) was supported by the GenioCivile staff. On the other hand, the works forrepairing damages and restoring the functional-

ity of the water service in LAquila were oper-ated, where possible, by the G.S.A. SpA techni-cians, or activating emergency outsourcing pro-cedures for the most demanding operations.Relationships with external organizations havebeen unfortunately, nowadays, interruptedbecause of the financial difficulties that the com-pany is undertaking due to the lack of income.Most commonly observed damages in the minordistribution system were the slippage/breakageof the joints and the breaking of cast iron pipes

(Fig. 2b). It is important to emphasize, however,that in large part of the red zones (damagedzones with prohibited access) the water networkis still closed. Because of that, it has not yet beenpossible to completely estimate the extent and 217


Fig. 2

Impact of the earthquake onthe water distributionnetwork: (a) Joint slip-off in amain water network pipelinein Paganica. (b) Repair ona cast iron pipe in aPaganica at the momentwhen some of theevacuated people werereturning home.

Punto in cui avvenuto losfilamento

a. b.


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the spread of the damage suffered by the net-work1.Finally, it is worth mentioning that the drinking

water purity and quality has been officiallytested and certified daily since the early daysafter the seismic event. Because the G.S.A. offi-cial testing laboratory was severely damagedafter the earthquake, this service was guaran-teed via mobile laboratories of a neighboring

water organization, C.A.M..The third phase of the emergency managementfocused on the construction of the water distribu-tion network and connections for the sites identi-

fied for the construction of the provisionalaccommodation: Temporary Housing ModulesM.A.P., and C.A.S.E project. Both the designand the new construction of the reservoirs and ofthe distribution network for these areas werecommitted to external organizations and con-tractors. The costs for both the design and theconstruction of the new reservoirs and networksfor the temporary accommodation were coveredby the Civil Defence. The G.S.A. SpA will con-tinue to be in charge of the management of the

water provision for the temporary accommoda-tion areas.

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Progettazione Sismica

1 The water consumption was reduced by 30% as a result of water shut off into the red zones. Mobile water tankers were used to

serve the relief camps in the first days after the quake.

2.12.4 Wastewater treatment plantThe technical visits at the wastewater treatment

plants serving LAquila (AQ), in the resorts ofPonte Rosarolo, Pile and Arischia, and at thatlocated in the City of Corfinio (AQ ) have shownthat examined systems have similar technicalcharacteristics, as they have the same practicalfunctions(Nigro & Bilotta, 2009). Each plant wasequipped both with the structures necessary forthe treatment of wastewater (primary clarifiertank, aeration tank, digestion tank, settling tank,thickener, sludge dewatering band press andchlorinator system) and with those for manage-ment purposes (buildings used as offices, roomsfor technical equipment and laboratories).The facility in Ponte Rosarolo is located near thehistorical center of LAquila (422018.10N -132339.09E). Structures were built the 60-70. The reinforced concrete digestion tank suf-fered partial collapse of a longitudinal wall (Fig.3a), several vertical cracks on a transversal walland the separation of orthogonal walls at theedges (Fig. 3b). The partial collapse of the wallalso involved the steel pipe adducting waste-

water that was connected to it. In buildings used

as offices, local technological and laboratoryequipment (RC framed structure) were alsofound cracks of both internal partitions andexternal walls. However, there were no evi-dences of damage to structural elements: thecracks detected on non-structural elements didnot represent significant damages and did notprevent the use of building. The inspected facili-ties were therefore useable at the time of inspec-tion, except the digestion tank that was useless.Due to this damage the tank has lost water andthe plant were partially closed by reducing the

disposal capacity of about 60%. The remaining

functionality was still sufficient to face thedemand, which was significantly reduced due to

the large number of evacuated people (approx-imately 30,000), housed outside the city.The structures of facility in Pile (42213.25N -132213.41E), which is situated between thetown and the industrial area of LAquile beingthe second plant serving the city, were realizedin two different periods (80 and 2000) with RC

walls and slabs. Structural damages were notdetected, only some damages to the partitions oflocal offices occurred. With regard to the oldersettling tanks, characterized by a circular crosssection, a deterioration of the curbing RC beam

was detected due to significant corrosion of thesteel reinforcements.The inspected structures, therefore, were viableand fully functional despite the damages (ofnon-seismic origin), due to degradation of mate-rials descending from a insufficient maintenanceof the settling tanks. However, in the controlroom, a tube connected to the pump (notanchored) was damaged due to a displacementof 15 cm, figure 3c. Finally it should be notedthat this plant has been out of energy for three

days after the earthquake, so it worked throughits own backup generator.The plant located in Arischia (42 2449 .02 N- 13 2025 .48 E) presents reinforced concretestructures with the exception of the circular tanksfor leaching, consisting of circular walls of arti-ficial masonry blocks connected with a RC curbat the top of the tank, and a gravity retaining

wall. The structures date back to the 70s with theexception of RC curb which was more recentlyconstructed. Cracks on the walls of a distributiontrap and damages to the retaining stone wall,

which led to the partial obstruction of the


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hydraulic groove drain at the base of the tank,were observed. With regard to the circulartanks, one of the two rotating distributors wasput out of service for damage to its support; thecracks found on some blocks of the structure

were dated before the earthquake. Therefore,the inspected facilities were functional, althoughthe restoration of the full functionality of thehydraulic facility required some minor rehabili-tation and repair of the tank distributor. In anycase, the age of the plant suggests a constant

monitoring even after the remedial action.The treatment facility in Corfinio (AQ) situatednot far from the center of the same town(42725.74N - 135031.78E) is a RC con-struction built in the 90s. The central part of thelongitudinal walls of the aeration tank, sepa-rated from lateral walls, shows a rotation veryprobably occurred in large part before the seis-mic event, as witnessed by the comparison of thepositions of monitoring slides before and afterthe earthquake; such slides were applied two

years before the event: the displacements due to

the earthquake did not compromise thehydraulic seal of the joint, nor the functionalityof the structure.

A comprehensive analysis of the observed dam-ages was carried out in relation to the position ofeach facility with respect to the epicenter of theearthquake of 6 April 2009 (UTC 01.32 hours)and to the records provided by the National Net-

work accelerometric (RAN) available (Chioc-carelli et al., 2009). It can be observed that:- Ponte Rosarolo facility is located near the

epicenter and close to the AQK acceleromet-ric station, which recorded ground accelera-tions equal to 3.7 m/s2 equal to about 50%of the maximum value recorded for the sameseismic event (station AGV - 6.6 m/s2); afterthe earthquake, the plant has shown dam-ages to the tanks with rectangular wallslarger than those found in circular tanks of

the Pile plant, despite the geographicalproximity. The structural behavior of the cir-cular tanks was essentially better than that ofthe rectangular ones, mainly because of thelack of structural details ensuring effectiveconnection between the orthogonal walls;

- Arischia plant lies about 5 km from theLAquila accelerometric stations AQV, AQGand AQA, which recorded maximumground acceleration values; even if distantfrom the epicenter (approximately 10 km), ithas shown some structural damages;

- The Corfinio plant was not damagedbecause distant from the epicenter (approxi-mately 50 km): the maximum accelerationrecorded by the accelerometers of Sulmonastation (Sul) located near the plant, is indeedequal to 0.34 m/s2, approximately one-twentieth of the maximum recorded at AQVStation of LAquila.

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Fig. 3Ponte Rosarolo Plant.Digestion Tank: (a) partialcollapse of a longitudinalwall and of the pipeconnected to it. (b) Detail ofthe detachment of theorthogonal walls at theedges. (c) Displacement ofthe pump in the controlroom.

a. b. c.

2.12.5 Gas distribution network

Enel Rete Gas S.p.A. is the gas provider forLAquila city and for other 5 municipalities in theearthquake affected area, namely Lucoli, Torn-imparte, Ocre, Rocca di Cambio Rocca diMezzo.

The gas is distributed via a 621 km pipeline net-

work, 234 Km of that with gas flowing at aver-age pressure (2.5-3 bar) and the remaining 387Km with gas flowing at low pressure (0,025-0035 bar).The medium pressure network is connected to


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the high pressure national one (namely SNAMnetwork) through 3 reduction cabins while,about 300 reduction groups allow for the trans-formation of the gas transport pressure (2.5-3bar) into the gas distribution pressure (0,025-0035 bar).The gas network is mainly made of steel pipes,

with an average internal diameter of intenal =125cm (external diameter external= 139.7cm)and the joints are mainly welded.The first priority identified for the managementof the gas network, in the first phase of the emer-gency immediately after the earthquake, was thetimely securing of the network in order to avoidexplosions, gas leaks and fires and to allow theemergency vehicles and the USAR teams to act

in the safest possible way.To ensure this priority, the entire network man-aged by Enel Rete Gas S.p.A. in the affectedarea was shut off via the closure of the 3 reduc-tion cabins. Thanks to this decision, and to therupture of a pipeline near Onna (Fig. 4a), it waspossible to timely and significantly reduce thegas pressure and to avoid the occurrence of sec-ondary effects. The subsequent closure of the300 reduction groups ensured the full securingof the network in less than two hours after theearthquake. In the days following the event, the

gas valves external to each residential buildingwere as well closed. The pipeline damaged inOnna was replaced with a new one that was toorigidly connected to a reinforce-concrete sup-port. It is worth highlighting that, as a result ofthe earthquake, the Enel Rete Gas headquartersin LAquila resulted unusable. Because of that thechief executive and the staff had to manage theemergency without the support of their data,software and maps. Luckily, the national societyEnel Rete Gas has, at a national level, an inte-grated information system, including a data

base and a geographical information systemGIS. Making reference to the closest Enel ReteGas headquarters in Teramo and Pescara, it waspossible to reprint the maps and all the docu-mentation necessary to operate.The second phase of the emergency response

was focused on the activation of the physicaland human resources in support to the CivilDefence. The timely provision of gas to thestrategic structures was the first priority identi-fied and was operated via mobile reduction

cabins and gas wagons. H24 shift were organ-ized for the local technical and administrativeteams, as well as for the teams coming fromother areas of the national territory including theEnel Rete Gas national headquarters in Milan. In

the first month after the earthquake, the dailycommitment of physical and human resourcesresulted on average approximately equal to 70men and 35 vehicles, including equipped trucks,gas wagons and gas-leak detectors.On the same time, activities for the reactivationof the gas provision were started. The reactiva-tion of the shut gas network required to operategradually restoring, first of all, the gas flow intothe medium pressure network, secondly the gasflow in the low pressure network, up to eachexternal valve pertinent to each residentialbuilding previously closed.Reactivation of the service was managed accord-ing to the following four steps: 1) seal verifica-tion; 2) nitrogen check; 3) repair of damaged

pipes and/or valves; 4) reopening. In the sealverification phase, the detection of broken pipesand/or the possible joint slip-off was made, act-ing in the first instance, from node to node, andfurther segmenting the network when necessary.The material and equipment needed for therepair was immediately available from the inte-grated logistics system which Enel Rete Gasuses; actually, the material normally in storagein the Battipaglia inter-harbour to perform ordi-nary repairs and maintenance works, was sim-ply diverted to LAquila. The adopted strategy

ensured the remediation and testing of morethan 90% of the gas network in three month timeafter the earthquake. The diagram in figure 4bshows how, three months after the quake, it waspossible to restart the gas distribution for all theend-users with a safe home, exception made forLAquila city.It is worth mentioning that the reconnection ofthe individual user supplies required, on onehand, the definition of the priorities to be fol-lowed and, on the other hand, the definition ofthe testing procedures to be carried out to certify

the safety of the gas systems that were subjectedto the action of the earthquake. As for the prior-ities, those identified by the Civil Defence werefollowed; namely, the service was provided firstof all to the strategic buildings, secondly to themanufacturing and industrial plants, and finallyto the residential buildings identified as safeafter the AeDES ispection. As for the testing pro-cedures, in accordance with the proceduresused by Enel Rete Gas for routine checks, an adhoc protocol was defined in collaboration with

the Civil Defence and the Firefighter Depart-ment. It was decided to reconnect each singleuser following the fulfillment of four conditions:1) safe dwelling (classified as A following the

AeDES survey); 2) leak-tightness checking; 3)


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11,1%

38,2%

25,1%

100,0%

43,2%

100,0%

20,1%

100,0%

50,7%

100,0%

69,2%

100,0%

L'Aquila Lucoli Ocre Rocca diCambio

Rocca diMezzo

Tornimparte

Utenze riattivatesu riattivabili

Utenze riattivabili

operative test of the equipment; 4) smoke test. Itis worth mentioning that the Civil Defence fullycovered the cost of the whole procedure toreconnect the individual users to the gas serviceand that a dedicated phone line (Line Amica

Abruzzo) was specifically set up to facili tate andsupport the end-users in this operation.

As a final note it is worth remembering that nodamages were detected to the gas storage facil-ities.

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Fig. 4Impact of the earthquake onthe gas distribution network:

(a) Onna (AQ), damagedpipeline.(b) End-user gas connectionsactiveted on June 8 2009(Green = end-users that canbe potentially reconnected;Bleu = end-user reconnectedwith respect to total that canbe potentially reconnected).

a. b.

2.12.6 Electric power distribution network andtelecommunicationsIt was reported that two substations serving thegreater LAquila had damaged connectionsbetween a rigid bus and insulator, figure 5a. That

was due to shifting of the un-anchored transform-ers during the earthquake. Also due to sloshing ofthe cooling oil within the transformer, cooling oilpressure increased, and actuated the safety shutoff feature to avoid costly damage. One of thetransformers moved about 14 cm. In the distribu-tion system, 30 posts were damaged causing sev-ered links that resulted in service disruption. Morethan 180 pedestal type connection boxes weredislocated and severed cable connections at thetermination lugs that resulted in localized powerfailure (Fig. 5b). The Electric Power Control Cen-ter at LAquila sustained severe damage, bothbuilding and equipment, and it had to be moved

to a temporary building in the yard of the build-ing premise. It took three days to complete themove, while the essential part of the system wasfunctional by 9 AM the day after the earthquake(Fig. 4). Transformers in substations were notanchored. We noted that steel angles were

welded on the tracks that the transformers weresupported to stop sliding, figure 6a. This wasdone after the earthquake. However the steelangles seemed to be under sized. In the control

house of substations, the batteries were notanchored or tied to the racks, figure 6b. There

was no batteries damage reported at these sub-stations. Some locations were without power forthree days, e.g. wastewater treatment plant.Telecommunication service performed reason-ably well. It went off air for a couple of hoursright after the earthquake. Cellular phonesseemed to be the main means of telecommunica-tion in this small community. Although there wasno reported damage to the physical equipmentand equipment building, we saw a number oftemporary cellular sites deployed within theearthquake impacted areas. The increase of cellsites might have reduced the circuit overloadthat commonly occurs after an earthquake. BothFire Fighters and Police used their own radiosystem as the primary communication tool. Cel-lular phones were also used to compliment the

radio system. With a good backup power gen-eration plant, their communication was not inter-rupted. The Fire department had three repeaterstations, which were not damaged. A number oflandlines were damaged or severed, as repairs

were evident during our investigation. Since ten-ants were not allowed back to their houses orapartments, most landlines were not used.Hence the demand on this circuit became muchlighter.

2.12.7 Temporary housingThe Italian government organizations andNGOs (Non-Government Organization) were tobe commended on a great effort providing the

victims with relief services and care. The military

and fire brigade set up service camps to pro-vided needed services to the victims. Some of therelief campsites provided the victims with Inter-net services in addition to daily necessities suchas medication, food, and water. In general the


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victims were very satisfied with the relief service.Many residents were afraid to get back to theirhouses even when their houses (marked as class

A or B) were not condemned, due to their fear offuture earthquakes and the potential for damageto their homes. Temporary housing is scheduled

to be completed by September 2009 (beforewinter arrives) for the victims, figure 7. Thesehouses will be on a base isolation system to pro-tect residents from future earthquakes. There

were more than 30,000 victims settling in morethan 160 campsites.

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Fig. 5(a) Damage to rigid

connection of a transformer.(b) Typical damage to

pedestal box.

a. b.

Fig. 6(a) Steel anchors installed

after the earthquake toavoid sliding of

transformers.(b) Unanchored batteries

racks in substation.

a. b.

Fig. 7One of the relief campite in

LAquila set up by the CivilDefence.

2.12.8 ConclusionsPerformance of lifelines during the April 6 eventmay be considered generally good if comparedto the extended losses related to buildings. This

is because: (1) the main damaged areas wereevacuated after the earthquake and their accesswas prohibited; and (2) the emergency manage-ment was effective in limiting the downtime ofessential services.

Damages to structures of wastewater manage-ment plants reduced the service level, but even inthis case, the evacuation reduced the demand ofabout 40%.

Critical element of the transportation networkdid not suffer any significant damage, experi-enced only in secondary branches of the net-

work. Reduction of the traffic flow capacity wasmainly due to debris from collapsed/damaged


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structures adjacent to the road in urban areasand to rock falls and landslides in mountainousareas.From the seismic risk reduction point of view, it

was concluded that components in facilitiesshould be anchored and that the use of flexibleconnections should become a standard practice.

As for the emergency management, the CivilDefence effectively coordinated a rapid andeffective response. Chief executive and adminis-trators of lifelines networks participated to thestrategic decision making process since the verybeginning of the post-event emergency-man-

agement. The cooperation with the Civil Defencewas continuous during all the phases of theemergency management ensured via dailymeetings.Finally more than 160 relief camps were prop-erly managed. It can be concluded that theemergency management of lifelines networksprovided a rapid and resilient response to theearthquake. The emergency management pro-cedures implemented for the physical and func-tional restoration of lifelines network, after aproper codification, may become a referencemodel for the Civil Defence at international level.

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ReferencesChioccarelli E., De Luca F., Iervolino I. (2009). Prelimi-

nary study on LAquila earthquake ground motionrecords V5.2 [Report disponibile a:http://www.reluis.it/doc/pdf/Aquila/Peak_Parameters_L_Aquila_Mainshock_V5.2.pdf].

Nigro E., Bilotta A. (2009) - Rapporto sui danni subitidagli impianti di depurazione per reflui civili aseguito dellevento sismico del 6 aprile 2009

V1.00. [Report disponibile a:http://www.reluis.it/doc/pdf/Aquila/Depuratori_Provincia_Aquila_V1.00.pdf].

Tang A., Cooper T.R. (2009) - LAquila Earthquake,Abruzzo. Italy May. 06, 2009 M w =6.3 Lifeline

Performance. [Report disponibile a:http://www.reluis.it/doc/pdf/Aquila/Lifelines_TCLEE.pdf].

Verderame G.M., Iervolino I., Ricci P. (2009) - Reporton the damages on buildings following the seismicevent of 6th April 2009 time 1:32 (UTC) - LAquilaM = 5.8. [Report disponibile a:http://www.reluis.it/doc/pdf/Aquila/Rapporto_f

otografico_V1.2.pdf].


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2.12 Emergency management for lifelines and rapid response after L’Aquila

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