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COLLECTED PAPERS ON SOUTH ASIA NO.2

POLITICAL IDENTITY IN SOUTH ASIA

Edited by

DAVID TAYLOR and MALCOLM YAPP

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First published 1979

Curzon Press Ltd: London and Dublin

and

Humanities Press Inc:' Atlantic Highlands, NJ: USA

© Centre of South Asian Studies, SOAS 1978

ISBN

UK 0 7007 01117

US 0 391 01005 0

ISSN0141 0156

t

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ELITE GROUPS, SYMBOL MANIPULATION ANDETHNIC IDENTITY AMONG THE MUSLIMS OF SOUTH

ASIA

Paul R. Brass

1

The study of the processes by which ethnic groups andnations are formed has been beset by a persistent andfundamental conceptual difference among scholars con-cerning the very nature of the groups involved, namely,whether they are 'natural', 'primordial', 'given'communities or whether they are creations of interested

leaders, of elite groups1 or of the political system inwhich they are included. The primordialist arguesthat every person carries with him through life'attachments' derived from place of birth, kinshiprelationships, religion, language, and social prac-tices that are 'natural' for him, 'spiritual' incharacter, and that provide a basis for an easy

'affinity' with other peoples from the same background.These 'attachments' constitute the 'givens' of thehuman condition and are 'rooted in the non-rational

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Elite Groups Elite Groups

attachments also often provide a basis for the forma-

tion of social and political groupings in adul~ lifefor those for whom they have a continuing consliousmeaning in their daily lives. Even for those persons,particularly in modern societies, who have beenremoved from their origins or have rejected their

childhood identifications, such attachments mayremain available in the unconscious to be revived by

some appeal that strikes a sympathetic psychic chord.It is difficult, however, to travel much furtherthan this with the primordialists. First of all, it

is clear that some primordial attachments are variable.

I n m ult il ing ua l de ve lop in g s oc ie ti es, m an y p eop lecommand more than one language, dialect, or code.S

Many illiterate rural persons, far from being attached

emotionally to their mother tongue, do not even knowits proper name. In some situations, members ofl ing ui st ic al ly d iv er se e th ni c c om mu nit ie s h av e ch os ento change their language in order to provide anadditional element in common with their group members.

In other situations, ethnic group members have deliber-ately shifted their own language and educated their

children in a different language than their mothertongue in order to differentiate themselves furtherfrom another ethnic group.6 Finally, many people, ifnot most people, never think about their language atall and never attach any emotional significance to it.

Religious identification too is subject to change -and not only by modern cosmopolitan man engaged inenlightened spiritual quests. Shifts in religiouspractices brought about under the influence of religious

reformers are common occurrences in pre-modern, modern-izing, and even in post-industrial societies. Some-times such shifts are clearly designed to promotein te rna l s ol id ar ity an d e xt ern al d iff er ent ia tio n f ro m

o th er g ro up s. 7Even one's place of birth and kinship connections

may lose their emotional significance for people or beviewed negatively. A psychoanalyst might argue that

these attachments at least pursue men through life andmust always remain as potential sources of affective

involvement with others. Yet, millions of persons

have migrated by choice from their native places inboth modern and traditional societies and, while manyhave retained an emotional attachment to their place of

origin, many have chosen to assimilate to their newsociety and have lost any sense of emotional identifi-

cation with their homelands. For those who do notmigrate, one's place of birth identifies a person, buta sense of identity based on attachment to one's

region or homeland usually does not become a politi-cally significant matter for those who remain thereunless there is some perceived discrimination against

the region and its people in the larger society.Moreover, even the 'fact' of one's place of birth is

subject to variation. A person is born in a particularvillage or town, but one is not born in a 'region', fora region is itself an artificial construct. A person

may be born in Savannah, Georgia, and not considerhimself a 'Southerner'. It is also possible obviously

for 'Southerners' to be born out of their region.Insofar as kinship connections are concerned, therange of genuine kin relationships is usually toosmall to be of political significance. Fictive kin-

ship relationships may extend the range of some ethnic

groups rather broadly, but their fictive characterp re su mes th ei r v ari ab ili ty by de fi ni ti on . C on se que nt ly,even 'the facts of birth' are either inherently of nopolitical significance or are subj ect to variation.S

As for the argument that it is not place of birth orkinship or mother tongue or native religion thatdefines ethnicity but a belief in a common descent thatdraws on one more of these attachments, it must be

conceded that the argument stated in this general form

is not without force. Many ethnic communities doexplicitly proclaim or implicitly assume that the

underlying basis of their unity is shared descent. Itis not at all difficult to find a broad spectrum ofsuch communities. Broad as the spectrum may be,

however, it will still not suffice to encompass all thecu lt ura ll y-d ef ine d c ol le ct iv iti es w ho se m em be rs l ay

claim to special privileges because of some shared

cultural features and who are united internally by theirattachment to them, Unless we define common descent so

broadly as to include shared historical, linguistic, orreligious experiences. In the latter case, however, we

do nothing more than redefine descent to equal sharedc ul tu ra l f ea tu re s.

There are two more serious objections to the primor-dialist point of view on ethnicity. One is the

assumption that sometimes accompanies it that therecognition of distinct primordial groups in asociety is sufficient to predict the future development

out of them of ethnic communities or nations. This

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E li te G ro up s E li te G ro up s

as sumpt ion, whic h i s a ssoci ated prin cipa lly w ith theearly European ideologists of nationalism, is ~

longer widely held even by their primordialist ~es-cend ents, for it i s cl early a n unte nable pr oposi tion.A second point of view is more widely held, namely,

t ha t e th ni c a tt ac hm en ts b el on g t o . th e n on -r at io na lpart of the human personality and, as such, arepote ntia lly d estru ctive o f ci vil socie ty.9 This

notion suffers from two defects. One is that itignores the possibility that an ethnic identity may befelt or adopted for rational as well as affective

reasons to preserve one's existence or to pursueadvantage through communal action. The second is the

ass umpti on t hat primo rdial a ttach ment s are mor e dang er-

ous to civil order than other kinds of potential con-flict s, presu mably bec ause of t heir hi ghly emo tive

character. However, there is no empirical evidence towarrant the view either that primordial conflicts have

produced more disruption in civil societies than econo-

mic, class conflicts or that the former conflicts areless amenable to compromise than the latter.

While many primordialists will concede that some

aspects of culture are changeable and that theboundaries of ethnic groups may be shifted in the

course of social and political movements that promote

their int~rest, they stand firm on one point, namely,that ethnIc groups properly so-called are groups basedon distinctive cultures or origin myths or patterns

of exchan?e with other. groups that have core featurest hat persI st thr ough tIme.lD Even this bedro ck po si-tion of the primordialists poses problems for thestudent of comparative ethnic movements. For onething, while some ethnic groups do draw upon old and

rich cultural heritages with a persisting core, many

m ovem ents creat e their c ultur es after -the- fact, as it

were. If, on the one hand, there are groups such asth e Jewish peop le wh ose s ocial and p oliti cal ident itie shav e unde rgone inn umera ble tra nsfor matio ns wh ile a

core culture has been retained and transmitted over

the millenia by the rabbinate steeped in the Talmudic

tradi tion and b y or dinar y bel iever s fo llowi ng t heird ai ly ' se lf -d ef in in g r ou ti ne s' , 11 t he re a re s uf fi ci en t

examples of other groups whose core cultures are lesseasy to identify, but that have nevertheless formed a

basis for cohesive and sometimes successful ethnic and

nationalist movements. The mushroom growth of ethnicpolitical movements in the United States in rece-nt

times provides at least a few examples of the lattersort that are more than ephemeral in nature. 12

A s econd d iffic ulty with t he bedro ck primo rdial ist

position is that, even where there is a persistingcore culture, knowledge of its substance may not be of

much use in predicting either the development or theform of ethnic movements on behalf of the cultural

groups in question. Certainly a knowledge of the core

religious cultures of orthodox Judaism or of tradi-tional Islam in India would have suggested that the

least likely possibilities would have been the rise of

a Zionist movement or of the movement for the creationof Pakistan for the traditional keepers of those

cultures, the rabbinate and the ulema, have consis-

tently argued that a secular national state is incom-patible with either religion. Of course, both the

rab binat e an d the ulem a have be en la rgely r espon siblefor the persistence of Jewish and Islamic communities

where ver they have p ersis ted, b ut th ey a re c ommun ities

differently defined and bounded than are Israel andPakistan.

D o thes e c ritic isms of th e p rimor diali st persp ectiv e

then mean that any cultural content should be removedentirely from the concept of ethnicity? Is ethnicity

to be seen from the extreme instrumentalist point of

view as the pursuit of interest and advantage formembers of groups whose cultures are infinitely malle-

able and manipulable by elites? Are 'ethnic conflicts'

merely 'one form in which interest conflicts betweenand within states are pursued,13 and ethnicity 'a

communal type of organization which is manipulated byan interest group in the course of its struggle todevelop and maintain its power,?14 And is culturechange part of 'a bargaining process' that can be

understood best in terms of a market model by which

ethnic group leaders/ and members agree to give upaspects of their culture or modify their prej udices for

the right price?lS The statements just cited come from

a literature that tends to treat cultural factors inethnic movements as epiphenomenal. Abner Cohen in fact

has written about groups that create cultural markers

f or p ur po se s o f i ntern al commu nica tion wit h eac h other

in secr et soci eties and domin ant cliqu es.16

The fact that new cultural groups can be created for

pur pose s of eco nomic an d poli tical d omin ation , h owev er,does not mean that .the p ri mo rd ia li st p er sp ec ti ve i s n otrelevant to our understanding of ethnic groups with

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long and rich cultural heritages. In other words, one

po~ sibl7 r~ ute towa: d reconciling the perspectiies ofprlmor~ l~ llsts and lnstrumentalists may lie in simplyr ec og nl zl ng t ha t c ul tu ral g ro up s d if fe r m t he s tr en gt hand richness of their cultural traditions and even

more importantly in the strength of traditional insti-tutions and social structure. The persistence over

t ime , fo r ex am pl e, o f r el ig io us ly -b as ed c om mu na l

institutions among Jews and Muslims wherever they arefound means that these cultural groups always formpotential bases for ethnic movements. However, the

mere persistence of the core religious traditions of

such groups as these offers no prospect for predictingwhether or when ethnic movements will arise among them

and whether or not such movements will be effective inmobilizing their members. Such cultural persistence

suggests only that it is likely that the groups can bemobilized on the basis of specific appeals and notothers and that, when ethnic appeals are.made the

pre-existing communal and educational institufions of

the ?roups will, ~f made available for the purpose,

provlde an effectlve means of political mobilization.In short, the values and institutions of a persistingcultural group will suggest what appeals and symbols

will be effective and what will not be and may alsoprovide traditional avenues for the mobilization and

organization of the group in new directions. Neverthe-less, the leaders of ethnic movements invariably selectfrom traditional cultures only those aspects that theythink will serve to unite the group and that will be

useful in promoting the interests of the group as theydefine them. When they do so, moreover, they affect

the self-definition of the group and its boundaries,

often to such an extent that the ethnic community or

nationality created out of a pre-existing ethnic groupmay be a very different social formation from itsprogenitor. Or, in the case of groups that have hada sense of identity and community even before ethnic

mobilization takes place and that contain elites whosetraditional right to define the group and its boun-

daries are well-established, ethnic mobilization led

by others than the traditional elites will introduceinto the group conflicting definitions of its essencea nd e xt en t.

Consequently, whether or not the culture of the

group is ancient or is newly-fashioned, the study ofethnicity and nationality is in large part the study

of politically induced cultural change. More precisel~

it is the study of the process by which elites andc ou nt er -e li te s w it hi n e th ni c g ro up s s el ec t a sp ec tsof the group's culture, attach new value and meaningto them and use them as symbols to mobilize the group,

to defe~d its interests, and to compete with othergroups. In this process, those elites have an advan-

tage whose leaders can operate most skilfully inrelation both to the deeply-felt primordial attach-

ments of group members and the shifting relationshipso f p ol it ic s.

2T he di ff er en ce s o f v ie wp oi nt b etw ee n p ri mo rdi al is tsand instrumentalists have also found expression amongSouth Asia specialists in their efforts to interpretand explain ethnic and nationality movements there.The differences have been most pronounced in discus-sions of the origins and development of Muslim separa-tism and the Pakistan movement. From the primordialist

point of view, which was also the view of the leadersof Muslim separatism, Hindus and Muslims constituted

in pre-modern times distinct civilizations destined to

develop into separate nations once political mobiliz-ation took place. The differences between the two

cultures were so great that it waS not conceivable thatassimilation of the two could take place and that a

single national culture could be created to which both

would contribute. The contrary view is that the cul-tural and religious differences between Hindus and

Muslims were not so great as to rule out the creationof either a composite national culture or at least a

secular political union in which those aspects of

group culture that could not be shared would be rele-gated to the private sphere. From this point of view,

Muslim separatism was not pre-ordained, but resultedfrom the conscious manipulation of selected symbols of

Muslim identity by Muslim elite groups in economic andpolitical competition with each other and with elite

g ro up s a mo ng H ind us .l7

This issue has recently been joined again in anexchange between Francis Robinson and me.IS AlthoughRobinson and I agree on many aspects of the Muslim

s ep ar at is t m ov em en t, a n a pp are nt d iff er en ce p er si stsconcerning the relative weight to be assigned to the

pervasiveness of Islamic values, to the strength of

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~ fusli m religi ous insti tution s a nd to t he e xtent towhich a Musli m i denti ty exist ~d in the ni netee nth

c en tu :y a s c on ~t ra in in g f ac to rs o n t he p os si bi ~Hi esfor ~ lnd u: Musl lm coop erati on a nd o n t he free dom o fMu slIm e~ lte g roups to ma nipul ate symbo ls of Musli mcultu re In the po litic al pro cess. Robi nson arguest ~a t ' t~ e r el ig io us d if fe re nc es ' b et we en Mu sl im s a ndHl n~ u~ In .t he n in et ee nt h c en tu ry , b ef or e s oc ia lm ob ll lz at l? n b eg an , ' we re f un da me nt al ' a nd t ha t s om e

of thos: dIfferences, such as on idol worship, onm on ot ~e ls m, .a nd o n a tt it ud es t ow ar d t he c ow ' cr ea te da b as Ic a nt Ip at hy ' between th e tw o c o mm un it i es ' wh i chhelped.to ~ et ~ hem apart as modern politics and self-go vernIng InstIt ution s deve loped in tow n di stri tan~ province.' The Muslims of Uttar Pradesh (UP~p rI me d b y t he se f un da me nt al r el ig io us d if fe re nc es '~ lre ady con scious of thems elves as a separ ate co~ un-lty, and aware that they were a minority 'feared

tha ~ th e ~ i~ du maj ori ty wo uld not o nly i~ terfer e with

t he Ir r el Ig Io us ~ ra c~ i7 es s uc h a s c ow -s ac ri fi ce , b utalso '" would dIscrImInate against them' on suchmatters 'as education and employment ,19 I hH· d . n sort

In us and Muslims in nineteenth-century Indl' 't 1" a weresepar a e re Ig lOUS comm unitie s p redis posed tow ards ifn ot n ec es sa r~ ly p re -o rd ai ne d a s, s ep ar at e n at io na l'g:oups. If It ~as not a foregone conclusion that~ lndus and ~ usllm s wou ld go sep arate w ays pol itica llyl~ was unthInkable that the separate identities of 'eIt her group coul d be s ubord inate d or ass imila ted tot he o tQ .e r.

Ro bi ns on 's a rg um en t i s n ot e nt ir el y i nc on si st en t w it h: he mode l de~ el op7 d in L an gu ag e, R el ig io n a nd P ol it ic s

~n North Ind:a whIc h, al though it em phasi zed th e ro lesp la ye d b y e ll ~e .g ro u~ s i n m an ip ul at in g c ul tu ra l s ym bo lst o c re ~t e. po ll tl ca l I de nt it ie s, d id n ot i gn or e e it he rp re -e xl st ln ~ c ul tu ra l v al ue s o r i nt er -g ro up a tt it ud esas factors ~nfluencing the ability of elites to mani-

~ ulate par tlcul a~ : ymbol s. In fact, t he model deve lopedIn L an gu ag e, R el ~g ~o n an d Po li ti cs did not take off

f ro m a n. ex tr em e i ns tr um en ta li st p er sp ec ti ve o r f ro m t he~ ssumpt lon th at e ither elite s or the gro ups whose

Inte rests they cl aim to r epres ent are cu ltura l blank

s~ates. Rat~er, it ~egan wit~ t he f ol lo wi ng q ue st io n:GIven the eXIstence In a multI-ethnic society of ana rr ay o f c ul tu ra l,d is ti nc ti on s a mo ng p eo pl es a nd o f

a ct ua l a nd p ot :n ~l al 7 ul tu ra l c on fl ic ts a mo ng t he m, w ha tfacto rs are crItIcal In de termi ning whic h of tho se

distin ction s, if any, will be u sed t o b uild polit icalidentities? In the model developed in Language,

Re li gi on an d p ol it ic s, t he fac tors emp hasize d w ere theroles play ed by parti cular e lite grou ps, the b alanc eb et we en r at es o f s oc ia l m ob il iz at io n a nd a ss im il at io nbet ween ethnic gro ups, t he build ing of polit ical or gan-i za ti on s t o p ro mo te g ro up i de nt it ie s a nd i nt er es ts ,and the influence of government policies. However, itwas not assume d that the pre- existi ng c ulture s orr el ig io us p ra ct ic es o f e th ni c g ro up s a re i nf in it el ym al le ab le b y e li te s.

Nevertheless, it is an important and not well-explored question to consider to what extent and inw ha t w ay s t he p re -e xi st in g v al ue s, i ns ti tu ti on s, a ndpractices of cultural groups with long and rich heri-t ag es c on st it ut e p ri mo rd ia l a tt ac hm en ts t ha t c on st ra ineli tes w ho m anipu late sy mbols o f grou p ide ntity fo rpolitical purposes. In the remainder of this essay,thi s que stion w ill b e expl ored with specif ic refe renceto thre e eleme nts in volvi ng Hindu and Muslim tr ad-i ti on al c ul tu ra l v al ue s, i ns ti tu ti on s, a nd c om mu ni -cation in South Asia in the last century - attitudes

toward cow protection and cow sacrifice, the role ofthe personal and family law components of the Shariain Muslim life, and the attitudes of Hindus and Muslimstowards the Hindi and Urdu languages. In this section,the issue will be taken up by considering separatelyeach element of traditional culture and its use byelites in politics. In the following section, theextent to which elites are able to alter the definitionof a group's boundaries by manipulating sets ofs ym bo ls w il l b e a na ly se d.

Consid er first the d iffere nt attit udes of Hind us an dMuslims towards the cow. As Robinson points out, 'Hin-dus revered the cow, the Muslims ate it. , 20 Moreover,

Mu sl im s s ac ri fi ce d c ow s a t c er ta in r el ig io us f es ti va lss uc h a s Ba kr _I d.2l The cow, therefore, was always apotential symbol of group identity for Hindus and of ,gro up co nflic t b etwee n Hindu s a nd Muslim s. Howev er, Itis also important to recognize that the symbol of thec ow has had differ entia l imp ort for Hindu s and Mus lims.For orthodox Hindus, it is simply mandatory to avoidthe killing of kine. It is not, however, mandatory forMuslims to eat kine. It is a disputed matter whetheror n ot cow sacr ifice is essent ial t o Musl im relig iousritual.22 T he se ' ob je ct iv e' c ul tu ra l p ar am et er sc learl y limi ted and constr ained the fre edom of movem ent

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of Hindu and Mus Lim elites in the late nineteenth andtwentieth centuries in South Asia but it did nOiconfine them completely. Hindus ~ ight have ignored thef~ ct that Muslims slaughtered cows for both dietary andrltual purposes - except insofar as cow slaughter wasflaunted before them - but many chose in the l880s andl89 0s to form cow protection societies and to demandpassage of laws to prevent cow slaughter. Muslims

might have avoided cow slaughter and, thereby made ag ra ~d c on ce ss ~o ~ t o Hin du s en ti men t w it ho ut v iol at in gthe~r own rellglous susceptibilities. In fact, Abd al.Barl~ the fiery alim of Firangi Mahal offered to stopMusllm cow slaughter during the early days of the

Khil.af'at a nd n on -c oop er at ion m ov em en ts 23 a nd t he Mu sl imLeague, in its 1 91 9 meeting, passed a resolutionr eco mm en din g t he s ub st it ut io n o f ' the s ac ri fi ce ofother animals in place of cows. ,24 The predominantleader~ of the Indian National Congress attempted torestraln the leaders of the cow protection movementand tried to prevent them from demanding laws to pre-

vent cow slaughter, even though the cow protection

m ov em en t h ad c on si de ra bl e su pp or t am on g Co ng re ss me n i nthe northern provinces. 25 Moreover, even the most mili-tant co~ protectors used an economic argument for thep re ve ntl ~n o f co w s la ugh te r w hi ch, h ow ev er t ra ns pa re nta cover It may seem for religious sentiment, alwayskept open the possibility that Hindus and Muslims could: each an agreement on secular grounds concerning anlssue of profound religious import.26 That the issuewas no~ settled on terms such as these was not becauseof its primordial character, but because several elitegroups among both Hindus and Muslims found it usefUlas a convenient symbol in their efforts to build

mternalunity and in their conflicts with each other.The cow wa~ a symbol that could be used equally by

o :t ho do x Hl nd ~s d ~f en d~ ng t ra di ti on al r el ig io us p ra c-t lc es , b y r ev lv al ls t Hl nd u l ea de rs a tt em pt in g t o r ef or mthem, ~ y.Hindu p~ litical leaders who wished to promotea speclflcally Hlndu form of Indian nationalism 27 andby Muslim religious and political elites who fe~ redHi nd u d om in an ce a nd f ou nd a nt i- co w s la ugh te r m ov eme nt suseful as an example of how Muslims would be oppressedunder a representative system in which Hindus would bei n a m aj or it y.

J ohn McLane has suggested that the political signifi-cance of the cow in Indian politics should not be over-emphasized and that it is not possible to separate

44

E li te G rou ps

controversy over the cow slaughter issue from otherissues of elite conflict over access to education,g ov er nm en t e mp lo ym en t o pp or tu ni ti es , a nd p ol it ic alrepresentation with which it was 'intertwined' 28Moreover, he has argued that', a lthough the cow pro-tection movement of the l880s and l890s had a greati mpa ct o n Hin du -Mu sli m r el at ion s a nd p re ci pi tat ed achain of riots in 1893, the disappearance of the cowp ro te ct io n m ov em en t t he re af te r ' su gg es ts t ha t. po pu la rsentiment was not broad or adamant and that Hlnduleaders regarded the alienation of Muslims and thegovernment as too heavy a price to pay for any poss-ible benefits 'for its continuance. He suggests furtherthat 'the issue of cow slaughter was more symbolic thansubstantive', that it 'was not central' to the per-s is ti ng s ub st an ti ve i ss ue s o f In di an p ol it ic s, w hi chc onc er ne d ' th e d ist ri bu tio n of p ol it ica l p ow er ' u nd ert he c on st it ut io na l s tr uc tu re s d ev is ed u nd er B ri ti shrule in India.29 It would be more precise to say thatthe cow protection issue was not central to thep ol it ic al e li tes w ho do mi na te d t he l ead in g p ~l it ic al

o rg an iza ti on s o f In di an n at io na li sm ~ nd Mus l~ m.separatism. It was central to theHln~u rellglousleaders revivalist and orthodox, and It later becamea u se fu i s ym bo l f or Hi ndu c om mu na l o rga ni za ti on sc om mi tt ed t o a Hi nd u de fi ni ti on o f In di an n ati on al ism ,such as the Hindu Mahasabha and the Jan Sangh. It wasa lso a p er si ste nt i rr ita nt i n Hi nd u-Mu sl im r el at ion sin municipal politics in the towns of the United.Provinces in the late nineteenth and early twentlethc en tu ri es . 3 0 A ft er i nd ep en de nc e, t he c on st it ue ntassembly of India acknowledged Hindu sentiment on thematter by including in the directive principles ofstate policy an article containing a mandate for the

state to prohibit cow slaughter. This mandate ha~since been implemented by most state governments InIndia. Moreover, as late as 1966, a movement waslaunched by Hindu revivalist groups, supported by them os t pr es ti gi ou s or th od ox g ur us as so ci ate d w it h t heholiest sanctuaries of Hinduism, in support of thedemand that the government of India impose a ban oncow slaughter throughout the country. The movementc ulm in at ed i n t he la rg es t m as s d em on str at io n e ve rwitnessed in the post-independence period on thestreets of Delhi, but the government refused to acceptt he d em an d.

The cow, therefore, may be seen as a primordial

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attachment for Hindus, to which religious reformers andHi nd u n at io na li st s i n t he l at e ni ne te ent h c en tu ryattached new meaning as a symbol of Hindu commJhal id~tity, and which secular political leaders of the timeeither avoided because they could not control its useo r us ed p ro vo ca tiv el y i n c on st ruc ti ng c at alo gu es o fg ri ev an ces a ga ins t t he ir o pp on en ts f ro m t he r iv alcommunity. Differences in Hindu and Muslim attitudes

toward the cow, therefore, provide an example of theintrusion into politics of a symbol that had primordialmeaning for Hindus and that served to threaten thereligious and political position of Muslims in India.The cow protection movement brought Hindu and Muslimre li ¥i ous s en ti me nt s i nt o d ir ec t c onf li ct , ev en t ho ug hthe Issue was of less religious significance forMuslims than for Hindus. Moreover, Hindu sentimenttoward the cow was such that it limited the freedom ofaction even of the secular leaders of the Congress.El it es w er e t her ef or e c on str ai ne d o n th is h ig hl yemotive issue, although a few Hindu leaders tookindependent action on it in opposition to the primor-di~ l fe~ lings of Hindus in hopes of political cooper-

a t~ on w It h Mu sl im s, a nd Mus li m r el igi ou s a nd p ol it ic alelItes offered to defer to Hindu sentiment on thematter.

The issue of Muslim personal law provides a some-what different example of a symbol of great religioussignificance to Muslims and with no religious signifi-cance to Hindus, but which has brought Muslims inIndia in~ o conflict with secular nationalists bothHindu and Muslim. It is a religious obligati~n forMuslims to adhere to the body of laws that make up theShari a and that includes the 'personal law' relatingto marriage, divorce and inheritance. However theapplication of the law is often a complex matt~r that

m ay ~ nv olv e t he i nt erv en ti on o f c le ri cal au th or ity .MuslImS must be taught some of the most important lawsof Islam from an early age, but ordinary Muslims canhardly be expected to know more than a fraction of theb ody o f p re sc ri pt ion s a nd p ro sc ri pt io ns co nt ai ned i nthe Sharia.The interpretation and application of theShari a is one of the principal mechanisms by which theu le ma m ai nt ai n t he ir c on tr ol o ver Is la mi c so ci et y.While an orthodox Muslim would not think of violatingthe more evident and established principles of theSharia and while he would revere the law the Shariameans most to the Muslim clerics. '

46

E li te G ro up s

I n M us li m- ma jo ri ty s oc ie ti es u nd er go in g s ec ul ar iz a-tion, the Shari a invariably emerges as a symbol of con-flict between the ulema and the secular politicalelites who wish to establish a centralized stat~ forw hi ch t hey c on si de r a m od ern ' l eg al s ys te m e s~ ent la l.In former colonial societies with large Musl1 m po~ u-lations and in societies such as contemporary IndIa,where Muslims are in a minority, the issue natura~l~ac qu ir es a di ff er ent s ig ni fi ca nc e, f or t h~ m od er n~ zl ngel it e w il l th en b e p re dom in an tly n on -Mu s Li. ma nd w iLl ,therefore be attacked for interfering with ther el ig io us 'r ig ht s o f' <M usL im s . T hi s, ~ f. c ou rs e, h asbeen the case in India both under BrItIsh rule andsince independence where any attempt to discuss theformulation of a uniform civil code has been sure tocall forth the nearly unanimous opposition of the

ulema. . . 1The British did impose a secular system of Crlffilna

a n d p r oc e du r al l a w i n I rt di aa rt d t h e y a bo li sh e~ t heqaei. courts that had previously enforced Musl1 m law,but they did not develop a uniform civil code for .

personal and family law.3l On t he c on tra ry ,. bot h HIn duand Muslim personal law were formally r ecogn i .z d andwere applied in the government cour~ s. 3 2 Al ~houghth e co ns ti tu ti on o f in de pe nd en t In dIa e st abl Is he d a sone of the directive principles of state policy thepassage of a uniform civil code, that directiv~ hasbeen carried out only with respect to non-MuslIms underthe Hindu Code Acts of 1955-56.

Ne it he r t he Br iti sh n or t he l ea de rs o f p os t-i nd ep en d-ence India were willing to antagonize the ulema on thematter of reform of Muslim personal law, for it isbelieved that the ulema have succeeded in imparting tomost Muslims the feeling that any tampering with thepersonal law would amount to an attack o~.Islam. Thefear that the ulema would be able to mobilize the massof Muslims in India in opposition to any efforts toreform their personal law has enabled them to holdhostage both the secular Hindu political elites and all

Muslim political leaders w~ o se~ k to r~ pre~ ent M~ sliminterests. During the natIonalIst perIod In IndIa, whenthe Congress and the Muslim League vied for the s~pportof the Muslim public, Congress leaders su~ ceed~ d Info rm in g a po li ti cal a ll ia nc e w it h th e J am l'y ~t -a l-ulama-i-Hind founded in 1 91 9 for ~ he exclusIve purposeof s af eg ua rd in g t he " Sh ar i ah!". ,33 For its part, theMuslim League, many of whose leaders were secular

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politicians opposed both to the rigid application ofthe Sharia and to the continued hold of the ulema overt he Mu sl im m as se s, n ev er th el es s f el t ob l i. ge deto i nc lu dein its demands protection for Muslim personal law.

In this case, therefore, the issue, however muchthe Sharia is seen as essential to Islam, does notinvolve conflict with Hindus as such. It is a symbolthat Muslim religious elites use to constrain Muslimpolitical elites who, in turn, have often found ituseful as a symbol in their conflicts with Hindu elitesfor political influence in the Muslim community. SinceMuslim adherence to the Sharia does not impinge uponthe religious feelings of Hindus and does not endangerHi nd u- Mus li m r el ati on s, t he s ec ul ar p ol it ic al e li te s i nmodern India have been able to avoid a confrontationon this issue with Muslims. Whereas, on the issue ofc ow p ro te ct io n, m an y o th er wi se s ec ul ar -m in de d Hi nd ue li te s f elt c on st ra in ed t o s up po rt co w p ro tec ti onlegislation in the Constitution of India and in statel eg is lat io n af te r i nd ep en de nc e, t he y h ave be en n eg a-tively constrained on the question of a uniform civilcode. The strategy followed in India since independ-

ence has been to use secular Muslims to speak on behalfof modernization of the Muslim personal law, but toavoid any action on the issue that would endanger Hindu-Muslim relations. In effect, a tacit bargain has beenstruck in modern India whose terms are that Muslimswill not be permitted to violate Hindu feelings byslaughtering cows, while the Muslims retain the rightto have a separate system of civil laws.34 Thisbargain coul-d have been struck at any time beforeindependence had it not served the interests of Hindureligious elites and Muslim political elites to keepthe issues alive. It was not struck because Hindurevivalists found the symbol of the cow invaluable inu nit in g Hi ndu s, b ec au se t he Mu sli m p Ol it ica l e li tesfound the cow protection issue useful to demonstratethe dangers of Hindu majority rule, and because bothHindu and Muslim political elites found the issue ofthe Sharia valuable in recruiting the support of theulema in their conflicts with each other for politicalinfluence.

A third major symbol of Muslim identity and Hindu-Mu sl im c onf li ct , p ar ti cu lar ly i n t he n ort h In dia nstates of UP and Bihar, is the Urdu language. Theadoption of Urdu as a symbol of Muslim identity byMuslim political elites in north India from the late

n in et ee nt h c en tu ry o nw ar ds i ll us tr at es s ev er al p oi nt sconcerning the uses made of cultural symbols byp ol it ic al e li te s.35 One point illustrated by the useof Urdu as a symbol of Muslim identity is the way inwhich elites attach new value to symbols for purposeso f pr om ot ing id en ti ty a nd d if fe ren ti at ing o ne g ro upfrom another. In the nineteenth century in northIndia, before the extension of the British system ofgovernment schools, Urdu was not used in its writtenform as a medium of instruction in traditional Islamicschools, where Muslim children were taught Persian andArabic, the traditional languages of Islam and Muslimculture.36 It was only when the Muslim elites of northIndia and the British decided that Muslims were back-ward in education in relation to Hindus and should beencouraged to attend government schools that it wasfelt necessary to offer Urdu in the Persian-Arabicscript as an inducement to Muslims to attend theschools. And it was only after the Hindi-Urdu contro-versy developed that Urdu, once disdained by Muslimelites in north India and not even taught in the Muslimr el igi ou s s cho ol s i n t he e arl y n in ete en th c en tu ry,

became a symbol of Muslim identity second only toI sl am i ts el f.37

A second point revealed by the Hindi-Urdu contro-versy in north India is how symbols may be used toseparate peoples who, in fact, share aspects ofculture. It is well known that' ordinary Muslims andHindus alike spoke the same language in the UnitedPr ov in ce s i n t he n in et een th c en tu ry , na me ly Hi nd us ta ni ,whether called by that name or whether called Hindi,Urdu, or one of the regional dialects such as Braj orAwadhi. Although a variety of styles of Hindi-Urduwere in U'se i n the nineteenth century among differentsocial classes and status groups, the legal and

a dm in is tra ti ve el it es i n c our ts a nd g ove rn me nt o ff ic es ,Hindus and Muslims alike, used Urdu in the Persian-Arabic script. When the Urdu-speaking elite dividedpolitically on the question of script, however, thatthe division was communicated and transmitted to themass of the people. As more and more governmentschools were set up, it became a critical question,therefore, for Urdu and Hindi spokesmen to insist thatHindus had the right to be taught through the medium ofHindi in Devanagari script and that Muslims had theright to be taught through the medium of Urdu inPer si an s cr ip t b ec au se t he ir l ang ua ge s a nd c ul tu re s

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Elite Groups

were inseparable. Moreover, leaders of the Hindi move-ment and of the Urdu movement set out to separate thet wo l an gu ag es t hr ou gh S an sk ri ti za ti on a nd P er st an iz a-tion of its two forms.38 In this way, the literaryelites of the United Provinces deliberately chose toe mph as iz e a nd e ve n t o c re at e l ing ui st ic d if fe re nc esrather than to emphasize and enhance the linguisticelements held in common by Hindus and Muslims alike by

such devices, for example, as developing a commonvo ca bu la ry a nd t ea ch in g b ot h s cr ip ts .

A third point is that the choice of a symbol oftenhas a material basis, arising out of elite competitionfor economic advantage. Urdu became a symbol ofMuslim identity in north India when the British,partly because of the demands of Hindi supporters,moved to either replace Urdu with Hindi as the languageof administration in the northern provinces or toadmit Hindi on 'an equal basis with Urdu. The Muslimelites in north India rose up to defend Urdu becausethe replacement of Urdu by Hindi or even its admissiont o e qu ali ty th re ate ne d th e a dva nt ag e t ha t Mu sl imst ra di ti on al ly h el d i n g ov er nm en t e mp lo ym en t, p ar ti cu -larly in the United Provinces. It should be especi-ally emphasized in this regard that the adoption ofthe Devanagari script presented only a slight diffi-culty for Muslims, whereas the maintenance of Urdui n Per si an -Ar ab ic s cr ip t r ai sed mu ch g re at er d if fi -culties for Hindus. It is a relatively small matterfor a Hindustani-speaker to learn to read and writethe language in Devanagari, which is a quite simplescript, but it requires a much greater educationali nve st me nt to l ea rn a nd m ai nta in t he Pe rs ian -Ar ab icscript. The defence of Urdu, therefore, could nothave arisen out of a fear that Muslims would acquirean undue burden by the need to learn the Devanagari

script but out of a desire to maintain the ratherheavier burden on Hindus of acquiring proficiency int he Pe rs ian -Ar ab ic s cr ipt t o q ua li fy f or g ov ern me ntjobs.

A fourth point is that the same symbol may be usedat different times for contrary objectives. When thedemand was made to admit Hindi in Devanagari script asan o ff ici al la ng uag e i n t he No rth -W es te rn Pr ov in cesand Oudh, along with Urdu in Persian-Arabic script,Muslims argued that Urdu was not their language only,but the common possession of Hindus and Muslims alikeand that it should be retained as the sole official

50

Elite Groups

language for this reason and for its alleged technicaladvantages over Hindi. The argument that Urdu is thelanguage of both Hindus and Muslims continues to bemade up to the present by its defenders. Moreover,the argument has some historical validity. However,Urdu has also often been used as a symbol by Muslimelites to separate themselves from the Hindus. WhenHindu leaders refused to withdraw their demands for

official recognition of Hindi and for its use in theeducational system and when its use threatened thema te ri al i nt ere st s o f Mu sli m e li te s, m an y Mu sl ims be ga nto argue that Urdu was the special language of Muslims,that its cultural heritage was expressed through it,and that it was nearly as much a part of Muslimi de nt it y a s Is la m it se lf .

The final point illustrated by the Muslim adoptionof Urdu in Persian-Arabic script is the tendency foret hn ic g ro up s i n c on fl ic t t o s ep ar at e th em sel ve sfrom each other by multiple symbols and to seek tomake those symbols congruent. In the early nineteenthce nt ur y, Mu sli ms a nd Hi nd us h ad d if fe re nt r el ig io ustraditions and practices and, insofar as they wereeducated at all, they were taught Persian or Arabic,if they were Muslims, Hindi or Sanskrit, if they wereHindus. In the different dialect or language regionsof north India, however, Muslims and Hindus alikespoke the language of the region in which they lived.In other words, they may have used different languagesto communicate with their deity, but they used acommon language to communicate with each other. Inthe course of the Hindi-Urdu controversy, however, asHindi and Urdu were developed as alternative regionals ta nd ar d l ang ua ge s t au gh t i n a ll g ov er nm en t sc ho ol sin the different dialect regions of the north, Hindiin Devanagari script became the language of Hindus and

Urdu in Persian script the language of Muslims. Thefunctions of language in the north thereby becamet ra ns fo rm ed f ro m t he ir t rad it ion al u se s f or r it ualcommunication with a deity or for ordinary discourseinto symbolic links among members of the same ethnicg ro up , b arr ie rs t o c om mu ni ca ti on b et wee n me mb er s o fd if fer en t r el igi ou s gr ou ps , a nd ad di ti on al m ar ks ofi de nt ity an d s ep ar at en es s fo r s uch g ro up s.

The changes over the past century in both Muslimand Hindu attitudes towards the Urdu language and theseveral different symbolic uses to which it has beenput by Muslim elites in their competition with Hindus

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demonstrate that 'primordial' attachments may besubject to substantial variation for the sak~ of

political and economic interests. Hindus an~ Muslimsin north India had the same 'given' mother tongues.

The religious and political elites of north Indiaand the British authorities, however, made decisions

about official languages and scripts and about mediaof instruction in the schools that, over time, have

affected the ways in which ordinary Hindus and Muslimsfeel about their language and how it should be used.In fact, the two languages, Hindi and Urdu, havealso diverged in the past century. Initially, how-

ever, the language controversy was principally astruggle over scripts. The Persian-Arabic and Devana-

gari scripts, however, are not 'givens'. They arec ul tu ra l t ra ns mi ss io ns , w it h r el ig io us s ig ni fi ca nc e

because they are the scripts used to decipher the

religious texts. But they did not have to become

symbols of group identity. They became symbols ofidentity because elite groups, with the aid of govern-

ment, promoted them as such in their conflicts with

e ac h o th er .

Insofar as the Muslims of India are concerned, twofeatures of their historical development as a community

are particularly relevant here. One is that, when theBritish arrived, the Muslim community of India or of

any part of India was much less of a social fact thanit is today. Secondly in the course of the social and

political development of the Muslim community in thenineteenth and twentieth centuries, the symbols used

to define its boundaries have varied depending uponthe elites who have done the defining. With regard tothe social reality of the Muslim community in Indiabefore the arrival of the British, Hardy has describedit as 'unified at best by a few common rituals and bythe beliefs and aspirations of a majority - not thetotality - of its scholars. ,39 Titus has pointed outthat Muslims in India have always been divided along

sectarian lines, some of them sharply antagonistic,

and has described in detail several Muslim groupswhose religious practices were quite similar to those

o f H in du s.40 Seal has remarked that the Muslim com-munity in the nineteenth century 'was not homogeneous.

Language, caste and economic standing worked togetherto divide Muslim from Muslim no less than Hindu fromHin du . ,41

In what sense, then, was there a Muslim community

at all in India in the nineteenth century? There wascertainly a community of Muslim, believers, united bya common relationship toa deity, by a belief in the

prophethood of Muhammad, by a recognition that the

Quran was the ultimate source of religious authority,and by participation in common worship. Many, but not

all Muslims were guided by the Sharia, there was ac on sid er ab le d iv er si ty o f r el ig io us p ra ct ice s, r it ua ls ,

and beliefs at the mass level not recognized or con-demned outright by the orthodox ulema, Muslims spoke

different languages, and they did not have a commonorigin, some being descendants of invaders from the

Middle East, others being indigenous converts. In theearly nineteenth century, then, there was at most aMuslim community of believers, with only a limited setof beliefs and religious practices held in common, but

not a Muslim political or speech community.

During the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries,however, elites within the Muslim religious community,

in their efforts to adjust to the extension of the

British imperial system in India and to new sets ofrelationships with other religious groups, began to

3

The three examples given above illustrate the inter-relationship among a group's cultural symbols, theinterests of specific elite groups in relation toparticular symbols, and the freedom of action thatelites have or do not have to manipulate such symbols

in the political process. However, in order to per-ceive fully the nature of the relationship between the

ethnic identity of a cultural group and the actions ofits elites, it is necessary to consider how sets of

symbols are used to define the boundaries of a group.

It is important to recognize beforehand, however, thatat no time in the history of any cultural group isthere likely to be anything like unanimous agreement

on defining what it means to be a member of a parti-cular cultural group. Moreover, any definition that

acquires a high degree of consensus within a communityat a particular point in its history is likely at

some time to be subject to redefinition as a conse-quence of either internal conflicts of interest or

ideology within the group or as a consequence of

external changes that affect segments of the groupdifferentially.

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define the Mus l im community in different ways. TheB ri ti sh a ut ho ri ti es m at er ia ll y a ss is te d t hi s p ro ce ssfor all elite groups involved in it by treatinl theMuslims of India as an official category for purposeso f c en su s e nu me ra ti on , d is tr ib ut io n o f g ov er nm en ta pp oi nt me nt s, p ol it ic al r ep re se nt at io n, a nd e du ca ti on .One such elite group, itself internally diverse insome ways, was the ulema. They set about throughm ov em en ts o f r eli gi ou s re vi va l, t hr ou gh t he e sta bl is h-m en t o f n et wo rk s o f e du ca ti on al i ns ti tu ti on s, a ndt hr oug h p ol it ic al a ct io n t o u ni fy th e Mus li m co mm un ity ,to educate the Muslim masses in Islamic beliefs andrituals and to persuade them to avoid non-Islamicr el ig io us p ra ct ic es , a nd t o s ee k g ove rn me nt al r ec og -nition for a legal definition of the Muslim communityin India as well.42

~ ru sli m r ev iv al is m a ro se i ni tia ll y o ut o f t he n ee dfelt by the ulema to combat the threats of Christianm is si on ar ie s t o c on ve rt Mu sl im s, o f w es te rn e du ca tio nto subvert them, and of the imperial state to loosentheir control over the faithful by introducing amodern legal system. Although Muslim revivalism was

d ir ect ed i ni ti al ly ag ai ns t th e a li en r ul er s, i t b ro ug htMuslims into conflict with Hindu revivalists who wereengaged in a similar enterprise and who resentedMu sl im pr os el yt iz at io n as m uc h a s Ch ri st ian mi ss io nar yactivity. The conflict between the two revivalisms ledto a sharpening of the religious boundaries between~indus and Muslims to the extent - which, to this daylS far from complete - that each side succeeded inc on vin ci ng i ts f ol low er s t o r el in qui sh r it ua l p ra ct ic esand forms of worship held in common.

Thus, the ulema did not accept Muslim religiousidentity in the form that they found it in the nine-teenth century, but worked to impart to the Muslim

masses an understanding and a practice of Islam more inline with what the ulema considered to be proper forthe faithful. In doing so, the ulema who led the' tr ad it io na li st r ev iv al ' w er e a ls o c on ce rn ed w it hd ef en di ng t he ir d ef in it io ns o f Is la mi c p rop ri et y f ro mt he r ef or mi st i nt er pr et ati on s of t he m od ern is ts i nIs lam , particularly of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Ali-garh movement, who had by the end of the nineteenthcentury also become a threat to the control of theu le ma o ve r th e Mu sl im c om mu ni ty .4 3 Re li gi ou s r ev iv al is mhad a dual impact on the Muslims as a religious commun-ity in that it both solidified the relationship between

the clerics and the masses44 a nd s ep ar at ed t he f ai th -ful more clearly from non-Muslims. The ulema alsoset about to extend the enforcement of the Shariaamong Muslims who had not been fully subject to it.45For the ulema, then, the Muslims of India constitutedboth a religious and a legal community. Such adefinition of the Muslim community is, of course,exactly in conformity with orthodox Islam,46 but itdid not exist in nineteenth-century India as fullyas the ulema wished and it had, therefore, to beenforced.

It is important to recognize that the conception ofthe Muslim community held by the ulema in the nine-teenth century did not include a definition of theMuslims of India as a political community in themodern sense of the term, that is, as a self-determin-ing entity with the right to have a state of its ownand the authority to make its own laws. Such ad ef in i t io n w ou ld h av e t he n b ee n c on si de red co nt ra ryboth to the orthodox teachings of Islam concerning theu ni ver sa li ty o f t he Mu sl im c om mun it y a nd c onc er ni ngthe duty of Muslims to follow the Sharia rather than

man-made law. It was not until the second decade ofthe twentieth century that some of the ulema began toarticulate a different conception of the 'Muslims asforming a political community ... capable of combiningin common enterprises because its members share thevalues of Islam. ,47 However, that conception did notinclude the idea that the Sharia could be applied ori nt er pr et ed ' by p op ul ar d ec is io n a nd c oll ec ti ve w il l. '48That task was to remain the prerogative of the ulema.Moreover, insofar as any of the ulema in India articu-l at ed a m od er n co nc ep tio n o f ' te rri to ri al na ti on hoo d' ,it was not to apply to the Muslims as a separate peoplebut to India as a whole,49 in which the Muslims afterindependence were, it was hoped, to constitute a' la rg el y s el f- go ve rn in g' r el ig io us c om mu ni ty .5 0

Al th ou gh t he e li mi na ti on o f n on -I sl am ic r el ig io uspractices prevalent among Indian Muslims and theprotection of the Sharia were the more prominent goalsof the ulema who became active in politics and socialm ov em en ts , p ar ti cu la rl y i n t he J am i' ya t- al -u la maformed in 1919,51 they also played a part through theJ ami'yat and through their educational network inpromoting the spread of the Urdu language among Muslimsand its use as an additional symbol of Muslim identity.An Urdu strongly infused with Arabic and Persian words

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was the medium of instruction at the leading ulema-dominated school at Deoband in UP and at its affili-a ted m ad ra sa hs s pr ea d t hro ug ho ut n or th In dia .5 jAlthough Arabic, not Urdu, was the language used byulema in Kerala, in the north and in Hyderabad, theu le ma f ou nd th at a Pe rsi an iz ed- Ar ab ici ze d Ur du w asthe most useful vehicle both to provide access tot ra di ti on al Is lam ic l it er at ur e a nd to c om mu nic at e w it hordinary Muslims. In its 1 926 conference, the J ami'yat-

al-ulama passed a resolution demanding that the 'Urdulanguage and Urdu script be declared as the acceptedNa ti on al Lan gu ag e a nd t he a cc ep ted Nat io na l Sc ri pt 'o f In di a.53 In t he p os t- in dep en de nce p er iod , a s Ur dulost some of its hold in the government schools inthe north, the ulema rushed to the defence of Urduwhich came to be seen as part and parcel of MUSlim'' soc ia l a nd c ul tu ra l i de nt it y a nd th ei r s pi ri tua li n he r it a nc e . 15 4

For the ulema, then, the Muslim community of Indiahas been defined primarily in religious and legm terms.The primary symbol of Muslim identity for the ulema,however, is Islam itself, in which adherence to the

Sharia is an indispensable aspect. Urdu has also beenincluded in the ulema's definition of the Muslim

community but as a secondary symbol only, used defen-sively in conflict with Hindus. However, while theulema would exclude from the Muslim community thosepersons who blatantly violate the Sharia, they wouldc le ar ly n ot e xc lu de no n- Ur du s pe ake rs .

For the Muslim political elites who founded theAligarh movement and the Muslim League and who ledsuccessfully the movement for the creation of Pakistanthe values attached to the several potential symbols 'of Muslim identity in India were quite different.Moreover, from the beginning, the definition of theMu sl im c om mu nit y a rt icu la te d b y t he m od er ni zi ng Mu sl im

elites associated with Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Aligmhmovement was a political one. In contrast to theulema, who attached most value to symbols of Muslimidentity that not only separated Muslims from non-Mus li ms b ut i so lat ed Mu sl im s f rom c on ta mi na ti on b yalien religious and legal influences and preserved theinfluence of the ulema within the Muslim community,the modernist elites were initially interested inusing the community as a base for the exercise ofinfluence in the wider society. The Muslim aristo-crats and government servants who founded the various

i ns ti tu ti ons as so ci at ed w it h t he Al ig arh m ove me nt m ov edin the same spheres as and had similar interests tothose of their Hindu counterparts. As landlords, theywanted to retain control over their tenants, who wereboth Hindu and Muslim. As government servants, theywanted to ensure that they and their children wouldcontinue to have favoured access to the best jobs ingovernment.

Whereas the interests of the ulema required only the

striking of a bargain whose terms were that the per-sonal law provisions of the Sharia would not betampered with or replaced by secular laws in return for

which the ulema would not resist the authority of theimperial state in other respects, the interests oft he Mu sli m a ri st ocr at s a nd g ov er nme nt s er va nt s r eq ui redactive collaboration with the British authorities. Theterms of the bargain worked out in the last decades ofthe nineteenth century and the first two decades of thetwentieth between the modernist Muslim elites and theBritish were that the British would recognize theexistence of a Muslim community in India, with theMuslim aristocrats and government servants as its

spokesmen, would concede to those spokesmen a separatepolitical arena in which they would not have to competewi th n on -Mu sl im s, w oul d gr an t e xt ra re pr es ent at io n t othose spokesmen in a proportion beyond the actualpopulation of the community they were to represent, andwould help the Muslims to maintain their advantage ing o ve r nm e nt e m pl o ym e nt . In r et ur n, t he Mu sl im l an dl or dsand government servants were expected not only to avoido pp os in g go ve rn me nt b ut t o p ro vi de p os it ive s up po rtfor it and opposition to its detractors.55

The primary symbols of Muslim identity used by thep ri vi le ge d Mu sl im c la ss es i n th e la te n ine te en thcentury were political and historical. They arguedthat the Muslims of India had been the rulers of the

country until the British arrived,56 that theirprevious tradition of rule gave them an historical andpolitical importance far beyond the mere numbers ofthe Muslim population of the country, and that they were,therefore, entitled to a continued and more than pro-portionate share in political power under British rule.The Muslim elites and their histori9graphical andliterary apologists looked back to the great days of~ fuslim e xpansion and political power not only in Indiabut in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe for inspira-tion. For these Muslim elites, as for the ulema, the

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Eli te Groups Elite Groups

Urdu langu age became a sec ondar y symb ol of Muslimidentity only when it came under attack by Hindu

revi vali~ ts, wit h the sup port of the Bri tish \ove rn-ment. S~nce, however, it was through the Urdulangu age t hat the Mu slim elites i n the n inete enthc en tu ~y p re se rv ed t he ir p ri vi le ge d a cc es s t o g ov er n-men t J obs, reco gniti on o f Hind i by the p rovin cialg overn ments in nor th Ind ia, parti cular ly in th e Nort h-W es te rn P ro vi nc es a nd Ou dh , t hr ea te ne d t he s oc ia l

pol itica l p ositi on o f the Muslim m inorit y i n theHi nd u m aj or it y a re as a nd u ps et t he Mu sl im -B ri ti shbargain.

It ~s noteworthy that the Sharia does not appear asa prom~nent symbol of Muslim identity for the Muslimlandl ords a ~d g overn ment serv ants. Al t houg h thelanded Musl~ m classes had a specific interest in theapplication of the Musl~m law of wakf in such a waythat they could put the~ r properties into a trust forthe use of their descendants, they did not like thoseas pects o f Sharia that rest ricte d their a bilit ies todispose of their properties to persons of theirchoi 57 II' If~ce., s ~,~tse ,was but a secondary symbol forthe Musl~ m p o~ ~t~ cal el~ te s of t he nin eteen th c entur y.Alt hough Sayy~ d Ahm ad Kh an did, on occ asion, d efendIslam from the attacks of Christian missionaries hewas no~ int erest ed i n la unchi ng an ISlami c count ~r-o ~f :n s~ ~e , b ut r at he r i n ' de mo ns tr at in g t he b as ics ~m ~l ar ~t y b e~ we en ,I sl am ~ nd C hr is ti an it y' , 5 8 w hi chf~ tted w: ll w~ th h~ s p ers~ stent desi gn for a c ollab ora-t~ v: all~ ance between the British and the Muslims ofIn ~~ a. No r w er : t he n in et ee nt h- ce nt ur y p ol it ic alel ~tes : ven ser~ ously eng aged in d efini ng theb ou nd ar ~e s o f t ~e .Mu sl im .c ?m mu ni ty . Ra th er , t he yacce pted the Br~ t~ sh o ff~ c~ al recog nitio n of the ex is-t en ce o f. a M us li m c om mu ni ty , w hi ch i nv ol ve d t he ir

e nu me ra t~ on ~ n t ~e .d ec :n ni al c en su se s a nd f re qu en t

report s and ~ nq u~ r~ es ~ nto the c ondit ions of th isc? mmunity and it s a lleged back wardn ess i n rel ation toHIndus. The Muslim elites of the nineteenth century

w er e c on c: :n :t ed p ri nc ip al ly t o u se t he d at a p ro vi de dby the Br~ t~sh concerning the backwardness of the massof Muslims, with whom the leaders had little contactas an argument for preserving their own privileges '

Altho ugh Sa~ yid Ahmad Khan was conce rned to pro~ oteWes~ ern educat~ on ~m?ng the Muslims so that they wouldbe ~n a bett:r pos~t~on to qualify for high governmentoff~ ce, h e d~ d n ot feel t hat edu catio n alon e quali fied

a man for a position of importance in the realm. Suchdistinctions were to be reserved for persons 'of highsocial position' and 'of good breeding', not for men'of low caste or insignificant origin'.59 Nor did hef av ou r c om pe ti ti on w it h t he Hi nd us , p ar ti cu la rl y w it hthe despised Bengalis, but he urged the Muslims toeducate themselves so that they might be eligible tobe selected to serve the Raj. He proposed, in effect,a coll abora tion betwe en the for mer rul ing nat ions a nd

cla sses of Hindus tan, amon g whom h e somet imes i nclud edthe Raj pu ts, with the then rul ing n ation , the Bri tish.

After th e Fi rst World W ar, how ever, the secula rMu sl im e li te s b ec am e m or e d iv er si fi ed a nd m id dl e- cl as sp ro fe ss io na ls a nd p ro fe ss io na l p ol it ic ia ns b ec am e m or eprominent in Muslim politics. At the same time, as thefra nchis e w as exte nded to la rger n umbers o f peop leu nd er t he M on ta gu -Ch el ms fo rd r ef or ms a nd l at er t heGovernment of India Act, 19 35, it became necessary, ifMus lim l eaders were to s ubsta ntiat e the ir c laim torepresent their community, for them to engage inpolit ical m obili zation of t he p eople in whos e a bstra ctname elite benefits had been previously sought. More-ove r, th e di versi ficat ion of el ites wi thin the Musli mc om mu ni ty i ts el f l ed t o i nt ra -c om mu na l e li te c om pe ti -tion for the right to speak for the community.

Robi nson has descr ibed the init ial im pact on Musl imp ol it ic s o f e li te d iv er si fi ca ti on a nd i nc re as in gp re ss ur es f or p ol it ic al m ob il iz at io n d ur in g t heK hilaf at mo vemen t of 1 91 9-1 92 0. Durin g th is m ovemen t,the new er grou ps of mid dle-c lass pr ofess ional s and f ull-time politicians joined in an alliance with the ulemain a campaign whose central symbol was a pan-Islamicone.60 Most membe rs of the tradi tional Musli m eli tegro ups and the secu lar-o rient ed Musli m l eaders s uch asJinnah refused to have anything to do with this move-ment, the former because it involved a challenge to

g ov er nm en t a nd t he ir c ol la bo ra ti ve r el at io ns hi p w it hi t, the l atter bec ause it invo lved an e motio nal me rgingo f r el ig io n a nd p ol it ic s.

In th e deca des afte r the Khila fat m ovemen t, how ever,the sec ular pol itica l lead ership of the Mu slim Leaguedominated Muslim politics and sought to achieve for theMuslim community in India the kinds of goals that hadbeen set by the Aligarh movement leaders, most of whichc on ce rn ed s at is fa ct or y p ol it ic al r ep re se nt at io n. T hefam ous Four teen Poi nts dra fted by J innah in '1 929c or it ai ne d t we lv e p oi nt s t ha t f oc us ed o n m at te rs o f

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p ol it ic al r ep re se nt at io n, i nc lu di ng s uc h q ue st io ns a sthe proportion of seats to be allotted to Muslims inl eg is la tu re s a nd c ab in et s, m ai nt ai ni ng o r e xt ~d in g

the number of Muslim-maj ority provinces and theretention of separate electorates. Onl~ two of the

fourt een p oints spec ifica lly men tion ed reli gious or

c~ ltura l mat te: s. Po int sev en d emand ed ful l relig iousl lb er ty a nd p 01 nt t we lv e d em an de d c on st it ut io na l'safeguards for the protection of Muslim culture and

for the protection and promotion of Muslim educationl an gu ~g e, .r el ~g io n, p er so na l l aw s a nd M us li m c ha ri t- 'able 1nst1tut1ons.,61 The issue of the Sharia of

such central and overwhelming importance to th~ ulemaand considered by many others than the ulema to be

7ssential to any definition of the Muslim community,1S relegated to two words in a long sentence without

any specific mention of the nature of the 'safeguards'

to be sought. It is also noteworthy that Urdu is notm7ntioned specifically in the Fourteen Points. In

J 1n na h' s l at er -s ta te me nt s a nd i n v ar io us r es ol ut io ns

and manifestoe: of the Muslim League, protection ofUrdu was somet1mes mentioned. However, it is clear

enough from the infrequent attention given to theU rdu i ssu7 in his own speeches and writings that thelanguage.1ssue was not his primary concern.62 As forthe Shar1a and the ulema, J innah hardly ever referredto the former and occasionally criticized the lattersome of whom he described as 'that undesirable eleme~t

of Maulv~s and Maulanas' from whose political clutchesthe Musl1m League had freed the Muslim masses 63

~i~nah's definition of the Muslim communit~ was ap~llt~ca~ one, rather than a religious-legal or

1~ ngu1st1c one. Although, therefore, it was entirelyd1fferent from the definition used by the ulema, it

a~ so m oved aw ay from t he histo rical -poli tical de fini-t10n of 7he early leaders of the Aligarh movement.

The Musl1m community for Jinnah was not an abstracth is to ri ca l- po li ti ca l e nt it y b ut a c on te mp or ar y p ol it ic al

forc7· Safeguards and weightage in representation for

~sllms were now sought not because of the historical1mportance of the Muslim community in India but because

though they were a minority, they were also a separate'people with distinct interests. They could not,

therefore, be treated like the shifting minorities ina representative system who could be voted down on one

~ssue, but would have a chance to prevail on other1ssues. On the contrary, the Muslims of India

60

E li te G ro up s

r ep re se nt ed a p er ma ne nt a nd p er si st in g p ol it ic alinterest and could not be treated only as a minority.

J innah 's polit ical meth ods were a lso entir ely

different from those of the Muslim political elites ofthe nineteenth century. Collaboration with the

B ritis h a uthor ities cou ld n ot p rovid e the n ecess arys afegu ards fo r Mus lims, espec ially a s Indi a mo ved

closer to self-government. What was required was

unity, solidarity, and organization. After the forma-

tion of Congress governments in six provinces in Indiain 1937 and the unwillingness of the Congress tocooperate with the Muslim League on its terms in those

provinces, Jinnah's call for Muslim unity andsolidarity became his principal theme. The Muslims,

Jinnah insisted, should follow the Muslim League as

i ts ' on ly a ut ho ri ta ti ve a nd r ep re se nt at iv e o rg an iz a-tion,6 4 and should pursue 'one single definite uniformpolicy,.65 Only by organization and unity could the

Mus lim m inori ty prote ct its 'r ights and int erest s'against what Jinnah saw as 'a permanent Hindum aj o ri t y . , 66

It was a short step from this position ideologically,

but rather a larger one rhetorically, to the positionarticulated by J innah after the failure of the MuslimLeague to achieve its political goals in India in the1930s and the passage of the Pakistan resolution of

1940, namely, the idea that the Muslims of India

c onsti tuted a self -dete rmini ng p oliti cal commu nity , anation in the modern sense of the term. The differ-

ences between Hindus and Muslims in India were now seenas not merely religious differences, but as entirely

different ways of life and thought. Hindus and

Muslims in India were distinct peoples, with 'different

r el ig io us p hi lo so ph ie s, s oc ia l c us to ms , l it er at ur es ,'a n d h is to r ie s.67 As such, it was unthinkable that

they could live as a mere minority in a Hindu-dominatedcountry. Rather, they must have a state of their own

in which they would establish their own constitutionand make their own laws.

Once the state of Pakistan was founded, however,Jinnah reverted to a position much more consistent

wit h hi s secul ar polit ical ori entat ion, na mely, tha tthe dif feren ces bet ween Hi ndus a nd M uslim s wer e ma tters

of personal religion only, which did not prevent their

cooperating together as cit1zens of the sam~ state.68

His death in 1948, however, meant that others in Pakis-tan had to face up to the fundamental contradiction

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E li te G ro up s

betw~en the secular political conception of a modern

Musllm state and the religious-legal conception of itheld by the ulema. Others too had to face the~ontra-dictions posed by the fact that north Indian Muslimswho had taken the lead in Muslim separatism had fordecades been promoting the view that Urdu was the

language of the Muslims, a position vehemently deniedby the Bengali majority in the new state. These

contradictions have so far proved to be irresolvable

! he fi rs ~ c on tr ib ut ed to t he pr ol on ge d d iff ic ul ti es 'In reachlng a consensus on a constitution for Pakistanthe second to its disintegration. The persistent 'problems of maintaining national unity in Pakistan inth e f ac e o f li ng ui st ic a nd c ul tu ra l d iv er si tie ssuggest that a satisfactory definition of the boun-daries of the Muslim nation is yet a long way off.

4~ n the preceding pages, the relationship between elitelnterests and three Hindu and Muslim cultural symbolsin South Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries have been discussed. It remains to considerwh at th e di sc us si on s ug ges ts a bo ut t he r el ati on sh ip sbetween these 'givens' of Hindu and Muslim existence

in north India and the symbols used by religious andp ol it ic al e li te s.

In some senses, all three of the symbols discussedcan be considered primordial attachments - the cow theSharia, and the Urdu language. For the orthodox Hindu~he prohibition against killing and eating beef is 'lnseparable from his religion and his whole moral

outlook on life. It is, therefore, inconceivable

~hat a~ y.H~ ndu politician could expect to be effectivel ~ m ob ll l7 lng support by proposing that the prohibi-

tl~n: aga6 nst co~ slaughte: be discarded as super-StltlOUS. 9 It lS also eVldent that the cow is always

pot~n~ially a s~b?l that can be called up by Hindurehpous 0 : po liticaj e li te s to m ob il iz e l ar ge nu mb er s~f Hln~us e~ther to build internal unity or to engageIn a~tlon dlrected against Muslims. To say that thecow lS always potentially available as a mobilizing

s~bol, how~v~r,·does not mean that any Hindu politi-Clan or rellglous leader who uses it at any time is

bound to succeed. It does mean, thoug~ that if govern-~ent or the Muslims flaunt Hindu sentiment by permitt-lng open or too evident slaughtering of cows, Hindu

62

E li te G ro up s

religious leaders are likely to rise up and mobilize

Hindus in protest. Does this mean that Hindu-Muslimco nf li ct wa s i ne vit ab le i n Hi nd u-m aj or it y I nd ia a nd

that Muslims must submit to Hindu sentiment on theissue? The strength of Hindu feeling on cow protectionand the relatively much smaller significance of cowslaughter for Muslims surely dictated that the terms of

an y po li tic al a cc om mo da ti on b et wee n H in du s an d Mu sli mswould involve limitations on Muslim freedom to

slaughter cows. In the pre-independence period, thesymbol of the cow was also available to those Muslim

le ad er s w ho w is hed t o p ro vo ke H in du -M usl im c on fl ic t

by using it to protest against Hindu oppression ofMuslims. It would be nothing but folly for any Muslim

politician in India to so use it in post-independence,

p os t- pa rt it io n I nd ia .The Sharia has been used as a symbol of Muslim

identity in a manner similar to the use of the cow byHindus. It has been a centra l symbol fo r th e ~ tus li m

religious elites, the ulema, but only a secondarysymbol for the·secular Muslim political elites. The

ulema have fought to protect the personal law portions

of the Sharia and their right to interpret thoseprOVisions against the inroads of the state and the

desires of other Muslims who are not ulema to reform

the personal law. The success of the ulema in usingthe Sharia as a symbol of Islam has meant that thestate and secular Muslim leaders are constrained fromattempting to reform the Muslim personal law by a mass

public opinion that has been socialized to believe thatit will be un-Islamic to do so.

Unlike the symbol of the cow for the Hindus, however,the Sharia is a divisive symbol w it hi n t he M us lim

community itself. One would be hard put to find many

Hindus who think it important to slaughter cows,7 0

but many secular Muslims consider it essential tomodernize the Sharia and to adopt a uniform civil lawadministered by the state. This division within the

Muslim community and the fact that the Sharia is not

a divisive symbol in Hindu-Muslim relations made

p os si bl e p ol it ic al b ar ga in s b ef or e i nd ep en de nc ebetween Hindu and Muslim elites, that is, between thesecular Hindu political elites and the ulema, toundercut the hold of secular Muslim elites over

M us lim pu bl ic op in io n. A ft er i nd ep en de nc e~ h ow ev er ,

in the changed political contexts of India and Paki-

stan, the Sharia has become a potential symbol of

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conflict between the u1ema and the secular politicalelites in both states. The hold of the Shariaover

Muslim public opinion in South Asia then has bstome a'given' of religious belief, but the use of the Sharia

as a symbol of conflict or cooperation between elitesn ev ert he le ss v ar ie s a cc or di ng t o p ol it ic al c ir cu mst an ce .

In other words, political context and elite interestsdetermine the political significance of this religioussymbol.

The most variable symbol discussed here is also themost 'primordial' of the three. Surely, one's mothertongue is second only to one's family relationships as

a 'given' and surely it is acquired sooner and moreinstinctively than feelings of reverence for areligious symbol such as the cow or than respect for

a complex body of laws such as the Sharia. Yet,despite the high degree of shared features in thespoken languages of Hindus and Muslims in north India,both sides have claimed as their true language one oft he t wo r eg io na l c on fl ic ti ng s ta nd ar d la ng ua ges ,

Hindi or Urdu, and alternately argued either that one

is merely a version of the other or that the two areentirely different languages. In the late nineteenth

c ent ur y, t he p re do mi na ntl y M usl im , U rd u- sp ea ki ng e li teargued that Hindi was but a dialect of Urdu less

effectively written in the Devanagari script than inthe Persian-Arabic script and that therefore Urdu in

the latter script should be retained as the soleofficial language of the North-Western Provinces and

Oudh. After independence, the predominantly Hindu

elites in the same province have argued that Urdu isbut a variant of Hindi and that therefore there is noneed to grant official recognition and status to it,

that only Hindi should be recognized as the official

language of the state. Yet, throughout the longhistory of the Hindi-Urdu controversy, many of the

spokesmen for both sides have taken the quite differentview that the two languages are entirely distinct,

that Hindi is the proper language of Hindus and Urdu

the proper language of Muslims, and that a threat toeither language is equivalent to a threat to thereligion of the respective community. Sometimes, in

fact, the argument that one language is but a

variant of the other has been made for politicalpurposes only by people whose true feelings are thateach language is identified with one of the twocommunities.

The three examples suggest the following generaliz-a tio ns c onc er ni ng t he r el at io ns hi ps a mo ng e li te s,

symbols, and primordial attachments. First, althoughthe 'givens' of human existence and of long-persistingcultural communities may constrain the free manipula-

tion of cultural symbols by elites, they do not prevententirely their manipulation or even alteration of

their meaning. It is after all a different proposition

to say, 'Hindus revere the cow', than it is to say,

'Those who revere the cow are Hindus. 'Second, when primordial symbols are brought forth

into the political arena, it is likely that a parti-

cular elite stands to gain from their use. Far be itfrom any non-Muslim to deny the religious significanceof the Sharia for Muslims. Yet, when the Sharia is

brought forth as a political symbol, it is certaineither that the u1ema are concerned about a threat totheir authority in Muslim society or that secularMuslim elites are using it for advantage against

perceived threats from a rival elite to their controlo ve r t he M us li m c om mu ni ty .

Third, the cultural 'givens' may make their appear-ance in the political arena in a dramatic way at one

time or another and then may disappear for longperiods because it is in no one's interest to bring

them forth as central symbols. Such has been thecase with the cow protection issue, which has occupiedthe centre of the stage only twice in modern Indian

history - once in the late 1880s and early 1890s, andthen again in 1966. In between, there was no loss of

Hindu reverence for the cow, and its symbolic uses didnot ce ase, but no great movements were launched in itsdefence.

F in al ly , t he e xi st en ce o f p ri mo rd ia l a tt ac hm en ts ,even of contradictory attachments held by rival commun-ities, does not mean that bargains cannot be struck

over them based on agreements to respect each others'feelings and to keep them out of politics. Hindusrevere the cow and Muslims are brought up to eat it,

but dietary habits are changed more easily than

religious beliefs. Consequently, Muslims may changetheir primordial attachment to eating beef for the sakeof the Hindu primordial attachment to the sanctity of

the cow, particularly if Hindus agree not to tamperwith those attachments that Muslims value more than the

Hindus, such as the Sharia. NOw, this particularbargain, though not an explicit one, surely exists

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tacitly in contemporary India. It is at least certainthat the ulema will not rise up in a body to defendcow sacrifice as long as there is no interferertce with

the Muslim perso nal l aw.A n examination, one by one, of the use of specific

cultural symbols and the attachment of new value tothem by religious and political elites does not takeus to the heart of the process of identity formation,

which involves the manipulation of a multiplicity of

symbols and attempts to define a group in terms ofsets of symbols. It is in the ways in which symbolsare combined and the emphasis given to particularsymbols in relation to others that the boundaries ofcommunities are established or break down. It has

been shown above how, in the history of Muslim separa-tism, three different elite groups used the same sets

of symbols, but emphasized and combined them indiffer ent ways, t hereb y ar riving a t diffe rent de fini-tions of the Muslim community in India. The Musliml an dl or ds a nd g ov er nm en t s er va nt s i n n in et ee nt h-

cen tury north In dia w ere inter ested in establ ishingthe historical importance of the Muslim community in

India and the right of its elites to occupy rulingpositions in public life. Therefore, for the nine-

t ee nt h- ce nt ur y M us li m p ol it ic al e li te s, t he c en tr al

symbols were historical ones, with religion and

l an g ua ge s ec on d ar y.For the u lema , religion and law, with the two

defined as inseparable, were the primary symbols, withUrdu again a secondary symbol. The Muslim community

was defined in terms of religious beliefs, ritual

practices, and adherence to the Sharia. Muslims needn ot seek po litica l sov ereign ty or domi nation in mu lti-

communal India. It was sufficient, if not ideal,that they constitute a religiously and legally autono-

mous community guided by the ulema.

For t he se cular pol itical elit e o f m iddle- classprof ession als and p oliti cians who d ominat ed the Musli m

League in the 1930s and 1940s, however, it was not law

that mattered but political power. For this elite,the Muslim community was defined in political terms,

that is, as a self-determining nation, distinctive inreli gion, hi story, phi losoph y of life, li teratu re, a ndlangu age from the Hind us, bu t unfort unatel y a m inorit y.During the drive for Pakistan, Jinnah went nearly to

the point of defining the Muslims of India as thosewho followed the Muslim League. No one else, he·

insisted, had the right to speak, politically at least,for the Muslims of India. Those who remained outsidethe League were classed into two categories - thoseyet to be organized and those who were 'careerists'and betrayers of the cause of Muslim unity.

For all three elite groups in the north and even for

Jinnah, the Urdu language at some point also became an

important symbol, but always a secondary one. Never-thele ss, it prov ed to be the prov erbial d ouble- edged

sword. For, while Urdu was a convenient symbol toreinforce the sense of separateness of north IndianMuslims, it was resisted vehemently by the Bengali

poli tical el ites, by Sin dhi-sp eaker s, and by ot herl an gu ag e- gr ou p l ea de rs i n p os t- in de pe nd en ce P ak is ta n.

The game of symbol selection and symbol manipula-

tion, therefore, is clearly one that requires con-

siderable skill and that is not always playedsuccessfully. Elites are indeed limited and con-

strained by the cultures of the groups they hope torepr esent. Some symbo ls are e motion ally p owerfu l,but may be dangerous to use - not only because their

use threatens civil disorder, but because their usewill benefit one elite group rather than another.

Other symbols may be useful for conflict with a rival

commu nity, bu t pot ential ly divis ive inte rnally . Thegr eat dile mma con stantl y face d by po litica l elites

who manipulate symbols of identity among peoples withrich cultures is that political mobilization of the

community against its rivals requires unity andSOlidarity, which in turn requires that sets of

symbols be made as congruent as possible. However,since most cultures are internally diverse, the search

for additional symbols of unity often leads tointern al discor d rathe r than to the d esire d sol idarit y

a nd c oh es i on .Where in all this does the idea of ethnic groups as

descent groups fit? It is simply irrelevant to thecase of Muslim separatism in north India, unless the

notion of descent is defined so broadly as to includea sense of a separate history. Unless one is willing

to stretch the notion of descent to this extent, the

only option for those who insist upon including descentin the idea of ethnicity is to exclude from its scopecases such as that of the Muslims of India. However,we will then be placed in an analytically difficult

position for there is no pr im a facie case to be made

for the idea that processes of identity-formation among

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groups for whom an origin myth is a central symbol areany different from those among groups for whom it isnot. i

~ final point remains to be taken up, namely, thenotl0n that, whatever changes take place in theboundaries of ethfiic groups, there remains a culturalcore that persists through time. If this argument is

applied to the Muslim case, it has an evident, but

superficial relevance. For, while it is certainly

true that Islamic symbols have been important to allgroups who have sought to establish the existence of

a Muslim community or nation in India and while it is

also true t~at some of those symbols remain relativelyconstant - Ln form, if not always in meaning - theethnic community or nation for whom they are a constant

has not yet been established. The Quran, the prophetMuhammed, the Sharia are constants for Muslims every-where, at least wherever Islam and the ulema have astrong hOld, but the Muslims of the world are neitheran ethnic community nor a nation. Muslim politicalelites in India in the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies attempted to argue that the Muslims of the

subcontinent formed a distinct nation and they had a

grand, but ephemeral success. It proved to be epheme-

ral because beyond the core of Islamic symbols, allother symbols proved to be divisive and could not bemade congruent with the religious ones. In fact,Islamic symbols, whose 'unifying power,7 1 has indeed

been often demonstrated, have been repeatedly used by

political elites in different contexts in South Asiain pursuit of competitive advantage against rivals

from other communities and as a base for achievingpolitical power, but their repeated use has not yet

established a firm basis for a Muslim nation anywherein South Asia. Rather, there exists on the Indian

subcon~ i~ ent a multiplicity of Muslim ethnic groups,

c om mu nl tl es , a nd p ot en ti al n at io na li tie s, c on gru en t i nboth religion and language, but nowhere defined by

descent.

Brass, 'Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic

Identity among the Muslims of South Asia'

Several friends and colleagues were kind enough to

read two earlier drafts of this chapter and to provide

detailed criticisms and suggestions. I am verygrateful to Charles F. Keyes, Daniel S. Lev, Francis

Robinson, David Taylor, Muna Vakil, and Malcolm Yapp,whose comments have aided me substantially in revisingthose earlier drafts. In many cases I have made

changes in text and footnotes that w~uld not haveoccurred to me otherwise. Since I could not always be

sure, however, that my revisions would satisfy thosewho made the suggestions, I have limited my acknow-

ledgments to them here, for the most part. I absolvemy colleagues from responsibility for any remaining

errors or deficiencies and for the arguments presented.

1. Malcolm Yapp has contrasted the arguments of

those theorists of nationalism who see it as a 'nat-ural' phenomenon with those who see it as 'unnatural'

in chapter 1 of this volume. Judith A. Nagata hasmade a similar comparison between two groups of

s ch ola rs o f e th nic it y w ho m s he l ab el s ' pr im or di al is ts 'and 'circumstantialists' in 'Defence of Ethnic

Boundaries: The Changing Myths and Charters of Malay

Identity', in Charles F. Keyes, ed., E th ni c C ha ng e,

unpublished manuscript submitted to University of

Washington Press. Joshua A. Fishman contrasts thework of those who approach the study of ethnicity

from the subjective, internal point of view of the

actors t~ emselves wi~ h what he calls the 'obj ectivist,externallst' school ln 'Social Theory and Ethnography:

Neglected Perspectives on Language and Ethnicity inEastern Europe', in Peter Sugar, ed., Et hn ici ty i n

E as te :n E ur op e, Santa Barbara, forthcoming, chapter 2.

In thlS paper the two perspectives will be referred toas 'primordialist' and 'instrumentalist'. The latterterm :efers to a perspective that emphasizes the usesto WhlCh cultural symbols are put by elites seekinginstrumental advantage for themselves or the groups

they claim to represent.

2. The quotations are, of course from Clifford

G ee rt z, ' Th e I nt eg ra ti ve R evo lu ti on : P rim or di al S en ti -ments and Civil Politics in the New States', in

69

68

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Notes to p ag es 3 5- 38 Notes to p ages 39 -44

C li ff or d G ee rt z, e d. , Old Societies and New States:

The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, Ne~ York1 96 7, pp.l08-ll0 and 128.

3 . Fi sh ma n, ' So ci al T he or y a nd Et hno gr ap hy ', ta ke s

this view. An extreme statement of the position maybe found in Pierre L. van den Berghe, 'Race and

E th ni ci ty : A S oc io bi ol og ic al L oo k' , Eth nic an d Ra cial

Studies 1 ,4 ( Oc to be r 1 97 8) , fo rt hc omi ng .4. See especially Fishman, 'Social Theory and

Ethnography'; Charles F. Keyes, 'Towards a New Form-ulation of the Concept of Ethnic Group', Ethnicity 3,

3 ( Se pt em be r 1 97 6) , pp .2 02 -2 l3 ; an d E .K . F ra nc is,I nt er et hn ic R el at io ns : An E ss ay i n S oc io lo gi ca l

Theory, New York 1976, pp.6-7.5. See, for example, Joshua A. Fishman, 'Socio-

l in ~li st ic s a nd t he L an gu ag e Pr ob le ms of t he D ev el opi ngCountries', in Joshua A. Fishman et al., eds., Language

Pr ob lem s of De velop in g Natio ns, New York 1968, p.3, andJohn J. Gumperz, 'Some Remarks on Regional and Social

L an gua ge D if fe re nc es i n I nd ia ' an d ' La ng ua ge Pr ob le msin the Rural Development of North India', in University

o f Ch ic ago , T he Co ll eg e, Introduction to t he C iv il iz a-

tion of India: Changing Dimensions of Indian Society

a nd C ul tu re , C hi ca go 1 95 7, p p. 3l -4 7.6 . All the situations mentioned in this paragraph

have occurred among different language groups in northIndia. For details, see Paul R. Brass, Language,

Religion and Politics in North India, L on do n 1 97 4.7. The conversion of untouchable Hindu castes in

India to Buddhism is a case in point. See Owen M.Lynch, The Politics of Untouch ability: Social Mob ility

and Social Change in a City of India, New York 1969,chapter 5. Another well-known example is the BlackMuslim movement in the United States.

8 . K ey es , ' To wa rd s a N ew F or mu la ti on ', p p. 2 0 4- 20 5,

takes a rather different view on 'the facts of birth'than the one presented here.

9 . Se e e sp ec ia lly G ee rt z, ' Th e I nt eg ra tiv e Re vol u-t io n' .

1 0. Fishman, 'Social Theory and Ethnography', is

especially insistent on this point. See also Keyes,'T ow ar ds a Ne w F or mul at io n' , p .2 l0 .

1 1. Fi sh man , ' So ci al Th eo ry an d Et hn og ra ph y' .Even for the Jews, however, there have been important

i nt ern al d iv is io ns o f a tt itu de an d fe el in g to wa rd s

some aspects of the core culture. For an interestinganalysis of the ways in which the meanings of persi~nt

Jewish cultural symbols have been reinterpreted atd if fe re nt ti me s a nd in d if fe re nt c ul tur al co nt ex ts ,

see Pearl Katz and Fred E. Katz, 'Symbols as Chartersin Culture Change: The J ewish Case', Anthropos 72( 1 9 77 ), p p .4 8 6- 4 96 .

12. Even if, for example, one accepts MartinKilson's view that 'black ethnicity' in the UnitedStates has 'lacked until recently the quality of

authenticity - that is, a true and viable heritage,unquestionable in its capacity to shape and sustain

a cohesive identity or awareness', blacks have, infact, adopted or created new cultural symbols andused them to build a political cohesiveness andidentity of greater strength than that of otherg ro up s w it h m or e ' au th en ti c' c ul tu ra l t ra di ti on s.'B la ck s a nd N eo -E th ni ci ty i n A me ri ca n Po li ti cal Li fe ',

in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., Ethni-

cit y: Th eory an d Ex peri en ce, C am br id ge , M as s. , 1 97 5,

p.243.13. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, 'Intro-

du ct ion ', in ibid., p.8.14. Abner Cohen, 'Variables in Ethnicity', in

Keyes, E th ni c C ha ng e.

15. Michael Banton, 'The Direction and Speed of

Ethnic Change', in ib id.

1 6. Ab ne r C ohe n, T wo -D im en si on al M an : An Essay on

the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex

Society, B er kel ey 1 97 4, p p. 98- l0 2 an d 1 06 -1 10.17 . I have contrasted these opposing points of

view and presented my own in Brass, Language,

R el ig io n a nd p ol it ic s, ch ap te r 3 .1 8. F ra nc is R ob in so n, 'Nation Formation: Th e Br as s

Thesis arid Muslim Separatism', and Paul R. Brass,' A R ep ly to Fr an ci s R ob in so n', in Jo urn al of C om mo n-

w eal th an d Com parati ve poli tics 15, 3 (November 1 97 7) ,

pp.215-234.1 9. F ra nc is R ob in so n, Sep arati sm A mon g In dian

Muslims: The Politics of the United provinces' Mus-

l im s, 1 86 0- 19 23 , L on do n 1 97 4, P .13.

2 0. Ib id.2 1. I bi d. , p p. 77 -8 .22. Ibid., pp.285 and 299 and John R. McLane,

In dian Nationalism and the Early Con gress, Princeton,

N.J . 1 97 7, p.279 .2 3. R ob in so n, Sep arati sm Am on g I ndia n M usli ms,

p . 29 9 . Ab d a.I> Ba ri ' s o ff er w as n ot wi th ou t p re ce de ntin Indian Muslim history. Akbar, whose memory

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Notes to pa ges 49- 50

admittedly is not revered by pious Muslims, prohibitedcow slaughter during his reign. Vincent A. Smi;th,Akbar the Great Mogul: 1542-1605, 2nd ed., Oxf~d 1919,p.220, cited in McLane, I n di a n N at io n al i sm , p.277.Emperor Bahadur Shah also prohibited cow slaughterduring the Mutiny of 1857: ibid., p.278.

24. A.M. Zaidi, ed., Evolutio n of Mus lim Politi cal

Thought in India, Vol. II, Sectaria n Nat ion alism an d

Khilafat, New Delhi 1975, p.2l7.

2 5. McLan e, I n di an N at i on a li sm , p p. 28 0, 3 04 -3 05 .However, McLane argues that the Congress officiallykept silent on the cow protection issue and on theparticipation of Congressmen in Hindu communal

activities, when a more forthright and outspokenstand against both was called for 'to allay Muslimf ea rs ': p .3 30 .

26. Ibid., pp.285-288. The merging of religious andeconomic arguments for cow protection has been a per-sistent feature in the cow protection movement. See,for example, the detailed economic arguments for cowprotection presented in Thakur Das Bhargava, Cow in

Agony, Bombay 1958. The author, who also supportscow protection for cultural and religious reasons,reaches the conclusion on economic grounds 'that there

are no useless cattle in India which cannot justifytheir existence and sufferance to reach full physicalage'; p .16 .

2 7. McLan e, I n di an N a ti on a li s m, p p. 27 5, 2 80 , 2 82- 4.28. Ibid., pp.272-3 and chapters 9 and 10, passim.29 . Ibid., p.326 .

30. See, for example, Robinson, S ep ar at is m A mo ng

I nd ia n M us li ms , pp.56, 81-2. However, even in the

m uni ci pal it ie s, Ro bi nso n' s w or k s ug ge st s t hat wh er eHindu-Muslim political alliances eXisted, as among thelandlords in eastern UP, the cow slaughter issue was

not permitted to intrude into politics: p.79.

31 . Ta hi r M ah mo od , Muslim Personal Law: Role of the

S ta te i n t he S ub -c on ti ne nt , New Delhi 1 97 7, pp.3-4,62-3.

32. Ibid., chapters 1 and 2.

3 3. Z iy a- ul -H as an F ar uq i, The Deoband School and the

D em an d f or P ak is ta n, Bombay 1 96 3, p.6 8.34. Muhammad Ismail, the Kerala Muslim League leader,

suggested a formal and explicit bargain of this sort in

the Constituent Assembly of India in December 1948:Mahmood, M uslim P erson al Law , p.95.

35. See Brass, L an guage, Reli gion an d Poli tics' ,

pp.127-38 for the background of the Hindi-Urdu con-

troversy in UP and for further illustration of someo f th es e p oi nt s.

36 . William Adam, Reports on the State of Education

in Bengal (1835 and 1838), Including Some Account of

the State of Education in Bihar and a C on si de ra ti on o f

th e Mean s Adopted t o the Improvement and Extension of

Pub lic In struction in Bo th provin ces, edited by

A nat hn ath B asu , C al cu tt a 1 94 1, p p. 29 0- l.

37. Robinson also notes the shift of Muslim atti-tudes from dislike for Urdu to the identification of

Urdu as 'a symbol of Muslim power and influence' andthe attachment to it of 'an almost religious signifi-cance'. He suggests that this shift occurred 'in the

second half of the nineteenth century' but that itpredated the Hindi-Urdu controve~sy. If so, thela tt er c ont ro ver sy c er ta in ly i nt en si fi ed th e ne wfeelings of attachment of Muslims to the Urdu language.

The dimensions of the shift, however, can hardly bedoubted. Sayyid Ahmad Khan who later became a greatproponent of Urdu criticized the British educationpolicy in 1858 for its neglect of Arabic and Persian

and its attention to Urdu and English, which, hewrote, had 'tended to strengthen the idea that Govern-ment wished to wipe out the religions which it foundin Hindustan!' Se paratism Am on g I ndian Muslim s, pp.70,

91, 98.38. These remarks are based on the work of Jyoti-

rindra Das Gupta and John J. Gumperz, 'Language

Communication and Control in North India', in Fishman,Lan guag e Prob lem s of revelop in g Nation s, e sp . p .1 57 .Francis Robinson has, however, suggested in a personalcommunication to me that Urdu was already Persianized

in the nineteenth century. Even so, the commonalitiesbetween Hindi and Urdu were sufficient to make it amatter of choice what kind of Hindi-Urdu - or Hindi and

Urdu - was to be taught in the schools and used at theelite level for administrative and literary purposes.

Robinson argues further that, in fact, a de-Persianiz-ation of Urdu took place in the nineteenth century. Ido not have the competence or knowledge to judge

whether Robinson's or Das Gupta and Gumperz's observa-tions are more accurate, but the point is that Hindiand Urdu can be used as one common language or as twoseparate languages, as vehicles of common communica-

tion or as separate expressions of the distinctivecultures of Hindus and Muslims. Some elites among both

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Hindus and Muslims in the nineteenth century chose thel at te r c ou rs e.

39 . P. Hardy, The Muslims of Bri t ish IndiJ, Cam-b ri dg e 1 97 2, p .2 .

40. Murray T. Titus, Islam in India and Pakistan:

A Religious History of Islam in India and Pakistan

Calcutta 1959, chapter 5 and pp.170 ff. Cf. Bernard S.Cohn who has remarked that 'at the folk level' thereh as b ee n ' li tt le f unc ti on ai d if fe ren ce b et we en Hi nd us

a nd M us li ms ', India: The Social Anthropology of aCivilization, En gl ew ood Cl if fs, N. J. 1 97 1, p p. 66 -7 .See also David M. Mandelbaum Society in India Vo lI I , C ha ng e a nd C on ti nu it y, B~ rk ele y 1 97 0, p p. 4i 3, 5 27 ,546 -9 for a survey of the anthropological literatureo n Hin du -Mu sl im s im il ar it ie s an d d if fer en ce s i n In di anvillages with respect to social and religiouspractices. Hardy too has noted the observance ofc om mo n fe st iv al s, c el eb ra ti on s, a nd w or sh ip b y Hi nd usand Muslims in town and country in Mughal times in Th e

Muslims of British India, p p. 19 , 27 .41 . Anil Seal, Th e Em erge nce of In dian N ation alis m:

Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nin eteenth

Century, C am br id ge 1 97 1, p .3 00 .42. Most of the religious societies formed todefend Islam in the late nineteenth century againstp er ce iv ed Ch ris ti an m is si on ar y a nd Hi nd u at ta ck sa do pt ed e xpl ic it g oa ls o f u ni fy in g t he Mu sli m c om mu ni ty .Th e An ju ma n- i-Hi ma ya t-i -Is la m, f ou nd ed i n Lah or e in1885, for example, established as one of its goals' th e c re ~t ion a nd p re se rv at io n o f f ri en dl y f eel in gsand concord between the different sects of Islam'.The goals of educating the masses to a common under-standing of proper Islamic beliefs and practices werealso clear in the missionary activities of some of thes oc ie ti es w hi ch w er e de si gn ed t o r ea ch ' ig nor an tMuslims' as much as OT mo re th an n on- Mu sl ims ' i bid

p.35l. The Jamryat-al-ulama was quite explicit in itsgoals of persuading 'all the Muslims of India to giveu p t he u nn ec ess ar y, us el es s a nd w as tef ul p ra ct is esand ceremonies which are against the commands of Godand His Prophet'. A.M. Zaidi, ed., Ev oluti on o f M uslim

Political Thought in India, V ol . III, parting of the

Ways, New Delhi 1977, p.686. The Jami'yat also ofc ou rs e t oo k t he l ead in d em an di ng g ove rn me nta l e nf or ce -men~ of ~uslim personal laws and in opposing anylegls~atlon on matters of personal and family lawpercelved not to be in conformity with the Sharia:

Mahmood, Muslim personal Law, p p. 27 -3 l, 5 2- 5, 8 3- 5,

a nd p as si m.4 3. Az iz Ah ma d, Islamic Modernism in India and

Pakistan, 1857-1964, London 1967, chapter 5. .44 Aziz Ahmad has remarked that one of the obJec-

t iv es 'o f t he De oba nd s em in ar y w as ' to r e- es ta bl is h

c on ta ct b et we en t he 'a1im a nd t he a ve rag e Mu sl im' :

i bi d. , p .l 04 .4 5. M ah mo od , Musl im pers on al L aw , p . 2 1 .

46 . See Peter Hardy, partners in Freedom - and TrueMuslims: The political Thought of Some Muslim Scholars

in British India, 1 91 2- 19 47 , Lun d 1 97 1, p .1 5.

4 7. Ib id ., p .23 .4 8. Ib id ., p .3 1.4 9. I bi d. , p p. 37 -8 .50 . Ib i.d., p.4l.51. See, for example, the statement of the goals of

the J ami'yat, given in Faruqi, Th e D eob an d Sch ool,

p.68.5 2. F ar uq i, Th e Deob an d Sc hool , p.36.5 3. Z ai di , E volu tion of Musl im po litic al T hough t,

Vol. III, p. 6 92.54. S. Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, Muslim s in India,

t ra ns la te d b y Mo ha mm ad As if K id wai , Lu ck no w n .d ., p .1 33 .55 . It was not only with Muslims and Muslim landlords

that such a bargain existed, but with other ~ollab?r-ators with the British authorities as well, lncludlngHindu landlords. Reeves has described how the govern-ment of the United Provinces instigated the collabor-ating landlords there in 1920-1 to join in an 'anti-n on -c oo pe ra ti on m ov em en t' b y f or mi ng a ma n s ab ha s toprovide 'vocal support for the government and opendenunciation of the non-cooperators'. Peter D. Reeves,' Th e Po li ti cs o f Or de r: n An ti_ No n_ Coo pe ra tio n" i n t heUn it ed P ro vi nc es , 1 92 1' , Journal of Asian Studies 25,

2 (February 1966), p.266. .

56 'What is this nation of OUTS?' a sk ed Sa yp dAhmad'Khan in 1887. 'We are those who have ruled Indiafor six or seven hundred years.' Speech delivered atLucknow on 28 December 1 887 , reprinted in A.M. Z aidi,ed., Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India,

Vol. I, F rom Syed to the Emergen ce of Jinnah, Ne w

De lh i 1 97 5, p .4 2.57. In the l890s, the Privy Council restricted the

rights of Muslims to establish wakfs t hat w er e c le arl ymeant principally for the benefit of descendants ratherthan as charity for the poor. See Asaf A.A. Fyzee,

7475

Notes to pages 58 -62 Notes to pages 63 -68

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Outlines of Muham madan Law, 2nd ed., London 1955, pp.254-6 6 and Z aidi, Evol utio n o f M usli m Poli tica l

Thought, Vol. I, pp.300-20. In 1913, Jinnah s~nsoredthe successful passage in the Imperial LegislativeCouncil of the Wakf Act, which restored the right ofMuslims to place their properties into trusts theincome from which would go to descendants. Z~idi,op.cit., p.429 and Hector Bolitho, J in na h: C re at or

o f p ak is ta n, London 1 954, p.53. Mahmood, however,

claims that the Muslim landlords opposed the moreg en er al a ppl ic at io n o f S ha ri a i nh eri ta nc e p rov is io ns

that would have prevented them from excluding women

from inheritance or bequeathing their properties toa do pt ed s on s: Mu slim Perso nal Law , pp.26 and 30-1.

5 8. R af iq Z ak ar ia , Rise of Muslims in Indian

Politics: An Analy sis of Developments from 1885 to

1906, Bo mb ay 1 97 0, p .23 6.59. Sayyid Ahmad Khan, speech of 28 December 1887

i n Z ai di , Evol utio n o f M usli m Poli tica l Th oug ht, Vol:I , p .3 4.

6 0 . Rob in so n, Se parat ism Am on g In di an Musl im s,

chapters 8 and 9.

61. Cited in Khalid B. Sayeed, Paki stan : Th eF or ma ti ve P ha se , 1 857 -1 948, London 1 968, p.7 3.

62. Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr.

Jinn~h, edited by J amil-ud-Din Ahmad, Lahore 19 42,passIm.

6 3. Ibid., p.42.

64. Ibid., pp.87, 104.6 5 . . Ib id ., p .3 0.

6 6. Ibid., p.4l.67. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Presidential Address at the

All-India Muslim League, Lahore Session, March 1940, ini bi d. , p .1 53 .

68. Jinnah's inaugural address in the Pakistan Con-stituent Assembly, August 1 947 , cited in Mahmood,Muslim Person al Law , p.174.

69. Such suggestions are reserved only for the mosti gn or an t W es te rn j ou rn al is ts c om me nt in g s an ct im on io us ly

on the Indian scene. The most sanctimonious such

advice ever seen by this author appeared in an articleby Oriana Fallaci, 'Indira's Coup', New York Review

of B ooks 22, 14 (18 September 1975), pp.14-21, which isso noteworthy for its total lack of understanding ofIndian society, its cultures and peoples that it

deserves to be exposed and condemned openly. Fallacicomments ignorantly at p.15 on the issue of cow

slaughter as follows: 'There exists no politician in

India daring enough to attempt to explain to themasses that cows can be eaten.' The especial stupidity

of the comment, of course, lies not only in the fact

that Fallaci thinks a politician who proposed such athing would be 'd~ring' rather than insane, but in her

belief that the masses are not aware that cows can be

eaten.70. Some Hindus do, of course, eat beef, but there

is no serious movement among Hindus to legalize cowslaughter.

7 1. Robinson, Sepa rati sm Am on g In dian M uslim s,

p.356.

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