MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME51Docket: Pen-19-237Argued: March4,2020Decided: April21,2020Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,HORTON,andCONNORS,JJ.*

RICHARDWATSONv.

STATEOFMAINEJABAR,J.

[¶1] RichardWatsonappeals froma judgmentof theUnifiedCriminal

Docket (Penobscot County, Lucy, J.) denying his petition for post-conviction

review.WeconcludethatWatsonwasdeprivedoftheeffectiveassistanceof

counselwhenhistrialattorneyintroducedintoevidenceandplayedforthejury

a videotaped recording of the ten-year-old victim’s interview with law

enforcement.Wethereforevacatethejudgmentandremandwithinstructions

tograntthepetitionandvacatethedefendant’sconvictions.

*AlthoughChiefJusticeSaufleyparticipatedintheappeal,sheresignedbeforethisopinionwas

certified.

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I.BACKGROUND

A. TrialandConvictions

[¶2]OnNovember25,2014,Watsonwasindictedontwocountsofgross

sexualassault(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§253(1)(C)(2018),onecountofunlawful

sexualcontact(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§255-A(1)(F-1)(2018),andonecountof

visual sexual aggression against a child (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. §256(1)(B)

(2018).

[¶3]Atwo-dayjurytrialwasheldinJuly2015.1Tobeginthetrial,the

Statecalled thevictim,whotestified thatshewasborn in2003and that the

defendantwas her biological father. The victim recounted two instances of

sexualabusethatoccurredduringthesummerof2014,whenshewastenyears

old.Accordingtothevictim’stestimony,Watsontoldherthathewouldbuyher

a cell phone if she engaged in certain sexual activity with him; she agreed

because she wanted a phone. The victim testified that the first incident

occurredonAugust4,2014,andWatsonboughtheraphonethefollowingday.

Thevictimtestifiedthatasecondincidentoccurredlaterthatsummer,andthat

bothincidentstookplaceinWatson’shome.Shealsotestifiedthatheshowed

herpornographicvideosandshowedherhowtousesextoys.

1WesummarizedthefactsinStatev.Watson,2016ME176,¶¶2-8,152A.3d152.

3

[¶4] The State also introduced testimony from the victim’s mother,

grandmother,andaunt,allofwhomtestifiedthatthevictimmadedisclosures

tothemfollowingthesexualabuse.2Thevictim’sgrandmotherandauntboth

testifiedthatthevictimhadfeelingsofguiltfollowingtheabuse.3Onthefirst

day of trial, the State also called the nurse practitioner who performed a

physical examinationon thevictimafter she reported theabuse. Thenurse

practitioner testifiedwithout objection that the physical examination of the

victimwasnormal,butexplainedthat“[i]t’sactuallythenormtohaveanormal

examinthistypeofsituation.”Oncross-examination,shetestifiedthatthere

werenosignsoftrauma.AMaineStatePolicetroopertestifiedastheState’s

finalwitnessinitscaseinchiefontheseconddayoftrial.Hetestifiedthathe

assisted in the execution of a searchwarrant ofWatson’s house and seized

pornographicDVDs,sextoys,andtwocomputers.

2Thevictim’sauntwaspermittedtotestifyunderthe“firstcomplaintrule”thatthevictimmade

adisclosuretoher.Seeid.¶4;seealsoStatev.Fahnley,2015ME82,¶¶19-26,119A.3d727.Thevictim’sgrandmotherandmotherdidnottestifyastothecontentsofthevictim’sdisclosures.

3Attrial,Watsonobjectedtothetestimonythatthevictimwas“feelingguilty.”AsweexplainedinStatev.Watson,thevictim'sstatementstoherauntandgrandmotheraboutherfeelingsofguiltwereadmissibleunderthehearsayexceptionforadeclarant’sthen-existingstateofmind.2016ME176,¶¶11-12,152A.3d152;seeM.R.Evid.803(3).

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[¶5] Watson’s defense counsel presented five witnesses, including

Watson and aMaine State Police detective. The detective testified that the

computersseizedfromWatson’shousewereneversearched.

[¶6]Watsondeniedtheallegationsthatheboughtthevictimthephone

becausesheagreedtoallowhimtotrytohavesexwithher.Hetestifiedthat

hepurchasedthecellphoneatthesametimehetookthevictimback-to-school

shoppinginAugust2014.Watsonandhisformergirlfriendbothtestifiedthat

theyhadsex toys thatWatsonkept inhisbedroom,butWatsondeniedever

showingthesextoystothevictim.Likewise,hetestifiedthatheneverkissed

thevictim,showedherpornographyonhislaptop,askedhertousesextoys,or

otherwisetriedtoengageinsexualactivitywithher.

[¶7]AfterWatsontestified,andjustpriortorestinghiscase,Watson’s

attorney offered into evidencewithout objection the video recording of the

victim’s September 2014 police interview with a female detective. The

followingexchangetookplace:

DEFENSECOUNSEL: Nothingfurther. I thinkwe’regonnaplay thevideonowof [thedetective’s] interviewwith [thevictim]lastSeptember.THECOURT:Andthat'sagreedtocomeintoevidence?DEFENSECOUNSEL:Yes.ASSISTANTDISTRICTATTORNEY:That’sfine.

...THECOURT:Isthatcuedup?

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DEFENSECOUNSEL:Yes.THECOURT:Okay.Dimthelights.(Defendant'sExhibitNo.2,avideorecording,wasplayedat1:20p.m.andwasconcludedat1:51p.m.)DEFENSECOUNSEL:Thedefenserests,YourHonor.

Defense counsel did not provide the jury with any context for the video

interviewbeforeorafteritwasplayed.

[¶8] The video showed the victim describing, consistent with her

testimonyattrial,thetwoincidentsofsexualabusethatoccurred.Inaddition

toarecitationof the factsby thevictim, thedetectivewasshowntelling the

victimthatshehaddonetherightthingbyreportingtheincidents,that“the

grownups”wouldmakesurethevictimwassafe,andthatWatsonshouldhave

knownbetter. Thevictimcanbeseenandheardon thevideostating, “So, I

won’tgettakenawayfrommygrandparents?”Defensecounselintroduceda

transcriptofthevideointerviewafterthevideowasplayedforthejury,which

wasadmittedintoevidencewithoutobjectionandgiventothejurorswhenthey

retiredfordeliberations.

[¶9]Theattorneyspresentedclosingargumentstothejuryshortlyafter

thevideowasplayed.TheStateprofferedtothejurythat“theheartofthecase

iswhat[thevictim]toldyou.”Indecidingwhosetestimonytobelieve,theADA

suggestedthatthejuryaskquestionslike“Who’stellingthetruth?Who’sbein’

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accurate? Who are you gonna rely on?” In his closing statement, defense

counselagreedwiththeADAthatthevictim’scredibility is“theheartofthis

case.”Therewasnocorroborativeevidenceoftheabuseintheformofmedical

evidence,eyewitnesstestimony,orDNAorforensicevidence.

[¶10]ThejuryfoundWatsonguiltyonallfourcounts,andthetrialcourt

(Penobscot County, Lucy, J.) entered judgments of conviction. Watson was

sentenced to twenty-sevenyears’ imprisonment followedby twentyyearsof

supervisedreleaseforeachoftheconvictionsforgrosssexualassault.Hewas

sentencedtotwentyyears’imprisonmentfortheconvictionforunlawfulsexual

contactandsentencedtofiveyears’imprisonmentfortheconvictionforvisual

sexualaggression,alltorunconcurrentlywiththeconvictionsforgrosssexual

assault. Watsonappealedhisconvictions to thisCourt, andweaffirmedthe

judgment.SeeStatev.Watson,2016ME176,152A.3d152.

B. Post-ConvictionReview

[¶11]Watsonfiledapetitionforpost-convictionreviewinApril2017.

See 15 M.R.S. § 2129 (2018). He claimed that his trial attorney provided

ineffectiveassistanceofcounselwhenheintroducedintoevidencethevideoof

the victim’s interview with police, which included her “detailed and highly

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prejudicial allegations.”4 Watson argued that introducing the videotaped

recording of the entire interviewwas “unnecessary . . . to provide evidence

supporting [the victim’s] potentialmotive to fabricate the allegations.” The

post-convictioncourt(PenobscotCounty,Lucy,J.)heldanevidentiaryhearing

on January 23, 2019, and denied Watson’s petition in an order entered on

May30,2019.Thecourtmadethefollowingfindings,whicharesupportedby

evidencepresentedatthepost-convictionhearing.SeeFahnleyv.State,2018

ME92,¶4,188A.3d871.

[¶12]Attheevidentiaryhearing,Watsonandhistrialattorneyagreed

thattheinformationthatthevictimprovidedintheinterviewwasthe“same”

as,andconsistentwith,hertestimonyattrial.Thepost-convictioncourtfound

thattrialcounselhadtworationalesforplayingthevideooftheinterviewfor

the jury: first, to support the defense theory that the detective failed to

thoroughlyinterviewthevictimand,second,toshowthatthevictimhadmotive

tofabricateherallegationsbecauseofacustodydisputebetweenWatsonand

hergrandparents,whomthevictimresidedwithatthetime.

4Watsonalsoallegedineffectiveassistanceofcounselfor(1)trialcounsel’sfailuretoobtaina

forensicevaluationofWatson’scomputersthathadbeenseizedbytheState,and(2)trialcounsel’sfailuretocallawitnesswhowouldpotentiallyofferexculpatoryevidence.Thepost-convictioncourtwasunpersuadedbytheseallegations,andwedeniedWatson’srequestforacertificateofprobablecausetoappealthepost-convictioncourt’sdeterminationsontheseissues.SeeM.R.App.P.19.

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[¶13] Trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that the

theoryofthedefense’scase,whichheclaimed“Watsonwasabigproponentof,”

was that the victim’s allegations were motivated by a custody dispute.

Accordingtotrialcounsel,thevictim’sstatementinthevideointerviewabout

staying and livingwith her grandparents supported the defense’s argument

thatshehadmotivetofabricatetheallegationssothatshecouldremainwith

hergrandparents.

[¶14]Thepost-convictioncourtalsofoundthattrialcounselplayedthe

video as “part of his overall strategy to discredit the State’s investigation,”

intendingtoshowthatthevictim’sdirect-examinationtestimonyattrialwas

thesameaswhatwassaidduringtheinterviewinwhichthedetectivefailedto

askimportantquestions.Thecourtalsofoundthatthepurposeofplayingthe

videoafterthevictim’stestimonywasnottohighlight inconsistenciesinher

storybuttoshowthejurythatthis“[t]wenty-minuteinterviewwastheentirety

of theState’s investigation, and that thevictim’s storydid notbear scrutiny

undercross-examination. . . .” Trialcounselbelievedthatshowingthevideo

“woulddemonstratethatthevictim’strialtestimonywassimplyarepeatofthe

limitedinformationcoveredinthe...interview.”

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[¶15] The court found that this strategywas “ultimatelyunsuccessful

because[Watson]wasconvictedbythejury....[who]musthaveunanimously

foundthatthevictim’stestimonywascredible....”Thepost-convictioncourt

determined that trial counsel’s decision to play the victim’s video-recorded

interview did not fall outside of the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance,seeStricklandv.Washington,466U.S.668,689(1984),anddenied

Watson’spetition.Thecourtconcluded:

Regardlessoftheoutcome,afterconsideringalloftheissuesandevidence, the court is not persuaded that trial counsel’srepresentation “fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness”orwasotherwiseconstitutionallyineffective.[¶16]Watsonsoughtacertificateofprobablecausetoappealthecourt’s

denial of his petition for post-conviction review. See 15 M.R.S. §2131(1)

(2018);M.R.App.P.19(a)(2)(F).Wegrantedthecertificateofprobablecause

limitedtothequestionofwhethertrialcounselwasineffective“byplayingat

trial a video of the interview between the victim and police.” See M.R.

App.P.19(f).

II.DISCUSSION

A. StandardofProof

[¶17] “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

articleI,section6oftheMaineConstitutionensurethatacriminaldefendantis

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entitledtoreceivetheeffectiveassistanceofanattorney.”McGowanv.State,

2006ME16,¶9,894A.2d493;seeU.S.Const.amend.VI;Me.Const.art.I,§6.

[¶18] “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

petitionermustdemonstrate (1) ‘that counsel’s representation fell belowan

objective standard of reasonableness’ and (2) that the ‘errors of counsel

actuallyhadanadverseeffectonthedefense.’”Fordv.State,2019ME47,¶11,

205A.3d896(quotingStrickland,466U.S.at688,693)(alterationomitted).

ThepetitionerbearstheburdenofprovingbothprongsoftheStricklandtest.

Id.Wereviewthepost-convictioncourt’sfindingsoffactforclearerrorandits

legalconclusionsdenovo.Id.¶9.

B. PerformanceProng

[¶19] Pursuant to the first prong of the two-part Strickland test, “a

petitionermust demonstrate (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. ¶ 11 (quotationmarks omitted).

“Thepropermeasureofattorneyperformanceremainssimplyreasonableness

underprevailingprofessionalnorms.” Strickland, 466U.S. at688. Wehave

explained that “counsel’s representation of a defendant falls below the

objectivestandardofreasonablenessifitfallsbelowwhatmightbeexpected

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fromanordinaryfallibleattorney.”Fahnley,2018ME92,¶18,188A.3d871

(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶20]“Judicialinquiryintotheeffectivenessofrepresentationis‘highly

deferential.’ . . . ‘[A] courtmust indulge a strongpresumption that counsel’s

conductfallswithinthewiderangeofreasonableprofessionalassistance;that

is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances,thechallengedactionmightbeconsideredsoundtrialstrategy.’”

Middletonv.State,2015ME164,¶13,129A.3d962(quotingStrickland,466

U.S. at 689). However, “[a] determination that defense counsel’s choices

amountto ‘trialstrategy’doesnotautomatically insulatethemfromreview.”

Gauthierv.State,2011ME75,¶15,23A.3d185,abrogatedonothergroundsby

Manleyv.State,2015ME117,¶18,123A.3d219.

[¶21] Here, the post-conviction court found that defense counsel’s

decisiontoplaytheentiretwenty-minuterecordedinterviewattheendofthe

defense’scasewastwofold:itwaspartofan“overall”trialstrategydesignedto

discredittheState’sinvestigationandpartofastrategytoshowthatthevictim

hadmotivetofabricatetheallegations.

[¶22]Duringthejurytrial,Watson’sattorneyinformedthecourtthathe

intended to play a portion of the video to show the victim’s motive for

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fabricatingtheallegations.Inhisopeningstatement,trialcounseldidnotmake

anysuggestionthattheState’sinvestigationwasinadequateorincomplete.He

set forth a theory that thevictim fabricated theallegations toblockWatson

from obtaining custody. In fact, the only time trial counsel referenced the

interviewduringhisopening statementwaswhenhedescribed thevictim’s

question to the detective about livingwith her grandparents. Trial counsel

informed the jury that “this case comes down to the credibility of the

witnesses.” Although trial counsel challenged the officer’s interviewing

techniques inhisclosingargument,positing to the jury, “Doesn’t adetective

have an obligation to fully investigate a claim like this? Does accepting

everything that a witness tells you without ever asking even a few tough

questions that might erode or bolster that witness’s credibility—this is

Mr.Watson’s life and reputation on the line here,” he failed to present any

evidenceorwitnessestosupporthisclaimthatthedetective’sinterviewwas

notthoroughortosuggestthatsheusedimproperinterviewtechniques.

[¶23]Wearecompelledbytherecordtoconcludethatthetwostrategies

(underminingthevictim’scredibilityandunderminingthethoroughnessofthe

State’s investigation) were not distinct: discrediting the interview as

incompleteorinadequatewaspartofthestrategyofunderminingthevictim’s

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credibilitybyshowingthatshefabricatedtheallegations.Therefore,wemust

determinewhethertrialcounsel’sdecisiontoplaytheentirevideointerview

forthepurposeofshowingthevictim’smotivetofabricatetheallegationsand

underminehercredibilitywasareasonabletrialstrategy.

[¶24] Even affording substantial deference to this strategy, it is

impossible to conclude that playing the interview video in its entirety, and

producingthetranscriptforthejurytotakeintodeliberations,wasobjectively

reasonable.SeeStrickland,466U.S.at688.Itmayhavebeenasoundstrategy

toarguethatthevictimhadamotivetofabricatebecauseofthecustodyissue

andthatthedetective’s interviewwastooshort,buttheseissuescouldhave

been raised and argued without playing the entire video interview. At the

post-convictionhearing,trialcounselconcededthathecouldhavebroughtout

the victim’s possible motive for fabricating the allegations by some other

means. For example, he could have asked the victim about the custody

statement through cross examination and introduced portions of the video

transcriptifthevictimdeniedmakingthestatement.Moreover,hecouldhave

secured the attendance of the detective who conducted the interview and

questionedher about the lengthof the interview and thevictim’s statement

aboutremainingwithhergrandparents.Perhapsevenmoreperplexingiswhy

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defensecounselchosetoplaythevideoattheendofhiscase,withoutre-calling

the victim to the stand, when he would not be able to cross examine her

regardingthestatement. Overthecourseofthetwo-daytrial, tenwitnesses

testifiedbetweenwhenthevictimtestifiedastheState’sfirstwitnessandthe

pointatwhichthejurysawthevideoattheendofthedefense’scase.

[¶25]Itwasnotjustunnecessarytoshowtheentirevideotoprovethat

the victim had motive to fabricate or that the detective’s interview was

insufficient,itwasunreasonabletodoso.Astrialcounseltestifiedduringthe

post-convictionhearingandarguedtothejuryduringtrial,thiscasewasa“he

said/shesaid”case.Thedecisiontoprovidethejurywithtwoopportunitiesto

hearthevictimdescribetheallegedabuse—inamannersoconsistentthateven

trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that it was “the same”—

unnecessarilybolsteredhercredibility.

[¶26]Casesfromotherstatesprovideguidance.InStatev.Triolo,2013

Wisc.App.LEXIS971, at*5-13(Wisc.Ct.App.Nov.19,2013), thepetitioner

arguedthathistrialattorneywasineffectivewhenhedidnotobjecttotheState

playing for the juryanentirevideo-recorded interviewof thechildvictim in

whichshemadesexualassaultallegationsagainsthim.Trialcounseldescribed

thedecisionnottoobjectasa“trialstrategytoargueabouttheinconsistencies

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betweenwhat [the victim] initially disclosed andwhat she disclosed on the

stand.”Id.at*3.However,whenthevideowasshown,thevictimhadalready

testifiedattrialandthattestimonywasconsistentwiththestatementsmadein

the recorded interview. Id. TheWisconsin appellate court held that “trial

counselperformeddeficientlyby failing toobjectto introductionof theDVD

interview.”Id.at*10.Thecourt“reject[ed]theargumentthatfailingtoobject

to theState playing theDVDcouldbeviewedas a reasonable trial strategy.

...Thevideoof[thevictim]givingconsistentstatementsfouryearsearlierserved

tobolsterhercredibilityattrial....[B]ecause[thevictim]testifiedpriortothe

DVD being played, trial counsel never had an opportunity to cross-examine

[her]concerningherpriorstatements.”Id.at*9-10(emphasisadded).

[¶27] The factsofTriolo arestrikingly similar to those in thepresent

case.Here,thevideoshowingthevictimgivingconsistentstatementsoneyear

earlierservedtobolsterhercredibility. Additionally,bychoosingtoplaythe

video at the end of his case, defense counsel did not afford himself an

opportunity to question the victim about the statements made during the

interview. Unlike in Triolo, where trial counsel failed to object to the

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prosecution’s introduction of the video interview, Watson’s attorney

introduceditaspartofthedefense’scase.5

[¶28]Trialcounsel’sdecisiontoplaythevideowasnotsoundstrategy,

andthepost-convictioncourterredwhenitconcludedthatthistrialconductby

defensecounseldidnotfallbelowanobjectivestandardofreasonableness.

C. PrejudiceProng

[¶29]Ifapetitionerprovesthefirstprongofthetwo-partStricklandtest,

hemustthenprove“thatthe‘errorsofcounselactuallyhadanadverseeffect

onthedefense.’”Ford,2019ME47,¶11,205A.3d896(quotingStrickland,466

U.S.at693)(alterationomitted).Toproveprejudice,thesecondprongofthe

Stricklandtest,Watsonmustestablishthat,butforhistrialattorney’sdeficient

performance, “there is a reasonable probability that ‘the result of the

proceedingwouldhavebeendifferent.’”Id.¶20(quotingStrickland,466U.S.

5 AlthoughWatsondidnotraise thisargument,wenote that thedetectivemadeanumberof

gratuitous statements regarding the case that were shown to the jury in the video and in theinterview transcript. Statements included telling the victim that she “did a very smart thing bytelling,”thatthedefendant“shouldknowbetter,”thatlawenforcement’sgoal“istomakesurethatnothinglikethishappenswithanyotherlittlegirl[thevictim’s]age,”andexpressingconcernforthevictim’ssafetyatmultiplepointsduringtheinterview.Thesestatementsofthedetective’spersonalopinion impermissiblyvouch for thevictim’scredibility. Hadthedetective testifiedat trial, suchstatementswouldnothavebeenadmissible.SeeStatev.Sweeney,2004ME123,¶11,861A.2d43(“Onewitness’sopinionofanotherwitness’struthfulnessisnothelpfultothejurywhenthejuryhastheopportunitytohearbothwitnesses.”);Statev.Crocker,435A.2d58,77(Me.1981)(“Determiningwhatcredencetogivetothevariouswitnessesandtheirtestimonyisamatterwithintheexclusiveprovinceofthejury.”).

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at694).Thismeansthatcounsel’sineffectiveassistance“compromise[ed]the

reliabilityof theconvictionandundermin[ed]confidence in it.” Philbrookv.

State, 2017 ME 162, ¶ 8, 167 A.3d 1266 (quotation marks omitted). “A

convictionmaybeunreliableandnotworthyofconfidence,thussatisfyingthe

reasonableprobabilitytest,evenwithoutproofthatadifferentoutcomewas

morelikelythannot.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶30]Wehaverecognizedthatitmaybedifficulttoteaseapartthe“‘mix’

oflegalandfactualquestions”thatareoftenpresentedinaStricklandanalysis.

Fortunev.Maine,2017ME61,¶13,158A.3d212.Therefore,“wewillapply

themostappropriatestandardofreviewfortheissueraiseddependingonthe

extenttowhichthatissueisdominatedbyfactorbylaw.”Id.

[¶31]Inthiscase,thepost-convictioncourtdeniedWatson’spetitionon

theperformanceprong; it did notmakeadeterminationas to theprejudice

prong. SeePhilbrook, 2017ME162,¶ 6, 167A.3d1266 (“A court need not

‘addressbothcomponentsoftheinquiryifthedefendantmakesaninsufficient

showingonone.’”(quotingStrickland,466U.S.at697)).Wethereforereview

the findings the court made for clear error and, based on that analysis,

determinedenovowhethercounsel’sunprofessionalerrorswereprejudicial

asamatteroflaw.SeeFortune,2017ME61,¶13,158A.3d212.

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[¶32]Thepost-convictioncourtrecognizedthatthiscasecamedownto

acredibilitycontestbetweenthevictimanddefendant.Itfoundthat

[t]hestrategyemployedbyPetitioner’strialcounselwasultimatelyunsuccessfulbecausePetitionerwas convictedby the juryonallcharges.Thejurymusthaveunanimouslyfoundthatthevictim’stestimony was credible, that the State had proven all chargesbeyond a reasonable doubt, and that Petitioner’s denials of thevictim’sallegationsdidnotgenerateanyreasonabledoubtinthemindofanyjuror.Regardlessoftheoutcome,afterconsideringallof the issues and evidence, the court is not persuaded that trialcounsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness”orwasotherwiseconstitutionallyineffective.

[¶33] Indeed, the evidence in the record shows that the jury found

Watsonguiltyonallcharges.BecausetheState’scasereliedexclusivelyonthe

victim’stestimony,theguiltyverdictsnecessarilyreflectedafindingbythejury

thatthevictimwascredible.SeeStatev.Drewry,2008ME76,¶32,946A.2d

981(“Avictim’stestimony,byitself,issufficienttosupportaguiltyverdictfor

asexcrime...ifthetestimonyaddresseseachelementofthecrimeandisnot

inherentlyincredible.”(alterationomitted)(quotationmarksomitted)).

[¶34]Moreover,intrialcounsel’sopeningstatement,heexplainedtothe

jury,“[W]ebelievethiscasecomesdowntothecredibilityofthewitnesses.In

assessing[thevictim]’scredibility,we’daskthatyoukeepacarefulearoutfor

whatshetestifiestoyoutodaycomparedto. . .whatshe’stoldpeopleinthe

past.”Trialcounselputthejuryonnoticethatthiscasehingedonthevictim’s

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credibility, asked the jury to be mindful of how her testimony may be

inconsistent,andthenpresentedtothejuryavideoofthevictim’sconsistent

statements regarding the alleged sexual assault. This bolstered the victim’s

credibilityandprejudicedWatson.

[¶35]InPeoplev.Douglas,theSupremeCourtofMichiganwaspresented

with similar facts in adirect appeal. 852N.W.2d587,590-92 (Mich.2014).

Although theMichigancourtwasnotreviewingprejudice in thecontextofa

Strickland analysis, it considered the prejudicial effect of a video-recorded

interview that was consistent with the victim’s trial testimony. See id. at

596-601. Douglaswasconvictedbya juryofcriminalsexualconductarising

fromhisyoungdaughter’sallegationsoftwoinstancesofsexualabuse. Id.at

590.Thecourtconcludedthatthetrialcourtabuseditsdiscretionbyadmitting

into evidence the victim’s out-of-court statements, which already came into

evidencethroughwitnesstestimony,byallowingtheprosecutionto“close[]its

caseinchiefbyshowingthejurythevideorecordingof[thevictim’s]forensic

interview.” Id. at 592-93,595. TheMichigan court consideredwhether the

errorinadmittingthevideowasprejudicial.Seeidat599-601.Itexplained:

Thiscasepresentedthejurywithapurecredibilitycontest;therewerenothird-partywitnessestoeitherinstanceofallegedabuse,nor any physical evidence of it. As such, the prosecution’s casehingedheavilyon[thevictim]’scredibility inheraccountsofthe

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allegedabuse. . . .Withregardtothealleged[instanceofabuse],the only accounts properly before the jury were [the victim]’stestimony at trial, and [her mother]’s testimony regarding [thevictim]’s prior disclosure of it to her. The credibility of theseaccounts,and[themother]’smotivesandinfluenceinconnectionwiththem,werethefocusofthedefenseandacentralissueattrial.Asaresultofthecourt’serror,however,theprosecutionwasnotlimitedtothisevidence,andinsteadthejurywaspermittedtohearfrom [the victim] . . . again through the video recording of [her]forensicinterview.

Id.at599-600(footnotesomitted).Thecourtconcludedthat“[t]heresulting

prejudiceisunsurprising.”Id.at601.Itheldthatthedefendantwasentitledto

anewtrialbecausethe“[victim]’serroneouslyadmittedstatementsduringthe

forensic interview more probably than not tipped the scales against the

defendantsuchthatthereliabilityoftheverdictagainsthimwasundermined.”

Id.(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶36]Therecordinthiscasecompelsafindingthatthejury’sverdictwas

groundedinitsdeterminationofthevictim’scredibility.Further,asinDouglas,

thevictim’scredibilityandmotivesfortheallegations“werethefocusofthe

defense and a central issue at [Watson’s] trial.” Id. at 600. There was no

corroborating evidence of the instances of sexual abuse to bolster the

testimony of this ten-year-old victim; it was the victim’s testimony that

supportedthejury’sverdict.

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[¶37]UnlikeinDouglas,however,thevideooftheforensicinterviewin

this casewas introduced byWatson’s defense attorney—adecision thatwe

holdwasmanifestlyunreasonable. It follows that,but for thisunreasonable

decision, “there isareasonableprobability that ‘theresultof theproceeding

wouldhavebeendifferent.’” Ford,2019ME47,¶20,205A.3d896(quoting

Strickland,466U.S.at694).

[¶38] Given trial counsel’s deficient conduct, it is clear that that the

defendant was adversely affected by introduction of the video-recorded

interview at the end of the jury trial alongwith the transcript of the video

suppliedtothejurorsfortheirdeliberations.Trialcounsel’sactions“roseto

the level of compromising the reliability of [Watson’s] conviction and

underminingconfidenceinit.”SeePhilbrook,2017ME162,¶8,167A.3d1266.

III.CONCLUSION

[¶39] The court erred when it denied Watson’s petition for

post-conviction relief. As a result of trial counsel’s deficient performance,

Watsonwasprejudiced inhis attempt todefendagainst all chargesbrought

againsthim,entitlinghimtopost-convictionrelieffromjudgmentofconviction

onallcounts.

22

Theentryis:

Judgment vacated. Remanded for entry of ajudgment granting the petition forpost-conviction review and vacating allconvictionsintheunderlyingcriminaljudgment.

DavidParis,Esq.(orally),Bath,forappellantRichardWatsonJoshuaK.Saucier,Asst.Dist.Atty.,andMarkA.Rucci,Asst.Dist.Atty.(orally),ProsecutorialDistrictV,Bangor,forappelleeStateofMainePenobscotCountyUnifiedCriminalDocketdocketnumberCR-2017-1320FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY