AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

January 3, 2017

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. ISIS is rebuilding its combat capabilities in Libya and will likely begin a new attack campaign in early 2017.

2. The failure of Somalia’s electoral process may compromise the regional and international cooperation required to counter al Shabaab.

3. AQIM’s affiliate in Tunisia may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in coastal population centers.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Al Qaeda NetworkThe U.S. continues to degrade al Qaeda leadership in Syria. Coalition airstrikes killed senior Jabhat Fateh al Sham (JFS) leader Abu Omar al Turkistani on January 1. A U.S. airstrike also hit a JFS command building on January 3, killing at least 20 militants. JFS is the successor of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. Al Qaeda affiliates continued to use the fall of Aleppo, Syria, as a call to jihad. Al Qaeda-affiliated Telegram channels also disseminated several announcements in Arabic, English, French, and Russian calling on Muslims worldwide to attack the West during the holiday season.

Outlook: JFS will replace attrited leadership and continue to pursue al Qaeda’s objectives in Syria.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesThe U.S. is attempting to constrain Pakistani government support for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). LeT is an al Qaeda-linked militant group that Pakistan has allegedly used as a proxy to attack Indian forces. The U.S. Department of State modified LeT’s designation to include LeT’s student wing, al Muhammadia Students, which LeT had used to evade sanctions. The U.S. Department of the Treasury also designated LeT’s emirs in Lahore and Karachi as specially designated terrorists.

Outlook: LeT may increase its reliance on illicit networks, including the al Qaeda network, to mitigate the effect of sanctions.

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GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

PoliticalThe al Houthi-Saleh faction is seeking a political settlement in order to preserve its current influence in a future Yemeni state. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh denounced parts of the UN’s October 2016 roadmap for peace talks on December 31, but his statement likely indicates posturing to improve his negotiating position. The al Houthi-Saleh faction previously agreed to the proposed roadmap on November 16. President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government is under international pressure to join talks but is pursuing a military victory over the al Houthi-Saleh faction on the ground.

Outlook: The al Houthi-Saleh faction and the Hadi government will agree to participate in preliminary talks in early 2017.

SecurityHadi government and allied forces are attempting to consolidate control of strategic locations on multiple fronts. Hadi government forces seized the al Houthi-Saleh 101st Brigade’s headquarters in northern Sa’ada on January 1. Hadi government and popular resistance forces also seized multiple positions in northwestern Shabwah governorate in an effort to secure major roadways connecting to neighboring Ma’rib and al Bayda governorates. Resource constraints may slow Hadi government forces’ progress on these high-conflict fronts.

Outlook: Hadi government forces will seek to reinforce recent gains and cut al Houthi-Saleh supply lines.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP and ISIS may be cooperating on a tactical level in central Yemen, where both groups are fighting alongside tribal forces against the al Houthi-Saleh faction. AQAP and ISIS Wilayat al Bayda both claimed the same IED attack in western al Bayda governorate on December 27. AQAP continues to produce propaganda for local and global audiences. AQAP-affiliated media disseminated propaganda promoting lone-wolf attacks in America, France, and Russia in late 2016.

Outlook: AQAP will focus its military resources on local objectives in Abyan and al Bayda governorates while leveraging its media capabilities to promote global Salafi-jihadi objectives.

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 27 DEC: Hadi government forces seized territory in western Shabwah.2) 27 DEC: ISIS and AQAP claimed an IED attack targeting al Houthi-Saleh forces in western al Bayda.3) 29 DEC: A reported U.S. airstrike killed AQAP militants in eastern al Bayda.4) 03 JAN: AQAP attacked Emirati-backed counterrorism forces in southern Abyan. 5) 03 JAN: Hadi government forces seized strategic mountains in eastern Sa’ada.

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PoliticalSomali presidential candidates are attempting to influence the elections. Election officials delayed the presidential contest for the fourth time due to alleged fraud and voter intimidation. Somalia’s National Leadership Forum (NLF), a body aligned with the incumbent president, is pursuing an unconstitutional expansion of the legislature that would increase its power. New parliamentarians took office on December 28, but five seats remain unfilled due to insecurity and electoral disputes.

Outlook: Incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud will likely win re-election.

Security African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing countries (TCCs) are threatening to withdraw from the coalition, risking AMISOM’s ability to counter al Shabaab. The EU delayed reimbursement to Kenya due to a payment verification issue. Kenya has threatened to withdraw from AMISOM in an attempt to secure more EU funding. The Burundian government is threatening an immediate withdrawal from AMISOM due to a payment dispute with the EU. The EU seeks to pay Burundian soldiers directly rather than allow the sanctioned Burundian government to facilitate payments.

Outlook: Kenya will remain in AMISOM. Burundi may use the EU dispute to justify withdrawing from AMISOM and redeploying troops to quell domestic protests.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab is disrupting security in Mogadishu and its environs. Militants attacked security forces in strategic Afgoi town, located 15 miles from Mogadishu, on December 29. Al Shabaab suicide bombers also targeted a security checkpoint near AMISOM’s headquarters in Mogadishu on January 2. Al Shabaab is attempting to disrupt Somalia’s elections. Militants assassinated a parliamentary elector in Mogadishu on December 29 and kidnapped seven delegates in Galmudug State on December 22. Al Shabaab also continued a campaign targeting communications infrastructure in eastern Kenya.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will increase the tempo of explosive attacks in Mogadishu as the election season continues.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

1) 23 DEC: Al Shabaab temporarily seized Haluqa town, Garissa County.2) 28 DEC: Al Shabaab seized Moqokori town in Hiraan region.3) 29 DEC: Al Shabaab kiled a parliamentary elector in Mogadishu.4) 29 DEC: Al Shabaab attacked a checkpoint in Afgoi town, Lower Shabelle region. 5) 02 JAN: Al Shabaab detonated two SVBIEDs at a security checkpoint near AMISOM’s HQ in Mogadishu.

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PoliticalThe UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is rapidly losing legitimacy due to internal divisions and the growing political power of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, whose supporters now control the bulk of Libya’s oil. A member of the GNA’s Presidency Council resigned due to the body’s ineffectiveness. The GNA reached a temporary funding agreement with Libya’s central bank but remains hampered by its lack of legislative authority. Pro-Qaddafi sentiment, as demonstrated by the hijacking of a Libyan commercial by Qaddafi supporters on December 23, is marginal but rising in response to governance failures.

Outlook: Haftar’s political allies will attempt to re-negotiate a political settlement that preserves Haftar’s power.

SecurityLibya’s most powerful militia coalitions are resuming open civil conflict. The return of hostilities between the LNA and Misratan militias signals a shift away from both groups’ prioritization of the fight against ISIS and al Qaeda. LNA airstrikes struck a Misratan base and military plane in al Jufra district on December 26 and January 3. Misratan militias, including GNA-allied forces that fought ISIS in Sirte, are partnering with Salafi Islamist militants to counter the LNA’s expansion into central Libya. The LNA is also attempting to seize Misratan military sites in the southwestern Fezzan region.

Outlook: Hostilities between the LNA and Misrata will continue to escalate, risking the return of full-fledged civil conflict and setting the conditions for Salafi-jihadi groups to gain support.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya. U.S.-backed Libyan forces drove ISIS out of its former stronghold in Sirte city in summer and fall 2016. ISIS militants who left Sirte city are now gathering in new safe havens in western Libya, where the group has established training camps. Suspected ISIS militants stole several vehicles likely intended for vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks.

Outlook: ISIS will conduct explosive attacks on military and government targets in western Libya.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 21 DEC: Militants detonated two bombs in Benghazi Medical Center.2) 25 DEC: Rival militias clashed in Ain Zara and Abu Saleem, Tripoli.3) 28 DEC: ISIS raided a water plant near al Shwayrif.4) 28 DEC: LNA airstrikes hit Chadian rebels near Sukna.5) 02 JAN: Misratan forces clashed with LNA forces at a checkpoint near Sebha.06) 03 JAN: An LNA airstrike destroyed a Misratan C-130 in Jufra district.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebAQIM’s affiliate in Tunisia may be attempting to resume attacks in coastal population centers. Tunisian security forces arrested ten Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia on December 29. AQIM media outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in fall 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in North Africa may be using Niger as a safe haven or transit zone. Nigerien security forces captured Winas al Faqih, a Tunisian cleric with reported ties to both ISIS and al Qaeda in Tunisia and Libya, in Niger in November 2016.

Outlook: AQIM-affiliated militants may conduct an attack in a Tunisian coastal city in early 2017.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)The potential breakdown of peace accords in Gao, Mali is setting conditions that Salafi-jihadi groups may exploit. The Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA), a Tuareg separatist coalition, withdrew from an implementation committee for the peace accords in response to a ceasefire breach by rival forces and chaotic municipal elections. Armed protesters prevented CMA members from participating in required joint patrols in Gao city on December 30, causing the CMA to issue an ultimatum to UN and Malian forces demanding the CMA’s re-entry. Salafi-jihadi groups are active in Gao, which is a regional smuggling hub, and will likely seek to exacerbate and exploit the unrest. AQIM-linked al Murabitoun may be responsible for the kidnapping of a French aid worker in Gao city on December 25.

Ansaru, a Boko Haram splinter group with ties to AQIM, may intend to use Nigeria as a safe haven to plan an attack on the U.S. homeland. A Nigerian intelligence official leaked to a local news source that internal security services thwarted an Ansaru attack targeting the U.S. in September 2016. Ansaru broke with Boko Haram in 2012 in order to conduct operations focusing on the West instead of the Nigerian state. Abu Musab Barnawi, the ISIS-recognized leader of Boko Haram, has ties to Ansaru leader Mamman Nur, who tutored Barnawi as a child.

Outlook: Joint patrols may resume in Gao but tensions will remain high. Ansaru militants may use territory controlled by Barnawi’s Boko Haram faction as a safe haven to plan attacks on the West.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 01 JAN: Algerian soldiers arrested an arms smuggler and two militants in In Guezzam,Tamanrasset Province, Algeria.2) 03 JAN: Algerian soldiers killed two militants in Laghouat city, Laghouat Province, Algeria.3) 02 JAN: A bomb exploded in Mouzaia, Blida Province, Algeria, killing two people and injuring six children.4) 02 JAN: Protesters clashed with riot police during strikes in Bejaia, Algeria.

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL

1) 19 DEC: Malian soldiers captured three Ansar al Din commanders in Diafarabe, Mopti Region.2) 24 DEC: The Nigerian Army claimed to clear the Sambisa Forest of Boko Haram militants.3) 25 DEC: A Boko Haram suicide bomber targeted a Christmas market in Mora, Cameroon.4) 25 DEC: Suspected al Murabitoun militants kidnapped a French aid worker in Gao city.

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569