Human Factors

Tel: (+44) 01492 879813 Mob: (+44) 07984 284642andy@abrisk.co.ukwww.abrisk.co.uk1Human Factors Engineering in the Oil & Gas industryGood & Bad practicesAndy Brazier

2A bit about meChemical engineerBSc - Loughborough UniversityPhD - Edinburgh University20 years working as human factors consultant11 years self-employedChartered member of the Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors (CIEHF)Associate member of Institute of Chemical Engineers (IChemE)

ExperiencePredominantly oil, gas, chemical, power and steel industriesHuman factors in process / major accident safetyDesign assessmentsSafety critical task analysisStaffing and organisational changeClients include Shell, BP, SSE, Centrica, Tata, Syngenta, Total, Maersk etc.3

Places I have works UK & Ireland

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Places I have worked further afield

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Projects I have worked on but not visited

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7Human factors and safetyUp to 80% of accident causes can be attributed to human failuresAll major accidents involve a number of human failuresHuman factors is concerned withUnderstanding the causes of human failuresPreventing human failuresAn important part of managing major accident safety

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1. Annulus cement barrier did not isolate hydrocarbons

Deepwater Horizon Explosions & Fire

2. Shoe track barriers did not isolate hydrocarbons

7. Fire and gas system did not prevent ignition

3. Negative-pressure test accepted - integrity not established

4. Influx not recognised until hydrocarbons were in riser

5. Well control response actions failed

6. Diversion of mud resulted in gas venting to rig

8. BOP emergency mode did not seal wellWhy?

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Initially did not achieve seal around drill pipe

Negative pressure test accepted even though integrity had not been established

Did not follow agreed test method

Mis-interpreted data

Crew had preferred method

Operational instruction only broad guidance

Did not recognise more liquid than expected

No prediction available at time

Rig crew expected to know how to perform test

Previous experience

Not aware of specified permit requirements

Did not realise constant high pressure indicated a problem

Plausible explanation (bladder effect)Why?Why?Why?Why?Why?Why?Why?

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Crew busy with other activities

Influx not recognised until hydrocarbon was present in riser

Instructions required constant monitoring - did not specify how

Crew not monitoring well

Other activities interacting with pits

Pits not set-up for combined activities

Mud pit levels not available to monitorWhy?Why?Why?

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Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well

Slow to detect the problem

Crew not properly prepared in required actions

Protocols did not cover the scenario

Crew had not been trained to deal with the eventWhy?Why?

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Human Factors Engineering (HFE)Understanding interactions between people and systems. Ensure systems are designed in a way that:Optimises the human contribution to productionMinimises risks to health, personal or process safety and environmental performance. An important contribution to the quality, safety and fitness for purpose of equipment and facilities used in the oil & gas industry.

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Applying HFEEliminate, reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences of human errorImprove human efficiency and productivity, thereby enhancing operational performanceImprove user acceptance of new facilities15

Focus effortWhere people are expected to act as risk barriers Prevent or reduce the likelihood of incidentsAvoid escalation if an incident does occur. Human activities required to support or maintain physical and technological barriersFabric of the pressure envelopePressure relief valvesSafety instrument systems (trips).

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Bow Tie

17Vessel Failure

Equip. failureUnignited release

Fire

Loss of containmentMaintenanceOperation

Auto response

Operator response

Construction

Design

Detection

Vinyl Chloride Monomer Incident

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HFE in ProjectsScreening identify critical elements of the projectDesign analysis systematic methods applied to identify specific design requirementsDesign validation ensure HFE requirements have been achievedSupport to start-up additional actions to address HFE that are not directly design related.

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HFE ScreeningCriteriaComplexity of the human activities (particularly operations and maintenance)Hazards to people, environment and assetFrequency of human interactionNovelty of the itemKnown issues based on past experienceIn practice, most elements are HFE criticalScreening is a way of identifying the hot spots20

Project philosophiesStrategy for HFE integrationAccessibility philosophyAnthropometric standardStaffing philosophyAutomation philosophyHuman machine interfaces (HMI) standardsLocal gaugesControl system graphics and alarmsSigns & labels

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HFE Design AnalysisCritical task analysisAccessibility requirements analysisValvesInstrumentationLocal controlsStaffing assessment

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HFE design validation3D model reviewBuildings (control rooms) evaluationAlarm review and rationalisationGraphics reviewWorkload assessment23

Support to start-upConstruction requirementsInspection and auditProceduresTraining and competenceOrganisation and management of change24

OGP 454Oil & Gas Producers AssociateHuman factors engineering in projects25

ChallengesImmature discipline good practices not identified or agreedLack of knowledge amongst operator companies and design contractorsNot enough specialists with the right background in process / major accident safetyToo little too late in many projects tick box.

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Examples

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Valve access in design

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Valve access in practice

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Non-routine access

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Cramped access

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Access for maintenance

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Unsafe access

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Looks good?

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Vessel internals 190 cartridges

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Usability

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Understanding the task

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Duplication

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Multiplication

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Labelling solution with design issues

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Good labelling

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Road route to avoid reversing

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Control room looks good on paper

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A standard layout

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A better layout?

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Graphics too crowded

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Graphics - confusing

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Graphics - pointless

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Process examples

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Compressor start-upComplicated equipmentNormally started with an automated sequenceOperators want the option to start manually50

Coalescer primingOperators assumed the vessel could be left liquid full when in standby modeHFE assessment with vendor highlighted that this would damage internal components51

Default use of Pressure Safety ValvesProtecting against high pressureValves have to be removed for calibration annuallyNot a problem for designers but can be for operators52

Default use of wellhead with cellarCreates a confined spaceLiable to fill with sand or snowNot a problem for designers but can be for operators53

Source of flush water preparing for maintenanceWater not always availableMay not be suitable quality (materials)Designers assume water is always available54

Automatic annulus managementTechnology exists desire to use itNo issues when all is OKWhat does the operator do when things are going wrong?55

Automatic filter changeoverAvoids part of a task for the operatorHow do they know it has happened?56

Doing it betterStandards and guidelinesLimited valueNot understood by designersToo much on approach without clear methodsTask analysisIdentify critical tasksFocus on design solutions firstProcedures and training for the pre-operations preparations.57

AnthropometricsCan be critical, but usually a low priority58

Understanding human perception helps us design for people59Middle of the screenAt the edgeLess Noticeable - MoreBigSmallColourfulContrastFlashingLoudQuietItalics Bold - UnderlineRightLeftMore Noticeable - Less

Focus on tasks and methodsThis is the main difference that an HFE can make to a projectLooking at the same design with a different perspective.60

Key messagesStart as early as you canFocus effort where greatest benefit can be achievedProcess / major accident riskFrequency and nature of interactionEnd user involvementThe project has to do the HFE.61