AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

November 29, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. The al Houthis’ response to Iran’s call for a future naval base in Yemen is an indicator that the movement seeks to preserve its independence.

2. Russia may expand its influence into North Africa by providing direct military support to the Libyan National Army.

3. The reported death of AQIM’s Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara, would be a major loss to al Qaeda’s leadership in the region.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Al Qaeda NetworkThe U.S. continues to target al Qaeda central leadership in order to degrade it and disrupt active planning. A U.S. airstrike killed al Qaeda senior leader Abu Afghan al Masri near Sarmada, Syria, on November 22. Al Masri was involved in attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan and was responsible for planning external attacks.

Al Qaeda’s and ISIS’s rhetoric may have helped influence a Somali refugee, Abdul Razak Ali Artan, to carry out an attack at the Ohio State University on 28 November. Artan called the late al Qaeda cleric Anwar al Awlaki a “hero.”

Outlook: Al Qaeda leadership will continue to push rhetoric to inspire “lone-wolf” attacks in the U.S. and Europe.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesThe Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s Wilayat Khorasan (ISIS-K) continues to expand into Pakistan. It is likely that ISIS-K is cooperating with regional Salafi-jihadi groups, especially Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Pakistani security forces claimed to have captured eight members of an ISIS-K cell in Lahore, Punjab Province, Pakistan. Salafi-jihadi organizations continued to carry out fatal attacks against Pakistani security forces. Outlook: ISIS-K will continue to expand into Pakistan by cooperating with local Salafi-jihadi organizations. Pakistani security forces will continue to target Salafi-jihadi organizations and actors.

SecurityPolitical and military tensions remained high between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Cross-border firing continued along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, killing soldiers on both sides and prompting residents of border villages to evacuate their homes. A five-day cessation of firing has occurred since 24 November, but there has been an uptick of militant violence against security forces.

Outlook: Regular cross-border firing along the Line of Control will likely resume. High-level officials will seek to de-escalate the conflict, despite inflammatory rhetoric.

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| ASSESSMENT:

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

PoliticalThe formation of an al Houthi-Saleh “National Salvation Government” in Sana’a will probably further complicate Yemen’s peace talks. The al Houthi-Saleh faction seeks to increase political legitimacy and public support by promising a representative government focused on resolving governance issues. Southern Yemenis continue protests for government services from the internationally recognized Yemeni government in Aden and an independent South Yemen.An al Houthi official responded to Iranian IRGC Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri’s statement that Iran would seek a naval base in Yemen by saying that Yemen had not forfeit its land or waters to any foreign party.

Outlook: The al Houthi leadership will seek to preserve its autonomy from Iran even as Iran seeks to expand its influence.

SecurityAl Houthi-Saleh forces launched multiple cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-led coalition struck several al Houthi-Saleh positions in northern Yemen in response. The Hadi government is preparing to seize territory surrounding the Bab al Mandeb Strait in western Taiz, through which roughly 40 percent of the world’s oil transported by sea passes.

Outlook: Hadi forces will not secure the Bab al Mandeb Strait while it still struggles to hold territory elsewhere in Taiz.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP continues to reinforce safe havens in Yemen from which it disseminates propaganda to a global audience. It claimed to destroy 13 vehicles belonging to Emirati-backed counterterrorism forces in near daily attacks in southern Yemen. AQAP claimed multiple attacks against al Houthi-Saleh forces in neighboring Ibb governorate while ISIS Wilayat al Bayda disseminated images of its fighters clashing with al Houthi-Saleh forces in neighboring al Bayda. AQAP’s al Masra newspaper provided updates on al Qaeda affiliates and commented on Trump’s recent cabinet appointments.

Outlook: AQAP operations will allow al Qaeda to maintain a presence in the global Salafi-jihadi movement.

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 23 NOV: Al Houthi-Saleh forces seized positions in al Misrakh district, south of Taiz city.2) 24 NOV: A U.S. airstrike killed two AQAP militants in al Sawmah, al Bayda.3) 24, 26, 28 NOV: AQAP militants attacked al Houthi-Saleh forces in northern Ibb. 4) 27 NOV: ISIS militants attacked al Houthi-Saleh forces in western al Bayda. 5) 29 NOV: Hadi government forces repelled al Houthi-Saleh forces in Maris, al Dhaleh.

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PoliticalSomali officials did not meet election deadlines because of controversies surrounding parliamentary contests. Lower House elections were to conclude by November 23, but regional administrations have filled only 175 of 275 seats. The presidential election cannot begin until Upper and Lower House contests are complete. Puntland State suspended its Lower House elections after officials awarded the rival Somaliland administration additional representation. Election officials’ intention to investigate accusations of fraud and intimidation may delay results further. The UN Special Envoy’s current estimate for the presidential contest is mid-December 2016.

Outlook: Ongoing issues are likely to delay Somalia’s presidential contest into early 2017.

Security Instability in Somalia’s central regions may allow al Shabaab to secure a stronger foothold in the area. Clashes between al Shabaab fighters and local militia supported by regional security forces killed at least 20 individuals near Harardhere in Mudug region on November 27 and 28. Ongoing confrontations between rival Galmudug and Puntland administrations in Galkayo town has displaced thousands and may have led to an increase in al Shabaab forces in the area.

Outlook: Al Shabaab may exploit Mudug and Galgudud regions for recruitment and financing.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab may be improving its ability to produce improvised explosive devices (IED). An al Shabaab militant conducted a remotely detonated vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack near a market in the Waberi district of Mogadishu on November 26. The blast may have been targeting Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who passed the area in his presidential convoy just 30 minutes prior. Shabaab’s IEDs are increasing in size, effectiveness, and lethality.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to use IEDs to target government and AMISOM targets in Mogadishu.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

1) 25 NOV: Warplanes struck an al Shabaab training camp in Dugulle, Lower Shabelle region. 2) 26 NOV: Al Shabaab militant detonated VBIED in Waberi district, Mogadishu.3) 27 NOV: Al Shabaab conducted IED attack on SNA outpost between Jowhar and Mahaday towns, Middle Shabelle region. 4) 27-28 NOV: Al Shabaab clashes with militia and local security forces in Dumaye area, Mudug region.

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PoliticalThe ongoing stalemate between the UN-supported Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Central Bank of Libya continues to fuel a liquidity crisis in Tripoli. The GNA is pushing for the devaluation of Libyan currency, for which the Central Bank has yet to announce a plan. The GNA, Central Bank, and Libyan National Oil Corporation agreed to provide a plan for currency devaluation, oil production, and institutional coordination by December 1. The execution of a credible economic program would cause a surge in support for the GNA.

Outlook: Political polarization and the lack of popular support for the GNA will likely delay the decision for the economic plan. Unrest will continue in Tripoli without an immediate solution to the liquidity crisis.

SecurityRussia may begin providing military support to the Libyan National Army (LNA), which would undermine the GNA and violate the UN arms embargo on Libya. The LNA supports a rival government to the GNA. It is backed by Emirati air support and is conducting a counterterrorism campaign in eastern Libya, especially in Benghazi. A local Islamist coalition with ties to al Qaeda, possibly coordinating with ISIS, retains control over a tenth of Benghazi. The coalition, the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council, is recruiting fighters from outside Libya. Clashes between the LNA and anti-LNA forces over control of eastern Libyan oil sites remain possible.

Outlook: Foreign support may bolster the LNA sufficiently to expand its control over parts of eastern Libya.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaU.S.-backed forces are close to seizing ISIS’s remaining stronghold in Sirte city as they continue to advance in al Jiza neighborhood in Sirte. French airstrikes on November 14 in southwestern Libya likely killed AQIM emir Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

Outlook: ISIS will wage a campaign of ambushes and explosive attacks to disrupt security operations in central Libya.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 23-24 NOV: ISIS used 40 militants and children as human shields in al Jiza, Sirte. 2) 25 NOV: Suspected ISIS militants killed a family of four in Suq al Khamis, Khoms. 3) 25-28 NOV: The U.S. conducted 52 airstrikes on ISIS in al Jiza, Sirte. 4) 27 NOV: Tripoli residents protested the liquidity crisis in Algeria Square and blocked main roads. 5) 28 NOV: Militants detonated an IED that killed seven LNA fighters in Qanfouda, Benghazi.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebAQIM may have lost a key leader. A French airstrike targeted AQIM senior leader and al Murabitoun emir Mokhtar Belmokhtar in southern Libya. Al Murabitoun, an al Qaeda-associated group, operates across the Maghreb and the Sahel. U.S. and French officials believe the airstrike was successful. Belmokhtar has survived previous strikes. An al Qaeda eulogy would be sufficient evidence to assess his death.

Outlook: AQIM and al Murabitoun would probably need to reset after the loss of Belmokhtar and his role in their operations.

TunisiaTunisia-based Salafi-jhadi groups may be attracting foreign, non-combat support networks.Tunisian forces arrested 12 people from three sleeper cells on November 27 in Gafsa governorate in central Tunisia, working to recruit fighters for the conflict in Syria. The cells included a Saudi computer science professor from Saudi Arabia, a student who received weapons training in Libya, and a Qatari national.

Outlook: Tunisian militants will continue to integrate with foreign networks seeking to destabilize the country.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)The trial of the leader of the 2012 coup in Mali may stir tensions in the aftermath of violent municipal elections. It is scheduled to begin on November 30. The coup leader may receive the death penalty.

Boko Haram is increasing operations in Cameroon. The militant organization conducted a series of attacks in Cameroon’s Extreme-Nord Province including a suicide vest (SVEST) attack on a market and a raid on a MNJTF base on the coast of Lake Chad. The Cameroonian government is bogged down with responding to clashes between the English-speaking minority and the French-speaking majority in the southwest.

Outlook: AQIM’s Ansar al Din may seek to exploit unrest stoked by the trial of the coup leader. Boko Haram will probably take advantage of unrest in Cameroon to increase its footprint in Extreme-Nord Province.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 24 NOV: The Tunisian National Guard discovered a weapons cache in Ben Guerdane, Medenine governorate.2) 27 NOV:Tunisian forces broke up three sleeper cells in Gafsa governorate recruiting people to fight in Syria.3) 27 NOV: The Tunisian National Guard arrested Taoufik Houimdi, a participant in the 2015 Sousse Resort Attack, in Chorbane, Mahdia governorate.

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1) 21 NOV: Boko Haram attacked a MNJTF base on Dakar Island, Lake Chad, Extreme-Nord Province, Cameroon.2) 23 NOV: A Malian Army vehicle struck a landmine near Taboye, Gao region, killing two soldiers and injuring seven others.3) 24 NOV: Malian soldiers detained Ansar al Din commander Attaher Ag Ihadou, who is responsible for ordering an attack on a convoy carrying ballot boxes during municipal elections, in Gao city, Gao region.

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569