AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT July 15, 2015

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. Iran and the P5+1 reached a final nuclear agreement limiting Iran’s nuclear program on July 14.2. The success of local anti-al Houthi forces in pushing the al Houthis back may prove to be a future

challenge to bringing Yemeni groups back under the control of a central Yemeni state.3. ISIS in Libya may be adapting to the recent loss of its sanctuary in Derna and is consolidating

gains in and around Sirte.

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ASSESSMENT:

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al Qaeda NetworkThe al Qaeda network continues to remain cohesive despite persistent rumors of defections to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula reaffirmed its allegiance to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri and continues to benefit from the unrest in Yemen. Syria-based Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have only given indications that they, too, remain in support of al Qaeda. There is a rumor that al Shabaab may be moving to support ISIS, but it has not been substantiated and previous reports were unfounded.

Outlook: ISIS may continue to attract al Qaeda-linked groups that had benefited from the al Qaeda network’s prestige and resources, but is unlikely to pull away core al Qaeda affiliates.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesThere are signs of a potential reconciliation between the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS Wilayat Khorasan. A U.S. drone strike killed Shahidullah Shahid, ISIS Wilayat Khorasan’s spokesman, on July 9. Previously, Shahid served as the spokesman for TTP before he pledged allegiance to ISIS. However, Ehsanullah Ehsan, spokesman for Jamaat-ul-Ahrar faction of TTP, confirmed Shahid’s death, praised him and vowed to avenge his death. This statement marks a departure from previous TTP rhetoric, where it has publicly condemned and denounced ISIS. The move may be the first step in an effort to end conflict between the two groups.

Pakistan continues to show reluctance to outlaw officially some of the country’s militant groups. Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, Pakistan’s interior minister, claimed that Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD) is not a banned organization as the United Nations failed to provide evidence of a link to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the militant group responsible for the Mumbai terror attacks. The UN, U.S., and India declared JuD to be a front for LeT after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.

Pakistani military continued Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the offensive against militancy, which is in its final phase.

Outlook: The Pakistani government will continue its attacks against militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

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PoliticalA political resolution to the Yemeni conflict appears unlikely as neither side seems willing to make concessions at this point. A UN-negotiated humanitarian ceasefire between the government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the al Houthi movement collapsed hours after it began as Saudi Arabia-led coalition airstrikes and ground fighting between local popular resistance forces and the al Houthi movement continued.

Outlook: It is unlikely that a lasting humanitarian ceasefire will be agreed upon and executed as long as the Hadi government and the al Houthi movement refuse to negotiate on their own redlines.

SecurityThe al Houthi movement appears to be overstretched and is struggling to maintain control of territory. Local popular resistance forces retook the al Jafaynah area in Ma’rib governorate on July 12, as well as a strategic position along the road in Radfan district in Lahij. Additionally, local popular resistance forces have been making territorial gains within the cities of Aden and Taiz, where the al Houthis have been fighting extensively against local popular resistance forces.

Outlook: The al Houthi movement will likely continue to suffer from minor territorial losses as their forces continue to be strained from a lack of resources due to prolonged conflict.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenA statement from AQAP’s new leader, Qasim al Raymi, in which he pledged allegiance to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri and called for attacks against the United States, reconfirms AQAP’s membership within the al Qaeda network. The group continues to fight the al Houthis alongside popular militias in al Bayda, Abyan, Shabwah, and Ma’rib governorates. Separately, ISIS Wilayat Sana’a claimed responsibility for a July 7 vehicle-borne improvised explosive (VBIED) attack targeting the al Houthis at the al Raoudh mosque in Sana’a.

Outlook: AQAP continues to strengthen its presence among popular resistance forces as ISIS Wilayat Sana’a continues its VBIED campaign to provoke a response from the al Houthis.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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1) 07 JUL: ISIS Wilayat Sana’a detonated a VBIED near the al Ramah neighborhood of Sana’a. 2) 09 JUL: Yemeni Army forces attacked Saudi border guard positions in Jizan Province. 3) 13 JUL: Local popular resistance forces took control of Jabal Jarah area in Taiz City. 4) 10 JUL: Two reported U.S. airstrikes killed AQAP members in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalRegional tensions resulting from the central state building conference continue to increase as local actors refuse to compromise. The moderate Islamist group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) announced that it elected its own president in Dhusamareb, whom it claims is the legitimate leader of the central state. Meanwhile, the Somali Federal Government announced that it would soon commence a conference to form a state consisting of the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions.

Outlook: The impending conference to form a state from the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions is likely to increase tensions among local groups created by the Galmudug conference. Al Shabaab may be able to exploit these tensions as the group is driven out of its strongholds in southern Somalia.

Security Regional security officials announced a plan to drive al Shabaab from its major strongholds of Bardhere, Gedo region, and Dinsoor, Bay region. At least 3,000 heavily armed Ethiopian troops crossed the Somali border into Luq, Gedo region, while Kenyan Defense Forces conducted two airstrikes in the region, killing at least ten civilians and destroying two al Shabaab vehicles.

Outlook: Regional security agencies are likely to continue to support Somalia and AMISOM in their operation to drive al Shabaab from their strongholds in Somalia while working to ensure the militants do not enter neighboring countries.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab attempted to reassert its presence in Kenya prior to the planned visit of U.S. President Barack Obama in late July. Al Shabaab militants launched an attack on July 7 that resulted in the deaths of 14 Christian quarry workers. On the same day, militants conducted an unsuccessful attack on a bus convoy in Lamu County. Kenyan officials attempted to undermine al Shabaab’s presence in the country by claiming reports of the Lamu County attack were false.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to conduct attacks in Kenya as regional security forces drive the group from its strongholds in southern Somalia, especially due to Kenya’s role in the Somali-backed operation in Gedo region.

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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1) 07 JUL: Al Shabaab attacked a bus convoy in Mpeketoni, Lamu County.2) 10 JUL: Al Shabaab detonated SVBIEDs before attacking two hotels near Villa Somalia, Mogadishu. 3) 13 JUL: Al Shabaab clashed with Somali troops after attacking a military base in Raga El, Middle Shabelle region. 4) 13 JUL: Kenyan Defense Forces conducted two airstrikes in Gedo region.

GULF OF ADEN

HORN OF AFRICA

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PoliticalAll delegates at the UN-led reconciliation talks in Sakhirat, Morocco, signed the 5th Draft of the Libyan Political Accord on July 12. The General National Congress (GNC) delegates were not present and declared that they would not sign the document until Gen. Hafter was deposed. The signing begins the process of creating a unity government, but a unified military remains a very distant goal.

Outlook: The delegations will begin assembling their choices for leadership in the unity government, but the GNC will remain recalcitrant over their loss of power in Libya’s future. The GNC’s foreign supporters will likely increase pressure on the GNC to sign the Libyan Political Accord over recent terror attacks and ISIS’ s expansion.

SecurityBenghazi Revolutionary Shura Council members launched new heavy assaults on numerous Saiqa brigade positions in Laithi, Buatni, and Buhdeima, Benghazi on July 9. It is still unclear what prompted the drastic change in the groups operational posture, although reports allege that the death of Abu Nazir al Yemeni, an ISIS Benghazi-based ideologue, inspired the shift. Neither side appears to have lost territory, despite the rising death toll.

Outlook: Both sides will continue to increase the intensity of their offensive operations in Laithi, Buatni, and Buhdeima, Benghazi, in order to gain strategic edge over the other.

Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in LibyaAnsar al Sharia’s affiliate in Benghazi appears to be directing the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council’s actions in the most recent conflagration. Assistance provided by ISIS’s Wilayat Barqa forces has bolstered its force strength, enabling it to continue fighting. In central Libya, ISIS’s forces in Sirte continue to consolidate and expand control of nearby territory. The most recent expansions point to a desire to sever unsanctioned ground travel between eastern and western Libya.

Outlook: ISIS will continue its expansion into Abu Grain, a town 112 km SE of Misrata, and to Waddan, Libya, a town 256 km south of Sirte, to establish a defensive perimeter that encompasses nearly all major roads to Sirte from the south and west.

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

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AQIM AQIM may be looking to prove its continued relevance in the region. The group claimed credit for its first attack in North Africa in over a month, carrying out an ambush on a police patrol in Bouira, Algeria. The silence in kinetic activity likely signals an attempt by the group to recuperate from their losses in both fighters and momentum to ISIS. Algerian forces continue to root out these militants in its northern mountains, as government operations led to the killing and capture of numerous terrorists.

Outlook: Algerian security forces will look to continue its momentum by carrying out operations in its northern mountains, while AQIM may look to respond through a new wave of small scale attacks.

Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)Tunisia continued its heavy security and military crackdown in response to the June 26 Sousse attack. The crackdown has targeted Ansar al Sharia-linked Uqba Ibn Nafaa brigade, which has lost five leaders, as well as ISIS and Ansar al Sharia cells planning attacks against civilians targets in Tunis. Separately, the government released details of its expansive emergency powers, which includes close monitoring of public gatherings, businesses, and social media.

Outlook: The Uqba ibn Nafaa Brigade and AQIM will look to ensure their survival through moving to remote locations as Tunisia seeks to expand security operations. ISIS and Ansar al Sharia will still remain operational in populated areas and seek to carry out attacks despite the heavy increase of security.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Ansar al Din continues to follow through on its threats to intensify attacks in Mali, expanding its attack zone to Bamako. Malian security forces dismantled an Ansar al Din cell there that security officials suspect was planning a major attack. Additionally, Ansar al Din may be linked to the 20 alleged militants arrested by the Malian Army in Fegoua near Mali’s borders with the Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso.

Outlook: Ansar al Din will most likely continue to attempt to carry out attacks in southern Mali and appears determined to continue to expand its influence in southern Mali.

MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST

AFRICA

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1) 08 JUL: A car bomb assassinated the Chief Intelligence Officer in Misrata. ISIS is the presumed culprit.2) 09 - 14 JUL: Ansar al Sharia began a new operation to expel the Saiqa brigade from its strongholds in Benghazi.3) 09 JUL: A 70-truck convoy of ISIS reinforcements arrived in Sirte and built new checkpoints along the coast.4) 13 JUL: A 100-vehicle ISIS convoy established a camp outside of Waddan, Jufra, Libya.

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST

AFRICA

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1) 10 JUL: Tunisian forces killed five leaders of the Uqba ibn Nafaa brigade in Gafsa, Tunisia. 2) 11 JUL: Tunisian authorities foiled two terrorist attacks in Tunis and in Sidi Bouzid. 3) 12 JUL: Tunisian authorities deployed 100,000 security personnel across the country.4) 12-13 JUL: Algerian forces clashed with militants hiding in mountains east of Algiers.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST

AFRICA1) 11 JUL: Malian security forces dismantled an Ansar al Din cell in Bamako, Mali. Security forces believe this cell was planning a major attack in the capital.2) 11 JUL: Malian security forces arrested an Ansar al Din courier who was traveling to Bamako. The courier was carrying Ansar al Din propaganda and funds for the cell in Bamako.3) 13 JUL: The Malian Army arrested 20 suspected militants in Fegoua.

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ASSESSMENT:

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Nuclear Talks

Iran and the P5+1 reached a final nuclear agreement that will place limitations on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. In a July 14 speech, President Hassan Rouhani highlighted the nuclear deal as “the first step toward achieving the [height] of constructive interaction with the world.” He stated, “…the world will experience a new page of relations with Iran.”

Outlook: The Rouhani administration will continue to promote the nuclear deal as a further opportunity to improve relations with the world.

Economy

President Hassan Rouhani stated that the recent meetings with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) represented a great opportunity for Iran to pursue its “political and economic interests.” Iran sees cooperation with the SCO and BRICS as a viable alternative to stimulate its economy without having to work with economic Western counterparts.

Outlook: Iran will look to its cooperation with BRICS and prospective membership in the SCO as a way to strengthen its economy without being dependent on Western powers.

Domestic Politics

In a statement to commemorate Qods [Jerusalem] Day, the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) stressed that Qods Day, which was celebrated on July 10, is an opportunity to condemn Israel “as the ‘common enemy of the Islamic society.’” Iran initiated International Qods Day in 1979 in condemnation of Israel and in support of the Palestinian people. IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari reiterated Iran’s commitment to Palestine and the “liberation of all Muslim nations.”

Outlook: Iran will uphold the narrative of Iran as the leader of the Islamic world and provider of regional security.

IRAN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

08 JUL: Advisor to the Commander of the IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Hamedani emphasized the expansion of Iran’s regional involvement during the Iran-Iraq War.

08 JUL: International and Legal Affairs Deputy to the Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the arms embargo against Iran was a blessing since it “resulted in the self-sufficiency of [Iran’s] defense industries.”

08 JUL: Expediency Discernment Council (EDC) Chairman Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani stated that “it is not impossible” for the U.S. embassy in Tehran to reopen.

09 JUL: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in Vienna.09 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani delivered a speech expressing Tehran’s interest in strengthening relations with

emerging economic powers at the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summits.

09 JUL: Passive Defense Organization Head IRGC Brig. Gen. Gholam Reza Jalali stressed the need for unity in the Islamic world against Israel ahead of Qods [Jerusalem] Day.

09 JUL: The Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) stated that resistance movements in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria symbolize the “force” of the Islamic Revolution.

10 JUL: The P5+1 and Iran extended nuclear negotiations until July 13.10 JUL: EDC Secretary IRGC Maj. Gen. Mohsen Rezaei attended the International Qods Day rally in Tehran in full

IRGC uniform. Rezaei stated, “[e]xpectations of reopening the American embassy are nothing but a dream…”11 JUL: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei highlighted “Iran’s wonderful spiritual influence” in an address to

university students. 13 JUL: Iran’s Day Bank rejoined the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT). 14 JUL: The P5+1 and Iran agreed to a final nuclear deal; President Hassan Rouhani praised the deal as signaling “a

new page of relations with Iran.”

07 JUL – 14 JUL 2015

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ACRONYMSAtomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)

Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)

Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)

Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)

Libyan National Army (LNA)

Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

North Waziristan (NWA)

Pakistani Military (PakMil)

Possible military dimensions (PMD)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

South Waziristan (SWA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Alexis Knutsenal Qaeda analystalexis.knutsen@aei.org (202) 888-6570

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Mehrdad MoarefianIran analystmehrdad.moarefian@aei.org(202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirectorfkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569