HOOD, Christopher C. MARGETTS, Helen Z. The Tools of Government in the Digital Age. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.

Governo como caixa de ferramentas (p. 2)

We can imagine government as a set of administrative tools – such as tools of carpentry or gardening, or any other activity. Government administration is about social control, not carpentry or gardening. But there is a toolkit for that, just like anything else. What government do to us – its subjects or citizens – is to try to shape our lives by applying a set of administrative tools, in many different combinations and contexts, to suit a variety of purposes.

Podemos imaginar um governo como um conjunto de ferramentas administrativas – tais como ferramentas de marcenaria ou jardinagem, ou de qualquer outra atividade. Administração de um governo é sobre controle social, não marcenaria ou jardinagem. Porém há um conjunto de ferramentas para tanto, assim como qualquer outra atividade. O que um governo faz para nós – seus sujeitos ou cidadãos – é tentar moldar nossas vidas aplicando um conjunto de ferramentas administrativas, em várias combinações e contextos diferentes, de modo a servir a uma variedade de propósitos. (Tradução livre)

Vantagens da caixa de ferramentas (p. 12)

Similarly, comparisons become much easier to handle; indeed, much of the fascination of exploring government’s tools is to compare the instruments brought to bear on a certain problem by different governments or by the same government at different times. The same instrument may be used for many different purposes.

This is just as well, for if government really had to design a completely new tool for each new subject in which it became interested, it would require far greater powers of innovativeness and imagination than governments can in practice be expected to possess. As it is, the same basic set of tools appears again and again as governments face up to ‘new’ problems, such as computer privacy or the regulation of reproductive technology. Only the mixture varies. This means that if we can grasp the basics of government, officialdom, authority – can do in any given case and what problems they may face.

Similarmente, comparações ficam muito mais fáceis de serem manuseadas; de fato, muito do fascínio em explorar as ferramentas governamentais é comparar os instrumentos utilizados em certos problemas por diferentes governos ou pelo mesmo governo em épocas diferentes. O mesmo instrumento pode ser usado para diferentes propósitos.

Tanto quanto, se um governo realmente teve que desenvolver uma ferramenta completamente nova para cada novo assunto no qual se vê interessado, seria necessária uma gigantesca capacidade de inovação e imaginação muito maior do que os governos possuem. Assim, o mesmo conjunto básico de ferramentas aparece de novo e de novo quando os governos encaram “novos” problemas, tais como regulação privacidade eletrônica ou regulação da tecnologia reprodutiva. Apenas a mistura varia. Isso significa que se podemos abarcar o básico do governo, oficialidade, autoridade – pode ser feito em qualquer caso dado e que problemas possa enfrentar. (Tradução livre)

Risco politico (p. 13)

It is by applying its tools that government makes the link between wish and fulfilment.

It hardly needs to be said that this link is frequently problematic and highly politicized. Selecting the right tool for the job often turns out to be a matter of faith and politics rather than

of certainty. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find that the choice of ‘instruments’ attracts much hotter political debate than the ends being sought.

É aplicando essas ferramentas que o governo faz a ligação entre desejo e realização. É preciso dizer que essa ligação é frequentemente problemática e altamente politizada. Selecionar a ferramenta correta para o trabalho se torna mais uma questão de fé e política do que certeza. De fato, não é incomum constatar que a escolha dos “instrumentos” atraia muito mais um debate político do que sobre os fins almejados. (Tradução livre)

Resposta à crítica (p. 13)

If the operation of government’s tools were unproblematic, it could be left to ‘technocrats’, and the rest of us could concentrate on the purposes that government should pursue. Things are not like that in reality. Knowing something about what is in government’s toolkit can at least help us to think about ways of doing better when – as so often happens – things go wrong. Such knowledge enables us to survey the main kinds of implements that might be used to address any given subject with which government may find itself dealing. If one tool fails to answer the purpose in any particular case, we can look systematically for other which might do the job.

Se a operação das ferramentas governamentais não forem problemáticas, podem ser deixadas aos tecnocratas, e o resto de nós pode se concentrar nos propósitos que um governo deve perseguir. As coisas não são assim na realidade. Sabendo alguma coisa sobre o que numa caixa de ferramentas de um governo pode por fim nos ajudar a pensar sobre modos de fazer as coisas quando – e tão frequentemente acontece – elas dão errado. Tal conhecimento nos permite avaliar os tipos principais de implementos que podem ser usados para abordar qualquer assunto dado, com os quais um governo pode lidar. Se uma ferramenta falha em responder o propósito em um caso particular, podemos olhar sistematicamente para outra que possa realizar esse trabalho. (Tradução livre)

Realidade complexa (pp. 135-136)

Frequently there are dilemmas involved in the choice of instruments by government(Hood, 1976; Dunsire, 1978). That is, using one instrument may well bring about undesirable side effects; but the alternatives may be similarly attended by unwanted by-products. The more active government becomes (and the more complex the social problems that arise), the more manifestations of such dilemmas may develop. The way government changes its approach to policy problems over time, turning from one instrument to another, has been termed by Guy Peters and Brian Hogwood (1980) as ‘policy succession’, to distinguish it from the entry of government into completely new social territory or, conversely, the total departure of government from some field of activity. Peters and Hogwood argued plausibly that as government activities came to embrace more and more aspects of social life, there was less virgin territory for government to move into. With the ‘ending of the frontier’, so to speak, government’s ‘policy space’ becomes crowded with agencies and programmes. Hence, argued Peters and Hogwood, government is likely to be increasingly concerned with policy succession. It will be trying to react to the dilemmas created by unwanted or unanticipated side effects arising from the use of government instruments in an ever more crowded policy space (Offe, 1975, pp. 88-9; Wildavsky, 1980). It will be searching new packages if instruments to apply to areas where the set of instruments originally chosen does not seem to answer the purpose.

Peters and Hogwood may have underestimated the extent to which new technology and social development create new virgin territory for government to deal with (as in cases such as

the internet, biotechnology or new diseases as AIDS and BSE). But in another sense, their notion of ‘policy succession’ points to the complexity of the concept of novelty in the sphere of government’s tools. As has already been stressed, most of the generic instruments used by government have a long ancestry and new instruments of the same order as nodality, treasure and organization are unlikely to appear. The basic toolkit – the NATO tools and combinations thereof – is intended to be exhaustive. But, as we have also seen, it is in a sense true both hat there is nothing new under the sun and that there is a vast scope for innovation in the use of government’s instruments. Provided there is a mechanism for generating variants – mutations or innovations – complex evolutionary processes can operate on the basis of a relatively fixed population of basic types.

Frequentemente existem dilemas envolvidos na escolha dos instrumentos por um governo (Hood, 1976; Dunsire, 1978). Isto é, o uso de um instrumento pode muito bem trazer efeitos colaterais indesejados; entretanto as alternativas podem ser similarmente atendidas por subprodutos não esperados. O governo mais ativo se torna (e mais complexos os problemas sociais que surgem) mais manifestações desses dilemas podem se desenvolver. O modo que um governo muda sua abordagem sobre políticas públicas ao longo do tempo, mudando de um instrumento ao outro, tem sido denominado por Guy Peters e Brian Hogwood (1980) como “sucessão de política pública”, para distinguir da entrada do governo em um território completamente novo ou, contrariamente, a saída total de um governo de algum campo ou atividade. Peters e Hogwood argumentaram plausivelmente que se as atividades governamentais abraçam mais e mais aspectos da vida social, existiria menos território virgem para o governo se mover. Com o “fim da fronteira”, por assim dizer, a “política espacial” do governo fica repleta de agências e programas. Consequentemente, argumentam Peters e Hogwood, ogoverno está continuamente preocupado com a sucessão de política pública. Ele tentará reagir aos dilemas criados por efeitos colaterais indesejados ou imprevistos que surjam do uso dos instrumentos governamentais em uma política espacial cada vez mais repleta (Offe, 1975, pp. 88-9; Wildavsky, 1980). Será procurando novos pacotes de instrumentos para aplicar em áreas onde o conjunto de instrumentos originalmente escolhido não parece responder ao propósito.

Peters e Hogwood parecem ter subestimado a medida em que nova tecnologia e desenvolvimento social criam novos territórios virgens para o governo lidar (em casos tais como a internet, biotecnologia ou novas doenças como AIDS e “doença da vaca louca”). Mas em outro sentido, sua noção de “sucessão de política pública” aponta para a complexidade do conceito da inovação na esfera das ferramentas governamentais. Como já foi salientado, a maior parte dos instrumentos genéricos usados pelo governo tem uma grande ancestralidade e novos instrumentos da mesma ordem como nodalidade, tesouro e organização não são suscetíveis de aparecer. A caixa de ferramentas básica – as ferramentas da OTAN e suas combinações – pretendem ser exaustivas. Porém, como já vimos, é num sentido verdadeiro que com tantos ‘chapéus’ não há nada novo sob o céu e há um vasto espaço para a inovação no uso dos instrumentos governamentais. Desde que haja um mecanismo para gerar variantes – mutações ou inovações – processos complexos evolucionários podem operar na base de uma população relativamente fixa de tipos básicos. (Tradução livre)

Citar junto com 1 das 3 hipóteses na sequência. (pp. 136-137)

The interesting question, of course, is what are the mechanisms for generating innovation in this case? There is now a large and growing literature on innovation in government (see Cabinet Office, 2003; Black et al., 2005; Hartley, 2005) but broadly, when noveltry is generated in government instruments, one or all of three things may be happening.

First, and old instrument may be applied in a new context. Deploying of old instruments for new problems or in different places is something that happens all the time, often through a

process of imitation (Simon et al., 1950, p. 38; Nelson and Winter, 1982). As we see in Chapter 3, government is forever wheeling out old stand-bys such as compulsory registration or licensing schemes in new contexts.

(…)

Second, an old instrument may change in salience as a result of technological change. As discussed in each of the NATO chapters (2-5), digital technologies allow government’s tools to be reshaped and some tool combinations become viable for the first time.

A questão interessante, evidentemente, é quais são os mecanismos para gerar inovação nesse caso? Existe hoje uma grande e crescente literatura sobre inovação no governo (ver Cabinet Office, 2003; Black et al., 2005; Hartley, 2005) mas amplamente, quando inovação é criada nos instrumentos governamentais, uma ou as três coisas podem acontecer.

Primeiro, um velho instrumento pode ser aplicado em um novo contexto. A implantação de velhos instrumentos para novos problemas ou em diferentes lugares é algo que acontece a todo tempo, usualmente por meio de um processo de imitação (Simon et al., 1950, p. 38; Nelson e Winter, 1982). Como vemos no capítulo 3, o governo está sempre atualizando velhas medidas como registro compulsório ou esquemas de licenciamento em novos contextos.

(...)

Segundo, um velho instrumento pode mudar na saliência como um resultado de mudança tecnológica. Como discutido em cada um dos capítulos sobre a OTAN (capítulos 2-5), tecnologias digitais permitem que as ferramentas governamentais sejam reformuladas e algumas combinações de ferramentas se tornam viáveis pela primeira vez (Tradução livre)

p. 138

(…)

Third, novelty may mean a combination or mix of instruments different from what existed before. The ingredients are the same but the recipe is different. It is very common, as we have already seen, to find government shifting the balance from one tool to another without abandoning any of them completely.

(…)

Thus, even with an unchanging repertoire of basic instruments, a powerful potential for generating novelty is afforded by context, combination and technological form. Of course, it may take a certain touch of ‘administrative genius’ to realize this potential – to spot a ‘niche’ or a new combination or to see how an instrument can be carried over from one context to another. Not everyone can do it in practice. But at least the process can be understood.

Terceiro, inovação pode significar uma combinação ou mistura de diferentes instrumentos que existiam anteriormente. Os ingredientes são os mesmos, mas a receita é diferente. É muito comum, como temos visto, encontrar um governo deslocando o balanço de uma ferramenta para a outra sem abandonar nenhuma das duas completamente

(...)

Assim, mesmo com um repertório imutável de instrumentos básicos, um potencial poderoso para geração de inovação é oferecido pelo contexto, combinação e forma tecnológica. Evidentemente isso requer certa medida de ‘gênio administrativo’ para realização desse potencial – para encontrar um ‘nicho’ ou uma nova combinação ou para ver como um instrumento pode transitar de um contexto para o outro. Nem todos podem fazer isso na prática. Mas ao menos o processo pode ser compreendido (Tradução livre)

p. 144-145

We discuss in turn four possible requirements for ‘intelligent’ policy design:

. Deliberative choice: the instrument or mix of instruments used in any given case should be selected after some examination or alternative possible tools for the job.

. Fitness for purpose: the tool should be matched to the job. Since there is no general-purpose tool that will serve government effectively in all circumstances, government needs to understand that circumstances which favour each of the instruments available.

. Economy: effectiveness is not enough – the desired effect must be achieved as economically as possible, with the minimum ‘spending’ of governmental resources and the minimum burden, in terms of form-filling, obligations and (except in rare cases, for instance when saturation policing is intended to reassure) highly visible signs of governmental presence, on the general public.

. Moral acceptability: the choice must not be ‘barbaric’; it must satisfy certain ethical criteria, notably justice and fairness.

(…)

Moreover, they belong together. Each requirement depends upon and in some cases limits the others. If government does not have any sense of what alternatives are available for any job, it is unlikely to know what circumstances favour which instruments. If it does not know the latter, it has no basis for choosing tools that will be effective, except on the basis of blind trial and error. And if this condition is not met, government has in turn no basis for achieving economy – a choice of tools that will be effective with minimum deployment of effort. Again, any idea of bringing ethical criteria to bear presupposes that there is some choice to be made: in other words, that alternatives can be identified. And if government does not make its choices within certain ethical parameters, there ceases to be any defensible reason for wanting government’s tools to be applied effectively or economically. On the contrary, we may positively welcome ineffectiveness and waste of resources in those circumstances.

Discutimos quarto requisitos possíveis para um projeto ‘inteligente de política pública:

. Escolha deliberativa: o instrumento ou mistura de instrumentos usados em qualquer caso dado deve ser selecionado após algum exame ou ferramentas alternativas possíveis para o trabalho.

. Adequação à finalidade: a ferramenta deve ser adequada para o trabalho. Desde que não há ferramenta de propósito-geral que sirva ao governo efetivamente em todas as circunstâncias, o governo precisa compreender quais circunstâncias que favorecem cada um dos instrumentos disponíveis.

.Economia: efetividade não é o suficiente – o efeito desejado deve ser alcançado do modo mais economicamente possível, com o mínimo de ‘gastos’ de recursos governamentais e fardo mínimo, em termos de cumprimento de formas, obrigações e (excepcionalmente em casos raros, por exemplo, quando a saturação da política pública se destina a tranquilizar) sinais altamente visíveis da presença governamental, sobre o público em geral.

Aceitabilidade moral: a escolha não deve ser ‘bárbara’; deve satisfazer determinados critérios éticos, notadamente justiça e equidade.

(...)

Além disso, eles são indissociáveis. Cada requisito depende e em alguns casos limita o outro. Se o governo não tem nenhuma percepção sobre quais alternativas estão disponíveis para algum trabalho, é improvável que saiba quais circunstâncias favorecem instrumentos. Se não sabe isto, não possui base para escolha de ferramentas que seriam efetivas, exceto na base da tentativa de erro e acerto. E se essa condição não é encontrada, o governo então não tem a base para alcançar a economia – uma escolha de ferramentas que seja efetiva com o mínimo empenho de esforço. Novamente, qualquer ideia de se trazer critérios éticos pressupõe que há alguma escolha a ser feita: em outras palavras, aquelas alternativas podem ser identificadas. E se o governo não faz

essas escolhas dentro de certos parâmetros éticos, deixa de haver qualquer razão defensável para se querer que as ferramentas governamentais sejam aplicadas economicamente ou efetivamente. Ao contrário, podemos positivamente dar boas vindas à inefetividade e desperdício de recurso sob tais circunstâncias. (Tradução livre)

Usar na parte prognóstica p. 146

Conventionally, a chooser must adopt a quite different approach in the choice is to qualify as ‘rational’. Formally, he or she must; (a) specify the goal(s) to be reached; (b) identify all the possible ways or means by which the goal might be reached; (c) ascertain the likely consequences of each alternative; and (d) choose the alternative that is likely to reach the goal(s) with the greatest certainty, to the greatest extent, or with the minimum of effort.

Convencionalmente, um escolhedor deve adotar uma abordagem bem diferente nas escolhas que se qualifiquem como ‘racionais’. Formalmente, ele ou ela devem; (a) especificar a(s) meta(s) a serem alcançadas; (b) identificar todos os modos ou meios possíveis pelos quais a meta deve ser alcançada; (c) determinar as prováveis consequências de cada alternativa; e (d) escolher a alternativa que provavelmente alcance a(s) meta(s) com a maior certeza, com a maior extensão ou com o mínimo de esforço. (Tradução livre)

Contraponto. As circunstâncias importam e conformam o planejamento da área pública; não é hermético. Mas aponta critérios, ajuda a tentar nacionalizar a ação administrativa e o desenvolvimento (???) de políticas públicas.

p. 147

In reality, it is common knowledge that choice normally falls far short of this procedural standard. Perhaps one could say that a choice which at least seriously considers some alternatives is more rational than a choice which plumps from one instrument without even considering the possibility that there might be other ways of going about the job. But choosing among government’s instruments cannot be a fully rational process, even in theory.

Na realidade, é de saber comum que a escolha normalmente fica muito aquém desse padrão procedimental. Talvez se diga que uma escolha possa por fim seriamente considerar algumas alternativas seja mais racional que uma recolha que varie de um instrumento ao outro mesmo considerando a possibilidade de que existam outros modos de realizar o trabalho. Mas a escolha entre os instrumentos governamentais não pode ser um processo completamente racional, mesmo em teoria. (Tradução livre)

p. 147

So a key reason why policy-making cannot be dependent upon rational choice alone is huge number of possible alternative combinations of government instruments.

pp. 147-148

It follows, then, that government cannot examine all feasible alternatives in most cases. The choice in practice merely lies between examining a greater or smaller number of combinations of instruments, depending on the circumstances. Certainly, one might expect the search to intensify when government perceives itself to have failed in tackling some problem. But, even in that case, the choice of the tool for the job must in practice also rest heavily on intuition, experience, tradition, faith and serendipity.

Crítica. Caráter politico.

p. 148

Given that all feasible alternatives cannot be systematically appraised, it follows that in many cases politics will play a large part in the selection of tools for the job. The idea of government coolly and open-mindedly for the job in hand – the image with which we began in Chapter 1 – is, of course, quite unrealistic. Just some weapons may be eschewed in war for high strategic or political reasons, so there are typically political or ideological constraints on the use of some of instruments in government’s too-shed to attack domestic policy problems. Governments will use massive police swoops for fiscal or public-order purposes, but not to enforce such things as safety-at-work laws. As Schaffer and Lamb (1981, p. 7) put it, ‘searches for alternatives … is neither random nor open-minded’.

Crítica, ineficiência política

p. 149

The simplistic but beguiling ‘steering not rowing’ idea that ‘politics’ is about ‘the big picture’, the broad aims or major goals, and that the ‘delivery’ or implementation of these goals are relatively non-political task for technocrats or managers (see Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) is often the exact opposite of the truth. Commonly, the real politics only begins when it comes to the choice of means and implements.

p. 149

Effective choice requires more than a review of alternatives, to the extent that such a review is possible. It also requires some understanding of the policy context, to match instruments to circumstances, There are some contexts where a specific government tool performs well, others where the same tool performs badly.

p. 151

In short, intelligent use of government’s tools requires effective contextual knowledge.

Cap. 3, prognóstico

p. 152

Another possible criterion for judging a ‘good’ selection of government tools is that of economy. The real test of policy engineering is to achieve the effect desired with the very minimum of bureaucratic building materials. Anyone (well, almost anyone) can make a house stand up if, as our ancestors did, they build enormously thick walls. But building that way is grossly wasteful or labour, materials and space. It takes the professional skills of the architect or of the trained builder to construct a strong building with the minimum of the materials. Similarly, it is not sufficient for the government to find tools that are effective, in the sense that they do the job required of them. Strictly, to do a good job, the tools must also be efficient, performing the task in the most economical way.

However, the idea of using the tools sparingly has more than one possible meaning. It could mean:

(a) Economy in governmental effort: minimizing the effort, expense and staff needed by a government to perform a certain task; and

(b) Economy in public burden: visiting on the public at large no more ‘trouble, vexation and oppression’, in Adam Smith’s (1910, p. 309) classic phrase, than in absolutely necessary to achieve the aim in view.

p. 156

If government aims to be economical in the second sense, it will prefer ‘precision’ to ‘non-precision’ instruments, and this again is likely to lead to conflict with the implications of economy in the first sense. ‘Precision’ tools are those which have the properties of ‘scalability’, ‘directness’ and ‘non-substitutability’, and these are likely to mean a preference for ‘particular’ tools that are bureaucracy-intensive in the first sense. Each of these characteristics of ‘precision’ will be briefly discussed.

p. 156-157

Scalability

This term denotes the degree to which an instrument can be varied in its intensity.

(…)

To achieve bureaucratic economy in the second sense, government’s effectors should be scalable, that is, capable of moving smoothly over a wide range of intensities. In this way government can hit the target just as hard as it needs to be hit, and no more. Like the dimmer switch that illuminates a room to the precise intensity required, the scalable effector avoids the ‘trouble, vexation and oppression’ involved in using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

p. 158

Directness

In order to avoid visiting more ‘bureaucracy’ on the population at large than is absolutely necessary, government’s instruments must not only be scalable; they must also be direct. ‘Directness’ refers to precision with which an instrument can be directed to a specific beneficiary or maleficiary.

p. 159

Substitutability or incidence

A third feature of a ‘precision’ instrument is non-substitutability. Substitutability is closely related to directness. It refers to the extent to which an implement can be blunted or deflected from its target even if it is able to reach the target directly. To the extent that this can happen, there will again be a spillover of bureaucratic impact from the target to others.

p. 161-163

Part of the reason for the ‘hot politics’ involved in selecting government tools is the uncertainty of the link between wish and fulfilment in many areas of government activity.

p. 167-168

Among the works of that kind that have been produced over the past twenty years, we can distinguish at least three main approaches. All of them have earlier antecedents but most are concerned with questions different from those dealt with in this book. One, contrasting with our broadly institution-free approach focusing on interactions between individuals and government, looks at government tools or instruments in terms of the different forms of organization

available to government – such as ministerial departments, state-owned enterprises, independent public authorities, contractors and public-private partnerships. A second well-established approach, also contrasting with the approach taken in this book, focuses centrally on the politics of instrument selection, in the sense of the interests or ideas that shape the choice of tools. A third set of approaches – the category in which this book belongs – aims to be institution-free and to focus more on cataloguing the toolkit in a generic way than on the politics of instrument choice.

Against that background, this chapter aims to do three things. First, it aims to show that the first two approaches, albeit sometimes portrayed as rival ways of understanding ‘tools’, are in fact answers to questions different from those dealt with in this book, not different ways of approaching the same question. So no real issue of gladiatorial combat arises, since those approaches are complementary rather than conflicting. Second, the chapter aims to bring out the advantages of the toolkit approach set out here relative to other approaches that share its broad characteristics of being institution-free and generic. Third, picking up a theme that has been developed in all the previous chapters, we conclude by exploring what kinds of challenges each of the three broad approaches considered here faces in an age of digital technology.

p. 169-170

If the institution-as-tools approach to thinking about the tools of government links to all those debates about what detailed forms of organization should be used to provide what kinds of public services or government functions, a second approach is concerned with the politics that lies behind the selection of whatever tools governments use, whether conceived as generic instruments or as forms of organization.

From this perspective, the important thing is to understand the political struggles, ideological mindsets and cognitive frames of politicians and policy-makers that lead to the pursuit of public policy through one kind of instrument rather than another. As with the institutions-as-tools approach, this approach is far from new, though it has traditionally been as much the province of historians as of political scientists.

p. 170-171

In recent decades, Stephen Linder and Guy Peters (1989, 1992, 1998) have been particularly associated with the politics-of-instrument-choice approach in the public policy literature. They distinguish four approaches to the understanding of public policy instrument, contrasting what they call ‘instrumentalists’ (those who concentrate on and often seek to champion some particular tool, such as those economists who see price mechanisms as the answer to every policy problem), ‘proceduralists’ (those who see tool selection as a product of political processes that are so complex and unique to every case that it is impossible to make any general assessment of ‘appropriateness’), ‘contingentists’ (a rather awkward label for those who see the appropriateness of tool use as depending on types of task, for instance as between ‘compliance cultures’ and cultures of resistance to government policy), and ‘constitutivists’ (those who see the appropriateness of tool use as turning on subjective and contested meanings). They say their own thinking about policy instruments has developed over time away from approaches such as contingency or instrumentalism towards what they call ‘constitutivism’, arguing in postmodern vein that there is ‘a growing understanding that instrument selection is not a simple mechanical exercise of matching well-defined problems and equally well-defined solutions. Rather, it is fundamentally an intellectual process of constituting a reality and then attempting to work within it’ (Linder and Peters, 1998, p. 45).

p. 196

In the digital age as in every other, the challenge for governments is to find new ways of using a limited basic array of tools effectively and creatively, as technology and social patterns change.

Howlett, Michael. Designing Public Policies: principles and instruments, Routledge Press, 2011.

Cap. 3. Diagnóstico – p. 22

A design orientation to analysis can illuminate the variety of means implicit in policy alternatives, questioning the choice of instruments and their aptness in particular contexts. The central role it assigns means in policy performance may also be a normative vantage point for appraising design implications of other analytical approaches. More important, such as orientation can be a counterweight to the design bases implicit in other approaches and potentially redefine the fashioning of policy proposals. (Linder, S. H. e Peters, B.G., 1990, Policy Formulation and the Challenge of Conscious Design. Evaluation and Program Planning 13: 304).

Cap. 3. Diagnóstico - p. 22

Policy design elevates the analysis and practice of policy instrument choice – specifically tools for policy implementation – to a central focus of study, making their understanding and analysis a key design concern (Salamon 1981; Linder and Peters 1990). Instrument choice, from this perspective, in a sense, is public policy-making, and understanding and analyzing potential instrument choices involved in implementation activity is policy design.

Cap. 3. Policy design – formulação e implantação (p. 23-4)

This is because, as we’ve seen, policy design largely takes place at the formulation stage of the policy cycle and deals with plans for the implementation stage. Thus the key sets of policy instruments of concern to policy designers are those linked to policy implementation, in the first instance, and to policy formulation, in the second.

Cap. 3 – p. 24

Whether the problem is an architectural, mechanical or administrative one, the logic of design is fundamentally similar. The idea is to fashion an instrument that will work in a desired manner. In the context of policy problems, design involves both a systematic process for generating basic strategies and a framework for a comparing them. Examining problems from a design perspective offers a more productive way of organizing our thinking and analytical efforts.

Cap. 6 (está escrito algo depois de cap. 6, mas não entendi) - p. 30

This is what Aaron Wildavsky (1979) termed finding and establishing a relationship between ‘manipulable means and obtainable objectives’.

Cap. 6 (está escrito algo depois de cap. 6, mas não entendi). Resposta à crítica política - p. 30

Politicians in most societies, for example, cannot do everything they consider would appeal to the public but also ignore popular opinion and public sentiments and still maintain their legitimacy and credibility.

P. 45

Fazer no cap. 3 esse registro das taxonomias e o avanço dos modelos de escolha de ferramentas? Fazer isso na parte prognóstica, ou criar um cap. 1 antes do diagnóstico?

Cap. 3. Combinação de ferramentas – p. 53

Studies such as Gunningham, Grabosky and Young’s work on ‘smart regulation’ led to the development of efforts to identify complementarities and conflicts within instruments mixes or tool ‘portfolios’ involved in more complex and sophisticated policy designs (Barnett et al. 2008; Shore 2009; Buckman and Diesendorf 2010). For them, the key question was no longer ‘why do policy-makers utilize a certain instrument?’ as it was for earlier generations of students of policy instrument choice, but rather ‘why is a particular combination of procedural and substantive instruments utilized in a specific sector?’.

Cap. 3 - p. 57

Current policy design theory is based on the insights developed during this period that while policy goals are manifold and alter over time, and while the choice of policy means in context driven and resource contingent, the toolbox with which designers must work is essentially generic (Majone 1989).

Cap. 3. Prognóstico - p. 63

Organizational implementation instruments include a broad range of governing institutions and personnel to affect policy output delivery and policy process change.

Cap. 3 - p. 101

Financial substantive tools are not synonymous with all government spending, since much of this goes to fund direct service delivery and also support regulatory agencies (as well as to provide information, which will be discussed in Chapter 8 below). Rather, such tools are specific techniques of governance involved in transferring treasure resources to or from other actors in order to encourage them to undertake some activity desired by governments through the provision of financial incentives, or to discourage them through the imposition of financial costs.

Cap. 3. Apresentou “todas” as ferramentas antes e agora vai selecionar as tendências – p. 128 e 130

Experts in government see the links between these policy components in terms of their inter-compatibility and inner coherence and use their positions in policy advisory networks to develop policy alternatives which combines these elements in more or less consistent ways, choosing particular tools based on factors such as political, social and economic feasibility, government capacity and target group structure, and calibrating specific tool components taking into account factors such as automaticity, cost, intrusiveness, visibility and precision of targeting. These factors and calculations change over time as the context of policy-making changes and shift in governance modes and policy regime logics do occur, as globalization and network theorists rightly noted, leading to changes in overall policy design preferences.

However, these changes occur at different times and with different impacts in each policy sector and it is a mistake to think that a general macro-level societal movement such as networkization

will manifest itself equally in all areas of state activity. This can be seen from even a rudimentary examination of the globalization and network literature which, in fact, argue equally vehemently that such shifts are occurring, but in two different directions: towards either the general adoption of market governance, or network governance, respectively.

Cap. 3. Intro. Esse é o contexto geral de aplicação. Dele é que vêm as aplicações diagnóstica e prognóstica – p. 139

As Stephen Linder, B. Guy Peters, Davis Bobrow, Peter May, Patricia Ingraham, Christopher Hood, Renate Mayntz and the other pioneers of policy design research in the 1980s and 1990s argued, like other kinds of design activities in manufacturing and construction policy design involves three fundamental aspects: (1) knowledge of the basic building blocks or materials with which actors must work in constructing a (policy) object; (2) the elaboration of a set of principles regarding how these materials should be combined in that construction; and (3) understanding the process by which a design becomes translated into reality. In a policy context this means understanding the kinds of implementation tools governments have at their disposal in attempting to alter some aspect of society and societal behavior; elaborating a set of principles concerning which instruments should be used in which circumstances; and understanding the nuances of policy formulation and implementation processed in government.

Cap. 3 - p. 140

Design is nevertheless a crucial activity in policy-making and considerations of policy success or failure (Marsh and McConnell 2010; McConnell 2010) since it embodies the lessons learned from other policy activities at the moment in time when a new policy is being developed or an old one reformed.

Cap. 3. Usar em que parte? p. 140

As we have seen, theories of policy design and instrument choice have gone through several ‘generations’ (Goggin et al. 1990; O’Toole 2000) as theorists have moved from the analysis of individual substantive instruments (Salamon 1981; 2002) to comparative studies of procedural instrument selection (Howlett 1991; Bemelmans-Videc 1998; Peters and Van Nispen, 1998; Varone 2005; Bode 2006; Howlett et al. 2006). While each generation has increased the complexity of the analysis, the central assumption of all these generations of theory is that the policy design process and its outcomes are ultimately shaped by contextual factors related to state capacity in the face of different levels of social complexity (Atkinson and Nigol 1989).

Cap. 3. Intro. Citar com referência do Weimer também - p. 142

As David Weimer (1992) has argued, ‘Instruments, alone or in combination, must be crafted to fit particular substantive, organizational and political contexts’. (Weimer, David L. 1992. ‘Claiming Races, Broiler Contracts, Heresthetics and Habits: Ten Concepts For Policy Design’. Policy Sciences 25: 373).

P. 144

As the discussion in the book has repeatedly noted, specific instrument choices are embedded decisions, existing within a nested, multi-level environment of governance modes, policy regime logics and tool calibrations, and is heavily context laden. The basic nature of possible governance regimes, however, is well known and the general implementation preferences they entail are also quite clear. That leaves the essential design challenge in many sectors as one of

the identification and articulation of specific policy measures, more or less carefully calibrated, from within each resource category, within an already existing governance mode.

Cap. 3. Diagnóstico – p. 145

That is, designers should ensure that any new design elements are coherent in the sense they are logically related to overall policy aims and objectives; that they be consistent in that they work together to support a policy goal; and that both policy goals and means should be congruent, rather than working at cross-purposes.

Cap. 3. Diagnóstico – p. 145

Administrators and politicians involved in policy design need to expand the menu of government choice to include both substantive and procedural instrument choice to include both substantive and procedural instruments and a wider range of options of each, and to understand the important context-based nature instrument choices.

Cap. 3. Diagnóstico. Resposta à complexidade deve ser nesta linha – p. 146

Given the complexity of policy making it is not surprising that many noble efforts by governments and citizens to create a better and safer world have foundered on poor policy design. However, while not an optimal outcome, this had led to a greater appreciation of the difficulties encountered is designing public policies, and the attempt to correct gaps in our understanding, a process which, albeit slowly, has improved our knowledge of the principles and elements of the nature of policy instruments and their governance contexts of policy design.

Cap. 3. Diagnóstico. Resposta à complexidade deve ser nesta linha – p. 146

The design process is complex, often internally orchestrated between bureaucrats and target groups, and usually much less accessible to public scrutiny than many other kinds of policy deliberations, but this should not be allowed to stand in the way of its further elaboration and refinement (Kiviniemi 1986; Donovan 2001).

GOODIN, Robert E. Institutions and their design. In: GOODIN, Robert E. The theory of institutional design, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Cap. 2. Instituições. Para uma síntese da abordagem institucionalista em diversos ramos do conhecimento – p. 19

Drawing together all those diverse disciplinary strands, a consolidated new institutionalism would serve to remind us, inter alia, of the following propositions.

Cap. 2. Instituições – p. 22

“Institutionalism” has been characterized as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.” In an institutionalized setting, behavior is more stable and predictable. Furthermore, that is not an incidental by-product of institutionalization – not merely the consequence of “coming to value a certain organization or procedure” for some independent

reasons. Instead, that very stability and predictability is, to a very large extent, precisely why we value institutionalized patterns and what it is value in them.

Cap. 3. Intro – p. 34

In the case of a policy, a well-designed policy is one which fits well with the other policies, and the larger political/economic/social systems in which it is set. In the case of a mechanism, a well-designed mechanic is one that works well alongside other features of the social environment in which it is set, including other mechanisms in play there. Insofar as the mechanism is one whose internal requirements are “compatible” with other incentives that individuals face, rather than offering people incentives for undercutting the goals (characterized as Pareto-optimality, or whatever) which we were trying to achieve by using the mechanism in the first place. In the case of a whole system, being well designed means that all the pieces fit together well in a harmonious whole: being well integrated, being in equilibrium (and perhaps robustly so, whether homostatically or otherwise).

Cap. 3. Intro. Diagnóstico é descritivo e prognóstico é prescritivo (suponho que esteja escrito isso, mas não tenho certeza) – p. 36-7

This seems to be a tough sort of claim to sustain. Government organizations, at least, display enormous longevity and persist well after their original reasons for existing have passed away. Insofar as other social institutions are like that, then it seems implausible to postulate any tough competitive environment that weeds out ill-fitting institutions on anything like a systematic basis.

In the end, the best analysis of any necessary connection between descriptive and prescriptive aspects of optimal design theories lodges it squarely in the intentions of social agents. What theories of optimal design try to do is to give social agents good reasons for shaping institutions in some ways rather than others. Insofar as they are convinced of those arguments and moved by those reasons, those social agents will try to act upon those design prescriptions. Insofar as they succeed, institutions shaped by their actions will end up bearing something of the mark of those theories of optimal design.

Thus, the connection is there. But the connection comes through effects of the prescriptions on the intentions of agents, and through the effects of those agents’ intentions on the social world. To say that is to claim (or ask) a lot. But any more facile claim – that optimal design theories are unreflectively internalized or automatically enforced through competition in a hostile environment – seems far less tenable. It seems far better to admit forthrightly that the point of moralizing (which is after all what we are doing is prescribing optimal social arrangements) is to shape people’s value and preferences and, through them, their actions.

Cap. 6. Experimentalismo (não entendi a obs.) – p. 42

Finally, insofar as we are counting on trial-and-error, learning-by-doing processes to perfect our institutional arrangements, we ought embrace as a central principle of design a desire for variability in our institutional arrangements. We ought encourage experimentation with different structures in different places; and we ought, furthermore, encourage reflection upon the lessons where appropriate. Federalism is sometimes defended on precisely this ground, as a “social laboratory” in which different approaches are allowed to emerge in different jurisdictions.

Cap. 2. Instituições – p. 43

In a whole raft of policy areas, from tax to regulatory policy, we often see the worst practice rather than the best being adopted in neighboring jurisdictions. Whether federal institutions, or

other variance-maximizing principles of institutional design, are good ideas thus depends once again upon a fundamentally political judgment as to which is the most likely consequence.

(…)

If we are to understand how social life works, and how it might work better, fixing our focus firmly upon institutions and their reshaping is one crucial step.

PETTIT, Philip. Institutional design and rational choice. In: GOODIN, Robert E. The theory of institutional design, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Cap. 3 – p. 58

The screens which operate on individuals will have the effect, under the ideal institutional design, of recruiting to certain tasks those individuals who are more likely – perhaps inherently more likely, perhaps more likely in the context of certain sanctions – to behave in the manner that is socially valued.

Cap. 3. Intro – p. 61

Rational choice theory can be described, in a phrase I used earlier, as social science by economistic means (Elster 1986a). It amounts to the attempt to pursue the explanation, not just of market behavior, but also of behavior outside the market, in an economistic manner. The idea guiding the approach is that if economics serves us well in the explanation of how agents behave in more or less marketlike context, then equally it should serve us well in the explanation of people’s behavior in other areas.

SCHNEIDER, Anne. INGRAM, Helen. Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools. The Journal of Politics, Volume 52, Issue 2 (May, 1990), 510-529

p. 511

One of the most remarkable changes in American politics over the past 50 years has been the proliferation of tools or instruments through which governments seek to influence citizen behavior and achieve policy purposes (Salamon 1989; Doern and Wilson 1974; Dahl and Lindblom 1953). These include such commonly-used techniques as standards, direct expenditures (subsidies), sanctions, public corporations, contracts, grants, arbitration, persuasion, education, licensing, and so forth. Dahl and Lindblom (1953, 8) referred to the rapid intervention of these techniques as “perhaps the greatest political revolution of our times.” They attributed both political and economic importance to policy instruments, contending that the invention and utilization of a variety of tools would enable governments to solve social and economic problems without the intense cleavages and ideological debates that otherwise might occur (1953, 6)

p. 512

Public choice scholars also have examined policy tools. One of their contributions is the emphasis on incentive structures and the recognition that perverse incentives in institutional arrangements will produce dysfunctional results (Ostrom 1988; Savas 1987).

p. 513. Citar no cap 2, ferramentas e incentivos, ou no subitem de regulação comportamental

The amazing proliferation of policy tools witnessed over the past half century has been accompanied by an equally amazing explosion of ideas which explore the fundamental ways through which policy influences behavior. Most of those who are interested in policy content, tools, and instruments recognize the importance of motivational devices, but none has developed a classification system based upon the underlying behavioral assumptions.

p. 513

A basic assumption underlying our approach is that public policy almost always attempts to get people to do things that they might not have done otherwise.

p. 514. Citar no cap 1 ou 2, em itens sobre ferramentas

If people are not taking actions needed to ameliorate social, economic, or political problems, there are five reasons that can be addressed by policy: they may believe the law does not direct them or authorize them to make action; they may lack incentives or capacity to take the actions needed; they may disagree with the values implicit in the means or ends; or the situation may involve such high levels of uncertainty that the nature of the problem is not known, and it is unclear what people should do or how they might be motivated. Policy tools address these problems by providing authority, incentives or capacity; by using symbolic and hortatory proclamations to influence perceptions or values; or by promoting learning to reduce uncertainty. Laws, provisions within laws, guidelines, programs, or even the practices and routines of case workers can be described and analyzed in terms of the types of tools upon which they rely.

p. 516. Citar no cap 2, em lógica dos incentivos

In contrast with capacity tools, incentives assume individuals have the opportunity to make choices, recognize the opportunity, and have adequate information and decision-making skills to select from among alternatives those that are in their own best interests.

p. 525. Citar no cap 6, item de incrementalismo e experimentalismo

Incremental change could be defined as intensification (or desintensification) of a strategy.

p. 525-526. Citar no cap 3, intro

Comparative analysis of the behavioral dimensions of tools will be instrumental in developing theories of policy participation and in understanding why target populations react as they do to policy initiatives.

There is much discussion and debate about whether people respond mainly to self-interest, whether positive incentives are more effective than negative ones, about the role of altruism, norms, and beliefs in decision making. Much could be learned by comparative studies in which policies relying upon positive incentives, for example, are compared with those relying upon sanctions, and where informational campaigns or those where symbolic and hortatory tools are employed. By holding constant the policy arena, comparative analysis would leave yield interesting useful information about the effectiveness of alternative tools in particular circumstances. Experimental studies of cooperation and defection could be broadened to take a more explicit policy framework and compare the effects of alternative combinations of policy tools, within different types of institutional frameworks, in producing various types of policy participation (e.g., Orbell, van de Kraft, and Dawes, 1988).

p. 527. Citar no cap 3, prognostica

The framework we present clusters tools on the basis of their underlying motivational strategies. Authority tools rely on the inherent legitimacy found in hierarchical arrangements. Incentive tools assume individuals are utility maximizers who will change their behavior in accord with changes in the net tangible payoffs offered by the situation. Capacity tools assume individuals may lack information, resources, skills, and may rely on decision heuristics (shortcuts or rules of thumb), but that these biases and deficiencies can be corrected by policy. Symbolic and hortatory tools assume individuals are motivated from within, and that policy can induce the desired behavior by manipulating symbols and influencing values. Learning tools assume agents and targets do not know what needs to be done, or what is possible to do, and that policy tools should be used to promote learning, consensus, building, and lay the foundation for improved policy.

p. 527 Idem ao anterior

The framework we have proposed brings together the behavioral dimensions of policy instruments with the concept of policy participation; an important but largely neglected form of political behavior. By focusing on the behavioral dimensions of policy tools found within policy designs, political scientists may be able to advance knowledge about the conditions under which target populations will contribute to preferred policy outcomes.