20130827 DATA Group StatementOfCase

7/27/2019 20130827 DATA Group StatementOfCase

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VNEB: Development and Transport Action Group

PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO TFL'S PROPOSAL TO EXTEND THE NORTHERN

LINE FROM KENNINGTON TO BATTERSEA POWER STATION

OBJECTION: VNEB DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSPORT ACTION GROUP

STATEMENT OF CASE

About DATA

DATA is a civic interest group that is an Affiliated Association to one of Vauxhall's

longest established Civic Societies, The Vauxhall Society. DATA was established in

October 2011 to provide a networking umbrella for a range of other civic groups with

an interest in transport implications associated with the major development of the

Vauxhall, Nine Elms, Battersea Opportunity Area (VNEB OA).

DATA is also associated with, and draws its support from, a wide range of other Civic

Groups across the South Lambeth area, including the Lansdowne Residents

Association and the Kennington Association Planning Forum and has a wide

newsletter readership across the area. DATA is also a member of the Coalition of

Lambeth and Walworth Residents group.

DATA was at the forefront in pressing the previous owners of the Battersea Power

Station site (Treasury Holdings) to allow Civic Groups to have direct discussions with

TfL and was one of the first groups to be allowed to do so. DATA's aims were to

work with TfL in identifying facts about their proposed NLE project but their best

endeavours were cut short by TfL's refusal to undertake any meaningful engagement

following their meeting with DATA on 12 January 2012.

DATA has drawn upon its broad perspective to provide an holistic view of the NLE

proposal. It is important that the full range of concerns and objections against TfL's

proposal should be taken as cumulative evidence that demonstrates its unsuitability

rather than as a series of individual issues. TfL has access to a huge range of resources

and PR teams that can provide glib responses that appear to address individual issues

but which lack real substance. The fact is that there are a large number of very serious

issues that either have not been addressed or that have been skewed to fit the TfL

agenda that there can be no confidence in the overall proposal as it stands, even that itis the right choice of transport investment.

Indeed, DATA has carried out research into TfL's NLE proposal and discovered that

the whole proposal is built on myth, incomplete information, manipulated

presentation of selective information and an absence of any real consultation or

consideration for public realm or public interest. It seems that their only interest is to

get this tube extension built at someone else's expense as soon as possible.

While DATA uses its best endeavours to be able to present its case, it comprises

members of the public who have limited resources and limited time to be able to

respond to a highly technical issue. TfL, on the other hand, has had the luxury of ahuge range of resources, including PR companies, its own staff, a massive

DATA


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infrastructure and a full time engagement with an obscure agenda. TfL has

consistently made it difficult for public engagement with the real issues by dressing

up selective facts, not releasing key information when asked and setting difficult

deadlines, for example the December 2012 consultation which closed over the Xmas

period.

It should also be borne in mind that the preparation for this public inquiry also occurs

over the Summer holiday period when many families are on holiday, making it

difficult to prepare a full Statement of Case. DATA has also only recently been able

to access the final report by Lambeth Council's technical consultants, Ramboll and

TfL's own Statement of Case. There has been insufficient time to consider the former

but DATA has had a preliminary look through the latter and has, so far as possible in

the short time available, been able to include reference to TfL's Statement of Case in

its own Statement of Case. This is not, however, a full response to TfL's Statement of

Case due to lack of time to consider its implications.

Introduction to statement of case

After more than eighteen months of refusing substantive contact with DATA, TfL

wrote to DATA on 5 July 2013 in response to the request to the Department for

Transport for a public inquiry to ask for more information on a number of the issues

raised in DATA's letter to the Secretary of State dated 17th June. Unfortunately, due

to time constraints, DATA was unable to meet TfL separately but the wider coalition

of Civic Groups against the NLE proposal held a meeting with TfL on 19th August

and DATA's points, sent to TfL in advance by email on 16 August 2013, were

reiterated. DATA raised a number of questions in its response to TfL and is still

waiting for answers.

A copy of TfL's letter to DATA and DATA's response, with a series of question, are

shown as documents referenced Intro 1 to Intro 4.

DATA's wants a Public Inquiry to examine all aspects of TfL's NLE proposal. It

concurs with the detailed points made by other members of the Coalition of Lambeth

and Walworth Residents group.

DATA's outline objections to the TfL NLE proposal were set out in its letter to the

Secretary of State for Transport dated 17th June 2013 (Document Intro 5). This

statement of case builds on the points raised in that letter and on objections sent toTfL in response to its calls for comments Documents Intro 6, Intro 7, Intro 8 and

Intro 9. It should be noted that no reply at all was received from TfL to any of the

points raised in any of these documents and there was no mention of this level and

type of objection in the reports submitted by TfL describing their (alleged)

consultation and response to it: for example, see pages 11 - 13 of document Intro 10.

Overview: Some Common Sense Points

Before we move into the detail of the issues, DATA would ask the Inquiry to take a

look at what is being proposed in graphic and real terms. In case the Inquiry is unable

to take the time to look at the physical site (which would be very revealing indeed),


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DATA appends at Picture 1 a Google maps image so that the relative directions and

distances can be seen easily.

This picture includes hand drawn lines to demonstrate directions and distances. There

is a white line that shows the proposed NLE route from Battersea Power Station to the

Nine Elms Station (which, incidentally, is some distance, with no current pedestrianaccess, from the main development of the VNEB OA).

There are also red lines showing the route across the VNEB OA to Vauxhall and

another showing how close the Battersea Power Station (BPS) site is to the siding

lines leading into Victoria Station. The map also shows the immediate proximity of

several network rail lines and a range of bus stops, including those running directly

into central London that pass directly past the BPS site (bus route 44, 137 and 452)

and those that run towards Vauxhall (routes 156 and 344). Directly across the adjacent

Battersea Bridge there are further bus routes (route 24 and, slightly further but still

easy walking distance, route 360).

There is also an almost complete pedestrian (and could be cycle) lane that runs along

the Embankment from BPS to Vauxhall and thence right across the centre of London.

There is a riverboat service as far as St George's wharf at Vauxhall and this could

easily be extended down to BPS.

These facts and figures are not indicative of an argument to use any particular one of

these alternatives to the proposed NLE but to make the point that the plethora of

existing transport options when taken together would provide a clear option to the

NLE. This has not, to DATA's knowledge, been explored at all.

Just looking at the proposed route of the NLE demonstrates immediately its serious

shortcomings as a transport solution for the VNEB OA. The glaringly obvious

problem is that the NLE proposal does not cover the VNEB OA at all. This is the

first point to be made in this section of DATA's Statement of Case.

TfL's NLE proposal runs from the South West corner of the most Westerly aspect to

the VNEB OA and heads South, underground, to a point in the Wandsworth Road that

lies, at best, at the furthest Southern perimeter of the most generous interpretation of

the VNEB OA and outside easy walking access to all the major developments in the

VNEB OA. None of the rest of the VNEB OA (the vast majority of the VNEB OA)

will benefit from this.

DATA suggests that the Inquiry panel should walk the length of the VNEB OA along

Nine Elms Lane. It takes about twenty minutes to walk from Vauxhall station to BPS

at a brisk walk. Apart from those residents in the BPS site itself, most residents will

be situated somewhere along the sides of Nine Elms Road. This is particularly true for

those residents in Embassy Gardens, Royal Mail, Market Towers and Riverlight

Tideway which, according to TfL's statement of Case (page 16) accounts for some

5,200 of the planned 5,900 new homes. These residents will have the choice,

therefore, of either walking ten minutes or so away from London to the BPS site to

catch the Northern Line from a station that will presumably be outside Zone 1 and

head South, away from London or walking for about the same length of time in the


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opposite direction, towards London, to access the Zone 1 Victoria Line directly into

London.

The point is that situating any transport solution for VNEB OA at its far South

West tip with a route that runs away from the VNEB underground, cannot be

described as providing a transport solution for the VNEB OA. Therefore TfL'sclaim in its Statement of Case (page 12 fourth point) that 'The NLE will

transform accessibility across the VNEB OA' is completely groundless and

misleading.

The lack of a transport needs analysis that is not predicated on, and skewed in

favour of, the NLE is a major concern. More detail on this will follow.

It is important that the cumulative nature of all objections to TfL's NLE

proposal are assessed as a whole in assessing whether it is a viable and credible

proposal.

TfL Documents Discredited

The way in which TfL has manipulated timings for comments on its proposals, its

lack of any real engagement with objectors and objections, its public presentation and

its selective use of responses from objectors in presenting its case has caused many

who follow this process to have no faith in anything that TfL produces. Nothing

should be taken on face value.

For example, TfL produced a marketing document dated 21 December 2012, shortly

before their 2012 'consultation' closed on 31 December 2012 (it was held over the

Christmas period). This document (at reference Intro 11) sets out a number of

disingenuous points including making statements about having considered other

Network Rail options (TfL's subsequent FOI statement to DATA demonstrates this to

be either grossly exaggerated or totally false - see reference documents A9, A9a and

A9b). This same TfL document (Intro 11) states that 'the World Health Organisation

(WHO), states that levels should not exceed 45dBLAmax,FAST in bedrooms to

avoid sleep disturbance. In 2009 WHO published Night Noise Guidelines which

lowers this value to 42dBLAmax, FAST.' But it does not put into context what the

WHO guideline actually says, which significantly undermines any claim that

42dBLAmax, FAST is a credible target. The WHO report to which TfL refers (see

Document Noise 1 on pages XV, XVI and XVII) which conclude:

Therefore, 40 dB Lnight, outside is equivalent to the lowest observed adverse effectlevel (LOAEL) for night noise. Above 55 dB the cardiovascular effects become themajor public health concern, which are likely to be less dependent on the natureof the noise. Closer examination of the precise impact will be necessary in therange between 30 dB and 55 dB as much will depend on the detailed circumstancesof each case.

and which go on to say:

Up to 30 dB

Although individual sensitivities and circumstances may differ, it appears that up to thislevel no substantial biological effects are observed. L night, outsideof 30 dB is equivalent to the no observed effect level (NOEL) for night noise.


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30 to 40 dB

A number of effects on sleep are observed from this range: body movements, awakening,self-reported sleep disturbance, arousals. The intensity of the effect depends on thenature of the source and the number of events. Vulnerable groups (for example children,

the chronically ill and the elderly) are more susceptible. However, even in the worst casesthe effects seem modest. L night, outside of 40 dB is equivalent to the lowest observedadverse effect level (LOAEL) for night noise.

Nor is the information on page XIII of the report taken into account, which says:

Effect Indicator Threshold, dB

Biological effects:Change in cardiovascular activity **EEG awakening L Amax,inside 35Motility, onset of motility L Amax,inside 32Changes in duration of various stages of sleep,in sleep structure and fragmentation of sleep LAmax, inside 35

This is not a specific argument for a specific lower level of noise in the NLE proposal

(although it does indicate that noise levels should be lower than TfL are predicting -

this will be argued by another member of the Coalition in more detail) but it does

show that that TfL has been very selective in ignoring facts that do not fit with its own

position regarding the technical requirements and standards for its NLE project.

TfL's document at Intro 11 makes claims about extensive consultation but this is

demonstrably not the case because the strenuous objections that DATA and others

have made against the NLE proposal have not been reflected in any of the

consultation reports that TfL has published. There will be more on consultation laterin this Statement of Case.

The TfL Statement of Case should certainly be seen in this same light. For example,

on page 87 there is a claim by TfL that they are 'corresponding and meeting with

objectors with a view to reassuring them and, if necessary, reaching a mutually

acceptable agreement or undertaking, which will allow the objection to be withdrawn.

In particular, TfL has offered to meet with all community groups who have made

objections to the scheme to try and address their issues.' This is such an exaggerated

and misdirected construction of the real situation as to be regarded as wholly false.

DATA refers the Inquiry in particular to reference documents Intro 1, 2, 3 and 4 as

evidence of the type of exchanges that have taken place: too little, far too late and

without any real substance or expectation that fundamental questions will be

addressed. This has not been consultation at all but a carefully stage managed

series of selective public presentations that TfL is now using to claim legitimacyfor its actions. Others in the Coalition will provide similar evidence in this regard.

These few examples are indicative of the way in which TfL has presented its entire

case to the public, politicians and public bodies that have been persuaded to lend

support to TfL's NLE proposal. DATA doubts that any political support for the NLE

project would be forthcoming if the truth were known. The scale of the misdirection

and risk to the public purse and infrastructure is of the same magnitude as faced bythe DfT in relation to the West Coast railway fiasco.


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The first point here is that this short critique has demonstrated that TfL's

document dated 21 December 2012 (Intro 11) is of dubious credibility and

cannot serve as a generic or specific response to any of the points raised by

DATA, or other Civic Groups in their earlier letters to TfL.

The second point here is that an initial appraisal of TfL's Statement of Case

reveals that it too is based on similar types of misdirection, selective and

incorrect statements and is posited as a marketing plan to persuade and convince

rather than to inform. It is more akin to a product advertisement that is

constructed to convince an audience that its product should be bought.

The third and related point here is that TfL has started from the position of

having decided they want an NLE and they are now doing everything they can to

get it built (at the expense of others). Therefore none of the documents issued by

TfL in support of its NLE proposal can be relied upon to provide a true and

accurate picture of the proposal because they are designed to persuade andconvince rather than inform and generate informed debate. All TfL

documentation must therefore be treated as marketing and propaganda and not

take at face value. All TfL documents should be treated with extreme caution

and examined with the same level of critical scrutiny as above.

The fourth point is that, to get an accurate picture of the NLE proposal, there

should be an equally well funded and resourced independent analysis of the TfL

proposal that does not start with the NLE precept and which reviews the overall

need for an NLE.

DATA's main points of argument causing a call for a Public Inquiry:

The points raised in DATA's letter dated 17th June 2013 (Document Intro 5) to the

Secretary of State covered the main areas in which DATA has concerns. They are

reiterated below with further details and evidence appended by reference:

POINT A: DATA is particularly concerned that the decision to build a NLE was not

made in response to a neutral and comprehensive transport needs assessment. The

original idea seems to stem from the previous owners of the Battersea Power Station

to make sales of flats on the site more attractive: ie for private commercial purposes.

But even this was not sufficient to save them from bankruptcy. The reciprocalagreement between TfL to build an NLE and the current developers to invest in the

Battersea Power Station development project seems to confirm that investment

incentive rather than transport needs drive TfL's NLE proposal. In addition,

documents that are just coming to light indicate that TfL saw the inherited NLE

scheme as a way to dominate transport networks in the South West. Neither of these

are a sound basis for a high-cost, public financed, transport infrastructure project;

additional bullet point from letter of 17th June is covered in this section for

expediency:

There has been no impact assessment for other transport and public needsalong the route of the proposed NLE. For example, the station at Nine Elms,


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would be on an already very busy junction with narrow roads. Pedestrian and

road traffic congestion will be exacerbated immediately prior to the Vauxhall

Cross gyratory traffic choke point. Commuters travelling to/from Nine Elms

station will add to the already overly-congested bus routes in this area;

Evidence and argument:

There is a long history of plans to develop a Railtrack (now Network Rail) link into

central London from the Battersea Power Station area with clear independent research

to show that a Network Rail (or, as it was at that stage, Railtrack) main plank in a

mixed mode transport solution for the predicted development needs in the Battersea

Power Station area was completely viable. Despite this, Treasury Holdings did not use

the previous studies as a basis for meeting the transport needs of the development and

TfL studiously ignored drawing on this earlier work when they took over the transport

project.

There are many documents available that demonstrate that up to 2004 a Network Railoption for the development was considered adequate and that TfL's own consultants

in 2009 make only a very nuanced case in favour of the possible use of an NLE but

make the point that, even then, when the NLE cost was much less than half the cost of

the most recent reliable figures (December 2012) the cost benefit was marginal. There

is no evidence of TfL ever carrying our, or commissioning a neutral transport needs

assessment that was not based on its exaggerated trip generation forecasts and that

uses its preferred NLE solution as a benchmark against other forms of transport

individually (ie ignoring mixed mode transport solutions).

The evidence for this is:

A1) the Wandsworth Council Planning Permission document dated 26 September

2000 (Document A1) demonstrates the history of planning towards a Network Rail

(equivalent) link from Battersea Power Station development to Victoria; and

A2) the record of Wandsworth Council planning permission application progress

(document A2) shows a clear commitment by Railtrack (as was - the predecessor for

all intents and purposes of Network Rail) to develop a rail service from Battersea

Power Station to Victoria as part of the major development at that site. This continued

up till 2002 (page 79 of Document A2) when Railtrack undertook a sudden reversal of

position, coinciding with the disclosure of huge losses and their going intoAdministration

A3) However, an independent study by the Babtie Group in 2004 (Document A3)

demonstrates a Network Rail (previously Railtrack) main plank within a mixed mode

transport solution for predicted development at Battersea Power Station is completely

viable. See also related point 8 in this section of the Statement of Case.

A4) TfL claims to have undertaken extensive discussions with Network Rail about

alternative options to an NLE (see document Intro 11 and heavily implied on pages

105 and 106 of TfL's Statement of Case) but TfL revealed under FoI that the only

consultation they did with Network Rail was cursory in the extreme, comprising justtwo very general letters (reference documents A4, A4a and A4b). This disclosure


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reveals under FOI reveals that TfL's engagement with Network Rail (NR) in seeking

alternatives to NLE or wider option comprised only the exchange of two letters, one

of which invites further discussion on one possible NR option (Battersea Park Station)

and the other, while advising against a dedicated shuttle service, refers to an existing

service from Battersea Park to Victoria. NR bases no further investigation of

enhancing this capacity because, once again, there is an assumption that there will bean NLE. A neutral assessment would have looked at enhancing the existing service

BEFORE considering whether to build an NLE. Unless TfL has given incorrect

information under FOI, they did not follow up these options at all. This is typical of

the way in which TfL has ignored or ruled out possible transport options and, at all

times, made the assumption that their preferred choice of an NLE should be

undertaken.

A5) Additionally, in the minutes of a meeting with DATA dated 12 January 2012 it is

recorded that there are several Network Rail options that TfL had not considered at all

and, despite undertakings to do so, we believe that they have still yet to be fully

explored (document A5)

A6) TfL wrote to a member of the wider coalition against the NLE on 21 August 2013

(document A6) and referred in paragraph 4, page three, in its defence of the decision

to construct an NLE, to the SKM 2009 transport report as proof that it had undertaken

a full transport study. Page 8 of this report (document A7) makes a very nuanced

cased that an NLE might be necessary at a very high level of development density

creates a high level of journeys but that the economic case (even at the much lower

predicted cost of an NLE at that stage - much less than half of the cost predicted in

December 2012 and therefore substantially lower than any realistic expectation of

costs at the present) was precarious. The favoured options for lesser numbers of

journey was Network Rail and bus throughout all levels of development density. The

statement in page seven of this report reads:

Full Appraisal

The full appraisal of shortlisted schemes suggests that the better performing transport

package for each OA development scenario is as follows:

OA Scenario 3 Bus-only package, possibly enhanced by a bus rapid transit facility

along the route of the LRT scheme; and OA Scenario 4 and 5 Bus package and the

NLE.

In OA Scenarios 1 and 2, bus-based initiatives would probably be sufficient for the

levels of development envisaged, although probably not without some improvementsto interchange facilities at Vauxhall.

A7) It is worth noting at this point that TfL has not made any allowance in its journey

prediction modelling for the fact that the Battersea Power Station development will be

of a luxury type that does not generate standard public transport patterns (see the first

three paragraphs of the minutes of the meeting between TfL and DATA on 12 January

2012 at reference document A5) and has not made sufficient allowance for the fact

that the majority of jobs created in the region of the development will be filled by

local workers. The trip generation figures even for the densest development scenarios

4 and 5 above will be far less than expected and this therefore gives even more weight

to the argument that a much fuller transport assessment needs to be undertaken.


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A8) London Planning Officer Peter Rees wrote on 21 July 2013 about the low density

actualoccupancy that could be expected across the VNEB OA due to investment

purchasing and predicted that there would be no need at all for an NLE because bus

services could cope. See document A8. This should be seen in connection with

document A9 which provides an overview of the type of development that should be

expected across the VNEB OA.

A9) TfL has been invited on numerous occasions (most recently in document Intro 4)

to provide evidence of a neutral and comprehensive transport needs assessment that

uses realistic trip generation figures, that does not take an NLE as a benchmark based

on these figures and which compares a mix of transport options (not just a small

selection of other tube routes or bus routes or Network Rail routes in isolation from

each other) with the demonstrated need but they have consistently failed to do so.

A10) Decisions were taken to focus on an NLE in an environment described by

Councillor Reed as 'chaotic and random' and where there were significant concerns

that only an NLE was being considered and that all other forms of transport optionswere being completely neglected. See the 23rd June 2011 Nine Elms Vauxhall

Strategy Board meeting record at document A10

A11) TfL's Heads of Heads of Terms agreement with the Developer with the

commercially interdependent commitment to deliver a NLE for a building investment

continues the original commercial basis for the NLE: ie not a transport basis for

building this expensive tube line. See PAPER NO: SB12-62 STRATEGY BOARD

14 DEC 2012 Document A10. The link with the private sector development in

Wandsworth is further demonstrated in TfL's Statement of Case (page 15 point 3.1.4)

A12) All major reports on transport aspects of the VNEB OA are referenced against

an existing decision to build an NLE and couched as justification for an NLE.

Illustratively Document A7 for example

A13) TfL claims to have undertaken a 'a detailed transport study which assessed a

number of transport options for meeting the future transport needs of VNEB. This

study considered National Rail, Underground, tram, and bus interventions as well as

improvements to walking and cycling' (Document A11 paragraph 3.4) but there is no

sign of this ever being published. Where is this document that takes a neutral look at

all OPTIONS for transport needs for the VNEB OA rather than a comparison of

options TO an NLE? Paragraphs 3.5 and 3.6 of TfL document A11 issued on 13March 2013 make it clear that the only real comparisons are against other tube lines

and set against trip generation figures based on traditional high density housing,

which is definitely not the case for the VNEB OA and which the policy of local

employment also completely undermines.

A14) In the same paper, same paragraph, TfL states: 'Since the OAPF transport study

was completed, a further review of alternatives has been undertaken and confirmed

that no other scheme would adequately meet the aims underlying the project.' NB The

use of the word 'confirmed'. This is all about justifying a previous decision. And when

one looks at paragraphs 3.5 and 3.6 of the same document (document A11) the

comparisons are all against other tube line extensions, not against a broad range oftransport options to meet the VNEB OA need.


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A15) Further in paragraph 3.4 of the same document (A11) TfL states: 'While the

NLE is the single biggest intervention in terms of cost and providing capacity, it is

part of a wider package of transport and urban realm improvements.' There has been

no comprehensive and reliable transport needs assessment so how can they know

what improvements are necessary? Where is the strategic transport plan that showsthis 'wider package'? Who is paying for it, and how?

A16) There has never been a proper transport needs analysis but TfL has used its

position to skew their attempts at justifying their preferred option of having a tube

extension built at public and private costs and risk in an area that has been

predominantly the domain of Network Rail. This constitutes rivalry and competition

rather than cooperation between and integration of rail systems. The losers are the

public and the public purse.

A17) DATA understands from anecdotal sources, however, that TfL has some more

data on the possible use of Network Rail as a viable alternative to the proposed NLEbut this has not been made public. DATA asked about this on 16th August (see

document Intro 4) but no reply had been received as at the date of assembling this

submission.

A18) Question: How will a single tube line going from the very Western edge of the

VNEB, leading away from the VNEB OA, to Nine Elms Wandsworth Road (with an

existing high level of transport options nearby) and on to the overcrowded Northern

Line at Kennington, help with transport needs ACROSS the VNEB OA?

A19) There has been no impact assessment for other transport and public needs

along the route of the proposed NLE. For example, the station at Nine Elms,

would be on an already very busy junction with narrow roads. Pedestrian and

road traffic congestion will be exacerbated immediately prior to the Vauxhall

Cross gyratory traffic choke point. Commuters travelling to/from Nine Elms

station will add to the already overly-congested bus routes in this area. TfL admits in

its Statement of Case (pages 10 and 11) that it cannot afford to pay for a second ticket

hall and access at the proposed station to be called 'Nine Elms' but it has not explained

how it intends to cope with the claimed hugely increased footfall along the narrow

Wandsworth and Pascal Roads to the single ticket hall entrance it does intend to

construct on an already overcrowded and very difficult road junction in the

approaches to the notoriously congested Vauxhall Cross. Combined with the adjacenthuge development of Sainsburys (which will surround the planned station on two

sides) this will be a pedestrian and traffic nightmare choke point. There has been no

impact assessment of this aspect of the proposal and no mitigation proposals for the

clearly obvious congestion and overcrowding it will cause.

A20 The following commentary is also indicative of the way in which the NLE has

been inveigled into a possible transport solution that includes a substantial Network

Rail component:

2010 November 11 - Wandsworth Planning Applications Committee

Paper 10-809 (3 Nov 2010 Officer's Report - A G McDonald, Director ofTechnical Services) - see document A12


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SEE Pg 7 - September 2000 - permissio n for new rai l stat ion to l ink withGrosvenor viaduct into Victor iaRef2000/1570 - permission lapsed in 2005SEE Pg 7 - Jan 2002 - blaming NR for need to review the transport strategySEE Page 11, last paragraph, last bullet point - Mayor wanting longer

platforms - sought resolution through unilateral undertaking...neverdeterminedSEE Pg 16 - the NLE proposal formally makes itself known in the planningsphereSEE Pg 35 - Transport Assessment ( "The draft OAPF proposed a revisedversion of Scenario 5, and it recognises the importance of the NLE to deliverthis scenario; the TA has been produced on this basis." )SEE Pg 37 - Transport Assessment - Trip GenerationSEE Pg 41 - NLE tube to be operational 2016/17SEE Pg 44-50 - NLE Progress Reports 1 (Planning application relation ofNLE, TWAO scheduling, Policy) & 2 (Funding & Delivery)

SEE Pg 138 Applicants proposed S106 contributions (NLE GBP 203m )SEE Pg 154 Consultation - Public (Transport/NLE - Pg 156)SEE Pg 166 No imp rovements prop osed to Rai l stat ions, yet theyprovid e impo rtant service l inks before the NLE is operat ional

SEE Pg 168, 2nd para, end - linking development phasing to NLEprogression, important part of the planning applicationSEE pg 180-186 - Transport for London GLA Stage 1 Report ...SEE Pg 183-186 - London Underground (LU) comments on the NLEProposalSEE Pg 194 Network Rail commentsSEE Pg 265 2nd para. NLE, Rail phasing, no mitigation for overgroundstationsSEE Pg 276-278 Summary of Transport infrastructure, NLESEE Pg 289 Some interesting 'decoupling' of the dependency on theNLE in terms of phase/site RS-1SEE Pg 290-294 Funding issues, Risk & TWAO schedulingSEE Pg 297 (16, 17, 18) Conditions linked to NLE

It is the competitive relationship between TfL and (now) Network Rail that has seen

the complete absence of the latter as a serious contender in the work towards a

transport solution for the VNEB OA that creates the impression of rivalry and lack of

cooperation in providing the correct balance of transport response to transport needsthat is referred to in DATA's call for a Public Inquiry.

There is no empirical evidence that an NLE is needed. TfL has ignored

alternatives and structured a case to support and justify its own preferred

outcome, which would result in a mix of public and private funding and

financing, at huge cost, with dubious transport benefits, to give them a foothold

in an area of London where at the moment they have none. The longer term

benefits for TfL are evident, and for the developer, but not for the taxpayer more

generally, the residents across the VNEB OA or their transport requirements.


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POINT B: TfL has carried out only very cursory transport options assessments based

on very dubious residential and journey expectation data and always skewed towards

demonstrating their pre-conceived preference of building an extension to the Northern

Line. Similarly, 'consultation' and public opinion output is skewed. For example, the

choice of Route 2 was based on a faulty consultation process which omitted to consult

many on the actual route. The option assessment study that forms part of thisconsultation contains sixteen criteria but omits impact on low-rise residential

households which is one of the major concerns about the proposal. Results were

skewed in favour of TfL's pre-selected outcome. TfL's aim at every stage has been to

justify their NLE plan, rather than to undertake a transport needs assessment, but they

quote actions in support of the former as demonstrating the latter;

B1) The decision to opt for a NLE rather than any other mixed mode of transport

solution for the VNEB OA has been extensively discussed under POINT A of this

Statement of Case but the fundamental issue is that of skewing the outcome of

reviews, presentations and documents towards TfL's pre-determined outcome of

securing funding and financing for its NLE project. Crucial to TfL's argument is thetrip generation figure that it takes for granted and then uses to justify subsequent

arguments in favour of its preferred outcome. Our colleagues in the Kennington

Association Planning Forum will be arguing this point in much more detail, but

DATA makes the point that the figures on which TfL bases its arguments should not

be relied upon for the same reasons as outlined above that other aspects of the TfL

arguments should not be relied upon - because they are part of a marketing plan to

persuade and convince the public, politicians and other interested parties not a reliable

source of balanced and neutral information. In this case, TfL has undertaking a

marketing campaign that has buried any question of the crucial fundamental data that

underpins its arguments and has focussed attention elsewhere (such as which NLE

route, rather than should there be an NLE route at all). TfL has created the conditions

in which there is now a degree of belief in their assertion that there is an

unquestionable need for mass transit and that only NLE will be suffice. This has

misled the public and the political leadership into support for the scheme in the belief

that there is no credible alternative. This is not the case. Informed experts, such as the

planning officer for the City of London (see document A8), have challenged this but

TfL has used its size and resources to deliberately and continuously ignore this

challenge.

B2) TfL has conflated the argument over economic benefits accruing to the VNEB

OA with the construction of an NLE. This is pure obfuscation. The economic benefitsare those which the VNEB OA will bring. DATA agrees that to maximise these

benefits an effective public transport system will be needed across the VNEB OA and

between the VNEB OA and the rest of London (and in the opposite direction, to leave

London as well). DATA has not seen any evidence from TfL that the NLE will

provide either of these essential transport benefits to the VNEB OA. Indeed, as

demonstrated in Point A of this Statement of Case, the NLE will not provide any

transport benefits across the VNEB OA and it will provide only very limited transport

benefits from far Western edge of the VNEB OA to the furthest Easterly part of the

central part of London via the Northern Line (including passing through one of the

most heavily congested parts of the London underground system at Waterloo).


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B3) TfL has sought to justify the need for mass transit by referring to the expected

increase in employment in the VNEB OA but has not mitigated this figure by the

policy requirement stated by both Lambeth and Wandsworth Councils that the

majority of such employment should be locally sourced. The NLE will not provide

any transport benefits for local workers to get to places of work within the VNEB OA

and nor should the trip generation figures include this element.

B4) With more realistic trip generation figures (that take into account the real levels

of trips generated by the type of occupants in the new development - perhaps akin to

those who occupy St Georges' Wharf) and mitigated to exclude local employment, a

much wider range of transport solutions become significantly more attractive. Even

with the higher range of figures used by TfL an assessment of a range of transport

options is important, particularly when it is clear that the NLE proposal will not

benefit transport requirements across the VNEB OA and the cost-benefit relationship

is so unclear - see point A6 on page eight of this Statement.

B5) It is a misnomer to call the engagement of TfL with the public consultationaccording to a professional study by a leading academic with good knowledge of

survey design and interpretation. Dorothea Kleine has demonstrated clearly in her

critique of TfL survey methodology that the results, certainly of the earlier surveys on

which TfL is heavily reliant for claims to support, is so badly flawed as to be

meaningless. See document B1.

B6) In practical terms TfL's claim that 90% of local people support the Northern Line

Extension is misleading in the extreme. According to the 2011 consultation paper

produced for TfL (see document B2) , this claim is based on fewer than 1600 opinions

(in a Lambeth population of more than 272,000) and even these few votes

are not for NLE as the best choice compared to other transport options

but in answer to a different question entirely. In reality, the 90% figure of support

claimed for NLE in the NLE 2011Consultation document (page 5) s not in response to

a question about supporting the NLE but, according to the document:

When asked if they thought the proposed scheme would bring transport benefits to

the area of Nine Elms and Battersea, 90% (1597) either agreed or strongly agreed,

compared with only 4% (64) who strongly disagreed.'

So, 90% of those asked thought the proposed scheme would bring transport

improvements. They did not support the NLE in terms of preferring it to anyalternative transport scheme. This headline figure is therefore misleading.

Notice also that this 90% covers only a tiny proportion of the population affected by

the NLE. This 90% is 1,661 respondents, a very small sample, which is hardly

representative of area in which many thousands live.

B7) The same report (document B2) also makes claims about public preference for

route 2 of the NLE and construe this to demonstrate support for the NLE and route 2

whereas in reality there was no such option presented:

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed Route Option 2. Ofthose that answered, the majority stated that they support Route Option 2, with


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69% (1195) in favour and 14% (260) against. The remaining 17% (284) had no

preference.

These figures are too small to be meaningful and with no real alternative to chose

from a responded to this survey is directed towards an answer that can be construed as

support.

B7) As residents of the area affected by the NLE many members of the DATA group

were not part of any consultation exercise until much later in the process when they

received what amounted to a fait accompli. Subsequent leaflet campaigns have

allegedly been a lot wider but they too have been patchy, and they only provide

opportunities to decide between pre-determined options with a clear and heavily

weighted argument by TfL for its own preference. There has been no neutrally

informed public debate about TfL's proposal except among Civic Groups and at

public meetings hosted by them.

B8) Interpretation of TfL's consultants' reports has been extremely selective. TfLchose to interpret their 2009 and 2011 reports by SKM (document A7) and B2 as

demonstrating a need for an NLE whereas the facts in both documents show that the

Northern Line and the Victoria Line are both unsuitable (even with planned upgrades)

for the level of increased commuter traffic that they predict. Indeed, the arguments

indicate that if one of the two routes needed to be chosen, the Victoria Line would be

able to cope more easily than the Northern Line. Note however, that DATA is not

making a case for either but that the logic of the TfL argument is false and their own

research does not support the arguments they have made. The details are:

Why this is wrong:

Vauxhal l Station too congested

The only congestion problem at Vauxhall is in the area of barrier

management, which is being addressed by planned changes identified in the

report at relatively low cost. See page 49 of the 2009 report.

In any case, extending the Victoria Line past Vauxhall to Battersea will not

bring any additional loading at the Vauxhall barrier because commuters will

already be on the train at Vauxhall.

But, creating a new Northern Line station at Nine Elms would likely(using

data in the 2010 report) result in commuters from that area opting to walk five

minutes to the Victoria Line at Vauxhall (cheaper and more direct route) thus

putting more pressure on the barriers there.

Victoria Li ne is too congested There is only a short journey area north of Victoria that reaches anything

like 80% of capacity at the peak period. The rest of the line (and all of it

during most of the day) is at a much lower level of use

Absolute figures for Northern Line use are much higher than on the Victoria

Line already, without adding a new load from Nine Elms and Battersea

For example: The statistics on page 44 of the 2009 report show that

Vauxhall is an extremely lightly loaded station (6,000 passengers in the three

hour peak period) whereas Waterloo on the Northern line (which would be

directly affected in traffic flow as predicted by the NLE model) is the highest


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on the entire Underground network with nearly twelve times as many

boardings (69,000)

Also: Using the statistics from pages 44 and 45 of the 2009 report, the

Vauxhall boardings of 6,000 in the three hour peak period is dwarfed by the

29,000 passengers who use the Stockwell to Oval route in the same period,22,000 of whom are opting to get into central London via Waterloo. The

traffic density indicators on pages 46 and 47 bear this out.

The problem relating to crowding on the Northern Line itself has not been

addressed in the studies. Adding passengers from the proposed new stations

will make the Northern Line even more heavily overcrowded.

DATA stresses that it is not using these statistics to argue the use of the Victoria Line

but to demonstrate that TfL has sought to manipulate information to support their own

preferred outcome. DATA's view is that a comprehensive and neutral transport needs

analysis should be undertaken using well informed and realistic trip generation

figures. Lambeth Council has also called for a 'satisfactory package of other strategictransport improvements, including improved/new bus services, that ensures the NLE

is part of an overall strategic transport solution for the VNEB Opportunity Area' as a

condition of not objecting to TfL's NLE (see document D1).

B9) TfL's Document A11 Paragraph 5.4 hugely underplays the enormous range of

very serious objections, including objections stimulated by an independent expert

commissioned by Lambeth Council and makes unquantified and unsupported claims

about large levels of support that have not been demonstrated. All the objections cited

by various interest groups to the public inquiry were also cited to TfL as part of their

consultation, but have been largely ignored. See for example DATA's response to the

2012 'consultation' at Documents B3, B3a and B3b.

B10) TfL's Document A11 Paragraph 5.5 claims that TfL has had, and continues to

have, a dialogue with groups opposed to the NLE. This is also very selective. The

Claylands Group success in having the ventilation shaft moved is an important victory

for common sense and sensibility, but it is hardly indicative of the norm. Indeed, our

Claylands Green colleagues carefully structured their argument to protect an

important and sensitive site. This should not be seen as TfL adapting to consultation

but a later realisation of the enormous original planning mistake in even considering

building a ventilation shaft in such an environmentally and socially sensitive site. This

is, in fact, a clear demonstrates of how poorly thought through the NLE proposal is,including the lack of public consultation in drawing up the proposals.

B11) TfL has frequently not replied to emails from DATA and has avoided having a

meeting with DATA for over a year. There has been no reply from TfL to any of the

points raised by DATA since the end of 2012 and what meetings have been held have

comprised a rejection of any of DATA's views. Public consultation started with a

rejection of allowing any group to discuss with TfL (by Treasury Holdings) and

subsequently a dogged defence by TfL of its plans, not a dialogue on them. TfL has

written to objectors to invite discussions only now that a public inquiry has been

called.


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Further information on the failure of TfL's consultation will be provided by

other members of the Coalition.

The point here is that TfL has not presented a balanced view of options but has

sought to manipulate information in support of its own preferred outcome.

POINT C: TfL has not been forthcoming about the cost of the scheme but admitted

in January 2013 that costs have increased by nearly 225% since first consideration

(from about 580 million up to 1.3 billion). But this is based on the lowest possible

mitigation standards for noise, vibration, and other public realm impact and there is

no provision for the essential safety upgrades to Kennington station or financing

costs. Actual costs will, therefore be significantly higher than currently admitted and

the already tenuous financing scheme will not be able to sustain, let alone repay them.

C1) In response to an FOI enquiry in March 2013 (See Doc C1) TfL refused to give a

specific figure for the cost of an NLE but referred instead to the highly speculative

costing and financing statements in Doc A11 demonstrating that they really do notknow how much the project will cost or how it will be financed.

C2) Also in document A11 (paragraph 4.2), TfL has sought to disguise the costs of

the NLE by stripping out:

(i) financing costs;

(ii) the cost of necessary environmental impact improvements;

(iii) a range of other costs including necessary upgrades to Kennington Station;

(iv) and without any mention that it is only now starting the detailed sub-ground

condition surveying that could lead to substantial increases in cost

These manoeuvres help to justify a predicted headline cost for presentational purposes

to just below the level of the Chancellor's agreed loan to build the NLE. This is a

convenient figure, but not at all reliable or accurate. Any realistic calculation of the

actual costs would put them significantly higher. But, as TfL readily admits ' there is

continued uncertainty about the cost of individual components' (Doc A11 paragraph

4.2 line three) and ' Clearly, at this stage, there is a risk that the cost will be higher'

(Document A11 paragraph 4.2 lines 7 - 8).

C3) On Financing, paragraph 4.7 of TfL's document at Doc A11 states that 'The EZ

delivers about three quarters of the funding required to service the 1bn NLE debt' but

there is, as yet, no EZ and there is no mechanism extant to create one.

C4) TfL's own consultants point out in their assessment of a possible NLE option that

cost benefits were marginal even at a substantially lower predicted cost of building

the NLE (see paragraph A6 on page eight above). Other parts of the Coalition (in

particular, but not necessarily limited to, the KAPF) will explore cost-benefit in more

detail and so this will not be pursued further here. DATA is, however, very concerned

that there is no cost-benefit for an NLE, particularly when compared to mixed-mode

transport solutions which could provide better transport and cost-benefit outcomes.

The point is that there are no clear figures for the cost of the NLE or what TfL

intends to spend this money on (eg Kennington station safety, environmentalimpact mitigation, financing, and real costs of a heavily front loaded project) nor


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is there any clear financing package in place. Everything is highly speculative

and costs are being presented at a highly unrealistically low figure. This project

should not be allowed to go ahead (at all on transport grounds) and for financial

probity and accountability reasons, until a much more detailed costing has been

obtained and reliable financing is in place.

POINT D: TfL has been very vague about mitigating noise and vibration to a level

acceptable to residents along the path of the NLE tunnels. Higher levels of

noise and vibration will cause extreme disturbance to residents and potential

damage to properties. TfL has also not carried out proper surveys of the sub-ground

composition to substantiate its predictions on costs or noise/vibration.

D1) DATA has already made reference on pages four and five of this Statement to

noise issues but wishes to remind that Lambeth Council's letter dated 17th June to the

Secretary of State for Transport (document D1) states: ' That the noise level resulting

from trains does not exceed 35dB (fast) and the Council has every expectation that

TfL will reduce this to 30dB or lower wherever possible'. Lambeth Council's letteralso contains a number of other provisions that should not be overlooked, including

on environmental impact, safety and security and a 'satisfactory package of other

strategic transport improvements, including improved/new bus services, that ensures

the NLE is part of an overall strategic transport solution for the VNEB Opportunity

Area'. DATA notes that this has not yet been put in place;

D2) A detailed case on noise and vibration will be made by other members of the

Coalition and DATA will not attempt to reiterate these complex issues again at this

stage but fully supports the points made by other members of the Coalition on this

subject.

D3) DATA is also very concerned about the lack of commitment to preserve or

replace community facilities and community activities such as beekeeping and dog-

walking areas. DATA fully supports the arguments put forward by other members of

the Coalition in making the case for the fullest impact mitigation and assistance to all

members of the community who are affected by the TfL NLE scheme.

D4) DATA is very concerned that TfL appears to be seeking powers to avoid any

controls over the period in which it can conduct excavations and other works, the

nuisance this may cause to residents and any noise restrictions resulting from these

works in connection with making preparations for, and actually building, the NLE.DATA has not had the time to study these proposals fully but if this is the case it

should be firmly rejected. TfL must comply with the law as it currently stands and

cannot seek exemption from it purely on the basis of its size and status.

The point here is that TfL has tried to oversimplify the acceptable level of noise

by quoting part of WHO guidelines out of context and is reluctant to give any

firm commitments on an acceptable level of noise disturbance. Presumably, due

to the fact that they do not yet know the ground conditions they are unable to

even estimate what they will be able to achieve and how much it will cost to

provide adequate environmental impact mitigation. TfL's original plans were for

least possible mitigation and it is a difficult struggle to get them to make


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anything like an acceptable commitment either in terms of noise and vibration or

community impact mitigation.

POINT E: TfL's predictions for commuter use and commuter numbers at Kennington

Station are not based on any evidence, and are widely at variance with observable

data, particularly if TfL's own commuter figures are accepted as accurate. TfL'sassertion that there will be few interchanges at Kennington Station are based on

flawed supposition to support their case, not on any evidential base. In any case,

emergency and evacuation routes are markedly insufficient from the station for this

level of commuter traffic. There are therefore strong concerns over safety at the

station;

E1) TfL has consistently refused to admit that any upgrade work will be necessary at

Kennington Station to cope with its predicted high level of increased commuter

traffic. This is in spite of the fact that, even with current levels of commuter traffic

there is sometimes need to control access to the station to prevent platform

overloading. TfL is now reluctantly admitting to the need for more openings betweenplatforms but the cost of this does not seem to have been added to the costs predicted

for the NLE project as a whole at the end of 2012: this figure, according to TfL,

doggedly remains at a level roughly consistent with the 1 billion loan from central

government. This is not plausible.

E2) DATA remains extremely concerned that there is no adequate safety and security

upgrade works built into the NLE project but understands that TfL are now beginning

to admit that this will be necessary. DATA awaits a funding and financing proposal

for this essential aspect of the NLE project. TfL has indicated that any such works

will be funded separately, but DATA would like to know where this funding and

financing will come from and why it is not included in the NLE project itself. These

costs should be included in any cost-benefit analysis of the NLE.

E3) Other members of the Coalition, in particular, but not necessarily limited to, the

KAPF, will make further representations and arguments on this aspect of the TfL

NLE proposal so DATA will not reiterate them here. DATA fully supports the points

made by other members of the Coalition and the KAPF in this regard.

End Notes

DATA fully supports the other members of the Coalition of Lambeth and WalworthResidents and the Kennington Association Planning Forum in their arguments and

representations against TfL's NLE project.

DATA wishes to make it clear that it is not against development and has as an aim

only to get the best (integrated, affordable and effective) transport solution for the

VNEB OA and surrounding area that will enhance its success and improve the quality

of life for residents.

VNEB DATA Group

20130827 DATA Group StatementOfCase

Documents

Transcript of 20130827 DATA Group StatementOfCase