20130401 NYState 2012 Impact Matching wTables

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    EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

    MICHAEL J. MALBIN

    CHAIRPERSON

    ANTHONY CORRADO

    TRUSTEES

    F. CHRISTOPHER ARTERTON

    BETSEY BAYLESS

    JEFFREY BELL

    RONDA BYBEE

    DAVID COHEN

    VIC FAZIO

    DONALD J. FOLEY

    GEORGE B. GOULD

    KENNETH A. GROSS

    RUTH S. JONES

    RON MICHAELSON

    ROSS CLAYTON MULFORD

    PHIL NOBLE

    JEANNE OLSON

    ACADEMIC ADVISORS

    JAMES E. CAMPBELL

    ANTHONY CORRADO

    DIANA DWYRE

    DONALD GREEN

    JOHN C. GREEN

    KEITH HAMM

    GARY C. JACOBSON

    ROBIN KOLODNY

    RAY LA RAJA

    THOMAS E. MANN

    MARK J. ROZELL

    KAY SCHLOZMAN

    CLYDE WILCOX

    ForReleaseApril1,2013

    Contact:MichaelMalbin(202)969-8890ext.221

    Updated CFI Research on State and Local Elections:

    New 2012 Data Reinforces Previous Findings

    Public Matching Funds in NY State, Reversing the Financial

    Influence of Small & Large Donors, Would Leave the Candidates

    Whole While Costing New Yorkers only $2/year

    New York States candidates for the legislature in 2012 raised 74% of their money from donors

    who gave them $1,000 or more, and from interest groups. Only 8% came from donors who gave

    $250 or less. The balance between the states small versus large donors was almost the same in

    2012 as in 2010 and 2008.

    Until now, big donors have dominated the Empire States politics, said CFIs Executive Director

    Michael J. Malbin, who is also a professor of political science at the University at Albany (SUNY).

    This study shows that making small donors the linchpins of candidate financing would come at

    a very low cost when compared to the benefits.

    Gov. Andrew Cuomo of New York has recommended that the state reduce candidates

    dependence on big donors by adopting a system of small-donor matching funds similar to New

    York Citys. The city provides $6 in matching funds for each of the first $175 that a donor gives

    to a candidate participating in its voluntary system. (Gov. Cuomo also proposed lower

    contribution limits, improved disclosure, and strengthened enforcement.) Assembly Speaker

    Sheldon Silver has reintroduced a bill from previous years that would provide six-for-one

    matching funds for a donors first $250, with lower contribution limits. While the details of this

    proposal may change, and the Senate and Governor may put forward their own proposals, this

    one is a sound basis for analysis.

    CFIs previous studies of New York have shown that matching funds could have a profound

    effect on the states election financing. The first was a broad peer-reviewed policy analysis in

    Election Law Journal(link). The second showed that small donors would likely be responsible for

    a majority of the candidates funds under a small donor matching system [link]. A third [link],

    published jointly with the Brennan Center, showed that New York Citys system brings a far

    more diverse pool of donors into the system than traditional fundraising. A fourth showed that

    the percentage of New York population giving a contribution in any amount is among the

    nations lowest (link). Finally, this study is a revision of one previously published that was based

    only on data from 2010 (link). The results based on 2012 data are virtually unchanged.

    http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-03-08/%E2%80%9CSmall_Donors_Big_Democracy_New_York_City%E2%80%99s_Matching_Funds_as_a_Model_for_the_Nation_and_States%E2%80%9D_published_in_Election_Law_Journal.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-03-08/%E2%80%9CSmall_Donors_Big_Democracy_New_York_City%E2%80%99s_Matching_Funds_as_a_Model_for_the_Nation_and_States%E2%80%9D_published_in_Election_Law_Journal.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-03-08/%E2%80%9CSmall_Donors_Big_Democracy_New_York_City%E2%80%99s_Matching_Funds_as_a_Model_for_the_Nation_and_States%E2%80%9D_published_in_Election_Law_Journal.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-04-17/Public_Matching_Fund_System_Would_Reverse_the_Importance_of_Small_and_Large_Donors_in_New_York_State_Elections.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-04-17/Public_Matching_Fund_System_Would_Reverse_the_Importance_of_Small_and_Large_Donors_in_New_York_State_Elections.aspxhttp://cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-05-14/Study_Public_Financing_Contributes_to_Greater_Diversity_of_Participation_in_NYC_Elections.aspxhttp://cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-05-14/Study_Public_Financing_Contributes_to_Greater_Diversity_of_Participation_in_NYC_Elections.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-12-20/VT_and_RI_Had_the_Highest_Percentages_of_Adults_Contributing_in_2010_and_2006_State_Elections_NY_UT_CA_and_FL_the_Lowest.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-12-03/CFI_Study_on_Public_Financing_in_New_York_State.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-12-03/CFI_Study_on_Public_Financing_in_New_York_State.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-12-03/CFI_Study_on_Public_Financing_in_New_York_State.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-12-20/VT_and_RI_Had_the_Highest_Percentages_of_Adults_Contributing_in_2010_and_2006_State_Elections_NY_UT_CA_and_FL_the_Lowest.aspxhttp://cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-05-14/Study_Public_Financing_Contributes_to_Greater_Diversity_of_Participation_in_NYC_Elections.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-04-17/Public_Matching_Fund_System_Would_Reverse_the_Importance_of_Small_and_Large_Donors_in_New_York_State_Elections.aspxhttp://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/12-03-08/%E2%80%9CSmall_Donors_Big_Democracy_New_York_City%E2%80%99s_Matching_Funds_as_a_Model_for_the_Nation_and_States%E2%80%9D_published_in_Election_Law_Journal.aspx
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    being $200 million per election or $100 million per year. In contrast, the Campaign Finance

    Institutes recently completed analysis suggests the cost would be more like $26-$41 million per

    year. To arrive at these estimates, CFI assumed the matching fund formulae and contributionlimits of the Silver bill and applied them to the actual donors in the elections of 2010 and 2012.

    The CFI analysis assumed that all donors who gave in each election would continue to give the

    same amounts under the new system but only up to the new contribution limit. To average

    the cost between a gubernatorial and midterm election, the analysis includes one election for

    statewide officials (2010) and two elections for the legislature (2010 and 2012). It then assumed

    four different scenarios, represented in the table below. The two variables producing the four

    scenarios have to do with the rules for contested primaries, and the presence or absence of newdonors in the system.

    The Silver bill would allow higher contribution limits and more public funding for a candidate

    who is challenged in a primary election than for one who is not. This results in two pairs of

    scenarios. For one, we assume a status quo in which only the few candidates who were actually

    challenged in 2010 and 2012 would continue to be challenged under the new system. Under

    the other scenarios, we assume a substantial increase in primary challenges. By definition, this

    assumption would mean that the rules were bringing new candidates into the system.Obviously, we have no idea how many these might be. (Many incumbents presumably would

    still be unchallenged.) If we assume arbitrarily and generously that half of the current

    candidates would face a primary challenge under the new rules, we can estimate the cost by

    treating all of the existing general election candidates as if they would be covered the under

    rules for contested primaries. This should produce overly high estimates of the new programs

    cost.

    Second, any estimate will be sensitive to the number of donors assumed. The table includestwo estimates of the number of donors. Under one, we calculate that only the donors who gave

    in 2010 and 2012 will continue to give under the new system. This produces a low estimate for

    the cost of public matching funds. The second assumes the programs incentives successfully

    bring new donors into the system. To put a dollar figure on this, we make the optimistic

    assumption that each candidate doubles the number of his/her donors, with each new donor

    giving $50.

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    Table 1. The Cost of a Public Matching Fund System for New York State Elections

    Includes the Four-Year cost for all Statewide and Legislative Candidates

    Assumption: all candidates ask for and

    receive public funds up to the maximum

    allowed for one contested election, usually

    the general election. In addition, for

    primary elections:

    Same Donors as

    2010-2012, Lower

    Contribution Limit

    Each Candidate Doubles

    the Number of Donors,

    with Each New Donor

    Giving $50

    Assume higher public funding cap only for

    those who actually had two contests

    Total Four-Year Cost 104,269,894 132,446,554

    Average Cost per Year 26,067,474 33,111,639

    Average per year per capita $1.34 $1.70

    Treat every 2010-12 general election

    candidate as if in a contested primary

    Total Four-Year Cost 120,928,616 162,373,570

    Average Cost per Year 30,232,154 40,593,393

    Average per year per capita $1.55 $2.08

    The above table shows the CFI estimate under each of the four scenarios. If no new donors are

    brought into the system, the cost would be $26 million - $30 million per year. This would

    average to $1.34 - $1.55 per person per year. With new donors, the cost would be $33 million

    to $41 million per year. Under these more expensive scenarios, therefore, the average cost for

    each of New Yorks 19.5 million residents would be between $1.70 and $2.08 per year, with the

    higher figure including generously optimistic assumptions for both of the key variables.

    HOW THE CANDIDATES WOULD FARE

    Under the Silver bill, candidates would lose some of their current money because the

    contribution limits would be lower. But they gain money from the new public matching funds.

    Incumbents who are asked to vote for such a program obviously would want to know whether

    combining the two provisions would leave them with less money to compete. As the following

    summary table indicates, almost all Assembly candidates would have ended up with moremoney, not less. So would most Senate candidates, but the number for the Senate would

    depend upon the final bills contribution limits.

    The bill as introduced would impose $2,000 contribution limits on any candidate for any state

    office, but this would be doubled for candidates facing two contested elections (a contested

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    Table 2. Number of 2012 Candidates Who Would Have Had Less Money

    With Public Matching Funds and Lower Contribution Limits Than They Actually Raised

    $2,000 Contribution Limit $4,000 Contribution Limit

    Total #

    CandidatesSame Donors

    More small

    donorsSame Donors

    More small

    donors

    Assembly$150,000 cap 232 4 1 0 0

    $300,000 cap 232 4 0 0 0

    Senate$350,000 cap 101 18 11 2 2

    $700,000 cap 101 16 8 1 1

    As the table shows, the bill provides adequate public funds to assure that almost every

    Assembly candidate receives at least as much by substituting small donor matching funds for

    large contributions. The bill is not as finely tuned for the Senate. By imposing the same

    contribution limits for all offices, the bill would have left more than one-quarter of all Senate

    incumbents (ten Democrats and six Republicans) with less money under the proposed systemthan under the status quo. Most challengers and candidates for open seats would be ahead;

    only two would be behind.

    To address this, the bills sponsors might want to vary the contribution limits across offices. The

    current Silver bill has the same limit for Assembly, Senate and all statewide offices. This need

    not be so. In 2011-12, thirteen states had the same limit for all offices, but nineteen had higher

    limits for statewide officials and six (including New York) had different limits for statewide office

    and each of the two legislative chambers. (Twelve states allowed unlimited contributions.)

    New Yorks Senate districts are approximately twice as large as its Assembly districts. One

    possibility might be to make the contribution limits for the Senate twice that of the Assemblys.

    The Senates current limit is about 2.5 times the Assemblys. A $4,000 limit for the Senate and

    $2,000 for the Assembly would still be about half of the current limit for each chamber. If the

    Senates limit was $4,000 instead of $2,000, almost all Senate candidates would find it

    advantageous to combine the new limits with small donor matching funds.

    Attachments

    Appendix 1: Candidates for NY State Senate in 2012

    Appendix 2: Candidates for NY State Assembly in 2012

    Appendices 1 and 2 show: (a) the amount of Money Each Candidate Raised in 2012; (b) how

    much each candidate would lose as a result of the Silver Bills contribution limits; (c) how

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