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The "Republic'"s Third Wave and the Paradox of Political PhilosophyAuthor(s): Jacob HowlandSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Mar., 1998), pp. 633-657Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130250 .

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THE REPUBLICS THIRD WAVE AND THE PARADOX OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

JACOB HOWLAND

"Unless," I said, "the philosophers rule as kings or those now called

kings and chiefs genuinely and adequately philosophize, and political power and philosophy coincide in the same place, while the many na tures now making their way to either apart from the other are by neces

sity excluded, there is no rest from ills for the cities, my dear Glaucon, nor I think for human kind, nor will the regime we have now described in speech ever come forth from nature, insofar as possible, and see the

light of the sun. This is what for so long was causing my hesitation to

speak, seeing how very paradoxical it would be to say."1

!5o GOES what Socrates DESCRIBES as the "biggest and most difficult" of the three waves of paradox set forth in book 5 of the Republic (472a4). While he does not pause to justify the latter description when

he introduces the third wave, there can be little doubt that this wave is

indeed both very big or important and very difficult. As for its diffi

culty, Socrates mentions no less than four times his hesitancy to state

that philosophers must rule or rulers philosophize (472a, 473e, 499a-b,

503b). Moreover, a more subtle, yet perhaps no less telling indication

of the importance of the third wave is provided by the fact that it breaks at the exact center of the text as measured by Stephanus

pages?a fact that commentators on the Republic seem hardly even to

have noticed.2

Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy and Religion, The Uni

versity of Tulsa, 600 South College Avenue, Tulsa, OK 74104; e-mail: jahow [email protected]

1 Plato, Republic 473cll-e4. Most quotations from the Republic in this

essay are drawn from Allan Bloom's The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic

Books, 1968); otherwise I offer my own translation of the Greek text of John

Burnet, Platonis Opera, vol. 4 (1902; reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 2 Some calculation is involved in determining the length of the Republic, because the numbering of the Stephanus pages is not continuous. Thus, book 1 runs from 327a-354c; book 2, 357a-383c; book 3, 386a-417b; book 4, 419a-445e; book 5, 449a-480a; book 6, 484a-511e; book 7, 514a-541b; book 8, 543a-569c; book 9, 571a-592b; book 10, 595a-621d. If we assign to each of

The Review of Metaphysics 51 (March 1998): 633-657. Copyright ? 1998 by The Review of Metaphysics



634 JACOB HOWLAND

There are several reasons to believe that the centrality of the

third wave may prove to be a philosophically important detail. First,

the general structure of the Republic seems to place special emphasis

on its central books. One scholar, Eva Brann, begins her interpreta

tion of the Republic with the observation that this dialogue "is com

posed on the plan of concentric rings."3 There are furthermore other

dialogues in which Plato has evidently calculated the center of the

text quite precisely, and has done so with the intention of indirectly

underscoring the fundamental importance of a philosophical concep

tion, argument, or issue. The most striking example of Plato's use of

this literary device is to be found in the Statesman, in which the

Eleatic Stranger introduces the notion of measurement in accordance

with the nonarithmetical mean?a notion that is crucial to his account

of statesmanship?at the arithmetically-determined midpoint of the

dialogue.4 So too, Plato seems to call special attention to the signifi

cance of the Eleatic Stranger's philosophical "parricide" of his teacher

Parmenides by placing that dramatic event at the midpoint of the

Sophist.5 While each of the passages cited above requires careful con

the five subdivisions of the Stephanus page that are designated by the letters

a, b, c, d, and e the value of 0.2 pages, book 1 is calculated to be 27.6

Stephanus pages in length; book 2, 26.6; book 3, 31.4; book 4, 27; book 5, 31.2; book 6, 28; book 7, 27.4; book 8, 26.6; book 9, 21.4; book 10, 26.6; and the total

length of the Republic is 273.8 Stephanus pages. By this method of reckoning, the midpoint of the dialogue occurs 136.9 pages from the beginning, or at 473b. The third wave breaks, so to speak, at 473c-e. The centrality of the third wave is almost universally overlooked in the secondary literature on the

Republic. It is noted in passing in Leon Craig, The War Lover: A Study of Plato's Republic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 11.

3 According to Brann, the center of the Republic?books 5 through 7, in

which Plato sets forth "the actual founding of a city in 'deed,' ergon"?coin cides with the dialogue's core accomplishment: the education of Glaucon

through Socrates' philosophical "music." Eva T. H. Brann, "The Music of the

Republic" St. John's Review 39.1 and 2 (1989-90), 1-103: 7-8. My claim that thematic elements in the Republic are arranged in opposition around the third wave (see below) supports Brann's insight that the Republic reflects the

"ring" or "geometric" composition that functions as a structural principle in Homer. Cf. Cedric H. Whitman, Homer and the Heroic Tradition (1958; re

print, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1965). 4 The midpoint of the Statesman is 284b. The Stranger's distinction be

tween arithmetical and nonarithmetical measurement is set forth at 283c 285c. At 284b, the Stranger explains that the arts, including the political art, could not exist in the absence of nonarithmetical measurement.

5 The midpoint of the Sophist is 242b, and the Stranger introduces the is sue of parricide at 24Id.



THE REPUBLIC'S THIRD WAVE 635

sideration in its own right,6 these examples perhaps suffice to show

that the placement of the third wave at the exact center of the Repub lic is unlikely to be incidental to our understanding of its significance

within the dialogue as a whole.

The center of a text is an appropriate place to hide that which is

especially questionable as well as to emphasize that which is espe

cially important; in certain cases where the author does not wish to be

understood by every reader, these intentions may overlap. In writing on Plato, Leo Strauss took pains to identify the central item in a list as

well as the subjects treated at the center of a section or book.7 Some

times, he suggested, the center is to be understood as a place of honor

suited to that which is most important; on other occasions, what is at

the center is questionable in a way that casts doubt upon that which

stands at the periphery.8 Both of these uses, we may note, are con

firmed by ancient authors.9 Both, moreover, coincide in certain texts,

especially where the author has reason to write esoterically. A nota

ble example of this coincidence is to be found in Alfarabi's Summary

of Plato's Laws, where, Strauss observes, at the "very center" of the

Summary and at the beginning of the fifth chapter (which is "literally the central chapter") Alfarabi "does exactly the same thing he did at

the end of the fourth chapter: he drops Plato's repeated and unambig uous reference to the gods."10 For those with eyes to see, Strauss sug

gests, the center of the Summary contains Alfarabi's implicit critique

6 For a discussion of the connection between the central passages of the trilogy Sophist, Statesman, and Theaetetus, see Jacob Howland, The Para dox of Political Philosophy: Socrates' Philosophic Trial (Lanham, Md.: Row

man and Littlefield Publishers, 1998). 7 See for instance Strauss's The Argument and the Action of Plato's Laws (1975; reprint, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 66, 69, 148,164-5, 175, 182.

8 For an example of the latter see Strauss, Argument and Action, 175.

Examples of the former are provided by the other passages cited in the previ ous note; see also Strauss's remark about Adeimantus in "On Plato's Repub lic," in The City and Man (1964; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1978), 64. 9 In his Life of Cicero 2.2-3, Plutarch notes that Cicero's being in the

middle among his friends was a mark of honor. In De Oratore 2.77.313-14, Cicero observes that a good speech begins and ends with its strongest points and hides its weakest points in the middle.

10 While Alfarabi maintains that "what has to be cared for in the first place is the soul," Strauss notes that "Farabi does not reproduce Plato's state ment that one ought to honor one's soul 'next after the gods' (726a6-727a2)."

"How Farabi Read Plato's Laws," in What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies (1959; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 148.



636 JACOB HOWLAND

of the central religious doctrine of God?a critique that this early Is

lamic philosopher certainly had reason to present with the utmost

caution.11

The present essay regards the textual centrality of the third wave

of paradox as an essential clue to the meaning and structure of the Re

public. The centrality of the third wave suggests that the relationship between philosophy and politics constitutes the foremost theme of

the Republic as a whole. The placement of the third wave is further

more a key to the organization of the dialogue. As we shall see, the

paradoxical character of the relationship between philosophy and

politics can be grasped most directly through an examination of cer

tain fundamental oppositions that are systematically arranged around

the third wave as the primary thematic and dramatic focal point of the

Republic. Finally, I shall argue that the Republic is also in some re

spects an esoteric document that appropriately attempts to conceal

certain dimensions of Plato's political teaching from nonphilosophical readers.

Plato scholars have followed two main lines of interpretation in

approaching the third wave. The majority of commentators take the

text more or less at face value. They understand the coincidence of

philosophy and politics as the indispensable requirement for bringing into being the regime that Socrates has been describing since the mid

dle of book 2, and they believe that Plato viewed this regime as a

model of the genuinely virtuous city. Opinions differ within this ma

jority viewpoint as to whether Plato saw this model as a blueprint for

political action or as an ideal that actual cities could at best only

roughly approximate.12 A second, very different line of interpretation was championed thirty years ago by Strauss and his student Allan

Bloom.13 Strauss and Bloom assert that the discussion of the just city

in general, and of the third wave in particular, must be understood

within the context of Socrates' relationship to his interlocutors, espe

cially Glaucon. They argue that Socrates was concerned to cure Glau

con of his political ambition and to turn him toward a life of philoso phy.14 Read in this way, they claim, the city in speech illuminates in

complex and subtle ways both the ineliminable tension between phi

losophy and politics and the necessary limits of the political commu

11 Strauss's interpretation of Alfarabi's Summary should be read in con nection with the general remarks on the extraordinary significance that a "central passage" may assume in esoteric writing offered in "Persecution and the Art of Writing," in Persecution and the Art of Writing (1952; reprint, Chi

cago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 22-37; see especially pp. 24-5.




nity with respect to the cultivation of virtue in human beings. Far

from advancing a Utopian vision, the Republic in fact sets forth a pro

found critique of political idealism.15

In important respects, the interpretation developed below lends

more support to the readings of Strauss and Bloom than to the major

ity view. I maintain that the third wave fails to present even an "ideal,"

impractical political solution, for Socrates raises serious doubts about

the virtue of the great majority of the citizens of the city in speech. In

particular, reflection upon the oppositions arranged around the third

wave brings to light the implication that even in the "just" city, the

Auxiliaries, precisely because they are not genuinely philosophical,

may be bound to the regime by vice more than by virtue. Rightly

12 In A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni

versity Press, 1975), W. K. C. Guthrie canvasses the range of views on the

question of "whether this [Plato's] state, granted its virtues if it existed, could ever become a reality" (483). Karl Popper famously asserted that the Repub lic "was meant by its author not so much as a theoretical treatise, but as a

topical political manifesto"; The Open Society and its Enemies, 2 vols.

(1943, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 1:153. According to Nickolas Pappas, the Republic, a "systematic utopia," presents "uncompro mising recommendations for political change"; Plato and the Republic (New York: Routledge, 1995), 14, 15. In Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), C. D. C. Reeve asserts that Plato attempted to show that the Kallipolis, "the good or maxi

mally happy political community" that is ruled by philosopher-kings, is "a real

possibility," from which it follows that the just city Socrates lays out prior to the third wave is "a real possibility as well" (170-1). Julia Annas argues that Plato wished only to make the case that his "political ideal"?the just city, the

society of good people?is at least "not impossible in principle"; An Intro duction to Plato's Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 185; em

phasis in original. 13 Strauss, "On Plato's Republic"; Allan Bloom, "Interpretive Essay," in

Bloom, Republic of Plato, 307-436. Dale Hall defends the majority view

against the readings of Strauss and Bloom in "The Republic and the Limits of

Politics," Political Theory 5.3 (1977): 293-313. The main lines of Bloom's

reading of the Republic axe summarized, and in certain respects extended, in

"Aristophanes and Socrates: A Response to Hall," now reprinted in Bloom, Giants and Dwarfs: Essays 1960-1990 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 162-76.

14 Strauss, "On Plato's Republic" 65; Bloom, "Response to Hall," 167-8.

Bloom asserts that by the end of the Republic "Glaucon has moved from the desire to be a ruler to the desire to be a ruler-philosopher to the desire to be a

philosopher. The conceit of philosopher-kings was the crucial stage in his

conversion"; "Response to Hall," 168. 15 "Socrates constructs his utopia to point up the dangers of what we

would call utopianism; as such it is the greatest critique of political idealism ever written"; Bloom, "Interpretive Essay," 410.



638 JACOB HOWLAND

understood, the core of the Republic suggests that a virtuous commu

nity of nonphilosophical individuals is an impossibility. This is a sug gestion that a politically responsible author would have good reason

to conceal from many readers. The third wave thus calls attention to

the relationship between philosophy and politics as the fundamental

and enduring problem for all who care Socratically for the souls of hu

man beings. Strauss and Bloom are also right to insist that the third wave

must be understood within the context of Socrates' relationship to his

young interlocutors; the Republic is, among other things, a pedagogi cal drama. Yet there is an important sense in which my reading tries

to find the neglected middle ground between the two main lines of in

terpretation set forth above. For the arrangements pertaining to non

philosophical souls in the city in speech must be distinguished from those pertaining to potential philosophers. Moreover, I shall argue

that the city in speech, at least in the final form that it achieves by the end of book 7, would be superior to any actual regime with respect to

the care and development of the souls of potential philosophers. To

this extent, Socrates' proposals are a serious?albeit admittedly unre

alistic?reflection of his wishes. The proposed education of the phi

losophers in the city in speech is one of the more poignant facets of

the problem of the relationship between philosophy and politics.

I

Just prior to introducing the third wave, Socrates states that

deeds fall short of, and can at best only approximate, the truth con

tained in speeches (473a-b). The paradox of the third wave, however,

does not first arise in the course of attempting to actualize the city in

speech; it is rather one that subsists on the level of speech or concep

tualization itself. Socrates thus stresses that it is very paradoxical

simply to say that philosophy and political power must coincide

(473e4). What could this mean? A preliminary answer to this ques

tion is furnished by the observation that Socrates misleadingly pre sents the rule of philosophers as simply an indispensable condition

for the genesis of the regime that he and his companions have already

described. This is misleading because the rule of philosophy will ulti

mately not be something external to the nature of the regime: the city

itself will inevitably be transformed by the requirement that its rulers




be philosophers. Most obviously, the regime must now be structured

so as to guarantee, insofar as this is possible, a reliable supply of

philosophic rulers (see 520a). Perhaps the first paradox associated with the third wave is that the essential condition for the possibility of the city in speech entails a transformation of the very nature of the

city itself.

This thought may be fruitfully extended, for it seems inevitable that philosophy will also be transformed when it comes to be yoked

with political power. If this is correct, our path into the paradox at the

heart of the Republic is well-marked: we must ask both what politics and philosophy are in themselves and what they come to be when

brought into connection with each other in the way that Socrates de

scribes. I speak of politics rather than the city in speech because So crates presents the third wave as the condition for the cure of political ills in general as well as the condition for the realization of the city in

speech in particular. This formulation, however, presents an obvious

problem: the Republic addresses neither politics as such nor philoso

phy as such, for the treatment of each is from the first conditioned by the requirements of the other. Just as the philosopher is introduced in

the guise of a ruler and in response to the needs of the city, the just

city is introduced in response to the philosophical question of the

power of justice in the soul (368b-369a). The conversation that un

folds in the Republic precisely reverses the order of nature: the city comes into being for the sake of speech, while the philosopher comes

into being for the sake of the deed of ruling. A few words must be said about the interpretative challenge pre

sented by this situation. Note first that interpretation is unavoidable.

In the city in speech the political things assume an exaggerated purity or perfection (see 473a-b), and in Socrates' depiction of the lover of

wisdom in books 6 and 7 we see the philosopher through the filter of the city's deepest longing. Fortunately there are two sorts of clues

that will assist us in correcting or compensating for the resulting dis

tortions of philosophy and politics. Some clues are internal to the ar

gument. These include Socrates' frequent references to compulsion,

politically necessary lies, and the like. Others are provided by the con trast between the level of drama and the level of argument. These two sorts of clues will help us to see politics and philosophy as they are. In

particular, they will help to show that Socrates' claims about the jus tice of the city are no less exaggerated than his claims about the excel



640 JACOB HOWLAND

lence of the philosophers as rulers?a political excellence that is pre

sented as a function of theoretical wisdom.

The Republic in fact puts before us three distinct versions of the

just regime. In introducing the third wave, Socrates mentions the re

gime "that we have now described in speech" (473e2). Socrates is

clearly referring neither to the first just city (or City of Pigs) nor to the Feverish City (372e-374a), but rather to the regime that results from the purification of the latter. This regime?let us call it the Second

Just City?includes the first two waves of book 5, which do not intro

duce new measures but merely amplify ones that were accepted much

earlier in the discussion (423e-424a). Because the Second Just City is

the city prior to the rule of philosopher-kings, it is in the description of this city that we will find the abstract or purified reflection of poli tics in itself or apart from philosophy. The third wave, moreover, sig

nals the introduction of philosophy as an explicit subject of discus

sion, so that it is in the stretch of text between the third wave and the end of book 7 that we will find the politicized reflection of philosophy in itself. Further, it is in this same central stretch of text that Socrates

confronts the problem of making philosophers into kings, or of con

vincing the city to accept the rule of the philosopher and convincing

the philosopher to rule the city. The third just city that results from

the paradoxical marriage of philosophy and politics is the Kallipolis, the "Noble and Beautiful City" that Socrates explicitly associates with

Glaucon.16

The third wave is the logical and rhetorical fulcrum of the Repub lic as a whole. As we shall see, Socrates' proposition that philoso

phers must rule or rulers philosophize entails the reconciliation of a

range of humanly fundamental oppositions, including those between

spiritedness and erotic love, public welfare and private affection,

technical knowledge and nontechnical inspiration, the political pro

duction of civic order and the philosophical discovery of truth. These

opposed elements are arranged as counterweights around the third

wave, upon which balances the whole burden of the argument. The

common thread running through all of these oppositions is the matter

of er?s, which is treated in radically different ways before and after

the third wave. The difficulties involved in attempting a reconcilia

tion of these oppositions are furthermore of interest not only with re

16 At 527cl-2, Socrates speaks of "the men in your [Glaucon's] kallipo lis."




spect to the city in speech, but, more importantly, with respect to Ufe

in actual human communities. For the fact is that, strange bedfellows

as they are, philosophy and the city nonetheless stand in need of one

another. The fundamental challenges and tasks of political philoso

phy are thus writ large in the Republic.

II

Socrates' hesitancy in introducing the third wave may initially surprise the reader. For his insistence that the city's rulers be philoso

phers looks at first merely like the restatement of a point that he has

already introduced and will develop further in the sequel, namely, that

the city must be governed by knowledgeable individuals whose under

standing of the regime will be no less adequate than that of its

founders (428e-429a, 497c-d). Viewed in this light, what is new in this restatement is simply the use of the word "philosopher" to designate

the possessor of the requisite political knowledge. Socrates' hesitancy

would then seem to be rooted solely in an apprehension that his com

panions will misunderstand him: his response to Glaucon's immediate

prediction that "very many men, and not ordinary ones" will attack

him is that they will have to make plain "whom we mean when we

dare to assert that the philosophers must rule" (473e7-474al, 474b5

6). Subsequent developments confirm the prudence of this course of

action, for Socrates must later argue against Adeimantus's association

of philosophy with individuals who are either vicious or, at best, use

less (see 487b-d and 498c-499b). The problem presented by Adeimantus's accusation is not insig

nificant. Nor is the fact that this accusation comes from the mouth of

Adeimantus, as this tells us something about the difference between

him and his more erotic and potentially philosophical brother. The

preceding interpretation nevertheless does not do justice to the radi

cal novelty of Socrates' suggestion. For Socrates introduces the third

wave without having clarified either the goal of philosophic striving or

the internal motivation of the philosopher. Not knowing yet what phi losophy is, we are nonetheless told that philosophers should rule.

Two questions will help to bring home the absence of philosophy from Socrates' prior account of the just regime. First, do the Guard ians in the Second Just City possess a genuinely philosophical charac ter? Second, how does the political knowledge possessed by these



642 JACOB HOWLAND

Guardians compare with the wisdom at which philosophy aims? With

regard to the first question, Socrates insists early on that those who

are going to combine gentleness with spiritedness after the model of

good guard dogs must be philosophical by nature (376a-c). In this

context philosophy is associated with gentleness and distinguished from spiritedness or thumos. The same distinction is at work when

Socrates later speaks of two coordinated elements within the souls of

potential Guardians, one spirited and one philosophical, which must

be "harmonized" by music and gymnastics (410c-412b). In describing

the distinctive qualifications of those fit to be rulers, however, So

crates says nothing about philosophy. He states instead that the

Guardians will be distinguished from the Auxiliaries by being older

and more skillful in guarding, and by their unusual steadfastness in

preserving the conviction (dogma) that one must do what is best for

the city (412c-e; see also 413c, 414b). This dogged steadfastness in

retaining the impress of civic orthodoxy is nothing other than the vir

tue of political courage, which Socrates identifies in book 4 as the

power always to hold fast to orth? doxa, or "right opinion," much as

good, white wool that has been well dyed keeps its color under even

the most adverse conditions (429d-430c). Courage, however, is the

virtue proper to thumos, not to intellect (see 375a-b). Moreover,

while one is courageous in the defense of that which one loves, So

crates makes it clear that the Guardians' care for the regime is to be

rooted not in philosophia or the love of wisdom but in their love of, or

philia for, the city (412c-d). In book 4, Socrates discovers wisdom in the "good counsel" and

"craft of guarding [h?phulakik?]" of the Guardians, which involves

knowledge of how the city as a whole is to be cared for (428b-d). In

what does this knowledge consist? We may approach this question by

way of the tasks that the Guardians are to undertake in the Second

Just City. These include the conduct of war, regulating the population

and the economy, sorting children into the appropriate classes, and

overseeing the breeding and education of citizens (415b, 421e-422a,

423b-d, 459c-461e). The latter tasks in particular will require the em

ployment of medicinal lies, which in the best case will deceive even

the rulers themselves (414b-c, 459c-d).17 These dimensions of the art

of ruling, however, amount neither individually nor collectively to

wisdom or sophia. To be willing to lie in the belief that it is best to do so is of course not the same thing as to know the truth about what is

best. We may note in this connection that when Socrates tracks down




the virtue of sophia in book 4, he rather pointedly confesses his igno rance about how it is that he was able to do so (429a). Nor is much

light shed on the nature of wisdom when Socrates turns from the vir

tues of the city to the parallel virtues of the soul. The virtue of the rul

ing part of the soul is said to be logismos or calculation (439d), but there is in this context only the faintest anticipation of that in the light of which correct calculation is possible, namely, one's perception of

goodness (438a). The Good, we learn in book 6, is the ultimate object of the soul's deepest desire as well as of philosophical aspiration

(505d-511e). Apart from an inquiry into the Good such as that under taken later in the dialogue, Socrates' identification of calculation with

wisdom is woefully incomplete.

To summarize, the Second Just City is distinguished by the rule of

courage and moderation, or of well-tempered thumos, rather than wis

dom. In this it resembles both the character of its founders and that of

the most well-ordered actual regimes. We recall that Socrates is

moved to establish a city in speech by the provisional praise of tyr

anny set forth by Glaucon, who is "always most courageous in every

thing" (357a2-3), and especially by the moral indignation of Adeiman

tus at the ubiquitous spectacle of human injustice (358b-367e). The

vehemence of Adeimantus's attack on those who "vulgarly" turn the

powers of justice and injustice "upside down" (367a7-8) and the indul

gence with which he excuses Glaucon's praise of injustice suggests that he thinks of himself as one of those exceptional individuals "who

from a divine nature cannot stand doing injustice" (366c7), and so as

someone who would be "so adamant [adamantinos] as to stick by jus tice" even if he possessed Gyges' ring (360b5). The same pun appears at the end of the Republic, when Socrates states that one must "cling

adamantly" to the opinion that the choice between justice and injus tice is the most important one "in life and death" (618e3-619al). That

the city in speech has its roots in offended thumos is underscored also

by Socrates' reference in this context to the courage that Glaucon and

Adeimantus displayed at the battle in Megara (368a). Socrates' intro duction of the city in speech is furthermore itself an act of courage: al

though he believes that he is incapable of presenting an adequate

17 Note that the models of the gods according to which the rulers are to be educated cannot themselves be distinguished from noble lies, because, as Socrates admits, "we do not know where the truth about ancient things lies" (382dl-2; see also 378a).



644 JACOB HOWLAND

defense of justice, he nonetheless maintains that "when justice is be

ing spoken badly of" it would be impious to "give up and not bring help while I am still breathing and able to utter a sound" (368b8-c2).18

There is another feature of the Second Just City that must be ob

served, and that is its technical approach to civic education. This is

something that the city in speech has in common with all actual cities.

Like every existing political community, the Second Just City wants

its citizens cut to measure: it seeks to fashion human beings who will

understand themselves not in terms of their particular individuality

but in terms of the homogeneity of citizenship. The city therefore en

visions civic education or paideia on the model of the productive

arts.19 According to Socrates, citizens are to be formed by a process

that involves taming human beings like animals, stamping and mold

ing them like putty, tuning them like musical instruments, and dying them like wool with salutary beliefs (375b-e, 377a-b, 410d-e, 429c

430b). Although the Second Just City carries its control over the edu cation and comportment of citizens to an extreme that has never been

seen in actual political communities, it is perhaps not coincidental

that the actual regime most like it in these respects was that of Sparta,

which was also distinguished by the rule of thumos moderated by shame.20

The artful molding of citizens in the Second Just City and the measures pertaining to women and children that are introduced in

book 5 have a common aim, namely, the achievement of civic order.

18 Strauss observes that "anger is no mean part of the city [in speech]"; "as far as possible, patriotism, dedication to the common good, justice, must take the place of er?s, and patriotism has a closer kinship to spiritedness, ea

gerness to fight, 'waspishness,' indignation, and anger than to er?s"; "On Plato's Republic," 78, 111. As Strauss notes in the same essay, the City of

Pigs "complies to some extent with Adeimantas' character. . . . [b]ut it is

wholly unacceptable to his brother"; 95. Cf. Stanley Rosen's careful distinc tion between Glaucon's spirited and erotic nature and Adeimantus's more

austere nature in "The Role of Eros in Plato's Republic," Review of Meta

physics 18 (1965): 452-75; see esp. 463-6. 19 Cf. the Eleatic Stranger's employment of the art of weaving as a model

for the political techn? (Statesman 279a-283a, 305e-311c). One should also consider in this connection the Euthyphro, in which Socrates compares the

Athenian model of paideia to the cultivation of plants. I explore this impor tant analogy in ch. 4 of The Paradox of Political Philosophy.

20 An excellent overview of the Spartan regime is provided by Paul A.

Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,

1992), 136-62.




We recall that in the first city in speech, civic order was a consequence

of the innate moderation of the citizens?individuals who seem inhu

man in that they lack thumos and are moved by er?s only on the most

rudimentary level of sexual appetite. Thus they neither eat meat nor

hunt animals (see 372a-c with 373c), they have no political offices and no army, there are no competitions among them, and they are free in

every respect from pleonexia, the desire always "to have more" (ple

onektein) of which Thrasymachus speaks (344al). It is Glaucon's re

jection of this "City of Pigs" that introduces the recognizably human

community of the Feverish City and so ultimately necessitates the al

teration of human nature for the sake of civic order. The Second Just

City represents an extreme attempt on the part of a Feverish City to

return to the humanly impossible order of the City of Pigs by means of the moderation of spiritedness and the suppression of potentially un

just desires in the souls of its citizens. Moreover, because every actual

city engages to some lesser degree in precisely this attempt, the failure

of the Second Just City to fashion truly virtuous citizens exposes the

necessary limits of nonphilosophical politics.

While Socrates never explicitly admits that the Second Just City fails in this respect, he provides us with enough evidence to rule out

any other inference. According to Socrates, the rulers must guard above all one "great" or at least "sufficient" thing (423el-2)?namely, the education and rearing of the Auxiliaries and potential Guardians.

Yet in a slightly earlier passage he admits that one cannot confidently affirm (diischurizesthai) the adequacy of this civic education with re

spect to the prevention of iryustice (416b8-9). It is not hard to see

why he does so. In the first place, Socrates finds it necessary to sup

plement the education with a great lie that will help to make the citi zens "care more for the city and for one another" (415d3-4). Even

with the addition of the Noble Lie, however, Socrates worries that the Auxiliaries may come to treat their fellow citizens like savage masters,

much as sheep-dogs may turn upon the flock "due to licentiousness,

hunger, or some other bad habit" (416a4-5). He therefore finds it nec

essary to remove the temptations that might "rouse them up to do

harm to the other citizens" (416dl). In particular, the Auxiliaries will not be allowed to possess private houses and storerooms or private

property beyond what is strictly necessary, and they will be told that it is not lawful or holy for them to pollute the gold and silver in their souls by coming into contact with material gold or silver (416d-417a).



646 JACOB HOWLAND

The latter measures leave no place to hide private gains. In guar

anteeing that the Auxiliaries are always in the public eye, these mea

sures combine shame before one's peers with fear and reverence be

fore the gods in order to insure that the desire for riches does not take

root in the soul. Notice that this assumes that the threat of unjust ag

gression can be neutralized by preventing the growth of the longing

for wealth and luxury, or at least by providing for its immediate dis

covery and punishment. But what about the other desires that may

lead to injustice, especially those more closely connected with the

spiritedness and erotic longing of youthful warriors?qualities that

are concretely exemplified by Glaucon (see 402e, 474d-475a)? It is

striking that Socrates is silent about these matters. For it is the ambi

tion to rule and the love of honor and victory that are most closely as

sociated with injustice in Glaucon's Myth of Gyges' Ring (see 360a-c

with 362b), while er?s is connected with psychic disease and tyranny from the moment Cephaius endorses Sophocles' description of erotic

desire as a "frenzied and savage master" (329c3-4). In book 3, So

crates equates erotic passion with such "misfortunes" as disease and

drunkenness; the "mad" pleasures of sex must therefore be restricted

on account of their connection with hybris and licentiousness (395e,

396d, 402d-403c). And in book 9, er?s is revealed as nothing less than

the inner tyrant that explains the phenomenon of the tyrannical man

(573b6-7, 574e2-575a7, 575c4-dl).

By failing to mention the potential for injustice that arises from

er?s and from the longing for power, victory, and honor, Socrates

seems to suggest that the civic education as supplemented by the No

ble Lie has succeeded in moderating these desires. That any such sug

gestion would be misleading is clear from the beginning of book 8, in

which Socrates explains that the decline of the city in speech results

from the ultimate failure of the regime to control sexual er?s, or in

Glaucon's words to subordinate erotic necessity to geometrical neces

sity (458d). This is not all. For the shocking truth is that the Second

Just City attempts to control the desires in question not so much by

moderating them as by pandering to them.

It is crucial to realize in this connection that in book 5?a book in

which Socrates speaks almost exclusively with Glaucon?Socrates

deliberately provides for the vicarious satisfaction of his companions'

desires for bodily pleasure, power, and honor. At the outset of book

5, Socrates is detained by men eager to hear about matters pertaining

to sex (449a-450a). This is not the first time in the dialogue that he




has been "arrested" (see 327c-328b), and since he capitulated on the

previous occasion his companions are no doubt confident that they will now also prevail. Under the circumstances, Socrates' resistance

to discuss matters pertaining to women and children seems coy?as

though he wished to tease his young companions rather than to dis

suade them. He then proceeds to inflame the imagination of his audi

tors by means of the increasing titillations of the first and second waves of paradox?measures stating that the male and female guard

ians must share all pursuits in common and establishing the common

possession of women and children (457b-d). Thus the pleasurable

prospect of joining women in naked exercise (452a-b) gives way even

tually to the fantasy of intercourse "as often as possible" with multiple

partners that is given as a reward to the best men of the city, and espe

cially to those among the Auxiliaries who are good in war (459d

460b). So enthusiastic is Glaucon about these measures that he lays down the additional law that no one, whether male or female, should

be allowed to refuse the kiss of the valorous soldier (468b-c). Keep

ing in mind Socrates' earlier reference to the fact that both Glaucon

and Adeimantus were eulogized by Glaucon's lover for their bravery in

the battle of Megara (368a), we may conclude that these young men,

and probably the others who are present as well, must imagine that

they themselves would receive all of the rewards of valor in this city?

including not only sex, but also choice cuts of meat, distinguished fu

nerals, and even worship as a daim?n or lesser divinity after death

(468c-469b).21 This list of rewards is, moreover, disturbingly familiar: in their enjoyment of food fit for heroes and honors and erotic liber

ties suited more to the traditional Greek gods than to human beings, the best men of the Second Just City possess many of the main advan

tages that Glaucon had earlier associated with the tyrannical license

conferred by Gyges' ring (360a-c). The connection with erotic license

is further strengthened by the observation that even the tyrannical dream of incestuous intercourse finds fulfillment in this city (461e; see also 571c-d). Finally, we may note that the suspension of laws against assault in the Second Just City goes a long way toward the fulfillment of still another tyrannical desire, in that it removes the greatest con ventional impediment to the immediate satisfaction of violent aggres sion (464e).

21 The reward of various honors in life and death was previously re served for the Guardians alone (414a).



648 JACOB HOWLAND

The preceding observations are sufficient to raise grave doubts

about the internal order of the souls of the Auxiliaries in the Second Just City. Put bluntly, it is unclear whether the attachment of these in dividuals to the city would be rooted in their courage and moderation

or in the selfishness of untutored desires. This problem cannot be dis

solved by the observation that the Auxiliaries, unlike the tyrant of

book 9, act for the common good, for what is in question here is the

intrinsic condition of their souls. Moreover, Socrates ultimately sug

gests that civic education without philosophy is capable of producing

only the superficial image of virtue in the soul, not the genuine arti

cle.22 Shortly after he calls into question the quality of the education

adumbrated in books 2 and 3, Socrates makes a distinction between

the political courage that such an education produces and the sort of

courage that would come to light by way of a "still finer" treatment

(430c4). The latter treatment would presumably involve the longer road that involves inquiry into the Good (435d, 504b). In book 6, at

any rate, Socrates explains that the philosophic ruler is a craftsman

not of virtue per se but of "the whole of demotic virtue" (500d7-8)? the common virtue characteristic of the people or demos. He goes on

to describe the process of crafting demotic virtue as one of drawing or

painting certain virtuous practices upon the dispositions of human be

ings, an image that suggests the results of this educational process

are, so to speak, no more than skin-deep (501a-c). This implication is

confirmed much later in the Republic by Er's cautionary tale about

the first participant in the lottery of lives, a soul that jumps at the

chance to possess the greatest tyranny. At the critical moment the

soul in question is swayed by unchecked folly and gluttony, even

though it had previously lived in an "orderly regime" and had partici

pated in virtue "by habit, [and] without philosophy" (619c6-dl). Yet it is true of every citizen in the Second Just City, and of all but the rulers of the Kallipolis, that if they participate in virtue they do so by habit, and without philosophy. Virtue apart from philosophy, however,

would seem to be a weak and paltry thing.

Before we leave behind the Second Just City, let us briefly con

sider the matter of Socrates' pedagogical rhetoric. Especially given

22 Put in the terms introduced by David Sachs in "A Fallacy in Plato's Re

public" (in Gregory Vlastos, ed., Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays, vol. 2, 1971 [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978], 35-56), the Auxil iaries are vulgarly just but Platonically ur\just. Cf. Strauss, "On Plato's Re

public": "while in one respect the warrior's life is the just life par excellence, in another respect only the philosopher's life is just" (115).




the limitations of the Second Just City, why does Socrates describe the life of the Auxiliaries in book 5 in such conventionally seductive terms?terms intended to arouse the erotic imagination of Glaucon

and his young companions? In addressing this question it is important to bear in mind that book 5 unfolds in a concrete context that makes

its own peculiar pedagogical demands upon Socrates. This point comes sharply into focus when we consider Socrates' suggestion at

the end of book 7 that the Kallipolis could be established by beginning with children under the age of ten (540e-541a). Needless to say, one

would not speak to these children as Socrates has just spoken to Glau

con; one would not attempt to win their allegiance to the regime by

emphasizing sexual rewards for bravery and the like. Conversely, So

crates speaks as he does in book 5 because he wants to win Glaucon's

allegiance, not to the Second Just City as such, but to the logos as a

whole. In particular, he wishes to guarantee that Glaucon will listen

with the keenest possible interest to what comes next. For what

comes next is a radical reorientation toward the subject of er?s?a re

orientation that creates space for the expansion of Glaucon's awaken

ing desire into a genuinely philosophical passion.

Ill

When Socrates introduces the third wave, he states that the coin

cidence of philosophy and political rule is necessary to bring into be

ing the just city that he and his companions have already described.

He thus implies that the city in speech has been perfected and now

lacks only actual existence (see 472d-e). As we have seen, the Second

Just City is less than perfect to the extent that the souls of most of its citizens (with the exception of the Guardians) are likely to remain in

ternally disordered, in spite of the civic education and the other mea

sures to which they have been subjected. In other words, the Second

Just City is not genuinely just; the genuinely just city does not yet exist even on the level of speech. The rule of philosophy, as we shall see, is

necessary not simply or even primarily for the existence of the virtu

ous regime in deed, but more importantly for the regime's (limited) achievement of virtue in speech.

The connection between philosophy and the perfection of the city in speech is not obvious from Socrates' defense of the third wave, be

cause that defense takes for granted the goodness of the regime and

focuses instead on the problem of its possibility (see 471c-e).



650 JACOB HOWLAND

Socrates points out that the regime will need rulers who possess the

same understanding as that of its founders?the primary founder, of

course, being Socrates himself?which is to say that the rulers will

have to possess philosophical insight into the superiority of this city over all others (497c-d). His main argument, however, is that only

philosophers possess knowledge of what virtue is in itself; they alone

will therefore be competent craftsmen of laws and practices pertain

ing to what is noble, just, moderate, and good (484b-d, 500b-501c).

Such knowledge, however, implies an intellectual apprehension of the

nature of the Good itself (504a-e, 540a-b), and so is equivalent to wis

dom. Perhaps it is his eagerness to provide the city with the best pos

sible rulers that causes Socrates thus to blur the distinction between

philosophia and sophia: no one who is wise, as he points out in the

Symposium, either "longs for wisdom [philosophei] or desires to be

come wise, for he is wise" (204al-2). No less noteworthy is Socrates'

apparent assumption that the regime has indeed been wisely founded

up to this point. For although he takes pains in book 7 to describe the education of the philosopher-kings, he does not modify or extend the

rearing and education of the nonphilosophical majority. The mode of

education established prior to the third wave must evidently suffice for the latter.

Especially when viewed in the light of Socrates' description of the painting of souls undertaken by the philosophic craftsman of de

motic virtue, the preceding considerations leads us to conclude that

the great majority of citizens in the Kallipolis will be no better or

worse than the citizens of the Second Just City. Socrates also makes

it clear, however, that the philosophic rulers of the Kallipolis will be

superior to everyone in the Second Just City because they alone will

be fully virtuous. Only the philosopher, he says, "knows and lives

truly," for he alone has a "clear pattern" of the virtues "in his soul" and

thus "becomes orderly and divine, to the extent that is possible for a

human being" (484c7-8, 490b6, 500c9-dl). The Kallipolis perfects the

Second Just City because only the Kallipolis aims explicitly at making possible the achievement of the fullest excellence of which the very best human beings are capable. Paradoxically, it is only in thinking

about how the best conceivable city can be realized in deed that So

crates and his companions succeed in bringing this city to perfection

in speech.23

Socrates' introduction of the topic of philosophy in fact involves a number of paradoxes, all of which turn, in one way or another, on

the matter of er?s. For the third wave signals a tidal shift, so to




speak, in his treatment of this subject. Let us begin with the observa

tion that the phenomenon of erotic love has no place whatsoever in

Socrates' discussion of the lives of the nonphilosophical many. In

fact, the laws established in book 5 attempt to sever the distinctively human connection between sexual desire and to kalon or the beauti

ful, which is to say that they effectively reduce er?s to an animal appe

tite that exhausts itself in the achievement of its immediate object. This reduction is necessary because sex in the city in speech is subor

dinated to a program of politically useful eugenics?a program that

represents a logical, albeit extreme, extension of the city's attempt to

fashion citizens after the model of the productive technai. Erotic at

traction to the beautiful is after all irrelevant to the biological event of

insemination, and tends in any event to lead to the disease of "irregu lar intercourse" (see 458d9 with the reference to drugs at 459c). One could say that the ladder of er?s that Diotima describes in the Sympo sium (210a-212b) is cut off at the first rung in the Republic. The love of other bodies is deprived of the usual human opportunities to grow into the love of another soul, for in the city in speech the fulfillment of

physical desire leads neither to marriage nor to the intimacy of the

family. Instead, the citizens are to be bred like farm animals and

reared in "pens" into which mothers will be brought for milking (459a b, 460c-d). Further, just as one might drown the runt of a litter, mal

formed or illegitimate babies, including those born of parents beyond the prime age of mating, will be destroyed (460c, 461b-c).24

So much for love apart from philosophy. Immediately after the

third wave is introduced, however, the theme of er?s explodes unex

pectedly into the dialogue: Socrates begins to clarify the nature of the

philosopher by appealing to the way in which boys who glow with the

23 This may be a consequence of the fact that Socrates' companions in the Republic axe not yet philosophers; in such a conversation, Socrates per haps could not perfect his city in speech by any other method.

24 Socrates, incidentally, is obviously well aware that such measures bru

talize er?s, since he introduces to kalon as the object of erotic love just after the third wave breaks (476b). We must conclude that he knows just how out

rageous are his constant references to the highly sacred character of the

ephemeral "marriages" in the city in speech (458e, 459e-460a, 461a)?mar riages that will inevitably violate even the divine prohibition against incest

(461e). This is presumably why he takes the precaution at the beginning of book 5 of prostrating himself before Adrasteia, a goddess who punishes acts of hybris against the gods and sacred laws, and why he later explains that he "shrank from touching the law concerning the possession and rearing of chil dren" (451a, 453dl-3). For further discussion see Jacob Howland, The Re

public: The Odyssey of Philosophy (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993), 110-18.



652 JACOB HOWLAND

bloom of youth are able to arouse and "put their sting in" erotic lovers

like Glaucon (474d5). What is more, the borrowed language of bodily attraction pervades Socrates' entire discussion of the philosophic na

ture. Thus the main distinction between philosophers and nonphilos

ophers is at the outset presented as an erotic one: while others love

wine, food, honors, beautiful sights, and arts and practices of all sorts,

the philosopher alone is a lover of the whole of wisdom and truth, for

which he cares, Socrates says, as a lover might care for everything re

lated to his boy (475a-476b, 485a-b). So strong is his er?s for wisdom

that moral virtue accompanies it as a kind of by-product: a soul en

gaged in "the contemplation of all time and all being" (486a8-9) would

not be immoderate, illiberal, cowardly, or unjust. While these vices

are connected with bodily er?s, Socrates explains that the genuine

philosopher?the soul that possess "a true erotic passion for true phi

losophy" (499c 1-2)?longs for intercourse with the Ideas, and for the

psychic labor and birth of wisdom that follows from this union (490a

b). He even goes so far as to represent philosophy as a woman who

will bear bastard children, or sophisms, when she joins with any but

the most worthy natures (495b-c, 496a; see also 535c, 536a). This

warning, we may note, is the philosophical or spiritual counterpart to

the prohibition against irregular bodily intercourse in the city.

What exactly is going on here? To begin with, it would appear that the topic of erotic love can be safely explored only in the context

of the soul's relationship to the true and the beautiful. But if it is safe

to discuss er?s in connection with philosophy, it is also necessary

that one do so. For philosophy cannot be pressed upon the soul. "No

forced study," as Socrates says in book 7, "abides in a soul" (536e3-4),

and the alternative to extrinsic pedagogical compulsion?the alterna

tive, in other words, to the process of stamping, molding, and dyeing

that constitutes the bulk of the civic education laid out in books 2

through 5?is the internal motivation of er?s. Socrates touches upon

the nature of this motivation in connection with the discussion of mu

sic in book 3, which is also the only place prior to the third wave

where er?s is treated as something other than merely a discrete phys

ical appetite. In that context, Socrates makes it clear that the proper

object of love is beauty: thus that which is kalliston, most beautiful or

fine, is also the most lovable (erasmi?taton: 402d6). Music, in turn, is

presented as a guide for er?s: by surrounding young souls with im

ages of beauty, music trains them "to love in a moderate and musical

way what is orderly and kalon" (403a7-8).25 Once it is awakened,




however, this love itself guides the soul. Socrates thus mentions the

fact that Glaucon once loved a boy with a good character but a defec

tive body in order gently to suggest to him that a musical soul will nat

urally move beyond the mad love of bodies to the orderly love of noble

and beautiful souls (402e-403c). So important is er?s for the develop ment of genuine virtue that it is literally the last word on the subject of

music: for it is fitting, Socrates says, that musical matters end in

"erotic matters pertaining to the beautiful [ta tou kalon er?tika]"

(403c6-7). Someone reading only the discussion of music in book 3 might in

correctly conclude that well-directed er?s is the foundation of virtue

in the Second Just City. Socrates suggests, however, that the educa

tion in music will be fully successful in only a very few cases, because

anyone whose soul is truly musical will become a Guardian. Con

versely, anyone who fails the tests by which the Guardians are se

lected?anyone who forgets to do what is best for the city, or can be

persuaded to do otherwise, or can be forced by grief or pain or

charmed by pleasure or terrified by fear to do otherwise?proves

thereby not to be "a good guardian of himself and the music he was

learning" (413e3). The great majority, in other words, need to be

guarded by others, who will control them with precisely these instru

ments of external compulsion?pleasure, pain, fear, and persuasive

deceptions. If Socrates cuts off Diotima's ladder of er?s in the first

parts of book 5 after letting us glimpse it in book 3, it is only because he understands that it cannot support the weight of the many.

For the many nonphilosophical citizens who are the focus of

books 2 through 5, education is a highly public, technical process founded not in er?s but in thumos. However, the situation after the

third wave is quite different. For the few philosophical rulers who are

the focus of books 6 and 7, education is a much more profound, inte

rior, and therefore private process that is essentially erotic and, with

respect to its ultimate goal, prophetic. In book 7, Socrates establishes

tests of character and intellect that recapitulate on a higher level the tests of courage and moderation set forth in book 3. Teachers, he ex

plains, should use play and not force in training and observing

25 Socrates states that the musical man will feel just this sort of moder ate and musical love for those who are beautiful in soul as well as body, and it is noteworthy that Glaucon identifies himself as one who is capable of lov ing a boy who is physically defective but beautiful in soul (402d-e).



654 JACOB HOWLAND

children in "labors, studies, and fears" (537a9-10). At each stage, So

crates says, "the boy who shows himself always readiest must be

chosen to join a select number" (537al0-ll). In this way, those suited

by nature to rule will in effect select themselves when they are placed

in situations that allow them to manifest the requisite qualities, in

cluding especially philosophical er?s and an aptitude for studies (see 535b-d). Philosophical er?s, in turn, is connected with a kind of

prophecy or foreknowledge about the Good. Thus Socrates uses the

verb manteuesthai, "to divine," to describe the soul's access to the

Good: just as the soul "divines that it [the good that it pursues] is

something, but is unable to get a sufficient grasp of just what it is," So

crates "divine[s] that no one will adequately know" the just and noble

things before it is known in what way they are good (505el-2, 506a6

7). "You divine beautifully," is Glaucon's response (506a8). One is re

minded of Aristophanes' remark in the Symposium that the soul of one in love "is not able to say, but divines and speaks oracles about

what it wants" (192dl-2). Aristophanes' speech, one should recall, is

followed by Socrates' account of his initiation at the hands of a priest ess into the Mysteries of er?s, a daim?n or demigod that interprets

for human beings that which is divine (202d-203a), and there is a par

allel here to Socrates' initiation of Glaucon into the Mysteries of the

Good.26

Would it be fair to say that in the Kallipolis the natures of poten

tial philosophers grow naturally toward the Good? Not quite. For

books 6 and 7 are also peppered with references to compulsion, not

all of which have to do with forcing philosophers to assume the task

of ruling. Most important, Socrates makes it clear that compulsion is

needed to harmonize the elements of a philosophical nature. "For the

parts of nature that we have described as a necessary condition for

them," he explains, "are rarely willing to grow together in the same

place" (503b7-9). In fact, Socrates explains by way of answering Ade

imantus's worry about the link between philosophy and viciousness

that the best souls are peculiarly corruptible, for each of the praise

worthy elements of the best natures "has a part in destroying the soul

26 Cf. 509a9, where Socrates reminds Glaucon to avoid blasphemy and use words of good omen (euph?mein) as he explicates the image of the sun. Since Socrates observes that the sun?Helios in Greek mythology?is a god (508a), it is evident that the Good, as a philosophical reinterpretation of our

divine origins, is itself to be understood as divine. Socrates engages in philo sophical divination or prophecy in book 7 as well (see 523a8, 538a4, a7, a9), and it is worth noting that at one point he calls Glaucon daimonic (522b3).




that has them and tearing it away from philosophy" (491b8-9). What

is more, in actual cities the very excellence of such souls makes them

a target for every kind of flattery (494b-495a). Carefully exercised

compulsion therefore plays a role at each stage of a philosophical edu

cation. Just as in the Image of the Cave the prisoner who is released

from bonds is compelled to look at the fire and must be dragged into

the sunlight (515e), the potential philosopher is forced to undertake

the study of calculation because calculation "compels the soul to use

the intellect on the truth itself" (526b 1-3). The same is true of kindred

studies such as geometry and astronomy, which potential philoso

phers will be commanded to pursue because they compel the soul to

turn toward what is (526e, 529a). Compulsion is present even at the fi

nal stage of education, for when philosophical souls reach the age of

fifty they must be forced to gaze upon the Good (540a). Given that no forced learning abides in a soul, how are we to un

derstand the role of compulsion in a philosophical education? There

seems to be only one answer, namely, that it is needed to remove im

pediments to the natural growth of learning?impediments that would

otherwise block the path of the soul's erotic attraction to the true and

the beautiful. Provided with the opportunity, philosophically-inclined

souls?but only such souls?will climb the ladder of er?s to the top.

Everything depends, however, on the creation of such opportunities

through the intelligent use of extrinsic pressure. To the many, of

course, such pressure must always seem burdensome. For the exter

nal harshness of a rigorous education fades away only when one be

gins to glimpse the inner beauty of genuine understanding.

IV

It is in thinking through Socrates' references to compulsion that we may best come to appreciate the complexity of the need that at

taches philosophy to the city, and therewith the enduring paradox that

stands at the heart of the Republic. The political community needs

philosophy because only philosophical insight into the soul makes

clear the limits of politics with respect to virtue, and it is only with

these limits in mind that the city can hope to establish and maintain

beneficial laws, customs, and institutions. Philosophy needs a well

ordered city because only such a city takes deliberate steps to remove

the many impediments to the perfection of philosophical natures. The

pursuit of philosophy, however, is at odds with the public life of the



656 JACOB HOWLAND

city in ways that are exemplified by the oppositions between thumos and er?s, orthodoxy and insight, and public order and private virtue

that we have been exploring in this essay. These thematic opposi

tions, arranged as they are around the third wave, come to a head

when one ponders how it is that philosophy and political power could ever be brought to coincide.

Actual communities do not recognize the political importance of

philosophy, because most human beings, lacking philosophical er?s

therefore also lack self-knowledge and knowledge of the nature of

genuine virtue. In actual communities, moreover, most philosophi

cally-inclined natures are corrupted, while those few that are able to

"keep company with philosophy in a way that's worthy" (496b 1) grow up spontaneously, like weeds (520b; see also 497b). Furthermore, these few philosophers are unwilling to rule. This general situation

makes for the problem of the third wave, a problem that Socrates is

ultimately unable to solve.

According to Socrates, the philosopher must attempt to persuade the nonphilosophical many that philosophers should rule (499d-500a; see also 493e-494a). This presupposes that the philosopher is willing to rule or can be compelled to rule, for otherwise he would never at

tempt to persuade others to allow him to do so. But the philosopher is not initially willing to rule, and can be compelled to do so only by an

argument that adverts to his debt to the city that has given him a

philosophical education?a debt that is not incurred by any philoso

pher in any actual regime (520a-b). Hence the only argument that can

persuade the philosopher to try to convince the citizens that philoso

phers should rule presupposes that a city ruled by philosophers al

ready exists. The same circularity is evident when we consider the

question of whether the many would be persuaded by the argument

that philosophers should rule. Socrates makes it clear that the many

could be persuaded of this only if they are gentle, ungrudging, moder

ate, and willing to let reason guide their actions (500a, 501c-d). Yet a

nonphilosophical multitude of such good character surely exists no where outside of the city in speech.27

The textual centrality of the third wave suggests that the para doxical character of the city in speech, and more generally of the rela

tionship between philosophy and the political community, is the

27 Cf. Strauss, who maintains that "the Republic repeats, in order to overcome it, the error of the sophists regarding the power of speech"; "On Plato's Republic," 127; see also 124-5.




philosophically central point of the Republic. Reflection on the third wave reveals the need that links philosophy to the political commu

nity, together with the necessary limits of philosophy's efficacy with

regard to the life of the city and of the city's ability to become philo sophical. For the philosophically-inclined reader who is sensitive to

the structure of the text, these are the core lessons of the Republic. That they have not generally been recognized as such is a measure of

Plato's subtlety in communicating them, which is in turn an indication

of his political responsibility.28 Finally, let it be noted that the Republic not only presents us with

a fundamental problem, but also provides a solution in dramatic form.

For it is with the paradox of political philosophy clearly in mind that we can best begin to appreciate the extent of Socrates' accomplish ment in fashioning even a single night's community of philosophical discourse out of a group of young men on their way to a big town

party.29

University of Tulsa

28 Yet these lessons are taken to heart by perhaps the most dedicated students of the political philosophy of the Republic, the medieval Muslim and Jewish philosophers. Alfarabi's influential description of the philosophical ruler and his appraisal of the usefulness of noble lies (and specifically reli

gious myth) in ruling the nonphilosophical many are clearly laid out in the passages from The Political Regime, The Attainment of Happiness, and Plato's Laws excerpted in Medieval Political Philosophy (hereafter, UMPP"), ed. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 31-94. With regard to the question of the political responsibility of the philos opher, Averroes remarks in his commentary on the Republic that "Just as it is

only the physician who prescribes a drug, so it is the king who lies to the mul titude concerning affairs of the realm. That is because untrue stories are nec

essary for the teaching of the citizens. No bringer of a nomos is to be found who does not make use of invented stories, for this is something necessary for the multitude to reach their happiness"; Averroes on Plato's Republic, trans. Ralph Lerner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 24. See also Al farabi's explicit defense of Plato's esotericism in Plato's Laws, MPP, 84-5, as

well as the distinction between the demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical classes drawn by Averroes in The Decisive Treatise, MPP, 163-86 (see esp. 181) and the remarks pertaining to Plato set forth by Isaac Israeli in his Book on the Elements, excerpted in Isaac Israeli: A Neoplatonic Philosopher of the Early Tenth Century, ed. A. Altmann and S. Stern (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1958), 134-41. 291 wish to thank the Philosophy Department at Baylor University and

the Philosophy Faculty at the University of Bucharest for the opportunity to present earlier versions of this essay. A Liberty Fund conference organized by Joseph Cropsey provided the seeds for my ideas about the third wave. I am especially indebted to Jeffrey Macy of the Hebrew University, whose

many helpful suggestions have greatly improved the present article.



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