2012 Update 3-23 the Cogniti

Cognitive Activation Theory of Stress 1

COGNITIVE ACTIVATION THEORY OF STRESS:

AN INTEGRATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACH TO WORK STRESS

JAMES A. MEURS

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI

UNIVERSITY, MS 38677

[email protected]

PAMELA L. PERREWÉ

COLLEGE OF BUSINESS

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

TALLAHASSEE, FL 32306

[email protected]


ABSTRACT

Workplace stress consistently has received a substantial amount of attention from

practitioners and researchers alike. Many occupational health scholars have developed or

contributed to our understanding of models detailing theoretical approaches to an individual’s

experience of stress. Although these theories have improved our understanding of occupational

stress, these conceptualizations of stress and much of the subsequent stress research based on

these models have been limited in their ability to fully explain individual experience. We suggest

that organizational stress research could benefit from an integrative approach that seeks to

incorporate both the positive as well as the more traditional negative aspects of the stress

experience. We contend that organizational stress researchers should look to a recently

elaborated stress theory developed outside of the organizational sciences (i.e., Cognitive

Activation Theory of Stress) to provide the theoretical framing necessary for such research. We

discuss the implications of integrating this theory into the organizational sciences and provide

several avenues for future occupational stress research based on this new conceptualization.


COGNITIVE ACTIVATION THEORY OF STRESS:

AN INTEGRATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACH TO WORK STRESS

Over the course of several decades, occupational stress research has emerged into a

prominent field in the organizational sciences. A recent 15-year review of occupational health

psychology research in three major journals, by Macik-Frey, Quick, and Nelson (2007),

indicated that the stress perspective dominates the field. Based upon the early theorizing and

empirical testing of a few prominent stress scholars (e.g., Cannon, 1932; Elliott & Eisdorfer,

1982; Selye, 1951-1956, 1955, 1974), researchers have proposed various models in an attempt to

explain the stress experiences of individuals (e.g., Hobfoll, 1989; Karasek, 1979; Lazarus, 1966;

Siegrist, 1996).

Early stress researchers argued that stressful experiences did not necessarily demonstrate

a damaging effect on the individual. Cannon (1932) suggested that initial or low levels of

stressors could be endured, but that prolonged or severe stressors resulted in biological

breakdown. Selye (1955) articulated the stress experience as a process of adaptation, arguing for

what he termed the general adaptation syndrome. According to Selye, the stages of the stress

process progressed from an alarm reaction to the situation, to resistance to the stressor, to

exhaustion. Selye (1955) argued that stress was an important part of life and elaborated that

stress is not necessarily negative and, thus, an experience to be avoided (1974). Instead, some

stressful experiences (i.e., eustress) can be associated with positive feelings and health. However,

the most prominent occupational stress theories developed since that time focus predominantly

on the negative consequences of stressors.

In our zeal to find the “problems” of workplaces or individuals, stress researchers largely

neglected to consider the adaptive effects of stress. This conclusion is strikingly similar to


Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s (2000) contention that for too many years psychology had

highlighted the “negatives”, resulting in their call for research into positive psychology. In the

same way that researchers in the psychology field have sought to heal damaged people and, thus,

ignored the characteristics of life that result in flourishing (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000),

so too until recently have most stress theorists and researchers neglected the aspects of stress that

can lead to individual growth.

If stress is a necessary and potentially positive aspect of life, then stress research should

consider what aspects of stressful experiences help to make life worth living. We argue that,

unfortunately, stress researchers have focused their attention predominately on the downsides of

workplace stressors. This concentration on the negative is understandable, given the high cost of

overwhelming stress to both the individual and the organization (Macik-Frey, Quick, Quick, &

Nelson, 2009).

However, over a decade ago, Ryff and Singer (1998) argued that stress researchers and

health professionals tend to define health and well-being as the absence of negative states rather

than the presence of positive states. Further, there has been a recent call for occupational health

and stress researchers to place a greater emphasis on the factors that exhibit a positive effect on

health and psychological well-being (Macik-Frey, et al., 2007; Macik-Frey, et al., 2009).

Psychological well-being encompasses a number of factors including autonomy, personal

growth, mastery, purpose in life, self-acceptance, efficacy, hope, optimism, and resilience (Avey,

Luthans, Smith, & Palmer, 2010; Ryff, Singer, & Love, 2004). Clearly, this is more than simply

the absence of negative states.

We propose that organizational scholars incorporate into our research, a theory of

individual stress, the Cognitive Activation Theory of Stress (CATS; Ursin & Eriksen, 2004),


which can account for the adaptive aspects and results of workplace stress. We are not

suggesting that the adaptive nature of stress is a new discovery; much empirical research recently

has been conducted concerning the “positives” (i.e., health and well-being) of the stress

experience. Instead, we believe that this research supports the integration of previous models of

occupational stress with CATS to provide a more complete picture of the adaptive characteristics

of stressful experiences.

In addition, CATS also can shed light on two other important issues, namely, the role of

time and past experiences in the processing of stressful encounters, and how the expected

outcome(s) of a stressful situation drives one’s response to stressors. In the sections that follow,

we examine the more prominent occupational stress theories and suggest that current approaches

are based, in large part, on balanced models of stress, which provide insufficient explanations for

these important issues. Next, we introduce CATS, which is a theory that has been developed

within the physiological health literature. We integrate this new (i.e., to the organizational

sciences) theory with occupational stress theories, and discuss how, by incorporating this new

theory, we can advance our understanding of the stress experience in the aforementioned three

specific ways. Finally, we conclude with a brief discussion of the directions that this new

framework allows for stress researchers.

INFLUENTIAL THEORIES OF OCCUPATIONAL STRESS

It is a sign of confusion in stress research that our primary term (i.e., stress) has been

conceptualized as the independent variable, the dependent variable, and the process itself

(Cooper, Dewe, & O'Driscoll, 2001), and Hobfoll (1989) detailed how researchers have differed

regarding their conceptualizations of stress. However, a widely adopted view of stress considers

it to be the experienced condition or feeling when individuals perceive that the demands of a


situation exceed their perceived resources and endanger well-being (Lazarus, 1966, 1999;

Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Hence, stress has been thought of as an imbalance between the

demands of a situation and the resources available to deal with these demands. This traditional

definition seems to have found a consensus of support because it recognizes that stress emerges

from the relationship between the person and the environment and it focuses researchers on the

process between the two (Cooper, et al., 2001). But, as noted below, this definition of stress

restricts it to a situation where strain and/or other negative outcomes are the result, and, thus,

does not allow for a consideration of the adaptive or functional aspects of experienced stress.

In this section, we review some of the most prominent work stress theories in the field of

organizational behavior and occupational health psychology. We suggest that most of our current

approaches to studying occupational stress have been based upon what we have termed balance

models. However, we believe that the idea of balance is ill-defined and cannot fully explain the

adaptive nature of stressful experiences. We briefly discuss four popular approaches to the study

of occupational stress; Lazarus (1991) Transactional Model, Hobfoll’s (1989) Conservation of

Resources Theory, the model of Effort-Reward Imbalance by Siegrist (2001), and the Demands-

Control model of job stress by Karasek (1979) and colleagues (Karasek & Theorell, 1990).

Based upon Lazarus’ (1991) belief in the primacy of cognition, the transactional model of

stress posits that two processes (i.e., cognitive appraisal and coping) mediate between

environmental stressors and resulting responses. Stress scholars have continued to use Lazarus’

transactional model as their theoretical foundation in empirical studies (e.g., Dewe, Cox, &

Ferguson, 1993; van Steenbergen, Ellemers, Haslam, & Urlings, 2008). According to the model,

an event in the work environment engages the cognitive appraisal process, or primary appraisal.

This consists of an evaluation of whether the event is a threat to the individual’s well-being, or


whether it can be dismissed as benign or perhaps challenging. If the individual perceives a threat

to well-being, the secondary appraisal process is engaged to determine if anything can be done to

handle the situation. In this secondary appraisal stage, individuals are said to evaluate their

available options for coping with the stressor. The transactional model suggests that an

imbalance of greater environmental demands than resources to cope with these demands

produces strain.

According to Hobfoll’s (1989) Conservation of Resources Theory (COR), resources are

the objects (e.g., home, vehicles), energies (e.g., money, time, credit), personal characteristics

(e.g., self-esteem, mastery), and conditions (e.g., socioeconomic status, valued work role) that

are valued by individuals. Stress is said to result from an actual or threatened net loss of

resources, or from a lack of resource gain following the investment of resources. According to

Schaufeli and Bakker (2004, p.296), a resource represents “physical, psychological, social, or

organizational aspects of the job” that serve multiple purposes—one of which is to offset the

effects of job demands. Theory and empirical work suggest that the effects of stressful situations

may be buffered or attenuated if individuals perceive they possess the resources necessary to

cope with the stressor (Hochwarter, Perrewé, Meurs, & Kacmar, 2007). Similar to the

transactional model, COR theory implies that an imbalance of greater environmental demands

than resources produces strain.

The model of Effort-Reward Imbalance (ERI) at work is derived from a more general

approach toward analyzing the psychosocial dimension of human health and well-being. Siegrist

(2001) proposed that personal self-regulation is important for health and well-being in adult life

and that this is largely contingent on successful social exchange. The ERI approach focuses on

individual appraisals of social reciprocity and social exchange, characterized by mutual


cooperative investments based on the norm of return expectancy where efforts are balanced by

respective rewards. Failed reciprocity violates this norm and leads to strong negative emotions

and sustained strain responses because it threatens the fundamental reciprocity/exchange

principle. Further, the ERI model suggests that failed reciprocity (i.e., high efforts spent and low

rewards received in turn) is likely to elicit recurrent negative emotions and sustained stress

responses in exposed individuals. Although positive emotions evoked by appropriate social

rewards and exchanges is argued to promote well being, health, and survival, the primary focus

of research on ERI has been on the appraisal of failed reciprocity and sustained strain (e.g.,

Preckel, Meinel, Kudielka, Haug, & Fischer, 2007; Siegrist, 1996). In the Effort-Reward model,

imbalance occurs when one receives fewer rewards than is believed to be deserved (Siegrist,

1996).

Finally, the Demands-Control (DC) model of job stress was introduced by Karasek

(1979) about 30 years ago, and has played a dominant role in shaping the research agenda in the

field of work stress and health. Control (i.e., decision latitude) includes both the worker’s

authority to make decisions and the breadth of skills that are employed (Karasek, 1979;

Verhoeven, Maes, Kraaij, & Joekes, 2003). Karasek (1979) argued that in jobs with high control,

workers experience low strain if they have low demands, whereas they play an active or learning

role if they have a job with high demands. Demands are considered an appraisal of the work

situation and are primarily psychological in nature (Daniels, Beesley, Cheyne, & Wilmarisiri,

2008). Alternatively, workers with low control have passive jobs if they have low demands, but

experience high strain if high demands are made of them. Control can be viewed as a type of

resource for individuals such that they perceive themselves as having the necessary tools to

effectively deal with the demands at work. Although there has been some support for the DC


model (e.g., Taris, Kompier, Geurts, Houtman, & van den Heuvel, 2010), researchers have

gravitated to an expanded model.

In an update to the original model, Karasek and Theorell (1990) proposed that the DC

model add the component of social support as another critical resource in determining responses

to job demands. A number of researchers have tested the role of social support in the demand-

control model finding stress-reducing effects (e.g., Karasek, 1990; Kristensen, 1995). However,

although the demands-control-social support conceptualization has demonstrated relationships

with strain outcomes, only modest support has been found for the buffering effect of control; that

is, at most demonstrating that in order for control to have a buffering effect, it needs to be

matched with the types of demands placed on the individual (Jonge & Dormann, 2006; Van der

Doef & Maes, 1998, 1999).

We suggest that balance models do not fully explain how experiencing stress can be

functional, nor do they address the experience of stress when resources exceed (or meet) the

demands encountered. For example, it can be inferred from Karasek’s (1979) model that balance

is achieved when both demands and control are low or high. But, according to the model, when

both are low, the individual is in a position of passivity, whereas, when both are high, a person is

in a more active role. Certainly, while both of these situations achieve balance, the distinction

between passive and active roles suggests different outcomes for the individual and different

processes leading to these outcomes. However, these differences are not entirely elaborated in

this model.

In addition, although containing an active or learning situation (i.e., high control and high

demands), the focus of the Demands-Control model is on lessening strain rather than increasing

learning or activity. Within the Karasek (1979; Karasek & Theorell, 1990) model, the learning or


active role is engaged only if control and/or support are also present at sufficient levels. The

implication is that if this is not the case, strain is experienced. In other words, it could have been

proposed that demands lead to activity or learning except when something (e.g., lack of control

or support) changes that relationship to cause strain. However, the framing of the model places

the emphasis on mitigating strain rather than promoting learning or activity. This distinction may

seem to be merely an issue of focus, but we contend that a theoretical model crafted to explain

how one learns from stressful encounters would propose different constructs and relationships

from a model developed to address the mitigation of strain.

Similarly, as noted above, the Transactional model and COR theory imply that an

imbalance of greater environmental demands than resources produces strain (Hobfoll, 1989;

Hobfoll & Shirom, 2000; Lazarus, 1966, 2001), and in the Effort-Reward model, imbalance

occurs when one receives fewer rewards than is believed to be deserved (Siegrist, 1996). But,

what about the situations where resources meet or exceed demands or where rewards are

proportional to or greater than effort? Strain might not be the predominant outcome of such

situations, yet the experience of stress is still a part of them. Simply because one is able to

manage a stressful situation with the resources at one’s disposal does not mean that it is not

stressful to utilize those resources in handling the stressor. Also, even if an individual appraises

that rewards will exceed effort, effort must still be made, and with effort comes the stress

experience. Stress occurs regardless of the outcome of the stressful encounter.

However, likely because of our understandable eagerness to assist employees with the

management of workplace stress, our theories have assumed that stress happens only when

strain, or another negative outcome, is the result. Thus, even a traditional definition of stress, as

given above, suggests this is the case. Consequently, these balance theories neither fully explain


the processing of experiences that do not result in overwhelming strain nor do they elucidate

their results. However, it is likely the case that individuals experience many such stressful

situations throughout the typical workday. In order to better understand the experience of stress,

research needs to include the entirety of stress, and, as noted above, scholars have begun to

consider the “positives” of health and well-being.

In addition, these balance models specify neither the impact of previous encounters on a

present stressful situation nor the duration of a stress experience. However, just as others have

noted the importance of prior experiences on present encounters (e.g., Daniels, Harris, & Briner,

2004; Warr, 2006), we argue that past situations impact present ones in a variety of ways, such as

through the accumulation of resources, the evaluation of stressors, or the changing of expected

outcomes in the present situation based upon previous ones. Moreover, although scholars have

begun to empirically analyze issues related to the duration of stress (i.e., stress recovery) (e.g.,

Sonnentag, Perrewé, & Ganster, 2009), balance theories are not entirely capable of accounting

for these phenomena. Finally, although expectancy has played an important role in motivation

research (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999), we believe that stress research has mostly neglected the vital

role that future expectations play in present stress experiences.

In sum, although providing at least a partial explanation of the consequences of an

inability to cope (i.e., strain), these models provide insufficient explanations for three very

important aspects of stressful experiences: 1. Whether and how individuals adapt and learn from

experienced stress, 2. The role of time and past experiences in the processing of stressful

encounters, and 3. How the expected outcome(s) of a stressful situation influences response to

stressors. As noted above and discussed below, empirical research already has begun to partially

address these issues, and we believe that, in order to more completely understand the stress


experience, research would benefit from a conceptual foundation that provides the framing for

such research. The following discussion examines the Cognitive Activation Theory of Stress

(CATS), which is a theory of stress we believe has strong implications for occupational stress

research. Further, we provide a general illustration of our interpretation and integration of the

CATS framework in work stress research in Figure 1.

-----------------------------------------------------------

Insert Figure 1 about here

------------------------------------------------------------

COGNITIVE ACTIVATION THEORY OF STRESS & PERSEVERATIVE COGNITION

Overview

Although the experience may produce discomfort for the individual, arousal and stress

are vital to the operation of complex brains (Ursin, 2005), and the Cognitive Activation Theory

of Stress (CATS) (Ursin & Eriksen, 2004) suggests that repeated experiences with a stimulus

allows individuals to adapt and regulate themselves (Ursin & Eriksen, 2004). The purpose of

arousal is to compel the individual to remove the source of the stress “alarm” and the alarm

itself, similar to how it has been argued that the function of affect is to direct action (Frijda,

1986). Or, if not removed, the individual then is able to sustain the activation necessary to handle

the stressor. Consequently, the stress experience is part of an adaptive and beneficial system that

has survived the test of evolution.

CATS argues that because the stress alarm occurs when there is a discrepancy between

what is desired and what is reality, individuals will associate a probability with the likelihood of

abolishing the alarm and its source. This expectancy will have a strong influence on the level of

arousal. At its simplest, if the person has control and expects a desired outcome, then the alarm


will not be activated (i.e., stressors will not be felt, psychologically or physiologically).

However, if the future is unpredictable and/or an individual does not have the necessary

resources to handle the demands, then the alarm is activated. Further, there are instances (e.g.,

avoidant coping, learned helplessness) when individuals do not possess the necessary resources

to handle the situation and remove themselves from it, thus engaging a passive response that

provokes a positive outcome expectation, reducing stress activation.

Much like previous research (e.g., Daniels, et al., 2004; Lazarus, 1999) has argued for the

importance of appraisal and cognition to stress and coping, clearly, the cognitive appraisal of a

stress experience is a critical element of CATS. In the field of cognition, much research also has

examined the importance of appraisal. For instance, it has been argued that appraisals are based

on mental models that are a simplified representation of the self and the environment, and that

individuals make appraisals through either a controlled or an automatic mechanism of processing

information (Power & Dalgleish, 1997). Also, Warr (2006) suggested that when individuals

appraise their environment, they judge it, either intentionally or through routine habit. In a

similar vein, CATS (Ursin & Eriksen, 2004) holds that appraisals involve the development of

future expectations.

Expectancies

According to CATS (Ursin & Eriksen, 2004), appraisals made by individuals are

determinations of expectancies, which can be divided into either stimulus or outcome

expectancies. Stimulus expectancies concern the understanding that a particular stressor leads to

a particular event, and it provides individuals with the ability to psychologically defend against

or distort the stressor. Outcome expectancies connect a response to a stressful situation with an

outcome from that response, and individuals develop outcome expectancies that represent


positive (i.e., coping), negative (i.e., hopeless), or no (i.e., helpless) expectancy; each of these are

detailed below.

Carver and Scheier (1990) argued that individuals self-regulate to minimize the

discrepancies between expectations and their present state. Further, they stated that expectancies

about one’s eventual outcome play an important role in whether a response to a challenge is to

exert effort to attain a goal or to disengage from such attempts. CATS can be thought of as an

extension of this theory, because it suggests that the expected favorability of an outcome is

critical to determining how a person responds to stressors (Ursin & Eriksen, 2004).

When a person anticipates that a chosen response to a stressor will lead to a positive

outcome, that individual is coping. Thus, coping involves beliefs both that actions taken in

response to a stressor can affect an outcome and that these actions will affect the outcome in a

positive (i.e., desirable) fashion. Although this conception of coping may seem to be a radical

departure from previous theory, it is related to the expectancy theory of motivation. In theories of

motivation, expectancy has been defined as the subjective belief that a given effort will lead to a

specific outcome on the job. Expectancies are judgments about the relationships between given

levels of effort and outcomes (Fudge & Schlacter, 1999; Vroom, 1964). Thus, it is the

expectation that effort will lead to a valued outcome that is the motivating force (House, Shapiro,

& Wahba, 1974; Wahba & House, 1974). Similarly, the expected outcome is the motivating

force for the behavioral response to stressors.

As noted by Ursin (1998), although the term coping has been used for the strategy

selected or actions taken when confronting a stressful situation (e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1985;

Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), it is only when it is used for the expected results from these

strategies that coping is predictive of health. For example, in a sample of parachutists, Ursin,


Baade, and Levine (1978) found that reported fear and endocrine responses were reduced after

the first training session, prior to performance reaching an acceptable level. Thus, neither

successful performance nor feedback from performance of parachuting reduced arousal; it was

the expectation of being able to perform that decreased the stress response. Similarly, a recent

study (i.e., Moreno-Jimenez, Rodriguez-Munoz, Pastor, Sanz-Vergel, & Garrosa, 2009) found

that being psychologically detached from work resulted in lower psychological strain when

facing workplace bullying than for those who were low in psychological detachment from work,

suggesting the potentially adaptive nature (i.e., positive outcome expectancy) of avoidant coping.

In both of these example studies, individuals were psychologically and/or physiologically coping

with the stressful situation because they expected their actions to lead to a positive outcome, not

because they engaged in particular actions that uniformly across situations would be considered

coping behaviors. In other words, coping is neither a strategy nor a behavior, but, instead, it is

the adoption of an expected and positive outcome, regardless of the actions (e.g., problem

focused-actions, avoidant behavior) one has or has not taken or will take in response to a

stressor.

Helplessness describes a situation where an individual perceives no relationship between

his or her actions and the outcome from a stressful encounter; it is similar to stating that one feels

no control or influence over the outcome. Although normally producing increased stress

activation, in a prolonged state of helplessness individuals may experience reduced arousal,

particularly if it leads to some form of subsequent gain or support from others. In such situations,

helplessness would be similar to coping. However, hopelessness can be considered the opposite

of coping, because it occurs when someone’s responses to stressors have results, but the effects


are perceived as entirely negative. An expectancy of failure also has been connected to

hopelessness by motivation researchers (e.g., Weiner, 2010).

Further, the expectancies that individuals maintain can be quantified via three

dimensions: strength, perceived probability, and affective value (Ursin & Eriksen, 2004). The

strength of an expectation stems from the salience of the stressful event, the contiguity and

number of the event’s occurrences, and the frequency with which they occur together. The

perceived probability concerning stimulus expectancies can be thought of as predictability,

whereas for outcome expectancies, it is similar to perceived control or understanding. Lastly, the

affective value of an expectancy describes the hedonic value (i.e., positive, negative, neutral) of

the expected outcome.

Variation in stimulus expectancies stems from psychological defense and distortion

(Ursin & Eriksen, 2004). This psychological defense is a cognitive filter mechanism that denies

or distorts the reality of the stressor based on the level of strength, probability, and value placed

on it. As described above, outcome expectancies can be positive (i.e., coping), such as when the

strength, probability, and value of the expectancy are high and positive (i.e., instrumental

coping), or when the strength and probability are high and positive and the value is high and

negative (i.e., avoidant coping). Thus, again, coping is not an action, but rather the establishment

of positive response outcome expectancies.

These characterizations of expectancies also allow for formal differentiations, concerning

their relationship to stress experiences, between the emotions of fear, safety, and anxiety, which

are all related to future expectancies (Ursin & Eriksen, 2004). Fear is high arousal produced by a

circumstance where the affective value of a stressor is highly negative, and the perceived

probability of it happening is high. Although a highly probable event would usually lead to low


arousal, because of the highly unattractive nature of this situation, fear is felt. However, when the

perceived probability of this undesirable event is low, arousal is low and feelings of safety arise.

Finally, when there is uncertainty about the probability of an event (i.e., probability is roughly at

chance level), anxiety is produced.

The CATS Explanation of the Stress Process

As discussed by Ursin and Eriksen (2004), CATS proposes four components to the stress

process. The first part is the stress stimuli (i.e., stressors) or load. It is argued that it is not the

physical characteristics of a stimulus that elicit the stress response (Levine & Ursin, 1991), but a

person’s appraisal (i.e., the second stage in the process) based on (previous) experience and

(future) expectations that translates a situation into a stressful experience. Certainly, some

stressors would be regarded as negative across persons, time, and situation. However, individual

and situational differences (e.g., prior learning, personality, contextual setting) are likely to

influence evaluations of most stressors.

Second in the stress process is the stress experience (i.e., appraised and felt stress). The

stressors most often reported in the literature are those that stem from the stress experience itself.

These are the physical, physiological, psychological, and emotional loads or demands felt by the

individual that are reported as stress to the extent that they are deemed a loss or a threat. It is this

feeling of stress that some could argue is the most relevant to occupational stress and, as noted

by Ursin and Eriksen (2004), it is what is reported on job stress questionnaires when individuals

are asked whether something is a source of stress. The respondent is reporting the expectancies

developed for this situation or source of stress. Similarly, Jex, Beehr, and Roberts (1992)

suggested that survey measures using the word stress are likely to assess respondents’ post-

appraisal evaluations of the stressor, not merely the presence of the stressor.


The third part is the individual’s general response (“alarm”) to the stress experience.

Similarly, Selye (1955) argued that an alarm reaction occurs prior to adaptation. In this phase, as

argued by Ursin and Eriksen (2004), the individual has an increase in arousal, and there is a

specific response to handle the cause of the alarm. Like above, individual and situational

differences play a role in the alarm reaction (e.g., strength and duration of alarm) elicited in the

individual during this stage. Because arousal affects many physiological systems, this is the most

reliable and consistent part of the process to analyze (Ursin & Eriksen, 2004).

As argued by Ursin and Eriksen (2004), examining stress alarm behaviors, such as coping

behaviors, coping strategies, or “ways of coping” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), is problematic,

because these behaviors can occur under different degrees of arousal and future expectancy.

Also, it is too simplistic to argue that certain coping behaviors are necessarily always “adaptive”

(e.g., problem-focused coping) or “maladaptive” (e.g., emotion-focused coping), because the

response to the stressor is determined by expectations of whether coping (i.e., a positive

outcome) will occur, not by the particular coping strategy taken (Eriksen, Murison, Pensgaard, &

Ursin, 2005). Consequently, the internal state of the individual, which is predictive of health, is

not connected to the coping strategy chosen.

The final component of the process is the person’s experience (“feedback”) of the stress

response. After responding to a stressor, the individual receives feedback regarding the results of

his or her response, and this feedback can influence the feeling of being stressed. Also, the

individual can alter the perception of the stressor and/or the outcome expectancies regarding

future experiences based upon this feedback. Ursin and Eriksen (2004) suggest that it is often

attempted to evaluate feedback through questionnaires, such as those concerning health

complaints. But, they contend that respondents would have difficulty distinguishing between the


stress experience (step 2 of the process) and the feedback response because of the feedback loop

necessary to the evaluation of stress stimuli.

Similarly, Lazarus (1993) argued that four concepts must be elaborated when detailing

the stress process, including: the stressor (or causal agent); the evaluation of the stressor,

differentiating between the stressful and non-stressful components; the processes by which the

person copes with these stressful demands; and, the effects or stress reactions of the individual

(see Dewe, 2001). Although Lazarus (1993, p.4) argued that a clear distinction between

physiological stress and psychological stress is “personal meaning,” these core components of

the stress process appear to be recognized by psychological, organizational, and physiological

scholars.

Perseverative Cognition

Stress theories have focused on the reactions of individuals during stressors, and,

suggested that the more frequent and stronger responses to stressors are the primary pathogens in

stress (Brosschot, Pieper, & Thayer, 2005). Consequently, these theories and the measures

developed from them have failed to measure the duration of the stress response (i.e., stress

responses before, during, and after the stressful experience), which is likely key in explaining the

connection between stressors and outcomes (Brosschot & Thayer, 1998). Certainly, there are

some researchers (e.g., Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; Daniels, et al., 2004; Sonnentag & Fritz,

2007; Sonnentag, Kuttler, & Fritz, 2010) who have endeavored to examine stressful experiences

beyond the short-term. However, the majority of empirical research has neglected what are likely

the major factors in the stress response, namely, anticipatory (i.e., the prolonging of activation

preceding a stressor), recovery (i.e., the prolonging of activation immediately following a

stressor), and recurrent (i.e., the prolonging of activation after recovery through the stressor’s


mental re-creation by the individual) stress experiences (Brosschot, et al., 2005; Pieper &

Brosschot, 2005). Further, Pieper and Brosschot (2005) suggested that these mental

representations of stressors could be characterized as perseverative cognitive processes which act

to prolong the experience of stress.

CATS argues that health is threatened only by sustained activation, not by short-term

arousal. As discussed in greater detail below, this suggests that short-term (phasic) activation has

training effects, whereas, sustained activation produces strain. However, not long after CATS

was proposed, Brosschot, Pieper, and Thayer (2005) noted that stress theories have neglected to

explain the cause of sustained physiological activation. For example, although CATS suggests

that negative expectancy produces sustained activation, what causes negative expectancy to be

prolonged? Eriksen and Ursin (2006) suggested that the protraction of negative expectancy is

due in part to sensitization, “increased efficiency in a neural circuit” (p. 63), in response to

stressors and to a cognitive mirror of sensitization. Brosschot and colleagues elaborated the

argument concerning this cognitive counterpart by arguing that individuals only experience

prolonged activation when they continue to lend support to their negative outcome expectancies

(Brosschot, et al., 2005), and by focusing or ruminating on these stressors, individuals are

prolonging their experience of stressful events.

Brosschot and colleagues (2005) offered a detailed description of the prolonging of

stressful experiences, arguing that extended activation is the result of a cognitive representation

of stressors they termed perseverative cognition. It is worth noting that Pieper and Brosschot

(2005) suggest that at least part of the perseverating occurs when an individual is unconscious,

such as during sleep. Thus, the concept of perseverative cognition provides a more thorough


explanation of the mechanism underlying the prolonging of stressors than that provided in

CATS, and, consequently, it is a useful addition to this theory.

We suggest that, within our framework in Figure 1, perseverative cognition represents an

individual characteristic or resource that clearly could have a detrimental influence on the

experience of stress. Although generally prior stress research has conceptualized resources as

only beneficial for the individual, we contend that researchers should recognize that resources

can not only mitigate and but also exacerbate stressful experiences through their impact on

expectancies of and responses to stressful encounters. We will provide a further discussion of

resources in our directions for future research.

Empirical Support of CATS and Perseverative Cognition

Although little research has provided direct tests of the importance of anticipatory stress,

in a study examining cortisol stress response (Gaab, Rohleder, Nater, & Ehlert, 2005),

personality factors (i.e., competence and control orientation) were found to influence cortisol

response through situation-specific appraisal (i.e., anticipatory stress). In addition, anticipatory

cognitive appraisal demonstrated a stronger relationship with cortisol response than personality

or retrospective cognitive appraisal. These results support arguments for the importance of

anticipating stress on the biological stress response.

Cognitive perseveration is evidenced in the constructs of worry and rumination, which

are thought to be related to the delayed disengagement from threatening information. Some

research (i.e., Pieper, Brosschot, Van der Leeden, & Thayer, 2007) supports the belief that worry

might have a stronger relationship with health than stressful events, because the experience of

worry about a stressor generally is longer than that of the event itself. Pieper and colleagues

(2007) found that worry episodes, particularly those concerning work episodes and future


stressors, and stressful events had similar and independent associations with elevated heart rate

and decreased heart rate variability, even after adding biobehavioral constructs (i.e., gender, age,

body mass, and negative health behaviors), trait factors (i.e., worry, depression, anxiety, and

hostility), and job strain to their statistical model. Another study (i.e., Brosschot, van Dijk, &

Thayer, 2007) found that worry demonstrated a greater impact on heart rate and heart rate

variability than did the stressors (i.e., annoying or disturbing events).

Worry and rumination also have been linked either directly or indirectly to important

health outcomes, such as sleep quality, increased cortisol, higher heart rate, and increased

mortality (see Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006; Brosschot & Thayer, 2004). Also, a study (i.e.,

Verkuil, Brosschot, Putman, & Thayer, 2009) provided support for the contention that

pathological (anxious) worry is related to an inadequate ability to prevent or disengage from the

processing of threatening information, and this deficit could be an indicator of perseverative

cognition. It also has been shown that trait worry only accounts for a partial explanation of daily

worry (Verkuil, Brosschot, & Thayer, 2007).

Further, in a study assessing heart rate response after negative and positive emotions,

Brosschot and Thayer (2003) found that heart rate activity after a negative emotional experience

was longer than heart rate activity after a positive episode, suggesting that a primary distinction

between the effects of positive and negative emotional responses could be the ability of negative

emotions to prolong the experience of the stressor. Also, studies have demonstrated the role of

rumination in, for instance, experiences of anger (Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008), anxiety and

depression symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), and major depression (Kuehner & Weber,

1999). The research findings concerning worry, negative emotions, and rumination suggest that

regardless of whether a future, stressful event occurs, an inability to prevent the mind from


dwelling on this possibility is a strong predictor of negative health outcomes. Further, we would

suggest that in an organizational setting, employees who engage in worry and rumination are

more likely to interpret job stressors (e.g., deadlines, interpersonal conflict) with negative

expectancies (i.e., hopelessness and helplessness) such that they believe either they will fail or

that there is nothing they can do about the stressor.

Positive and negative outcome expectancies, as described by CATS, are similar to

optimism and pessimism, respectively. Optimism and pessimism have been argued to be

generalized outcome expectancies (O'Connor & Cassidy, 2007), describing whether an

individual expects positive or negative experiences in the future (Carver & Scheier, 1998).

Across two cross-sectional studies, it was demonstrated that positive expectations buffered the

relationship between stress and hopelessness, such that those experiencing high perceived stress

who reported greater positive future thoughts reported lower hopelessness than did those

experiencing high stress and fewer positive thoughts (O'Connor, O'Connor, O'Connor,

Smallwood, & Miles, 2004).

O’Connor and Cassidy (2007) found that these general expectancies can be moderated by

specific outcome expectancies. One particularly interesting finding was that, for pessimists

experiencing stress, high levels of positive future thinking about specific events was related to

increased hopelessness. This might suggest that, when persons who tend to expect negative

outcomes (e.g., pessimists) experience stress, they will interpret even positive future

expectancies in a negative light. These findings shed light on the strength of generalized outcome

expectancies (e.g., worry, rumination, anxiety, pessimism) when individuals face specific,

stressful situations.


HOW CATS CAN INFORM OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OCCUPATIONAL STRESS

Arnetz (2005) used the CATS theoretical lens in an organizational setting, finding that

the clarity of a department’s goals were associated with the stress level (i.e., mental energy and

work-related exhaustion) of that department’s employees. However, the CATS perspective

primarily has been of assistance to non-organizational phenomena, such as for Chronic Fatigue

Syndrome (Wyller, Eriksen, & Malterud, 2009) and socio-economic status (SES) related

differences in health. For example, within the context of CATS, it can be argued that the stress

responses that function as mediators between SES and health are determined by the acquired

expectancies (i.e., coping or inability to cope) of individuals (Kristenson, Eriksen, Sluiter,

Starke, & Ursin, 2004). It could be that, concerning those lower in SES, generally, their response

to stress is hampered by an increased difficulty with both recovering after stressors and

responding to new ones.

In addition, we believe that CATS also can provide greater understanding of

occupational stress-related phenomena, regarding areas that have received some research

attention and those that research generally has neglected. We suggested that CATS offers a

theoretical framework for speaking to three stress-related issues that other occupational stress

theories have struggled to address, including, whether and how individuals learn from

experiences of stress, the role of time in the stress experience, and how expectancies direct one’s

response to stressors. Below we will explain how we believe CATS can assist organizational

researchers in each of these areas, prior to concluding with a review of several potential avenues

for future research.


Learning

As noted in a recent review of occupational health research (i.e., Macik-Frey, et al.,

2007), positive health has not received substantial research attention, and the authors agreed with

Wright and Cropanzano (2000) that researchers have instead taken a disease perspective on

occupational health issues. The disease perspective has dominated stress research as well. The

principle theories (e.g., Job Demands-Control Support, Appraisal, Conservation of Resources)

provide substantially more insight into the detrimental effects of strain than into the adaptive

aspects of the stress experience. Unlike the negative outcome of stressful encounters (i.e., strain),

the occupational stress field does not have a singular concept to describe the potentially

favorable aspects of stressful experiences.

A number of different variables could be offered as describing the beneficial effects of

experienced stress, such as challenge (LePine, LePine, & Saul, 2007), hardiness, self-efficacy,

job satisfaction, locus of control, or engagement (Schaufeli & Bakker, 2004). However, these

concepts provide inadequate explanations for the upside of experienced stress. For instance, if

engagement is necessarily a positive outcome, it would imply that disengagement or avoidant

behaviors are maladaptive, which, as argued earlier, is not the case (Moreno-Jimenez, et al.,

2009). Also, hardiness (Maddi, et al., 2006) and general self-efficacy (Eden & Kinnar, 1991;

Eden & Zuk, 1995) have been conceptualized as be stable individual differences, and job

satisfaction limits the positive outcomes of stress to the workplace. Even if one were to suggest

that these approaches provide adequate explanations for the “positives” of stressful situations, it

is unarguable that, as a whole, empirical organizational stress research has focused attention on

the damage to the individual experiencing stress and our theories of stress have failed to provide


a singular concept, to mirror that of strain, that explains the adaptive nature of stressful

encounters.

CATS provides an avenue for the investigation and explanation of these functional results

from stress. Stress is not viewed as detrimental to the individual by default, with the negative

effects only mitigated by introducing something positive (e.g., control, social support, resources).

Instead, the experience of stress itself has both positive (i.e., training effects) and negative (i.e.,

straining effects) ramifications for the individual, as driven by expectancies. With that in mind,

researchers can investigate how and which resources influence the stress experience, prolonging

either negative or positive expectancies as well as behavioral responses.

Certainly, outcomes proximal to the stress experience (e.g., job tension, workplace

engagement, work-family conflict) can be indicators of the (mal)adaptive properties of stress, but

these represent only one category of variables that would be useful to organizational research. In

addition, scholars need to consider the long-term consequences of stressful experiences, and

many have investigated the detrimental impact of chronic strain through constructs such as

burnout (Halbesleben, 2006). However, what are the long-term consequences of adaptation to

stress? Aside from the active role in Karasek’s (1979) Job Demands-Control model, there has

been relatively little theoretical consideration of the healthful aspects of stress by organizational

researchers. In the context of CATS, it becomes clear that the positive (i.e., training) results of

stress yield a singular, distal construct that provides the connection between stressful encounters

and long-term adaptation—learning.

Ursin (1998) argued that the most important reason for a decrease in the stress response is

that the individual has learned something about the situation, because acquiring expectancies

necessitates learning (Ursin & Eriksen, 2010). In other words, individual differences in outcome


expectancies are conceptualized as primarily stemming from differences in learning experiences

(Ursin & Eriksen, 2004). Learning provides a reduction in uncertainty and expectations for

future outcomes of stressful encounters, whether they are positive expectancies of coping or

negative expectancies (e.g., psychological defense, learned helplessness). Further, the findings

from a cross-sectional study of employees at an organization facing downsizing suggest that the

survivors of previous organizational changes, which included many of the employees, developed

positive outcome expectancies based on their past experiences (Svensen, Neset, & Eriksen,

2007).

Outside of the CATS literature, occupational research has begun to consider the construct

of learning as an important outcome of stressful experiences. For instance, some have considered

perceived mastery and self-efficacy (e.g., Parker & Sprigg, 1999) or learning computer software

(i.e., Bond & Flaxman, 2006) as learning-related outcomes of stress. Taris and Feij (2004) found

that high levels of strain had a negative impact on skill enlargement and skill acquisition, and

another study (i.e., Daniels, Boocock, Glover, Hartley, & Holland, 2009) demonstrated that

work-related learning mediated the relationship between responses to work demands (e.g.,

changing aspects of work activities) and pleasant affect. We believe that these results suggest

that, for example, if employees are allowed to make mistakes without being subjected to

punishment or abuse and they are encouraged to learn from their mistakes, they will be more

likely to anticipate positive outcomes and interpret their environment as challenging as opposed

to threatening.

Also, using both structural equation modeling and longitudinal hierarchical regression

analyses across 3 samples, Holman and Wall (2002) tested direct, mediated, and moderated

models of the relationships between work characteristics, learning-related outcomes (i.e., skill


utilization and self-efficacy), and strain. Their results demonstrated that mediated models best fit

the data and supported the argument that learning and strain have reciprocal relationships, such

that learning reduces strain and strain impedes learning. Further, as noted by Roberts (2006), the

findings across a range of studies suggest that hardship can lead to improved outcomes for

individuals, because individuals are able to learn from their experiences.

In sum, the likely path through which the stress experience affects subsequent behavior

is individual learning. When appraising a situation, the individual’s stated or unstated desired

outcome is to learn from this experience, and this is particularly the case when it is believed that

the circumstance will recur in the future, as many stressful workplace situations actually do.

Thus far, research in this emerging area has mostly examined perceived job-related learning and

self-efficacy as learning-related outcomes of experienced stress. However, research also could

examine other types of learning, such as learning related to the stress experience itself (i.e.,

stressors, expectancies of outcomes, responses to stressors, effectiveness of responses). For

example, scholars could consider what changes the relationship between expectancies and an

individual’s short- and long-term arousal level. In other words, when an employee expects a

negative (or chance) outcome from a particular circumstance, but experiences and recognizes

positive results from the stressful encounter, would not that be potentially the situation (and its

converse) that is most likely to characterize learning related to stressful experiences? Thus,

CATS allows researchers to theoretically frame and empirically test how negative appraisals can

become “positive” experiences for employees, and how learning influences long-term stress

activation and future appraisals of stressors.


Time & the Prolonging of the Stress Experience

Related to learning, the stress response develops over time (Eriksen, Olff, Murison, &

Ursin, 1999). As shown by CATS, when individuals develop an efficient way of coping with

stress, their psychological and physiological reactions tend to involve only brief arousal.

Whereas, when persons engage in psychological defense (i.e., denial or distortion of the

stressor), or have an inability to cope with stressors, their activation levels are prolonged, and the

influence of the stressful situation is lengthened. Thus, it could be said that the effect of stress on

the individual is more due to the inability to recover from work than to what happens during the

workday (Ursin, 2000).

Further, research on stress recovery has demonstrated that some individuals have greater

difficulties than others in recouping following a stressful situation. Geurts and Sonnentag (2006,

p.483) argued that the essence of recovery is “… the psychophysiological systems that were

activated during work will return to and stabilize at a baseline level, that is, a level that appears

in a situation in which no special demands are made on the individual.” Successful recovery,

however, differs across individuals (Rook & Zijlstra, 2006). For example, some persons may be

able to recover by simply taking regular short breaks or vacations (Cartwright & Cooper, 1997),

while others may need physical activity on a daily basis to be able to recover well (Rook &

Zijlstra, 2006).

Scholars also recently have highlighted the importance of recovery in the stress process

(see Sonnentag, et al., 2009) and that rumination prolongs physiological activation, hindering the

recovery process (McCullough, Orsulak, Brandon, & Akers, 2007). Recovery could be

considered a form of prolonged activation (Brosschot, et al., 2005; Kristenson, et al., 2004), and

some evidence suggests that a poor ability to recover from stressors might be an important factor


linking sustained activation to ill health (Harris, Ursin, Murison, & Eriksen, 2007). These

findings highlight the importance of recovery from stress, and lend support to the foundational

arguments of CATS and perseverative cognition, namely, that, typically, it is less that the

stressful event itself has ill health effects, and more that an individual’s response to the stressor

(e.g., anticipatory stress, worry, rumination, anxiety, recovery) has profound effects on health

and well-being.

In addition, the harboring of negative or uncertain outcome expectations also promotes

the extension of arousal by preventing the disengagement from previous, threatening or stressful

situations (Verkuil, et al., 2009), encouraging recurrence of the stressor through its mental

recreation (Pieper, et al., 2007). Moreover, before establishing the outcome expectancy in a

particular situation, individuals often spend time vacillating from considering one coping

strategy to contemplating another, as they ponder which one is likely to lead to a positive

outcome. Consequently, even outside of what is typically measured as “the stress experience,”

strain can be prolonged through an inability to recover, it may reoccur through mental

representations of the stressor, and it may be maintained or increased during a stressful episode

when individuals vacillate between different strategies for handling the stressor.

Thus, it can be seen that anticipatory stress, which has received little research attention,

becomes an important variable in the true experience of stress. For instance, one group of

researchers (i.e., Waugh, Panage, Mendes, & Gotlib, 2010) found that anticipating a speech and

giving a speech, although they had different underlying affective mechanisms, yielded similar

cardiovascular recovery, suggesting that recovering from an anticipated stressor and recovering

from the stressful event involve a similar cardiovascular profile. Also, an experimental study

demonstrated that those participants in a gambling task who were placed in an anticipatory stress


condition took longer to make advantageous decisions in the task (i.e., Preston, Buchanan,

Stansfield, & Bechara, 2007). This finding could suggest that the addition of anticipatory stress

(e.g., worry) to the stressful brooding and vacillating over coping strategies that individuals

naturally do in stressful situations intensifies and elongates the experience of stress. Clearly,

there is a substantial amount of time in the experience of stress, and in the transfer of learning

from one stressful experience to another that has yet to be fully examined by research.

However, if effective, such studies would improve our knowledge of the link between

short-term stressors that are internally prolonged by the individual, and the long-term

consequences of stress, such as cardiovascular disease. This particularly would be the case for

research that tracks an individual moving through multiple, potentially stressful encounters.

However, there are many other potential issues for researchers to consider as they relate to time.

For example, does the expected duration of a stressor influence one’s response to a stressful

situation? It seems likely that a subordinate would have a greater ability to cope with a

demanding supervisor who needs to be satisfied for only one day than one that needs to be

contented for several months. Even if the employee expects a positive, eventual outcome, a

greater duration of the stressor leading up to that outcome would likely take an increased toll on

the individual. In a similar fashion, the length of time a resource is available would seem to have

an influence on a person’s appraisal of a stressful situation. There are many other such potential

research questions where considerations of time add another layer to our understanding of the

experience of stress. Such studies would provide organizational scholars with crucial insight into

the development of the stress response over time, and CATS, when combined with a more

elaborate explanation of the prolonged cognitive representation of stressors, as is provided by the


perseverative cognition hypothesis, can serve as a theoretical guide for researchers conducting

this type of research.

Expectancies Guide Response to Stressors

For many years, appraisal has been an important component of stress theory. As

discussed earlier, Lazarus’ Appraisal Model (1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) has shaped the

approach of many stress researchers, and numerous studies could be cited that framed research

within the context of this model. However, some have continued to emphasize a desire for a

greater consideration of appraisal when analyzing stress arousal and response (i.e., Day &

Walker, 2007).

Appraisal is an important component of CATS, because it is through appraisal that a

person develops expectations, and expectations determine whether a stimulus becomes a stressor

and whether an individual believes that coping can be accomplished. These subjective and

personally-constructed expectations (i.e., related to the response and to the outcome) are the

crucial links between potential stressors and the stress experience. Without the conceptualization

of appraisals or expectations, stress theories are under appreciating what might be the most

fundamental aspect of the typical stress experience—individual interpretation of stimuli. Further,

the adoption of expectancies is the result of learning (Ursin & Eriksen, 2010).

Related to expectancies, it appears that some confusion exists in the research community

concerning the place of hopelessness and helplessness in the stress experience. For instance, a

well-researched hopelessness scale (i.e., Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974)

operationalizes the construct in line with the CATS definition of it (i.e., negative outcome

expectancy). In addition, the concepts of learned helplessness (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman,

1993) and hopelessness depression (Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky, 1995) are in line with the


CATS explanations of helplessness and hopelessness. However, Luthans and Youssef (2007,

p.332) noted that helplessness is the “conceptual opposite of an optimistic explanatory style.”

Using the CATS formulations, hopelessness (i.e., negative outcome expectancy

regardless of coping response) could be considered conceptually opposite of optimism, but

helplessness (i.e., no relation between coping response and expected outcome) could not be.

O’Connor and Cassidy (2007, p.598) also suggested that individuals experience hopelessness

when “there is no relationship between their behaviour and subsequent outcomes,” but that,

instead, should be considered a description of helplessness. We believe that by having more

distinct definitions of hopelessness and helplessness, as described by Ursin and Eriksen (2004),

researchers will be better able to juxtapose these concepts against others and develop clearer

explanations of how each of these fit within the stress experience.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As Whetten, Felin, and King (2009) argued, organizational research frequently borrows

theories and concepts from other disciplines without modifying them, where needed, to fit the

organizational context. Thus, our primary suggestions for future occupational stress research are

not only to empirically test relationships in the CATS model, as discussed in various directions

given below, but also to consider the organizational context as an important aspect of how CATS

is adapted to occupational stress research. Due to the recent development of CATS, and because

research using CATS has occurred almost exclusively outside of the organizational sciences, we

do not believe we are yet able to construct a complete occupational CATS model. Instead,

occupational stress researchers need to consider the occupational or organizational features that

would assist in adjusting the CATS model to the workplace environment. Below, we detail

several potential avenues for future research based on the CATS model where scholars could


work to expand our knowledge of stressful experiences in ways that would elaborate and/or

expand the model we have presented.

Resources

Karasek’s (1979) model suggests that job control is the most salient on-the-job resource,

and Hobfol’s (1989) COR theory argued that a number of resource categories (i.e., conditions,

objects, personal characteristics, energies) are of use to individuals facing stressors. However,

occupational stress researchers have only characterized resources as being of benefit to the

individual in a stressful situation. But, as noted earlier regarding perseverative cognition,

resources can be helpful or detrimental to individuals coping with stressors. In addition, the

(un)helpfulness of a particular resource often would be dependent on the particular situation and

the outcome assessed. For instance, those high on neuroticism, typically considered a

disadvantageous personality trait, have been found to obtain higher performance ratings when in

a busy work environment (Smillie, Yeo, Furnham, & Jackson, 2006). Thus, when considering

both the training and straining effects of stressful experiences, it could be argued that a particular

resource is not necessarily always and entirely beneficial or harmful to the individual across a

range of situations and outcomes, but more likely that it has both adaptive and maladaptive

features depending on a variety of factors.

Also, researchers could examine the influence of prior learning from stressful encounters

on resource accumulation. Further, can stressors become so demanding that resources are

irrelevant to the individuals? At what level and type of stressors do particular resources become

unimportant? Similarly, stressors and resources likely differ in their stability and/or availability

to the individual. In sum, research could vary the transience, quality, and quantity of appraised

stressors and resources to more accurately explain resource value.


Cognitive Defense

CATS argues that defending against or distorting stressors is the method for consciously

altering one’s stimulus expectancies, the predictability that a stressor will be followed by a

particular event, and that the stimulus expectancy is learned from previous stressful encounters

(Ursin & Eriksen, 2004). However, psychological defense mechanisms have received relatively

little attention in occupational stress research when compared to coping mechanisms. Although

psychological defense has been found to be related to lower psychological well-being (Kernis,

Lakey, & Heppner, 2008), other findings might suggest inconsistent relationships between

defense and physiological reactivity to stress (Cramer, 2003).

However, the apparent inconsistency could be explained by the possibility that

individuals differentially adopt various defense strategies. Future research could investigate

whether defense strategy “preference” has an influence on physiological and psychological

response to stressors. Potentially even more valuable to organizational stress research is the

possibility that psychological defense mechanisms could partially explain the discrepancies

between self- and physiological-report of strain, as suggested by other scholars (e.g., Cramer,

2003; Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993)

Coping Generalization

Ursin and Eriksen (2004) suggest that coping generalizes across situations, leading to

future expectations of success and failure in a range of situations. However, how and to what

extent does one’s learning from previous stressful encounters generalize to the approach taken to

other, future stressors? In a study reporting that specific future expectancies moderated the

relationship between general expectancies (i.e., optimism and pessimism) and hopelessness,

O’Connor and Cassidy (2007) suggested that the relationship between generalized and specific


expectancies lacks clarity, implying that future research should address this matter. Also, when

and how does perceived learning develop into unrealistic expectations or narcissistic beliefs

about one’s capabilities? This substantial number of unknown relationships concerning the

generalization of coping provides scholars many avenues of research.

The Beginning and the Ending

Pieper and Brosschot (2005) argued that future research should clearly establish the onset

and offset of stressful events. Research on stress recovery suggests that the effects of a stressor

extend beyond any objective presence it may have. In addition, the ability of resources to

prolong stressful activation supports the same notion. Consequently, without an empirically-

based understanding, the beginning and ending of strain (and learning) become indistinct. As

highlighted above, research already has begun to address the recovery needs of individuals

facing stressors, and future research along these lines should continue and also consider how

individual differences (e.g., perseverative cognition) might change these relationships. However,

much less attention has been directed to anticipatory stress, and a fruitful avenue of research

would be to consider when anticipatory (psychological or physiological) stress begins, what

moderates when it begins, and what its trajectory is to a stressful event.

In addition, scholars could research how long-term individual learning relates to the onset

and offset of workplace stress. The role of emotions in the production of health and resiliency

over time has begun to draw greater research attention, such as through the Broaden-and-Build

theory of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001). Positive emotions could emerge as the

result of learning from stressful experiences, and this growing body of research seems to suggest

that positive emotions, as examples, build psychological resources (Fredrickson, Tugade,

Waugh, & Larkin, 2003), produce a wide range of personal resources that lead to greater life


satisfaction (Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, & Finkel, 2008), and promote a broadened

cognitive state (i.e., holistic processing and attention flexibility; Johnson, Waugh, & Fredrickson,

2010). Consequently, stress researchers could further our understanding of learning by

examining how stressful experiences relate to positive emotions, cognitive states and stress-

related learning over time.

The Importance of Interdisciplinary Research

Recently, Heaphy and Dutton (2008) encouraged the integration of physiological data

into organizational research, urging researchers to pursue interdisciplinary research. Certainly,

we join with Heaphy and Dutton’s (2008) encouragement, and this paper could be viewed as an

attempt to integrate an “outside” theory into occupational stress research. However, although we

believe that the CATS model of stress can be of great assistance to occupational stress

researchers, research has yet to elucidate many of the complex relationships between physiology,

psychology, and stress.

For example, one study (i.e., Wirtz, et al., 2006), utilizing an Appraisal perspective

(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) on stress, found that a greater fibrin stress response was produced

when individuals evaluated a stressor as more challenging or threatening (i.e., primary

appraisals). But, there was no significant relationship with fibrin stress response for perceived

control or beliefs about one’s abilities to cope (i.e., secondary appraisals), and this finding would

appear to run contrary to much of the occupational stress literature, which suggests that beliefs

about control and self-efficacy are important to the individual’s psychological responses to

stressors.

However, as noted by Day and Walker (2007), there are multiple components to an

individual’s physiological response to stress. Also, in a review of ambulatory assessment in


industrial and organizational psychology, Klumb, Elfering, and Herre (2009) suggested that the

determination of the best indicator(s) (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, EEG) of the relationship

between stressors and strains depends on the type of strain under investigation (e.g., physical,

musculoskeletal, mental). In order for occupational stress researchers to benefit from the

integration of physiological data, it is important that we not only seek such data but that we

carefully consider what it measures and how we will be able to integrate it into our present

knowledge.

Conclusion

Macik-Frey, Quick, and Nelson (2007) presented findings suggesting that despite the fact

that the field of occupational health is broader than the theme of stress, stress remains a dominant

issue in the field of workplace well-being. We believe that CATS can provide stress researchers

with the perspective necessary in order to better integrate our future studies with the new

directions of occupational health research (e.g., positive health). Consequently, although

occupational stress might continue to be a widely investigated topic within the broader area of

occupational health and well-being, it also can be of better service to the occupational health

field as a whole.


REFERENCES

Abramson, L. Y., Alloy, L. B., & Metalsky, G. I. 1995. Hopelessness depression. Hillsdale, NJ:

Erlbaum.

Ambrose, M. L., & Kulik, C. T. 1999. Old friends, new faces: Motivation research in the 1990s.

Journal of Management, 25: 231-292.

Arnetz, B. B. 2005. Subjective indicators as a gauge for improving organizational well-being. An

attempt to apply the cognitive activation theory to organizations.

Psychoneuroendocrinology, 30: 1022-1026.

Aspinwall, L. G., & Taylor, S. E. 1997. A stitch in time: Self-regulation and proactive coping.

Psychological Bulletin, 121: 417-436.

Avey, J. B., Luthans, F., Smith, R. M., & Palmer, N. F. 2010. Impact of positive psychological

capital on employee well-being over time. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology,

15: 17-29.

Beck, A. T., Weissman, A., Lester, D., & Trexler, L. 1974. The measurement of pessimism: The

hopelessness scale. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42: 861-865.

Bond, F. W., & Flaxman, P. E. 2006. The ability of psychological flexibility and job control to

predict learning, job performance, and mental health. Journal of Organizational Behavior

Management, 26: 113-130.

Brosschot, J. F., Gerin, W., & Thayer, J. F. 2006. The perseverative cognition hypothesis: A

review of worry, prolonged stress-related physiological activation, and health. Journal of

Psychosomatic Research, 60: 113-124.

Brosschot, J. F., Pieper, S., & Thayer, J. F. 2005. Expanding stress theory: Prolonged activation

and perseverative cognition. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 30: 1043-1049.


Brosschot, J. F., & Thayer, J. F. 1998. Anger inhibition, cardiovascular recovery and vagal

function: A model of the link between hostility and cardiovascular disease. Annals of

Behavioral Medicine, 20: 1-8.

Brosschot, J. F., & Thayer, J. F. 2003. Heart rate response is longer after negative emotions than

after positive emotions. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 50: 181-187.

Brosschot, J. F., & Thayer, J. F. 2004. Worry, perseverative thinking and health. In I. Nyklicek,

L. R. Temoshok & A. J. J. M. Vingerhoets (Eds.), Emotional expression and health:

Advances in theory, assessment and clinical applications: 99-115. London, UK: Taylor

and Francis.

Brosschot, J. F., van Dijk, E., & Thayer, J. F. 2007. Daily worry is related to low heart rate

variability during waking and the subsequent nocturnal sleep period. International

Journal of Psychophysiology, 63: 39-47.

Cannon, W. B. 1932. The wisdom of the body (2nd ed.). New York: Norton.

Cartwright, S., & Cooper, C. L. 1997. Managing workplace stress. London: Sage.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. 1990. Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: A

control-process view. Psychological Review, 97: 19-35.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. 1998. On the self-regulation of behavior. New York, NY:

Cambridge University Press.

Cooper, C. L., Dewe, P. J., & O'Driscoll, M. P. 2001. Organizational stress: A review and

critique of theory, research, and applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Cramer, P. 2003. Defense mechanisms and physiological reactivity to stress. Journal of

Personality, 71: 221-244.


Daniels, K., Beesley, N. J., Cheyne, A. J. T., & Wilmarisiri, V. P. 2008. Coping processes

linking the Demands-Control-Support model, affect, and risky decisions at work. Human

Relations, 61: 845-874.

Daniels, K., Boocock, G., Glover, J., Hartley, R., & Holland, J. 2009. An experience sampling

study of learning, affect, and the demands control support model. Journal of Applied

Psychology, 94: 1003-1017.

Daniels, K., Harris, C., & Briner, R. B. 2004. Linking work conditions to unpleasant affect:

Cognition, categorization and goals. Journal of Occupational and Organizational

Psychology, 77: 343-363.

Day, T. A., & Walker, R. 2007. More appraisal please: A commentary on Pfaff et al. (2007)

"Relations between mechanisms of CNS arousal and mechanisms of stress". Stress, 10:

311-313.

Dewe, P. J. 2001. Work stress, coping, and well-being: Implementing strategies to better

understand the relationship Research in Occupational Stress and Well-Being: 63-96.

Oxford: Elsevier Science, Inc.

Dewe, P. J., Cox, T., & Ferguson, E. 1993. Individual strategies for coping with stress at work: A

review. Work & Stress, 7: 5-15.

Eden, D., & Kinnar, J. 1991. Modeling galatea: Boosting self-efficacy to increase volunteering.

Journal of Applied Psychology, 76: 770-780.

Eden, D., & Zuk, Y. 1995. Seasickness as a self-fulfulling prophecy: Raising self-efficacy to

boost performance at sea. Journal of Applied Psychology, 80: 628-635.

Elliott, G. R., & Eisdorfer, C. 1982. Stress and human health. New York: Springer Publishing

Company.


Eriksen, H. R., Murison, R., Pensgaard, A. M., & Ursin, H. 2005. Cognitive activation theory of

stress (CATS): From fish brains to the olympics. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 30: 933-

938.

Eriksen, H. R., Olff, M., Murison, R., & Ursin, H. 1999. The time dimension in stress response:

Relevance for survival and health. Psychiatry Research, 85: 39-50.

Eriksen, H. R., & Ursin, H. 2006. Stress - it is all in the brain. In B. B. Arnetz & R. Ekman

(Eds.), Stress in health and disease: 46-68. Wiley-VCH.

Folkman, S., & Lazarus, R. S. 1985. If it changes it must be a process: Study of emotion and

coping during three stages of college examination. Journal of Personality and Social


Fredrickson, B. L. 1998. What good are positive emotions? Review of General Psychology, 2:

300-319.

Fredrickson, B. L. 2001. The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-and-

build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56: 218-226.

Fredrickson, B. L., Cohn, M. A., Coffey, K. A., Pek, J., & Finkel, S. M. 2008. Open hearts build

lives: Positive emotions, induced through loving-kindness meditation, build

consequential personal resources. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95:

1045-1062.

Fredrickson, B. L., Tugade, M. M., Waugh, C. E., & Larkin, G. R. 2003. What good are positive

emotions in crises? A prospective study of resilience and emotions following the terrorist

attacks on the United States on September 11th, 2001. Journal of Personality and Social


Frijda, N. H. 1986. The Emotions. London: Cambridge University Press.


Fudge, R. S., & Schlacter, J. L. 1999. Motivating employees to act ethically: An expectancy

theory approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 18: 295-304.

Gaab, J., Rohleder, N., Nater, U., & Ehlert. 2005. Psychological determinants of the cortisol

stress response: The role of anticipatory cognitive appraisal. Psychoneuroendocrinology,

30: 599-610.

Geurts, S. A. E., & Sonnentag, S. 2006. Recovery as an explanatory mechanism in the relation

between acute stress reactions and chronic health impairment. Scandinavian Journal of

Work, Environment and Health, 32: 482-492.

Halbesleben, J. R. 2006. Sources of social support and burnout: A meta-analytic test of the

conservation of resources model. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91: 1134-1145.

Harris, A., Ursin, H., Murison, R., & Eriksen, H. R. 2007. Coffee, stress and cortisol in nursing

staff. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 32: 322-330.

Heaphy, E. D., & Dutton, J. E. 2008. Positive social interactions and the human body at work:

Linking organizations and physiology. Academy of Management Review, 33: 137-162.

Hobfoll, S. E. 1989. Conservation of resources: A new attempt at conceptualizing stress.

American Psychologist, 44: 513-524.

Hobfoll, S. E., & Shirom, A. 2000. Conservation of resources theory: Application to stress and

management in the workplace. In R. T. Golembiewski (Ed.), Handbook of organization

behavior: 57-81. New York: Dekker.

Hochwarter, W. A., Perrewé, P. L., Meurs, J. A., & Kacmar, C. J. 2007. The interactive effects

of work-induced guilt and ability to manage resources on job and life satisfaction.

Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 12: 125-135.


Holman, D. J., & Wall, T., D. 2002. Work characteristics, learning-related outcomes, and strain:

A test of competing direct effects, mediated, and moderated models. Journal of

Occupational Health Psychology, 7: 283-301.

House, R. J., Shapiro, H. J., & Wahba, M. A. 1974. Expectancy theory as a predictor of work

behavior and attitude: A re-evaluation of empirical evidence. Decision Sciences, 5: 481-

506.

Jex, S. M., Beehr, T. A., & Roberts, C. K. 1992. The meaning of occupational stress items to

survey respondents. Journal of Applied Psychology, 77: 623-628.

Johnson, K. J., Waugh, C. E., & Fredrickson, B. L. 2010. Smile to see the forest: Facially

expressed positive emotions broaden cognition. Cognition and Emotion, 24: 299-321.

Jonge, d. J., & Dormann, C. 2006. Stressors, resources, and strain at work: A longitudinal test of

the triple-match principle. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91: 1359-1374.

Karasek, R. A. 1979. Job demands, job decision latitude, and mental strain: Implications for job

redesign. Administrative Science Quarterly, 24: 285-307.

Karasek, R. A. 1990. Lower health risk with increased job control among with collar workers.

Journal of Organizational Behavior, 11: 171-185.

Karasek, R. A., & Theorell, T. 1990. Healthy work, stress, productivity and the reconstruction of

working life. New York: Basic Books.

Kernis, M. H., Lakey, C. E., & Heppner, W. L. 2008. Secure versus fragile high self-esteem as a

predictor of verbal defensiveness: Converging findings across three different markers.

Journal of Personality, 76: 477-512.

Klumb, P., Elfering, A., & Herre, C. 2009. Ambulatory assessment in industrial/organizational

psychology. European Psychologist, 14: 120-131.


Kristensen, T. S. 1995. The demand-control-support model: Methodological challenges for

future research. Stress Medicine, 11: 17-26.

Kristenson, M., Eriksen, H. R., Sluiter, J. K., Starke, D., & Ursin, H. 2004. Psychobiological

mechanisms of socioeconomic differences in health. Social Science and Medicine, 58:

1511-1522.

Kuehner, C., & Weber, I. 1999. Responses to depression in unipolar depressed patients: An

investigation of Nolen-Hoeksema's response styles theory. Psychological Medicine, 29:

1323-1333.

Lazarus, R. S. 1966. Psychological stress and the coping process. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lazarus, R. S. 1991. Psychological stress in the workplace. In P. L. Perrewé (Ed.), Handbook on

job stress (Special Issue), Journal of Social Behavior and Personality: 1-13.

Lazarus, R. S. 1993. From psychological stress to the emotions: A history of changing outlooks.

Annual Review of Psychology, 44: 1-21.

Lazarus, R. S. 1999. Stress and emotion: A new synthesis. New York: Springer.

Lazarus, R. S. 2001. Conservation of resources theory (COR): Little more than words

masquerading as a new theory. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 50: 381-

391.

Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. 1984. Stress, appraisal, and coping. New York: Springer.

LePine, J. A., LePine, M. A., & Saul, J. R. 2007. Relationships among work and non-work

challenge and hindrance stressors and non-work and work criteria: A model of cross-

domain stressor effects. In P. L. Perrewé & D. C. Ganster (Eds.), Research in

occupational stress and well being: 35-72. Amsterdam: Elsevier Ltd.


Levine, S., & Ursin, H. 1991. What is stress? In M. R. Brown, G. F. Koob & C. Rivier (Eds.),

Stress: Neurobiology and neuroendocrinology: 3-21. New York: Marcel Dekker.

Luthans, F., & Youssef, C. M. 2007. Emerging positive organizational behavior. Journal of

Management, 33: 321-349.

Macik-Frey, M., Quick, J. C., & Nelson, D. L. 2007. Advances in occupational health: From a

stressful beginning to a positive future. Journal of Management, 33: 809-840.

Macik-Frey, M., Quick, J. D., Quick, J. C., & Nelson, D. L. 2009. Occupational health

psychology: From preventative medicine to psychologically healthy workplaces. In A. G.

Antoniou, C. L. Cooper, G. P. Chrousos, C. D. Spielberger & M. W. Eysenck (Eds.),

Handbook of managerial behavior and occupational health: 3-19. Cheltenham, UK:

Edward Elgar Publishing Inc.

Maddi, S. R., Harvey, R. H., Khoshaba, D. M., Lu, J. L., Persico, M., & Brow, M. 2006. The

personality construct of hardiness, III: Relationships with repression, innovativeness,

authoritarianism, and performance. Journal of Personality, 74: 575-597.

McCullough, M. E., Orsulak, P., Brandon, A., & Akers, L. 2007. Rumination, fear, and cortisol:

An in vivo study of interpersonal transgressions. Health Psychology, 26: 126-132.

Moreno-Jimenez, B., Rodriguez-Munoz, A., Pastor, J. C., Sanz-Vergel, A. I., & Garrosa, E.

2009. The moderating effects of psychological detachment and thoughts of revenge in

workplace bullying. Personality and Individual Differences, 46: 359-364.

Nolen-Hoeksema, S. 2000. The role of rumination in depressive disorders and mixed

anxiety/depressive symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109: 504-511.


O'Connor, R. C., & Cassidy, C. 2007. Predicting hopelessness: The interaction between

optimism/pessimism and specific future expectancies. Cognition and Emotion, 21: 596-

613.

O'Connor, R. C., O'Connor, D. B., O'Connor, S. M., Smallwood, J., & Miles, J. 2004.

Hopelesness, stress and perfectionism: The moderating effects of future thinking.

Cognition and Emotion, 18: 1099-1120.

Parker, S. K., & Sprigg, C. A. 1999. Minimizing strain and maximizing learning: The role of job

demands, job contrl, and proactive personality. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84: 925-

939.

Peterson, C., Maier, S. F., & Seligman, M. E. P. 1993. Learned helplessness: A theory for the

age of personal control. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Pieper, S., & Brosschot, J. F. 2005. Prolonged stress-related cardiovascular activation: Is there

any? Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 30: 91-103.

Pieper, S., Brosschot, J. F., Van der Leeden, R., & Thayer, J. F. 2007. Cardiac effects of

momentary assessed worry episodes and stressful events. Psychosomatic Medicine, 69:

901-909.

Power, M., & Dalgleish, T. 1997. Cognition and emotion: From order to disorder. Hove, East

Sussex: Psychology Press.

Preckel, D., Meinel, M., Kudielka, B. M., Haug, H.-J., & Fischer, J. E. 2007. Effort-reward-

imbalance, overcommitment and self-reported health: Is it the interaction that matters?

Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 80: 91-107.

Preston, S. D., Buchanan, T. W., Stansfield, R. B., & Bechara, A. 2007. Effects of anticipatory

stress on decision making in a gambling task. Behavioral Neuroscience, 121: 257-263.


Ray, R. D., Wilhelm, F. H., & Gross, J. J. 2008. All in the mind's eye? Anger rumination and

reappraisal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94: 133-145.

Roberts, L. M. 2006. Shifting the lens on organizational life: The added value of positive

scholarship. Academy of Management Review, 31: 292-305.

Rook, J., & Zijlstra, F. 2006. The contribution of various types of activities to recovery.

European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 15: 218-240.

Ryff, C. D., & Singer, B. 1998. The contours of positive human health. Psychological Inquiry, 9:

1-28.

Ryff, C. D., Singer, B., & Love, G. D. 2004. Positive health: Connecting well-being with

biology. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 359: 1383-1394.

Schaufeli, W., & Bakker, A. 2004. Job demands, job resources, and their relationship with

burnout and engagement: A multi-sample study. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 25:

293-315.

Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. 2000. Positive Psychology: An introduction.

American Psychologist, 55: 5-14.

Selye, H. 1951-1956. Annual report of stress. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Selye, H. 1955. Stress and disease. Science, 122: 625-631.

Selye, H. 1974. Stress without distress. Philadelphia: JB Lippincott.

Shedler, J., Mayman, M., & Manis, M. 1993. The illusion of mental health. American

Psychologist, 48: 1117-1131.

Siegrist, J. 1996. Adverse health effects of high-effort/low reward conditions. Journal of



Siegrist, J. 2001. A theory of occupational stress. In J. Dunham (Ed.), Stress in the workplace:

Past, present, and future: 52-66. Philadelphia, PA: Whurr Publishers.

Smillie, L. D., Yeo, G. B., Furnham, A. F., & Jackson, C. J. 2006. Benefits of all work and no

play: The relationship between neuroticism and performance as a function of resource

allocation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91: 139-155.

Sonnentag, S., & Fritz, C. 2007. The recovery experience questionnaire: Development and

validation of a measure for assessing recuperation and unwinding from work. Journal of


Sonnentag, S., Kuttler, I., & Fritz, C. 2010. Job stressors, emotional exhaustion, and need for

recovery: A multi-source study on the benefits of psychological detachment. Journal of

Vocational Behavior, 76: 355-365.

Sonnentag, S., Perrewé, P. L., & Ganster, D. C. 2009. Research in occupational stress and well-

being (Vol. 7: Current perspectives on job-stress recovery). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group

Publishing Ltd.

Svensen, E., Neset, G., & Eriksen, H. R. 2007. Factors associated with a positive attitude

towards change among employees during the early phase of a downsizing process.

Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 48: 153-159.

Taris, T. W., & Feij, J. A. 2004. Learning and strain among newcomers: A three-wave study on

the effects of job demands and job control. Journal of Psychology, 138: 543-563.

Taris, T. W., Kompier, M. A. J., Geurts, S. A. E., Houtman, I. L. D., & van den Heuvel, F. F. M.

2010. Professional efficacy, exhaustion, and work characteristics among police officers:

A longitudinal test of the learning-related predictions of the demand-control model.

Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 83: 455-474.


Ursin, H. 1998. The psychology in psychoneuroendocrinology. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 23:

555-570.

Ursin, H. 2000. Psychosomatic medicine: State of the art. Annals of Medicine, 32: 323-328.

Ursin, H. 2005. Press stop to start: The role of inhibition for choice and health.


Ursin, H., Baade, E., & Levine, S. 1978. Psychobiology of stress: A study of coping men. New

York: Academic Press.

Ursin, H., & Eriksen, H. R. 2004. The cognitive activation theory of stress.


Ursin, H., & Eriksen, H. R. 2010. Cognitive activation theory of stress (CATS). Neuroscience

and Biobehavioral Reviews, 34: 877-881.

Van der Doef, M., & Maes, S. 1998. The job demand-control (-support) model and physical

health outcomes: A review of the strain and buffer hypotheses. Psychology and Health,

13: 909-936.

Van der Doef, M., & Maes, S. 1999. The job demand-control (-support) model and psychological

well-being: A review of 20 years of empirical research. Work & Stress, 13: 87-114.

van Steenbergen, E. F., Ellemers, N., Haslam, S. A., & Urlings, F. 2008. There is nothing either

good or bad but thinking makes it so: Informational support and cognitive appraisal of the

work-family interface. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 81: 349-

367.

Verhoeven, C., Maes, S., Kraaij, V., & Joekes, K. 2003. The job-demand-control-social support

model and wellness/health outcomes: A European study. Psychology and Health, 18:

421-440.


Verkuil, B., Brosschot, J. F., Putman, P., & Thayer, J. F. 2009. Interacting effects of worry and

anxiety on attentional disengagement from threat. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47:

146-152.

Verkuil, B., Brosschot, J. F., & Thayer, J. F. 2007. Capturing worry in daily life: Are trait

questionnaires sufficient? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45: 1835-1844.

Vroom, V. H. 1964. Work and Motivation. New York, NY: Wiley.

Wahba, M. A., & House, R. J. 1974. Expectancy theory in work and motivation: Some logical

and methodological issues. Human Relations, 27: 121-147.

Warr, P. 2006. Differential activation of judgments in employee well-being. Journal of

Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 79: 225-244.

Waugh, C. E., Panage, S., Mendes, W. B., & Gotlib, I. H. 2010. Cardiovascular and affective

recovery from anticipatory threat. Biological Psychology, 84: 169-175.

Weiner, B. 2010. The development of an attribution-based theory of motivation: A history of

ideas. Educational Psychologist, 45: 28-36.

Whetten, D. A., Felin, T., & King, B. G. 2009. The practice of theory borrowing in

organizational studies: Current issues and future directions. Journal of Management, 35:

537-563.

Wirtz, P. H., Ehlert, U., Emini, L., Rudisuli, K., Groessbauer, S., Gaab, J., et al. 2006.

Anticipatory cognitive stress appraisal and the acute procoagulant stress response in men.

Psychosomatic Medicine, 68: 851-858.

Wright, T. A., & Cropanzano, R. 2000. The role of organizational behavior in occupational

health psychology: A view as we approach the millennium. Journal of Occupational

Health Psychology, 5: 5-10.


Wyller, V., B., Eriksen, H. R., & Malterud, K. (2009). Can sustained arousal explain the Chronic

Fatigue Syndrome? Behavioral and Brain Functions, 5. Retrieved from

http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/5/1/10 on 02/26/2010


FIGURE 1

An Integrative Theoretical Approach to Work Stress

Stressors Appraisal

Brief Behavioral Response

Negative Expectancy

Psychological Defense

Training Effects (Phasic Activation)

Straining Effects (Sustained Activation) Distortion of

Stressor Expectancy

Prolonged Behavioral Response

Positive Expectancy

Anticipated Outcome

Subconscious

Conscious

Feedback Regarding Outcome Expectancy

Resources

Learning Learning

2012 Update 3-23 the Cogniti

Documents

Transcript of 2012 Update 3-23 the Cogniti