2012 Nuclear Security Summit: The Korean Twist, by Ms. Duyeon Kim

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Korea Economic Institute

Volume 5

Academic Paper Series

Contents:

Foreign and Domestic Economies of North and

South Korea

• The Markets of Pyongyang

• Similar Policies, Dierent Outcomes: Two Decadesof Economic Reforms in North Korea and Cuba

• KORUS FTA Compared with KOREA-EU FTA:

Why The Dierences?

• Developing an International Financial Center to

Modernize the Korean Service Sector

Security Factors and Regional Impact on the

Korean Peninsula

• Preparing for Change in North Korea:

Shifting Out of Neutral

• Reviving the Korean Armistice: Building Future

Peace on Historical Precedents

• Proactive Deterrence: The Challenge of Escalation

Control on the Korean Peninsula

Human and Nuclear Security Concerns on the

Korean Peninsula

• Engaging North Korea on Mutual Interests in

Tuberculosis Control

• 2012 Nuclear Security Summit: The Korean Twist



ON KOREA 2012:

ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES

Volume 5



5

Human and Nuclear Security

Concerns on the Korean Peninsula



7

2012 Nuclear Security Summit:

The Korean Twist

Ms. Duyeon Kim, is the Deputy Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferaon,Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferaon

Abstract

The March 2012 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Seoul, Korea comes

at a crical juncture: connued global terrorist aacks prompt concerns

about the threat of nuclear terrorism, and many countries may connue to

shop for nuclear reactors to meet their energy needs despite the horric

incident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Nightmare

scenarios include vulnerable nuclear materials falling into the wrong

hands or being smuggled across borders, and nuclear facilies becoming

aracve targets for terrorist aacks. These possibilies were evidently

considered by al Qaeda before its aacks of 11 September 2001, by the

ploers of the November 2008 Mumbai aack, and by the homegrown

Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik who detonated a powerful bomb indowntown Oslo in 2011. Thirty-three cases of unauthorized possession or

losses of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium were reported to

the Internaonal Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) between 1993 and 2010.

The NSS also comes as a me when the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster

reminded the world of yet another adversary—the force of nature—that

combined with the force of malice threaten the safety features of nuclear

facilies that are intended to protect, not harm, life. Against this backdrop,

over 501 world leaders are charged with the dicult task of agreeing onmeasures that will indeed secure all vulnerable materials around the world.



8 2012 Volume 5 n ON KOREA

Introduction

Inial thoughts of this paper formed in late 2010 as an aempt to explore

key issues and recommend policies in preparaon for the 2012 NSS. It

began with the tle “The Korean Twist” to suggest ways Seoul could givethe second NSS a Korean air as the next summit chair.

The paper, however, quickly took on a twist of its own in light of the nuclear

disaster at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi power plant in March 2011. The disaster

ushered in a wave of quesons about the quake-tsunami’s implicaons for

the upcoming 2012 NSS, and the conclusion was that the safety and security

interface should be on the summit agenda, among other items.2

At the me, some nuclear security experts parcularly in the UnitedStates contended that the summit agenda should not be expanded to

include nuclear safety since other internaonal forums deal with this issue

extensively. The concern, righully so, was that it would dilute the focus of

the NSS. However, given the current and future realies, a nuclear safety-

security3 discussion at the summit level will be dicult to avoid. A safety-

security conversaon would:

• Help sustain the aenon and parcipaon of certain countries in the NSS;

• Address future potenal threats amid a connued spread of nuclear

materials and plants for nuclear energy;

• Help restore condence in peaceful nuclear energy uses;

• Naturally include “outlier” or “problemac” states into the

conversaon in the future.

The fundamental dierence between nuclear “safety” and nuclear“security” lies in the human factor. The Fukushima disaster is a safety

concern caused by a natural disaster, while unauthorized entry to a

nuclear power plant, sabotage, a terrorist aack, and the involving

nuclear materials fall under security.4 In the same vein, the safety of

radioacve sources means reducing the likelihood of accidents that could

harm people, while the security of radioacve sources refers to measures

to prevent these materials from going astray or being diverted for illegal

and malevolent acts.

However, nuclear safety and nuclear security do share a fundamental

objecve—to protect life.

Therefore, the Fukushima disaster has provided the impetus to broaden

the Seoul 2012 NSS agenda to include nuclear safety—more specically,



9Kim: 2012 Nuclear Security Summit

the nuclear safety and security nexus—as well as to place a higher priority

on radioacve materials. These issues apparently are now included on the

agenda, but the quesons are how and to what extent .

Ocial negoaons on craing the 2012 NSS agenda and Seoul Communi-qué began among Sous-Sherpas5 on 27 June 2011 in Seoul as parcipang

countries began assembling a dra communiqué with 10 starter items on

the table.6 Sherpas connued to massage the communiqué on 4 October

in Helsinki, focusing on roughly eight key points (Table 1), and will aim to

nalize the text in mid-January 2012 in New Delhi before adopng the nal

document at the March summit. The goal is to formulate responsibilies,

commitments, and aconable steps that are polically acceptable for state

leaders as well as consistent with naonal and internaonal regulaons.

Their approach is guided by ve principles in draing the communiqué(Table 2):

Table 1: Discussion Topics for Seoul Communiqué, Helsinki Sherpa Meeng

1. Secure high-risk nuclear materials

(HEU, Pu)

5. Tighten management of radioacve

materials for dirty bombs

2. Enhance nuclear facility protecon

6. Encourage states to join andrafy key

nuclear security-related convenons

(CPPNM and ICSANT)

3. Create synergy between nuclear

security and nuclear safety

7. Bolster global nuclear security

architecture (i.e. GICNT, G8 Global

Partnership, UNSC 1540 Commiee)

4. Prevent illicit nuclear materials

tracking

8. Expand support for IAEA nuclear

security acvies

Source: Ocial sources, October 2011.

Table 2: Guiding Principles for Draing Seoul Communiqué

• Placing nuclear security at the center of the discussion.

• Ensuring the connuity of the Washington NSS while making new progress.

• Ensuring the voluntary nature of naonal commitments and parcipaon.

• Opng against the creaon of a new regime.• Respecng President Barack Obama’s vision to secure all vulnerable

nuclear material in a four-year lockdown.

Source: 2012 NSS Chair, Republic of Korea.




It is important that the all-encompassing document not only ensures full

implementaon of the results of 2010 summit but also deepens those

results and priorizes measures to deal with pressing nuclear security

dilemmas of today and tomorrow. It is also important that it includes new

items that will connue to aract heads of state to the NSS process while

maintaining the central focus on nuclear security.

The fundamental challenge for world leaders going forward will be over-

coming polical and diplomac hurdles in all areas of nuclear security.

Such is the task for the Republic of Korea as the chair and host of the 2012

NSS. Taking into account its unique posion on the global stage, Seoul brings

to the table certain characteriscs that will serve as both opportunies andchallenges for the NSS. It is a non–nuclear weapons state that has proven to

be a responsible member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferaon Treaty (NPT) and

a host of other internaonal regimes and instuons but shares a border

with a nuclear-armed neighbor, North Korea. Its 21 reactors provide almost

40 percent of the country’s electricity with seven more reactors under

construcon, and Korea is becoming a compeve nuclear exporter in the

world energy industry. Seoul can play a vital role in bridging the nuclear and

non–nuclear weapons states as well as the developed and developing states.

Against this backdrop, there are clear ways in which Seoul can add a Korean

air to the upcoming summit while leading more intensied eorts to pre-

vent nuclear terrorism.

Why Seoul?

“Global Korea” Policy

Since the end of the 1950–53 Korean War, the ROK has quickly transformed

itself from being a recipient of internaonal aid to being a donor. Its policy,

which was focused heavily on diplomac and security soluons conned

to the Korean Peninsula, also began to steer outward. In other words,

the ROK has been steadily posioning itself as a major power center in

an increasingly globalized world. Seoul plans to increase foreign aid and

has chaired the Group of 20 (G-20) summit as the rst country outside the

Group of Eight (G-8). With the acknowledgment of the evolving globalsecurity environment, Seoul has also stepped up its contributions to

world peace and security far from home.

Such is the pursuit of the current Lee administraon for a “global Korea,”

a catchphrase symbolizing President Lee’s vision to become a more



11

asserve contributor in the internaonal arena. The seeds to this policy

were rst planted during his inauguraon speech in 2008,7 and a global

Korea quickly moved higher on his policy agenda with a naonal security

objecve of “enhancing competence and status internaonally.”8

Korea has a record of chairing major internaonal summits and events over

the years, and the upcoming NSS is an opportunity, as well as a challenge,

for the business-minded Korean president to showcase his country’s

leadership in the security realm both eecvely and substanvely. Just

as Seoul was tasked to lead and enforce expanded economic cooperaon

at the 2010 G-20 summit, the pressure is on the ROK again to intensify global

coordinaon of nuclear security iniaves while addressing the various gaps

between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

Road to NSS Chairmanship

Seoul’s agreement in 2010 to receive the NSS baton from Washington

appears to have had several consideraons and meanings. First,

Washington was said to have picked Seoul on the basis of deep trust and

friendship between their presidents. President Obama reportedly felt

secure about having a close ally to help connue his vision of a nuclear-

free world.9 President Obama’s consideraons seemed to have includedSeoul’s posion as the direct recipient of North Korea’s nuclear threat and

the potenal to realize his vision for a nuclear-free world starng with a

nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.10

The ROK would want to show its growing stature by hosng two major

economic and security summits. But, more important, the NSS will instead

hold Seoul accountable to iniated agreements in the future and place

a burden of proof that it will connue to be a responsible internaonalplayer on the global stage.

In accepng the chairmanship, Seoul may have considered the symbolic

and pivotal ming of the NSS in geopolical history. The year 2012

is when the region will witness presidenal elecons and leadership

transions in the ROK, the United States, China, and Russia. It is also the

year when Pyongyang claims it will open its doors to becoming a “strong

and prosperous nation” as it celebrates the centennial of the regime’s

founding father, Kim Il-sung, while adjusting to a post-Kim Jong-il era.

The summit might also have been considered as a chance for the ROK to

highlight to the world the stark contrast between it—the responsible user of

nuclear energy and growing nuclear exporter—and North Korea—the rogue

aspirant for nuclear weapons—while implicitly pressuring Pyongyang to

Kim: 2012 Nuclear Security Summit




denuclearize and join the peaceful nuclear club. An assessment might have

also been made that the summit could be a venue for Seoul to adverse its 32-

year accident-free record as it shops for potenal buyers of nuclear reactors,

especially aer having won a major nuclear deal with the United Arab Emirates

in 2009. At the same me, such adversement would need to be matched by

transparency and credibility that its reactors are indeed safe and secure.

Korean Flair

Nuclear Safety-Security11

The Washington 2010 NSS was in eect an important iniave stemming

from President Obama’s Prague speech in April 2009. It rightly focusednarrowly on securing all vulnerable ssile materials and prevenng

nuclear terrorism, parcularly in the aermath of 9/11.

In the wake of the Japanese nuclear disaster, however, the 2012 Seoul

summit will in part be an inevitable reacon to Fukushima. March 2011

was another wake-up call that the world is not free from nuclear accidents

and signaled that a Fukushima-like incident caused by malefactors or

terrorist groups with access to nuclear facilies is a real threat. At the sameme, many states will connue to opt for nuclear power as an energy

alternave despite the horric events at Fukushima.

Just as United Naons Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s September 2011

system-wide study on Fukushima states, “there are several common

characteriscs shared by accidents and sabotage, such as reduced

eecveness of remaining systems, including through the loss of power,

communicaons, computer, safety and physical protecon systems; and

the loss of key operang, safety and security personnel.”12

Nuclear safety and nuclear security share a common denominator and

objecve—to protect life. Safety measures provide the basic foundaon

for addional security measures to prevent malicious acts; safety and

security steps can be taken to create synergies that reinforce and support

each other without handicapping the other. Substanve discussions can

take place on the safety-security nexus without losing sight of the main

objecve: nuclear security.

At the summit and in the Seoul Communiqué, world leaders could rst

acknowledge the relaonship between nuclear safety and security. They

can then agree on implemenng steps to strengthen safety measures

that serve nuclear security purposes and vice versa.




Sucient discussion on nuclear safety vis-à-vis security could naturally draw

aenon and interest from heads of state who would otherwise place a lesser

policy priority on nuclear security. The safety-security discussion can also

sustain the parcipaon of some states that believe sucient work already

exists on the nuclear security front since the 2010 Washington Summit.

The main obstacle in shining sucient aenon on the nuclear safety-security

nexus is the gap in percepon and interest among states. It appears internaonal

awareness and consensus on the need to strengthen safety and security

measures have grown quickly since Fukushima. However, the translaon of

such awareness into concrete acon remains unclear, due to diering naonal

interests and in light of the currently ostensible priority gap between Seoul and

Washington on the need to highlight this issue in the Seoul Communiqué.

At the September 2011 UN high-level meeng, President Lee said Seoul is “keen

to contribute to the peaceful use of nuclear energy by leading the 2012 Seoul

Nuclear Security Summit to a success.” In its pursuit to become a compeve

nuclear exporter and enjoy presge in the nuclear industry, Korea would need

validaon by a communiqué that adequately includes the nuclear safety-security

interface. While strengthened safety-security measures could help restore

the public’s condence in nuclear energy, the verdict on whether the SeoulCommuniqué is deemed a success for nuclear safety-security may eventually be

determined by the interpretaon of the language by respecve countries.

Nuclear safety-security may eventually appear in the Seoul Communiqué in

a single sentence or small paragraph at best. What is most important is that

its language—however long or short—adequately addresses the importance

of strengthening the interface and includes concrete, aconable steps. Such

steps, at best, should come in the form of naonal commitments if parcipangstates nd them too technical or polically dicult for a communiqué.

Possible language for the communiqué could be:

• Recognizing the inherent relaonship between nuclear security

and nuclear safety, areas of overlap, and the need to strengthen

the interface:

• Parcipang States will work naonally, bilaterally and mullaterally

to implement measures that strengthen and create synergies

between nuclear security and nuclear safety of facilies and materials.

• Parcipang States will work naonally, bilaterally and mullaterally

to ensure the security and safety of radioacve materials, and ghten

the management of such materials aracve for dirty bombs.




Nuclear power plants and facilies.

Fukushima demonstrated that terrorists and malefactors can re-create the

same condions—damaging a reactor’s cooling system, cung o-site power,

and damaging on-site emergency diesel generators—all of which could lead to

a meltdown and radiaon leaks. Summit parcipants could begin by working

naonally, bilaterally, or mullaterally to implement stronger safety-security

measures at nuclear power plants and facilies against sabotage, aack,

and insider threats, pursuant to and building upon the recommendaons

outlined by the IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents.13

Table 3: Nuclear Safety and Security Recommendaons by the

Internaonal Nuclear Safety Group, 2010

Level Recommendaon

Internaonal level Promote coordinaon between safety and

security at nuclear installaons by developing

security guidelines and safety standards that

are consistent and complementary while

developing combined assistance programs and

review and training missions.

State level Integrate safety and security authories

into a single regulatory agency responsible

for both safety and security regulaons, or

ensure compability and coordinaon among

regulatory agencies, and develop ways to

promote safety and security cultures taking

into account their similaries and dierences.

Operang organizaonal level Prime responsibility for safety and security

lies in the management of the operang

organizaon that ensures the coordinaon of safety and security from the conceptual stages

of development through all phases of a nuclear

installaon while ensuring that opmal balance

between safety and security are achieved.

Emergency response by

the operator, regulator,

and the state

The operator should centralize decision mak-

ing in a single management chain; emergency

preparedness and response plans in safety and

security need to be well coordinated, comple-

mentary, and coherent between all relevant en-es; joint exercises should be organized, and any

on-site acons by outside security forces should

be coordinated with the operator.

Source: Internaonal Nuclear Safety Group, The Interface between Safety and Security at

Nuclear Power Plants, Report no. INSAG 24 (Vienna: Internaonal Atomic Energy Agency, 2010).




This includes securing the electrical supply, protecng the reactor cool-

ing system, making spent fuel ponds safer, guarding the main control

room beer, and strengthening the containment structure.14

The IAEA Nuclear Safety Group’s 2010 report on the nuclear safety andsecurity interface, shown in Table 3, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s 2008 security regulaons, in Table 4, are exisng models

that can be considered in parallel or in conjuncon with each other. The

challenge would be to persuade states that may be wary of allocang

addional funds to implement stronger safety-security measures.

Parcularly controversial proposals such as placing more armed guards

at nuclear plants and facilies would require persuading states with

diering threat percepons about the value of such measures and then

deciding whether specic baselines—in this case on the type of arms

used by guards—are needed. The same logic applies to calls for a baseline

security standard:15 the challenge is how to overcome polical barriers,

sovereignty issues, and diering threat percepons before adopng

much-needed, and preferably mandatory, universal standards.

Table 4: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Recommendaons, 2008Recommendaon Descripon

Safety and security interfaceRequirements to ensure that security measures

do not compromise plant safety

Mixed oxide (MOX) fuelPhysical security requirements to prevent the

or diversion of MOX fuel

Cyber security

Required submissions from nuclear power plants

of how digital computer and communicaons

systems and safety networks are protected

against cyber aacks

Aircra aack migave

strategies and response

Strategies to respond to aircra aacks and

migang the eects of large explosions and res

Plant access authorizaonImplementaon of more rigorous programs for

authorizing access

Security personnel training

and qualicaon

Security personnel requirements include

addional physical tness standards, higher

qualicaon scores for mandatory personneltests, and on-the-job training requirements

Source: Mark Holt and Anthony Andrews, Nuclear Power Plant Security and Vulnerabilies,

RL34331 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 23 August 2010).




Radioacve materials.

As a representave of states that possess neither nuclear weapons nor

ssile materials, Seoul is apparently placing a higher priority on radioac-

ve sources. For some countries, the threat of a “dirty bomb” that dis-

perses radioacve materials is considered greater than or as serious as

that posed by a nuclear weapon, although nuclear weapons states do

recognize the serious risks posed by them.

Hundreds of medical and industrial radioacve sources are abandoned, sto-

len, or lost each year, thus constung both safety and security concerns. The

threat of radiaon leaks or loss of control over radioacve materials caused

by nature, internal system failures, or malicious intent could be included in

this category of discussions as well as radiological terrorism prevenon.

Radiological terrorism or sabotage—either through the use of a radiologi-

cal device (radiological dispersal device or radiaon-eming device16) or

aacks on nuclear facilies—would be an aracve means for terrorists

to cause public fear and serious damage.

Table 5: Korea’s Systems to Trace and Track Radioacve Sources

System Descripon

Radiaon Safety

Informaon System (RASIS)

Web-based cradle-to-grave control system

integrang necessary regulatory acvies and

safety management processes to protect the

public and environment from harmful radiaon

exposure

Computerized Technical

Advisory Systems for a

Radiological Emergency

(AtomCARE)

Idenes the safety status of a power plant

in the case of abnormal radiological events,

predicts radiological eects, predicts aected

areas, and recommends necessary acons

Radiaon Sources LocaonTracking System (RADLOT)

Combines global posioning system (GPS) withmobile telecommunicaons technology to track

the locaon of lost or stolen radiaon sources

in real me

Integrated Environmental

Radiaon Monitoring

Network (IERNet)

Detects radioacve contaminaon in the early

stages of an accident, collects and manages

informaon from 37 regional monitoring

staons naonwide, and publicly discloses such

informaon on the Internet in real me

Source: Korea Instute for Nuclear Safety.




The ROK could also capitalize on its renowned technology for tracing and

tracking radioacve sources by seng an example and sharing its know-

how with summit parcipants. World leaders could also discuss ways to

export Korea’s tracking technology (Table 5).

Mulple hazards and emergency response.

The world has entered an age in which nuclear and radiological threats

emanate not from a single source but from nature’s fury, human error,

crime, and terrorists—and combinaons of those factors. Countries are

not only threatened by the forces of nature (“natech disasters”) but are put

increasingly at risk from “maltech disasters”17 wrought by any type of ma-

licious acon, including insider threats from a facility’s workforce. Further

complicang the picture is a third adversary—a combinaon of forces—inwhich opportunisc antagonists may seek to me malicious acvity with

natural disasters. This scenario would not only weaken safety systems but

also overburden security personnel and distract managers’ aenon.18

The possibility of combined natural and malicious disasters warrants their

consideraon in integrated and complementary nuclear safety-security plans

for nuclear facilies. Safety personnel (operators, engineers, and technicians)

and the security sta (military, police, and guards) must be able to respondharmoniously in the overall emergency planning.19 Safety and security

consideraons cannot be improvised on the y during an emergency. They must

be built into a plant throughout all phases of its service life, from design and

construcon, to roune operaon, to decommissioning and dismantlement.

Safety and security thus begin at the drawing board, with an assessment of

candidate sites for the plant and the design of the installaon itself.

Aconable steps should be coordinated and applied throughout thedierent segments—vercally from the highest level of internaonal

legal frameworks down to naonal legislaon and human resources

development, as well as horizontally among nuclear facilies, infrastructure,

and organizaons that transport nuclear material and use radioacve

sources. Inslling the right habits and traits in responders—the right culture

and governance—is crical. Leadership and management need to be

demonstrated at the highest levels—hence the emphasis on governance—

to ensure eecve coordinaon and balance between safety and security.This could be a challenge for nuclear “newcomers” and amid a steady post-

Fukushima trend among some states, parcularly in Asia, that connue to

opt for nuclear power to meet their energy needs.




Nuclear Instruments and Legal Frameworks

As a country that shares a border with a nuclear-armed regime, the ROK

will nd it dicult to ignore a discussion on nonproliferaon due to its

nuclear proliferang northern neighbor parcularly since the crux of

nuclear security is ensuring that vulnerable nuclear materials do not fall

into the hands of terrorists or rogue regimes. Seoul may wish to highlight

nonproliferaon in the context of implemenng nuclear instruments

and legal frameworks that prohibit and criminalize the illegal tracking

and smuggling of nuclear parts, materials, and know-how. This focus

would prevent both repeang exisng nonproliferaon discussions in

other internaonal forums and legimizing, for example, North Korea’s

nuclear programs as well as those of other states and actors that are notsignatories or in violaon of the NPT.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s September 2011 report also stressed

that “in order to properly address nuclear security, the internaonal

community should promote universal adherence to and implementaon

of relevant internaonal legal instruments.”20

Korea should prod world leaders to not only support the objecves of

key, internaonal nuclear security instruments spulated in the 2010 NSScommuniqué21 but to rafy, commit to, and strengthen them. The summit

chair should drum up more support for aggressively and fully implemenng

three key instruments and iniaves: the Convenon on the Physical

Protecon of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment, the

Internaonal Convenon on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

(ICSANT), and UN Security Council Resoluon 1540 (Table 6).

A priority for the NSS could be to raonalize the exisng legal frameworksby designang, with certain organizaonal adjustments, the IAEA to

help coordinate the relevant naonal, regional, and mullateral bodies.

Praccal measures that have been proposed by some experts include

harmonizing naonal laws and seeing that law enforcement, intelligence

agencies, emergency respwonders, the nuclear industry, and civil society

organizaons work toward the stringent implementaon of the laws.23

IAEA and Subsequent Summits

The NSS should strengthen the IAEA’s role to further assist naonal

regulators. Although naonal regulators have primary responsibility and

authority for nuclear safety-security, the IAEA should connue to be the

main agency that provides advice and experse to strengthen nuclear

safety-security around the world. The NSS would be integral in injecng




Table 6: Internaonal Nuclear Instruments and Iniaves

Convenon on the Physical

Protecon of Nuclear

Materials (CPPNM) and2005 Amendment

Entered into force in 1987. The legally binding

convenon was amended in 2005 to include

commitments to the physical protecon of nuclear facilies and materials in domesc use,

storage, and transit. However, the amendment

will enter into force when two-thirds of the

convenon pares rafy, accept, or approve

it. The United States and the ROK have yet to

rafy the amendment, although Seoul plans to

rafy it by the end of 2011. Parcipang states

should also agree to protect all nuclear materials

and facilies at the level consistent with theh revision of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security

Recommendaons on Physical Protecon

of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilies

(INFCIRC/225 Rev 5).

The Internaonal

Convenon for the

Suppression of Acts of

Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)

Criminalizes specic acts of nuclear terrorism

and aims to prevent threats, aempts, and

aacks involving possible targets such as nuclear

power plants and reactors. The convenon

obligates alleged oenders to be either

extradited or prosecuted. It went into force on 7

July 2007.




the polical force needed to ensure the implementaon of any exisng

and new standards, guidelines, and measures in both nuclear security

and safety. They can also help breed and integrate security cultures into

their naonal cultures and governance. It is important that the NSS and

other ad hoc groups are not alternaves to the IAEA, whose mandate

should be updated frequently to adequately fulll new tasks and respond

to evolving nuclear threats. In other words, the IAEA should not remain

hostage to the pre-Fukushima status quo.

UN Security Council

Resoluon 1540

Obligates all member states to establish strict

naonal controls to prevent proliferaon

of weapons of mass destrucon. Primary

obligaons are to prohibit support to nonstate

actors seeking such items; to adopt and enforceeecve laws prohibing the proliferaon of

such items to nonstate actors, and prohibing

assisng or nancing such proliferaon; and

to take and enforce eecve measures to

control these items in order to prevent their

proliferaon as well as to control the provision

of funds and services that contribute to

proliferaon. Implementaon is measured by the

number of states that have submied naonalreports to the 1540 Commiee as required by

the resoluon. Twenty-nine of the 192 member

states of the UN have not submied country

reports as of May 2011.

Global Iniave to Combat

Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

Internaonal partnership of 82 naons with

the mission of strengthening global capacity

to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear

terrorism by conducng mullateral acvies

that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures,

and interoperability of partner naons. Launched

in July 2006 by the United States and Russia,

the GICNT builds on ICSANT, CPPNM, and UN

Resoluons 1373 and 1540. The latest meeng

was held in Daejeon, Korea, on 29–30 June 2011.




A third summit would help complete President Obama’s four-year objec-

ve, cement the iniaves agreed upon by world leaders and address

evolving future threats. It would prove helpful for Seoul to strategize

near-term (second summit) and medium-term (third summit) goals when

craing the 2012 agenda. A Seoul summit with a slightly expanded scope

that includes nuclear safety-security and radioacve sources could serve

as the turning point to eventually broadening the agenda further at future

summits to meet evolving global security challenges.

Broadening the agenda will not necessarily dilute the NSS as long as leaders

remain commied to the central focus of nuclear security. For example, the

2010 Washington Summit included radioacve sources but with a lesser

degree of importance and will now be given more weight in 2012. While

the future geopolical and security landscape is uncertain, expanding the

agenda again in 2014 to include, for example, safeguards may become a

natural undertaking.

It would be worthwhile to approach, preferably by 2011, a third NSS

chair that understands the objecves of both Seoul and Washington. It

may be eecve to pass the baton to Russia or a European country like

France that is also interested in addressing nuclear safety issues. Anothersymbolic opon could be a BRIC country (Brazil, Russia, India, China),

although it may be useful to alternate regions. The chairmanship would

provide the opportunity to steer and shape the future nuclear discourse.

The troika system is a familiar one in internaonal forums such as the

G-20, where the previous, incumbent, and future chairs work together

to ensure connuity and management of the G-20’s work. A similar method

should be applied, ocially or unocially, to the NSS if parcipang states

decide to hold subsequent summits.

Summits aer 2014 are necessary to maintain urgency of nuclear security

at the highest governmental level and ensure proper implementaon. The

challenge would be how to aract all heads of state back to a nuclear security

summit, which may warrant further expansion of the agenda. Once nuclear

security measures are normalized, the summit process could be brought

down to the senior or working level of governments.

It may also prove worthwhile for Washington to connue spearheading full

implementaon of key 2010 iniaves despite a change in chairmanship,

while Seoul could be responsible for seeing through its iniaves. For example,

the United States could connue to track the bulk of country commitments in

which it has resources and leverage, such as the minimizaon of HEU.




The creaon of an “observer” category should be considered in future summits

for states that would otherwise be deemed as “spoilers.” The purpose would

be to eventually expose more countries to best pracces, and it would serve

to further raise awareness while prevenng obstacles in securing unanimous

consensus on NSS agreements.

North Korea

The North Korean nuclear problem was apparently one of the key consider-

aons when Seoul assumed the NSS chairmanship. The ROK Foreign Minis-

try’s 2011 Work Report also spulated plans to use the 2012 NSS to persuade

North Korea’s denuclearizaon.24

It is unrealisc, however, to expect a direct or substanal discussion on NorthKorea at the 2012 NSS because it is not a venue to resolve Pyongyang’s nucle-

ar problem. At the same me, it would sll be a grave loss for Seoul if its lead-

ers neglect to menon the ROK’s biggest security threat, parcularly in the

face of the general public, who usually associate “nuclear threats” with “North

Korea.” Since the NSS aims to secure ssile materials in respecve countries,

the challenge will be to deal with it in a manner that does not legimize

Pyongyang’s nuclear programs despite their possession of nuclear devices.

Among the world’s nuclear facilies, the reclusive regime’s facilies may bethe installaons most secure from outsider threats, but their safety remains a

concern. The other challenge would be to provide further impetus to exisng

frameworks like the six-party talks while trying to draw a line between the NSS

process and the NPT.

President Lee Myung-bak has repeatedly extended a condional invitaon to

the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.25 Possible condions to grant eligi-

bility for the North’s parcipaon as an NSS observer could be for Pyongyangto return to the status and spirit of the September 2005 Joint Statement, and

for all six pares to return to the mullateral bargaining table before the NSS.

Aending the summit would also be a win-win situaon for North Korea as

Fukushima, which rocked the reactors in a country known for its state-of-the

art nuclear technology, would have sent a clear safety alert to the regime.

It would be polically dicult, if not impossible, to explicitly name North

Korea in the Seoul Communiqué. However, ambiguous language can be

chosen without menoning North Korea, but with clear implicaons. For

example, possible communiqué language could include:

• Nong the potenal for terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized

actors to acquire nuclear materials and parts, we:




• “Call on all states, regimes, and non-state actors with aspiraons

to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear parts, as well as

those in violaon of the Nuclear Non-Proliferaon Treaty, to surre-

nder their weapons ambions, roll back exisng nuclear programs,

and enjoy greater benets as responsible internaonal players and

users of peaceful nuclear energy while cooperang mullaterally to

secure all vulnerable nuclear and radioacve materials.”

• “Call on nuclear-armed states and aspirants currently in violaon of

the NPT to refrain from transferring nuclear materials, parts, technol-

ogy, and know-how.”

One praccal way to deal with North Korea at the 2012 NSS could beto enhance the implementaon of UN Security Council Resoluon 1540.

While 1540 targets non-state actors, a more vigilant mullateral ap-

proach can be taken since Pyongyang is a major nuclear threat and pro-

liferator believed to assist non-state actors. Another opon could be to

adopt a separate chairman’s statement on North Korea (and Iran), but

it would sll need to overcome the tricky task of agreeing on the most

appropriate language for full endorsement by all parcipang countries.

Any statement separate from the ocial summit communiqué absentunanimous endorsement would lose credibility and impact. This is why a

separate meeng among like-minded states on the sidelines of the sum-

mit, though useful and necessary, would lack impact.

At the very least, President Lee could reiterate in speeches and conver-

saons the imperave of resolving the North Korean problem at an early

date, parcularly in light of Pyongyang’s November 2010 disclosure of its

uranium enrichment program. States involved in the six-party talks couldalso use the summit to engage in bilateral and mullateral side discussions

on the North Korean issue.

Conclusion

As the 2012 NSS chair, the ROK brings clear advantages and capabilies to

the table in leading the global nuclear security iniave. In order for the 2012

Seoul Summit to be remembered as the implementaon event rather thanthe conceptualizaon event seen in 2010, it is crical that next year’s summit

goes beyond the 2010 pledges and agrees to take concrete, aconable steps.

It is important to have an all-encompassing 2012 communiqué that does not

compromise or sacrice depth and quanty of aconable steps.




There are clear ways in which Seoul can capitalize on its strengths to

avor the 2012 communiqué with a “Korean twist” as it maintains depth

on key substanve issues that ensure the security of nuclear materials,

parts, and facilies:

• Ensure the adequate spulaon of strengthened and synergisc nuclear

and radiological safety-security measures in the Seoul Communiqué.

• Persuade more states to sign, rafy, and implement key nuclear

security instruments and convenons.

• Strengthen the IAEA to further assist naonal regulators.

• Approach, at the earliest possible date, a like-minded candidate for

the 2014 NSS chair such as Russia, France, or even a BRIC country

to strategize the agenda for follow-on summits and discuss ways

to further expand the scope of the NSS agenda to address evolving

nuclear threats.

• Encourage more country commitments, or “house gis,” from heads of

state on areas on which unanimous consensus would be dicult to reach.

• Further contribute to global nuclear security by sharing its knowledgeand experse in other key areas, including the tracking of radioacve

sources and the conversion of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) as

a leading example of a country that cleaned out its U.S.-origin HEU

and developed LEU-based fuels.

• Adequately address the North Korean nuclear issue and other outlier

states by including ambiguous yet targeted communiqué language,

and enhancing UNSC Resoluon 1540 implementaon targeng

Pyongyang’s provisions to non-state actors’ proliferaon acvies,

and considering the creaon of an “observer” category.

Seoul is tasked with the responsibility and challenge to not only chair a

major internaonal summit but also show eecve leadership by furthering

the 2010 nuclear security goals while leaving behind its legacy. The

slightly broader agenda for the 2012 NSS pressures Seoul to prove that an

expanded communiqué can provide an eecve means to combat nuclear

and radiological terrorism without dilung the central focus of nuclearsecurity. The barometer of success for the 2012 NSS may eventually rest in

the naonal commitments, or “house gis,” pledged by each state.

Diplomacy will serve to be an increasingly integral tool in garnering

consensus and implemenng nonbinding guidelines to secure vulnerable




nuclear materials. Polical force needs to be injected into nuclear security

measures from the summit level to help certain states alleviate major

domesc budgetary and bureaucrac hurdles. Concrete steps are needed

in order for the 2012 Seoul Summit to implement the ideas conceptualized

at the 2010 Washington Summit. The fundamental challenge for world

leaders going forward will be overcoming polical and diplomac hurdles in

all areas of nuclear security. Some states may be reluctant to discuss certain

issues at the NSS, preferring to deal instead with them at other forums such as

the IAEA. Sovereignty and condenality issues may also prevent deepening

certain nuclear security measures.

Another key challenge is craing a 2012 agenda and communiqué that

will maintain the aenon and interest of all parcipang states on the

need for future global nuclear security iniaves at the summit level.

While March 2012 may be a chance for the Lee administraon to raise

Korea’s internaonal prole, the NSS would in part be a metric of

success on nuclear safety-security and key nuclear security priories. The

challenge lies in clearly demonstrang that benets outweigh the costs,

and that states would have a naonal interest in further invesng their

polical capital in nuclear security.

The ROK is faced with two dilemmas: it carries with it the responsibility of dealing

with both nuclear security linked to North Korea and nuclear terrorism, and

nuclear safety linked to the implicaons of Fukushima on Korea and in waters

shared by neighboring China and Japan. But the NSS is also an opportunity, as well

as a challenge, for Seoul to show eecve leadership in deepening global nuclear

security measures, parcularly in a busy polical year that will be dominated by

domesc issues soon aer the close of the summit.

References

1 As of December 2011, the envisioned number of invitees was almost 60 world leaders.The last-minute addions may not get a voice to alter the Seoul communiqué in theJanuary 2012 New Delhi Sherpa meeng.

2 See Duyeon Kim, “Fukushima and the Seoul 2012 Nuclear Security Summit,” Bullen of the Atomic Sciensts, 18 May 2011, hp://thebullen.org/web-edion/op-eds/fukushi-ma-and-the-seoul-2012-nuclear-security-summit.

3 The author’s hyphenated term “nuclear safety-security” indicates a combined conceptspecically indicang the interface, as opposed to two separate concepts. Thus, nuclearsafety-security can be dened as the areas in which nuclear safety and nuclear securityoverlap in nuclear and radiological facilies and materials.

4 Nuclear security: the prevenon and detecon of and response to the, sabotage,unauthorized access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear material,other radioacve substances, or their associated facilies; this is the working denion




established by the h meeng of the IAEA Director General’s Advisory Group onNuclear Security, 1–5 December 2003.

5 Sous-Sherpa is the term given to the deputy negoators responsible for craing theagenda, communiqué, and work plan for the NSS.

6 Sherpas began the 2012 NSS discussion in June 2011 with 10 issues of most interestto parcipants in 2011: 1. Management guidelines for HEU (France), 2. Transporta-on security (Japan), 3. Illicit tracking (Jordan), 4. Nuclear forensics (Netherlands),5. Nuclear security culture (Russia), 6. Treaty racaon (Indonesia), 7. Coordinaonof exisng iniaves (Pakistan), 8. Informaon security of sensive technology andknowledge (United Kingdom), 9. Radioacve sources (Germany, Korea), 10. Nuclearsafety and security (Korea).

7 President Lee Myung-bak said in his presidenal inaugural address: “The ROK will take a more posive stance with a greater vision and carry out global diplomacyunder which we acvely cooperate with the internaonal community. . . . As bengour economic size and diplomac capacity, our diplomacy will contribute to promong

and protecng universal values. Korea will acvely parcipate in United Naonspeacekeeping operaons as well as enlarge its ocial development assistance(ODA).”Cheong Wa Dae (Blue House), 25 February 2008.

8 Ministry of Naonal Defense (MND), Defense White Paper 2008 (Seoul: MND, Republicof Korea, December 2008). The language in the ROK’s Defense White Paper 2010 is:“Keeping security in the forefront of the mind, the ROK Government set its naonalsecurity objecves as maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula; estab lishing the foundaon for cizens’ safety and naonal prosperity; and enhancing thecountry’s internaonal capacity and stature.”

9 Various media reports in April 2010.

10 Chu Seung-ho, “Korea to Chair 2012 Nuclear Security Summit,” (Korean language)Yohap News Agency, 13 April 2010.

11 This paper will use the term “nuclear safety-security” to refer specically to the areasof overlap, or the interface of nuclear safety and security, as one combined concept asopposed to two separate concepts.

12 United Naons, United Naons System-wide Study on the Implicaons of the Accidentat the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Report no. SG/HLM/2011/1 (New York:United Naons, Report of the Secretary-General, 2011), 20.

13 “Nuclear Security Guidelines,” IAEA, www-ns.iaea.org/security/nuclear_security_ series.asp.

14 Duyeon Kim and Jungmin Kang, “Where Nuclear Safety and Security Meet,” Bullen of the Atomic Sciensts, January/February 2012 edion.

15 Kenneth Luongo, “Creang a 21st-Century Nuclear Material Security Architecture,”Policy Analysis Brief, Stanley Foundaon, November 2010.

16 A radiological dispersal device (RDD) contains radioacve materials that can be spreadover a wide area and does not result in a nuclear explosion nor is a nuclear bomb.A popular type of RDD is a “dirty bomb.” A radiaon-eming device (RED) is a morepassive form of radiological terrorism that exposes people to radioacve sources overa short or long period of me. See “Radiological Terrorism Tutorial,” Nuclear ThreatIniave, www.n.org/h_learnmore/radtutorial/chapter01_02.html.

17 “Maltech disaster” is a term invented by Igor Khripunov, Center for Internaonal Tradeand Security, University of Georgia.

18 For more details, see Igor Khripunov and Duyeon Kim, “Nature and Malice: ConfronngMulple Hazards to Nuclear Power Infrastructure,” Bullen of the Atomic Sciensts, 7September 2011.

19 Igor Khripunov and Duyeon Kim, “Time to Think Nuclear Safety-Security,” Korea Times,8 August 2011.




20 United Naons, United Naons System-wide Study on the Implicaons of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant .

21 For the full text of the 2010 communiqué, see “Communiqué of the Washington Nucle-ar Security Summit,” White House, Oce of the Press Secretary, 13 April 2010, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-oce/communiqu-washington-nuclear-security-summit.

22 Fissile Materials Working Group, “Strengthening Nuclear Security: The Legal Agenda,”Bullen of the Atomic Sciensts, 8 April 2010, hp://thebullen.org/web-edion/colum-nists/ssile-materials-working-group/strengthening-nuclear-security-the-legal-agen.

23 Ibid.

24 Kim Mi-kyung, “North Korean Nuclear Issue Excluded from 2nd Nuclear Security Sum-mit: Background and Prospects,” (Korean language) Seoul Shinmun, 1 February 2011.

25 On 9 May 2011 in Berlin, President Lee said, “I oer a proposal to invite ChairmanKim Jong-il to the Nuclear Security Summit on March 26–27 next year if North Koreaagrees with the internaonal community that it will be rm and sincere about giving

up nuclear programs.” This is in line with a similar comment he made aer the 2010Washington NSS when he stated that he would “gladly invite” Pyongyang to the follow-on summit if the regime rejoins and complies with the NPT and demonstrates a clearcommitment to denuclearizaon.

26 In September 2007, the U.S. repatriated all of its HEU fuel from the ROK by removing 11fresh fuel assemblies containing approximately 1.8 kg of HEU from research reactors 1and 2 located at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Instute in Daejeon, Korea. For de-tails, see: “NNSA Removes All U.S.-Origin Highly Enriched Uranium Fuel from the Republicof Korea,” Naonal Nuclear Security Administraon Press Release, 19 September 2007.



K E i I i f A i

Authors:

John Everard

José Luis León-Manríquez

Yeongkwan Song

Yoon-shik Park

Michael J. Mazarr and the Study Groupon North Korean Futures

Balbina Y. Hwang

Abraham M. Denmark

Sharon Perry, Heidi Linton,Louise Gresham, and Gary Schoolnik

Duyeon Kim

On Korea began in December 2006 with the initiation of KEI’s

Academic Paper Series, a year-long program that provides both

leading Korea scholars and new voices from around the world

to speak and write on current events and trends on the

Korean peninsula.

Each year, KEI commissions approximately ten papers and

distributes them individually to over 5,000 government officials,

think tank experts, and scholars around the United States andthe world. Authors are invited to the Korea Economic Institute

to discuss their research before a Washington, DC policy

audience. At the conclusion of each series, the papers are

compiled and published together as the On Korea volume.

To learn more about how to contribute to future Academic

Papers Series forums and other programs at KEI, please visit:

www.keia.org.

ark

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2012 Nuclear Security Summit: The Korean Twist, by Ms. Duyeon Kim

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