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STATES AND THE NUCLEAR POWER: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE1

Artemio Baigorri, Manuela Caballero, Mar Chaves2

Contenido STATES AND THE NUCLEAR POWER: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ............... 1

Abstract ............................................................................................................... 2

Resumen .............................................................................................................. 2

Introduction: the nuclear question or, the nuclear as a question ...................... 2

Milestones in the global nuclear debate ............................................................ 5

An Ominous Nuketopia ................................................................................ 5

The end of the dream: the antinuclear movement ........................................ 7

The reaction: the nuclear lobby ...................................................................... 9

Climate change at the service of nuclear power .......................................... 13

Nuclear strategies ............................................................................................. 13

Type A: State Monopolist Nuclearism .......................................................... 14

Type B: Nuclear Liberalism (libertarianism) .................................................. 15

Type C: the Precautionary Principle, or Moratorium.................................... 16

Type D: Return to the atom .......................................................................... 17

Type E: Abandonment ................................................................................... 18

Type F: The prohibition or doing without model .......................................... 18

The Fukushima effect: a heat of the moment reaction or changing trends? 18

Are there factors which explain nuclear policies? .......................................... 20

Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 25

Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 26

Web references ............................................................................................. 28

Autors ................................................................................................................ 28

1 A versin of this paper has been published in International Review of Sociology: Revue

Internationale de Sociologie, Volume 22, Issue 3, 2012

2 Anlisis de la Realidad Social (ARS) Reasearch Group, Universidad de Extremadura (Spain). The first

results of this research, financed by the Centro de Estudios del Cambio Social (Fundacin Encuentro), were published in the Informe Espaa 2009. E-mail address for correspondence: baigorri@unex.es

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the evolution of public policies on nuclear energy from an international perspective highlighting an interesting sociological paradox: the opposition to the nuclear power contributed to the development of the environmental movement; and at present, the promoters of this kind of energy are including environmental arguments in their discourses: the fear of climate change and the reduction of CO2. Despite Kyoto Protocol does not accept this kind of energy as Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), its promotion is carried out on the basis of environment objectives, so that the nuclear lobby is obtaining more social acceptation thanks to the environmental discourse in the last four decades. For the carrying out this research, the nuclear policies from an international level are analyzed inside a wider research about the Nuclear Debate financed by Encuentro Foundation (Spain).

Resumen

El artculo analiza la evolucin de las polticas, a nivel planetario, sobre la energa nuclear, a partir de una interesante paradoja sociolgica: siendo uno de los componentes de la Sociedad Industrial madura que ms ha contribuido al crecimiento del ecologismo y el ambientalismo, por oposicin, hoy las corporaciones que la promueven vienen incorporando como base argumental fundamental los propios logros del movimiento ambientalista: el miedo al cambio climtico y el objetivo de reduccin del CO2. Aunque el protocolo de Kyoto no acepta esa energa como Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), paradjicamente se asiste su promocin a nivel planetario en base a los principios de sostenibilidad. Lo que se define como lobby nuclear consigue pues, paradjicamente, ms aceptacin que nunca en las ltimos cuatro dcadas, gracias al discurso ambientalista. Para la realizacin del estudio se analizaron las polticas nucleares a nivel planetario, dentro de una investigacin ms amplia sobre el Debate Nuclear financiada por la Fundacin Encuentro (Espaa).

Introduction: the nuclear question or, the nuclear as a question

In recent years the nuclear debate has reappeared on the scene, a cognitive conflict about the nature of nuclear energy and its risks. Public and private scientific institutions, public bodies, political parties social agents, business groups, churches, ecological groups and other NGOs use the mass media and other generators and/or transmitters

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of public opinion to argue for the use of nuclear fission as a source of energy, or against its use, whether for civil or military purposes.

The debate, however, is a very old one. Leaving aside religion, the nuclear question is perhaps the area of public debate which has achieved the greatest degree of intensity and persistence, with its four constituent elements: scientific, technical, economic and moral, being deeply penetrated by and themselves deeply penetrating systems of values. Although the technical developments subject to debate are many (because they put employment stability at risk and so generate Luddite fears or because they put the nature of what is human at risk, such as cloning or other transgenic procedures), the nuclear debate is primary and basic leading either to acceptance or rejection. It should also be remembered that behind the cognitive conflict there exists (as in many other conflicts, a material base, because the profits of many business groups and the power of some institutions and scientists, depends wholly and exclusively on the acceptability of nuclear energy.

The debate began when, after the use of nuclear energy for military purposes (1945), the knowledge acquired for this purpose was applied to civil purposes (civilized) with the construction (1951) of the first nuclear reactor for the production of electricity. Since then the semantic fields of nuclear weapons (McMurrin, 1987) and the peaceful use of nuclear energy have been closely related (Gamsson, Modigiliani, 1989).

But this is a paradoxical debate. It is so firstly with regard to the changing position of the actors involved. For three decades it was the anti-nuclear side that led the way but since the accidents at Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 and Chernobyl (1986) and the application of the precautionary principle by many governments it has been the proponents of nuclear energy who have fomented the debate at the local and global level and tried to modify public opinion in those countries with the highest level of opposition to nuclear power. Furthermore, only one of the parties to the debate makes its position - anti-nuclear - clear. The other side, while it works implicitly in favor of the promotion of nuclear energy, does not make its position explicit and says that it is defending the debating of the issue, in the hope that the more nuclear power is talked about then the more acceptable it will become. And finally, the debate is also paradoxical in symbolic terms. The promotion of nuclear energy at the beginning of the 1960s was based on the idea of overcoming the Industrial Society. The name Atomic Age was even among those successively used to attempt to define an emerging new society; others included the Technotronic, Leisure, Information and Post-Industrial Societies). However, the anti-nuclear critique would convert this form of energy into the paradigm of the evils of the Industrial Society, seeing it as expressing, better than any other technical achievement, humanitys capacity for self-destruction.

There have been three distinct phases to the nuclear debate. The first, strongly linked to the military industry, was characterized by an almost irrational technological optimism which saw nuclear power almost as a panacea for all the ills of humanity. This dream collapsed when scientists and other former participants in nuclear programs alerted the world to its dangers. Among them were Nobel Prize winners and thinkers

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such as Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Joseph Rotblat, Linus Pauling, Barry Commoner, John Gofman, Leo Szilard and Eugene Rabinowitch.

The second phase began after the 1973 oil crisis when nuclear energy appeared to offer a response to the shortage of fossil fuels and plans were made for a massive expansion of the nuclear industry. This time the nuclear dream was confronted by two nightmares, the anti-nuclear movements of the 1970s and the consequences of the TMI and Chernobyl accidents. Furthermore, in some countries the same energy crisis which encouraged the development of nuclear programs generated a financial crisis which led to their being put on hold3.

The third stage began with the situation that arose in the wake of the Kyoto Treaty. The manufactures of nuclear power plants and the big electricity companies (although the latter were already diversifying their investments toward renewable energy sources), presented nuclear energy as a rational response to the challenges of global warming. With some anti-nuclear movements weakened during the first decade of the 21st century and faced with a powerful global pressure group involving energy firms, research groups in need of finance, publicity firms in need of income sources etc., the pro-nuclear side of the argument has started to win the battle. The economic crisis initially brought new allies to the pro-nuclear side; the trade unions, organizations that have sometimes been critical of nuclear energy but which show few ecological scruples when there is a shortage of jobs. The result of this was a surge in pro-nuclear policies at the international level, either through the extension of the service life of existing nuclear power stations or through the construction of new ones, after 2006.

Figure 1

3 For example, in Spain the moratorium on nuclear power imposed by the government of Felipe

Gonzlez (1984) was produced more by the financial problems experienced by the main electricity companies involved, as well the banks (Banca Catalana) that supported them, than by anti-nuclear pressure.

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This is the process that is analyzed in our study but two fresh nightmares suddenly appeared on the scene: the Fukushima accident and the global financial crisis, the worst since 1929. Are we once more entering a period of nuclear stagnation, produced by the fact that only serious accidents and financial crises are able to counterbalance the capacity to influence of the nuclear lobby? This could be the case but our hypothesis is that is it is most improbable.

This present study derives from a previous one into attitudes towards nuclear energy in Spain (Baigorri, Chaves & Caballero, 2009), which showed the necessity to connect the local debate - the usual perspective in the sociological literature (Garca, 1987; Gamsson & Modigiliani, 1989; Rosa & Dunlap, 1994) - with the global debate in the arena of the strongly interconnected Telematic Society (Baigorri, 2006:203). On the basis of this study we were able to see how states set themselves up as actors which, in response to stimuli (energy infrastructure, political configuration, cultural features, public opinion, etc.) opt for certain energy policies and also seek to influence the adoption of energy policies in other countries. This paper examines these questions with a view to improving the understanding the issues, background and frameworks that lead to the formation of national positions.

Milestones in the global nuclear debate

An Ominous Nuketopia

There is no doubt that the strong link between the civil and military use of nuclear energy forms the basis of its polemical character. It is a form of energy the development of which was initially encouraged by the Third Reich and which is still today the focus of debates among historians of science about the role played by physicists in this period

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(Hoffman, Walker, 2006). The emigration to the United Kingdom and the USA of German scientists who had lost funding or who felt threatened because they were Jews, and that of others to the Soviet Union after the defeat of the Nazi regime put in motion a complex research process in search of a weapon that would ensure the definitive elimination of the enemy. This was what made nuclear energy a startling and frightening force. Humanity was able to see at Hiroshima what the results of playing with that fire would be. The smoke from the Hiroshima bomb had barely cleared when Albert Einstein, Linus Pauling and other scientists set up the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists (ECAS). Although its initial objective was simply to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy some of its members were subject to persecution.

On the basis of the ambiguous Atoms for Peace speech made by President Eisenhower at the General Assembly of the United Nations (1953) a mystique of progress was constructed, a veritable nuketopia surrounding nuclear energy with the mass media as architects of the popular imagination. The Atomic Age was the name which became popular for this promising future which seemed to be on its way thanks to a supposedly ubiquitous and almost free source of energy. The Atomic Energy Commission of the USA forecast that by the year 2000 the country would have 1000 nuclear power stations. The current figure is 100.

However, many detractors of nuketopia quickly appeared on the scene. The ECAS, under the leadership of Pauling, denounced the activities of the military-industrial complex which began to grow around nuclear energy. The committee was radically opposed to the use of nuclear energy for civil purposes on the basis of moral principles, the evidence gathered of the risks involved and the fact that it would be impossible to produce nuclear weapons without the existence of nuclear reactors (Wellock, 1998). The first success achieved by what was soon to become a social movement was the abandonment in 1964 of the first commercial nuclear power project in the United States, at Bodega Bay in California, after a lengthy legal and political conflict.

On this occasion it was neither religious irrationality nor Luddite fears that were the basis of the critique. It arose rather from the very heart of the Science and Technology complex (Goffman, Tampli, 1971), a characteristic that was to profoundly mark the anti-nuclear movement. Even the strategic reports from the Rand Corporation and the Hudson Institute (Kahn, 1962, 1965) on the unthinkable(nuclear war) ironically served as proof that while nuclear energy existed then so would nuclear weapons and so the temptation to use them, even at the risk of total war.

In Europe, national, ideological and linguistic diversity limited its impact and the refusal to participate and anti-nuclear commitment of some scientists were important factors. The development of atomic research began in France (1939) and it was to be its first researcher (Irne Joliot-Curie, Nobel Prize winner in 1935 and designer of the first French nuclear reactor) was to be the person who drew up the Stockholm Manifesto (1950) released by the World Peace Council4, which although it was only opposed to

4 Thousands of personalities from the world of culture signed it but the fact that movement was

directed from behind the scenes by the Soviet Union devalued the manifesto.

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nuclear weapons, reopened the techno-humanist debate relating to the nuclear debate in general. Later would come the call for nuclear disarmament of the philosophers and in the UK the Aldermaston March in protests against the construction of a nuclear weapons facility (1958). In 1963 the Mouvement Contre l'Arme Atomique (MCAA) was founded. However, neither in the USA nor in Europe did the conditions exist to ensure the success of a social movement (McAdam, 1996:27):

a) high degree of openness in society, b) a certain level of fragmentation among elites, c) defection of part of these elites to give their support to the emerging social movement, d) a low capacity for repression. These conditions were achieved in the post-1968 crisis and the moral collapse of American elites after the defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate crisis. Furthermore, despite the fact that between 1952 and 1970 there occurred 7 serious accidents leading to core meltdowns in the USA and Great Britain, as well as another hundred minor accidents, mainly in military installations, it was only during the 1970s that relevant information about these problems began to circulate, once again due to activities of committed scientists and technicians. John Gofman, of the Manhattan Project, in his book Poisoned Power (Gofman, Tamplin, 1971) warned of the risks of low doses of radiation, an issue that until then had been forgotten about. The most influential contribution in this context came from Barry Commoner and his book The Closing Circle (Commoner, 1971), published in the same year that the Dont Make Waves group launched a boat called Greenpeace and the first mass demonstrations occurred in Europe.

The end of the dream: the antinuclear movement

Earth Day in 1970, celebrated by millions of people in the USA, was a foretaste of the magnitude of the phenomenon. In 1972 among the referendums held in California along with the elections was one with great importance for the future, it called for a nuclear moratorium. The referendum was lost but its promoters had succeeded in establishing the issue on the agenda of public opinion.

Thus, when a year later the oil crisis occurred (1973) and the industrialized nations became involved in plans for massive nuclearization the antinuclear movement was sufficiently mature to convert itself into a nightmare for the promoters of nuclear power.

What arose was in fact the result of synergies derived from three converging forces:

a. The ecological movement (which drew from the Luddite tradition of Thoreau, the naturalist one of Leopold and the technical critique of Carson and Commoner)

b. The pacifist movement (which first opposed nuclear weapons and later nuclear tests)

c. The nascent anti-nuclear movement as such.

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It was thus that from the middle of the decade that it became almost impossible to distinguish between the anti-nuclear movement and the ecology movement. The nuclearization of the industrialized nations (USA, France, Germany, Japan etc.) was planned on the basis of plants with large generating capacity and the emerging economies followed the same model (Spain, South Korea etc.). There rapidly arose local anti-nuclear groups and committees when faced with the threat of the construction of a new plant. These quickly joined forces with scientific and other pro-environmental organizations at the national and international level. This connection grew ever more intense as accidents occurred and above all to the degree to which the Telematic Society developed itself5.

The demonstrations in France were not successful in achieving their objectives although information about them was widely disseminated, as a result of the after effects of May, 1968. The demonstrations had more success in Italy where they were able to take advantage of a climate favorable to their demands produced by the Seveso catastrophe. As was later to occur in Spain, national level authorizations clashed with building prohibitions established by local governments. These latter quickly received support from ecologists and it was thus possible to block many projects. Later, the impact of the Chernobyl accident (1986) did the rest. In 1988 the Italian people rejected nuclear energy in a referendum, a decision ratified by the countrys parliament in 1988.

The case of Austria is paradigmatic with regard to the unpredictable consequences of intentional social action (Merton, 1936).With a reactor being built and an almost non-existent anti-nuclear movement the propaganda campaign extolling the benefits and safety of nuclear energy led to a public debate accompanied by demonstrations. These led in turn to Austria in 1978 becoming the first country to have a law that prohibited not only the use of nuclear fission (at least until 1988) but also the transportation and storage of nuclear materials.

In the United States the demonstrations were widespread throughout the country but had their epicenter in the state of California. As in the case of Europe the national governments support for nuclear projects ran up against the opposition of local administrations. And although the nuclear power plant construction project which generated the largest demonstrations (Diablo Canyon) was finally built, the growing costs and delays arising from the drawn out administrative and legal procedures led to the abandonment of many other projects. In 1976 twenty states were considering measures against nuclear energy similar to the failed California referendum.

It is probable that the TMI (1979) and Chernobyl (1986) accidents as well as the recovery of supply and the normalization of the prices of fossil fuels were critical to the success of the anti-nuclear movement. Furthermore, the financial crisis, which followed on from

5 These were the years in which access to a fax service became more widespread (in 1974 the first

official standard for fax technology, recommendation ITU-T T.2, or Fax Group 1 was agreed on). This technology accelerated the dissemination or technical reports and data.

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the oil crisis after 1976 made it difficult in many countries for planned, very large, investments to actually be carried out. But attention must also be paid to certain intrinsic components of the anti-nuclear movement which - in terms of synergy explain its success:

a) The movement represented the beginning of the end for bureaucratic political parties as the only channel available for the democratic expression of the interests of citizens. b) It brought certain decisions which involved risks to the public to be disputed not only in the technical but also in the political sphere. c) The arguments presented against nuclear energy were emphatic:

the risk or massive or localized radioactive contamination due to accidents, sabotage, terrorism or natural disaster,

the risk of low dose radiation, possible geopolitical destabilization arising from nuclear proliferation, as a

result of its use of the raw material for nuclear weapons, the difficulties and costs associated with the management of nuclear waste, dependence on other countries for access to technology, fuel6 (as in the case

of fossil fuels) and for the management of waste, deepening of center-periphery inequalities with plants normally being built

in deprived areas with few inhabitants and a lower capacity for resistance, so making them lose all attractiveness for more normal development,

difficulties in counting the real cost of nuclear energy due to the failure to include public investment in research, the real costs of dismantling plants, the future costs of dealing with waste and risk management,

nuclear energy being seen by its very nature as a paradigmatic form of centralization and social control.

But the ideology behind the anti-nuclear movement went far beyond that of opposition. Like all other ideologies it seeks to make sense of the world and is thus prescriptive, that is to say, it includes alternative proposals. Thus the anti-nuclear movement emerged as a specific social movement which developed a model of resistance to the dominant energy model and offers responses from a technical and economic viewpoint. Anti-nuclear scientists and technicians develop renewable energy solutions and criteria for efficient energy use that already form part of our daily lives.

The reaction: the nuclear lobby

The anti-nuclear has as its objective that humanity rid the world of nuclear energy in its entirety and not only its use for military purposes. It has had to confront two clearly defined social actors, the so-called military-industrial nuclear complex and the state, the latter heavily influenced, or even controlled, by the former which consists of military departments, research centers linked to universities, large electricity companies, capital goods manufacturers, consulting firms, politicians, opinion leaders, etc.

6 40% of world production uranium is in the hands of six countries that suffer from a high degree

of political instability. That figure rises to 50% if Russia is included in the list of politically unstable countries). The rest is controlled by Canada, Australia and the United States.

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Although some analysts (Ruano, Gonzalez, Garca, 2002) continue to attribute the success of the anti-nuclear movement to funding by the oil industry or support from Moscow, the partial victory of the anti-nuclear arguments can be attributed to three factors which linked themselves together: its moral superiority in the eyes of public opinion, the growth in the cost of construction of nuclear power stations arising from their hidden costs in the context of a financial crisis and finally, the fall in the price of oil since 1981.

In order to understand the moral superiority which public opinion sees in the anti-nuclear movement three elements must be considered, the synergies of which lead to political action:

a. moral principles, clearly defined and which have endured starting from primordial opposition to the Bomb. Instead of the selfishness of those who would annihilate the enemy, the altruism of those who struggle for a better world, even at the expense of their own welfare,

b. science as a legitimating mechanism. It is scientists, often Nobel Prize winners, who regret having participated in military or civilian nuclear projects and provide necessary data and evidence about a subject where secrecy normally rules,

c. public opinion, the arena in which the debate is held, or what amounts to the same thing, the mass communication media (easily influenced by emotions) and opinion formers (foundations, scientific academies, professional bodies etc.).

What is today not known as the military-industrial complex but rather the nuclear lobby has tried to confront these components in the order which they have been presented above. The Atoms for Peace7 program was the first attempt to deal with the moral principles set out by the first scientists who publicly regretted their participation in the Manhattan Project. In the framework of the Cold War it assured the allies of the USA of the happiness they would enjoy by participating in the imminent Atomic Age, a participation which would also make American investments profitable8 (Mian, Glaser, 2008: 42). With regard to the second component, the role of science, already during Eisenhowers period in office there was an insistence that the military industrial complex could not do without the commitment of researchers. However, the condemnation of the nuclear industry by scientists of the caliber of Einstein, Pauling and Joliot-Curie could only be countered by scientific argument. Thus the strategy used by the industry when faced with this conflict has been to confront the discourse of the activist with the knowledge of the expert and so devalue the opinion of citizens who lack a particular level of knowledge. In those countries with massive public opposition to nuclear energy the relative lack of information is cited as an explanatory factor for this opposition (as in Rodrguez and Prez Daz, 2007). This ignores the fact that the costs and risks associated

7 The rhetoric of Eisenhower was deeply marked by nuclear energy in its various forms. As well as

the Atoms for Peace announced the Doctrine of Massive Retaliation, which promised massive retaliation in the event of an attack on the USA.

8 The development of the first atomic bombs involved about 500,000 people from the

administration, army, industry and universities in USA, Canada and Britain (Edwards, 1983).

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with nuclear power are such that it is not considered necessary to provide concerned citizens with more information about them (Beck, 2008). They do not need to know how uranium is processed or the exact number of years during which nuclear waste will be radioactive in order to oppose this type of energy on the grounds of the risks they perceive it as having, Just as they do not need to know the principles of solar energy in order favor this kind of energy9. Some scientists have been granted mythical status in order to strengthen the moral dimension of the arguments in play. A paradigmatic case in this regard is that of the chemist James Lovelock, presented to the world as a saint of the ecology movement who has seen the light regarding the benefits of nuclear power10, when he was in fact a defender of it from his earliest work, and as an independent scientist when his relations with oil companies (in particular Shell) is well known. But the nuclear lobbys main activities influence trafficking is between governmental departments and agencies which have some influence over its activities. In countries like the UK and the USA and others in the English-speaking world, nuclear lobbying is a public activity and there exists a certain degree of monitoring of it by not-fo-profit such as SpinWatch11. In the UK this allowed the activities of PR companies such as Bell Pottinger Good Relations, Grayling Political Strategy and Luther Pendragon to become known to the public. These spend millions of Euros every year in modifying opinions and attitudes on behalf of electrify utilities and public bodies. NIREX, the agency that which deals with nuclear waste in the UK spends more than a quarter of a million Euros a year on visible PR activity.

In the USA spending on lobbying in the energy sector has taken off over the past decade rising from 10 million dollars in 1998 to almost 60 million in 2008, a year in which the presidency was in play. General Electric was the third biggest investor in political contributions having spent 182,468,000 dollars in this period, much more than that spent by firms such as Exxon, Lockheed, Boeing or General Motors (more than a 100 million each).

However, in the majority of countries, especially Latin ones, these processes are totally opaque as a result of the unregulated and indeed unlegislated nature of the work of lobbying firms. In countries such as France and Spain, where there is a close link between the energy sector and the state, understanding how this system works can be very difficult and complex12. This way of doing things has contaminated the European Union

9 This argument can be turned against itself. It is similar to considering people to be mal nourished

or not appropriately nourished if they do not know the temperature at which milk comes out of cows udders, or to hold that it is not intelligent to not consume drugs if one does not know how they are manufactured or their exact effects on the body.

10 Author of the "Gaia hypothesis", published in 1979 and inspired by the concepts of homeostasis,

especially that of autopoiesis developed by the Chilean thinker Humberto Maturana (Varela, Maturana, Uribe, 1974).

11 We have taken the bulk of the data here regarding the activities of the nuclear lobby from the

website www.spinwatch.org, the most reliable on the internet. 12 Some cases go beyond even the literary or cinematographic imagination. The French nuclear giant

Areva has an agreement with a French farmers association by way of which it finances a multidisciplinary

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itself with the somewhat more transparent English-speaking country style of lobbying being overlapped by the less transparent Mediterranean style, together producing something that too often comes close to being corruption13.

FORATOM is the main nuclear industry pressure group in Europe. It has 800 members which include 17 national nuclear associations as well as the main nuclear companies in France (EDF and Areva), the UK (BNFL British Energy), Germany (RWE and EON), Belgium (Electrabel) and Spanish companies such as Endesa. Unlike the USA, the EU does not oblige pressure groups to publish data regarding their spending.

At the global level the network is very dense. The direct interests of firms and technical staff related to the nuclear industry are represented by the World Nuclear Association (http://www.world-nuclear.org/), from which information and ideology is produced. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), created to regulate and monitor the peaceful use of nuclear energy also acts as an interconnection mechanism for the global interests of the sector, with the help of the International Energy Agency (IEA). The activity of the nuclear lobby can sometimes be indirect; not defending nuclear energy but rather boycotting the use of renewable sources of energy14. For many years the IEA blocked the setting up of the International Renewable Energy Agency, requested by Germany, Denmark and Spain.

It is necessary to focus on the impressive agit-prop machinery in order to understand the changes in public attitudes to nuclear energy that have occurred in some countries. Public opinion, the third component which explains the partial victory of the anti-nuclear movement, has become a veritable obsession for the nuclear lobby. It funds a great deal of sociological and psycho-social research throughout the world. The results of this research provide it with mechanisms and indications for modifying the level of acceptability of nuclear power. One of the most controversial tools used in this context is the school visit to nuclear power stations. This was invented" in the USA in the 1970s and later spread to other countries with nuclear power stations. One of the oldest Spanish nuclear power stations, Garoa, has been visited by a total of 260,000 children since 1992. During these visits, or directly in schools, children receive propaganda material heavily loaded with subliminal emotional elements. Particularly famous are the comics featuring irradiated characters that turned into superheroes which in the 1970s

think tank which is in turn linked to university institutes which carry out studies on the excellent agriculture being carried out around Chernobyl.

13 In January 2007 the CEO (Corporate Europe Observatory) requested a response from Energy

Commissioner Andris Piebalgs about the fact that the former MEP (Member of the European Parliament) Rolf Linkohr was a special advisor to the Energy Commissioner at the same time as he direct a commercial lobbying firm. Just by chance, the former MEPs firm (CERES) only worked for big energy firms, at the same time as Linkohr was advising the Commissioner with responsibility for the area (www.corporateeurope.org).

14 In May 2006, The Sidney Morning Herald ran a story about a surprising campaign against the

setting up of windmills in New South Wales. The activists involved, who used names like Landscape Guardians and Coastal Guardians, were in fact being advised from the UK by the so-called Country Guardians, an anti-windmill organization. Curiously enough its inspiration was Bernard Ingham, the former Press Secretary of Margaret Thatcher and formerly the holder of an important position in BNF, the British nuclear waste company.

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were sent to schools in the USA. In the 1980s a shift occurred from out and out propaganda to material that was more pedagogical in nature; curriculum material designed to accept the future acceptance of nuclear energy. Can the coincidence in the last decade of the rampant activities of the nuclear lobby triggered by the Kyoto treaty and reappearance in the cinema of almost all the Marvel superheroes, whose super powers come from contact with toxic, often radioactive material, be regarded as mere chance?

Climate change at the service of nuclear power

During the first decade on the 21st the world has witnessed a new phase in the positioning of states. At the discursive level this can be seen in the construction of an ideology around climate change and the urgent need to reduce the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere, underpinned by scientists such as the previously mentioned James Lovelock, in spite of the fact that neither the Kyoto Treaty (nor the more recent Durban agreement) regard it as a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). What we are faced with here is an ideological construct as it does not accord with reality. However, its effectiveness can be observed in the revival of pro-nuclear policies in countries that were previously considered to be defenders of sustainable development, even to the extent of proposals for the construction of new nuclear power stations. There has also been an increase in the level of acceptability to public opinion in many countries (Baigorri, Chaves, Caballero, 2009).

Sometimes the road taken can be sinuous. Thus the European Union immediately ratified the Kyoto commitments and set down the intention to reduce total emissions in the period 2008-2012 by 8% by comparison with 1990. However, the use of nuclear power to achieve this goal was left to the discretion of member states, with this form of energy being described as one of the low carbon emission sources of energy with more stable costs and output15. At the start of 2009 the European Parliament went even further when, almost forced by the powerful FORATOM, it approved a report on Europes energy supply which dedicated almost two pages to listing the reasons the continent cannot do without nuclear power. The report even recommended the countries ought to invest in nuclear technology and encourage public debate in order to modify the state of public opinion with the necessity to make efforts to end the anti-nuclear feeling in countries such as Germany and Austria being expressly stated.

Nuclear strategies

The result of the strategies and processes analyzed is a planet with an ever growing nuclear capacity, whether for peaceful or military purposes. Of the 61 reactors currently under construction the majority (40) are in Asia (49 if we include Russia). On the American continent Canada, the United States, Brazil and Canada have reactors under construction. In Europe reactors are being constructed for the most part in former

15 Communiqu from the Commission to the European Council and European Parliament, January,

10th 2007, Una poltica energtica para Europa [COM (2007) 1 final ( not published in the Official Journal).

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Eastern Bloc states. In the same region there are also plans for the construction of more reactors that have yet to receive funding. In the rest of Europe only France (whose publicly owned nuclear power company Areva, with 75,000 employees and which reported a loss of 1.5 million Euros in 2011, is one of the worlds most powerful nuclear lobbyists) continues to build nuclear power stations. One is under construction at Flamanville (four years behind schedule and double the initial budget) and there is another planned at Penly (which has undergone repeated delays to the date for beginning of work). A new reactor is also being constructed in Finland at Olkilouto. This is a paradigmatic case for both pro- and anti-nuclear campaigners. For the former it is an example of the return to the atom while for the latter it is an unmistakable example of the economic waste involved in going nuclear; constructed by Areva the Finnish plant is also four years behind schedule and has undergone a doubling in the size of its original budget.

These data present a paradoxical situation. On the one hand they show that the nuclearization of the world is advancing, though much more slowly than the promoters of nuclear energy imagined half a century ago. But they also show, to judge by the construction of new nuclear power plants, that with the exception of France, it is only developing countries that have decided to expand their nuclear capacity.

There is no single nuclear scenario in the world, not even a basic dichotomy between pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear countries. What we find is a diversity of opinions that to some degree forms a gradation. Thus there are countries that have maintained a more or less pro-nuclear policy over time while others, as in the case of most European countries, have undergone nuclear moratoriums and delays going back to the 1980s. As previously mentioned, France is the exception here. Others have sought to leap into development by riding on the nuclear wave as, decades previously, did the then emerging Spain, South Korea and Taiwan.

To try to analyze the nuclear situation of the planet as a whole we have drawn up a typology which, on a hypothetical basis, seeks to observe the evolution over the last 20 years of nations in relation to the civil use of nuclear energy. In order to do this we have analyzed all the countries that currently have some relationship with electrical production of nuclear origin, though in the examples we have chosen we have limited ourselves to the most representative.

Type A: State Monopolist Nuclearism

This is the most regulationist energy model with strong political links in which nuclear power has a significance that goes beyond the simple generating of energy. It is basically the French model, with a strong interest in exports; it was also the Spanish and Korean nuclear model during their respective dictatorships and is the model followed by the Islamic states and oriental neo-despotism.

France: Having been the cradle of the European ecology and anti-nuclear movements has had no effect on its energy policy. Regardless of the political allegiance of the government of the day the conversion of France into a nuclear power, both civil and military, has been a cultural obsession. Currently 78.4% of its electricity is produced by

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59 reactors, a third of which will finish their useful life by 2020. It also exports electricity to Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and Germany. The French government in its guidelines on energy policy (2005) decided to maintain nuclear energy as the nations main source of electricity and initiate the construction of a third generation of nuclear power plants and research for a fourth generation expected to come on stream in 2040. France is a defender of the scientific and political assumptions behind climate change and regards its environmentalist position as compatible with its strategic nuclear energy policy.

China: It is hungry for energy in order to finish its process of industrial development. It currently has 11 nuclear reactors and in order to maintain its competitive position in the markets its leadership has committed itself to nuclear energy. The amount of electricity generated from this source is expected to quadruple by 2020. China, which approved and ratified the Kyoto protocol, is regarded as one of the most polluting countries in the world

India: Like France, India has a veritable obsession with being a nuclear power and like China it is immersed in a process of economic and industrial development which requires large amounts of energy to ensure its competiveness. It has made agreements with France, Russia and the United States which ensure its access to nuclear technology and consolidate the pro-nuclear orientation of its energy policy.

Russia: Accused of using its energy reserves as an instrument of pressure in its foreign policy, it controls the oil it sells to its neighbors, the ex-soviet republics, and it holds the key Europes gas supply. With a rapidly growing economy and extensive energy reserves Russia has opted for nuclear energy for the production of electricity and aims to have 25% of its production coming from that source by 2030. This would involve a growth in the number of nuclear reactors in service from 31 to 59.

Japan: Since 1954, nuclear energy limited to peaceful purposes has been a strategic national priority. Activities have been based on American technology and associated with multinationals such as General Electric and Westinghouse. Over time there has also been increasing participation by Japanese companies (especially Mitsubishi) in the design and construction of new nuclear power stations, all with the strong support of the state. Prior to the Fukushima accident the Japanese government expected that by the year 2050 some 60% of the countrys electricity would be nuclear in origin.

Type B: Nuclear Liberalism (libertarianism)

The laissez faire, laissez passer basically implies allowing large firms and energy multinationals to use nuclear energy for civil purposes without excessive government controls, except those relating to safety. This model only exists in the USA and was revived by the National Energy Policy (NEP) of the Bush-Cheney administrations in the 1990s. These administrations also tried to promote it at the international level through the activities of the Department of State

USA: Thanks to the impulse their construction received from President Eisenhower, the USA is the country with the largest number (104) of nuclear power stations in the world. However TMI, as well as the financial crisis of 1976-1980 and later Chernobyl put an end

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to private investment in new plants. Taking advantage of signs of an energy crisis in 2000-2001 the Bush administration launched the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), which although its main conclusions concerned difficulties with the supply of oil, served as an excuse to relaunch nuclear energy with a proposal to construct eight new nuclear reactors. With the election of Barack Obama it seemed that the time for a new clean energy economy had arrived for the USA. In February 2009 Obama announced at George Mason University the creation of a clean energy economy, we will double the production of alternative energy in the next three years. However, just a year later, in 2010, he announced his intention to support the use of federal funds for the construction of two new nuclear reactors.

South Korea: This one of the countries with the largest number of reactors (20) with more under construction. It is a member of the ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) project, formed in 1986 to demonstrate the scientific and technical feasibility of nuclear fusion. The country is also involved of a new generation of nuclear reactors.

The United Kingdom: The United Kingdom has 19 functioning nuclear reactors which produce 18.39% of the countrys electricity. In the 2007 White Paper on Energy the UK government defined itself as clearly pro-nuclear and gave free rein to the construction of new nuclear power stations. Although the governments role is limited to licensing construction it retains control of the management of nuclear waste.

Type C: the Precautionary Principle, or Moratorium

These are countries that would be classified as Type B were it not for the fact that they explicitly base their nuclear policy on the Principle of Precaution, which has generally led them to introduce moratoriums, that is say, no more nuclear power plants are built but the ones that already exist continue to be used. The best example of these countries is Spain. Germany used to form part of this group but it later decided to abandon nuclear energy.

Spain: The nuclearization of Spain occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. It was to be the construction of third generation of reactors in the final years of Francoism which to lead to large demonstrations by citizens and the founding of the anti-nuclear movement in Spain. The TMI and Chernobyl disasters put pressure on democratic governments to such a degree that when the PSOE came to power in 1982 it did so with a firm anti-nuclear commitment and halt building work at four nuclear power plants that were under construction. The PP governments from 1996 to 2004 made no change in this regard. However, in the early years of the 21st century, in a climate strongly influenced by the nuclear lobby, a clear change occurred. When the PSOE returned to office in 2004 it did so with a promise to abandon nuclear energy. In spite of this the government of Rodrguez Zapatero in 2009 agreed to extend the service life of already amortized nuclear power plants (Garoa), although not for the amount of time requested by the nuclear companies (and supported by the PP). The nuclear debate in Spain centers not on the construction of new power stations but rather on whether or not to lengthen the

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life of the existing ones. The PP, on its return to power in 2011, agreed to a further extension of their service life but not to the construction of any new ones.

Type D: Return to the atom

Arising from a particular interpretation of the Kyoto protocol we have seen how in recent times some countries that had opted for the precautionary model or even for abandonment of the nuclear option, returning to nuclear energy. In all cases these have been political decisions taken by conservative governments which ignored decisions taken previously by parliaments or by referendums. In this category we can distinguish between countries which have decided to build new nuclear reactors, such as Italy and Sweden, and those which have already begun to construct them, such as Finland.

Finland: It currently has 4 reactors, one of which has been closed and another of which is under construction. Nuclear energy is considered to be a matter of personal conscience in Finland and so members of parliament are not obliged to adhere to party voting discipline when decisions are made about it. This explains the failure of a 1994 project to build a fifth plant, a project that had been supported by the government, unions and industry. However, in 2002 parliament did approve the building of a fifth reactor, a decision considered to be very significant as it was the first taken to build a new one in Europe for more than a decade.

Sweden: It has 10 reactors, 3 of them closed. After TMI the Swedish parliament, following a referendum, decided that no more nuclear power plants would be built and that nuclear energy would be progressively eliminated after 2010. In fact, after the Chernobyl and accident reactors were closed in 1998 and 2001. The conservative government tried to cancel the progressive elimination policy but was initially forced by public protests to limit itself to extending the deadline until 2020. Finally the conservative coalition led by Fredrik Reinfeldt was able to give the green light to the construction of new stations.

Italy: After Chernobyl, in a nation already strongly influenced by the ecological catastrophe that had occurred as a result of a chemical leak at Seveso16, a referendum was held on the question of the use of atomic energy. On the basis of the result the government decided (1988) to close all the existing nuclear power stations. This made Italy into the main importer of electricity in Western Europe, buying 10% of its necessities from France. However, Berlusconis first government, without returning to consult the people, decided that 10 new plants were to be built. To this end an agreement was signed with France in February 2009 covering the sharing of technology. Matters rested there pending the holding of a referendum which, as we will see, had an unexpected effect.

16 In 1976 there was a leak of dioxin from a small pesticide plant located 25 km north of Milan.

Although no one died as an immediate result hundreds of people suffered negative health effects and had problems with the land and their farms. This accident gave rise to the (1982) EU Directive 82/501/EEC, the Seveso Directive, which imposed strict safety regulations and was one of the EUs first in this area.

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Type E: Abandonment

By abandonment of nuclear power we understand the factual and expressed decision to close nuclear power stations with the intention to substitute them with renewable sources of energy.

Germany: In the year 2000 and with 17 reactors in service the Social Democrat Greens coalition government decided to end the use of nuclear energy when the last reactor reached the end of its useful life in 2025 and to direct the countrys efforts with regard to energy towards renewable sources. In 2008,taking advantage of the fact that opinion polls showed 54% of the people to be in favor of the retention of nuclear energy Prime Minister Merkel stated that in so far as possible we have to reevaluate the decision to abandon nuclear energy. However, it was not until the end of 2010 that this decision was put before parliament and when the Fukushima catastrophe occurred no formal decision had been taken. This is the basis on which we have included Germany in this category.

Belgium: With 7 reactors producing 54.04% of its electricity the Belgian government committed itself in 2002 to a total abandonment of nuclear energy on a progressive basis between 2015 and 2025. This commitment formed part of the coalition agreement between the ecologist, liberal and socialist parties in 1999.

Type F: The prohibition or doing without model

Austria: Without any doubt this is the paradigmatic model for a country doing without nuclear energy. In the 1960s the government began a nuclear energy program and parliament unanimously agreed to the construction of a nuclear power station. Two years prior to the opening of the plant the government began a propaganda campaign about the benefits and safety of nuclear energy. The effect of this campaign, however, was totally unexpected. It led to a public debate and large demonstrations in 1977. Finally in 1978 Parliament voted in favor of a prohibition on the use of nuclear fission in Austria, the prohibition included the storage and transport of nuclear materials in or across Austria. In 1997 the Austrian Parliament unanimously ratified this decision.

The Fukushima effect: a heat of the moment reaction or changing trends?

As has previously been mentioned, we would have preferred not to include decisions taken in the aftermath of Fukushima because we believe that in many cases these were heat of the moment reactions which did not seem to respond to the general trend detected and which in the case of many countries that were in the process of changing their governments, would not be maintained. However, it also seemed unwise to ignore these developments entirely.

How has Fukushima affected countries nuclear strategies? We have monitored the relevant cases but far from one might think, the tsunami of the global nuclear alert caused hardly any damage, except in a few countries. The Fukushima effect, therefore, made no fundamental difference to the analysis previously set out. However, a change did occur in Italy which would now form part of the abandonment group. The same is

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not true of Germany where no effective measures to return to the use of nuclear energy were ever taken.

The USA and the UK continued with the nuclear policy planned prior to Fukushima. Barack Obama maintained his support for the construction of new nuclear power stations and the UK governments energy plan (published in June 2011) involved the construction of eighth new nuclear power plants by 2025.

France, regardless of the disputes surrounding the reactors under construction and in spite of the delays and spiraling costs involved, remained untouched by the Fukushima effect. President Sarkozy even used the opportunity to promote French nuclear technology saying that the technical excellence, the rigor, the independence and transparency of our safety installations are recognized throughout the world. As G20 president he proposed reforms to the international atomic safety regimen which would lead to the strengthening of the French nuclear giant AREVA

With regard to the Asian giants China, India and Russia (though Russia is partly European), their closeness to Fukushima had no effect on their respective nuclear strategies and they maintain a firm commitment to the nuclearization of their countries. In this regard Russias commitment includes the innovation of building a floating reactor to be anchored off the Kamchatka peninsula. The same pro-nuclear line is being followed by all the ex-soviet countries of Eastern Europe with the exception of Poland.

The situation of Japan is complex as the myth of safety and rigor constructed by governments and firms over 30 years has now collapsed. However it is still possible to detect ambivalence in its positions which will, in all probability undergo changes once it leaves the crisis behind. The former Prime Minister Naoto Kan recognized that his countrys energy policy must undergo a change towards a society that can exist without nuclear energy, but he also said that his government will not abandon nuclear energy and will create the conditions for its safe use. We can therefore state that Japan is initiating a reconsideration of its energy strategy with a greater focus on renewable but also without abandoning nuclear energy.

In Spain the public alarm caused by the Fukushima accident was calmed by the positive results produced by the stress tests to which the countrys nuclear power stations were then submitted. The PSOE government made no announcement with regard to any possible definitive shut down of the reactors. When the PP returned to power at the end of 2011 one of the first measures taken by the government of Mariano Rajoy was the extension of the service life of the oldest reactor (which was originally to end in 2011) until 2019. The PSOE government had already extended it from 2009 to 2013.

Germany tops the list of country on which, at least for the moment, the Fukushima accident has had a denuclearizing impact. In September 2010 the coalition led by Angela Merkel had decided to extend the service life of the countrys nuclear power stations by 12 years with the aim of ensuring energy supplies, reducing CO2 emissions and facilitating the development of renewable sources of energy. However, after unfavorable local election results in the wake of the tsunami Merkel announced a three

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month moratorium and set up two commissions, one technical (to evaluate the safety of Germanys nuclear reactors) and the other focused on ethics (to draw up an exit strategy form nuclear energy). In May 2011 Merkel announced that by 2020 none of the 17 German nuclear power stations would be in use.

Another country in which elections (approaching) have led to Fukushima having an important effect is Taiwan. Although in March 2011 the government declared the inevitability of nuclear power, the express wish of Tsai Ing-wen, President of the Democratic Progressive Party ( and according to opinion polls, the probable winner of the 2012 presidential elections) to close all Taiwans nuclear power stations led the current President Ma Ying-jeou to announce, in November 2011, a series of measures aimed at converting the country into a nation free from nuclear radioactivity and eliminating the possibility of renewing the licenses of the three existing nuclear power stations when they expire.

Possibly the strongest effects of Fukushima were felt in Italy. Faced with the Berlusconi governments determination to build 8 new nuclear power stations starting in 2013, the opposition parties and social movements organized themselves to ensure the calling of a referendum on the matter which was held in May 2011. In spite of the media campaigns encouraging apathy and, from the government, encouraging people to boycott the poll, some 57% of the electorate voted (with 50% being required to make the referendum valid), almost all in favor of the quashing of the norm that sought the nuclearization of the country. This clear result kept the country in the class of those that have abandoned this kind of energy.

Are there factors which explain nuclear policies?

It is obvious that a countrys nuclear policy can be explained by a range of factors which probably go from its natural resources to its dominant religion; that is from the most material to the immaterial. But are there factors which might explain or predict why a particular country belongs to one or other of the previously described categories?

We have tried to analyze this possibility. To do this we have taken a group of nuclearized countries (or which were nuclearized, or which were at the point of so being or which abandoned nuclear energy) and observed how their position with regard to nuclear energy is related to a series of material and immaterial factors. The method used was the following. In the first place we established an indicator of the level of nuclearization, as a dependent variable, on the basis of the models considered, which goes from 0 in the case of Model F countries (doing without and/or prohibition) to 5 for Model A countries (state monopoly of nuclearization). Each country was assigned to one of these models after analyzing its energy policy, nuclear history, political structure and socio-economic system etc. As well as this indicator, a set of variables that express both material and immaterial factors have been considered. These are listed in Table 1.

In the first place a cluster analysis was tried in order to see if through the use of statistical methods it would be possible to determine the existence of internally homogenous but

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distinct groups. After several trials it was found that three large groups was the number most descriptive of our model and that this explains practically 89% of the variances of the 13 variables used.

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Table 1 CLASSIFICATION OF NUCLEARIZED COUNTRIES

1 2,0 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Argentina 2 5,9 9124,34 76,56 12,30 5,39 0,76 30,21 2800,35 0,80 6,84 1,87 5

Armenia 1 39,4 3030,71 72,68 17,50 4,42 4,12 33,53 1577,09 0,72 4,09 1,52 5

Austria 0 0,0 45209,40 79,50 3,50 5,46 0,91 29,15 8218,26 0,89 8.49 1,94 0

Belgium 7 51,2 43144,34 79,22 3,50 6,46 1,14 21,71 8521,50 0,89 8,05 2,03 1

Brazil 2 3,1 10710,07 71,99 17,30 5,08 1,64 25,95 2237,09 0,72 7,12 1,79 5

Bulgaria 2 33,1 6325,39 73,09 10,70 4,44 2,27 30,26 4594,28 0,77 6,84 1,46 5

Canada 17 15,1 46235,64 81,23 5,20 4,77 1,44 31,82 17060,83 0,91 9,08 2,18 4

China 15 1,8 4428,46 73,47 15,80 3,60 2,01 46,24 2455,19 0,69 3,14 1,54 5

Czech Republic 6 33,2 18245,17 76,81 3,10 4,08 1,54 37,22 6464,39 0,87 8,19 1,85 5

Finland 4 28,4 44512,01 78,97 2,40 6,13 1,51 28,18 16349,99 0,88 9,19 1,86 2

France 58 74,1 39459,55 80,98 3,40 5,58 2,43 19,04 7695,28 0,88 7,77 1,92 5

Germany 9 28,4 40152,22 79,26 3,40 4,49 1,37 26,47 7149,11 0,91 8,38 1,94 1

Hungary 4 42,1 12851,98 73,44 5,40 5,09 1,31 29,45 3988,77 0,82 7,21 1,53 5

India 20 2,9 1474,98 69,89 48,20 3,09 2,69 26,97 566,02 0,55 7,28 1,56 5

Iran 1 0 4525,95 71,14 21,80 4,68 2,71 44,47 2411,60 0,71 1,94 1,54 5

Italy 0 0,0 33916,88 80,20 3,10 4,58 1,69 25,08 5661,18 0,87 7,83 2,01 0

Japan 51 29,2 42831,05 82,12 2,40 3,42 1,01 28,01 8071,01 0,90 8,08 1,84 5

Korea (South) 21 32,2 20756,69 78,72 4,20 4,80 2,88 36,44 8853,09 0,90 8,11 1,48 5

Mexico 2 3,6 9123,41 76,06 14,10 4,81 0,54 34,78 1941,67 0,77 6,93 2,00 5

Netherlands 1 3,4 46914,66 79,40 3,60 5,46 1,53 23,89 7226,07 0,91 8,99 1,97 1

Pakistan 3 2,6 1018,87 64,49 69,70 2,69 3,03 23,62 432,62 0,50 4,55 1,54 5

Philippines 0 0,0 2140,12 71,66 23,20 2,81 0,76 32,57 589,32 0,64 6,12 1,54 1

Romania 2 19,5 7537,71 72,45 11,30 4,28 4,12 26,20 2487,63 0,78 6,60 1,57 5

Russia 33 17,1 10439,64 66,03 9,10 4,09 4,36 32,81 6435,41 0,76 4.26 1,46 5

Slovakia 4 51,8 16061,25 75,40 6,70 3,59 1,50 35,26 5267,61 0,83 7,35 1,58 5

Slovenia 1 37,3 22850,67 76,92 2,30 5,67 1,73 33,88 6920,24 0,88 7,69 1,95 5

South Africa 2 5,2 7275,34 49,98 40,70 5,44 1,45 31,30 4759,49 0,62 7,79 1,67 5

Spain 8 20,1 30541,61 80,05 3,90 4,62 1,25 26,09 6315,50 0,88 8,16 1,76 3

Sweden 10 38,1 48935,67 80,86 2,30 6,74 1,31 25,30 14869,35 0,90 9,50 2,20 2

Switzerland 5 38,0 67463,71 80,85 4,10 5,37 0,83 26,81 8307,36 0,90 9,09 1,87 4

Ukraine 15 48,1 3006,92 68,25 11,40 5,28 2,86 29,04 3534,36 0,73 6,30 1,55 5

United Kingdom 18 15,7 36143,94 79,01 5,00 5,42 2,68 21,06 6062,41 0,86 8,16 2,15 4

USA 104 19,6 47198,50 78,11 6,50 5,46 4,71 21,41 13653,95 0,91 8,16 1,98 4

Items: 1: Operating reactors; 2: % nuclear electricity; 3: GPD/cpita; 4: Life expectancy; 5: Child Mortality; 6: % GDP for Education; 7: % GDP for Defense; 8: % Industry in GDP; 9: Electricity Consumption per capita; 10: Human

Develompent Index; 11: Democracy Index; 12:Inglehart Postmaterialism Index; 13: Nuclearism index Sources: 1 (World Nuclear Association/ International Atomic Agency Energy); 2-9 (World Bank); 10 (UNDP); 11 (The

Economist Intelligence Unit); 12 (World Values Survey); 13 (Self Research)

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In our view, if we had to decide which of the variables used had the most explanatory power regarding inter and intra-group differences and similarities we would choose postmaterialism. The lowest level of postmaterialism was found in Bulgaria (1.46) and the highest (2.20) in Switzerland. The difference between the two figures was 0.72 which we divided by three (the number of groups produced by the cluster analysis) and the resulting figure, (0.24) was used to construct our ranges of postmaterialism:

1.46 to 1.70 a low level of postmaterialism 1.71 to 1.95 a medium level of post-materialism 1.96 to 2.20 a high level of post-materialism On this basis the first group would consist of countries with a low level of post-materialism with the exception of Argentina. The second group is a mixed one including countries with medium and medium-high levels of postmaterialism, with the exception of Korea and the third group would consist of countries with medium-high and high levels of postmaterialism

Graph 2

When we analyze with care the correlations between variables, taking the index of nuclearization as a dependent variable, we find that it is this variable of postmaterialism which groups the countries in clusters, which has the closest relationship (a negative one) with the index of nuclearization.

The multiple correlation coefficient indicates a strong relationship (78.28%) between the degree of nuclearization (the dependent variable to be explained) and the rest of the variables taken as independents. However, the relationship will be positive (increases or decreases in the independent variables involve changes in the same

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direction in the dependent variables) or negative (rises or falls in the independent variables involve changes in the opposite direction in the dependent variable).

To discover the direction of the relationship between variables we have to turn to the matrix of simple correlation coefficients. If we look at the relationship which the dependent variable establishes (degree of nuclearization) with the independent variables we can highlight the negative relationship between GDP per capita (-53.34%), life expectancy (-39.41%), and the percentage of GDP devoted to education (-27.29%), electricity consumption per capita (-33.34%), Human Development Index (-37.35%), level of democracy (-41.75%) and level of post-materialism (-47.06%) with the grade of nuclearization.

That is to say that in general terms countries with the highest levels of nuclearization have the lowest levels of economic development and lowest life expectancy for their citizens; they also have a low percentage of their GDPs dedicated to education, a low level of quality of democracy in their political system and lower levels of individual emancipation and self-expression.

The level of nuclearization had a positive relationship with the rate of infant mortality (29.95%), with the percentage of GDP devoted to defense (37.81%) and the weight of industry in the economy of the country.

Taking everything into account and in spite of the significance of some of the data the linear analysis defined by the coefficient of determination, it only explains the 61.28% of the variation in the level of nuclearization.

Table 2 Matrix of simple correlation coefficients

N R EN GPD LE IM E D I EPC HDI ID IP

N 1 0,1876 0,1799 -0,5334 -0,3941 0,2995 -0,2729 0,3781 0,3468 -0,3334 -0,3735 -0,4175 -0,4706

R 0,1876 1 0,2331 0,2999 0,1913 -0,1517 0,0344 0,4524 -0,3072 0,3698 0,2414 0,1107 0,1484

EN 0,1799 0,2331 1 0,2632 0,2889 -0,4392 0,3312 0,0654 -0,2217 0,3 0,4254 0,2637 0,0348

GPD -0,5334 0,2999 0,2632 1 0,6978 -0,5927 0,5485 -0,2886 -0,4929 0,7923 0,8031 0,731 0,7534

LE -0,3941 0,1913 0,2889 0,6978 1 -0,7248 0,2879 -0,2836 -0,2367 0,515 0,8003 0,4916 0,5937

IM 0,2995 -0,1517 -0,4392 -0,5927 -0,7248 1 -0,5268 0,211 0,0522 -0,5553 -0,9159 -0,4631 -0,4523

E -0,2729 0,0344 0,3312 0,5485 0,2879 -0,5268 1 -0,1649 -0,3347 0,5715 0,582 0,4894 0,5912

D 0,3781 0,4524 0,0654 -0,2886 -0,2836 0,211 -0,1649 1 -0,0511 -0,0945 -0,237 -0,4403 -0,398

I 0,3468 -0,3072 -0,2217 -0,4929 -0,2367 0,0522 -0,3347 -0,0511 1 -0,26 -0,2417 -0,5715 -0,46

EPC -0,3334 0,3698 0,3 0,7923 0,515 -0,5553 0,5715 -0,0945 -0,26 1 0,7249 0,6479 0,6134

HDI -0,3735 0,2414 0,4254 0,8031 0,8003 -0,9159 0,582 -0,237 -0,2417 0,7249 1 0,653 0,6339

ID -0,4175 0,1107 0,2637 0,731 0,4916 -0,4631 0,4894 -0,4403 -0,5715 0,6479 0,653 1 0,6683

IP -0,4706 0,1484 0,0348 0,7534 0,5937 -0,4523 0,5912 -0,398 -0,46 0,6134 0,6339 0,6683 1

Multiple correlation coefficient: 0,7828 Coefficient of determination (R): 0,6128 N: Degree of Nuclearization; R: Num. reactors; EN: % electricity from nuclear; GPD: GDP/capit; LE: Life expectancy; IM: Infant Mortality; E: GDP for Education; D: GDP for Defense; I: % Industrial GPD; EPC: electricity consumption per capita; HDI: Human Development Index; DI: Democracy Index; P: Postmaterialsm Index

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Conclusions

The data examined here shows two different nuclear strategies. The rich countries opt between extending the service life of existing nuclear power stations or a return (and not only at the level of discourse) to the construction of new plants (Finland). In the emerging nations, especially the BRICs (China, India, Brazil, Russia etc.) the pro-nuclear policies remain firm and solid n the basis of a rising demand for electricity.

The arguments used by the rich countries to legitimize their pro-nuclear discourse includes climate change, the depletion of fossil fuels and resulting cost increases, the energy Independence of their countries and the limited capacity for substitution with renewable energy etc. But above all, and paradoxically the pro-nuclear discourse incorporates the theses that might be described as environmentalist in that it sees nuclear energy as clean energy because it reduces CO2 emissions into the atmosphere and is thus compatible with the principles of sustainability; France, Finland and Obamas USA are good examples of this.

This duplicitous discourse (compatibility between sustainability and nuclear energy) sustained by the rich countries gives states a lot of room for maneuver with regard to public opinion in that it allows them to make compatible an international image of defending sustainable development (the countries that signed the Kyoto Protocol) while at home being tolerant of the use of nuclear energy by extending the service life of existing nuclear power plants in some cases and the building of new ones in others. In short, the climate change discourse and sustainability have become basic parts of the marketing of the nuclear industry.

We can speak, therefore, of a return to nuclear energy by the majority of nuclearized countries in the world. And, according to the results produced by the statistical models used here (which show that the nuclearism of nations is closely linked to their desire for development and materialist values), the rise in nuclear energy seen over the past decade may well have a close relationship with the return to materialist values which has been pointed to by Diez Nicols (2009) on the basis of an analysis of the World Values Survey.

Furthermore, the Fukushima effect, as a general rule (we have considered the exceptions of Germany, Italy and Taiwan), is making no deep difference to the energy strategy of countries with pro-nuclear policies. Based on what we have learned from the diachronic analysis of our study it can be stated that in the medium term there will only be a new process of denuclearization if the following three factors occur together:

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a. The impact of a nuclear catastrophe the media effect of which will not, it can safely be predicted, go on beyond one or two years. Fukushima, for the moment, fulfills this condition

b. A massive and systematic anti-nuclear mobilization in the countries concerned. This has not been seen on this occasion (except in Germany, Italy, Taiwan and Japan), which might be explained by the return to materialist values.

c. The persistence of the current financial crisis. In the 1980s it was a financial crisis that blocked the bulk of nuclear projects and today it is another financial crisis which has stymied nuclear projects in countries such as Rumania. This today is probably a key element but it still does not affect he BRICs countries where the bulk of potential for nuclear growth is located

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systems, its characterization and a model, Biosystems, 5, pp. 187196

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Web references

http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/

http://www.nuclearfiles.org/

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change an Kyoto protocol text:

http://unfccc.int/2860.php

On lobbys:

http://www.sourcewatch.org/

A fairly objective wen on the debate (BBC):

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/sci_tech/2005/nuclear/default.stm

Wikipedia is already today, especially the English version, the best starting point for information on how fair on energy issues and the nuclear debate:

http://en.wikipedia.org/

Autors

ARTEMIO BAIGORRI

Born 1956. Ph. D. in Sociology. Associate Professor (Profesor Titular) in Universidad de Extremadura (Spain). Head in Research Group Anlisis de la Realidad Social (ARS). Some books, individual or collectives: Extremadura saqueada. Recursos naturales y autonoma regional (1978), La enseanza de la arquitectura (1980), Ecodesarrollo. El modelo extremeo (1980), El espacio ignorado. Agricultura periurbana de Madrid (1987), Mujeres en Extremadura (1993) El paro agrario (1994), El hombre perplejo (1995), Sociologa de la Empresa (1996), Ocio y deporte en Espaa (1997), La economa Ibrica (1999), Sociologa y Medio Ambiente (1999), Hacia la urbe global (2001), Agroecologa y Desarrollo (2001), El campo andaluz y extremeo: la proteccin social agraria (2003), Botelln: un conflicto postmoderno (2003), Young Technologies in old hands (2005), Debate Educativo (2005 y 2006), Enseando Sociologa a profanos (2007), Perspectivas tericas en desarrollo rural (2007), : La comunidad educativa ante los resultados escolares (2009), Dispora y retorno (2009), Informe Espaa (2009), Environmental transitions (2012, on press)

Web: http://www1.unex.es/eweb/sociolog/BAIGORRI

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Blog: http://baigorri.blogspot.com

MANUELA CABALLERO

Born 1963. Ph. D. candidate in Sociology. Researcher in Research Group Anlisis de la Realidad Social (ARS). Head in a Local Development Agency (Castuera, Spain). Has been Lecturer in Universidad de Extremadura. Collective books: La comunidad educativa ante los resultados escolares (2009), Informe Espaa (2009), Environmental transitions (2012, on press)

MAR CHAVES

Born 1974. Ph. D. Candidate in Sociology, Lecturer in Universidad de Extremadura. Researcher in Research Group Anlisis de la Realidad Social (ARS). Some books: Botelln: un conflicto postmoderno (2003), Young Technologies in old hands (2005), Debate Educativo (2005 y 2006), Dispora y retorno (2009), La comunidad educativa ante los resultados escolares (2009), Informe Espaa (2009), Environmental transitions (2012, on press)