8/3/2019 2010522

1/21

Trustees of Princeton University

Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to WaterlooAuthor(s): Woosang KimReviewed work(s):Source: World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Oct., 1992), pp. 153-172Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010522 .

Accessed: 01/12/2011 08:07

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

preserve and extend access to World Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2010522?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2010522?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup

8/3/2019 2010522

2/21

POWER TRANSITIONS AND GREATPOWER WAR FROM WESTPHALIATO WATERLOO

By WOOSANG KIM*

A greatdeal of the literaturen international oliticshas analyzedYI and debated the causes of great power conflict. he balance-of-power theory, houghsubjectedto onlylimitedempirical crutiny, asbeenthemostwidely cceptedexplanation f thewayinternationalon-flict nd stability mergein the international rder. Balance-of-powertheoristsontend hat lliances re made inresponse o a perceived hreatand are intendedto preservepower parity mong thecompetinggreatpowercoalitions.They suggest hat hepresence f an equalityofpoweramong coalitionstends to discouragewar.1Power transition nd hege-monic stability heorists ropose a contradictoryiew of internationalstability: hat there xists powerhierarchyhat tructures he nterna-tional order.They attribute eace to thepoweradvantageof the domi-nantnation hegemonorworld power)and to the supportfor he nter-

* I would like to thank Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Jack Levy, and JamesMorrow for theirhelpful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at theannual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 1991.1 Inis L. Claude, Jr., ower and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962);Edward Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance ofPower (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,1955); Morton A. Kaplan, System nd Process n International Politics (New York: JohnWiley,1957); George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1962); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1973); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of InternationalPolitics (Reading, Mass.:Addison-Wesley, 1979); Quincy Wright,A Study of War, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chi-cago Press, 1965). There have been some efforts o develop formal models of the balance ofpower. See, e.g., Emerson M. S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balanceof Power: Stabilityin International Systems Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989);R. Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power," World Politics 38(July 1986); Dina Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories," Journalof Peace Research 4 (1967). But these models have not been tested against empirical reality.Some recent empirical studies that support the balance-of-power hypothesis that equality ofpower tends to lead to war include Wayne H. Ferris, The Power Capabilities ofNation-States(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973); J. David Singer, Stuart A. Bremer, and JohnStuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty,and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in BruceM. Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972); Randolph M.Siverson and Michael R. Tennefoss, "Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of InternationalConflict, 1815-1965," American Political Science Review 78 (December 1984). For an excellentreview of the balance-of-power theory,see Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review ofTheories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society,and Nuclear War,vol. 1 (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1989).

WorldPolitics 45 (October 1992), 153-72

8/3/2019 2010522

3/21

154 WORLD POLITICSnational order by its allies or by the "satisfied"nations n general. Theysuggest, n turn,thatwar is a resultof thedynamic power change be-tweenthedominantstate nd the challengingpower,due todifferentialgrowthrates cross states vertime.2Some studieshave tested hepowertransition nd hegemonic tabilityarguments gainsttheempiricalrecordofthe nineteenth nd twentiethcenturies.3 thers have looked to theempiricalrecordpriorto the Na-poleonic Wars to examine therelationships etween naval power and aglobal war cycleand betweenalliance formation nd warbehavior.4 it-tle, fany, rigorous mpirical nalysisof thepower transitionmodel hasbeen done fortheperiodbefore1815.5Much of what we know about therelationshipbetweenpower transitions nd war is based on evidencesince theCongressof Vienna. Here I undertakea systematic nvestiga-tion of thetheory fpower transitionwar as applied to the period from1648to 1815. This allows us to assess the robustness fkey hypothesesnlightof eventsnever before ubjected to thisscrutiny. will show thata

2 Robert Gilpin, Warand Change n WorldPolitics Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1981); George Modelski,"The Long Cycleof Global Politics nd theNation State,"Comparativetudies nSocietyndHistory 0 (April 1978);A. F. K. Organski,World olitics,2d ed. (New York: AlfredA. Knopf, 1968);A. F. K. Organskiand JacekKugler, The WarLedger Chicago: UniversityfChicago Press, 1980);William R. Thompson,On Global War(Columbia: University f South Carolina Press, 1988). AlthoughGilpin, Modelski andThompson,and Organskidiffern manypoints-what constituteapabilities, heway dif-ferential rowthrates re operationalized, ow to understandmotivation nd thebehaviorof the dominant tate nd thechallenging ower, nd thedefinitionfgreatpowerwar-thesimilaritiesmongthem re neverthelessrofound. heyall focus n howchanges nthedistributionfcapabilities rive arge wars,and all considerpowertransitions o be critical,centralmoments nhistory.I Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, "Empirical Support forSystemic ndDyadic Explanations f International onflict,"World olitics 1 (October1988); dem,Warand Reason (New Haven: Yale University ress, 1992); Henk Houweling and JanG. Sic-cama, "Power Transitions s a Cause ofWar,"Journal fConflict esolution 2 (March 1988);idem, "Power Transitions nd CriticalPoints s Predictors fGreat PowerWar,"Journal fConflict esolution 5 (December 1991); Woosang Kim, "Power, Alliance, nd Major Wars,1816-1975,"Journal f Conflict esolution 3 (June 1989); idem,"AllianceTransitions ndGreatPowerWar,"American ournal fPolitical cience 5 (November1991); WoosangKimand JamesD. Morrow,"When Do Shifts n Power Lead to War?" American ournal fPolitical cience forthcoming); rganskiand Kugler fn.2).4Jack S. Levy,"Alliance Formation nd War Behavior:An Analysis fthe Great Pow-ers,"Journal fConflict esolution 5 (December 1981); dem,War n theModernGreat owerSystem, 495-1975 Lexington: University ressofKentucky,1983);GeorgeModelski andWilliamR. Thompson,SeapowernGlobalPolitics, 494-1993 Seattle:University f Wash-ingtonPress,1988); dem, Long Cycles nd GlobalWar," inManus I. Midlarsky, d., Hand-bookofWarStudiesBoston:UnwinHyman, 1989); Thompson fn.2).

5 An exceptionsThompson's study n thepowertransitionheory. lthoughhisresearchdoes notemploya rigorous tatisticalnalysis,he examinesthe trends f relativenaval ca-pabilities mong the principalcontendersn the internationalystem o test a key powertransition ypothesis.ee William R. Thompson,"SuccessionCrisesin theGlobal PoliticalSystem:A Test of the TransitionModel," inAlbertBergesen, d.,Crises n theWorld ystem(BeverlyHills, Calif.:Sage, 1983);and idem fn.2).

8/3/2019 2010522

4/21

POWER TRANSITIONS AND GREAT POWER WAR 155key revisionof thepower theory upported n studiesof the post-Napo-leonic era is also applicabletothe pre-Napoleonicperiod.PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTIONQuite a few studiesthat have testedhypotheses f power transition ndhegemonic tability eport mpirical videncethat upports part of thepowertransitionrguments.6hese studies nvestigateheempiricalrec-ord of only the nineteenth nd twentieth enturies,however. Indeed,Organski,the founder of the power transition heory, rgues that themodel can be applied onlyto thatperiod the"periodof ndustrial ev-olution,"when "differentialndustrializations thekeytounderstandingtheshifts n power."7The restrictionhat the power transition heory nly applies to theperiodafter he ndustrial evolution temsfrom n emphasison theroleofindustrializationn stimulating ifferentialrowthrates. nternalde-velopmentthrough ndustrialization s oftenconsidered to be the prin-cipal means bywhich relativepower changes.By contrast, ower tran-sition theorists enerallyoverlook alliance formation s an importantmeans ofaugmentingnationalpower.8This assumption hat lliancesarenot critical onfines hetheory's irect pplicabilitynlyto the ndustrialera.Accordingto Organski,prior to the industrial evolution, ll nation-stateswerepreindustrial. nly during nd after he ndustrial evolutionis there mixofpreindustrial,ndustrializing,nd industrializednation-states, situation hat creates context funevengrowth nd transitionofpower.9Others,however, ssertto thecontraryhat thestructures ftheglobal politicalsystemwere alreadyin place priorto the industrialrevolution. here seems to be no compellingreason to assume thatsomedegreeof industrializations a prerequisite ordifferentialrowthratesamongnation-states. he processes fdynamicchanges n powercan beobserved n an "earlieragrarianand trade-oriented hase of thedevel-opmentofthemodern worldsystem."10

6 Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalman (fn.3, 1988,1992);Houweling and Siccama (fn.3, 1988,1991);Kim (fn.3, 1989, 1991);Kim and Morrow fn.3); Organskiand Kugler (fn.2).7 Organski fn.2), 345-46.8 JacekKuglerand A. F. K. Organski, The Power Transition:A Retrospectivend Pro-spective valuation," nMidlarskyfn.4); Organski fn.2); Organskiand Kugler fn.2).9Organski also argues that once all states re industriallydvanced,the circumstanceswould presumably nce againpreclude he possibilityf transitiontruggles,ince "great ndsudden shiftsn national power" would be less likely. Therefore,he suggests,we need a"new" theory or he future. ee Organski fn.2).10Thucydides,The PeloponnesianWar,trans.Rex Warner (Harmondsworth, ngland:Penguin Books, 1972); Gilpin (fn. 2); idem,"The TheoryofHegemonic War," Journal fInterdisciplinaryistory 8 Spring1988); Levy fn. , 1981,1983); dem, Theories of General

8/3/2019 2010522

5/21

156 WORLD POLITICSThis paper questionsOrganski's assumption, articularly or he yearsleading up to the industrial revolution. revise the power transitionmodel by relaxingthe problematic ssumptionthat internalgrowth s

the only methodofaugmentingpower,and I suggest nstead that a na-tion's power can also be augmented by such externalmeans as allianceformation."The theory an then be applied to the risk ofgreat powerwars during the preindustrial ra: thispaper evaluates theevidence fortheperiod between1648 and 1815 to test whether hepower transitionargumentshold notonlyforthe nineteenth nd twentieth enturiesbutalso fortheseventeenthnd eighteenthenturies.REVISED HYPOTHESESI have shown elsewherehow powertransitionrguments an be alteredby allowingalliance formation s an alternativemeansbywhichnationsaugment theirpower.'2 Here, I offer briefsummaryof the revisedpower transitionargument.'3 Among great powers, differences ngrowth ratesand the formation f alliances and counteralliances ead toa redistributionfpowerin the nternationalystem; omegreat powersovertake theirrivalsduringthatprocess.The newly strengthened reatpower challengesthe dominantpower thatenjoysmostof the benefitsand privileges n theexisting nternationalystem. urther, s the chal-lengerincreases ts capabilitiesthrough nternaldevelopmentand alli-ance formation nd overtakesthedominant power, t is more likely toattack the dominantpower.Threatenedbydemands forchanges in theWar," World olitics 7 (April 1985); ModelskiandThompson fn. , 1988,1989); Thompson(fnn.2, 5). Levy, Modelskiand Thompson,Toynbee, nd Wallersteinhold thatthe modernnation-stateystem merged round 1500.Russett nd Starrnoteotherwise, hatmany chol-ars date the modernnation-state rom he Peace ofWestphalia 1648).See Bruce M. Russettand Harvey Starr,World olitics: heMenuforChoice San Francisco:W. H. Freeman,1981);Levy (fn. 4, 1981, 1983);Modelskiand Thompson fn.4, 1988);ArnoldJ.Toynbee,A Studyof History, ol. 9 (New York: OxfordUniversity ress, 1954); Immanuel Wallerstein,ThePolitics fthe World conomy Cambridge:Cambridge University ress,1984).11MichaelAltfeld,The DecisiontoAlly:A Theory ndTest,"WesternoliticalQuarterly37 (December 1984); Grace Iusi-Scarborough nd BruceBueno de Mesquita, "Threat andAlignmentBehavior," nternationalnteraction 4 (1988); Kim (fn. 3, 1991); JackS. Levy,"DecliningPower and the PreventiveMotivation orWar," World olitics 0 (October 1987);JamesD. Morrow, AlliancesandAsymmetry: nAlternative otheCapabilityAggregationModel ofAlliances,"American ournal fPolitical cience35 (November 1991); BenjaminA.Mostand Harvey Starr, International elationsTheory,ForeignPolicySubstitutability,nd'Nice' Laws," World olitics 6 (April 1984).

12 Kim (fn.3, 1991).13 This argumentmight lso be appliedto cases ofgreatpowerwar ingeneral,where therapidlygrowinggreat power challenges hedeclining tronger ival in thosecases,the de-clining stronger ival s not thedominantpowerbuta great power). The hegemonicwararguments eem to be specialcases of powertransitionsn general.For theoriginal argu-ments bout powertransition,ower parity,nd therateofgrowth, eeOrganski fn.2); andOrganskiand Kugler fn.2).

8/3/2019 2010522

6/21

POWER TRANSITIONS AND GREAT POWER WAR 157existing nternational rder,the dominantnation has a large stake inpreserving he statusquo, in which t and itsallies share the benefits ndprivilegesof both collectiveand private goods. The dominantnation,with the support of its allies, tries to thwart he challenger'sprogress.During such a period of power transition, haracterized y an equal dis-tribution fpowerbetweenthedominantnation and thechallenger,ma-jor powerwar ismore likely.'4The speed with which the challenging power catches up is anotherimportant actorn assessing he ikelihood ofconflict.fthechallenger'sinternal nd external apabilities re increasing lowly, here s a greaterlikelihood that the problems arisingfroma great power's catching upwith its rival can be resolvedwithoutresort o military onflict.How-ever, f the challenger's apabilities re increasing apidly, hen both thedominantpower and thechallenger re caught unpreparedfor the re-sultingshift n the international ower order. The fast-growing hal-lenger lters heexistingnternational ower order, nd this ttemptwilllead thefast-growing reat powerto attack the dominantnation.The challenger'sdegreeof satisfaction an also affect he ikelihood ofmajor power conflict.'5 rganski writesthat some great powers in theinternationalystem re

satisfied iththepresentnternationalrder nd itsworking ules, orthey eel hat hepresentrder ffers hem he best hanceofobtainingthegoals theyhave in mind.The dominant ation s necessarily oresatisfied ith he xistingnternationalrder han nyother ince t s toa large xtentts nternationalrder.Others,however, re not satisfiedwiththe status uo, becausethey havegrown to fullpower after heexisting nternational rderwas fully s-tablished nd the benefitslreadyallocated."'6During thepower transi-tionperiod, fthechallengingpower is dissatisfiedwiththeexisting n-

14 The roleofalliance is vieweddifferentlyn the revisedpower transition heory nd inthe balance-of-power heory.Balance-of-powerheoristsrgue that alliances are made inresponse o a perceived hreat nd are indispensable omaintaining balance of power andhenceto preservinghepeace. See, e.g.,Gulick (fn. 1); Liska (fn. 1); and StephenM. Walt,The Origins fAlliancesIthaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity ress,1987).On thecontrary,ntherevisedpowertransition ramework, pproximate qualityofpowerfor he challenger ela-tive to thatof the dominantnation,which results rom uch nternal nd external fforts fchanges n poweras internal rowth nd allianceformation,maybe seen as a precursor fwar.

15 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,"PrideofPlace: The Originsof GermanHegemony," WorldPolitics 3 (October 1990); Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (fn. 3, 1992); Michael Howard,The Causesof Wars Cambridge:HarvardUniversity ress, 1983), 18-20;Paul M. Kennedy,TheRiseand Fall oftheGreatPowers New York: RandomHouse, 1987), chap. 5; Kuglerand Organski fn. 8); Organski fn.2); Organskiand Kugler fn.2).16 Organski fn.2), 366; emphasis noriginal.

8/3/2019 2010522

7/21

158 WORLD POLITICSternationalorder and refusesto abide by its rules,thenmajor powerconflict s hypothesized o be most ikely.But if nsteadthechallenger ssatisfiedwiththeexistingnternational rderand wishesmerely o takeover its eadership, henmajorwar is less likely.Based on theabove argumentfourhypotheses an be putforth:

Hi. Majorwar s more ikelywhen great ower's nternalndexter-nal capabilitiesre overtakeny hose fanother reat ower.H2. Majorwar s more ikely hefaster hechallengerncreasests n-ternal ndexternalapabilitieselativeo thedominant ation.H3. Majorwar s most ikelywhen he nternalndexternalapabilitiesof the wogreat tates reequallydistributed.H4. Majorwar s more ikelyfduring hepower ransitioneriod hechallenging ower s dissatisfiediththe status uo. War is lesslikely,however,fthechallenging ower s satisfied iththeexistingnterna-tional rder.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES

This researchconsiders all power relationships etweenpairs of greatpowers duringtheperiodfrom1648 to 1815. The definitionfthegreatpowersused hereis fromModelski and Thompson.'7Table 1 is a list ofthe great powers during thisperiod. To create the set of test cases, Ifollow the same procedureused by Organski nad Kugler."8First, theentire period is divided into twenty-yearntervals.'9Then, for eachtwenty-year eriod each great power is paired with everyothergreatpower on thelist n Table 1. This procedurecreates eventy-four yad-

17 The listof greatpowers n this nalysis s the same as Modelski and Thompson's listofglobal powers.Modelski and Thompson emphasize naval capabilities:to be considered agreat,or "global," powerin their erms, nation-statemust control minimumof 10% oftheglobal-reachnavalcapabilities nd demonstrate genuineoceanic scale ofnaval activities.For details bouttheirdefinition fglobal power, ee Modelskiand Thompson fn.4, 1988),97-99;orThompson fn. ),47-49. Modelski ndThompson's ist s somewhat ifferentromLevy's ist fr.. , 1983).WhereasLevy ncludesAustria-Hungary1648-1815), weden (1648-1721),the OttomanEmpire (1648-1699), nd Prussia 1740-1815)among thegreat powers,Modelskiand Thompsondo not,because those tatesdid not have thenecessary aval capa-bilities. use Modelski and Thompson'sdefinition fgreatpowerfor woreasons.First, t sbecauseofdata availability. developa new national apability ata setfor heperiodfrom1648 to 1815 usingdata based on army ize, population, nd sea power; sea powerdata forAustria,Sweden,the OttomanEmpire,and Prussia are not readily vailable.Second, Mo-delskiand Thompson's definitions moreglobally riented hanLevy's,which s more Eu-rocentric.

18 Organskiand Kugler fn.2).'9 Organskiand Kugler (fn. 2) believe that forwar to break out a long period of time srequiredtoproducesufficienthanges nthepowerdistributions etweenpossible dversar-ies. They arguefor periodofapproximatelywenty earsbefore ach war.

8/3/2019 2010522

8/21

POWER TRANSITIONS AND GREAT POWER WAR 159TABLE 1

GREAT POWERS, 1648-1815GreatPower Years s GreatPowerFrance 1648-1815England/Greatritain 1648-1815Spain 1648-1808Netherlands 1648-1810Russia 1714-1815SOURCES: George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Seapower n Global Politics, 494-1993 Seattle:University fWashingtonPress,1988).periods.20 able 2 shows the testperiods and the number of dyads ineach period. Then, takinginto account each side's alliance structure,determinewhether henationalcapability f each dyad in each twenty-year period is or is not equal, followingthe method described below.Likewise,I determinewhether war between ach dyadtookplace dur-ingeach twenty-year eriod.The objective s to separate empirically hedyad-periods hat ncludea war between the membersof the dyad from those that do not. Theobservationsn this nalysis nclude all possiblepairsofgreatpowersandnot just thosethateventuallyfought.Hence, thedependentvariable inthis nalysis s a dichotomy fwar orno-war. By distinguishing etweendyad-periods hatgo to war and thosethatdo not,we can test herevisedpower transition rguments bout what conditions make great powerwarmore likely.GREAT POWER WARSThis analysis ncludes thegreat powerwars identified y power transi-tionand hegemonic tabilityheorists: rganskiand Kugler, Gilpin,and

20 Disputes betweenthetwogroupsof nations re decomposed nto all possibledyads,aprocedurethathas both advantagesand disadvantages.On the one hand, it increasesthenumberof cases and avoids aggregating ationswhoseactionsmay be independent. n theotherhand, t also isolatesdependentdecisions nd increases he effectsf random error nthemeasurementfthe ndependent ariables. orexample, here retendyads n theperiodfrom1800 to 1815.The behavior fsome nations n thosedyadswas not ndependent crossdyads. Cases that re not statisticallyndependent an be problematicn statistical ests.Thesignificanceests used here should be viewed as a heuristic evice to suggestthe relativestrength fassociations. ven giventheseproblems, ecomposingmultilateral isputes s notnovel. This procedure s comparableto the approachesofHouweling and Siccama (fn. 3,1988, 1991);Kim (fn.3, 1991);and Organskiand Kugler (fn. 2). Statistical nalysesof armsrace disputesalso oftendecomposemultilateral isputes.See, e.g., JamesD. Morrow,"ATwist of Truth: A Reexamination f the Effects f Arms Race on the OccurrenceofWar,"Journal fConflict esolution 3 (September1989); and Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Racesand Escalation:Some New Evidence,"Journal f Conflict esolution 3 (March 1979).

8/3/2019 2010522

9/21

160 WORLD POLITICSTABLE 2

TEST PERIODS, GREAT POWERS, AND NUMBER OF DYADSTest eriods Great owersa Number fDyads1648-59 ENG FRN SPA NET 6b1660-79 ENG FRN SPA NET 61680-99 ENG FRN SPA NET 61700-1719 ENG FRN SPA NET 61720-39 ENG FRN SPA NET RUS 101740-59 ENG FRN SPA NET RUS 101760-79 ENG FRN SPA NET RUS 101780-99 ENG FRN SPA NET RUS 10180N-1815c ENG FRN SPA NET RUS 10(N = 74)

a ENG = England; FRN = France; SPA = Spain; NET = Netherlands; RUS =Russia.b4C1 = 6 where C is combination.Spain is considered greatpoweruntil1808;Netherlands s considered great poweruntil 1810.

Modelski and Thompson.2' Gilpin considersthe Dutch War of LouisXIV (1672-78), theWar oftheLeague ofAugsburg 1688-97), the Warof the Spanish Succession (1701-13), the French RevolutionaryWars(1792-1802),and theNapoleonic Wars (1803-15) as "hegemonic" warsduringtheperiod from1648 to 1815. Modelski and Thompson identifytheWar oftheLeague ofAugsburg, heWar of theSpanish Succession,and the French Revolutionarynd Napoleonic Wars as "global" warsduring that ameperiod. Organskiand Kugler identifyix"major" warsaccordingto thefollowing riteria: 1) whether t least one great powerparticipated n each side; (2) whetherthe opposing sides made all-outeffortso win, udged bytheseverity f battledeaths foreach war; and(3) whether he war resulted n theloss ofterritoryorthelosingside.22The sixmajorwars are theDutch War ofLouis XIV (1672-78),the WaroftheLeague ofAugsburg 1688-97),theWar of theSpanishSuccession(1701-13), the Seven Years' War (1755-63), the French RevolutionaryWars (1792-1802),and theNapoleonic Wars (1803-15).23 he threedif-

21Organskiand Kugler fn.2); Gilpin fn.2); and Modelski and Thompson (fn.4, 1988).Gilpin speaksofhegemonic ars,Modelskiand Thompsonofglobalwars, nd Organski andKuglerofmajorwars. For an excellent ummary fdifferencesn theirdefinitions,ee Levy(fn. 10, 1985).22 Organski and Kugler fn.2).23 Unlike Gilpin and Modelski and Thompson, Organskiand Kuglerconsider he SevenYears' War as a majorwar bytheirvariouscriteria. uring the Seven Years' War, first fall, great powers participatedn each opposingside.Second,thatwar was as severe s pre-vious wars: totalbattledeaths of theWar of theLeague of Augsburg n nine years were680,000, or n averageof75,555dead per year;for he War ofSpanishSuccession he num-

8/3/2019 2010522

10/21

POWER TRANSITIONS AND GREAT POWER WAR 161ferent ets ofgreat power wars included n this nalysis re presented nTable 3.24NATIONAL CAPABILITY AND ALLIANCE DATAThe nationalcapabilitiesmeasureof the greatpowers from1648to 1815is developed here. The effort o arrive at estimates s based on threeindicators:two, armysize and population, re among themost widelyrecognized ndicators f nationalcapabilities;25hethird, ea power, hasalso been considereda very mportant ndicatorof nationalpower. Toretain he statusofa great powercapableofexertingnfluence nywherein the world,a nation-statemusthavenotonlya strongand-basedarmybut also naval capability hatcan support onstant cean-going ctivity.26Sorokin's data providethe basis for heroughestimate farmy ize ofeach great power foreach five-year eriodof the seventeenth nd eigh-teenth enturies. he data detailwarsbetween500 and 1925byduration,average armystrength,nd numberofcasualties.27he populationdata,ber over twelve yearswas 1,251,000, or n average annual level of death of 104,250; n theSeven Years' War totaldeaths neightyearswere 992,000, veraging124,000 er year.Thus,theseverityf battledeathsof the Seven Years' War reached higher evel than thoseof thetwopreviouswars,the War oftheLeague ofAugsburg nd the War ofSpanish Succession.This comparison s based on the data inLevy fn.4, 1983),77-92.

24 Levy includestheWar ofAustrian uccession 1739-48) in his listof thegeneral wars,but it is not included n anyofthe threewar lists n Table 3. Organski and Kugler do notinclude the War of Austrian Succession,however,because by their criteria t was not assevere s earlierwars,theWar of theLeague ofAugsburg r the War ofSpanish Succession.Total battledeaths for thenineyearsof theWar of the AustrianSuccession were 359,000,averaging 9,888 per year.See Levy fn.4, 1983),77-92; and idem fn. 10).25 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,The WarTrap (New Haven: Yale University ress, 1981);Gilpin (fn. 2); Organskiand Kugler (fn. 2); Singer,Bremer, nd Stuckey fn. 1); A. J.P.Taylor, The Struggle or Masteryn Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University ress,1954).26 See AlfredMahan,The nfluence fSea PoweruponHistory,660-1783 New York: Hilland Wang, 1890);and Modelski and Thompson fn.4, 1988, 1989). Military, conomic, nddemographic ndicators re important omponents f estimates f nationalcapabilities.Mycapability ndexdoes not include direct conomic ndicators. his could be a shortcoming,althoughnaval power was probablyhighly orrelatedwith wealth.Althoughthe currentavailabledata allow the constructionfonly crude ndicator, hopethat hismeasurementwill soonbe modified o include some economic ndicators. he new indexproposed here sthe only compositenationalcapability ndex forthepre-1816period and at least is morecomprehensivehan Modelski and Thompson'snavalcapability ata alone.Their sea powerdata are theonly capability ata used in other mpirical nalysesfor hepre-1815period.27 PitirimA. Sorokin, ocialandCulturalDynamicsNew York: AmericanBookCompany,1937),3:543-77. These roughestimates f armysize are comparedwithotherhistoricalsources.See, e.g.,ErnestR. Dupuy and TrevorN. Dupuy, TheEncyclopedia fMilitary is-tory: rom 3500 B.C. to thePresent,d rev. ed. (New York: Harperand Row, 1977),WilliamL. Langer,An Encyclopedia fWorldHistory Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 948). am in theprocessofdevelopingmore reliabledata for rmy ize by including ther vailable sourcesas well.These sources ncludeKennedy fn. 15); Geoffrey arker, urope nCrisis, 598-1648(Brighton:Harvester ress,1980);Karen A. Rasler nd William R. Thompson,War ndStateMating: TheShaping ftheGlobalPowers Boston:Unwin Hyman, 1989);Theodore Ropp,War n theModernWorldDurham,N.C.: Duke University ress, 1959).The data for rmy

8/3/2019 2010522

11/21

TABLE 3WAR LISTS,1648-1815Organskind Kuglera(Major War) (H

Dutch War ofLouis XIV, 1672-78 XWar of the League of Augsburg, 1688-97 XWar of the Spanish Succession, 1701-13 XSeven Years' War, 1756-63 XFrench Revolutionary Wars, 1792-1802 XNapoleonic Wars, 1803-15 XSOURCES: RobertGilpin, Warand Change n WorldPolitics Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityGlobal Politicsand the Nation State,"Comparativetudies n SocietyndHistory 0 (April 1978)University fSouthCarolina Press,1988).

a The listof Organskiand Kugler'smajorwars s based on their election riterian A. F. K. OUniversity fChicago Press, 1980).

8/3/2019 2010522

12/21

POWER TRANSITIONS AND GREAT POWER WAR 163obtained fromBabuscio and Dunn, Cook and Paxton, nd McEvedy andJones,28re also rough estimatesof the population size of each greatpower foreach five-year eriod.Data for ea power are fromModelskiand Thompson.29Naval capabilityscalculatedfor achgreatpower,alsofor each five-year eriod, based on the number of warships. Between1655 and 1670 all warships with thirty uns or more are counted. Be-tween 1671 and 1690, warshipswith the minimum of forty uns areincluded. After 1691 warships with the minimum of fifty uns arecounted. These three indicators- army size, population, and seapower are weighted equally and are transformednto a quinquennialrelativegreat power capabilityndex forthe years1648 to 1815.30

The list of great power alliances from 1648 to 1815 is also developedhere.While the threetypesofmilitary lliance identified y SingerandSmall provide a sound frameworkforempiricalstudies of alliance be-havior, such detailed information s currentlynot available prior to1815.31 must therefore se a less preciseindicator formy analysis: Iidentify he presenceor absence of alliance relationships mong greatpowers duringtheperiodfrom1648 to 1815without lassifyinghembytype.32The secondary ources that relyon are generally learer about thesize based on Sorokin'sworkdo notseem to be verydifferent rom he newly reviseddatabased on the sources isted bove.For example, have revised henational apabilitymeasurefor France and comparedit with theFrenchcapabilitymeasureused in this analysis.Thecorrelation oefficientor hese woisveryhigh r = .97).

28 JackBabuscio and Richard M. Dunn, EuropeanPoliticalFacts, 1648-1789 New York:Facts on File, 1984);Cris Cook and JohnPaxton,EuropeanPoliticalFacts,1789-1848 NewYork: Facts on File, 1981); Colin McEvedy and RichardJones,Atlasof WorldPopulationHistory Middlesex,England: Penguin Books, 1978).29 Modelskiand Thompson fn.4, 1988).30 The same weighingprocedure s used in the Correlates f War (cow) project'snationalcapability ndex for 1816 to 1970.This index and thatof thecow projectdiffer, s follows:whereas mine is based on three ndicators, he cow indexis based on six indicators armysize,military xpenditure,nergy onsumption,ron/steelroduction, otalpopulation, ndurbanpopulation).For details boutthecow index, ee Singer,Bremer, nd Stuckey fn.1).31 See J.David Singerand MelvinSmall, "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939:A QuantitativeDescription," ournal fPeace Research (1966). Singerand Small focuson formalmilitaryalliances and classifyhem nto three ategories. hese are defensepacts, n whichthe sig-natories gree to come to each other'smutualdefense n case anyone of them s attacked;neutralityr nonaggression acts, n which thesignatoriesgreenot todeclare war against

each other n the event hat thirdnationdeclareswaragainstone ofthem;and entente,nwhichthe signatories gree to consulteach other aboutpossiblecoordinated ction in theeventone ofthem s attackedbya thirdparty.32 Alliances dentified yanyof the three eadinghistorical ources Albrecht-Carri6,u-puy and Dupuy, and Langer) are included n this alliance data set.However, mostof thealliances mentionedbyone source are also identified ythe othertwo and/orbyother m-portant ources.Ren6 Albrecht-Carri6,he New Encyclopediaritannica, 5th d., s.v. "Eu-ropean diplomacyand wars,c. 1500-1914"; Dupuy and Dupuy (fn. 27); Langer (fn.27).Other important ources nclude Babuscio and Dunn (fn.28); Cook and Paxton (fn.28);Levy fn.4, 1981).

8/3/2019 2010522

13/21

164 WORLD POLITICSinceptionof an alliance than about its termination. onsequently,ter-minationdates are estimatedbased on two simplerules.First,since analliance treaty s here considered a collectionof bilateralagreementsamong the signatories, he additionofnew membersto an existing lli-ance terminates t and transformst intoa new alliance. Thus, forex-ample, theLeague ofAugsburgwas formed n 1686by Austria,Spain,Sweden,and otherminorpowerssuchas the electorates f Bavaria, Sax-ony,and the PalatinateagainstFrance. AfterEngland and the UnitedProvinces oined the League of Augsburgin 1689,it was transformedinto theGrand Alliance.By my rule,then, heLeague ofAugsburgwasterminatedn 1688and theGrand Alliancewas started n 1689.Second,when any two membersofan alliancefight ach other nwar, considerthealliance to be terminated.f,however, ll the members n thealliancefight gainstcommon enemies, then thepeace treaty t the end of thewar is consideredto terminate he alliance. I estimate that the GrandAlliance terminatesn 1697when theWar of theLeague ofAugsburgended with the two treaties f Ryswick, hefirst etweenFrance, En-gland, Spain, and theUnitedProvinces, nd the secondbetween Franceand theAustrianempire.33With thisnewly developed list of great power alliances, the utilityindex (that s, tau-bcoefficients orsimilarity n alliance portfoliosUkorUk-]) s calculatedfor ach five-year eriodfrom1648to 1815.34n thefollowingsection,thisindex is utilized in developing the adjusted na-tionalcapabilitymeasure and inoperationalizing ne ofthe ndependentvariables: evelof dissatisfaction.THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLESI synthesizenone measure the nternal nd external apabilities nationcan draw on. A nation's nternal apabilities re given byitscomposite

3 Albrecht-Carri6fn. 32); Babuscio and Dunn (fn. 28); Dupuy and Dupuy (fn. 27);Langer (fn. 27). In a subsequentpaper, explain in more detail how these new nationalcapabilitynd alliance data aredevelopedand provide heseraw data.34 The "utilityndex" comes fromBueno de Mesquita'sexpectedutility esearch rogram.It is a measureof thedegreeto which thepoliciespursuedbytwo nations re congruent ndis based on themilitary lliance patterns fnations,whichmaybe considered he singlemost

important oreign olicydimension.Bueno de Mesquita usesSinger and Small's formal l-liancedata to createhisutilityndex;that s,hisutilityndex,Uk orUk,,for heperiod from1816 to 1970 is based on fourcategories defensepacts, neutralityr nonaggressionpact,entente, nd no alliance).With these fourcategories, four-by-fourontingency able foreverypossibledyadineveryyearfrom1816 to 1975 s constructed;hesimilarity f allianceportfoliosor theutilityndex) smeasuredbycalculatingKendall's tau-b corefor ach four-by-four able.A more detaileddescription f theutilityndex can be found in Bueno deMesquita (fn. 25). As described bove,whencalculating utilityndex fortheperiod from1648 to 1815, do notdistinguishhree ypes falliances. nstead, use onlythetwocatego-riesallianceand no alliance.

8/3/2019 2010522

14/21

POWER TRANSITIONS AND GREAT POWER WAR 165capability core,described above. I then add the supportthata nationexpectsfrom ll othergreat powers.The amount of support particularthirdparty ontributes o a great power dependson itsown capabilitiesand its closenessto thegreat power.Countries with greater nternal a-pabilities an contributemore, nd thosewith better elations ontributea greaterfraction f those capabilities.Great power i's and greatpower j's adjusted national capabilities recalculatedas follows:

AdjC, = C1+ Ekes]y Ck x ( if (Uk, - Uk)) ? 0(Uk) - Uk,)if(k-U)AdjC = C + k Ck X 2 f Uk) - Uk,) > ?

where (or ) isgreatpower (or ) in eachdyad;k is a third-partyreatpower.AdjC, or AdjC1) s i's (or 's) adjustednational apability; l (orC,orCk)isi's (or 's ork's) nternalapability;(Uk, 2 k) gives hepercentagefk's capabilitieshattcontributeso 'scapabilities henUk, - Uk1) ? 0-

The adjusted capability fgreat power i in a dyad,denotedAd C, in theequation,adds theproportion fthird-partyesources hatgreat poweri can draw on to augment its internalcapabilities.That proportion sbased on those thirdpartiesbelievedbyi to prefer to j. It is estimatedas the sum of the productsof the capabilitiesof each such thirdpartymultipliedby greatpower i's approximation f each thirdparty's nten-sityofpreference oran outcomefavoring over j. The adjusted capa-bility, hen,measuresa great power'scapability ugmentedbythe assis-tance texpectsfrom thergreat powers.The adjustedcapabilitymeasurementn the above equation improvesin twowayson thealternativemeasureofsimply dding thecapabilitiesof a nation's allies to itsown. First,nations do not always honor theiralliances.35 he adjustedcapabilitymeasurement iscounts nation's ex-pected supportfrom ts allies by the reliability f the alliance. Second,nationsoften xpectaid from ther tatesnotformallyllied withthem;the measure used here includes these contributions y considering ll

35Alan N. Sabrosky, Interstate lliances: Their Reliabilitynd theExpansionofWar,"in J.David Singer, d., TheCorrelatesfWar: I (New York: Free Press,1980).

8/3/2019 2010522

15/21

166 WORLD POLITICSthird-party reat powersas possiblecontributors.36he utilitymeasure(Uk, - Ukj) in the equation above discounts llies' internalcapabilitiesforthe reliability f the alliance and providesa roughmeasure of aidfrom hose not formallyllied but nevertheless aving shared patterns falliance commitments.37The equalityof adjusted national capabilitiesbetweenthe two greatpowers in each dyad is employed s one of the ndependentvariables nthis analysis.The power transition,he differencen the growthratesbetweenthe twogreat powersin a dyad,and thelevel ofdissatisfactionofthechallengingpowerare also employed s independentvariables.One independentvariable-equality ofinternal nd external apabil-ities between the two great powers in each dyad is measured as theratio of the mean adjusted national capability cores of the two greatpowers duringeach twenty-yeareriod.The ratio s defined s the meanadjusted national capabilityof the weaker great power divided by themean adjusted capability core ofthestronger reat power.This ratio shereafteralledallianceequality.Another ndependentvariable thepowertransition etweenthe twogreat powers in a dyad is defined s the overtaking f one greatpow-er'sadjustedcapability ytheopposinggreatpower'sadjustedcapability.When a great powerthatwas lesspowerful n terms fadjustedcapabil-ity t the beginning f the twenty-yearnterval rew more powerful hanthe opposing great power before the period ended, the transitionofpower betweenthe two is said to have occurred nd is coded as 1. Oth-erwise, t is coded as 0. Thus, thealliance transitionariable is dichoto-mized.

The rate of growth s definedas the difference etweenthegrowthratesofthetwogreatpowers.The growthrate of each great powerdur-ing theperiodfrom 1660 to 1679,forexample, s calculated by AC2 -AC,)/AC,,whereAC, is eachgreat power'smean adjustedcapability ortheperiod from 1655to 1664,and AC2 is each great power'smean ad-justedcapability or heperiodfrom1675 to 1684. The differences mea-suredas thesmallergrowthrate of one great powersubtracted rom hebiggergrowthrate.So, if thegrowthrate of one great power is fast ndthatof the other s slow,thenthe difference ill begreat,whereas fthegrowthrates of bothgreat powers are slow or fast, henthe difference

36 In this paper, therefore,allies" does notnecessarilymean nations hathave a bilateralformal reaty. lliesrefers o nations hathave sharedvalues or a common lliancepattern)evenifthey re notformallylliedwitheachother.37 MichaelAltfeld nd Bruce Buenode Mesquita,"ChoosingSides inWars," nternationalStudiesQuarterly3 (March1979).

8/3/2019 2010522

16/21

POWER TRANSITIONS AND GREAT POWER WAR 167will be small. This independent variable is hereafter alled alliancegrowth ate.The challenger'sdissatisfactions assessed by determining he degreeof agreementbetween ts policies and thoseof the dominant or leading)power in the system.Accordingto Organski,a nation that favors thestatusquo in the international rder s a satisfied ation, nd the domi-nant nation is always satisfied.A nation that does not accept the statusquo and refuses o abide by the rules of the existing nternational ystemis a dissatisfied ation. The dissatisfied hallenger, hen,has not muchcommon interestwiththedominantnation, nd the moredissatisfiedchallenger s, the less common interest tshareswiththe dominant na-tion. n measuringdegreeofdissatisfaction,first efine hegreat powerwith the greatest verage internal apabilitiesfor each twenty-year e-riod as the dominant or leading) power forthatperiod.For everyotherpower, I calculate the average utility core (that is, the average tau-bcoefficientf alliance portfolios) orthe dominantpower's policiesdur-ing the period. The higherthe average utility core, the greater theagreement betweenthe dominantpower's policies and its policies andvice versa. Withthismeasurement f thedegreeof dissatisfactionf eachgreat power, the dissatisfactionvariable is operationalized as thechallenger's evel of dissatisfactionn each dyad.38 hat is,thedegree ofdissatisfactionf theweakerpowerin each dyad is used as themeasure-mentforthedissatisfactionariable.

DATA ANALYSISTo examine the influenceof the four ndependentvariables alliancetransition,lliancegrowthrate, llianceequality, nd dissatisfaction-onthe likelihood ofwar,these fourvariablesare includedindividually.Toexamine theirpossible interactive ffect, he interactive ermof thesefourvariables s also included n the model. I also include the nteractivevariable foralliance equality and dissatisfaction ecause the empiricalfindings n previous studiesfor the period 1816-1970suggestthat thelevel ofdissatisfactionnd theequalityofpower between thetwogreatpowers after aking nto account their llies' support)have a significantinteractiveffect n the ikelihoodofmajorwar.39 he firstmodel, then,is specified s follows:

38 For more details bouttheconcept nd measureofdissatisfaction,ee Organski fn.2);and Kim (fn.3, 1991).39 Kim (fn.3, 1991).

8/3/2019 2010522

17/21

168 WORLD POLITICSModel SpecificationWar= B1 + B2 X Alliance Transition + B3 X Alliance GrowthRate

+ B4 X Alliance Equality + B5 X Dissatisfaction+ B6 XInteractive+ B7 X Interactive I + U

where Interactive = (Alliance Transition X Alliance GrowthRate XAlliance Equality X Dissatisfaction); nteractive I = Alliance EqualityX Dissatisfaction;B,'s re parameter stimates nd U is the stochastic rrorterm.There is a multicollinearity roblemwith model I. The correlationcoefficient etween the interactive I variable alliance equality X dis-

satisfaction) nd the dissatisfaction ariable s about 90,betweenalliancetransition nd allianceequality sabout 54,and between lliance growthrate and the interactive variable alliance transitionX alliance growthrate X alliance equality X dissatisfaction)s about .66. To solve theproblemofmulticollinearity,nothermodel is specified. ome studiesonlaterhistorical eriod ndicate hat heequalityofpowerhas a significantindividual effect n the ikelihoodofmajorwarand that he power tran-sitionand therate ofgrowthdo not have a significantndividualeffectbutmighthave interactiveffectswith theequalityofpower on the in-cidenceof war. These studies lso suggest hatmajor war is most ikelywhenthechallenging oweris dissatisfied iththeexistingnternationalorder and catchesup with the dominantpower.40 he second model,then, ncludes the alliance equalityvariable,the interactive erm foral-liance equalityand dissatisfaction,nd the interactive ermforalliancetransition,lliancegrowthrate and allianceequality.Model SpecificationIWar = B1 + B2 X Alliance Equality + B3 X Interactive I + B4 XInteractive II + Uwhere Interactive I = (Alliance Equality X Dissatisfaction); nteractiveIII = (Alliance Transition X Alliance Growth Rate X Alliance Equal-ity);B's are parameter stimates nd U is thestochastic rrorterm.Because thedependentvariable,war, s dichotomous, use logit anal-

ysis,which estimates he effect f each independentvariable on thelogof theodds ratio ofthedependentvariableusinga maximum ikelihoodprocedure.Resultsofthelogit analysesformodels I and II are summa-rized in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.n Table 4 onlytheparameter s-timateof the alliance equalityvariableis statistically ignificantt the40 Kim (fn.3, 1989,1991);Kim and Morrow fn. ); KuglerandOrganski fn.8); Organskiand Kugler (fn.2).

8/3/2019 2010522

18/21

POWER TRANSITIONS AND GREAT POWER WAR 169TABLE 4LOGIT ANALYSIS RESULTS WITH WAR DATA

(MODEL SPECIFICATION I)Organsti ModelskiIndependent and andVariables Kugler Gilpin Thompson

Intercept - 4.443 - 4.264 - 3.580Alliance Transition 0.566 0.147 0.431(s.e.) (0.734) (0.769) (0.824)(prob) (0.221) (0.424) (0.301)Alliance GrowthRate - 0.759 - 1.300 - 1.333(s.e.) (0.932) (1.042) (1.143)(prob) (0.208) (0.106) (0.122)Alliance quality 5.212 4.846 3.192(s.e.) (2.832) (2.932) (3.040)(prob) (0.003)* (0.049)* (0.147)Dissatisfaction 9.003 9.606 6.876(s.e.) (7.243) (7.507) (7.765)(prob) (0.107) (0.100) (0.188)Interactivea - 2.007 - 6.238 - 6.036(s.e.) (5.517) (5.201) (5.427)(prob) (0.358) (0.115) (0.133)Interactivelb - 11.110 - 10.936 -6.701(s.e.) (9.703) (9.963) (10.364)(prob) (0.126) (0.136) (0.259)-2 X LLRC 10.960 8.710 6.040

(prob) (0.045)* (0.095) (0.209)a Interactive = Alliance TransitionX AllianceGrowthRateX AllianceEqualityX Dis-satisfaction.b InteractiveI = AllianceEqualityX Dissatisfaction.-2 x LLR: (-2 X Log LikelihoodRatio)with6 Degreesof Freedom.* p < .05,one-tailed est.

0.05 level with Organski and Kugler's and Gilpin's war data. Unlikeprevious empiricalfindings fthepower transitionmodel forthenine-teenthand twentieth enturies,41he dissatisfaction ariable seems tohave neither n individual effect or an interactive ffectwith allianceequality on the probability f war. This result seems consistentwithBueno de Mesquita and Lalman's theoretical nd empiricalresults ftheperiodfrom1816to 1970.42 lliance transition,lliancegrowthrate, nd

41 Kim (fn.3, 1991);Kim and Morrow fn.3).42 Buenode Mesquitaand Lalman suggest hat t s notdissatisfactionutthe"large stake"

8/3/2019 2010522

19/21

170 WORLD POLITICSTABLE 5

LOGIT ANALYSIS RESULTS WITH WAR DATA(MODEL SPECIFICATION II)

Organsti ModelskiIndependent and andVariables Kugler Gilpin ThompsonIntercept -2.808 -2.551 -2.581AllianceEquality 3.139 2.589 1.878(s.e.) (1.389) (1.428) (1.533)(prob) (0.012)* (0.035)* (0.110)Interactivela 1.002 1.091 1.703(s.e.) (1.940) (2.019) (2.251)(prob) (0.303) (0.295) (0.225)Interactive llb -0.201 - 1.711 - 0.979(s.e.) (1.144) (1.695) (1.662)(prob) (0.430) (0.156) (0.278)-2 X LLRc 7.600 5.300 3.310(prob) (0.028)* (0.076) (0.173)

aInteractive II = AllianceEqualityX Dissatisfaction.b InteractiveII = Alliance TransitionX AllianceGrowth RateX AllianceEquality.' -2 XLLR: (-2 XLog Likelihood Ratio)with3 Degrees of Freedom.* p < .05,one-tailed est.

the interactive ariable of alliance transition,lliance growth rate, alli-ance equality,and dissatisfactionre not statistically ignificant t the0.05 level either.The results fthe ogitanalysis n Table 5 also indicatethat the interactive ariables do not have any significantffect n theprobability f war. It is only the alliance equalityvariable that has asignificantnfluence n the ikelihood of war.WithOrganski and Kug-ler's war data theparameter stimate fthe alliance equalityvariableisstatistically ignificantt the0.05 level (prob = .012) and the value ofthatparameter stimate s3.139.43A parallelresult sfound withGilpin'swar data. This finding uggests that major power war is most likelywhen internal nd externalcapabilitiesbetween the two rivalsare ap-proximately qual. Thus, thethirdhypothesisH3) of therevisedpowerofa system-transformingisputethat s an important actornfluencingheprobability fmajorwar. See Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalman (fn.3, 1992), hap.6.By changing hevalue ofthe ndependent ariablefrom .15 to 1.00,we get an approx-imately .34 increase ntheprobabilityfwar, holdingothervariables onstant: = 1/(1+e-0*3139- 1/(1 e-05*3139) = 0.9585 - 0.6156 = 0.3429. The relative djusted nationalcapability atio= 0 is impossible ecause thevalue 0 means that headjustedcapability coreof the weakergreat poweris 0. The minimumvalue of relativepowerratio n thisdata isabout0.15and themaximumvalue s 1.00.So we canchangethevalueof the llianceequalityvariable from0.15 to 1.00 and obtain about0.34 increase n theprobability fwar, holdingothervariables onstant.

8/3/2019 2010522

20/21

POWER TRANSITIONS AND GREAT POWER WAR 171transitionmodel is strongly upported by power transition nd hege-monic war data.A partof the findings f this analysis of the power transition heoryforthe seventeenth nd eighteenth enturiesparallelsthose of previousempirical nalysesfor he nineteenth nd twentiethenturies.44 lthoughtransitionsfpower betweenthe two sides, the evel ofdissatisfaction fthechallenger, nd therate at which thechallenger s catchingup withthe dominant statehave no statisticallyiscernible ffectn thisanalysis,thefindings upportOrganski'scontention hatroughequalityofpowerbetween thetwo sides increasesthe ikelihood ofwar. Thus, major waris most ikely when thechallenginggreat power,supportedbyitsallies,catchesup with the dominantpower.

CONCLUSIONThe theoreticalquestion of power transition nd hegemonic declinesince the emergenceof the modern nation-state as attracted onsider-able attention. et therehas beenonlyone empirical nalysis hatfocuseson transitions efore1816.4This research, n extension frecent tudieson the theoretical nd empirical nvestigations f the power transitionmodel,modifies heoriginal theory y relaxing restrictivessumptionregarding he augmentation f national power. The revised rgument snot limitedto theperiodafter he IndustrialRevolutionand can there-forebe applied to thepreindustrialra.The revisedpowertransitionmodel has improvedon theoriginalver-sion of thetheory, ecause the evidence indicatesthat, s hypothesized,it is indeed applicable not onlyto thepresent ndustrial ra but also tothe preindustrial ra. Organski's contention hat a rough equality ofpower betweenthe challengingstate and the dominant state increasesthe ikelihoodof war isempirically upportednotonlyfor he nineteenthand twentieth enturies46ut also for hepre-1816period.That is, majorwar is most likelywhen the challengingnation's internal nd externalcapabilities atchup withthoseofthe dominantpower.Power transition heoristseem to be verypessimisticboutthe future.Organskiand Kuglerwritethatthesources fnational ower fanynation re butthepatternsf socio-economic nd political evelopment;nd itis differencesn therates fchange nscribedn these atternshatwe thinkreresponsiblenthe nd

44 Kim (fn.3, 1989,1991);Kim and Morrow fn.3).45 Thompson fn.5).46 Houweling and Siccama (fn.3, 1988,1991);Kim (fn.3, 1989,1991);Kim and Morrow(fn.3); Organskiand Kugler (fn.2).

8/3/2019 2010522

21/21

172 WORLD POLITICSfor he fact hatwars breakout. . The trends n question renot re-versible, orwhen hey ct n ourfavorwouldwe choose hem o be ifwehad the hoice.. Such trendsre simply otmanipulablenresponse oforeign-policyeeds.Nor aretheir olitical onsequences t the nterna-tional evel.47

This pessimism sthus based on the assumption hatnational power maybe augmented only through nation's nternaldevelopment. n contrastto this pessimistic iew-that cataclysmicwars are not manipulable andare outofhumancontrol48-the rgument nd the evidence ofthis tudysuggestthatthe future s not so bleak. Not only nternally erivedcapa-bilitiesbut also alliancesare sources ofpower,so the risk ofmajor warmay be manipulableand may be prevented hroughboth internal ndexternalmeans ofaugmentingnationalpower. Through alignment ndrealignment fnations,by strengtheningnd enlarging ach great pow-er's alliancesor by weakeningand shrinking pposing coalitions,majorwars that mightotherwiseresultfrom he rise and fall ofgreat powerscould be prevented. o understand reatpower wars,we need to under-standalliancesand the nterests hatmotivate hem s well as the dynam-ics of relativepower changes among great powers.

47 Organski and Kugler fn.2), 63.48 Modelski's long-cyclephases of "world power, deconcentration,elegitimation, ndglobalwar" also suggest he deterministiciewthat ataclysmicwars are out ofhumancon-trol.AlthoughGilpinnotesthat peaceful djustment fthesystemic isequilibrium" s notimpossible,he also seems toarguethathegemonicwars are noteasilyavoidable. For moredetails, ee Gilpin fn.2); Modelski fn.2); Thompson fn.2).