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    LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL Vol. 102:4 [2010-31]

    The European Human Rights System*

    James W. Hart**

    This article presents the historical, organizational, and bibliographic information needed to research the Council of Europes regulation of human rights. It begins with an explanation of the reasons for the organizations founding and then describes its statute, its structure, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the history of the changes in the treatys procedures, and its enforcement mechanisms. The final section provides similar treatment for another, less well known, of the Councils human rights treaties, the European Social Charter.

    TheContext. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534TheCouncilofEurope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536TheConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRights

    andFundamentalFreedoms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537ThePeriodoftheCommission,19531998. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539ChangestotheECHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543ThePeriodofProtocol11,19982009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 543ThePeriodofProtocol14,2010. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546

    ResolutionofCasesBeforetheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights. . . . . . . . . . . 552PrinciplesGuidingDecisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552JustSatisfactionandEnforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553Compliance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554PilotJudgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555

    TheSocialCharterandtheExpansionofRights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559

    1Thisarticlepresentshistorical,organizational,andbibliographicinforma-tionforresearchingtheCouncilofEuropesregulationofhumanrightswithinitsregion. It is intended for librarians who need an understanding of the biblio-graphicstructureofCouncilofEuropedocuments.Itwaswrittenfromahistoricalperspectivefortworeasons:First,bibliographicitemsaresituatedinamatrixofpolitics,law,economics,andculture.Second,librariansmayneedtoknowhowtoretrieve all kinds of documents relevant to this subject from any time period.Indeed,onecannotfullyunderstandtheCouncilofEurope,thechangesithasbeenthroughsinceitsinception,oritsliterature,withoutunderstandingtheforcesthat

    * JamesW.Hart,2010. ** Associate Senior Librarian, University of Cincinnati College of Law, Robert S.Marx LawLibrary,Cincinnati,Ohio.

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    spawneditandhaveinfluencedit.ThearticledescribesthehistorythatledtotheCouncilofEuropesfoundingandlatertoitsexpansion,itsprimarypoliticalandlegalorgans, theEuropeanConvention for theProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms(ECHR),principlesoftheConventionsinterpretation,theproceduresoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,compliancewiththecourtsjudgments,andtheexpansionoftheideaofhumanrightsinothertreaties.

    The Context

    2 In 1945, Europe was economically, spiritually, and physically devastated.Nearlyallofitscountrieshadrecentlybeenorcurrentlywereoccupiedbyforeignarmies.Thirty-sixandahalfmillionEuropeanshaddiedinthewar.1TheSovietUnion lost 16million civilians and 8.6millionmilitarymen andwomen.2 TheGermans had sent special troops, called Einsatzgruppen, into the Soviet Unionbehindtheregulararmy,whosespecialtaskwastomurderasmanyciviliansastheycouldinordertomakeroomforfutureGermansettlers.3ItisnowclearthatthearmywascloselyinvolvedinimplementingtheHolocaustintheUSSR....4Therewere thirteen million displaced persons in Europe in the summer of 1945.5Germany,forexample,containedovertenmillionpeoplewhowereimportedfromconquerednationsandforcedtoworkthere.6ThreeandahalfmillionhomesingreaterLondon,ninetypercentofhomesinWarsaw,andtwentypercentofhomesinFrancehadbeendestroyed.7In1946,thetotalsteeloutputofEuropewasonlyfifty-fivepercentofthatof1937.8Attheendofthewar,therailroadsinsomecoun-trieswerehalfthesizetheyhadbeenatitsinception.9Productionofwheatandother bread-grains was down by a third.10 In the American-occupied zone ofGermany,thefoodrationwas860caloriesperday.11

    3Gradually, however, another conflict emerged between theWestern alliesandtheSovietUnion.AlinethatranroughlysoutheastfromtheBalticSeainthenorthtotheAdriaticinthesouthdividedthecontinent.TothenorthandeastofthelinewerethearmedforcesoftheSovietUnionandYugoslavia.TothewestwerethearmedforcesoftheUnitedStatesandGreatBritain.ThisdivisionwasmoretheresultofgeographyandmilitarystrengththanagreementsmadeamongRoosevelt,Churchill,andStalin.12AsStalinsaid,Thiswarisnotasinthepast;whoeveroccu-pies a territory also imposes upon it his own social system.13 The war with

    1. Tony JudT, PosTwar: a HisTory of EuroPE sincE 1945,at17(2005). 2. Id. at18. 3. LEE BakEr, THE sEcond worLd war on THE EasTErn fronT7,4850(2009). 4. Id.at19. 5. wiLLiam i. HiTcHcock, THE sTruggLE for EuroPE16(2002). 6. Id. 7. JudT,supranote1,at82. 8. andrEw & francEs Boyd, wEsTErn union: a sTudy of THE TrEnd Toward EuroPEan uniTy11(1949). 9. Id. 10. Id. 11. JudT, supranote1,at21. 12. HiTcHcock,supranote5,at23. 13. miLovan dJiLas, convErsaTions wiTH sTaLin114(1962).

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    Germanyhadmerelyforcedatemporaryallianceofnecessityonnationsthathadalonghistoryofmutualsuspicion.

    4ThecountriesofEasternEurope,however,werecaughtinthemiddle.GreatBritainandtheUnitedStateshadagreedtoallowStalintodominatethatregiontokeephimfrommakinganearlypeacewithHitlerandpullingoutofthewarearly.14ThecountriesofEasternEuropehadtraditionallybeenwaryoftheirgiganticeast-ernneighboranddecidedlynoncommunist.15So,duringthewaranditsimmediateaftermath,StalinwalkedafinelinebetweenappeasingtheUnitedStatesandGreatBritaintokeeptheminthewar16andplottingtheCommunisttakeoverofthegov-ernmentsofthecountriesofEasternEurope.17UnderStalinsdirection,thenativeCommunistpartiesalliedwith socialistparties togetaplace in thegovernment.Once taken into the government, the communists then had fellow communistsappointedtoheadtheministriesofthearmy,thepolice,andthejudiciary.Inthefinal stage the communists arrested the leaders of their putative political allies,closedtheirnewspapers,outlawedthementirely,executedtheleaders,andtookthegovernmentby force.18Theprocesswas a longone.As early as 1941, the SovietUnion trained andplanted a number of native Polish communists in Poland tofightboththeNazisandthelarge,anti-communistresistancemovementcalledtheHomeArmy.19ThelastnationtofalltocommunistintrigueswasHungary,wheretheWorkersPartydecisivelywontheelectioninMayof1949.20

    5TheWesternEuropeancountrieshadtostandalonewiththehorrorsofwarbehindthemandthehorrorsofStalininfrontofthem.Historywaspushingthemtoward cooperation. Each of themhad its own idea of the kind andmanner ofcooperationthatwouldbenefitWesternEuropethemost.21Aplethoraoforganiza-tionssupportingtheideaofcooperationgrewupinresponsetotheseforces,e.g.,the European Union of Federalists, the United Europe Movement, and theIndependentLeagueforEuropeanCooperation.22SeveralofthemostimportantoftheseorganizationsheldaCongressofEuropeinTheHagueinMayof1948.23Churchill,whoinSeptember1946calledforakindofUnitedStatesofEurope,24washonorarypresident.25Itwasatthisconferencethatideassuchasaparliamen-taryassembly,acourtofhumanrights,andtherightof individualpetitionwerefirstproposed.26

    14. JudT,supranote1,at10001. 15. Id.at130. 16. rEmi nadEau, sTaLin, cHurcHiLL, and roosEvELT dividE EuroPE 10, 2938 (1990);amos PErLmuTTEr, fdr and sTaLin: a noT so grand aLLiancE, 19431945,at10102,10812(1993). 17. HiTcHcock,supranote5,at99. 18. Seeid. (discussingthetheoryofEnglishhistorianHughSeton-Watson). 19. Id.at102. 20. See id.at110. 21. See Boyd, supra note 8, at 7194 (outlining the views of the various organizations forEuropeanunity). 22. Id.at73. 23. Id. 24. Id. 25. A.w. Brian simPson, Human rigHTs and THE End of EmPirE604(2001). 26. Id.at60708.

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    The Council of Europe

    6TheCouncilofEuropeemerged fromtheCongressofEuropeonMay5,1949.ThefoundingdocumentoftheCouncilisitsStatute.Thepreamblereaffirmsthecontracting statesdevotion to the spiritualandmoralvalueswhichare thecommon heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom,politicallibertyandtheruleoflaw,principleswhichformthebasisofallgenuinedemocracy . . . .27Article 1 states that theCouncils purposes areto achieve agreaterunitybetweenitsMembersforthepurposeofsafeguardingandrealisingthe ideals andprincipleswhichare their commonheritage and facilitating theireconomicandsocialprogress.28

    7 The organization is governed primarily by the Committee of Ministers,whichconsistsoftheforeignministersofthecontractingstatesortheirdesignatedsubstitutes.29Article14giveseachcontracting stateonerepresentative,andeachrepresentativehasonevote.Article15givestheCommitteetheauthoritytocon-cludeconventionsoragreementsandmakerecommendationstogovernments,andarticle 16 allows it to make decisions relating to the internal organisation andarrangementsoftheCouncilofEurope.Ithasanexecutivefunctionsimilartothatofaprimeministerorpresident.TheCommitteesmeetingsareheldinprivateinStrasbourgbeforeandduring thebeginningof every sessionof theConsultativeAssemblyandatsuchothertimesasitmaydecide.30ItissupportedinitsworkbytheSecretariat.TheCommitteemakesthedecisionsandtheSecretariatcarriesthemout.31

    8 The second organ was originally named the Consultative Assembly, butsince February 1994 has been referred to in all Council documents as theParliamentary Assembly.32 It is composed of representatives selected by orappointed from the legislatures of the contracting states.Thenumber of repre-sentatives accorded to each country is determined by a formula that is looselybasedonpopulation,givingthe largeststates thesamenumberandthesmalleststatesthesamenumber.33Article26oftheStatuteassignsFrance,Germany,Italy,Russia,andtheUnitedKingdomeighteenrepresentativesapiece.Austriahassix,Estonia three, Liechtenstein two, Poland twelve, and Moldova five. Article 22describes theAssembly asthedeliberativeorganof theCouncil ofEurope. Itspurpose is to debate issues and make recommendations to the Committee ofMinisters.Itspowerresidesinitsabilitytorepresenttheviewsofthecitizensofthe

    27. StatuteoftheCouncilofEurope,pmbl.,May5,1949,87U.N.T.S.103,E.T.S.Nos.1,6,7,8,11(updatedversionavailable athttp://www.ifa.de/pdf/abk/inter/ec_ets001_en.pdf(lastvisitedJuly27,2010))[hereinafterStatute]. 28. Id.art.1. 29. Id. arts.13,14. 30. Id.art.21. 31. Id.arts.10,37. 32. Comm. of Ministers, Council of Eur., Decisions Adopted, app. 8: Denomination of theParliamentaryAssembly,Doc.No.CM/Del/Dec(94)508,ata27(Feb.23,1994),available athttps://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=518505&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383. 33. A.H. roBErTson, THE counciL of EuroPE: iTs sTrucTurE, funcTions and acHiEvEmEnTs41(2ded.1961).

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    contracting states,not in its authority todecideanything. It appears tohave thedebatingfunctionofalegislatureandtheadvisoryfunctionofacabinet.

    The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

    9ThefirstmajortreatytheCouncilproducedaftertheStatuteandtheGeneralAgreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe was the[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms(ECHR).34TheconventionwassignedonNovember4,1950,andcameinto force on September 3, 1953.35 Itwas the first real human rights treaty.TheU.N.s Universal Declaration of Human Rights36 was proclaimed during theConventionsdraftingprocess,butthatwasaproclamation,notatreaty.Itboundno one. The ECHR had a preamble, laid out ten fundamental rights, and esta-blishedtwoenforcementbodiesaEuropeanCommissionofHumanRightsandaEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.

    10TheoriginalconventioncanbefoundintheUnitedNationsTreatySeriesinbothof theCouncil ofEuropes official languages,English andFrench.37Thelatest version incorporatesProtocols 11 and14, bothofwhichmade substantialchangestotheConvention.38ThewebsiteoftheCOEsTreatyOfficeincludesalistofalltheorganizationstreaties.39EntriesinthelistlinktothetextofthetreatyinbothWordandHTMLformat;asummaryofthetreaty;achartofsignaturesandratifications;thelistofdeclarations,reservations,andothercommunications;40andanexplanatoryreportifthereisone.Theexplanatoryreportsarewonderfulaidstounderstandingthetreaties.TheTreatyOfficeexplainstheirauthorityasfollows:

    The[][reports]arepreparedbythecommitteeofexperts instructedtodrafttheconven-tioninquestionandarepublishedwhentheconventionisadoptedbytheCommitteeofMinisters.Theseexplanatoryreportsmightfacilitatetheimplementationoftheprovisionsoftheconventions,althoughtheydonotconstituteinstrumentswhichprovideanauthori-tativeinterpretationofthem.41

    34. ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,Nov.4,1950,213U.N.T.S.221[hereinafterConvention]. 35. Id. 36. G.A.Res.217A,U.N.GAOR,3dSess.,1stplen.mtg.,U.N.Doc.A/810(Dec.10,1948),avail-able athttp://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 37. Convention,supranote34. 38. [European]Convention for theProtectionofHumanRights andFundamentalFreedoms,asamendedbyProtocolsNo.11andNo.14,entered into forceJune1,2010,E.T.S.No.5,available athttp://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=01/08/2010&CL=ENG[hereinafterECHR]. 39. CouncilofEur.,CompleteListoftheCouncilofEuropesTreaties,http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG(lastvisitedJuly27,2010). 40. Forinformationonwaysthatstatescanconditiontheiracceptanceoftreaties,seemark w. Janis, an inTroducTion To inTErnaTionaL Law2326(4thed.2003);1 oPPEnHEims inTErnaTionaL Law118892,124047(RobertJennings&ArthurWattseds.,9thed.1992). 41. Council of Eur., About Conventions in the Council of Europe Treaty Series, http://conventions.coe.int/general/v3IntroConvENG.asp(lastvisitedJuly27,2010).

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    11TheECHRspreamblestatesclearlythatthepurposeoftheECHRwastotakethefirststepsforthecollectiveenforcementofcertainoftheRightsstatedintheUniversalDeclaration....WhiletheUniversalDeclarationwasintendedtobeuniversalandadeclarationofideals,theECHRwasintendedtobearegional,bind-ing agreement. TheECHRbound the contractingmembers to live by the rightsenumeratedinit.ThePreamblesreferencetoEuropeancountrieswhich...haveacommonheritageofpoliticaltraditions,ideals,freedomandtheruleoflaw. . . .indicatesthatoneoftheECHRsintentionsistodelineateandembodythepoliticalandethicalcultureofWesternEurope.42

    12The first sectionof theConventionsetsout theparticularhumanrightsand fundamental freedoms thatwere to beprotected.43The first thirteen items,whichappearintheoriginalECHR,wereintendedtorestraingovernmentsfromtyrannizingthepeople.Thiswastheresultoftheexperienceofoccupationduringthewaronthecontinent.[O]utsidetheactualzonesofcombattheworstbrutali-

    42. Convention,supranote34,pmbl. 43. ThefollowingisalistofthegeneraltopicsasamendedupthroughthecurrentversionoftheECHR:

    1. Therighttolife2. Theprohibitionoftortureorinhumanordegradingtreatmentorpunishment3. Theprohibitionofslaveryandforcedlabor4. Therighttolibertyandsecurity5. Therighttoafairandpublichearingwithinareasonabletimebyanindependentand

    impartialtribunal6. Theprohibitionofexpostfactocriminallaws7. Therighttorespectforprivateandfamilylife8. Therighttofreedomofthought,conscience,andreligion9. Therighttofreedomofexpression10. Therighttofreedomofassemblyandassociation11. Therighttomarryandfoundafamily12. Therighttoaneffectiveremedybeforeanationalauthorityforviolationsoftherights

    andfreedomsenumeratedintheConvention13. The prohibition of discrimination on grounds such as sex, race, color, language,

    religion,political orotheropinion,nationalor social origin, associationwith anationalminority,property,birth,orotherstatus

    14. Freeelections,property,andeducation(FirstProtocol)15. Freedom from imprisonment for the nonfulfillment of a contractual obligation

    (FourthProtocol)16. Freedom of movement within a state and freedom to leave its territory (Fourth

    Protocol)17. Rightof anationalnot tobe expelled fromand to enter a states territory (Fourth

    Protocol)18. Freedomofaliensfromcollectiveexpulsion(FourthProtocol)19. Abolitionofthedeathpenalty(Sixth&ThirteenthProtocols)20. Freedomfromexpulsionofindividualaliens(SeventhProtocol)21. Therighttoreviewincriminalcases(SeventhProtocol)22. Righttocompensationformiscarriagesofjustice(SeventhProtocol)23. Abolitionofdoublejeopardy(Nebisinidem)(SeventhProtocol)24. Equalityofrightsofspouses(SeventhProtocol)25. Restrictionofthescopeofderogationfromtheserightsandfreedomstotheextent

    strictlyrequiredSeedavid Harris ET aL., Law of THE EuroPEan convEnTion on Human rigHTs655755(2ded.2009)foranexcellentexplanationoftherightsprovidedforintheprotocolstotheConvention.

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    ties inflictedon individualswere likely tobe inflictedby theirowngovernment,operatingthroughfellowcitizens.44

    13Finally,articles15,17,and18restrictthescopeofthecontractingpartiesability to derogate from the ECHR in times of emergency beyond the extentstrictlyrequiredbytheexigenciesofthesituation.45Althoughthesearticlesallowsomeleewaytocontractingstatesduringwarorotherpublicemergency,46theyprohibit contracting parties from using derogation to limit the Conventionsrights.47

    the period of the Commission, 19531998

    14 The structure of the Councils institutions of enforcement has changedtwicesincetheywerecreatedin1953.48Thesize,composition,function,andoper-ationoftheoriginalinstitutions,theEuropeanCommissionofHumanRightsandtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,aredescribedinthesecondandthirdsec-tionsoftheConvention.

    15TheCommissions purposeswere to investigate conflicts and tomediatefriendlysettlements.49Underarticle20oftheConvention,theCommissionhadthesame number ofmembers as thereweremember states.Article 23 required themembersoftheCommissiontoactintheirowncapacities,notasrepresentativesoftheirgovernments.TheCommissionwasdiscontinuedanditsfunctionsgiventothecourtin1998byProtocol11.50

    16 One of the great innovations of the Convention was article 25, whichallowedanyperson,non-governmentalorganization,orgroupofindividualstofileacomplaintwiththeCommission.51UntiltheendofWorldWarII,internatio-nallawdidnotrestrictthewayasovereignstatecouldtreatitsowncitizens.Thishaschangedsubstantially.Themessageofinternationalhumanrightslawisthathowastatetreatsindividualssubjecttoitsjurisdictionis...amatterofinternatio-nalconcern.52Article25requiredthatgovernmentsallowtheirowncitizenstofilecomplaintsagainstthemintheCouncilofEuropesHumanRightsCommission.53Eachmember state had to file a declarationof agreement to article 25with theCouncilsSecretary-General,and theprovisiondidnotcome intoeffectuntil sixcontractingstatesagreedtoit.54TherewasgreatdisagreementwithintheCouncil

    44. simPson,supranote25,at60102. 45. ECHR,supranote38,art.15(1). 46. Id. 47. Id.art.17. 48. Figures13infradetailthesestructures. 49. SeeroBErTson,supranote33,at164. 50. ProtocolNo.11 to theConvention for theProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms art. 27(1), May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No. 155, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=155&CM=8&DF=01/08/2010&CL=ENG [hereinafter Protocol11]. 51. Convention,supranote34,art.25(1). 52. sTEPHEn c. mccaffrEy, undErsTanding inTErnaTionaL Law252(2006). 53. mark w. Janis ET aL., EuroPEan Human rigHTs Law26(3ded.2008). 54. Convention,supranote34,art.25.

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    overtheinclusionofthisprovisionintheConvention.55Ittookfiveyearsforsixcontractingpartiestoagreetoit,butitfinallycameintoforcein1955.56Aswewillsee,itturnedouttobeagreatsuccess.

    17Theprocessthroughwhichcomplaintstraveledfromapplicationtojudg-ment is pictured in figure 1.Both states and individuals could file applications:interstateapplicationswereallowedbyarticle24,whichbecamearticle33underProtocol11in1998;individualapplicationswereallowedbyarticle25(nowarticle34).Theinterstatecasemechanismhasbeenusedonlyrarely.57

    18Complaintshadtomeetcertainrequirementsinordertobeconsidered.58Article27oftheoriginalConvention(nowarticle35)indicatesthatthefollowingkindsofcomplaintswereinadmissible:

    1. Anonymouscomplaints;2. Matters that had already been examined by theCommission or the

    court;3. Thosepreviouslysubmittedtoanotherinternationalorganizationfor

    investigationthatcontainnonewinformation;4. Thosethathadnotexhaustedalldomesticremediesandhadbeenfiled

    sixmonthsafterthelastdecisionoftherelevantdomesticinstitution;and

    5. Thoseincompatiblewiththe...Convention,manifestlyill-founded,oranabuseoftherightofpetition.

    Thejurisprudenceonadmissibilityisstillanimportantshieldagainstinappropri-ate applications.59 Between 1955 and 2000, 180,319 applicationswere filed, and6736(3.7%)werefoundtobeadmissible.60

    19 If a settlement was reached in a case, article 30 provided that theCommission would write a report consisting of a summary of the facts and adescription of the settlement and send the report to the states involved, theCommitteeofMinisters,andtheSecretary-GeneraloftheCouncil.Thecasewouldthenberemovedfromthelist.Ifnosettlementwasreached,however,article31(1)provided that the Commission write a report that included the opinion of theCommissiononwhetherornottheConventionhadbeenviolated.ThereportwassenttotheCommitteeofMinistersandthestatesinvolvedinthedispute.61Ifnei-therpartyappealedthedecisiontotheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(ECtHR)within three months, article 32(1) provided that the Committee of Ministersdecidewhetherornottherehadbeenaviolation.

    55. Janis ET aL.,supranote53,at1519. 56. Id.at21. 57. See Eur. Court of Human Rights., Inter-States Applications, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/5D5BA416-1FE0-4414-95A1-AD6C1D77CB90/0/Requ%C3%AAtes_inter%C3%A9tatiques_EN.pdf. 58. Convention,supranote34,arts.26,27. 59. SeegenerallyHarris ET aL., supranote43, at757810; and Janis ET aL., supranote53, at2749formoredetailedexplanationsofadmissibility. 60. Eur. courT of Human rigHTs, survEy of acTiviTiEs70(2000),available athttp://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/501D81E2-C4D9-4EAD-990E-AC27448F60E1/0/SurveyofActivities2000.pdf. 61. Convention,supranote34,art.31(2).

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    20TheCommitteemight also require theviolating state to compensate thevictimfor theviolationandtocorrect,withinacertainperiod, thataspectof itslegalsystemthathad ledtotheviolation.62If theviolatingstatedidnottaketheprescribedactionintime,theCommitteedecidedwhateffect[should]begiventoitsoriginaldecisionandpublisheditsreport.63Underarticle32(4),allthecontract-ingparties to the treatywerebound toabideby theCommitteesdecisions.TheCommissionsfriendlysettlements,decisionsonadmissibility,andjudgmentswerepublished in its Decisions and Reports64 and selectively in the Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights.65

    21TheCommitteesjurisdictionwasthedefault;theECtHRsjurisdictionwasoptional.Agreementtothecourtsjurisdictioncouldbeacceptedunconditionally

    62. Id.art.32(2). 63. Id. art.32(3). 64. Eur. commn of Human rigHTs, dEcisions and rEPorTs(19751998). 65. yEarBook of THE EuroPEan convEnTion on Human rigHTs (1959present) [hereinafteryEarBook].TheEuropeanLawCentrealsopublishesthedecisionsoftheCommissioninEuropean Human Rights Reports(1979present).

    Figure 1. process under the Commission

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    or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain other HighContractingPartiesorforaspecifiedperiod.66CountriescouldacceptthecourtsjurisdictionbyfilingadeclarationwiththeSecretary-General.67Andarticle46(1)limitedjurisdictiontotheinterpretationandapplicationoftheConvention,whichisstillthecasetoday.68

    22Article 38 assigned the ECtHR the same number of judges as there arememberstates,andthisrulestillapplies.69Underarticle42theyweretobepaidbytheday,becauseitwasnotexpectedthatthecaseloadwouldbeheavyenoughtojustifypaymentonalongerbasis.70Achamberofsevenjudgeswouldsit,includingonesittingex officiowhowasanationalofanyStatepartyconcerned....foreachcase.71OnlytheCommissionoracontractingstatecouldbringacasebeforethecourt.72Article51requiredthecourttowriteanopinionforeachcase,andarticle52madethatopinionfinal.Article54gavetheCommitteeofMinisterstherespon-sibilitytosupervisetheexecutionofthejudgment.

    23 The court published its Judgments and Decisions from 1961 to 1996 asSeriesAanditsPleadings, Oral Arguments, and Documents from1961to1988asSeriesB.In1996,theECtHRchangedthetitleandformatofseriesAtotheReports of Judgments and Decisions.73Thecourtprovidesawidevarietyoftextsonitswebsite.ThesearchsystemthatprovidesaccesstotheHUDOCdatabase74includesallthefollowingdocumentsbeginningwith1960:

    Decisions,judgments,andadvisoryopinionsofthecourt ReportsoftheCommission ResolutionsoftheCommitteeofMinisters

    The database provides a template with blanks for the following search criteria:documentfields,language,importance,title,respondentstate,applicationnumber,Conventionarticlenumber,keyword,Strasbourgcaselaw,conclusion,casenum-ber,anddate.Italsoprovidesitsownlistofkeywordstochoosefromandsearchesfor cases decided under previous cases, like a citator. The court also providesMonthly Information Notes, which summarizes cases of particular interest andincludesannual indexestothecases.Onecanalsofindcommunicatedcases

    66. Convention, supranote34,art.46(2). 67. Id. art.46(3). 68. ECHR,supranote38,art.32(1). 69. Id.art.20. 70. roBErTson,supranote33,at168. 71. Convention, supra note 34, art. 43. See also LuziusWildhaber, An Insiders View of theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights:AnAddress to the InnerTemple (Oct.20,2003) (unpublishedspeech,onfilewithauthor). 72. Convention, supranote34,art.48. 73. TheopinionsthemselvescanbefoundintheEur. courT of Human rigHTs, PuBLicaTions of THE EuroPEan courT of Human rigHTs, sEriEs a: JudgmEnTs and dEcisions (19611996)andEuroPEan courT of Human rigHTs, rEPorTs of JudgmEnTs and dEcisions (1996present). TheyEarBook,supranote65,publishessummariesofthedecisionsandjudgments.Pleadings,transcripts,andotherdocumentsfiledwiththecourtcanbefoundinPuBLicaTions of THE EuroPEan courT of Human rigHTs, sEriEs B: PLEadings, oraL argumEnTs, and documEnTs(19611988). 74. Eur. Court of Human Rights, HUDOC Database, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database(lastvisitedAug.1,2010).

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    complaintsthathavebeencommunicatedtothecountriesagainstwhichtheyhavebeenfiled.

    Changes to the eCHR

    24Overtime,theConventionchanged.Indeed,theFirstProtocol(E.T.S.No.9)wasopenedforsignaturebeforetheConventionevencameintoforce.Itaddedrightstoproperty,education,andfreeelections.Protocol2,whichcameintoforcein 1970, conferred advisory jurisdiction on the court. Only the Committee ofMinisterscanrequestadvisoryopinions,andthoseopinionsmaynotaddress

    anyquestionrelatingtothecontentorscopeoftherightsorfreedomsdefinedinSection1oftheConvention...,or...anyotherquestionwhichtheCommission,theCourtortheCommitteeofMinistersmighthavetoconsiderinconsequenceofanysuchproceedingsascouldbeinstitutedinaccordancewiththeConvention.75

    Protocol2waslaterintegratedintotheConventioninitspresentformasarticles47,48,and49.Protocol4(E.T.S.No.46)prohibited imprisonment fordebtandguaranteed freedomofmovement.Protocol6 (E.T.S.No.114) limited thedeathpenaltytowartime.Itwassignedin1983andhasbeenratifiedoraccededtobyallcontractingpartiesexceptRussia.76ThedeathpenaltywasfinallyabolishedentirelybyProtocol13(E.T.S.No.187)onJuly1,2003.Protocol7(E.T.S.No.117)addedaright to appeal in criminal matters, compensation for wrongful conviction, theprohibitionagainstdoublejeopardy,andequalityofspouses.

    25 In the beginning, the Commission followed a conservative line on theadmissibilityofapplications,inordertobuildthetrustofthegovernments,whichweresuspiciousoftheinstitutionsofenforcementandtherightofindividualappli-cationinparticular.77Indeed,thenumberofapplicationssubmitteddeclinedinthefirstfewyears.In1955,therewere138applications;in1956,104;in1957,101;andin1958theyreachedalowof96.78ThecultureoftheCommissionchangedinthe1970s,andastheCommissionadmittedmoreapplications,itscredibilitygrewandthenumberofapplicationsgrewapace.79

    the period of protocol 11, 19982009

    26 Two factors led to the immense increase in individual applications: theCommissionsculturalchangeandthebreakupoftheSovietUnionanditssatellitesinEasternEurope.Asearlyasthemid-1970s,itwasbecomingclearthattheSoviet

    75. ProtocolNo. 2 to theConvention for the Protection ofHumanRights and FundamentalFreedoms, May 6, 1963, E.T.S. No. 44, art. 1(2), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=044&CM=8&DF=01/08/2010&CL=ENG. 76. karEn rEid, a PracTiTionErs guidE To THE EuroPEan convEnTion on Human rigHTs679(3ded.2008). 77. See Erik Fribergh&MarkE.Villiger,The European Commission of Human Rights, inTHE EuroPEan sysTEm for THE ProTEcTion of Human rigHTs 605,619 (R.St. J.Macdonald et al. eds.,1993); Christian Tomuschat,The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, in THE EuroPEan courT of Human rigHTs ovErwHELmEd By aPPLicaTions 1, 67(RdigerWolfrum&UlrickeDeutscheds.,2009). 78. See41yEarBook, supranote65,at18. 79. Tomuschat,supranote77,at7.

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    andEasternEuropeaneconomieswerefallingbehindthecapitalistcountriesoftheWest.80ThusthefamousRussianjoke:Wepretendtowork,theypretendtopayus.81TheSovietpercapitagrossnationalproductgrewatarateof2%between1950and1953,rosetoarateof3.9%between1953and1960,butdeclinedtonega-tive2.1%between1985and1991.82AlthoughtheSovietUnionhadonceexportedgrain, during the 1970s it had to import ten million tons a year to feed itspopulation.83

    27Thereasonsfortheseproblemsincludedgovernmentbureaucratsfearofexposing the truth,84 thegovernmentsbailingoutof industrial andagriculturalfailures,85anexcessiveemphasisonheavyindustry,86alackofconsumergoods,87as well as the weakness of the command economy.88 When Gorbachev wasappointedGeneralSecretaryin1985,hesetouttoreformthesystem.89Herecog-nizedthattheSovietUniondidnothavetheresourcestoaccomplishthenecessarydomesticreformsandatthesametimecontinuetocompetewiththeUnitedStatesonmilitaryspending.90Inaddition, thedomesticreformsrequiredchangingthecultureofthegovernmenttooneofopenness,genuinedemocracy,andtheruleoflaw.91TheSovietUnionwas thusno longerableorwillingtopropupthepost-StalinisttotalitarianregimesofEasternEurope.92

    28As a result, for different reasons and in different ways, one communistgovernmentafteranothercollapsedandwasreplacedbyaWestern-styledemoc-racy.OnAugust24,1989,anoncommunistgovernmentwasinstalledinPoland;93onNovember9and10theBerlinWallwasdemolished;94onDecember29,VaclavHavel,theleaderofCzechoslovakiasopposition,waselectedpresident;95Hungaryheld free elections in the spring of 1990;96 and on October 3, 1990, the twoGermanyswerereunited.97

    29Thenewlyfreenations,includingRussiaitself,soughtmembershipintheCouncilofEuropeand,aftersomediscussionandrequestsforfurtherreform,theCounciladmittedthem.Thestandardforadmissionwasarticle3of theStatute:

    80. JudT,supranote1,at577. 81. JohnKampfner,Russia 2: We Pretend to Vote; They Pretend to Notice,nEw sTaTEsman,Dec.1,2003,http://www.newstatesman.com/200312010017. 82. PHiLiP Hanson, THE risE and faLL of THE soviET Economy243tbl.9.2(2003). 83. HiTcHcock, supranote5,at351. 84. Seeid.at35354. 85. Id. at35152. 86. JudT, supra note 1, at 578;vicTor sEBEsTyEn, rEvoLuTion 1989: THE faLL of THE soviET EmPirE7778(2009). 87. HiTcHcock, supranote5,at351. 88. JudT,supranote1,at578. 89. HiTcHcock,supranote5,at35458. 90. SeeJudT,supranote1,at592. 91. Id. at597600. 92. sEBEsTyEn, supranote86,at195. 93. HiTcHcock,supranote5,at362. 94. Id.at366. 95. Id. at367. 96. Id. at360. 97. Id. at 369.

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    EverymemberoftheCouncilofEuropemustaccepttheprinciplesoftheruleoflawandoftheenjoymentbyallpersonswithinitsjurisdictionofhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms....98Themethodwastoprovideawareness-raising,....assistanceandcooperation,[and]integrationonsubjectssuchasdraftingconsti-tutionsandelectionlaws,creatingandoperatingconstitutionalcourts,andothermattersconcerningdemocracy,humanrights,andtheruleoflaw.ThisworkledtothefoundingoftheVeniceCommission,whichisanarmoftheCouncilandcon-tinuestogiveassistancetonationsthatrequestit.99Theenlargementincludedstatesas far east as Bulgaria (admitted 1992), Georgia (admitted 1999), andMoldova(admitted1995).100Between1989and1996,eighteencountriesjoined.101Theaddi-tionofsomanystatesinsoshortatimeexacerbatedthefloodofcasesfacingtheECtHR.102Indeed,atonepointcaseshadtowaitfiveyearsforadjudication.103

    30Inresponse,theCounciladoptedProtocol11(E.T.S.No.155)in1998.ItremainedinforceuntilJune1,2010,thedateonwhichProtocol14(C.E.T.S.No.194)cameintoforce.ThefirstarticleofProtocol11replacedoldarticles1956oftheConvention. Itwrote theHumanRightsCommissionoutof theConventionentirely;madetheECtHRpermanent;gavethecourttheresponsibilityforpursu-ingfriendlysettlements;abolishedtheappealofindividualcasestotheCommitteeofMinisters;made the judgmentsof the court final; restructured the court intocommitteesandchambers,includinggrandchambers;establishedaregistryforthecourt;andinsertedheadingsintothetextoftheConvention.

    31Theprocessthroughwhichcomplaintstraveledfromapplicationtojudg-mentunderProtocol11ispicturedinfigure2.Ajudgerapporteur,whoischargedwithpresentingthecasetotheCourt...,104isassignedtoeachcase.Therappor-teurmakesarecommendationonadmissibilitytoacommitteeofthreejudges,whointurnmaketheinitialdecisiononadmissibility.105Onlycasesthatareunanimouslyconsideredadmissiblearereferredtoachamber.Chambershaveseven judgesandreviewindividualcasesforadmissibilityagain.Theymayruleonlyonadmissibilityoronbothadmissibilityandthemeritsofacase.106Iftheyruleonlyonadmissibility,thecasecanbereferredtoagrandchamber,whichconsistsofseventeenjudges.107In

    98. TomasNiklasson&AndersSannerstedt,Europe Safe for Democracy? The Council of Europe and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe,96sTaTsvETEnskaPLig TidskrifT69,70(1993). 99. Id.at 7276. 100. Council of Eur., 47 Countries, One Europe, http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en(clickonDisplaytheListofCountries). 101. Id. 102. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms:ExplanatoryReport,May 1, 2004, 56,available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/194.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Protocol 14ExplanatoryReport]. 103. Seedavid s. wEissBrodT & conniE dE La vEga, inTErnaTionaL Human rigHTs Law 314(2007). 104. rEid,supranote76,at11. 105. Id. 106. Id.; Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamentalFreedoms:ExplanatoryReport44,available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/155.htm(lastvisitedAug.24,2010)[hereinafterProtocol11ExplanatoryReport]. 107. Protocol11,supranote50,art.27(1).

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    rarecases,attherequestofoneparty,agrandchambermayexamineacaseonwhichachamberhasalreadyruledonthemerits.Thesecasesmust

    raise[]seriousquestionsconcerningtheinterpretationorapplicationoftheConventionoritsprotocols,or...anissueofgeneralimportance.ThepurposeistoensurethequalityandconsistencyoftheCourtscase-lawbyallowingforare-examinationofthemostimportantcasesiftheabove-mentionedconditionsaremet.108

    Decisionsonadmissibilitymustbetakenseparatelyfromthoseonthemeritsandmustbereasoned.109

    32AlthoughProtocol11amelioratedthedelaystosomedegree,thenumberof applications continued to grow and soon outstripped the ability of the newinstitutionstocope.110TheCouncilwroteProtocol14tofurtherreformthesystem,butitcouldonlycomeintoforceifallthecontractingpartiesratifiedoraccededtoit,andRussiadidnotdosoforseveralyears.111

    the period of protocol 14, 2010

    33TheoriginalpurposeofProtocol14wastoequiptheECtHRtodealwiththelandslideofcasesthatthreatenedtocrushit.Thecourtsannualreportfor2003notes that27,281applicationswereallocatedtoadecisionbody,16,724applica-tionsweredeclaredinadmissible,and548judgmentsonthemeritswererenderedthatyear.112Withforty-sevenjudgesonthecourt,thatequatestomorethanonehundredjudgmentsperjudge.Sinceatthattimeadmissibilitydecisionsweremadebythree-judgecommittees,onecanseethatthecaseloadwasenormous.Thesitu-ationcontinued todeteriorate:by2008, thecourthadstartedcountingpendingcases,ofwhichtherewere97,300.113

    34 To bring some temporary improvement to the situation, the CounciladoptedProtocol14bis,whichcameintoforceonOctober1,2009.114TheCouncilsetthenumberofsignatoriesrequiredforittocomeintoforceatonlythree,sothatitwouldcomeintoforcequickly.115Unfortunatelyitwasneververyeffective,enter-ingintoforceforonlyninecountriesbeforeitwassupplantedbyProtocol14.116

    108. Protocol11ExplanatoryReport,supranote106,at47. 109. Id.at78. 110. Protocol14ExplanatoryReport,supranote102,at5. 111. Harris ET aL.,supranote43,at86367. 112. Eur. courT of Human rigHTs, annuaL rEPorT 2003,at10305(2004). 113. Eur. courT of Human rigHTs, annuaL rEPorT 2008,at129(2009). 114. Protocol No. 14bis to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms, May 27, 2009, C.E.T.S. No. 204, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=204&CM=8&DF=01/08/2010&CL=ENG. 115. Protocol No. 14bis to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms: Explanatory Report 22, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/204.htm(lastvisitedJuly27,2010). 116. Protocol No. 14bis to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=204&CM=8&DF=21/04/2010&CL=ENG(lastvisitedJuly27,2010).

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    Figure 2. process under protocol 11

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    35 After high-level negotiations,117 Russia finally ratified Protocol 14 onFebruary18,2010,anditcameintoforceonJune1,2010.118TheprocessforhumanrightscasesunderProtocol14ispicturedinfigure3.Initialadmissibilitydecisionsinindividualcasesaremadebyasinglejudgeandarefinal.119Thisisintendedtorelease the manpower that is currently tied up by having committees of threejudgesexamineapplicationsforadmissibility.120Ifthecaseisadmissible,itisfor-wardedtoacommitteeofthreejudgesorachamberofsevenjudges.121Committeesmaydecideonadmissibility.Ifthedecisiononadmissibilityispositive,thecom-mitteemayrenderadecisiononbothadmissibilityandthemerits,butthelatteronlyincasesthatconcernsubjectsthatarealreadythesubjectofwell-establishedcase-lawoftheCourt.122Committeedecisionsmustbeunanimoustobefinal.123Applications thatareadmissible,butnotalready the subjectofwell-establishedcase-law of the Court, go to a chamber.124 Chambers decisions on individualapplicationswillcoverbothadmissibilityandmerits.Chambersmakethe initialdecisionontheadmissibilityofinterstatecasesandmaymakedecisionsinthosecasesonbothadmissibilityandmerits.Butthetwotypesofdecisionininterstatecasesmustbemadeseparately.125

    36Protocol14addedonemorehurdletoadmissibility:Inthefuture,applica-tionsmaybefoundtobeinadmissibleif

    theapplicanthasnotsufferedasignificantdisadvantageunlessrespectforhumanrightsasdefinedintheConventionandtheProtocolstheretorequiresanexaminationoftheappli-cationonthemeritsandprovidedthatnocasemayberejectedonthisgroundwhichhasnotbeendulyconsideredbyadomestictribunal.126

    Thiscriterionappearstogivethecourtalotofwiggleroomindeterminingwhatisasignificantdisadvantage.Thecourtisrestrainedfromabusingthiscriterionbytherequirementthatitexaminecasesthataffecttheapplicationorinterpreta-tionoftheConventionornationallaweventhoughtheirfactsmayseemtrivial.

    37Protocol14alsoallowstheCommissionerforHumanRightstoparticipatein hearings.127 TheCommissioner forHumanRights is not a leftover from the

    117. See Council of Eur., Press Release: Secretary General Welcomes Forthcoming Entry into Force of Protocol No. 14 (Feb. 18, 2010)available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1585729&Site=DC&ShowBanner=no&Target=_self&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE#. 118. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=194&CM=8&DF=27/07/2010&CL=ENG(lastvisitedJuly27,2010). 119. ECHR,supranote38,art.27(1). 120. Protocol 14 Explanatory Report, supra note 102, at 38; Paul L. McKaskle, The Euro-pean Court of Human Rights: What It Is, How It Works, and Its Future,40u.s.f. L. rEv.1,62(2005). 121. ECHR,supranote38,art.27(3). 122. Id.art.28(2). 123. Id. art.28. 124. Id. art.29(1). 125. Id. art.29(2). 126. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamentalFreedomsart.12,May13,2004,E.T.S.No.194,available athttp://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=194&CM=8&DF=01/08/2010&CL=ENG.This is part ofarticle35ofthecurrentECHR. 127. Id. art.13(amendingart.36oftheECHR).

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    Figure 3. process under protocol 14

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    earlier Commission; it is a new positionwhose primary responsibilities are thepromotionofhumanrightsinEuropeandtheprovisionofsupportfornationalgovernments that wish to strengthen the protection of human rights by theircourtsorotherinstitutions.TheCommissionersparticipationhasthepotentialtoaddanobjectiveandknowledgeablevoicetotheprocedure.

    38PerhapsthemostmomentouschangeofallwasthegrantingofpermissiontotheEuropeanUnion(EU)toaccedetotheECHR.WhentheEuropeanCoalandSteel Community (ECSC)was founded in 1951, its goalswere restricted to theeconomicsphere:[T]hetreatyisconcernedwiththeestablishmentofacommonmarket for coal and steel,managed by joint institutions on the basis of agreedpolicies.128UnliketheCouncilofEurope,theECSCwastohaveitsownpowertoputintoeffectthepoliciesonwhichthemembersagreed.Inotherwords,itwastohavethepowertoactunderthedirectionof,butindependentlyof,theindividualmembers.129

    39Eventually issues related to human rights began to appear in cases thatcamebeforetheEuropeanCourtofJustice(ECJ),whichisthejudicialarmoftheEU.Itwasfoundthatthefundamentalfreedomsofhumanrightsareinextricablyboundtothefreedomtoactasaplayerinafreemarketsystem.Becausetherewasnothingexplicit in theECSC treatyor itsprogenyabouthumanrights, theECJbegan to take inspiration from sources outside the EU treaties, principally theECHR.ItdidnotcitetheECHRasauthorityitmerelyderivedgeneralprinciplesoflawfromit.Inotherwords,ittooktheECHRasasourceofcustomarylaw.AstheimportanceofhumanrightstotheEUincreased,theEUgraduallytookstepsto recognize and then adopt these as general principles of law. The Treaty onEuropeanUnionof1992recognizedtheECHRasgeneralprinciplesoflaw,130andtheEUapproveditsownCharterofFundamentalRightsin2000.131TheCharterdidnotcreatenewrights,butenshrinedtherightsthattheECJhadfoundtobegeneralprinciplesoflaw.

    40AlthoughitwouldseemnaturalfortheEUtobecomeapartytotheECHR,thereare somepotential consequences thatmightnotbe immediatelyapparent.Indeed,theexplanatoryreporttoProtocol14saysthatmanyoftheseconsequenceswillhavetobeworkedoutandputintoanotherprotocoloranaccessiontreaty.132Neverthelessitwouldseemthatsomeareforeseeable.133

    41A2002reportoftheSteeringCommitteeonHumanRightsaddressesverybriefly and superficially the question of themeans to avoid any contradictionbetweenthelegalsystemoftheEuropeanCommunities/Unionandthesystemof

    128. sTanLEy HEnig, THE uniTing of EuroPE 27(2ded.2002). 129. Id.at13. 130. TreatyonEuropeanUnion,art.F(2),July29,1992,1757U.N.T.S.3,12. 131. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J.(C364)1. 132. SeeProtocol14ExplanatoryReport,supranote102,101. 133. See generallyHarris ET aL., supra note 43, at 2830; Hans Christian Krger, Reflections Concerning Accession of the European Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights21PEnn sT. inTL L. rEv.89(2002).

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    theEuropeanConventiononHumanRights.134Such treatment implies that therelationshipbetweenthetwocourtsandthechoiceoflawbetweentheEUCharterandtheECHRisunclearandwouldneedtobeclarifiedinanyaccessioninstru-ments.Indeed,oneofthecourtscurrentandmostimportantconcernsiskeepingitsjurisprudenceconsistent.135ThisleadstofurtherquestionsabouttheconsistencyoflawamongtheCouncilofEurope,theEU,andindividualstates,whichisatopicof great complexity. Although EU accession was certainly proposed in order tosimplify thesituation, itcanonlydosobya thoughtful,evenprescient,plan forbringingthetwoinstitutionsandtheirlawtogether.

    42ItisclearthattheEUwouldbesubjecttothejurisdictionoftheECtHR,justasthestatepartiesare.136Acitizen,orevenastatememberoftheEU,couldfileanapplication against it, although the latter situationwouldprobablybe addressedwithintheEU.137ComplaintsagainsttheEUwouldbesubjecttotheECtHRadmis-sibilitycriteria,includingtheexhaustionofdomesticremedies.138Domesticreme-dies in this case, however, would be those of the EU, perhaps the ECJ. ECJprocedures would not be considered to be another procedure of internationalinvestigationorsettlementasrequiredforstatepartiesbyarticle35(2)(b).139TheEUmightbebroughtintoacaseasathirdpartyunderarticle36(1)inwhichoneof its citizens is the applicant.This could lead to an enormousnumber of suchinterventionsbytheEU,sinceitsstatemembersaresuchalargepartoftheCouncilofEurope.140

    43AnotherpossibilityisthattheEUmightwanttobeaco-defendantwhenitslaw is at issueor itmightbebrought in to ensure theproper administrationofjustice.141 The EU would, of course, participate in the Committee ofMinistersenforcementproceedings.142It isnotclear,however,whetheritwouldvoteonallcasesoronlyonthosethatconcernedEUlaw.143IftheEUlostacase,theCommitteeofMinisters could issuea resolutiondirecting it toprovide just satisfaction toasuccessfulcomplainantor tomakechanges to its legal system,as itdoes to indi-vidualstates.

    134. counciL of Eur., sTudy of TEcHnicaL and LEgaL issuEs of a PossiBLE Ec/Eu accEs-sion To THE EuroPEan convEnTion on Human rigHTs17(June28,2002),available athttp://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/cddh/2._activities/StudAccessionEU_en.pdf. 135. Janis ET aL., supra note 53, at 87885; Council of Eur., High Level Conference on theFuture of the EuropeanCourt ofHumanRights, InterlakenDeclaration PP 8, PP 10(4) (Feb. 19,2010), available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/europa/euroc.Par.0133.File.tmp/final_en.pdf. 136. Israel de Jess Butler & Olivier De Schutter, Binding the EU to International Human Rights Law,27y.B. Eur. L.277,301(2008). 137. SeecounciL of Eur.,supranote134,at1214. 138. Id. at12. 139. Id.at11. 140. Id.at12. 141. Id.at13. 142. Id.at910. 143. Id.at10.

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    Resolution of Cases Before the European Court of Human Rights

    principles guiding Decisions144

    44ThereareseveralprinciplesthatarenotexplicitlydiscussedbytheECtHR,but thatnevertheless influence it.The first is subsidiarity,whichmeans thatanytaskthatanorganizationundertakesshouldbedoneatthelowestlevelpossible.Itcouldbeexpressedconversely:theonlytasksthatshouldbedoneatahigherlevelare those thatonly thehigher level is capableofdoing.Thus the court and theConventionareconsideredtobesafetynetsunderthenationallegalsystemsthatassurethepeopleofthosenationsthattheyhaverecourseshouldtheirlegalsys-temsfailtoaffordthemtherightsoftheECHR.AlthoughthetermssubsidiaryorsubsidiarityarenotusedintheECHR,theprincipleisinherentinparticularpartsofit.Article53,forexample,guaranteesthattheConventiondoesnotlimitorderogatefromrightsindomesticlaw.Article1givesresponsibilitytothecon-tractingpartiestosecuretoeveryonewithintheirjurisdictiontherightsandfree-domsdefinedinSectionIofthisConvention.Article13putstheburdenonthecontractingstatestoprovidedomesticremediestocitizenswhoserightsundertheConventionhavebeenviolatednotwithstandingthattheviolationhasbeencom-mittedbypersonsactinginanofficialcapacity.

    45Thesecondprinciple is themarginofappreciation. It isessentially thedeferencethecourtshowscontractingstatesinterpretationsoftheparticularitiesoftheirownlegalsystems.Thisprinciplehasbeenusedtodecidewhetherornotastatesinterferencewithaprotectedrightisnecessaryinademocraticsocietytoachievecertain interests.145 IthasbeenappliedtoanumberofrightsundertheConvention.146Itisparticularlydifficultforthecourttoapplythisprinciplecon-sistentlyacrosslegalsystemsthatseemtodefycomparison.147

    46Arelatedprincipleisthatofproportionality.WhentheECHRallowsstatestorestrictaright,thestatemustrestrictthatrightonlyinsofarasisnecessarytoachieve a legitimate goal. In some cases the Convention explicitly allows suchrestrictions;inotherstheECtHRhasinferredthemeventhoughtheyarenotinthetext.148 As mentioned earlier, article 15 allows states to limit the rights in theConvention[i]ntimeofwarorotherpublicemergencythreateningthelifeofthenation....Thesecondparagraphofarticles8through11allallowsomerestric-tions.Forexample,therighttorespectforprivateandfamilylifeapplies

    exceptsuchasisinaccordancewiththelawandisnecessaryinademocraticsocietyintheinterestsofnationalsecurity,publicsafetyortheeconomicwellbeingofthecountry,for

    144. The principles described in this section do not come from the ECHR, but are widelynotedintheliterature.See generallyF.Matscher,Methods of Interpretation of the Convention,in THE EuroPEan sysTEm for THE ProTEcTion of Human rigHTs,supranote77,at63. 145. Janis ET aL.,supranote53,at242(quotingFrettev.France,2002-IEur.H.R.Rep.351). 146. Id. 147. See id. at 107; R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE EuroPEan sysTEm for THE ProTEcTion of Human rigHTs, supranote77,at83,83. 148. See Marc-Andr Eissen, The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights,inTHE EuroPEan sysTEm for THE ProTEcTion of Human rigHTs, supranote77,at125,13137.

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    thepreventionofdisorderorcrime,fortheprotectionofhealthormorals,orfortheprotec-tionoftherightsandfreedomsofothers.149

    Inthemostgeneralterms,thepurposeofproportionalityistoprotectindividualrightsfromlimitationbystateswhensuchlimitationexceedswhatisnecessarytoaccomplishsomepublicgood,suchastheexerciseoftheConventionsrights,theprotectionofdemocracy,orthesuppressionofcrime.

    47Under theprincipleofFourth Instance, theECtHR isnot an appellatecourtandapplicationstoitarenotappealsfromthedecisionsofnationalcourtsapplying national law.150 The courtwill not second guesserrors of fact or lawallegedlycommittedbyanationalcourtunlessorinsofarastheymayhaveinfringedrightsandfreedomsprotectedbytheConvention.151Thearticle6guaranteeofafairtrialisprocedural;itdoesnotguaranteeafairoutcome.

    Just satisfaction and enforcement

    48ThecourtmayawardjustsatisfactiontothepartiesiftheinternallawoftheHighContractingPartyconcernedallowsonlypartialreparationtobemade.152

    Thisissupportedbyarticle46,whichsays:TheHighContractingPartiesunder-taketoabidebythefinaljudgmentoftheCourtinanycasetowhichtheyarepar-ties.Inotherwords,ratificationoftheConventionconstitutesagreementtoputthecourtsjudgmentsintoeffect.Thusassumptionofresponsibilityentailsthreeobligations: theobligationtoputanendtotheviolation,theobligationtomakereparation...,and,finally,theobligationtoavoidsimilarviolations.153Justsat-isfactionmaybemerelythejudgmentofthecourt;afindingagainstagovernmentmaybeenoughtovindicatetheapplicant.Ontheotherhand,thecourtmayalsoaward monetary damages. It did so for the first time in 1974 inNeumeister v. Austria.154Sincethenithasincreasedthispracticetothepointthatonecouldnowsaythatitisnotuncommon.155Monetaryawardsaremadeforbothpecuniaryandnonpecuniarylossandmayincludetheexpensesofbringingtheapplicationandbackinterestwhenagovernmentdelayspayment.156

    49 Article 46(2) of the Convention gives the Committee of Ministers theresponsibility for enforcing the courts judgments. If the government fulfills therequirementsofthecourtsjudgmentsorthepartiescometoafriendlysettlement,the Committee adopts a resolution accepting the governments actions or thefriendlysettlementandstatingthatnofurtheractionisnecessary.157Otherwise,theCommittee asks the government to submit information on the progress toward

    149. ECHR,supranote38, art.8. 150. Harris ET aL.,supranote43,at14. 151. Id. (quotingGarciaRuizv.Spain,1999-IEur.Ct.H.R.8728). 152. ECHR,supranote38,art.41. 153. ELisaBETH LamBErT aBdELgawad, THE ExEcuTion of JudgmEnTs of THE EuroPEan courT of Human rigHTs10(HumanRightsFiles,No.19,2ded.2008). 154. Neumeisterv.Austria,17Eur.Ct.H.R.(ser.A)(1974). 155. See rEid,supranote76,at60856foralistofmonetaryawardsinindividualcases. 156. Harris ET aL.,supranote43,at85758. 157. Council of Eur., Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the Supervision of theExecutionofJudgmentsandoftheTermsofFriendlySettlements(May10,2006),available athttp://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Documents/CMrules2006_en.asp.

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    fulfillmentandputstheissueontheagendaofitsnexthumanrightsmeeting.158AlthoughthedocumentssubmittedtotheCommitteearepublic,itsdeliberationsareconfidential.Itmaytakeanyofthefollowingactions:(1)attempttobringtheparties to a friendly settlement, (2) adopt an interim resolution of concern, or(3) threaten to take action under article 8 of the Statute, which allows theCommitteeofMinisterstoendthegovernmentsmembershipintheCouncil.NocontractingpartyhasyetbeenexcludedfromtheCouncil.

    Compliance

    50Althoughtherehavebeenanumberofpartialorimpressionisticattemptstoassessthecontractingpartiescompliancewiththecourtsjudgments,therehasbeennocomprehensiveandreliablestudy.Certainlyitvaries.Sometimesgovern-ments comply with a judgment quickly and completely; other times belatedly,incompletely,ornotatall.159

    51Indeedtherearedeep,inherentdifficultiestoanysuchassessment.Thereisanenormousvariationintheculturesoftheforty-sevenmembersoftheCouncil,anditisdifficultforoutsiderstoassesshowdeeplythosecultureshaveassimilatedthevaluesoftheECHR.160Thesamecouldbesaidofthestructureandoperationofthememberstatesgovernmentsandlegalsystems.Finally,itisunclearwhatthemostreliableorappropriatebasisofanysuchcomparisonwouldbe.Shouldthecomparisonbemadetocompliancewithrulingsofdomesticcourts;orthecompli-anceofnationswiththedecisionsofotherinternationalbodies;ortheextentoftheadoptionoftheECHRintothelegalsystemofthemembers?161Successcouldalsobemeasuredbythenumberofapplicationsreceived,theextenttowhichthemembershaveratifiedoraccededtotheConvention,thejurisdictionofthecourt,andtherightofindividualpetition.162

    52Thereare,however,somegoodreasonsforconcludingthatcomplianceishigh.Althoughstateshaveobvious,material interests in internationaleconomic,trade, and travel agreements, human rights agreements require governments toacceptanobligationwithnocorrespondingbenefittothem.Indeed,agreementtotheECHRopensagovernmenttopotentialcomplaints,embarrassment,andthepaymentofdamages.Thewonderisthattheywouldagreetoitinthefirstplace.Inaddition, although the contracting states are not required to incorporate theConvention into theirnational law, theyhave all done so.163The efficacyof thecourtis,therefore,oftenhiddenintheguiseoftheordinaryworkingsofthecon-tractingstates legalsystems.164Thisreasoningleadsmostcommentatorstocon-

    158. aBdELgawad,supranote 153,at33. 159. Janis ET aL.,supranote53,at105n.90,109. 160. Id. at107. 161. Id. at108. 162. Id. 163. Harris ET aL.,supranote43,at23. 164. Janis makes the point that most of the enforcement of international law in generaloccurswithinnationallegalsystems:Whenatreatyprovisionoracustomaryinternationallaworanyotherinternationallawnormisusedasaruleofdecisionbyamunicipalcourtoradministrativeagency,internationallawhasalltheefficacythatamunicipallegalsystemcanmuster.Janis ET aL.,supranote53,at112.

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    clude that compliance is high. A review of states compliance to the courtsjudgmentsgivesonetheimpressionthattheybehavealotliketeenagers.Theymaynotdoexactlywhatyouwantthemtodowhenyouwantthemtodoit,but,aftersomeadmonishment,theyoftendomoreorlesswhatyouwantsoonerorlater.

    pilot Judgments

    53Inyetanotherchangetotrytoimproveitsefficiency,theECtHRhasbegunto use what is called the pilot judgment procedure. The court explains it asfollows:

    Thecentralideabehindthepilotjudgmentprocedureisthatwheretherearealargenumberofapplicationsconcerningthesameproblem,applicantswillobtainredressmorespeedilyifaneffectiveremedyisestablishedatnationallevelthaniftheircasesareprocessedonanindividualbasisinStrasbourg.165

    Pilotjudgmentsareusedinthecaseofrepetitiveapplicationsthatshareacommon,rootcause.Thecourtselectsaparticularcasethatappearstobereasonablyrepre-sentativeoftheentiregroup.Itmayadjournthecaseduringtheadjudicatorypro-cess to give the contracting state time to remedy the situation. Although thedurationof the adjournmentmaybeprescribed at its beginning, the courtmayrestartthecaseatanytimeifthisiswhattheinterestsofjusticerequire....166TheECtHRusedthepilotjudgmentprocedureforthefirsttimein2004.167

    The Social Charter and the Expansion of Rights

    54AlthoughcommentatorsregardtheECHRasthecrowningachievementofthe Council of Europe, the Council has adopted many other treaties that havedeveloped human rights beyond their traditional core. First among these is theEuropean Social Charter (ESC).168 The Charter was opened for signature onOctober18,1961.AmajorAdditionalProtocolwasaddedin1988andotherlesseramendmentswereaddedatvariousothertimes.ThewholeCharterwasrevisedandreissued as an autonomous treaty in 1996.169 The new treaty incorporated theAdditionalProtocolof1988,otheramendmentstotheCharter,principlesofotherinternationalsocialandeconomictreaties,andtheprinciplesofmembersdomes-

    165. Eur.Court ofHumanRights, ThePilot-Judgment Procedure 6 (2009), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF4E8456-77B3-4E67-8944-B908143A7E2C/0/Information_Note_on_the_PJP_for_Website.pdf. 166. Id.5. 167. Id.8(citingBroniowskiv.Poland,2004-VEur.Ct.H.R.1). 168. EuropeanSocialCharter,Oct. 18, 1961, 529U.N.T.S. 89,E.T.S.No.35,available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=035&CM=8&DF=27/07/2010&CL=ENG. 169. European Social Charter (revised), July 3, 1996, E.T.S. No. 163, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=163&CM=8&DF=28/07/2010&CL=ENG.Thisdoesnot replace theoriginalCharter,but complements it. Id. art.B;EuropeanSocialCharter (revised):ExplanatoryReport 10,http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/163.htm.

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    tic socialandeconomic legislation.170TheCouncilofEuropedevotespartof itswebsitetotheESC,andthisisanexcellentplacetofindmanyofthedocumentsthatthissectionofthearticledescribes.171

    55TheESChasapreamble,sixparts,andanappendix.Thepreamblemakesclear that the Charter is an extension of the ECHR and that its purpose is toimprovethestandardoflivingand...socialwell-beingofmemberspopulations.TheESCdealswitheconomicandsocialpolicies thatapply togroupsofpeoplewithinmemberssocieties,whereas theECHRenumerates individualrights.ThefirstpartoftheESCconsistsofthirty-onebriefpolicystatementsthatmemberspledgetopursue.172Theycoverprinciplessuchastherighttowork;therightofboth labor andemployers toorganize; the right to theprotectionofhealth; therightof the family to social, legal, andeconomicprotection; the rightof elderlypersonstosocialprotection;andtherighttohousing.Althoughatfirstglancemostofthemappeartohavetodowithconditionsofwork,manydealwithprotectingthedisadvantagedofallkinds.ThesecondpartamplifiesthemeaningofeachofthepoliciesstatedinpartI.Membersarerequiredtoconsiderthemselvesboundtoimplement

    sixitemsoftheirchoicefromalistofninefrompartI; atleastsixteenotherarticlesorsixty-threenumberedparagraphsoftheir

    choicefrompartII;and to adopt a system of labour inspection appropriate to national

    conditions.173

    56TheESCestablishesatwo-partsystemofsupervisionconsistingofregularreports and collective complaints. The reports are submitted to the EuropeanCommittee of Social Rights (ECSR), which consists of fifteenmembers electedfrom five regions of Europe; before 1998 this was known as the Committee ofIndependent Experts.174 Governments submit two types of reports on the ESCarticlesinpartII:oneonthosetheyhaveratifiedandanotheronthosetheyhavenot ratified.175Theprocess for submitting reportsonratifiedarticlesbeganasafairlysimpleprocess,buthasbecomerathercomplexovertime.Anexcellentexpla-nationof thepastcalendarsandfutureschedules through2011canbefoundinwitkowskisCharter of Social Rights of the Council of Europe.176

    57 After a thorough, substantive examination of these reports, whichmayincludeface-to-facemeetingswithrepresentativesof thegovernmentconcerned,the Committee issues its report on whether or not the country submitting thereportisincompliancewiththearticlesthatithasratified.177Thisfunctionofthe

    170. EuropeanSocialCharter(revised):ExplanatoryReport,supranote169,7,8. 171. Council of Eur., European Social Charter, http://www.coe.int/T/DGHL/Monitoring/SocialCharter(lastupdatedJune9,2010). 172. EuropeanSocialCharter(revised),supranote169,pt.I. 173. Id.pt.III,art.A(1),(4). 174. See andrzEJ marian wiTkowski, cHarTEr of sociaL rigHTs of THE counciL of EuroPE37778(2007). 175. EuropeanSocialCharter,supranote168,arts.21,22. 176. wiTkowski,supranote174,at37982. 177. Id. at38183.

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    ECSRisquasi-judicialinsofarasitsreportshaveaparticularlystronginfluenceonsubsequentactionstaken.178Theyareneverthelessnotbinding.179TheCommitteecanalsosendacopyofthereporttotheInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO).TheConclusions of the European Committee of Social Rightshaspublisheditsreportssince1969.180

    58Aspartofthearticle22process,theECSRcommonlymeetswithrepresen-tativesofthecountryconcernedandoftengivesthegovernmentadviceonhowtomeetthechallengespreventingfurtherimplementationoftheunratifiedarticles.InasensetheCommitteeactsastechnicaladvisors.181Thereportisthensenttothenationalorganizationsofworkersandemployers,182andrelevantnongovernmen-talorganizations.183ThereportandtheresponsestheretoarethenforwardedtotheGovernmental Committee, which is the political consultative body to theCommitteeofMinisters.184

    59TheECSRmakesrecommendationsonthebasisofasubstantiveexamina-tionofthecontentsubmittedbythegovernment.185TheGovernmentalCommitteere-examinesthecontent,considerspoliticalfactors,andthenselectsthecasesthatwill be referred to the Committee of Ministers.186 Although the Committee ofMinistersusuallyadoptstherecommendationsoftheGovernmentalCommittee,ina fewcases ithasadopted the recommendationsof theECSR instead.While theCommitteeofMinistersresolutionsarenotbinding,theydoexpressweightysub-stantiveandpoliticalopinions.187

    60ThesystemofcollectivecomplaintswascreatedbytheAdditionalProtocoltotheEuropeanSocialCharterProvidingforaSystemofCollectiveComplaints,whichwasopenedforsignatureonNovember9,1995.TheProtocolallowsthefol-lowingkindsoforganizationstobringcomplaintsagainstastatethathasratified,accededto,oracceptedit:

    a. Internationalorganisationsofemployersandtradeunionsreferredtoinparagraph2ofArticle27oftheCharter;

    b. Other international non-governmental organisations which have consultativestatuswiththeCouncilofEuropeandhavebeenputonalistestablishedforthispurposebytheGovernmentalCommittee;

    178. See id. at378. 179. Id. at383. 180. These are available for 2003present at Council of Eur., Conclusions of the EuropeanCommittee of Social Rights, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/conclusions/ConclusionsYear_en.asp (last visited July 28, 2010). Earlier years can be found by searching theEuropean Social Charter database at http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/esc2008/query.asp?language=en (lastvisitedJuly28,2010). 181. wiTkowski,supranote174,at38384. 182. Id.at384. 183. There are two types: national nongovernmental organizations and specialized interna-tionalnongovernmentalorganizationsthathaveconsultativestatustotheCouncilofEurope. 184. wiTkowski, supra note 174, at 385; Council of Eur., Governmental Committee:Follow-Up of Conclusions, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/GovernmentalCommittee/GCdefault_en.asp(lastvisitedJuly28,2010). 185. wiTkowski,supranote174,at38384. 186. Id.at386. 187. Id.at388.

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    c. Representativenationalorganisationsofemployersand tradeunionswithin thejurisdiction of the Contracting Party against which they have lodged a com-plaint.188

    61Thereisafourthkindoforganizationthatcanfileacollectivecomplaint:arepresentativenationalorganizationthathasparticularcompetenceinthemat-terscoveredbytheCharterandthatthestatehasdeclaredmayfilesuchcomplaintsagainst it. The Subcommittee of the Governmental Social Committee (theGovernmentalCommittee)towhichsection(a)refersmayinvitetwoemployersorganizations and two trade union organizations as observerswith consultativestatus. The employers organizations must be representative; an individualemployersuchasacorporationcannotbringacollectivecomplaint.Thecomplaintmustrefer to thespecificarticleandparagraphof theCharter that italleges thestatehasnotsatisfactorilyappliedandindicateinwhatrespecttheapplicationhasnotbeensatisfactory.189ThecomplaintistransmittedtotheECSR,whichmayaskboth the contractingparty and the organization that has filed the complaint tosubmitinformationonitsadmissibility.190Ifitisadmissible,theCommitteeasksthepartiestosubmitwritteninformationrelevanttothecomplaintandtheothercontractingpartiestosubmitanycommentstheymaywish.TheECSRalsonotifiesinternationalorganizationsofemployersandtradeunionsreferredtoinparagraph2 of article 27 of the complaint and invites them to submit observations. TheCharter allows the Committee to hold a hearing after reviewing thedocuments.191

    62TheECSRthenwritesareportthatdescribesitsinvestigationandpresentsits conclusion. That report is sent to the party that made the complaint, theCommitteeofMinisters,andallcontractingpartiesoftheESC.192TheCommitteeofMinistersthenvotesonwhetherornotthestateagainstwhomthecomplaintwas lodged applied the ESC satisfactorily. If the vote is against the party, theCommittee ofMinisters votes on a resolution that recommends the actions thedefendantpartymusttaketoimproveitsapplicationoftheESC.OnlycontractingpartiestotheESCcanvoteandtheresolutionmustpassbyatwo-thirdsmajori-ty.193 If the report raises new issues, the contracting partymay request that theCommitteeofMinistersconsult itsGovernmentalCommitteeonthose issues.194Onlycontractingpartiesmayvote,andtheresolutionmustpassbyatwo-thirdsmajority.195Thecontractingpartymustincludeinitsnextregularreportadescrip-tionofthemeasuresithastakentoimproveitsapplicationoftheESC.196

    188. Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System ofCollectiveComplaints,Nov.9,1995,2045U.N.T.S.224,art.1. 189. Id. art.4. 190. Id. arts.5,6. 191. Id. art.7. 192. Id. art.8. 193. Id. art.9(1). 194. Id. art.9(2). 195. Id. 196. Id. art.10.

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    Conclusion

    63TheCouncilofEuropeissixty-oneyearsold.IthasseenthereconstructionofEuropefollowingWorldWarII;theboomofthe1950sand60s;thebustofthe1970s;theColdWaranditsend;theemergenceofnationsformerlydominatedbyorapartoftheSovietUnion;andtherecentworldwiderecession.Duringitsexis-tence,theCouncilhasbeenintheforefrontoftheestablishmentofhumanrightsnormsthroughbindingtreaties.Althoughthetreatiesdescribedabovehavebeenitsmost importantandinfluential, ithasenactedmorethantwohundredothers.197Thesetreatiescoveranenormousarrayoftopicssuchasthepreventionoftorture;thesuppressionofterrorism;childcustodyandvisitation;thesexualexploitationandabuseofchildren;traffickinginhumanbeings;theprotectionofthehumanbeingwithregardtotheapplicationofbiologyandmedicine;theprotectionoftheEuropeanarchaeologicalheritage;thelaundering,search,seizure,andconfiscationoftheproceedsfromcrime;theelaborationofaEuropeanpharmacopeia;andthecompensationofvictimsofviolentcrime.These treatieshavecontributed to thelegal cohesion of the states of Europe and have made that continent the mostadvancedintheworldwithrespecttotheprotectionofhumanrightsandfunda-mentalfreedoms.

    197. SeeCouncilofEur.,supra,note39.