Much Ado About Nothing? Some Comments on B. F.Skinner’s Definition of Verbal Behavior

Matthew P. NormandUniversity of the Pacific

Some have suggested that the definition of verbal behavior offered by B. F. Skinner (1957) failsto capture the essence of language insofar as it is too broad and not functional. In this paper, Iargue that the ambiguities of Skinner’s definition are not an indictment of it, and thatsuggestions to the contrary are problematic because they suffer a critical error of scientificreasoning. Specifically, I argue that (a) no clear definition of verbal behavior is possible becausethere is no natural distinction between verbal and nonverbal behavior; (b) attempts at animmutable definition are essentialistic; and (c) Skinner’s functional taxonomy of language is inno way affected by the particulars of any definition of verbal behavior.

Key words: essentialism, functional analysis, language, verbal behavior

In his seminal treatise, VerbalBehavior, B. F. Skinner (1957) sug-gested that verbal behavior is distin-guishable from nonverbal behaviorbecause ‘‘it is reinforced through themediation of other persons’’ (p. 2).He further refined this definition bysuggesting that ‘‘Verbal behavior isshaped and sustained by a verbalenvironment—by people who re-spond to behavior in certain waysbecause of the practices of the groupof which they are members’’ (p. 226).That is, the verbal community mustestablish the meditating behavior inthe context of verbal episodes.

Skinner actually struggled to arriveat what he considered a usefuldefinition that captured the essentialfeatures of a class of behavior rea-sonably subsumed under the categoryof language (Palmer, 2008). Somethink he missed the mark (cf. Leig-land, 1997; Palmer) and have arguedthat his definition fails to capture theessential features of language insofaras it is too broad and not functionalin the standard behavior-analyticsense. The following scenario cleverlyillustrates some key points of conten-tion:

Imagine two rats, each in its own chamberwith its own feeding apparatus. In the firstchamber, the apparatus is set by an experi-menter to release a food pellet on a VR 5schedule. In this case, the rat’s pressing of thebar is considered verbal, because the listeneror experimenter has been conditioned by asocial/verbal (scientific) community to mediatereinforcement of the bar press with thedelivery of a food pellet. … In the secondchamber, imagine that a feedbag is leaningagainst the manipulandum. The bag has asmall hole in it and about every five barpresses a food pellet is jarred loose and isknocked into the chamber food dish. … Wecould switch the two rats from one chamber toanother and it would be impossible for the ratto detect any difference whatsoever in thecontingencies. If the behavior of both rats isidentical and the contingencies contacted areidentical, the functional category should beidentical, yet in one case, the behavior isverbal according to Skinner’s definition and inanother it is not. (Hayes, Blackledge, &Barnes-Holmes, 2001, p. 12)

More generally, the argument can bestated as follows: Skinner’s definitionof verbal behavior is inadequatebecause it captures trivial behavioralepisodes that do not reasonablyqualify as verbal, and the definitionis notably odd because it relies on thebehavior (and corresponding rein-forcement history) of one organism(the ‘‘listener’’) to define the behaviorof another (the ‘‘speaker’’).

In contrast, defenders of Skinner’sdefinition of verbal behavior aretypically consistent in their emphasison the critical defining characteristics

Address correspondence to the author atthe University of the Pacific Department ofPsychology, 3601 Pacific Ave., Stockton,California 95211 (e-mail: mnormand@pacific.edu).

The Behavior Analyst 2009, 32, 185–190 No. 1 (Spring)

185

thereof. The indirect manner ofreinforcer procurement via mediationof members of the verbal communityis emphasized (e.g., Moore, 2008;Salzinger, 1970, 2003; Sundberg,2007; Sundberg & Michael, 2001),as is the particular learning historythat gives rise to such mediation (e.g.,Moore; Salzinger; Sundberg). Thesecharacteristics, one might argue, ren-der the definition far from all encom-passing and effectively capture thatwhich should be the provenance oflanguage. If the behavior of nonhu-mans is thereby included, then it isreasonable to consider such behaviorverbal. Indeed, Skinner consideredthe behavior of nonhumans to beperfectly appropriate for the subjectand offered an example of a riderturning a horse via the use of reins asan example of a verbal episode (1957,p. 225).

In the remainder of this paper, Iargue that the fuzzy borderlands ofSkinner’s (1957) definition are not anindictment of it, and suggestions tothe contrary are problematic becausethey suffer a critical error of scientificreasoning. In addition, invoking thebehavior of one organism as adefining feature of the behavior ofanother is not unique in behavioranalysis. Specifically, I propose that(a) no clear definition of verbalbehavior is possible because there isno natural distinction between verbaland nonverbal behavior; (b) attemptsat an immutable definition are essen-tialistic; and (c) Skinner’s functionaltaxonomy of language is in no wayaffected by the particulars of anydefinition of verbal behavior.

DISTINGUISHING VERBALFROM NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR

Hayes and Barnes-Holmes (2004)1

offered a particularly succinct state-ment about what they, and others,

see as the shortcomings of Skinner’s(1957) definition of verbal behavior.They state,

The definition is (a) not a functional one in abehavior analytic sense, because it is not basedon specific aspects of an individual organism’shistory but on aspects of some other organ-ism’s history (namely that of the audiencetrained to mediate reinforcement to thespeaker); (b) it is so broad as to includevirtually all animal operant behavior intraditional behavior analytic research; andthus (c) any attempt to apply the analyticcategories described in the book [VerbalBehavior] leads basic behavior analysts inexo-rably back to what they were already doing inthe [animal] laboratory. (p. 218)

It is difficult to quibble with thisstatement. The foundation of Skin-ner’s (1957) analysis of language ishis assertion that it is behavior andnothing more. As such, he conceptu-alized language as verbal behavior,thereby permitting a scientific inter-pretation of the elementary compo-nents of language in terms of stimu-lus control over behavioral unitsrather than in terms of grammaticaland syntactical regularities. No spe-cial principles or analyses were in-voked. Distinguishing verbal fromnon-verbal behavior, then, is not anexercise in determining a clear line offracture for two distinct naturalphenomena. That Skinner’s defini-tion would ‘‘lead basic behavioranalysts inexorably back to whatthey were already doing’’ is exactlythe point, not the problem (see alsoLeigland, 1997; Palmer, 2008).

The ambiguity resulting from Skin-ner’s (1957) broad definition of ver-bal behavior is not unique in behav-ior analysis, nor is it especiallyproblematic. Consider an analogousexample using aggression. In applied

1 Much of the discussion that prompted thispaper has occurred in the context of confer-ence presentations, conversation, Listserv cor-respondence, and so on. It proved difficult to

find much committed to print on the topic,except for the frequently cited and eloquentlystated criticisms published by some relationalframe theory researchers. It is for this reason,and this reason only, that many of theexamples cited herein originate in this litera-ture. No broader criticism of this approachshould be construed.

186 MATTHEW P. NORMAND

research and practice, aggression of-ten is defined topographically accord-ing to subtypes. For example, itmight be defined as hitting, kicking,biting, or throwing objects at anotherperson (e.g., Vollmer et al., 1998).These subtypes could be furtherrefined by defining hitting as theforceful contact of one person’s handwith any part of another person’sbody, biting as the contact of oneperson’s teeth with another person’sbody, and so on. In basic research,aggression has been defined as aresponse resulting in the delivery ofaversive stimulation to another per-son (e.g., Buss, 1961). With any ofthese definitions, we must deal withfuzzy boundaries. One person mightstrike another as a result of quicklyturning around while gesturing, beingunaware of the other person standingso close, or a doctor might administera painful or uncomfortable medicalprocedure to a patient. It is unlikelythat anyone would categorize suchincidents as aggressive.

We could further analyze thesituation and identify maintainingvariables for the aggressive response(e.g., attention, access to preferreditems or activities, or escape fromdemands or otherwise aversive situa-tions), or we could demonstrate thatthe occurrence of certain aggres-sive response topographies covarywith certain environmental condi-tions, such as the difficulty of aca-demic tasks presented or the presenceof certain individuals, sounds, smells,and so on. But such functionalanalyses would not necessarily distin-guish aggression from other types ofbehavior (e.g., crying) because allcould be maintained by the samevariables and, hence, be members ofthe same response class. In terms ofunambiguously defining aggression,either topographically or functional-ly, we are at a loss. However, thisdoes not prevent careful analysis ofbehavior that we might ultimatelycall aggression, in research or inpractice.

It also should be noted that manydefinitions of behavior appeal to thestate of another organism in amanner similar to the way in whichSkinner’s (1957) definition of verbalbehavior invokes the behavior andreinforcement history of a listener.The behavior of one organism servesas part of the context in which thebehavior of another organism isemitted. That the behavior of oneorganism might be invoked as adefining feature of the behavior ofanother organism is therefore not outof place in a behavioral analysis. Todefine compliance, for example, wemust consider the behavior of oneorganism in the context of thebehavior of another organism (theinstructor). Implicitly, the behaviorof the instructor must be dependenton a very specific type of reinforce-ment history that gives rise to lan-guage in general and instructiongiving in particular. It would beimpossible to define compliance oth-erwise.

Social behavior raises the sameissues. To deal with social behaviorone would necessarily have to invokea definition analogous to Skinner’s(1957) definition of verbal behavior.The behavior of one organism wouldbe considered social only if the effectsobserved on the behavior of a secondorganism occurred because of somespecific reinforcement history of thatsecond organism. If we teach a youngchild social skills, we are teachinghim or her to behave in ways thatproduce certain characteristic behav-iors on the part of other members ofthe social community because of thereinforcement practices common tothat community. Of course, onecould quibble about the appropriatedividing line between social andnonsocial behavior, just as somequibble about the dividing line be-tween verbal and nonverbal behav-ior.

None of the above examples resultsin unambiguous definitions of a typeof behavior, even when the functional

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING 187

aspects of the response class areconsidered. At issue is the distinctionbetween a functional definition and acategorical definition of behavior,with the aforementioned examplesillustrative of the latter. A functionaldefinition does not distinguish ag-gression from crying any more than itdistinguishes verbal from nonverbalbehavior. These are categorical defi-nitions that can encompass bothfunctional and topographical aspectsof behavior and lead us to sometimeswalk the fuzzy borderlands of thecategories. The degree to which acategorical definition is useful is mostprobably proportional to the numberof cases that reside in the center ofthe category compared to those thatoccupy the boundaries. Skinner’s(1957) definition of verbal behavioris an example of a categorical defini-tion, whereas his taxonomy of verbaloperants is an example of a function-al analysis of behavioral units,whether they are unanimously judgedto be verbal or not. The utility ofSkinner’s definition lies in the greatmany cases of behavior typicallycategorized as language that arecaptured by the definition, withrelatively few, and arguably trivial,instances (e.g., the rats in the exampleabove) occupying the borderlands.

THE PROBLEMOF ESSENTIALISM

An essentialist explanation is onethat treats categorical phenomena(e.g., the race of a person, a speciesof plant, or a type of behavior) assomehow reflective of various under-lying immutable properties that char-acterize the members of those cate-gories (Mayr, 1988; Palmer &Donahoe, 1992). Examples of essen-tialism in both scientific and laydiscussions of the natural worldabound. Much time and effort arespent classifying organisms as onerace or another or one type of dog oranother, to say nothing of morecomplex dichotomies such as good

and evil. In so doing, we behave asthough there is some underlyingimmutable essence that makes oneperson black and another personwhite, one dog a pug and another achihuahua, or one person good andanother person evil. Certainly, suchdistinctions serve a purpose insofaras they facilitate discussion (bothscientific and casual), foster research,and so on. In the final analysis,however, we must remember thatthese are convenient categorical dis-tinctions only and do not reveal anydeep and immutable characteristicsof the organism or the behaviorunder consideration.

Elegant descriptions of and argu-ments against essentialistic thinkingin the natural sciences have been pro-vided elsewhere (e.g., Mayr, 1988),and they will not be repeated here,but a brief discussion of the relationsto behavioral science is warranted.Behavior analysis is a selectionistscience, like biology, insofar as itexplains behavior largely as a prod-uct of operant contingencies of selec-tion (reinforcement) that operate onpopulations of behavior during thelifetime of the organism. Behaviorcannot be considered independent ofthe contingencies of which it is aproduct, and these contingencies aresubject to change over time. Thismeans that the populations of behav-ior are not static; aggression at onepoint in time might look quitedifferent from aggression at a laterpoint in time. There is no underlyingcharacteristic or essence that definesa class of behavior. Palmer andDonahoe (1992) elegantly contrastthe essentialist and selectionist per-spective as follows:

Contingencies of selection do not yield rigid,static, or idealized species, nor do they selectrigid, static, or idealized properties of species.The selected property, be it a morphologicalfeature or a behavior, can vary in anyarbitrary characteristic that is incidental tothe contingency, but, more fundamentally, itcan even vary along the dimensions that aredefined by the contingency. A selection

188 MATTHEW P. NORMAND

contingency merely sets minimum standardsfor a property; it does not provide a blueprint.Variation within the boundaries of the selec-tion contingencies will be constrained only bythose mechanisms that generate variability inthe property. The critical difference betweenessentialism and selectionism, then, is thatselectionism regards variability within classesof phenomena as fundamental, whereas essen-tialism regards it as a misleading irrelevance.(p. 1346)

To call for an unequivocal definitionof verbal behavior is to commit theessentialist error insofar as such adefinition is predicated on the exis-tence of some underlying character-istic of verbal behavior that distin-guishes it from nonverbal behavior(cf. Leigland, 1997; Schlinger, 2008).The central thesis of Skinner’s VerbalBehavior (1957) is that verbal behav-ior is not special in any fundamentalway, and his definition should beconsidered accordingly.

THE IMPLICATIONS FORSKINNER’S TAXONOMY

Practically, behavior analysts aremost concerned with understandingthe function of a particular class ofbehavior and speak of functionalresponse classes rather than specifictopographies or general categories.For example, we deal with escape-maintained behavior, no matter thetopography, more effectively than wecan deal with aggression, no matterthe function. The heart of Skinner’s(1957) analysis of language, his func-tional taxonomy of behavioral units,is rooted in this tradition, even if hiscategorical definition of verbal be-havior is not.

At this point, the issue of functionin behavior analysis merits someattention. Typically, the term is usedin one of two ways. First, it is used todenote the effect that behavior has onthe environment. For example, apigeon might peck a key becausedoing so has reliably produced grain,or a child might display aggressionbecause doing so has characteristical-ly resulted in the lessening or removal

of task demands. That is, the func-tion of the key peck is access to grainand the function of the aggression isescape from task demands. Second,the term can describe a relationbetween two variables in which onevaries given the presence or absenceof the other. For example, locomo-tion in the wood louse varies as afunction of ambient humidity. Whenthe humidity is low, its legs move.When humidity reaches a sufficientlevel, the legs stop. There is, then, afunctional relation between humidityand locomotion. The same could bedemonstrated for, say, task difficultyand aggression in a young child or ashy adult biting his nails in thepresence of strangers but not in theirabsence.

In Verbal Behavior, Skinner (1957)offers a comprehensive analysis ofelementary behavioral units thatcomprise a language repertoire. Inso doing, a number of basic verbaloperants are defined in terms of thecharacteristic antecedent control ex-erted over particular response forms.A mand, for example, is described asa behavioral unit for which theresponse form is controlled by somecurrently effective motivating opera-tion and for which a history ofreinforcement specific to that moti-vating operation—and mediated by amember of the verbal community—serves to establish and maintain thatresponse form. This definition of abehavioral unit is indeed functional,in that it specifies the conditions withwhich the response form will covaryas well as the characteristic reinforce-ment that follows. It also is in no wayconstrained by any general definitionof verbal behavior. The taxonomystands on its own because it is simplya detailed analysis of the types ofstimulus control that can developover responding, verbal or otherwise.Arguably, it is this functional taxon-omy that is the essence of Skinner’sanalysis and the greatest contributionthereto, his definition of verbal be-havior notwithstanding.

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING 189

CODA

The preceding arguments are notmeant to prove or disprove Skinner’s(1957) analysis of verbal behavior.Rather, they are intended to showthat a behavioral analysis of languageis not dependent on Skinner’s defini-tion of verbal behavior or any other.Examples from notable proponentsof relational frame theory (e.g.,Hayes & Barnes-Holmes, 2004;Hayes et al., 2001) have been usedthroughout the paper, not to providea critique of relational frame theory,but only because they provide theclearest criticisms of Skinner’s defini-tion from within the behavior-ana-lytic community. An analysis ofrelational frame theory is beyondthe scope of this paper (but seePalmer, 2004a, 2004b). It does seemthat too much is made of theinadequacies of Skinner’s definitionby some relational frame theorists,however, even though their analysisof language is no more dependent onsuch a definition than is Skinner’s. Ifit all is just behavior, then it seemsodd to make so much fuss over thedefinition of verbal behavior when nosuch fuss is made about other behav-ioral categories. In essence, we couldforego altogether any general defini-tion of verbal behavior and proceedunimpeded into a functional analysisof language. Perhaps we should.

REFERENCES

Buss, A. H. (1961). The psychology of aggres-sion. New York: Wiley.

Hayes, S. C., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2004).Relational operants: Processes and implica-tions: A response to Palmer’s review ofRelational Frame Theory. Journal of theExperimental Analysis of Behavior, 82,213–224.

Hayes, S. C., Blackledge, J. T., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2001). Language and cogni-tion: Constructing an alternative approachwithin the behavioral tradition. In S. C.Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, & B. Roche

(Eds.), Relational frame theory: A post-Skin-nerian account of human language andcognition (pp. 3–20). New York: KluwerAcademic/Plenum.

Leigland, S. (1997). Is a new definition ofverbal behavior necessary in light of derivedrelational responding? The Behavior Ana-lyst, 20, 3–9.

Mayr, E. (1988). Toward a new philosophy ofbiology: Observations of an evolutionist.Cambridge, MA: Belknap.

Moore, J. (2008). Conceptual foundations ofradical behaviorism. Cornwall-on-Hudson,NY: Sloan.

Palmer, D. C. (2004a). Data in search of aprinciple: A review of Relational FrameTheory: A Post-Skinnerian Account of Hu-man Language and Cognition. Journal of theExperimental Analysis of Behavior, 81,189–204.

Palmer, D. C. (2004b). Generic responseclasses and relational frame theory: Re-sponse to Hayes and Barnes-Holmes. Jour-nal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior,82, 225–234.

Palmer, D. C. (2008). On Skinner’s definitionof verbal behavior. International Journal ofPsychology and Psychological Therapy, 8,295–307.

Palmer, D. C., & Donahoe, J. (1992). Essen-tialism and selectionism in cognitive scienceand behavior analysis. American Psycholo-gist, 47, 1344–1358.

Salzinger, K. (1970). Language behavior. InA. C. Catania & T. A. Brigham (Eds.),Handbook of applied behavior analysis (pp.275–321). New York: Irvington.

Salzinger, K. (2003). On the verbal behaviorof Relational Frame Theory: A Post-Skin-nerian Account of Human Language andCognition. The Analysis of Verbal Behavior,19, 7–9.

Schlinger, H. D. (2008). Listening is behavingverbally. The Behavior Analyst, 31, 145–161.

Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. NewYork: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Sundberg, M. L. (2007). Verbal behavior. In J.O. Cooper, T. E. Heron, & W. L. Heward(Eds.), Applied behavior analysis (2nd ed.,pp. 526–547). Upper Saddle River, NJ:Pearson.

Sundberg, M. L., & Michael, J. (2001). Thevalue of Skinner’s analysis of verbal behav-ior for teaching children with autism.Behavior Modification, 25, 698–724.

Vollmer, T. R., Progar, P. R., Lalli, J. S., VanCamp, C. M., Sierp, B. J., Wright, C. S., etal. (1998). Fixed-time schedules attenuateextinction-induced phenomena in the treat-ment of severe aberrant behavior. Journal ofApplied Behavior Analysis, 31, 529–542.

190 MATTHEW P. NORMAND