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ABSTRACTDesign and construction errors can have serious consequences in construction project systems,including various failures. Recent studies by the authors revealed that the root causes of humanerrors are diverse and the consequences may vary. Moreover, late discovery of errors andunfound errors will have more serious impacts. Although to err is a human nature, most of theproject-based human errors are avoidable by having adequate knowledge, better managementpractices and relevant systems. A set of case-study based research ndings on some human error-based rework occurrences in design and construction phases are described in this paper, i.e.three examples of design/construction errors from recent projects are explained. The rst example

illustrates a rework case due to late discovery of a setting out error. The second example is abouta rework occurrence from wrong assumption of a standard practice. The third case presents arework instance from a late discovery of a drafting related design error. The case-study discussionsoutlined in this paper include key lessons learnt such as basic inferences on consequences andavoiding future occurrences for improved project performance.

KEYWORDSDesignConstructionError

Rework Lessons LearnedProject Performance

1Department of Building and Construction, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong [email protected] Structural Consultants, Maunsell AECOM, Hong Kong [email protected] of Building and Construction, City University of Hong Kong, Hong [email protected]

Rework in Projects: Learning from ErrorsEkambaram Palaneeswaran and Muthukaruppan Ramanathan and Chi-ming Tam

Surveying and Built Environment Vol 18 (2), 47-58 December 2007 ISSN 1816-9554

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INTRODUCTION

Construction projects are mainly multi-disciplinary and involve several consultantsand contractors. Project success is mainly

propelled by essential understanding of thedesign principles and construction methods byvarious team players (Love and Smith, 2003).Moreover, effective coordination frameworksand efcient arrangements for information andcommunication are essential for project success(e.g. Love et al. 2004). Reduction of reworkand wastages is crucial for achieving goodperformance in project systems (e.g. Love andLi, 2000; Fayek et al. 2004; Palaneeswaranet a l . 2005) . Rework occurrences inconstruction projects are mostly avoidableas these are mainly unnecessary redoing/rectifying efforts of incorrectly implementedprocesses or activities (Love, 2002).

Human errors are among the leadingcauses for defects, rework and wastages inconstruction projects (Kaminietzky, 1991;Atkinson, 1999; Love and Josephson, 2004).Thus, errors in construction projects can be

costly and even become a social problemdue to future repairs, inconveniences, andother perils including safety (Rimer, 1976).Uncontrolled rework and wastages canaffect the project success. Reduction of suchdamaging items can be targeted by effectivemanagement of design (Rounce 1998;Acharya et al. 2006; Palaneeswaran et al.2007) and construction (Love et al. 1999;Fayek et al. 2003), which can ultimately

yield sustainable whole-life values includingstakeholder satisfaction.

Drawing threads from such requirements, anongoing Hong Kong based research hastargeted to consolidate useful knowledge-setsfor developing a knowledge portal of project-based lessons, including those on managingrework in design works. In this exercise, ahybrid research method with triangulationapproach (e.g. surveys, interviews, data-

mining, and case-studies) is used. Thediscussions in this paper mainly integrate someuseful overview regarding three noteworthycases of human errors occurred in recentprojects.

CASE 1: LATE DISCOVERY OFSETTING-OUT ERRORS

Basic description of the error

The setting-out tasks of various buildingelements and corresponding verificationsare normally vested with the contractors.The managerial practices in the Hong Kongconstruction industry are reasonably sound. Inaddition, due to the mandatory requirement ofseveral clients, quality management systemsare implemented extensively in both designand construction organizations. Furthermore,with professional staff and modern surveyequipments, even minor mistakes are usuallyavoided in the setting-out works. Thus, errorsof serious consequence owing to incorrectsetting-out instances are not common in theHong Kong construction industry. However, ifsuch serious setting-out errors are not detectedand rectified in time, there will be severecost and time impacts, e.g. due to temporarysetbacks and lasting implications. Moreover,several design changes would have to beimplemented to redress such errors. A case-study regarding one such occurrence of aserious late discovery of a signicant setting-out error, which occurred in a recent privatebuilding project is reported in this section.

Project details

The referred project is a low-rise buildingproject situated in a remote site. The civil andbuilding services works of this project includedtwo contract packages, i.e. (i) foundationcontract and (ii) superstructure contract. Thefoundation contract included related workssuch as site formation and drainage diversionin addition to construction of piles, whereas

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the superstructure contract included constructionof pile caps, associated excavation and lateralsupport works, construction of superstructure,all electrical and mechanical services (includinginternal and external drainage works), and

approach roads. Both contracts followedtraditional procurement approach (i.e. design-bid-build) with lump-sum arrangements.Moreover, the private client employed aproject manager to manage both design andconstruction phases. The project site is featuredwith a hillside slope at the rear side.

Causes and Impacts

The setting-out of any construction work is

normally carried-out by the contractors andmost of the contract documents in Hong Kongafx sole responsibility with contractors in clearterms. Hence, 2 to 5 resident surveyors will beemployed by the contractors and the numberof surveyors at site will be based on the sizeand complexity of the project. In many cases,the engineers, architects and other supervisorypersonnel may not be adequately procient toprecisely verify the correctness of the setting-out. Occasionally, the project manager mayemploy an independent surveyor to verifythe contractors outline setting-out beforecommencement of the work.

In this reported case, the foundation contractorcommenced the foundation works soonafter the contract was awarded. Initially,the foundation contractor had incorrectlyset-out the building outline. Due to somepoor managerial practices and inadequate

quality management in his part, this errorwas not detected and rectified immediately.Consequently, all the longitudinal gridlines(i.e. alphabetical notations A, B, C, D, andE as in Figure 1.1) and the piles along thosegridlines were wrongly set-out, offsetting by3 meters away from their intended positionstowards the hillside. Subsequently, all the pileswere constructed in wrongly set-out locations.Apart from this undetected error, the 3-months

duration of piling work activity was delayedearlier with 2 weeks extension of time for someother excusable delays.

Normally, minor setting-out errors of some piles(i.e. offsetting by few centimeters) may bedeemed acceptable or easily rectifiable andmany cases with such occurrences have beenidentied in this research. Wherever necessary,some redesigning of (a) pile caps and/or (b)connecting ground beams may be resorted forsuch minor errors. However, the extra costs willbe mostly borne by the foundation contractorsin such minor error instances. However, majorsetting-out errors including wrong setting-out

of whole set of piles as found in this caseis typically uncommon in the local industry.Hence, knowing the background of thisparticular case of a major error occurrence aswell as particulars of managing the subsequentconsequences will be useful.

Figure 1.1 portrays an indicative cross-sectionof the design intent and Figure 1.2 portraysthe piles as constructed with 3 meters offsetof setting-out error. Upon completion of piledriving, chosen piles were load tested and thelocal authority granted consent to proceed withexcavation and pile cap works. Subsequently,the superstructure contractor excavated for pilecap construction and the error was discoveredas piles had been driven-in at wronglocations. The project manager instructed boththe contractors (i.e. the two designated forfoundation and superstructure works) to carryout a joint survey and the foundation contractorconfirmed that they had wrongly set-out thebuilding outline and that consequently, all thelongitudinal gridlines and piles are also notin correct positions. Upon the late discoveryof this error, the project manager immediatelyissued a Certicate of Non-Completion to thefoundation contractor. Additional unwarrantedimpacts included design and constructionrework, the time and cost impacts, need foradditional resources and wastages.


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Management measuresFor managing this atypical rework scenario,the design team considered various optionsand two viable alternatives, both of which arepresented in this section. The first option (i.e.Option 1) as portrayed in Figure 1.3 wasto keep the building footprints unchanged bydesigning a combined pile cap with additionalpiles wherever required (e.g. in the front portionof the structure). Moreover, in this option, therewas no need for the locations of columnsand walls to be drastically changed as thefoundation could be redesigned with pilesalready driven and additional piles as requiredfor the new arrangement. However, this optionraised some concerns such as programmeimpacts and statutory approvals and consents.

In Hong Kong, the private building works arestrictly controlled by the Building Authority (BA).

Figure 1.1: Design Intent

Figure 1.2: Piles as Constructed

Hence, the client was required to appointan Authorized Person (AP) and a RegisteredStructural Engineer (RSE) who could submit theplans and requisite forms to BA for necessaryapprovals/consents and who could overseethe construction works. According to thisarrangement, the foundation works andsuperstructure works, including the interface,were carried out in the following sequence:(i) submission of foundation plans by AP/RSE;(ii) approval of foundation plans by BA; (iii)

completion of foundation work; (iv) submissionof as-built foundation plans by AP/RSE; (v)selection of pile/raft for loading test by BA; (vi)satisfactory completion of loading test; and (vii)BA granting consent to commence pile capand superstructure works. When this setting-outerror was discovered, all the above-mentionedapproval/consent steps had already beencarried-out.

Fresh set of approvals and consents were

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required for the rework and related mendingchanges which arose from the late discoveryof the setting-out error. These above-mentionedstatutory approvals and consents had tobe repeated. As the Option 1 requiredredesigning of foundation with additional piles,fresh approvals/consents were necessary(including load tests for additional piles), whichwould delay the superstructure works as well,i.e. till that time the superstructure contractorwho had already commenced his worksshould wait. However, the Option 1 had

some advantages too. By keeping the buildingfootprint unchanged, statutory resubmissionswere not necessary for the superstructure part.Moreover, the original proposal for slopecutting works need not be revised (i.e. onthe rear side). Thus, an originally proposedfootpath behind the building could be retainedand the hillside slope could be stabilised to therequired standards as planned. However thedisadvantage of programme impact was the

dominating decision criterion for this privateclient and hence Option 1 was not pursued.

The second option (i.e. Option 2) proposedby the design team was mainly to shift thewhole building by the erroneous offsettingdistance (i.e. 3 meters) towards the hillsideslope. Figure 1.4 portrays the details ofOption 2, which was finally considered inthis project. The set of pile caps and columnsby this option could be built right above theexisting wrongly-driven piles. Moreover, the

structural framework of the building remainsunchanged, though shifted. In addition, therequired revisions to architectural and structurallayout were minimal. However, additionalslope cutting and revision of stabilisationmeasures for the slopes behind the footpathwere required. The width of the footpath wasreduced to satisfy the minimum requirementin planning regulations, which reduced theextent of the additional slope cutting. Then

Figure 1.3: Option 1 - Piles Displaced, Combined Pile Cap(Additional Piles Required)

Figure 1.4: Option 2 - Piles Displaced, Whole Building Shifted (Adopted Scheme)

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the superstructure contractor continued withthe pile cap works as per Option 2 and inthe meantime statutory approval for shiftingthe building and additional slope cutting wasobtained. Thus, no substantial time delay was

experienced. However, the design team hadto revise relevant drawings for the buildingshift and slope cutting changes. These designchanges involved additional design costs. Inaddition, the revised slope works related tocutting and stabilisation measures involvedadditional construction costs. The costs for allsuch rework and revisions were recovered fromthe erring foundation contractor in this project,i.e. about 17% of his total contract amountwas recovered which was much higher thanhis own prot markup for this project.

Lessons learnt

This case-study illustrates the signicance ofverifying the setting-out. In most of the publicprojects in Hong Kong (including governmentand quasi-government projects), a team ofresident site staff are employed includinga set of surveyors. But, in private sectordevelopments, only the services of respectivecontractor s surveyors are relied upon.However, the Buildings Department (BD)has recently strengthened safety and qualitysupervision requirements. Quality SupervisionPlan (QSP) for foundation works is mainlyto ensure that piles/rafts are foundedin a stratum as intended in the design.According to this QSP arrangement, afulltime resident engineer nominated by RSEand to be agreed by BA, among his otherresponsibilities, has to verify the setting outof every single pile before commencement.Such checking arrangements would behelpful in avoidance of drastic errors andpreventing resultant rework and wastages.Nevertheless, the construction industry maybenet considerably by choosing to appointan independent land surveyor to periodicallyverify the contractors setting-out works andto avoid serious late discoveries.

CASE 2: ERROR OF WRONGLY ASSUMING ASTANDARD PRACTICE

Basic description of the errorAs a standard practice, construction drawingsnormally contain various general notes andtypical-detail drawings. Such notes anddetails are generally typical for many similarprojects. Thus, some notes and details arenormally reused with minor modificationsin comparable projects. Although this is acommon practice in building projects, asnumerous common details might be similarly

relevant for many cases, necessary careshould be exercised while applying suchstandard references. Additio nal notices(e.g. warnings, disclaimers) and necessarydistinctive information should be included forindividual cases, e.g. for elaborating specicitems that are substantially different fromassumed standards.

Project details

This case-study refers a recent multi-usebuilding project of a public sector client. Theprocurement arrangement for the constructionphase in this project is a traditional design-bid-build approach with lump sum contracts. Asin the previous Case 1, the project deliverymainly included two construction contractssuch as (a) foundation contract and (b)superstructure contract. Although this projectwas procured with traditional approach, thepublic client employed a team of residentsite staff as construction managers who wereindependent of the design consultants.

Causes and impactsFigure 2.1 portrays the standard arrangementfor reinforcement details for the column starterbars. According to this standard practice,the reinforcement bars should be taken downto the pile cap bottom level. Besides, the

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extended down to the cap bottom. Thecontractors interpretation is portrayed inFigure 2.2.

The concerned project was of a special

situation in which the typical details are notsuitable. Given the large size of the pile cap,concerting in several pours was expected.Necessary precautions of such piecemealconcreting had been included in the concretespecications. But the specications of typicaldetails were not modied to suit the deep pilecap. However, the experienced contractoranticipated that he would be asked to take thebars down to the pile cap bottom. Hence, heraised the issue ahead of steel bar installation.Thus, the error discussed herein came to lightin the initial stages of superstructure contractwork and hence serious rework and wastageswere avoided.

Figure 2.2: Contractors Interpretation(Contractors Proposed Construction Joints Inserted)N.T.S.

Management measures

In this project, the pile cap is 4m deep andhence CJs were necessary for constructability.The starter bar detail was ambiguous in the

contract drawing and hence the erroneousassumption was made initially, it wassubsequently considered as desirable toextend the starter bars passing through theCJs. Consequently, the engineer had toconvince the project team on his intendedrequirements for taking the bars down to pilecap bottom. If the intention of providing thestarter bars up to the pile cap bottom hadbeen expressed in an unambiguous way(e.g. with relevant cautionary messages),related claims and variations could have beenavoided. Earlier, the project quantity surveyoragreed to the contractors interpretation.However, the engineer insisted that the bars

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should be taken down to the bottom of pilecap, as the proposed construction sequenceincluded casting in several pours with threeCJs, the starter bars should pass beyond allthe CJs. The design team quickly discussed,

and the construction manager took stock of thetechnical requirement, deciency in the drawingand contract implications and took a decisionwithout any time loss. Subsequently, theconstruction manager issued formal instructionsto the contractor for extending the starter barsup to pile cap bottom and this constituted anecessary variation. Figure 2.3 portrays the as-built details of starter bars.

Lessons learnt

This case illustrates that implementation ofstandard practices without adequate checkingof suitability aspects can lead to errors. Beforeinserting standard details into the tender setof drawings, corresponding suitability for theparticular project should be carefully checked. In

this case-study, not inserting additional warningnotices and not exercising adequate care (e.g.verifying on applicability of standard particularsand constructability) had caused additional coststo the project stakeholders and the ripple effects

included embarrassment to a design consultant.Adequate care and appropriate systems canprevent such errors. Early discovery will reducethe damaging impacts on costs and schedules,and ripple effects can also be avoided.

CASE 3: LATE DISCOVERY OF A DRAFTING ERROR

Description of the errorAll construction projects are multi-disciplinary, andhowever small it is, engagement of several designconsultants is necessary. For ensuring performanceand project success, relevant project leadershiproles (e.g. by lead consultants) and appropriateinterface coordination arrangements (e.g.

Figure 2.3: Starter Bars as Constructed N.T.S.

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between foundation and superstructure works)are necessary. Depending upon the project type(such as building works and infrastructure projects)such lead roles may vary. In addition, designmanagers may be employed in some projects.

Inadequacies in such arrangements includinglack of clarity and poor interface coordinationcan result in dysfunctions such as rework andwastages. In this section, a design related reworkoccurrence due to late discovery of a draftingerror is presented. This error led to the demolitionand rebuilding of a portion of the work, the costof which was borne by the design consultant.

Project details

This case-study refers to a recent private projectthat mainly included the design and constructionof a plant and a 40-meter tall steel chimney. Theprivate client is a manufacturing company. Theplant and chimney were part of a research studyjointly conducted by the client and an educationalinstitution. The purpose of the plant was to enablethe recycling of some wastes by thermal treatment.The steel chimney was designed by a specialistmainland rm, which also fabricated and erectedit. The client employed a consulting engineer todesign the foundation of the chimney. In additionto the foundation design, the consultant wasalso nominated as the RSE (under the BuildingOrdinance) and he was required to managethe submission of the aforementioned specialistsdrawings and calculations (as per local codesand regulations). The engineer designed theraft foundation based on the chimney loadings,with a RC ring beam on the top together withthreaded bolts embedded into it for fixing the

steel chimney.Causes and impacts

After completion of design and submissionrequirement s, a foundation contractorcompleted the foundation works as per theengineers drawings and specifications. But,before installing the tank, the superstructurecontractor found that bolts installed in thefoundation were not in correct position to build

the steel chimney. It was subsequently discoveredthat the bolt locations shown in the engineersdrawings were incorrect, and did not matchthose in the chimney drawings. This resulted insignificant wastages and unwarranted rework.

Moreover, the project was also delayed. Theroot causes include poor communication, lack ofcoordination and absence of well-dened designleadership for effective design management.

Management measures

Due to the late discovery of this design error,subsequent construction works were affected.Since the error of misplaced bolts wasdiscovered after considerable advancement in

the construction phase, easily implementableoptions were not available for rectification.Consequently, the ring beam was demolished,the bolts were re-fixed at correct locationsand the beam was re-cast. Although designleadership in this project was not well-dened,the client felt that the consulting engineer shouldbe held responsible for this rework and wastagesas he should have avoided this drafting error orat least should have discovered it much earlier.Hence the client decided to recover some costsfrom the consulting engineer, such as the directcosts of demolishing and re-constructing the ringbeam. Due to this recovery, the engineer hadto forego most of his consultancy fee and hisreputation was also affected.

Lessons learnt

The error referred to in this case is a draftingerror (or draftsman error), but the engineerhad to pay a price in this project. Thiscase illustrates the importance of interface-coordination and necessary verifications.Normally the design coordination roles ofelectrical and mechanical services in buildingprojects will remain with the main civilcontractors, who should also coordinate withhis own sub-contractors and other nominatedspecialist contractors. A main contractor shouldprepare combined builders work drawings orstructural electrical and mechanical drawings,

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showing relevant details including all openingsand fixtures. In order to prevent errors, suchdrawings should be vetted by the designconsultants. From the case-study observations(including respective interviewed perceptions),

it is apparent that the managerial measuresand quality management systems were notrigorous in the supply chain because thisproject was relatively small. More importantly,the interviewed perceptions revealed that duecare might have been missing, with respectto coordination amongst contractors andconsultants. In order to avoid such errors andcarry-forward rework effects, the consultantshould provide all relevant superstructuredrawings to the respective civil contractorand the latter should be asked to check thebolt locations and alike before carryingout the subsequent works. In addition, thesuperstructure contractor should be asked tocomment on the engineers foundation drawing.Such good practice measures would haverelieved the consulting engineer from bearingthe entire burden in the aforementioned case.Nevertheless, adequate care should beexercised in drafting and checking the details

involving multi-interface works.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Three interesting cases of design and constructionerrors which occurred in recent project arepresented in this paper. The case-study illustrationsprovide useful dissemination of those errorexamples with highlights on causes and impacts,management measures and lessons learnedknowledge-sets. For example, the rst case citesa late discovery instance of one non-typicalconstruction error which necessitated a series ofdesign and construction rework. Although somerecovery was made from the erring contractor,some impacts were experienced by other projectparticipants as well. In the next example, awrong assumption of a standard practice led toa design error which might have caused someserious problems including defects. However, thiserror was detected subsequently before actual

construction. However, as the tendering phasewas already over and the contractor had alreadycommenced some works, this error led to someformal variations and additional costs. The othercase referred to another late discovery of a

design error caused by multiple dysfunctionalreasons such as unclear project leadershiprole, lack of design verifications and interfacecoordination. In this case, the default designerhad to pay for the error consequences and sometangible/intangible ripple effects might havebeen felt by other stakeholders.

Thus, design and construction errors in projectscan lead to serious concerns as the resultingrework and wastages will affect projectperformance and productivity aspects. In general,the errors are avoidable. Necessary mechanismsfor prevention/reduction of errors should bein place. Moreover, timely discovery of erroroccurrences will minimize the extent of impacts.But, several inadequacies in project systems(e.g. lack of knowledge, poor coordination, andmediocre quality management) add to difcultiesfor such timely discoveries and/or preventionmeasures. Since time pressures and resource

limitations are common in the constructionindustry, many of the error-related dysfunctionsand lessons are not properly documented in allcases. Hence, developing a knowledgebase oferror-related case-studies is considered as useful,e.g. finding ways to avoid errors, formalizingrecording of error occurrences and constructingsystematic knowledge systems. Moreover, suchmeasures and knowledge systems should besuitably integrated with project-based operationalsystems and other learning frameworks.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The work described in this paper was jointlysupported by a start-up grant from the CityUniversity of Hong Kong (CityU ProjectNo. 7200097) and another competitiveearmarked research grant from the ResearchGrants Council of the Hong Kong SpecialAdministration Region, China (Project No.

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712606). The research team is also gratefulfor the valuable knowledge-based contributionsfrom many Hong Kong construction industrypractitioners who shared their valuableexperiences with the research team.

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