2007 - Why We Are Still Not Cognitive Psychologists - Phelps

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On MediaWhy We Are Still Not Cognitive Psychologists:

A Review ofWhy I Am Not a Cognitive Psychologist:A Tribute to B. F. Skinner

Brady J. PhelpsSouth Dakota State University

Any instructor of behavior analysis is no doubt aware that neuroscience, characterized bya cognitivementalistic approach, has substantial influence in behavioral science. Asa counterpoint, behavior analysis can raise timely questions and promote critical thinking, asdid Skinner (1977) in his critical analysis of cognitive psychology. Keenan and Dillenburger(2004) have produced a CD-ROM with effective audio-visual presentations to aid in the

teaching of behavior analysis and in critiquing reductionistic mentalism.Key words: behavior analysis, B. F. Skinner, neuroscience, mentalism, reductionism,cognitive psychology

In his book, Soul Made Flesh: TheDiscovery of the Brainand How ItChanged the World, Zimmer (2004)speculated about the implications ofnascent brain science at OxfordUniversity in the 17th century:

These men of Oxford ushered in a new age,one in which we still livecall it the Neuro-centric Agein which the brain is central notonly to the body but to our conception ofourselves. Today some three hundred fortyyears later, the Neurocentric Age is moredeeply entrenched than ever. The maps thatthat neuroscientists make today are like theearly charts of the New World with grotesquecoastlines and blank interiors. (p. 7)

Are contemporary behavior analysts

equipped to address the reductionismof todays brain-centered psycholo-gy? Keenan and Dillenburger (2004)make some unique inroads into thisquestion with the CD-ROM Why I

Am Not a Cognitive Psychologist: ATribute to B. F. Skinner. This Win-dowsH-based CD-ROM consists ofthree modules: Brain, Illusions, andInside. The content of this CD-ROMis a unique presentation of behavior

analysis; it is certainly not pro-grammed instruction in the typicalsense. The user can pick any of thesemodules at any time, and each of themodules have untitled chapters; theproper use of this teaching tool isnot necessarily a linear sequence.

Keenan and Dillenburger makevery creative use of atypical visualicons and video clips. Along with itsaudio commentary, this CD-ROMprovides antecedents that set theoccasion for critical thinking aboutreductionism. In doing so, the CD-ROM is an effective tutorial to show

just how relevant Skinner (1977) istoday and to shape students behav-ior into the practice of asking criticalquestions about invoking the brainand mentalism to explain behavior.Why I Am Not a Cognitive Psychol-ogist: A Tribute to B. F. Skinner doesnot make many arguments that are

novel to most behavior analysts. It isnot intended for the typical reader ofThe Behavior Analyst. Instead, theprogram is intended to be used in

I would like to acknowledge the helpfulcomments and suggestions from CharlesLyons and Jeffrey Weatherly on an earlierversion of this paper as well as those of thereviewers.

Correspondence concerning this article

should be addressed to Brady J. Phelps,Department of Psychology, South DakotaState University, Scobey Hall Box 504,Brookings, South Dakota 57007 (e-mail:[email protected]).

The Behavior Analyst 2007, 30, 217226 No. 2 (Fall)

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teaching and introducing behavioranalysis to a novice audience, and itis a gem in this regard.

As any behavior analyst knows,Skinner and virtually all subsequent

behavior analysts have taken anapproach that differs from that ofmuch of todays neuroscience inviewing how brain and behavior arerelated. Although a special issue oftheJournal of the Experimental Anal-

ysis of Behavior devoted to the re-lation between behavior analysis andneuroscience only appeared in 2005,Skinner argued for decades about theneed for parallel and complementary

sciences of behavior and brain (Skin-ner, 1938, 1974; Timberlake, Schaal,& Steinmetz, 2005). For a study ofthe brain to develop properly, itneeds satisfactory protocols for thestudy of behavior (Richelle, 1993). Infulfillment of this view, operanttechniques developed by Skinner inthe alleged black-box approach(Richelle, p. 89) are now widely usedby various brain sciences (Timberlake

et al.). Nevertheless, cognitive psy-chologists (or cognitive scientists orcognitive neuroscientists) have gener-ally taken a particular route inattempts to determine what is in thebrain and what their models of thebrain have to offer as explanatoryaccounts of behavior. Attempts tocritique or question the type ofneuroscience seen weekly in publica-tions such as Science or Nature runthe risk of making behavior analysissusceptible to the stereotype of be-haviorism as considering the humanbrain or a person as a black box.Nevertheless, a critique of the com-mon assumptions of cognitive neu-rosciences that points out what thesesciences cannot answer or avoidaddressing is not only possible butvery revealing, and that is providedby the CD being reviewed. Forreductionism to be valid, it must

have something to reduce, (Bennett& Hacker, 2003; Schlinger, 2006).Keenan and Dillenburger (2004) raisesimilar, thought-provoking questions

about cognitive psychology, neuro-science, and mentalism in an audio-visual format that is user-accessiblefor a behavior analyst in training.

Me and My Brain

A great deal of the material offeredby Keenan and Dillenburger goesinto critiquing mentalism, that is,the separation of events as beingeither mental or behavioral (Baum,2005). The authors provide a videoclip in which a young girl says Ihave a brain (a perfectly acceptablestatement of fact) but then the videofades the girl out and fades in animage of a human brain while thesame voice utters the same statement.A brain itself saying, I have a brain,is a nonsense statement, but in thevisual thought experiment presentedby Kennan and Dillenburger, anexample of what starts out as anacceptable and sensible statementtransitions into a nonsensical state-ment. The episode raises the questionof whether there is a point of transition from sensical to nonsensi-cal and if so, where it is. The CDreinforces the reality that with regardto having a brain, there is only oneentity, the whole person, that makesthe statement sensible (Schlinger,2005). The syntax and structure ofeveryday language, however, createthe confusion of a duality of meandmy brain when no such independentduality exists (Hineline, 1980).

The CD next presents video ofa young girl and an elderly lady bothbeing asked if they have a brain, howthey know they have a brain giventhey have never seen it, what func-tions and actions their brain per-forms for them, what they themselvesare doing while their brain remem-bers for them, calculates for them,and thinks for them. The point of thetwo exercises about the brain is that

when the vernacular is introducedinto accounts of behavior, illusionsoccur that can create the impressionof dualities when none exist. When

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people are interviewed with a dualisticlanguage, people are inclined to thinkand speak in dualistic terms. Behav-ioral scientists must be cognizant ofthe illusions inherent in a vernacular

adopted into a formal language ofexplanation and wary for how anyscientific inquiry can be misdirectedby the mirages of language.

IfIt Is Raining, Is It Also Thinking inMy Head?

Throughout the CD-ROM, Keen-an and Dillenburger present eitherstill images or brief video clips asthought-provoking antecedents to in-sightful audio commentary. The con-tent is effectively tailored for thegeneration of college students whoexpect to be presented with visuals.Keenan and Dillenburger providecompelling arguments for the impactof out of the ordinary imagery toillustrate a scientific principle.

Consider the following three sen-tences: The wind is blowing; Memoryis remembered; and It is raining. Inthe first two, the noun performing theaction is implied by the actionperformed. There is no wind withoutthe blowing; there is no memory inthe absence of remembering. In thelast, the noun performing the actionis a nonexistent it. A more preciseutterance would be to say that therain is falling, but does that reallyclarify the sentence? The authors givelucid redefinition to the point beingpursued: From the perspective ofa science of behavior, reconsider thestatement, I have a brain. Withoutbegging the question too much, whatis the I that has the brain? Theproblem to be addressed here is thatfor each of the three sentences underinitial analysis, it is implicitly un-derstood what is meant, but theimplications of such sentences arethe real concern here. As Hineline

stated, Given that patterns of En-glish virtually disavow actions with-out agents, when one describes anaction that has no obvious external

agent one gratuitously implies anagent. By convention, the impliedagent is usually internal or mentalis-tic (1980, p. 81).

In a natural science, theorists

search for general principles anddescriptions about the natural worldby observing events in the environ-ment and describing and explainingthese by relating the former to othernatural events (Baum, 2005). If it isour use of language that has thepotential to lead us off target in oursearch for laws of behavior, then ouruse of problematic language must bespotlighted with special attention.

The advancement of any sciencedictates the shedding of vestigialconcepts of past incorrect thinking,the exorcism of the unseen andputative causes of natural events(Baum). If one agrees with the fore-going, then are we still dealing withfictional its? Just because a languagehas a term for an it, does thatinstantly validate the reifying of theit in question?

Looking Inside for It

In a subsequent section of the CD-ROM, Keenan and Dillenburgerpresent even more illusions borneout of the vernacular. In psychol-ogys past, it was posited that a soulor a homunculus dwelled inside us,eventually being localized to thebrain, and that this entity had therole of directing a persons action andthinking (Schlinger, 2005). The un-recognized illusions engendered byour language allowed this entity tobecome part of psychology andeventually reconceptualized as themind, as Descartes thinking thing(Schultz, 1981). As a separate entitywithin, its role was likewise to de-termine and direct the actions of theperson; it became the mysterious it,the agent of action expressed by the

behavior and body of the person socontrolled (Schlinger, 2005). Nowwhen a persons behavior changes, itis commonly said that the person has

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changed his or her mind or made uphis or her mind. Although such a viewis socially acceptable and a commonconvention of a vernacular, how dowe begin to look for this agent, the

mind, especially if it is a mere illusionborne out the vernacular? Movingthe mind from the vernacular into anexplanatory account of behaviorposes the logical impossibility oftrying to submit an entity that hasno temporal or spatial referents intoa scientific analysis (Chiesa, 1994). Ata minimum, the subject of a scientificanalysis must be localizable in timeand space (Baum, 2005). When

Keenan and Dillenburger use cleveranimations to show a brain uttering,I have a mind (or should it say, Itoo have a mind!), the familiarityand vacuousness of that statementbecome obvious. Ordinary languageis not only a poor guide for thescientist but also clearly holds manyillusions for the unsuspecting novice.

In an illustration of an analogyused by Skinner (1977), Keenan and

Dillenburger present a video clip ofa typical dry-cell battery being cutopen to look for the electricity storedinside. Even though a detailed sche-matic can illustrate how electricitymust be stored inside, examining theanatomy of the battery reveals noth-ing that looks like electricity. Theanalogy with the nervous system isapt; theorized schematics of a putativeconceptual nervous system in thecentral nervous system reveal storedrepresentations, memory, even anexecutive, but examination of theactual central nervous system revealsonly anatomy. A battery does notstore electricity (Buckle, 2006) any-more than a nervous system storesexperiences. Both a battery and thenervous system are changed in howthey will respond by specific types ofexperiences (Skinner, 1985); the ner-vous system is changed by the selec-

tive action of environmental contin-gencies but any attempt to reify thechange as storage or as an innerentity is unnecessary and likely mis-

leading. The constructs of a concep-tual nervous system do not match upwell with the actual details of thecentral nervous system.

In an example that is closer to

home for students of psychology, onemistake is all too common. In thecourse of respondent conditioning,when the conditioned response to theconditioned stimulus has been estab-lished, it is commonly said that theconditioned response is the result ofan association having been formedbetween the conditioned stimulus andthe unconditioned stimulus. But thensome go one step too far and if asked

to specify the details of this formedassociation, the typical response isthat the organism has formed theassociation in question and that theassociation is inside the organismsnervous system. The proper answer isthat the association is only in theexperimenters arrangement of theenvironmental contingencies or inthe natural environment (Pierce &Cheney, 2003). Of course, a change

resulting from the association is a partof the now-altered nervous system(Skinner, 1985). Many students areresistant to this distinction and arequite adamant in insisting that theassociation must be inside the organ-ism. Keenan and Dillenburger pro-vide clever and creative visual ante-cedents with which to clarify theargument as to where to look forthe association.

An Archeological Dig forWord Origins

Keenan and Dillenburger also pro-vide valuable audio and video mate-rial for how to introduce the conceptsof Skinners (1989) chapter on theorigins of cognitive thought. AsSkinner elucidated, the terms nowused to refer to feelings and cognitiveprocesses typically began as refer-

ences to specific aspects of behavioror to the contexts in which behavioroccurred. Such terms slowly acquireda different connotation when they

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became the vocabulary for an it, theinternal agent of action, the mind. Toprovoke discussion, Keenan and Dil-lenburger present video footage ofa rat performing on a schedule of

intermittent reinforcement and askthe viewer to try and arrive at his orher own tentative accounts of theanimals behavior. Does the ratbehave the way it does because ithas arrived at its own rule forschedule performance? Has it decidedwhen it should press the lever? Doesit have an expectancy to conformwith to produce the reinforcer? Withthese and other possible inferences

from the observed behavior, theviewer is asked if anything is gainedby making such inferences ratherthan referring to a historical accountof the animals experience with thecontingencies of a particular scheduleof reinforcement. For useful levity,the viewer can click on a highlightedicon and see a bubble of speechwherein the rat says, Those are yourthoughts, not mine, to encourage

the viewer to hesitate to fill the ratwith the viewers mentalistic specula-tions.

For another example, the authorsprovide a video clip of a young girl,initially being wobbly and unsteadystarting out on her bicycle butquickly riding it with control andapparent confidence. If we try toaccount for her behavior change byconcluding the rule or algorithm forbicycle riding came on-line after aninitial search-delay or by citing theexecutive in her prefrontal cortex thatprocessed the needed information,collated it with stored informationfrom memory, rehearsed the actionand then issued an output command-line to execute the desired action, isanything gained? With a list ofconstructs dwelling in a conceptualnervous system, do we gain anythingexcept verbiage for the invented

surrogates for the actual mechanismof behavior change, learning fromexperience how to balance, resultingfrom the childs history of experienc-

ing the physical contingencies associ-ated with riding a bicycle? Skinnernoted the invention of such innercauses was to be expected withoperant behavior: By its very nature

operant behavior encourages the in-vention of mental or cognitive pro-cesses said to initiate action. Thebehavior seems to start up suddenly,without advance notice as if sponta-neously generated. Hence the inven-tion of such cognitive entities asintention, purpose or will (1977,p. 4). Keenan and Dillenburger giveaudio-visual means with which to letstudents see how quickly they will

leap to invoking mental inventions aswell as the means by which instruc-tors can inject some degree of skep-ticism and critical thinking about thenecessity for doing so.

Futuring and Past-ing

Keenan and Dillenburger, in a chal-lenging module, also lead the listener-viewer in a discussion of anticipatingfutures (futuring) and remember-ing pasts (past-ing). The questionis posed: What are people actuallydoing when they are said to be seeingor anticipating their future as well asremembering and dwelling on theirpast? Keenan and Dillenburger de-scribe people as engaged in timetraveling and make the case thata very particular type of behavior isbeing performed when a person en-gages in these actions. Others havemade similar points, viewing someremembering as a behavior akin toseeing. William Verplanck used theanalogy of trying to remember veryrecent events versus distant events ascomparable to trying to see objectsthat are in the same room with you,right in front of you, compared totrying to see objects 10 yards away,50 yards away, or more. In both theliteral seeing and in the attempt to see

the past, one can clearly see more ofthe more proximate objects andevents. The more distant an event orobject, the more it is obscured by

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gencies that led to the pattern ofbehavior. Skinner put it this way:Behavior is internalized as mentallife when it is too slight to beobserved by others, when we say it

is covert (1977, p. 3). Without thelongitudinal observation of the chick-en, a mental explanation is invented,and the chicken is reading the wordand behaving according to what theword means. Palmer (2001) made thebehavioral point of view clear bysaying, behavioral phenomena em-braced by the term cognition aredistinctive in that commonly someportion of the performance is un-

observed, and that portion that isobserved is often insufficient to per-mit prediction or control. Appropri-ate behavior appears as if by magic(p. 43).

But in the present context, ifreading does not explain the behaviorof the chicken in question, thenperhaps the nervous system of thechicken does. Keenan and Dillenbur-ger present a still image of a chicken

brain and pose difficult questions: Atwhat level of detailed examination ofthe brain of the chicken would wearrive at a more complete account ofthe observed behavior? Would a thor-ough enough understanding of thebrain of a chicken with the behaviorobserved lead to a technology where-by another subject could be inducedto demonstrate the same behaviorchange? Keenan and Dillenburgermake the point decisively: Lookinginside the brain of a subject offers thepromise of identifying neurophysio-logical changes produced by environ-mental contingencies. The physiolog-ical changes are part of the changes inthe dependent variable, the behaviorof the subject, that occur as a functionof the manipulation of the environ-mental independent variables. Thechanges that occur in the now-alterednervous system of the subject as

a result of learning constitute thechanged organism caused by theeffects of the environment on theorganism. The brain sciences study

these changes in the nervous systembut do not fully explain thesechanges; arguing otherwise results ina circular argument that leads usnowhere in identifying the underlying

causes of behavior (Keenan & Dil-lenburger). Any study of the brain isa worthwhile endeavor and an in-formative account of behavior ata different level of analysis. But thedata from a science of the brain canobscure a more detailed and holisticview of a person as an ongoingprocess. The changes in the brainare part of the how of behaviorand behavior change but not the

why of behavior and behaviorchange; When we attribute behaviorto a neural or mental event, real orconceptual, we are likely to forgetthat we still have the task of account-ing for the neural or mental event(Skinner, 1984, p. 518). A view of thebrain as the entity that controls usbrings to mind an analogy withsymbiosis. Cognitive neuroscientistscome close to painting a picture of

the person as having formed a symbi-otic relationship with another organ-ism, the brain. Cognitive accounts ofthe abilities and functions of thebrain read as though humans providea brain with a body, sensory organs,mobility, and defenses, and the brainprovides the human with the com-plexity of behavior such as cognition,perception, command, and control.Attributing the behavior of an intactperson to a brain by itself is known asthe mereological fallacy (Bennett &Hacker, 2003). Woodbridge (1965)put it this way: We may be con-vinced that without brains we couldnot think, but to expect a brain tothink seems to be about as unreason-able an expectation as one canentertain (p. 183). Contrasted withthe caricature of behaviorism asblack-box brain theory, it is as ifcognitive brain science sees a person

as the host organism for the brain.Put in this context, can the cognitiveneuroscience view of biology anda persons behavior be seen as holistic

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and appealing? Keenan and Dillen-burger make a strong case for how topull back the curtain to reveal thatthe wizard and his magic are notreally there.

Views of the Inside from Outsidethe Person

Keenan and Dillenburger use atyp-ical video imagery to present animaginary scientific brain imaging-measuring scanner that will let us seewhatever amount and type of brainactivity we wish. This scanner will letus plot functional relations betweenbrain-activity changes as they occurin real time in response to environ-mental contingencies. From this plot,one can determine that changes inbrain function at any specific point intime are a function of the environ-mental contingencies. But any datacollected in this way constitute datathat require a third-person perspec-tive. Can the person whose behavioris monitored learn much about whatcontrols his or her behavior from the

scans of environmentbrainbehav-ior relations? Yes, but only by step-ping back and viewing the scans fromthe perspective of being outside onesself, as an observer. The point beingmade here is one that Skinner maderepeatedly, that knowledge of the selfresults from the perspective of anoth-er person.

In arranging conditions under which a person

describes the public or private world in whichhe lives, a community generates that veryspecial form of behavior called knowing. Self-knowledge is of social origin. It is onlywhen a persons private world becomesimportant to others that it is made importantto him. It then enters into the control of thebehavior called knowing. But self-knowledgehas a special value to the individual himself. Aperson who has been made aware of himselfby the questions he has been asked is ina better position to predict and control hisown behavior. (1974, p. 31)

To illustrate the point of self-knowledge arising from a social en-vironment, Keenan and Dillenburgerpresent video footage of a person

walking down a city street. The viewof the street is from the perspective ofthe person himself as well as a viewfrom the perspective of anotherobserver. The latter perspective lets

one see virtually everything the per-son walking sees as well as enablinga view of events the walking personcannot see. When the walker ob-serves a bodily feeling and a sub-sequent change in behavior, theperson may conclude that the feelingcaused his or her behavior. By sodoing, the person is committing the

fallacy of false causeor post hoc ergopropter hoc. Merely noting the tem-

poral arrangement of the feeling andbehavior change and thereby con-cluding the former caused the latter isakin to concluding that the roosterscrowing caused the sun to rise(Schick & Vaughn, 2004). By step-ping back to view ourselves from theperspective of another, we becomeaware of events that give rise tofeelings and thoughts and understandour own behavior more fully.

The Use of Multimedia

Much of this review is a paraphras-ing of and commenting on the audionarration and visual images providedby Keenan and Dillenburger. Thereader has been repeatedly asked toimagine seeing what the authorspresent visually with their CD-ROM. At first viewing, some maywonder exactly what is the relationbetween the still images and the videoclips Keenan and Dillenburger select-ed to use and the topic beingdiscussed. For instance, in theirdiscussion of where the associationformed in classical conditioning is,they present a still image of a dog,and if one clicks on the image, thedog opens its mouth and emits a lionsroar. How could this image berelevant to the issue of where associ-

ation lies? The connection is notnecessarily obvious unless the viewersees the images presented as anoccasion to ask him- or herself: What

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is being asked here and what have I,as a viewer-learner, typically thoughtabout this topic? And have I everstopped to examine my thinking onthis topic? The atypical imagery can

function so unexpectedly that it canmake the viewer stop thinking andthen begin to think about his or herthinking. When placed in the contextof the perspective of a learner whowill view the imagery with the men-talistic assumptions typical for anundergraduate psychology student,Keenan and Dillenburger have donevery well to select atypical imagerywith thoughtful narration to produce

a very effective teaching tool. Thesection on debunking mentalism isfirst-rate behavior-analytic thinkingand presents very thought-provokingimagery. The authors also have anexemplary tutorial on stimulus equiv-alence that will be a valuable in-troduction or addition to any lectureon that topic. This CD-ROM con-sists of three modules, with a com-plete audio transcript, to enable

the use of each on discrete occasions,and each would serve well as a pre-cursor to a discussion on severaltopics. It is designed to be used witheither advanced undergraduate stu-dents or possibly 1st-year graduatestudents.

Could this CD-ROM be used bystudents on their own? Yes, for somegraduate students; probably no, forundergraduates, if for no other rea-son than that the program is pricedat approximately $100 by its soledistributor in the United States, In-sight Media. This CD-ROM is nota standard tutorial; instead it is aninventive treatment of a behavior-analytic view. It functioned to stim-ulate thinking akin to free associationin this reviewer, as might be evidentin the somewhat rambling natureof this review. Why I Am Nota Cognitive Psychologist: A Tribute

to B. F. Skinner is a teaching gem. Itdeserves serious consideration inteaching of behavior analysis to thenext generation. (For a preview of the

CD see http://www.celticfringe.me.uk/).

REFERENCES

Baum, W. M. (2005). Understanding behavior-ism: Behavior, culture and evolution (2nded.). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Bennett, M. R., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2003).Philosophical foundations of neuroscience.Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Buckle, K. (2006, September). Ask the experts:How do batteries store and dischargeelectricity. Scientific American, p. 126.

Chiesa, M. (1994). Radical behaviorism: Thephilosophy and the science. Boston: AuthorsCooperative.

Hineline, P. N. (1980). The language of be-havior analysis: Its community, its functions,

and its limitations. Behaviorism,8, 6786.Keenan, M., & Dillenburger, K. (2004).

Why I am not a cognitive psychologist:A tribute to B. F. Skinner [CD-ROM] CelticFringe Productions. (Distributed by InsightMedia, New York)

Miller, G. (2007, January 19). A surprisingconnection between memory and imagina-tion. Science, 315, 312.

Palmer, D. C. (2001). Behavioral interpreta-tion of cognition. History and Philosophy ofPsychology, 3, 4345.

Pierce, W. D., & Cheney, C. D. (2003).Behavior analysis and learning (3rd ed.).Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Richelle, M. N. (1993). B. F. Skinner: Areappraisal. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Schick, T., & Vaughn, L. (2004). How to thinkabout weird things: Critical thinking for a newage. Boston: McGraw Hill.

Schlinger, H. D. (2005). How the human gotits mind. Skeptic, 11(4), 4853.

Schlinger, H. D. (2006, May).Why conscious-ness hasnt been explained until now. Paperpresented at the annual meeting of theAssociation for Behavior Analysis, Atlanta.

Schultz, D. (1981). A history of modern

psychology (3rd ed.). New York: AcademicPress.Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organ-

isms: An experimental approach. New York:Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Skinner, B. F. (1974).About behaviorism. NewYork: Knopf.

Skinner, B. F. (1977). Why I am not acognitive psychologist.Behaviorism,5, 110.

Skinner, B. F. (1984). Methods and theories inthe experimental analysis of behavior. Be-havioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 511546,541546.

Skinner, B. F. (1985). Cognitive science and

behaviorism. British Journal of Psychology,76, 291301.

Skinner, B. F. (1989). Recent issues in theanalysis of behavior. Columbus, OH: Mer-rill.

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Timberlake, W., Schaal, D. W., & Steinmetz,J. E. (2005). Relating behavior and neuro-science: Introduction and synopsis. Journalof the Experimental Analysis of Behavior,84,305311.

Woodbridge, F. J. E. (1965). Nature and mind.New York: Russell & Russell.

Zimmer, C. (2004). Soul made flesh: Thediscovery of the brainand how it changedthe world. New York: Free Press.

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2007 - Why We Are Still Not Cognitive Psychologists - Phelps

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