The Ultimate Challenge: Prove B. F. Skinner Wrong

Paul Chance

For much of his career, B. F. Skinner displayed the optimism that is often attributed tobehaviorists. With time, however, he became less and less sanguine about the power of behaviorscience to solve the major problems facing humanity. Near the end of his life he concluded thata fair consideration of principles revealed by the scientific analysis of behavior leads topessimism about our species. In this article I discuss the case for Skinners pessimism and suggestthat the ultimate challenge for behavior analysts today is to prove Skinner wrong.

Key words: challenge, evolution, extinction, pessimism, pollution, B. F. Skinner

The wag has it that There is nofuture in pessimism. Certainly think-ing well of the future is morepleasant than thinking ill of it,because the future is where we allend up. When approaching old age,for example, it is more pleasant totell ourselves that the best is yet tobe than to contemplate urinaryincontinence, deafness, and life with-out memory. We all become mastersof self-delusion when self-delusionpays better wages than realism, as itso often does.

B. F. Skinner, it seems, deludedhimself for years about the power ofbehavior science to improve thefuture of humanity. In the early daysof his career, he was quite theoptimist. In 1945, Skinner (1948b)spent a summer writing Walden Two,a novel describing a utopian commu-nity based on behavioral principles.In Science and Human Behavior hewrote, The methods of science havebeen enormously successful whereverthey have been tried. Let us thenapply them to human affairs (1953/1965, p. 5). In a 1967 magazineinterview, Skinner spoke of usingbehavior science in designing aworld that will make us into the kindof people we would like to be andgive us the things that we could allagree that we want (M. H. Hall,

1967, in Chance & Harris, 1990,p. 5). In Beyond Freedom and Dignityhe wrote, Our culture has producedthe science and technology it needs tosave itself (1971, p. 181), and heended the book with these lines: Ascientific view of man offers excitingpossibilities. We have not yet seenwhat man can make of man(p. 215). Not long after this, Skinnerremarked, Im an optimist. I thinkwe have only to understand ourselvesto reach a golden age (E. Hall, 1972,p. 65).

But although Skinner was optimis-tic, he knew there were formidableimpediments to reaching a goldenage. Over the years, Skinner seemedto feel more and more that thoseimpediments tipped the scales againstus. The major difficulties were nottechnical. We already had the tech-nology to improve education dramat-ically, for example, and to reducemarkedly pollution and the con-sumption of natural resources. Rath-er, the difficulty stemmed mainlyfrom certain behavioral propensitiesthat are part of our evolutionaryheritage. In 1982, Skinner wrote thatalthough we may be able to predictcertain events,

the future of the species may depend uponwhether there can ever be any contingencies ofreinforcement, contrived or natural, that willinduce us to act upon those predictions. Wemay know that certain things are going tohappen, but knowing is not enough; action isneeded. Why should it occur? That is perhapsthe most terrifying question in the history ofthe human species. (p. 8)

I am grateful to Susan Friedman and SusanSchneider for their helpful comments on anearlier draft of this article.

Address correspondence to Paul Chance,9590 Cedar Lane, Seaford, Delaware 19973 (e-mail: paulchance@verizon.net).

The Behavior Analyst 2007, 30, 153160 No. 2 (Fall)

153

In a talk at the American Psycholog-ical Association in 1982, Skinnerattempted to explain why we arenot acting to save the world (pub-lished in Skinner, 1987). His answerfocused on evolved propensities, suchas our liking for sugar, salt, and sex,that work against us in our presentenvironment. Yet even then he ar-gued that we have the scienceneeded to design a world that wouldtake that nature into account andcorrect many of the miscarriages ofevolution (p. 11).

By the end of the 1980s, however,Skinners optimism had vanished. Idiscovered this when I called himconcerning an anthology I was thenediting (Chance & Harris, 1990).Skinners 1967 interview was toappear in the book, and I asked himwhether his views had changed sincethen. They had indeed, he said. Iused to believe that a science ofbehavior could show us how to solvethe problems confronting uspollu-tion, overpopulation, poverty, thethreat of nuclear war. But I amforced to conclude that what thescience of behavior shows us is thatwe cant solve these problems (pri-vate conversation, 1989; reported inChance & Harris, 1990, p. 10). Headded, Id say that was a prettysignificant change in my views,wouldnt you? Stunned, I had toagree. I asked if he had expressed thisopinion publicly before then. Hereplied that he had said as much ina new preface to one of his books,but deleted the comment after some-one objected that it would be toodemoralizing.1

Some might dismiss Skinnerschange of heart as a reaction to oldage and the frailty that comes with it.Skinner was well over 80 at the timeof our conversation and would die ofleukemia about a year later. But aswe chatted he seemed energetic andwell, and I detected no sign ofdepression. On the contrary, he wasquite cheerful and chuckled a bit athis surprising revelation. Whetherwhat amused him was his own trans-formation or my surprise at hearingit, I cannot say.

There seems no reason to believethe shift in Skinners thinking was theresult of age, illness, or depression.Rather, it appears to have beena conclusion arrived at graduallyand reluctantly after many years ofthought and study. Unfortunately, itis all too easy to list the kinds offindings from behavior science thatmight have led Skinner to pessimism:

Immediate consequences outweighdelayed consequences (Grice, 1948;Hineline, 1977; Hull, 1943; Mischel& Grusec, 1967; Navarick, 2004;Perone, 2003). As Rachlin (2000)points out, the alcoholic wants towake up sober in the morning, butright now he wants a drink. In thesame way, John Q. Citizen wants hischildren to live in a world with cleanair, but right now he wants to drivehis air-polluting SUV. Many mem-bers of Congress want to have lawsone day that make it illegal foranyone to manufacture, sell, or drivea vehicle that gets only 10 miles tothe gallon of gasoline, but today theywant to meet with the lobbyist forone of the major car makers or oilcompanies. Skinner (e.g., 1986)pointed out that it is possible to dealwith delayed consequences by arran-ging mediating events, but the bene-fits for doing so are apt to be delayed.Advice and rules are often offered toencourage people to behave in waysthat are in their long-term interests,but unless the immediate conse-quences for doing so are positive theadvice is often ignored. As Skinner

1 Presumably the book in question wasBeyond Freedom and Dignity, which waspublished by Penguin with a new preface in1988. Although Skinner evidently temporizedhis position on the ability of behavior scienceto save humanity, hints of his pessimismremain. For example, he writes, When Iwrote this book I thought [italics added] thatwe could correct for the weakness of remoteconsequences simply by creating currentsurrogates to serve in their place (1988,reprinted in Skinner, 1989, p. 118).

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(1982, published in 1987) observed,The advice we are now being offeredis about a distant future; it may begood advice, but that has very little todo with whether we shall take it(p. 5).

Consequences for the individualusually outweigh consequences forothers. Researchers debate whethertrue altruism, in which one individualhelps another without personal gain,exists (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce,& Neuberg, 1997; Sober & Wilson,1999; Staub, 2003). Even if it does, itseems clear that most of the time welook out for number one. In princi-ple, everyone abhors the politicalpork that builds bridges to nowhere.Yet few people write letters to theircongressman complaining about theuse of federal tax dollars to builda presidential library or other touristattraction in their state. We all agreethat making sacrifices for the com-mon good is a virtue, but its a virtuewe like to see practiced by othersmore than by ourselves.

Coincidental events often strengthenineffective behavior (Ono, 1987; Skin-ner, 1948a; Vyse, 2000; Wagner &Morris, 1987). Events that are in noway causally related to the behaviorthey follow often affect that behavioras if they were. One result is thatmany people reject proven medica-tions in favor of unproven herbs,attach good luck charms to theirdashboards while failing to use seatbelts, and deal with the Palestinianproblem, if at all, by praying forpeace.

Some chemicals are destructivelyreinforcing. Skinner (e.g., 1987) oftennoted that the reinforcing power ofsugar and salt, which were usually inshort supply during humanitys hunt-er-gatherer days, now threaten ourhealth. But our fondness for sugarand salt is just the beginning. Alco-hol, nicotine, opium, cocaine, meth-amphetamine, and many other chem-icals are powerfully reinforcing formany people and have a huge nega-tive impact on productivity world-

wide, to say nothing of the tragicconsequences they have for healthand human welfare (United NationsOffice on Drugs and Crime, 2007;von Zielbauer, 2007).

Simple, familiar ideas that arewrong are often preferred over com-plex, alien ideas that are correct(Kaiser, McCloskey, & Proffitt, 1986;McCloskey, Washburn, & Felch,1983). Students learn in school thatday follows night because the earthrotates on its axis, but many laterrevert to the more intuitive idea thatthe sun orbits the earth every 24 hours(Sadler, 1992). Reams of data suggestthat most behavior can be explainedentirely in terms of biology, learninghistory, and the current situation, buteven many psychologists prefer expla-nations based primarily on a mysteri-ous and willful mind. Skinner himselfwas often the victim of the tendency ofpeople to twist statements into sim-pler, more familiar, but inaccurateforms (Morris, Lazo, & Smith, 2004;Morris, Smith, & Lazo, 2005; Palmer,2006; Todd & Morris, 1992).

Susceptibility to social reinforce-ment can incline us toward extremeviews (Fraser, 1971; Janis, 1982;Kaplan & Miller, 1983; Verplanck,1955). Ku Klux Klan members donot ordinarily associate with mem-bers of the American Civil LibertiesUnion. We like hearing people saythat they agree with us and tend toavoid the company of those whodont. Without the tempering influ-ence of contrary opinions, some ofus spiral toward ever more radicalviews. The people who carried out themurder-suicide attacks against theUnited States on September 11, 2001,for example, were not poor, uneducat-ed, downtrodden people with nothingto lose; they were mostly well-educat-ed, middle-class people with familieswho, unfortunately, spent a lot oftime interacting with others whoshared their fundamentalist religiousbeliefs. Some people thought thatthe Internet would reduce extremismby exposing people to many different

THE ULTIMATE CHALLENGE 155

opinions. Instead, it may increaseextremism. Through it, people withradical beliefs can readily find otherswith similar opinions and, throughmutual social reinforcement, gravi-tate toward even more extremeviews.

In the absence of countercontrol, theuse of aversives tends to be veryreinforcing to those who use them(Conroy, 2000; Haney, Banks, &Zimbardo, 1973; Sidman, 1989). Theabuses at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraqrevealed nothing new about thecapacity of ordinary people for cru-elty (Higham & Stephens, 2004).Some people attempted to explainthose abuses by attributing them tocharacter flaws in the individualsinvolved, saying, There are a fewrotten apples in every barrel. Butsocial psychologist Philip Zimbardo(2007) replied that it was not theapples that were rotten, but the barrelitself. Put people in a situation inwhich they are free to abuse otherswithout paying a price, and they arelikely to do so.

Strong aversives presented abruptlyprompt appropriate action, but strongaversives following a long string ofaversives that gradually increase instrength often do not (Masserman,1946; Miller, 1960; Scripture, 1895,reported in Perone, 2003). This sug-gests that as long as conditionsworsen gradually, we will toleratebad air, foul water, loud noise,psychological and physical abuse,and crime that would once have beenconsidered intolerable. Oh, we say,you get used to it. And that isprecisely the problem.

Nearly all people believe in super-natural forces and identities (Bloom,2005; Harris, 2006). Our inclinationto believe in devils, angels, ghosts,miracles, and other mystical ideasworks against a rational, scientificapproach to problems. For example,many Americans believe that theAIDS pandemic, fighting in the Mid-dle East, and environmental degra-dation do not signal the need for

rational analysis and changed behav-ior. Rather, they are signs thatbiblical prophecies of the worldsend are about to be fulfilled. Similar-ly, people who see the face of thedevil in smoke emanating froma World Trade Center tower are notlikely to understand, much less sup-port, a scientific approach to terror-ism.

Had Skinner composed this list(which is by no means exhaustive),it would no doubt be somewhatdifferent, but it has to be admittedthat many of the things that sciencehas revealed about behavior raisedoubts about our ability to solve thecomplex problems that confront us.It seems that Skinner had goodreason to be pessimistic about huma-nitys future.

Optimists may reply that if we arenot dealing effectively with our great-est problems, it is because it takestime for new ideas, such as thescientific analysis of behavior, to takehold. We must be patient, the opti-mists argue, and they point to Dar-win for support. It took manydecades for Darwins ideas to winacceptance, but now virtually allbiologists, the vast majority of otherscientists, and in some countriesa majority of laypeople, accept evo-lutionary theory. Give us time, theoptimist says, give us time.

The trouble, Skinner might count-er, is that we dont have time.2 Thefact that it has taken nearly 150 yearsto win over fewer than half theAmerican people to the idea ofevolution is an argument for pessi-mism, not optimism. It suggests thatit may well be another hundred yearsbefore even a large minority of adults

2 British physicist Stephen Hawking wouldprobably agree. He urges the establishment ofcolonies on other celestial bodies. Life onearth, he explains, is at the ever-increasingrisk of being wiped out by a disaster, such assudden global nuclear war, a genetically en-gineered virus or other dangers we have notyet thought of (quoted in Overbye, 2007,p. A14).

156 PAUL CHANCE

will accept the idea that a technologyexists for changing behavior. Mean-while:

Earths temperature is increasing,glaciers are melting, and sea levels arerising (Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change, 2007). Within20 years the homes of tens of millionsof people are likely to be flooded,hundreds of millions of people will bewithout sufficient drinking water,and tropical diseases such as malariawill spread (Kolbert, 2006; TopScientists Warn, 2007). Althoughvigorous efforts now could preventsome of this damage, some climatol-ogists believe it is already too late toavoid all of it (Top ScientistsWarn).

Natural resources are diminishingwhile the competition for them isincreasing. Wilson (2002) speaksof a bottleneck of overpopulationand wasteful consumption (p. xxiii).Wilson adds that for the rest of theworld to reach United States levels ofconsumption with existing technolo-gy would require four more planetearths (p. 150).

Species are becoming extinct at anastonishing rateperhaps 100 timesgreater than before human influence(Wilson, 2002). Some experts believethat up to one million species will beextinct or doomed to extinction by2050 (Pounds & Puschendorf, 2004).The extinction of so many speciesmay increase our own chances ofextinction. For example, many plantshave medicinal value; some animalsare important to agriculture; theextinction of one species can resultin an economically devastating in-crease or decrease in another.

Species that evolved in one envi-ronment are now invading others,where they pose various kinds ofthreats to our survival. Today at least5,000 alien species make their homesin the United States (Devine, 1999).Bilge water pumped from foreignvessels is just one important sourceof transplanted life forms (Sax, Sta-chowicz, & Gaines, 2005).

Devastating epidemics are a virtualcertainty. Epidemiologists say thata flu pandemic like the one thatkilled 40 million worldwide in 19171918 is overdue. Conditions in manyparts of the worldcontaminatedwater, untreated sewage, war, sharedneedles, prostitution, interaction ofhumans and wild animals, overuse ofantibioticsare ripe for widespreadbacterial and viral diseases (Garrett,1995).

The rate of human populationgrowth, while slowing, is still expo-nential. The worlds populationreached 1 billion in 1800, exceeded1.5 billion by 1900, now stands atover 6 billion, and is expected toexceed 9 billion by 2050 (UnitedNations Population Division, 2007).Advances in biomedicine threaten tomake matters worse by extendingaverage life expectancy, at least inthe more affluent countries (Mann,2006). The biomass of human life isalready as much as 100 times thebiomass of any large land animal thathas ever lived, and continued growthcannot be sustained (Wilson, 2002).

Terrorist acts have become com-monplace in some parts of the worldand may become the norm on everycontinent. Advances in technologyhave resulted in weapons of greatpower, some of which can be con-structed with readily available mate-rials following instructions availableon the Internet. It seems inevitablethat the tit-for-tat pattern of violencewe have seen in Iraq and elsewherewill include nuclear weapons or othermeans of mass destruction.

Ignorance is rampant throughoutmuch of the world. Millions of peoplecan neither read nor write, believethat diseases are caused by witches orevil spirits, and think natural disas-ters are Gods punishment for collec-tive sins.

It is true that not all the news is bad,that there have been some successes.Smallpox and polio have been effec-tively eradicated. Thanks in part tobehavior analysts, many victims of

THE ULTIMATE CHALLENGE 157

severe childhood disabilities such asautism can lead much more fulfillinglives (Lovaas, 1987; Smith, 1999);people suffering from certain debili-tating behavior disorders (e.g., obses-sions, phobias, depression) are able toget relief from their symptoms (Kaz-din, 2000; Wolpe, 1992); many busi-nesses have discovered that they cantreat their employees well and stillprosper (Daniels, 1999; Fox, Hopkins,& Anger, 1987; New Tool, 1971);there are schools here and there inwhich students are learning a greatdeal and enjoying the school day(Johnson & Layng, 1992); and ani-mals are trained and maintained moreeffectively and humanely than in thepast (Markowitz, 1982; Pryor, 1999).Positive reinforcement is a phrase thatis now familiar to (if not well un-derstood by) many parents, teachers,and corporate managers. Govern-ments now sometimes reward desir-able behavior, such as working, rath-er than undesirable behavior, such ascollecting welfare checks (e.g., theWelfare Reform Bill of 1996). Andmany organizations are striving tofight hunger, poverty, pollution, hab-itat destruction, species extinction,and disease (e.g., Habitat for Human-ity, Doctors without Borders, Green-peace, the Nature Conservancy, thePeace Corps, Population Connection,UNICEF). Surely Skinner wouldadmit that these are grounds foroptimism.

Skinner was undoubtedly aware ofthese achievements, yet they did notdeter him from pessimism. It seemslikely that his reply to this challengewould have gone something like this:These developments are admirable,but the effort falls far short of what isneeded to avert catastrophe and farshort of what could be accomplishedif the full power of science, includingbehavior science, were brought tobear. We are simply not attackingthe major problems that confronthumanity in the most effective ways.Where serious threats to humanityare concerned, we offer little more

than the palliative care of self-de-lusion. We tell ourselves and othersthat we can solve even the toughestproblems, but we are like the shamanwho holds a dying patients hand andsays, Dont be alarmed. I can healyou. The patient is eager to believethe lie, and so is the shaman, but thepatient is dead in the morning all thesame.

It seems clear, then, that a goodcase can be made for Skinners thesisthat what behavior science teaches usis that we cannot solve the problemsthat now threaten our species. Hadwe reached our current level ofunderstanding of behavior a hundredyears ago, our prospects might bebrighter. But under present circum-stances, even optimists must admitthat our future is in doubt. In myconversation with Skinner, the onlyhope he held out was winning overa substantial number of influentialpeopleeducators, writers, journal-ists, scientists, and scholarswhomight then pressure policy makersto take effective action. The fact thatwe are doing next to nothing to winthem over is perhaps further supportfor Skinners view.

And so the ultimate challenge isthis: To prove that evolution hasgiven us not only impulses thatundermine our health; impel us to-ward violence; turn us into cheats,liars, and brigands; and threaten tomake our world uninhabitable, butalso the ability and the propensity toovercome those failings. Ironically,the ultimate challenge for behavioranalysts is to prove B. F. Skinnerwrong.

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