2006 - And Yet … Further Comments on Distinguishing Positive and Negative Reinforcement - Lattal,...

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And Yet : Further Comments onDistinguishing Positive and Negative Reinforcement

Kennon A. Lattal

West Virginia UniversityAlice D. Lattal

Aubrey Daniels International

Baron and Galizio (2005) usefullyreview and update Michaels (1975)observations concerning the prob-lems surrounding the distinction be-tween positive and negative reinforce-ment (hereafter, the 6 distinction). Inthe end, they, like Michael beforethem, conclude that the valence isunjustified. And yet, despite the factthat the logical and empirical under-pinnings of the distinction have beenquestioned for more than 30 years, ithas persisted. Here we comment onsome of the underpinnings of the

distinction, some further practicalreasons for its persistence, and howthe inconsistencies between what isknown about the distinction and howit is described in both professionaland lay settings might be addressed.

Logical Inversion, Empirical Quagmire

If we assume, for the sake of thepresent argument, that the operations

of presentation and removal canbe distinguished formally or structur-ally, then there is a basis for explor-ing functional or behavioral differ-ences between the two operations.Because behavior analysis is a data-based discipline, it follows that thedistinction should be put to experi-mental test. Considering the problemof the 6 distinction as an empiricalproblem leads to two further ques-

tions: How is the problem framed interms of an experimental question?And what evidence is there of func-tional differences between positiveand negative reinforcement?

In the experimental analysis ofbehavior, as in other sciences, it isassumed that a variable has no effectuntil shown otherwise. Thus, a differ-ence between baseline and manipula-tion phases is not considered to existuntil it has been shown in a properlycontrolled experiment. This is noth-ing more than the application of the

time-tested logic behind the nullhypothesis. By this reasoning, theassumption should be that positiveand negative reinforcement are func-tionally the same until shown empir-ically to be otherwise. And yet, thelogic implicit in maintaining the 6distinction historically has been thatof rejecting a priori the null hypoth-esis, awaiting experimental evidencethat it should be accepted. An odd

inversion indeed.The closest approximation to em-

pirical evaluations of the 6 distinc-tion are those similar to ones con-ducted by Dinsmoor (1962) andAzrin, Holz, Hake, and Ayllon(1963). These authors are amonga small number to investigate sched-ules of escape from electric shockarranged in ways roughly compara-ble to those studied using food as

a reinforcer. But, even here, onecannot be certain that the twoprocedures are indeed comparable.Perone, Galizio, and Baron (1988),

Address correspondence to Kennon A.Lattal, Department of Psychology, WestVirginia University, Morgantown, West Vir-ginia 26506-6040 (e-mail: [email protected]).

The Behavior Analyst 2006, 29, 129134 No. 1 (Spring)

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for example, have outlined a numberof methodological problems in com-paring human behavior to that ofother animals, many of which couldbe extrapolated to the question of

making direct comparisons betweennominally positive and negative re-inforcement. Nonetheless, using squir-rel monkeys as subjects, Azrin et al.concluded that fixed-ratio escapereinforcement appears to be compa-rable to fixed-ratio food reinforce-ment in the manner in which re-sponses are maintained, as well asthe manner in which the response isacquired (p. 456). Earlier, Dins-

moor was slightly more circumspect,noting sometimes mixed mainte-nance of the operant bar pressingof rats maintained on variable-in-terval (VI) escape schedules. Hesuggested that such respondingmight be

contaminated by responding that is main-tained by differences in the probability ofshock following different classes of behavior.This contamination is relatively small whenlong intervals intervene between successiveshocks in the series. More severe shocks ora more sensitive organism may be needed toensure satisfactory performance under theseconditions. (p. 47)

Dinsmoors results may or may notbe qualitatively different from thosein analogous VI schedules of foodreinforcement. The difficulties notedby Dinsmoor may indicate a differ-ence in behavioral process between

shock- and food-based responding,or they may indicate that the use ofelectric shock is simply not as wellunderstood as is the use of food.Thus, Dinsmoors results do notnecessarily mean that the two nomi-nal types of reinforcement are differ-ent; only that little remains knownabout escape from shock relative tofood-maintained responding. Thelimited types of schedules and sched-

ule parameters, however, do notallow clear conclusions either in favorof or opposed to the assertion thatpositive and negative reinforcement

differ from one another. We notethat the comparisons noted hereinwere between food- and shock-re-lated responding. It could be thatsuch behavioral, or even physiologi-

cal (e.g., Donahoe & Palmer, 1994),evidence of differences between pos-itive and negative reinforcement un-der these circumstances may havemore to do with the behavioraldifferences between shock and foodexposure than with those betweenpresentation and removal per se. Andyet, the difference persists.

Given the difficulties of direct com-parisons of food- and shock-main-

tained responding, perhaps a moreindirect approach might be useful incomparing their relative effects. Con-sider, for example, an experimentreported by Hearst (1962) in whichrhesus monkeys trained on multipleshock-avoidance food-reinforcementschedules subsequently were testedfor stimulus generalization aroundthe stimuli correlated with the twotypes of reinforcement. Hearst did

find differences in generalizationgradients (avoidance-based stimulusgeneralization gradients usually weremore flat), but the methodologicalpoint is that behavior maintained bydifferent types of reinforcementwas examined under a common con-dition to bothchanges in the di-mensional stimulus correlated withreinforcement. Nevins (e.g., 1974)analysis of response strength follows

a similar logic in that the relativeresistance to change of two differenttraining conditions is tested asa function of a common disrupter.Such an approach also may havemerit with respect to examiningwhether there are empirical differ-ences on responding maintained bythe nominally different conditions ofpresentation and removal of stimuli.

The Persistence of the6

DistinctionCultural contingencies and the per-

sistence of verbal behavior. If theformal differences between positive

130 KENNON A. LATTAL & ALICE D. LATTAL


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and negative reinforcement are notsupportable and the functional dif-ferences are at least questionable, itremains to be answered why thedistinction persists. Numerous exam-

ples can be noted, in addition to the6 distinction, of behavioral processesand descriptions that have persistedeven though they also have flown inthe face of logical or empiricalanalysis. Hearst (1975) presentedstrong arguments opposing the oper-antrespondent conditioning distinc-tion that had been a part of thepsychology of learning for the pre-vious 40 years. Dinsmoor (1954) de-

constructed the negative law of effectby suggesting that punishment was,in fact, not a separate behavioralprocess but rather the suppressionobserved when punishment as insti-tuted was the result of the negativereinforcement of some other, unmea-sured behavior. In what has becomea terminological tug-of-war with ap-plied behavior analysts, both Zeiler(1972) and Lattal and Poling (1981)

argued against describing response-independent events as noncontin-gent reinforcement (cf. Poling &Normand, 1999; Vollmer, 1999).And yet, all of these distinctionspersist.

In each of these cases, as well aswith the 6 distinction, the persistencecan be attributed in no small partto historical-cultural contingencies,those to be found in the cumulativeand tonal verbal community. Estab-lished verbal practices are hard tochange, as Vollmer (1999) has noted.Moreover, the notion of categoriza-tion of events as positive and nega-tive, carrying along with the catego-rization the complementary notion ofadditive and subtractive processes, isengrained in western culture fromJob 1:21 in the Old Testament to theSpencer-Bain principle to Thorn-dikes law of effect to Skinners

operant conditioning.Cultural and historical practices in

turn persist because they, in somesense at least, work within the culture

(cf. Harris, 1977). If they did not,there likely would be different prac-tices, be they cultural institutions or,in the present case, terms and dis-tinctions. In describing the selection

of traits, Dawkins (1986) discussedthe good enough criterion wherebya trait or structure may not betheoretically ideal but it persistsbecause it is sufficient for the purposeat hand (e.g., a birds wing is notaerodynamically perfect, but it allowsflight). Certain process and proce-dural distinctions may not be perfect,but they allow progress. So wesuggest it has been with the 6

distinction. It may not be perfect. Itmay in some senses be wrong. But, inother important cultural ways, itworks in both the scientific andbroader cultures in which behavioranalysis is discussed.

Practical considerations.Baron andGalizio (2005) suggested that thedistinction is serving a useful com-municative function and is so wellembedded within discussions of op-

erant behavior that one cannot nav-igate the literature without beingfamiliar with it (p. 96). We concur.The persistence of the terms suggeststhat the communication they allow inmost circumstances weighs moreheavily than the obscurity they in-terject. But, there are other contin-gences within the behavior-analyticculture that may contribute to thepersistence of the practice of distin-guishing positive and negative re-inforcement.

Increasingly, legal considerationsin treatment contribute to the 6distinction in applied settings. Legalmandates (e.g., least restrictive treat-ment) have incorporated culturalvalues about what is best or rightmore broadly than what might beargued from a pure science perspec-tive and have institutionalized andthereby perpetuated the distinction in

the applied realm as few other thingscould have. Beyond legal institutions,working in applied settings brings thebehavior analyst and behavior-ana-

IN RESPONSE 131


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lytic language into contact withbroader cultural institutions: schools,workplaces, clinics, hospitals, pris-ons, and any other organizationalsetting in which behavior invites

systematic management. The 6 dis-tinction persists in such settingsbecause it is easily understood in thebroader cultural context described inthe previous section, even though thedistinction may be conceptually am-biguous.

Persuading agencies and institu-tions to consider behavioral treatmentprograms seems more likely whenpositive features of the program are

emphasized, including describing theprocedures as involving positive asopposed to negative reinforcement.In lay terms, this might described asexpressing the tone of the programor the intent of the implementer ormanager, and in more behaviorallanguage it describes the context orframework in which the reinforce-ment procedure will be implemented.Behavioral programs based on what

is described as positive reinforce-ment may be no different or effectiveon the targeted behavior than thosebased on negative reinforcement,but the former are more likely to beaccepted, implemented, and followedthrough (e.g., Daniels, 2000; Iwata &Bailey, 1974). Other useful, moregeneral behavioral differences mayaccrue from procedures framed posi-tively, such as overall productivity,verbal reports of satisfaction, andretention. It is important to keep inmind that the focus of this discussionis on the terms themselves and not onthe actual behavioral process. Thepositive results just described accruein large part, we suggest, by the use ofpositive terms as opposed to neg-ative ones in behavior managementsettings. This practical outcome of thelanguage contributes significantly tothe persistence of the terms positive

andnegativereinforcement in appliedsettings.

More generally, and practicallyspeaking, the use of the language of

positive reinforcement widens theacceptance of behavior analysis ina broader culture that does distin-guish, and places moral value on,circumstances construed as positive

as opposed to those that are negative.Indeed,coercionandmanipulationarewords still strongly associated withbehavior analysis. Positive reinforce-ment may give practitioners a verbalhook for scaling the bias againstbehavior analysis to the goal ofchanging behavior through reinforce-ment.

Addressing the Seeming Inconsistency

Between What is Known and Whatis Said

Addressing the 6 distinction isakin to the broader question of usinglay language to describe scientificconcepts derived from behavior anal-ysis. Hineline (1980), for example,made a carefully crafted argumentfor the precise use of language vis avis descriptions of behavioral pro-cesses. Bailey (1991) offered a morepractical approach in advocating thatlanguage must communicate the con-cepts in a useful way, regardless ofthe precision of the language used todescribe them. The 6 distinction,although imprecise, is likely to persistas long as it is useful, as noted in theprevious section, following the gen-eral scheme described by Bailey.

It is critical that students andprofessional practitioners of behavioranalysis understand the logical andempirical difficulties inherent in dis-tinguishing positive and negative re-inforcement, just as they must un-derstand other technical intricacies ofthe discipline. At the level of thescience, not to understand technicalissues and the proper descriptions oftechnical issues and procedures is notto understand behavior analysis. Incommunicating with others, be they

beginning students, clients, or parentsof clients, however, the goal ofcommunicating the concept effective-ly is primary. Such communication,



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we suggest, can occur at a simplifiedlevel only if the theoretical subtletiesof the concept can be articulated bythe communicator, teacher, or thera-pist under appropriate circumstances.

Communication in practical settingsoften means putting precision on theback burner in favor of more user-friendly descriptions than those em-ployed with colleagues. As long asthe behavior analyst understands theconcept in a technical and scientificsense, it seems both acceptable andeven necessary to distill the languageused to describe the concept ata communicable level. If the behav-

ior-analytic speaker does not under-stand the concept a priori, then thedistilled version is not a translationbut rather may be a bastardizationand misrepresentation of the concept.

Of course, the danger of distilledbehavioral concepts is always pres-ent. It was described by Kennedy(1992) with respect to anthropomor-phic behavioral descriptions: A de-scription that starts off as useful

shorthand for the real thing may bereified by either speaker or listener.In the case of the 6 distinction, itsuse is likely to continue for thereasons already noted herein and byothers, but such use must be donewith an understanding of the concep-tual baggage that the distinctioncarries. It is the case in otherdisciplines as well that, at the cusp,concepts are not always as simple asthey are portrayed further away fromthe cusp and in general communica-tion. After all, in physics, predictionand control sometimes are betterserved when light is considered asa wave and at other times when it isconsidered a particle.

Even if the 6 distinction could benegated empirically, it likely wouldcontinue on practical grounds alonefor the reasons discussed herein. Bythe same token, the celestial mechan-

ics of the sun and planets in our solarsystem have been known for hun-dreds of years, and yet, knowing tothe contrary, behavior analysts still

describe the sun as rising and settingeach day.

REFERENCES

Azrin, N. H., Holz, W. C., Hake, D. F., &Ayllon, T. (1963). Fixed-ratio escape re-inforcement. Journal of the ExperimentalAnalysis of Behavior, 6, 449456.

Bailey, J. S. (1991). Marketing behav-ior analysis requires different talk. Jour-nal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 24,445448.

Baron, A., & Galizio, M. (2005). Positive andnegative reinforcement: Should the distinc-tion be preserved?The Behavior Analyst, 28,8598.

Daniels, A. (2000). Bringing out the best inpeople. New York: McGraw Hill.

Dawkins, R. (1986). The blind watchmaker.London: Norton.

Dinsmoor, J. A. (1954). Punishment: I. Theavoidance hypothesis.Psychological Review,61, 3446.

Dinsmoor, J. A. (1962). Variable-intervalescape from stimuli accompanied by shocks.Journal of the Experimental Analysis ofBehavior, 5, 4147.

Donahoe, J., & Palmer, D. C. (1994).Learningand complex behavior. Boston: Allyn &Bacon.

Harris, M. (1977). Cannibals and kings: The

origins of cultures. New York: RandomHouse.

Hearst, E. (1962). Concurrent generalizationgradients for food-controlled and shock-controlled behavior. Journal of the Experi-mental Analysis of Behavior, 5, 1931.

Hearst, E. (1975). The classical-instrumentaldistinction: Reflexes, voluntary behavior,and categories of associative learning. InW. K. Estes (Ed.), Handbook of learning andcognitive processes: Vol. 2. Conditioning andbehavior theory(pp. 181223). Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum.

Hineline, P. N. (1980). The language ofbehavior analysis: Its community, its func-tions, and its limitations. Behaviorism, 8,6786.

Iwata, B., & Bailey, J. (1974). Reward versuscost token systems: An analysis of theeffects on student and teacher. Journal ofApplied Behavior Analysis, 7, 567576.

Kennedy, J. S. (1992). The new anthropomor-phism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-sity Press.

Lattal, K. A., & Poling, A. D. (1981).Describing response-event relations: Babelrevisited. The Behavior Analyst, 4, 143152.

Michael, J. (1975). Positive and nega-tive reinforcement: A distinction that isno longer necessary; or a better way totalk about bad things. Behaviorism, 3,3344.

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Nevin, J. A. (1974). Response strength inmultiple schedules. Journal of the Experi-mental Analysis of Behavior, 21, 389408.

Perone, M., Galizio, M., & Baron, A. (1988).The relevance of animal-based principles inthe laboratory study of human operant

conditioning. In G. Davey & C. Cullen(Eds.), Human operant conditioning andbehaviour modification (pp. 5985). NewYork: Wiley.

Poling, A. D., & Normand, M. (1999). Non-contingent reinforcement: An inappropriate

description of time-based schedules thatreduce behavior. Journal of Applied Behav-ior Analysis, 32, 237238.

Vollmer, T. R. (1999). Noncontingent re-inforcement: Some additional comments.Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 32,

239240.Zeiler, M. D. (1972). Superstitious behavior inchildren: An experimental analysis. In H.W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child develop-ment and behavior (Vol. 7, pp. 129). NewYork: Academic.


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