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Israel Banks on a FenceAuthor(s): Yuval ElizurSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2003), pp. 106-119Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033507 .

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AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOSMakinggood neighbors:an Israeliofficernear a segmentofthewall,Qalqilya,WestBankJune23,2002

Israel's oliticianshave been quick to takenote of thegrowingsupport for a completedivisionbetween the two peoples.AmramMitzna, the new leaderof the Labor Party, has called for an immediateIsraeliwithdrawal fromGaza and most of theWest Bank, togetherwith thebuildingof a wall. His opponent,PrimeMinister ArielSharon,has alsobackedconstructionf the fence(albeitreluctantly,andin thewake ofmounting publicpressure), utwithout lettinggoof thesettlements.

The preferenceorunilateraleparationveranegotiated greementis the result of the reluctance of leaders on both sides to strive for atwo-statesolution.Neither SharonnorYasirArafat seems towantsuch a result. The two men realize that a fence will be more thanjust a physical barrier. Itwill also play a psychological role, preparingtheir nations for separation from which there will be no return.Both Sharon andArafat have thereforehelped torpedonegotiations:on severaloccasionswhen talks seemed imminent,Sharontook steps that fanned the flames of Arab animosity and sabotagedPalestinianattemptsat reform(includingefforts to replaceArafatwith leadersmore inclined tomake peace). And Arafat, for his part,

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YuvalElizurhas secretly-and at times not so secretly-encouraged terrorismagainst Israel, despite making repeated promises to rein inHamasand other rejectionist roups.There is anotherreason, essobviousbut perhapsmore powerful,

why recent attempts to restart the negotiations between Israelis andPalestinians have failed: the legacy of the now-defunct Oslo peaceprocess.Oslo allowed oth sides todelayresolving undamentalssuessuch as land and water rights, without giving Israelis total securityor the Palestinians a state. So much damage was done to both sides,and confidence was so undermined, that today all the alternatives toseparation ppear o have been discredited.But separation, even unilateral separation carried out by Israel,should not be regarded simply as an act of frustration in the absenceof negotiation. It could well be the best hope for peace in the region.Although itmay be painful initially-indeed, the economic dislocationmay be severe-separation should ultimately profit both sides. Anditwill help create the conditions that may ultimately lead to a finalnegotiatedpeacebetween Israeland thePalestinians.

THE OSLO ERRORIT HAS NOW become obvious that Oslo-which represented anattempt to avoid the arduous and dangerous process of negotiatinga detailed, final peace plan between Israel and the Palestinianswas, in part, a blunder. The 1993 declaration of principles allowedboth sides to ignore many of its terms: in the case of the Israelis, bycontinuing theirmassive effort to establish settlements in theWestBank and Gaza, and in the case of the Palestinians, by disregardingtheir commitment not to arm themselves or engage inviolence.

Observers usually blame the "humiliation of occupation" enduredby the Palestinians for the savage terrorism they have mounted inthe years since the Oslo agreement was signed. Although psychological factors may indeed have played a major role in theseevents, however, it was the negotiators' failure to grapple withsome of the issues underlying the conflict that has been amuchmore important trigger for the bloodshed thanmany experts are

willing to admit.[io8] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume 2No.2

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IsraelBanks on a FenceOslo was premised on theprinciple of "slidinginto peace." Its nego

tiatorswere convinced that themore both sides enjoyed the fruitsof theinitial agreement, themore flexible theywould become regardingwhat

were once thought themost divisive questions: namely, settlements,borders, Jerusalem, and control of theholy places.The Oslo agreementwas also based on the idea of an eventual economic union betweenIsrael and the future Palestinian state.

All of these premises, however, have turned out to be flawed. Theideaof an economic union is anoversimplified concept that soundsgoodto politicians and theoretical economists but ishighly problematic inpractice. The notion is so attractive that even the UN'S1947partitionresolution alled for the establishment f two states oined togetherby just such a union. The ideawas thatPalestine, as a territorial unit,was too small to justify the existence of two separate economies.Unfortunately, plans for an economic union ignore the regional realitiesof the past ioo years: themutual suspicions, the uneven economic potential, and above all, the failureof Israelis and Palestinians to ever agreeon how todivide theirmeager natural resourcessuch as landandwaterresourcesthat both sides regardas essential to theirvery existence.

BREATHING ROOMTHE STRUGGLE ver land has always been the core of the conflictbetween Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Today that legacy takes theformof bitter resentment on both sides-resentment thatOslo ignoredbut thatmust be addressed by any final settlement.

Although they lackedpolitical sovereigntyunderOttoman andBritishrule,Palestine'sArabs felt some securityand even a senseof national identity for as long as they held control overmost of the land.This controlbegan to slipand localanxiety increased,however,when Arab landowners, some of whom lived outside Palestine, began selling large tractsof land toJewish settlers. In some cases,Arab tenant farmerswere unceremoniouslyvicted rom lotstheir amiliesad tilled orgenerations.At the time, the economic potential of a country in such an aridpart of theworld was thought to depend on the quantity of arableland available for fallow farming. Based on this concept, the BritishMandatory Authority adopted "absorptiveapacity"-namely,the

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YuvalElizuramount of additional farmers the local agriculture could support-asa yardstick to determine how much additional Jewish immigration toallow into Palestine. In 1939,with the land question becoming evermore explosive, heBritish issueda regulation reventing ews frompurchasing land in certain areas of Palestine. This discriminatory actwas a failure, however: it not only infuriated Jews, who compared itto the antisemitic Nuremberg Laws adopted in Germany four yearsearlier, but it also encouraged Arab nationalists to increase their demands.No similardiscriminatoryegislation as everpassedagain.

The establishment of Israel in 1948 seemed finally togrant the Jews aunique pportunityofulfill heir spirationsormassive and cquisition.The newly created IsraelLand Authority was given the taskof administering the hundreds of villages abandoned by theirArab inhabitants, as

well as all land owned by the Israeligovernment and theJewishNationalFund (JNF).lthoughtheJNFontributedomore than18percent f theland controlled by the Israel Land Authority today, it stillmaintains50 percent control in allLand Authority bodies. This dominant positionhas resulted ingross underrepresentationof IsraeliArabs (whomake up20 percent of Israel'spopulation) and much discrimination againstthem-especially in the expropriationof land forgovernment purposes.

Israel has also expropriated landover the years for the establishmentof settlements in theWest Bank andGaza, invoking the rightof eminentdomain. As a result, in the Gaza Strip-which has one of the highestpopulation densities in theworld-about adozen Israeli setdements nowoccupy 40 percent of the arable land.Given this long andbitter legacy,itishardly surprisingthat, from the Palestinian perspective, Israelwill haveto do more than remove its settlements before a final peace can bereached.The question of landrightswas one ofmany major subjects thattheOslo agreement intentionally avoided, and any futureagreementbetween Israeland PalestinewiJi have to resolve it conclusively.

DIVIDING THE WATERSALTHOUGHSRAELspartof the "fertilecrescent"that stretchesfromMesopotamia to the Nile, the shortage of water has alwaysbeen a dominant factor in the existence of the local population.

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Israel Banks on a Fenceking of Grar, over wells needed for their sheep and goats, and thesituation has hardly improved in the centuries since. Indeed,things were little better a hundred years ago-even though thepopulation was much smaller then, the standard of living (andthus the level of water consumption) much lower, and agriculturemore primitive.

Once they arrived in Palestine, Jewish settlers dug wells, builtwater reservoirs, and, in the 1950S,undertook ambitious irrigationprojects, bringing water from the Sea of Galilee in the north to theNegev Desert in the south. Although thismay have allowed Israelto partially realize the Zionist dream of "making the desertbloom," it has now become evident that the pumping was overambitious and grossly wasteful. Israeli water experts overestimatedthe size of the country's reserves-in part due to political pressurefrom Israel'spowerfulagriculture obby,which insistedon usingprecious water for thirsty crops such as cotton. The situation wasthen exacerbated in 1967,when Israel gained control over theWestBank and Gaza and began to overexploit themountain aquifer inthe center of the country. Photographs from the era show Israelichildren splashing around in swimming pools in some of the newlyestablished settlements, while in towns such asHebron, the pipesbegan to rundry in summer andwater forbasic human needs had tobe supplied to households by tankers (a situation that continuesto this day).

The declining cost of desalinated seawater now seems to be theonly hope for Israel and its neighbors to solve theirpermanent watershortage. Several desalination plants are already under constructionin Israel, and thesemay partially alleviate the crisis.Yet any progresstowardpeace between Israeland thePalestinianswill require adetailedagreement for the equitable division of all available sources ofwater,starting with theHatzbani River and its tributaries inLebanon, thesources of the Jordan River in Syria, and allwater presently pumpedfrom aquifers in Israel and theWest Bank. Oslo, unfortunately, ignoredthesewater questions. Now a formal agreement, or at least an understanding in principle, on how to allocate the region's insufficientwater supply will be critical in order to reach a political solutionbetween Israel and the Palestinians.

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YuvalElizurSINS OF OMISSION

As MENTIONED ABOVE, the Oslo agreement was based on theconcept of "sliding into peace"-a concept thatwas used by both sidestojustifyavoiding ontroversialuestionssuchasborders, erusalem,settlements, land andwater rights, and the future economic, social,and political relationsbetween the two statesof Palestine. Such matters

were either erroneously thought out or not thought out at all.The most blatant of these sinsof omissionwas the Paris agreementofApril1994, hich outlined he future conomic elations etweenIsrael

and the newly formed PalestinianAuthority (PA).Although the agreementwas termed temporary,"tssignatoriesnewverywellhat twouldset thepattern for all futurerelationsbetween the two states.Since Israelinsisted that thereshouldbe no borderdemarcationbetween areasunderitscontrol and those ruledby thePalestinians, therewas no way to avoidmassive smugglingof goods between thevariouszones.Therefore,different ratesof import duties and excise taxes had to be avoided.The Palestinianseluctantlygreed hatIsrael ould collectcustomsand excise duties on theirbehalf. Since these taxeswere to become thePA'S ain source of revenue (income tax collection in the Palestinianterritories isnegligible), the agreement drastically reduced the Palestinians'control over their economy.The agreement also allowed Israelto retain control over infrastructure services such as electricity, gas,fuel,andtelecommunications.Palestinian merchants, however,were to be allowed tomove freelyin Israel inorder tobuy and sellmerchandise. And work in Israel for

more than ioo,ooo Palestinian workers was to become amajor sourceof income for Palestine. The advantage for Israelwould be that thePalestinians would return home every night, eliminating the dangerof their remaining for long periods inside Israel proper, as do foreignworkers from other parts of the world. Another boon to Israelwasthat, although the PAwas not prevented from imposing protectivetariffs, thePalestinian market soon became amost convenient one forIsrael's industrialproducts. Inmany cases, having Palestinian marketsnearby enabled Israelis to reach economies of scale thatmade itpossiblefor them to sell theirproducts elsewhere, inplaceswhere theyhad notpreviously een competitive.

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IsraelBanks on a FenceThe Paris agreement also provided many short-term advantages tothe Palestinians. The money earned by Palestinians working in Israel,aswell as the customs and excise duties collected for the PAby thebetter-organized Israeli tax authorities, became the PA'Smost stablesourcesof cash.And although it isdifficult to assess the exact influence

of the agreement on the Palestinian economy, the years immediatelypreceding and following its implementation were by far itsbest. TheGNProse, as did the standard of living, and capital began to flow intoPalestine from both charitable and economic sources.

The basic flaws of the Paris agreement soon became apparent,however. Conceived at the high point of globalization, the thinkingbehind the agreement owed much to the visionary theories ofShimon Peres, Israel'sveteran statesman. In his New Middle Eastdoctrine, Peres envisioned that Israelwould help lift allMiddle Easterncountries out of theirmisery by providing themwith technology andhelping them obtain financing from theworld community. Peres alsohoped that the special relations he had built with King Hassan of

Morocco andwith some Persian Gulf stateswould enable Israel andthePalestinians oget involved n regional evelopmentprojects.Peres' theory, however, was naive and did not foresee some of thedestructive side effectsof globalization. In the caseof Palestine, he overlooked the deep gaps indevelopment and the standardof livingbetweenIsraelis andArabs. If such a gap is too great, economic association soonbecomes exploitation-even with the best intentions.This lesson hadbeen learned the hardway in theEuropeanUnion, where itwas foundthat if thegapbetween anew member and other EUnationswas toowide,the associationwould not succeed. The weaker countrymust maintainits own economic independence until all sides can be sure thatunion willnoteviscerateheeconomic nstitutionsf theweakercountry.Even before the Paris agreement was signed in 1994, economistshad begun to warn that a real economic dialogue between the twosides could become a reality only if the gap between their annual percapita GNPs-which, at that time, was $14,000 in Israel and only$2,000 in theWest Bank and $8oo inGaza-was drastically narrowed.Politicians,unfortunately,gnored hiswarning.The danger posed by this failurewas nowhere more obvious thanin employment. Since many Palestinians still live off the land and are

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YuvalElizurnot part of the area's labor force looking forwork, long-term employment of ioo,ooo Palestinians in Israelwould deprive Palestine of muchof itsmajor natural resource- a resource that should havebeen absorbedby itown industry instead.The longer theParis agreement remained inforce, hedeepereconomic ntegrationetweenthe two sidesbecame,mostly to the detriment of the Palestinians.The benefits both sides hadderived from theirmany yearsof separationwere soon forgotten.

Starting in1936,as a resultof theArab boycott and the efforts of localJews to establish their own institutions, each community had becomequite independent economically. The Jews learned to grow their ownfood and establish industries and infrastructure,and the Palestiniansdespite having to bear the burden of 20 years of Jordanian occupationand of the refugee camps established after 1948-also established anindependent economy.After thewar of 1967,when Israel occupied theWest Bank andGaza, most of the economic barriersbetween the twocommunitiesollapsed.hat fewroadblocksemainederedismantledby theParis agreement that followed Oslo, and thePalestinian economybecame evenmore dependent on Israel's.

To be fair, theParis agreement never had much of an opportunity towork theway itwas intended to.As Ephraim Kleiman, a professor ofeconomics atHebrew University and an adviser to the Israelinegotiatingteampoints out, the seriesof closures Israelbegan to imposeon thePalestinians in 1995 in response to the growing wave of Palestinian terrorlimited economic contact and may have further contributed to thePalestinian economic slowdown thatbegan thatyear. Independence nowmay make itmuch easier forPalestine tomobilize investments, loans,andknow-how from foreign sources-especially from the oil-rich PersianGulf Arab states. Itwill also force thePalestinians to figureout how toincrease domestic entrepreneurship. Independence may even, in thefuture, allow Palestine to negotiate an economic cooperation agreement

with Israelundermuch better terms than the 1994Paris agreement.

A LAST RESORTTHE FIRST PLANSfor a unilateral physical separation between areassettledbyJews andArabs were actuallymade longbefore thebeginningof the second intifada inOctober 2ooo. Contrary towhat many people

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IsraelBanks on a Fenceoutside Palestine remember, the seven years after the signing of theOslo agreement in September 1993were not quiet at all, but markedby constant Palestinian terrorism.The subject of a fence thus beganto be raisedby the Israeligovernment as early asMarch 1995,when asuicide bomber killed 21 Israeli soldiers at a bus stop nearNetanya.The goal of the fencewas tomake various closuresmore effective andto drastically limit the entry of Palestinians into Israel.

Discussion of the fence began in earnest in1996,when itwas raisedby theminister of internal security at the time,Moshe Shahal (amember of the then rulingLabor Party). Shahal suggested the constructionof a 300-mile, electronically controlled barrierwith seven or eightcrossingpoints.Although securityandpoliceexpertssupported isplan, itwas soon shelved by Shahal's superiors.The governments ofPrimeMinister Yitzhak Rabin and, even more so, of Shimon Peres(who succeeded Rabin after his assassination inNovember 1995)werenot yet ready to give up on the dream of "aNew Middle East," in

which the emphasis was placed on integration, not separation.Meretz, Israel's leftistparty,alsobalked atunilateral separation, arguingthat direct negotiation was the only way to solve the conflict.

The Rabin and Peres governments also held an attitude towardArabterrorismquite different from that of their successors.Both primeministersrefused to let violence deter progress towardpeace and stuck to theslogan "Wemust fight terroras if there are no hopes forpeace and wemust strive forpeace as if there isno terror." he outbreak of the secondintifadaand the intensification of Palestinian violence has since greatlydiminished thepopularity of these slogans. It isworth noting, however,thatwhen Mitzna was elected chairman of the Labor Party inNovember 2002, he adopted essentially the sameposition, rewording it as "Weshall fight terroras if thereareno negotiations andwe shallnegotiate asif there isno terror."He added, however, that if it becomes clear thatnegotiations arenot possible, Israelshould resort tounilateral separation.When Sharon became prime minister, succeeding Ehud Barak inearly 2001, he advocated a policy very different from Labor's: nonegotiations without a total cessation of violence first. "We cannot beexpected to negotiate under fire," Sharon said.Although this policywon the supportof theBush administration, its fatal flaw soon becameobvious: itgives aveto power to themost extreme among the Palestinian

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YuvalElizurterrorroups.Under Sharon'solicy,a singleactof violenceperpetratedby amarginal group can block peace talks for an unlimited period. Itwas thus subsequently decided to limit the condition of an "obligatorycease fire" to twoweeks, and then to aweek.

These modifications, however, have been to no avail. Indeed, aftertwo years of extreme violence between Jews andArabs, it has becomeobvious to both sides that a total separation, a "cooling off' period, isurgently needed.This ispreciselywhat a fencewould provide.Moreover,total physical separationmay actually enable more effective internationalmediation that could eventually lead to a final peace agreementbetween Israel nd thePalestinians. lthoughPalestinian erroristncursions into Israelmay still take place even after separation, theirnumber and effectiveness can be expected to bemuch more limited.

Meanwhile, after every suicide bombing over the last fewmonths,the voiceswithin Israelcallingto speedup the fence'sconstructionhave grown louder.Not only has thepresident of Israel,Moshe Katzav,expressed his support,but evenBinyamin Netanyahu, Sharon's rival inthe Likud Party, has demanded that all available resources be divertedtobuilding the barrier.Mitzna and the Labor Party even made itoneof theirmajor issues in the run-up to the general elections on January 28.Accusing Sharon of dragging his feet,Mitzna admitted thatcompletion of the first stage of the fence-now scheduled for laterthis year-would probably not solve all of Israel's security problems.For one thing, the fence will be short: only loo miles, a third of thetotal length of the Israeli-Palestinian border. Determined suicidebombers may still be able to get across.Even before the first segmentis completed, therefore, theremay be a decision to extend it.Yet thefence around theGaza Strip,which has existed for severalyears, hasalready proven valuable. No suicide bomber has come from Gazasince its completion, and inNovember 2002, Gazan suicide bombersheaded for Israelwere forced to try to get there by sea,where theywere intercepted and sunk by the Israeli navy.The completion of the first segment of the entireWest Bank fence,which will run from Beit She'an toArad, should not only providegreater security but also have other, equally important positive effects.It should convince both sides that a two-state solution has becomethe only viable option, and that they should stop their often violent

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IsraelBanks ona Fenceefforts to sabotage such a resolution. Complete separationwill reduceIsrael's dependence on Palestinian workers and Palestinian dependence on employment in Israel.Of course, thismay hurt the twostates in the short term, since both sides have become dependent oneach other despite the violence. The Palestinians may be the biggerlosers, but some economists believe that in the long run, even theywill profit from separation by becoming more self-sufficient.Psychologically,eparation ill provideboth sideswith breathingspace for severalyears duringwhich, free from the pressureof ongoingviolence, fundamental problems such as the equitable division ofland andwater and the nature of futureeconomicand socialrelationsanbe dealtwith. Separation will provideIssues that until recently seemed the mainstickingpoints, such asborders, erusalem,breathing space to bothandtheright f return or heArabrefugeesf sides -which should1948,may prove easier to resolveonce agree- make former stickingment is reachedonmore fundamental topics.Israelis ho remain pposedto thefence points easier to resolve.can be divided into two groups: thosewhodo not believe in a two-state solution andwould like to "uproot"Palestinian terror through military action, and those who would like tosee a separation from the Palestinians but believe that the Israelisettlements are an irreversiblefactor thatwill make a fence impractical.This lattercampwould like to see anegotiated settlement leading to an"equitable solution" to the settlement question: namely, an evacuationof the outlying settlements in return for the extension of the Israeliborder to include settlements in theAriel area and inGush Etzion.Supporters of the fence,meanwhile, also fall into two groups. Thefirstbelieves that an internal Israeli clash over the future of the settlements is coming andwill occurwhen the fence iscompleted. Thisgroup, moreover, is convinced the fencewill not be able to keep outsuicidebombers f largenumbers fJewish settlers ontinue tocrossit every day on theirway towork inside Israel.Thus the retiredgeneralDan Rothschild, who formany years was the coordinator of Israel'sactivities in theWest Bank, now leads thegrowing pro-fencemovementbut believes that if Israeli guards are forced to screen 30,000 Israelivehicles a day (the current level of Jewish traffic in and out of the

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YuvalElizurterritories),heywill have littlechanceof keepingout terrorists.ostof the settlements,he argues,will therefore ave to be disbanded.

Another groupof Israelis, omewhatmore optimistically, elievesthatseparation ay induce argenumbers f settlers, specially hosein isolatedsettlements, o give up theirhomes voluntarily. surveycompleted nOctober 2002 revealed hat in thepreceding ear,morethan 20,000 settlers had returned to Israel as a result of economic andsecurityconsiderations. upportersof voluntaryseparationbelievethatgenerouscompensation, ossiblysupported y outside sources,could speed up this departure of the settlers. Such a process will bedifficult and inmany cases heartbreaking, yet it remains imperativefor the future ofJews andArabs inPalestine.

Because unilateral separation will, one hopes, be temporary,the borders set by the fence can be adjusted when a final agreementbetween Israel and Palestine is reached. This will be especially nec

essarywhere the fence splits villages in twoNo one expects the and if it is agreed that certainIsraelisettlements that now fall east of the demarcationdaily influx of tens of line shouldbe included ithin Israel.thousands of Palestinians Not all aspectsof separation houldbe

to be renewed. temporary, however. No one expects that theto be renewed . daily influx f tensof thousandsf Palestinianworkers into Israelwill be renewed, andmuchof the economic separationwill remain.Many Israelis have alreadystarted to argue asmuch, noting thepositive experiences of Israelpriorto 1967.The Palestinian market does not consume many of themostly

sophisticated products Israeli industrynow produces, and, like somanydeveloped countries trying to limit the entry of foreign labor, Israelwould be better offwithout dependence on Palestinian workers.For itspart, thePalestinian economy, already in ruinsaftermore thantwoyearsof adevastatingwarwith Israel,canbe expected to suffermore.Despite its reservoirof semi-skilled workers, the Palestinian economyneeds Israel-its ports, infrastructure,and technical assistance-as abridge tomarkets in theWest. Arab markets, including those of the oilrichPersianGulf states,offer litdepromise to theeconomy orworkers ofPalestine. And hopes thatPalestine would become the "Singaporeof theMiddle East" now seem likepipe dreams amid thegrim realityof 2003.

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IsraelBanks on a FenceSome Israelieconomists,however,such as Zvi Sussman,former

deputy governor of the Bank of Israel, are more optimistic. Theybelieve separation will be a blessing in disguise for the Palestinianeconomy. Sussman says that thePalestinians "need a period inwhichtheir economy will learn to fend for itself,with international help, ofcourse."To this end, he has even urged thePalestinians to strive for theirown independent urrency.

Even the Israeli economy will need time to adjust to separationand to being deprived of cheap labor. Israelwill have to learn to importrather hanproduce abor-intensiverops uchas tomatoes,ucumbers,andmelons. Still, Israelientrepreneurshope to establishworkshops andfactories inPalestine, similar to those they have already established inJordanandEgypt, where Israelismostly handle thedesign, engineering,and marketing, and localworkers supply the labor. It can thereforebeexpected hatsome interrelationshipill developbetweenthe IsraeliandPalestinianconomies. opeftdly,hese inks ili develop raduallyas the idea of two states for two peoples takes hold and clears thewayfor a real peace.

In sum, then, even as de facto or unilateral separation achievesconcrete gains, itwill also help both sides rid themselves of the ghostsof the past. In 1999, the Palestinians turned down the peace planproposed by President Bill Clinton because it did not address theissue of Palestinian refugees of the 1948war. Of course, the idea ofallowing any number of them to return to Israelproper is a nonstarterfor Israelis,whether on the right or on the left,who fear that theirstatewould be flooded byArabs. In future peace negotiations, afterseparation has become a fact,Palestinians maybe prepared to addressthis subject inmore realistic terms.

Apart from relatively small groups of Palestinians who believe in"total victory" and Israeliswho claim that Palestinian terror can be"uprooted," Israelis,Arabs, and theworld at largehave already cometo accept that there can be no military solution to the bloodshed inPalestine. That recognition alone, however, has not been sufficient toachieve real peace. The experience of the bitter conflict shows thatpeace can be achieved only in two stages-the first of which shouldbe separation between the two sides, unilateral if necessary.0

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