C H A P T E R 1

INTRODUCING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor

The words ‘global’ and ‘civil society’ have becomecommonplace during the last decade. Yet whatthey mean and how they come together are

subject to widely differing interpretations. For some,global civil society refers to the protestors in Seattleand Prague or Greenpeace’s actions against trans-national corporations: in other words, a counter-weight to global capitalism. For others, the wordshave something to do with the infrastructure that isneeded for the spread of democracy and develop-ment: the growth of professional associations,consumer organisations, and interests groups thatspan many countries. Yet others identify thephenomenon with the efforts of groups like Savethe Children or Médécins sans Frontières to providehumanitarian assistance: global solidarity with thepoor or oppressed. Or perhaps the term just refers tothe growing connectedness of citizens: Internetchatrooms, networks of peace, environmental orhuman rights activists, student exchanges, or globalmedia.

It is no wonder that, apart from a few politicalactivists and policy experts, most people, includingmany social scientists, have little understanding ofwhat global civil society means and implies. It has notyet become what sociologist Zerubavel (1991) calls an‘island of meaning’ in the conceptual landscape ofmodern social science and policy-making. The‘market’, the ‘state’, and, in recent years, even ‘civilsociety’ have to varying degrees become such‘conceptual islands’ that we use in everyday languageas well as for policy purposes and in social scienceanalysis. While we associate certain distinct qualitiesand characteristics with terms like the ‘market’ andthe ‘state’, and have at least some notion of thequantitative dimensions involved, no such con-ventional understanding exists for ‘global civil society’.

While the ‘unfamiliar words’, as John Keane putsit in Chapter 2, may have little intuitive meaning, theysuggest at the same time, something unconventional,even dramatic. The term takes the perhaps mostimportant social science (re)discovery of the 1990s —civil society —and places it in a framework that

ultimately transcends conventional social sciencecategories. The concept posits the existence of asocial sphere, a global civil society, above and beyondnational, regional, or local societies.

Our aim in producing a Yearbook was to try toestablish an ‘island of meaning’. We set out to analyseand describe, to map both conceptually and empiric-ally, what we mean when we talk about ‘global civilsociety’. We hoped to be able to draw conclusions thatwould be relevant and useful to the various actorswho participate in global civil society. But inproducing the first edition of the Yearbook what wethink we have learned is where to begin ourinvestigation. Whether we are talking about thedebates about the meaning of the concept or theproblems of data collection, our end-point turns outto be our starting point. We have learned, at least tosome extent, where we need to look to find out moreabout global civil society and with whom we need toengage to develop the conceptual underpinning ofthe project. So we are not informing our readers aswe imagined, although we hope there is a lot to begleaned from this first Yearbook; rather we are, ineffect, asking our readers to participate in a journeyof discovery. As we see it, the Yearbook is itself apart of global civil society: a terrain for developingideas, investigating issues, and gathering informationthat does not readily fit existing categories andcannot be found in conventional sources. We inviteyour reactions, comments, and feedback.

In introducing the Yearbook, we focus on fourthemes that emerge out of our first efforts. First, weset out three propositions about global civil societythat are both initial conclusions and hypotheses forfuture research. Second, we provide a thumbnailsketch of the evolution of the concept and thecompeting definitions. Third, we discuss the problemof data collection and the challenge of ‘methodo-logical nationalism’ (Beck 2000; Shaw 2000; Scholte1999). In the last section, we summarise the keyconclusions for both activists and policy-makers thatcan be drawn from the studies undertaken for theindividual chapters.

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Three Propositions about GlobalCivil SocietyProposition 1: Global civil society as a reality

The first proposition is that the spread of the term‘global civil society’ reflects an underlying socialreality. What we can observe in the 1990s is the

emergence of a supranational sphere of social andpolitical participation in which citizens groups, socialmovements, and individuals engage in dialogue,debate, confrontation, and negotiation with eachother and with various governmental actors—inter-national, national, and local—as well as the businessworld. Of course, there have historically existedelements of a supranational non-governmental sphere.The Catholic Church or Islam have long had ‘global’aspirations and maintained far-reaching operationsfor centuries; colonial empires have come and gone;political entities like the Commonwealth, the UN, andthe European Union emerged; international non-governmental organisations like the Red Cross andRed Crescent Societies have operated above thenational level for many years, as have politicalorganisations like the Socialist International and thepeace and environmental movements. What seemsnew, however, is the sheer scale and scope thatinternational and supranational institutions andorganisations of many kinds have achieved in recentyears. The number of organisations and individualsthat are part of global civil society has probably neverbeen bigger, and the range and type of fields in whichthey operate never been wider: from UN conferencesabout social welfare or the environment to conflictsituations in Kosovo, from globalised resistance to theMutual Agreement on Investments to local humanrights activism in Mexico, Burma, or Timor, and frommedia corporations spanning the globe to indigenouspeoples’ campaigns over the Internet.

This conclusion is supported by four types ofinformation that have been used in producing theYearbook: data on international non-governmentalorganisations (INGOs) (see Tables 1.1–1.3 and PartIV of this Yearbook) and on parallel summits (seeChapter 7), our chronology, and the qualitativeinformation contained in the issue chapters.

INGOs are autonomous organisations that arenon-governmental, that is, they are not instrument-alities of government; and non-profit, that is notdistributing revenue as income to owners; and formal,legal entities (see Salamon and Anheier 1997). Many

INGOs employ staff and are professional organisa-tions. They can include campaigning groups likeAmnesty International or Greenpeace, the famous‘brand names’ of global civil society; professionalsocieties like international employers federations ortrades unions; charities like Christian Aid or CARE;think tanks and international commissions.

INGOs are not new. They date back to the nine-teenth century, but the term itself is of more recentorigins, coined during the League of Nations period.The earliest INGO is generally said to be the anti-slavery society, formed as the British and ForeignAnti-Slavery Society in 1839, although there was atransnational social movement against slavery muchearlier. The International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC) was founded by Henri Dunant in 1864 after hisexperiences in the Battle of Solferino. By 1874, therewere 32 registered INGOs and this number hadincreased to 1,083 by 1914 (Chatfield 1997). INGOsgrew steadily after World War II but our figures showan acceleration in the 1990s. Around one quarter ofthe 13,000 INGOs in existence today were createdafter 1990 (see Table R19 in Part IV). Moreover,membership by individuals or national bodies ofINGOs has increased even faster; well over a third ofthe membership of INGOs joined after 1990. Thesefigures include only NGOs narrowly defined as‘international’; they do not include national NGOswith an international orientation.

What our figures also show is that during the1990s, INGOs became much more interconnectedboth to each other and to international institutionslike the United Nations or the World Bank (see alsoTable R21). Thus, not only has the global range ofINGO presence grown during the last decade, butthe networks linking these organisations arebecoming denser as well. In Held’s terms (Held et al.1999), our data suggest that global civil society isbecoming ‘thicker’.

INGOs are, however, only one component of globalcivil society. Individuals, grass-roots groups, loosecoalitions, and networks all play a part in a globalpublic debate. Moreover, since most INGOs areorganisationally based in the northern hemispherenear international institutions and donors, the dataon INGOs exaggerates the role of northern groups.Another lens through which to view the growth ofglobal civil society is through parallel summits. Theseare gatherings of INGOs, other groups, and individualsthat generally but not always take place in parallelto important inter-governmental meetings.

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Like INGOs, parallel summits have a long history. Atthe Hague Peace Conference in 1899, non-governmental groups organised a parallel salon fordiplomats to meet with concerned citizens, various

petitions with numerous signatures were submittedto the official conference, and an independent activistproduced a daily conference newspaper (Charnovitz1997: 196–7). Likewise, there were internationalcongresses of citizens on issues like peace or laboursolidarity throughout the nineteenth century. Buteven in the 1970s and 1980s these were exceptionalevents. It is only in the 1990s that both internationalgovernmental summits and parallel summits gatheredpace as a normal way of doing politics. Pianta showsin Chapter 7 that parallel summits increased fromaround two a year in the period 1988–91 to over 30a year in the period 2000–1. Participation in theseevents also increased. Around a third involved morethan 10,000 people and several involved tens ofthousands, especially in 2000 and 2001. INGOs playan important role in the coordination of parallelsummits but, as Pianta shows, there are manydifferent types of groups and individuals alsoinvolved.

Our chronology of global civil society events coversthe decade 1990–9 and we have a more detailedchronology for the year 2000 which we will bring upto date every year. Covering the past from the pointof view of global civil society is difficult becauseglobal civil society events are much less well reported

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HighIncome

Middle Income

LowIncome

OceaniaNorthAmerica

WesternEurope

Japan East Asiaand

Pacific

Europeand

CentralAsia

LatinAmerica

andCaribbean

NorthAfricaand

MiddleEast

South Asia

Sub-SaharanAfrica

140,000

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0

1990 2000

Figure 1.1: Membership growth in INGOs,* 1990-2000

Type 1990 2000 %growth

INGOs 8,690 11,693 35

IGOs 1,769 1,732 –2

Total 10,459 13,425 28

INGOs 35,020 69,922 100

IGOs 23,191 36,383 57

Total 58,211 106,305 83

INGOs 4 6 48

IGOs 13 21 60

Total 5.6 7.9 42

Table 1.1: Links between INGOs and IGOs*

Total orgs. citedas having linkswith others**

Total citations

Average citationsper org.

* International governmental organisations

** See Table R21 for further information.

Source: ©Union of International Associations (1990; 2000),presenting data collected in 1989 and 1999 respectively. Datahave been restructured from more comprehensive countryand organisation coverage in the Union of InternationalAssociations’ Yearbook of International Organizations.

*International non-governmental organisations.

Source: ©Union of International Associations (1990; 2000), presenting data collected in 1989 and 1999 respectively. See table R20for fuller information. Data have been restructured from more comprehensive country and organisation coverage in the Unionof International Associations’ Yearbook of International Organizations.

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than global governance or global corporations; wehave relied on individual correspondents but thenetwork of correspondents we are building is stillpatchy. Nevertheless, the chronology shows what thefigures both on INGOs and on parallel summits fail tocover: the range of protests relating to global issues,against the activities of governments or multinationalcorporations on environmental issues, dam- building,social issues, indigenous people’s rights, democracyand human rights, or peace. Moreover, it is evidentthat these take place predominantly outside Europeand North America.

The growth of global civil society has beenfacilitated by the growth of resources available to civilsociety. These resources are of two kinds: technologyand money. Increases in Internet usage and bothmobile phones and land lines has greatly facilitatedthe construction of networks and has allowed greateraccess for groups outside the main centres ofinternational power (Chapter 6). Thus, even taking justmembership of INGOs, we can see in Table 1.2 thatmembership of low- and middle-income regions (70per cent and 98 per cent respectively) has increased

faster than membership in high-income regions(56 per cent). The biggest increases have beenfor eastern Europe and Asia, although this is notreflected in the membership densities because ofrapid population growth. Likewise, there has been abig increase in the economic importance of NGOsduring the last decade. Specifically, governmentsand international institutions have greatly increasedthe amounts of development funds channelledthrough NGOs (OECD 1997). In addition, privategiving has also increased from both foundations andcorporations. In Chapter 8, it is estimated that globalcivil society receives approximately $7 billion indevelopment funds and $2 billion in funds from USfoundations. Figures collected by the Johns HopkinsComparative Nonprofit Sector Project (Salamon et al.1999) show that the number of full-time equivalentemployment in INGOs for France, Germany, Japan, theNetherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom aloneamounts to over 100,000 and that volunteers inINGOs represent an additional 1.2 million full-timejobs in these countries (Table R24). Even withoutprecise and comprehensive figures, available data

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Table 1.2: Membership of INGOs, 1990-2000

Member Member Share of Member Member Share of Member Member-ship of -ship total % -ship of -ship total % -ship % -ship

INGOs density* INGOs density* of INGOs density*

High Income 75,016 93 117,377 135 56 46Middle Income 47,547 45 94,089 62 98 40Low Income 25,938 8 43,967 12 70 41Western Europe 6,547 150 38 85,518 221 33 52 47North America 6,533 24 4 10,257 33 4 57 41Oceania 4,042 197 3 6,382 280 2 58 42Japan 2,347 19 2 3,569 28 1 52 48East Asia and Pacific 9,255 6 6 16,393 9 6 77 55Europe and Central Asia 8,940 46 5 35,235 74 14 335 62Latin America & Caribbean 22,697 52 15 33,565 65 13 48 25North Africa & Middle East 8,242 35 6 11,964 39 5 45 13South Asia 5,121 5 3 8,136 6 3 59 30Sub-Saharan Africa 20,076 39 14 32,763 51 13 63 30World 148,501 30 100 255,432 43 100 72 42

* Per million of population

Source: ©Union of International Associations (1990; 2000), presenting data collected in 1989 and 1999 respectively.Data have been restructured from more comprehensive country and organisation coverage in the Union of InternationalAssociations’ Yearbook of International Organizations. See table R20 for fuller information.

Growth 1990–200020001990

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suggest the significant economic scale of INGOactivities.

Finally, the three chapters that deal with globalissues on bio-technology, global finance, andhumanitarian intervention all show in dramatic wayshow citizens’ groups of various types and persuasionhave come to play a crucial role during the lastdecade in raising public consciousness, taking action,and even influencing public policy.

Proposition 2: Global civil society andglobalisation

The second proposition is that global civil societyboth feeds on and reacts to globalisation. Like globalcivil society, ‘globalisation’ is also a new concept withdifferent meanings. In every day usage it tends torefer to the spread of global capitalism. In the socialscience literature it is usually defined as growinginterconnectedness in political, social, and culturalspheres as well as the economy, something whichhas been greatly facilitated by travel and communi-cation (see Held et al. 1999). It is also sometimesused to refer to growing global consciousness, thesense of a common community of mankind (Shaw2000; Robertson 1990).

The above proposition applies to all three senses.On the one hand, globalisation provides the bedrockfor global civil society, the supply side of thephenomenon that pushes it on. There does seem tobe a strong and positive correlation between whatone might describe as ‘clusters of globalisation’ orareas of what Held et al. (1999: 21–5) call ‘thickglobalisation’ and clusters of global civil society. Inparticular, one of the most striking findings of theYearbook is that global civil society is heavilyconcentrated in north-western Europe, especially inScandinavia, the Benelux countries, Austria,Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Thus, forexample, 60 per cent of the secretariats of INGOsare based in the European Union (Table R19 in PartIV) and one third of their membership is in westernEurope (Table 1.2). In addition, over half of all parallelsummits have also been organised in Europe. Thisarea is also the most densely globalised, whether wemean the concentration of global capitalism asmeasured by the presence of transnational corpor-ations and the importance of trade and foreigninvestment; or growing interconnectedness asmeasured in terms of Internet usage or outwardtourism; or the growth of global consciousness as

evidenced by the absence of human rights violations,the values of tolerance and solidarity, or—moreconcretely—the ratification of treaties.

On the other hand global civil society is also areaction to globalisation, particularly to the con-sequences of the spread of global capitalism andinterconnectedness. Globalisation is an unevenprocess which has brought benefits to many butwhich has also excluded many. It is those who aredenied access to the benefits of global capitalismand who remain outside the charmed circle ofinformation and communication technology who arethe victims of the process and who organise inreaction: the demand pull of global civil society. Theyare now also linking up with those in the North whoform a new kind of solidarity movement. The oldsolidarity movement supported Southern aspirationsfor national liberation; members of this newmovement seek to revitalise Southern and Northernself-determination by joining the struggle againstthe disempowerment and social injustice broughtabout by unbridled global capitalism.

This new form of activism takes place against thebackground of the ‘development industry’ and thespread of INGOs in the South for service delivery anddevelopment assistance. Together, activism anddevelopmentalism may explain why, after Europe,the figures on INGOs show the greatest membershipdensities not for other advanced industrial countriesbut for countries in Latin America and sub-SaharanAfrica (see Table 1.2). The relatively low membershipdensities in East Asia, South Asia, and North Americaare to be explained, in the case of East Asia, by therelatively low degree of INGO organisation in generaland, in the case of South Asia (particularly India)and the United States, by the relative lack of interestof local NGOs in global issues.

But is not only the range and density of INGOnetworks that matter in relationship to globalisation.Our studies of specific global issues show that globalcivil society is best categorised not in terms of typesof actors but in terms of positions in relation toglobalisation. All three of the issue chapters in theYearbook adopt a similar categorisation of globalcivil society actors, as shown in the Table 1.4.

The first position is that of the supporters: thosegroups and individuals who are enthusiastic aboutglobalisation, whether we are talking about thespread of global capitalism and interconnectednessor the spread of a global rule of law as well as globalconsciousness. They include the allies of transnational

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Table 1.3: Focal points of globalisation, rule of law, and global civil society

Sweden 0.45Netherlands 0.32France 0.22Finland 0.19United Kingdom 0.19Australia 0.16Germany 0.15Japan 0.13Canada 0.10United States 0.10Italy 0.07Venezuela 0.04Spain 0.03

Sweden 56.4United States 55.8Norway 52.6Iceland 52.1Denmark 48.4Netherlands 45.8Singapore 44.6Australia 43.9Finland 43.9Canada 42.8New Zealand 39.0Austria 36.9Belgium 36.3Korea, Rep. 34.6United Kingdom 33.6Switzerland 33.1Japan 30.5Ireland 27.5Germany 24.3Italy 23.3

Switzerland 1.72Austria 1.64Sweden 1.29Poland 1.28Hungary 1.22Singapore 1.18Malaysia 1.16Estonia 1.14Germany 1.01Denmark 0.94Finland 0.92Lithuania 0.88United Kingdom 0.86Ireland 0.82Netherlands 0.82Latvia 0.80Belgium 0.76Norway 0.70Canada 0.58Lebanon 0.39

Top TNC host countries

Country Top TNC HQsper millionpopulation

Top Internet using countries

Country Internet useas % of

population

Top outbound tourism countries

Country Outboundtourism

per capita

G L O B A L I S AT I O N

Australia 22Austria 22Belgium 22Bulgaria 22Costa Rica 22Croatia 22Cyprus 22Ecuador 22Germany 22Greece 22Italy 22Luxembourg 22Netherlands 22Norway 22Panama 22Portugal 22Romania 22Slovak Republic 22Slovenia 22Spain 22Sweden 22

Canada 0Costa Rica 0Denmark 0Iceland 0Luxembourg 0Mali 0Malta 0Netherlands 0Samoa 0São Tome & Principle 0Slovenia 0Sweden 0

Finland 10.0Denmark 9.8New Zealand 9.4Sweden 9.4Canada 9.2Iceland 9.1Norway 9.1Singapore 9.1Netherlands 8.9United Kingdom 8.7Luxembourg 8.6Switzerland 8.6Australia 8.3United States 7.8Austria 7.7Hong Kong 7.7Germany 7.6Chile 7.4Ireland 7.2Spain 7.0

Top treaty ratifying countries

Country Ratifications22 major

treaties

Top human rights respecting countries

Country Mention in3 major

HR reports

Top transparent (non-corrupt) countries

Country CorruptionPerception

Index 2000

I N T E R N AT I O N A L R U L E O F L AW

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Belgium 163.3Luxembourg 141.5Barbados 100.0Switzerland 85.1Iceland 49.8Denmark 46.6St. Lucia 44.9Fiji 41.6Netherlands 38.5Trinidad and Tobago 35.4Malta 33.4Norway 30.0Sweden 28.7Samoa 27.8Austria 24.6Finland 24.6United Kingdom 23.1Bahrain 22.7Cyprus 20.4France 20.1

Barbados 29.6Belgium 18.6Luxembourg 18.6Iceland 14.2Malta 10.3Belize 10.0Switzerland 9.2Denmark 8.5Netherlands 7.0Finland 5.6Norway 5.1Sweden 5.1United Kingdom 4.6Fiji 3.7New Zealand 3.6Austria 3.5France 3.5Guyana 3.5Ireland 3.5Singapore 3.3

Sweden 2.8Iceland 3.0Brazil 3.5Australia 4.6Netherlands 5.3Argentina 5.7Colombia 6.9Uruguay 7.1Luxembourg 8.4Germany 8.6Spain 9.3Latvia 9.8Switzerland 10.0United States 10.1Peru 10.3Albania 10.6Denmark 10.6Georgia 10.8Russian Federation 11.0Norway 11.2

Top INGO host countries

Country INGO densityper million of

population

Top INGO & IGO leaders suppliers

Country of Leaders pernationality of million ofleaders population

Top tolerant countries

Country % citizensobject to

immigrant neighbours

G L O B A L C I V I L S O C I E T Y

Countries occurring in six or more of the categories are shown in bold.

For more detailed information and sources, see Tables R3, R6, R10, R11, R12, R13, R19, R22 and R26 in Part IV of this Yearbook.

business, the proponents of ‘just wars for humanrights’, and the enthusiasts for all new technologicaldevelopments. These are members of civil society,often, but not necessarily, close to governments andbusiness, who think that globalisation in its presentform is ‘a jolly good thing’ and that those who objectjust fail to understand the benefits.

The second position is that of the rejectionists:those who want to reverse globalisation and returnto a world of nation-states. They include proponentsof the new right, who may favour global capitalismbut oppose open borders and the spread of a globalrule of law. They also include leftists who opposeglobal capitalism but do not object to the spread ofa global rule of law. Nationalists and religiousfundamentalists as well as traditional leftist anti-colonial movements or communists who opposeinterference in sovereignty are also included in thisgroup. They think all or most manifestations ofglobalisation are harmful, and they oppose it with alltheir might. One might also think of this group asfundamentalists, but we rejected this term as being

judgemental. Cohen and Rai’s (2000: 2) term‘transformative’ was also rejected because whatdistinguishes these groups is that they tend to wantto go backwards to an idealised version of the pastrather than transform into something new.

The third position is that of the reformists, inwhich a large part of global civil society resides. Theseare people who accept the spread of global capitalismand global interconnectedness as potentiallybeneficial to mankind but see the need to ‘civilise’ theprocess. These are the people who favour reform ofinternational economic institutions and want greatersocial justice and rigorous, fair, and participatoryprocedures for determining the direction of newtechnologies, and who strongly favour a global ruleof law and press for enforcement. Reformists are alarge category, which includes those who want tomake specific and incremental change as well asradicals who aim at bigger and more transformativechange. (Pianta believes a further distinction shouldbe made between reformists and radicals; seeChapter 7.)

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The final group we have called the alternatives: theseare people and groups who neither necessarily opposenor support the process of globalisation but whowish to opt out, to take their own course of actionindependently of government, international institu-tions, and transnational corporations. Their primaryconcern is to develop their own way of life, createtheir own space, without interference. This manifestsitself in the case of biotechnology in growing and

eating organic food, with global capitalism in localmoney schemes, opposition to brand names, andattempts to reclaim public space, and in the case ofhumanitarian intervention in making non-military‘civil society interventions’ in conflicts.

In other words, one way of defining or under-standing global civil society is as a debate about thefuture direction of globalisation and perhapshumankind itself.

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Table 1.4: Global civil society positions on globalisation

Types of actors Position on Position on Position on Position onglobalisation plant global finance humanitarian

biotechnology intervention

Supporters Transnational Favour global Favour plant Favour Favour ’justbusiness and capitalism and biotechnology de-regulation, wars’ for humantheir allies the spread of a developed by free trade rights

global rule of corporations, no and freelaw restrictions capital

necessary flows

Rejectionists Anti-capitalist Left oppose Believe plant Favour national Oppose allsocial global biotechnology protection of forms of armed movements; capitalism; right is 'wrong' and markets and intervention in authoritarian and left want to 'dangerous' and control of other statesstates; preserve should be capital flows. Intervention isnationalist and national abolished Radical imperialism or fundamentalist sovereignty rejectionists ‘not ourmovements want overthrow business’

of capitalism

Reformists Most INGOs; Aim to ‘civilise’ Do not oppose Want more Favour civilmany in globalisation technology as social justice societyinternational such, but call and stability intervention institutions; for labelling Favour reform andmany social information and of international internationalmovements and public economic policing tonetworks participation in institutions as enforce

risk assessment; well as specific human rightssharing of proposals likebenefits debt relief or

Tobin tax

Alternatives Grass roots Want to opt out Want to live Pursue an anti- Favour civilgroups, social of globalisation own lifestyle corporate life- societymovements and rejecting style, facilitate intervention in submerged conventional colourful protest, conflicts butnetworks agriculture and try to establish oppose use of

seeking local alternative military forceisolation from economiesGM food crops

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Proposition 3: Global civil society as a fuzzy andcontested concept

Thus, we can conclude that something new andimportant is happening and that it has a close andmultifaceted relation with globalisation, but we arestill not able to map its contours satisfactorily and,even more importantly, we are still not able to findan agreed meaning for what it is that is happening.Our third proposition is that global civil society is afuzzy and a contested concept.

Both the fuzziness and the contested character ofthe concept can be attributed to its newness. It isfuzzy because the boundaries of the concept are notclearly defined. Even where there is an agreed coreof meaning, it is not always clear what is to beincluded and what is to be excluded. In part, theproblem arises because the term has both normativeand descriptive content and it is not always possibleto find an exact correspondence between the two.But the fuzziness also arises because the conceptsteps over or outside many familiar social sciencecategories that are frequently caught up withnineteenth-century notions of the nation state thathave entered into common parlance. ‘Social partici-pation’ is taken to mean participation in the contextof a national or local society, as are political actionand engagement in most social movements. Bycontrast, we find it difficult to think of socialparticipation in global networks, political action inrelation to global events, and movements that takeon global rather than national issues. The inter-national relations literature speaks of transnationalcivil society, yet at the same time there is doubtabout the very existence of such a society without thepresence of an effective state (Brown 2000).Sociologists identify the emergence of a world society,but many see it as little more than a thinly disguisedform of US cultural dominance (Meyer, Boli, andRamirez 1997). Economists point to the emergence ofglobal markets and institutions for labour, finance,production, information, or e-commerce, yet criticsare eager to emphasise the predominance of largecorporations and the concentration of decision-making power in a handful of metropolitan areassuch as New York, London, Frankfurt, and Tokyo (Hirstand Thompson 1999). Political scientists analysingthe spread of democracy around the world proudlyanticipate the age of global democracy, only to findthat democratic participation is eroding in manycountries of the West and that democracy is

frequently made subject to national interests indealings with countries like China, Indonesia, or Russia(Forsythe 2000).

Global civil society is also a contested conceptbecause it is new and therefore can be interpreted byboth practitioners and social scientists as they choose.Or, to put it another way, the term is used differentlyaccording to political predilections and inheritedunderstandings. Among policy-makers, especially inthe West, there is a tendency to conceive of globalcivil society as the spread of what already exists in theWest, especially in the United States, as a ‘metaphorfor Western liberalism’ (Seckinelgin 2001). Themovements that demanded civil society in LatinAmerica and eastern Europe in the 1980s areunderstood as having wanted to build democracy ona western model. Support for civil society is seen asa kind of political laissez-faire, the political equiva-lent of neo-liberalism. Civil society is seen as a wayof minimising the role of the state in society, both amechanism for restraining state power and as asubstitute for many of the functions of the state.Transposed to the global arena, it is viewed as thepolitical or social counterpart of the process ofeconomic globalisation, that is to say, liberalisation,privatisation, deregulation, and the growing mobilityof capital and goods. In the absence of a global state,an army of NGOs performs the functions necessaryto smooth the path of economic globalisation.Humanitarian NGOs provide the safety net to dealwith the casualties of liberalisation and privatisationstrategies in the economic field. Funding fordemocracy-building and human rights NGOs issupposed to help establish a rule of law and respectfor human rights without taking account of theprimary responsibility of the state in these areas.

Among activists, however, civil society has adifferent meaning. It is not about minimising thestate but about increasing the responsiveness ofpolitical institutions. It is about the radicalisation ofdemocracy and the redistribution of political power.For activists in eastern Europe or Latin America, civilsociety refers to active citizenship, to growing self-organisation outside formal political circles, andexpanded space in which individual citizens caninfluence the conditions in which they live bothdirectly through self-organisation and throughpressure on the state. Transposed to a global level, thisdefinition encompasses the need to influence andput pressure on global institutions in order to reclaimcontrol over local political space.

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The fact that these same words are understood in verydifferent ways paradoxically creates a shared terrainon which individuals and representatives of organ-isations, institutions, and companies can com-municate with each other, can engage in a commondialogue. Precisely because of these different under-standings, the proponents and opponents of globalcapitalism can come together within what appears tobe a shared discursive framework. The Yearbook is oneexpression of this shared terrain.

Evolution of the Concept ofGlobal Civil Society

Both the term ‘civil society’ and the term ‘global’have a long history stretching back to antiquity.One of the reasons it is so easy to contest

contemporary meanings is that it is possible to selectdifferent classic understandings of a concept to suitcurrent political and theoretical presuppositions. Thisis why it is useful to know a little more about thehistory of the concept, even though our version ofhistory is selective as well.

From Greece to Scotland: civil society vsbarbarians

The term ‘civil society’ has a direct equivalent in Latin(societas civilis), and a close equivalent in ancientGreek (politike koinona). What the Romans andGreeks meant by it was something like a ‘politicalsociety’, with active citizens shaping its institutionsand policies. It was a law-governed society in whichthe law was seen as the expression of public virtue,the Aristotelian ‘good life’. Civilisation was thus linkedto a particular form of political power in which rulersput the public good before private interest. This alsovery clearly implied that, both in time and in place,there were people excluded, non-citizens, barbarians,who did not have a civil society.

The term is used throughout European history,but it gained more prominence when philosophersbegan to contemplate the foundations of theemerging nation state in the seventeenth andeighteenth centuries. A key assumption for theconcept of civil society was the Christian notion ofhuman equality. At that time, it was linked to the ideaof a rights-based society in which rulers and theruled are subject to the law, based on a socialcontract. Thus, civil society was contrasted with thestate of nature, although conceptions of the state of

nature varied. For Thomas Hobbes, one of the earliestwriters on civil society, the state of nature was a‘warre . . . of every man against every man’ (1990: 88)and the main benefit of living in a civil society wasphysical security. For Locke, on the other hand, thestate of nature was more prone to war than was civilsociety but its main characteristic was the absence ofa rule of law. Locke was concerned about restraintson arbitrary power; thus the rights enjoyed in civilsociety also included the right to liberty and toprivate property.

The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers of theeighteenth century were the first to emphasise theimportance of capitalism as a basis for the newindividualism and a rights-based society. One of themost extensive treatments of civil society is by AdamFerguson, in An Essay on the History of Civil Society(Ferguson 1995), first published in 1767. In this book,he tried to resurrect the Roman ideal of civic virtuein a society where capitalism was taking the place offeudalism. In order to have a civil society, men — notwomen, of course, in that age — need to take anactive interest in the government of their polityinstead of just getting rich and diverting themselves.That still has some resonance in the present use of theterm. But, as for the seventeenth century writers,the dividing line for Ferguson and his contemporarieswas still between civil society on the one hand anddespotism or ‘savage’ living on the other. A problemwith the modern use of ‘civil society’ is that we mightwant to preserve the connotation of non-violentinteraction based on equal rights while we disavowthe Euro-centric assumption of savages vs civilisedpeople, but the two are historically connected (see forinstance Comaroff and Comaroff 1999 on this line ofcriticism).

Hegel and de Tocqueville: civil society vs the state

Ferguson was widely translated, and made more of animpression in Germany than in Britain (Oz-Salzberger1995: xxv). Kant and Hegel were among the readers(see Keane in Chapter 2 for a brief description ofKant’s thinking on civil society). Hegel had a greatdeal to say about civil society, not all of which iseasily understandable, but one of the most importantpoints for the further development of the concept isthat he saw civil society as something separate from,although symbiotic with, the state (Hegel 1991). Civilsociety for him consisted of men trading and

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interacting socially, but it was separate fromgovernment and purely public activity. This alsoexplains why Karl Marx, strongly influenced by Hegel,had an extremely negative view of civil society (Marx1975). Hegel thought the pursuit of self-interest byindividuals in civil society was balanced by aconsciousness of interdependence and also by therole of the state as mediator. But Marx equated civilsociety, in its German translation ‘BürgerlicheGesellschaft’, with bourgeois society, and narrowedit to only economic life in which everyone pursuedhis own selfish interests and became alienated fromhis own human potential and his fellow people. If thathad remained the prevailing idea about what civilsociety is, we would probably not be taking such aninterest in the concept today.

The other important nineteenth century thinkerwas Alexis de Tocqueville. In his study of democracyas practised in America, de Tocqueville argued thatthe guarantee of individual liberties was to be foundin what he called ‘democratic expedients’; theseincluded local self-government, the separation ofchurch and state, a free press, indirect elections, anindependent judiciary, and, above all ‘associationallife’. In America, he was greatly impressed by theextent of associations in civil life and put forward theargument that active associations were a conditionfor freedom and equality. As the state took over moreand more functions of daily life, as the division oflabour became more complex and as demands for theredistribution of wealth increased, an active voluntarysector was necessary to provide a check on statepower.

As soon as several inhabitants of the UnitedStates have taken up an opinion or a feelingthey wish to promote in the world, they lookfor mutual assistance; and as soon as theyhave found one another out, they combine.From that moment they are no longer isolatedmen, but a power seen from afar, whoseactions serve for example and whose languageis listened to . . . Among the laws that rulehuman societies, there is one which seems tobe more precise and clear than all the others. Ifmen are to remain civilised or to become so,the art of associating together must grow andimprove in the same ratio as the equality ofconditions is increased. (de Tocqueville1945:117–18)

While de Tocqueville did not use the term ‘civilsociety’, his argument about the virtues of associ-ational life continues to inform modern-day thinkingabout it, particularly in the United States (Putnam2000).

From Gramsci onwards: civil society between thestate and the market

The concept of civil society was rescued for modernuse by Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci was a member ofthe Italian parliament and general secretary of theunderground Italian Communist Party when he wasarrested by Mussolini in 1926 at the age of 35. Hespent the next ten years in prison, writing. In hisPrison Notebooks, he also discusses civil society(Gramsci 1971). In his interpretation, he goes backfrom Marx to Hegel, who saw civil society as all kindsof social interaction, not just economic ones. Gramscithen goes a step further, and divorces the notion ofcivil society from economic interactions. He viewscivil society as consisting of cultural institutions,notably the church (in Italy the omnipresent churchrather obviously got in the way of a purely economic,Marxist view of society), but also schools, associations,trade unions, and other cultural institutions. Gramsciis ambiguous about this civil society of his. On the onehand, it is through this cultural ‘superstructure’ thatthe bourgeois class imposes its hegemony, using it tokeep the working class in its place. On the otherhand, it is a kind of wedge between the state and theclass-structured economy, which has the revol-utionary potential of dislodging the bourgeoisie.Unlike in Russia in 1917, the revolution would notcome suddenly but through a prolonged war ofposition, and civil society represented the trenches inwhich and over which this war was fought. So hereone has the first germs of the idea that most peoplenow have of civil society as ‘between the state andthe market’. It is important to keep in mind, however,that Gramsci intended this idea of civil society, as thenon-state and non-economic area of socialinteraction, to be only temporary and strategic, atool in the revolutionary struggle.

The rediscovery of civil society

None of this is stated very clearly in Gramsci. It isstated confusingly, self-contradictorily, and certainlynot as one of his central theses. Nevertheless, Gramsci’sidea of civil society as the non-state and non-

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economic area of social interaction, which he himselfseems to contradict a few pages later in the PrisonNotebooks (see for instance Gramsci 1971: 263), hasbecome the dominant one, perhaps also because of thegrowing importance attached by sociologists andpolitical thinkers to intermediate associations(Durkheim 1984). There are a few related explanationsfor the dominance of the Gramscian meaning. Theterm ‘civil society’ very nearly died out in westEuropean and American political thought (see Cohenand Arato 1992: 159–74). There were some followersof Gramsci especially in the Italian and SpanishCommunist parties but there was little debate orinterest. When the term really resurfaces, it is withdissidents against the authoritarian state both in LatinAmerica and in central Europe for whom the idea ofcivil society as something separate from the state wasstrategically useful (see Cohen and Arato 1992: 29–82).

In Latin America, the situation of left-wingintellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s was very similarto Gramsci’s, fighting fascist dictatorships in whichcapitalists were by and large colluding with the statebut in which, in the words of Fernando Cardoso(1979: 48), ‘authoritarianism is still underdeveloped:it [the state] may kill and torture, but it does notexercise complete control over everyday life’. In suchstates there was some room for civil society and, asAlfred Stepan (1988: 5) put it: ‘”Civil society” becamethe political celebrity of the abertura’, the politicalopening that evolved gradually in Brazil between1974 and 1985. Latin American thinkers, first of allin Brazil, appear to have been attracted to the ideaof civil society because it was a term that could unifyentrepreneurs, church groups, and labour movementsin their opposition to the regime and because as aforce in society it could be distinguished from politicalparties, which many felt had been discredited, aswell as from the kind of mass mobilisation by skilfulpopulists that had been endemic in various LatinAmerican countries (see Stepan 1988: 3–7; O’Donnelland Schmitter 1986: 49–52; Weffort 1989).

With the central Europeans it was somewhatdifferent. Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, Hungary,and Poland, such as Jan Tesar (1981), Vaclav Havel(1985), Gyorgi Konrad (1984) and Adam Michnik(1985) revived the term to mean autonomous spacesindependent of the state; their understanding wascloser to de Tocqueville’s than to Gramsci’s. Theywanted to emphasise self-organisation, individualresponsibility, the power of conscience. Thus, termslike ‘anti-politics’ , ‘parallel polis’, ‘living in truth’, or

the ‘power of the powerless’ were alternativeexpressions of their concept of civil society (see alsoCohen and Arato 1992; Keane 1988; Kaldor 1999 onthe importance of these figures).

Gramsci wrote (1971: 265) that

A totalitarian policy is aimed precisely: 1. at ensuring that the members of a particularparty find in that party all the satisfactionsthat they formerly found in a multiplicity oforganisations, i.e. at breaking all the threadsthat bind these members to extraneous culturalorganisms; 2. at destroying all other organisations or atincorporating them into a system of which theparty is the sole regulator.

For intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain, it wasprecisely the total control over all aspects of every daylife that was the target of their efforts (see Arendt1968; Lefort 1986). While state terrorism was morespectacular in Latin America, with military regimes‘disappearing’ thousands of people in each countryin a matter of months, civil society in the Gramsciansense was snuffed out more successfully by the longerrule and more totalitarian aspirations of communismin eastern Europe and the USSR. In a totalitarianstate, where the distinction between the interests ofthe people and the interests of the state iscategorically denied — hence ‘people’s republics’ —central European dissidents began to believe thatconceiving of ‘civil society’ as association betweenpeople away from the tentacles of the state was theway to begin resisting the state.

The central European and the Latin Americanthinkers had several things in common. The way inwhich they conceived of civil society, it was not justa means to achieve the overthrow of the regime theylived in. They were more interested in ‘reclaiming’space that the authoritarian state had encroachedupon than in taking over the reigns of power (seeespecially Havel 1985; Weffort 1989; ironically, VaclavHavel became President of Czechoslovakia andFrancisco Weffort became Brazil’s Minister of Cultureunder Cardoso’s Presidency). This space had to be keptopen and alive as a necessary complement to a healthydemocracy, an antidote to narrow party politics, anda bulwark against future threats to democracy.

Thinkers and activists from both regions were alsostrongly influenced by the idea of human rights,which had gained international prominence with the

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adoption of US congressional legislation, the signingof the Helsinki Accords, and the entry into force ofthe two main UN human rights conventions, all in themid-1970s. In their thinking, individual human rightsand civil society together were the complements andguarantors for effective democracy.

Finally, while very much focused on curing theirnational societies, opposition figures from bothregions also learned the value of internationalsolidarity. It was strategically necessary for them tolink up with others across borders, with those whocould speak up for them in international forums,who could criticise the policy of their own govern-ments towards these dictatorships, and, last but notleast, who could fund them (see Keck and Sikkink1998: 79–120 for the Latin-American networks, andKaldor 1999 for the European ones).

After Latin America and central Europe, the civilsociety idea has been spreading like wildfire. On theone hand, it has increasingly occupied the emanci-patory space left by the demise of socialism andnational liberation. Particularly in dictatorships orcountries emerging from dictatorship, people haveapparently felt the relevance of the concept: in thePhilippines and South Korea, in South Africa, and inthe Arab world. It has become equally popular,however, in places that have not recently experienceddictatorship, in western Europe and North Americabut also in India, for instance. In western Europe andNorth America this has something to do with concernover the erosion of democracy through the apathyand disillusionment of the electorate. The idea ofcivil society is seen as a way of revitalising democracy.In recent decades, fewer and fewer people have beenjoining political parties, and more have joinedenvironmental, peace, and human rights groups likeGreenpeace and Friends of the Earth, AmnestyInternational, and the anti-nuclear movement. Thename increasingly given to this phenomenon is ‘civilsociety’. Both the leftist great hopes of the all-powerful, all-providing state and the rightist beliefthat leaving everything to the market deliversbenefits to all have lost appeal. While politicianshave invented the ‘Third Way’, many people nowseem to be placing their hopes for society in this‘third force’.

On the other hand, the concept has also beentaken up by Western governments and internationalinstitutions who understand civil society as ‘catchingup’ with the west and who find the concept usefulfor implementing programmes of economic and

political reform. After the end of the cold war,ideological objections to cooperation with citizensgroups dissolved and it became more difficult to allywith authoritarian governments—something whichhad earlier been possible under the cold war umbrella.Cooperation with civil society was seen as way tolegitimise programmes of economic reform and tostabilise market societies. This also provides a rathermore cynical explanation for the spread of ‘civilsociety’ in the developing world: since donors haveadopted the dogma that strengthening civil societyis good for development, using the language of civilsociety is good for funding applications.

Descriptive and normative conceptions

One thing that helps to explain the present universalpopularity of ‘civil society’ is its very fuzziness: it canbe all things to all people. In particular, there is aconflation of an empirical category, which is oftenreferred to as NGOs or the non-profit or voluntarysector, with a political project. In the first meaning,it is simply a label for something that is out there, acategory, that is both non-profit and non-governmental. On the other hand, in the way thecentral Europeans and Latin Americans were using it,it is more a political project, a sphere through whichto resist, pressure, or influence the state andincreasingly also the market. This ideal type can havevarious characteristics, all of which are hotly debated.

First, it is argued that the fact that people aregetting together regularly for a variety of purposes,from playing cards to saving the environment,generates trust between people in a society. This isalso referred to as ‘social capital’ (Putnam, 2000;Fukuyama 1995). More politically minded proponentsusually insist (like Adam Ferguson) that civil societyconsists of active citizens who take an interest inpublic affairs. Also based partly on the classical,eighteenth century notion, civil society can be seenas essentially non-violent and resisting violence, forinstance through Gandhian forms of civildisobedience. Finally—and this is a more moderncomponent of the ideal—being part of civil society issometimes seen as a commitment to common humanvalues that go beyond ethnic, religious, or nationalboundaries.

The problem with a purely normative definition ofcivil society is, however, that defending civil societyas a ‘good thing’ threatens to become tautological:civil society is a good thing because it espouses the

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values we hold. Anyone who fails to hold these valuesis not part of civil society. And whose values arethese? The desirability of absolute non-violence, forinstance, is not something everyone agrees about.And are nationalist and fundamentalist movementspart of civil society? Where and how do we drawboundaries?

Emergence of global civil society

Until recently, civil society was primarily thought ofas a national concept (yet another consequenceperhaps, of the methodological nationalism of thesocial sciences referred to below). In reality, of course,self-organised non-profit associations and socialmovements have been networking across borders fornearly two centuries, even if this has dramaticallyaccelerated in recent decades. But an important pointabout the way in which central European and LatinAmerican intellectuals began to talk of civil societyis that they made this transnationality a centralelement in it. This goes quite against Ferguson and hiscontemporaries, for whom defining civil society waspart of building the concept of the nation state. Italso differs from the line starting with Hegel, in whichan abstract civil society-state dialectic is paramountand the idea of cross-links with other civil societiesand other states is not considered. But for thosedissidents in the 1980s it was strategically necessaryto link up with others across borders. Keck and Sikkink(1998: 13) have described this as the ‘boomerangpattern.’ When it comes to human rights, the problemis very much national, but the solution lies partly infinding allies beyond one’s own dictatorial state. Inboth Latin America and Central Europe the cold warwas understood as a key component of authori-tarianism, a way in which repression was legitimised.The Latin American dictators made an ideology oftheir national security doctrines, while the eastEuropeans were crushed in the name of the struggleagainst Western imperialism. Hence, crossing bordersto oppose the cold war, especially in Europe, was animportant element of the citizens’ struggle againstdictatorship; this is why in Europe the term ‘pan-European civil society’ preceded ‘global civil society’.

Environmental groups have always stressed thetransnational nature of their activism, for a slightlydifferent reason. For them, the problems are global.One Chernobyl, or one state’s misbehaviour onCO2 emissions, affects us all. It is perhaps with themthat the talk of ‘one world’ and ‘global solutions’

originated (Lipschutz 1996; Wapner 1996). The neweranti-capitalist movement has taken the same tack. Infact, one of its slogans is ‘Globalise the resistance’. Inthe 1990s, that deliberate transnationality also takeson more than a strategic meaning, however, itbecomes a moral-political statement against ethnicnationalism and religious fundamentalism.

Transnational vs global

Many authors are referring to the new phenomenonwe discuss in this Yearbook as ‘transnational civilsociety’ (Florini 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smithet al. 1997). They say that ‘global civil society’ soundstoo grandiose; in the sense of something that reallybrings together people from every part of the globe,it just isn’t there, and it is not inevitably going to bethere either. In the empirical sense, they have a point.Some parts of the world are much more linked upthan others. There are few links with EquatorialGuinea or Mongolia. We nevertheless prefer to speakof a ‘global civil society’, for three reasons.

First, while ‘global civil society’ may overstatewhat is really out there, ‘transnational civil society’understates it. All one needs to be transnational is asingle border-crossing. In that sense, as we outlinedabove, civil society has been transnational for at least200 years. ‘Transnational’ does nothing to capturethe revolution in travel and communications butalso the opening up of many formerly closed societiesthat has really made civil society much more globalin the last ten years than it has ever been before.

Second, only ‘global civil society’ can be posed asa counterweight to ‘globalisation’. Both are justprocesses. If formal democracy remains confined tothe level of the state, while various economic,political, and cultural activities are indeed goingglobal, then only a global civil society can call themto account. While we believe that globalisation hasboth good and bad sides, representation of citizens’interests becomes a problem when the market andother transnational phenomena take over from thestate. Corporations are not democratically elected,and while there are now more democratically electednational governments than ever before, citizens haveno direct control over what these governments do atthe now all-important international level. A worldgovernment with a world parliament is one utopia,of course, but like earlier utopias could easily turninto global totalitarianism. Global civil society, onthe other hand, may be a more viable way of ‘taming’,

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‘humanising’, ‘calling to account’, indeed ‘civilising’globalisation.

Third, the term ‘global civil society’ has anormative aspiration that ‘transnational civil society’does not. Just as the term ‘human rights’ has auniversalistic intent that ‘civil rights’ lacks, globalcivil society can be seen as an aspiration to reach andinclude citizens everywhere and to enable them tothink and act as global citizens. Some of the literatureon globalisation stresses the emergence of a globalconsciousness, an ‘imagined community of mankind’(Shaw 2000; Robertson 1990). In particular, two worldwars and the threat of a nuclear war generated thisglobal consciousness; the holocaust and Hiroshimahave become global collective memories. In this sense,global civil society is an expression of thatconsciousness even if the participants cannot travelor even use the telephone.

Definitions

As in the case of national civil societies, part of theattraction of the term ‘global civil society’ is thatdifferent people feel at home with differentconceptions of it. This Yearbook reflects that diversity.Rather than providing a definitive definition of globalcivil society, it has been our intention as editors tooffer this and future Yearbooks as a continuingplatform for an exchange of ideas about the meaningof ‘global civil society’. We have opted for thisapproach because we believe that debating whatglobal civil society means contributes to theemergence of an animated, open, and self-reflexiveglobal civil society.

For our table programme in Part IV of theYearbook, ‘Records of Global Civil Society’, however,we had to operationalise the concept. We havechosen the following, purely descriptive, definition:global civil society is the sphere of ideas, values,institutions, organisations, networks, and individualslocated between the family, the state, and the marketand operating beyond the confines of nationalsocieties, polities, and economies. While we recognisethat global civil society is ultimately a normativeconcept, we believe that the normative content is toocontested to be able to form the basis for anoperationalisation of the concept. We do giveattention to the normative dimensions of globalcivil society in our table programme, but it wouldgo against our conception of global civil societyas an open, contested, and contestable concept to

fill in this normative content in any definite way(see Anheier in Part IV of this Yearbook).

Other authors in this Yearbook have chosendifferent interpretations. In Chapter 7, for instance,Mario Pianta appears at first to adopt a similardefinition: ‘the emerging global civil society has tobe conceptualised, with all its ambiguities and blurredimages, as the sphere of cross-border relations andcollective activities outside the international reach ofstates and markets’ (p. 171). However, he then honesin on a narrow, more political and more normativecharacterisation:

‘Despite extreme heterogeneity and frag-mentation, much of the activity in the sphereof global civil society consists of what RichardFalk (1999: 130) has termed “globalisation frombelow”, a project whose “normative potential isto conceptualise widely shared world ordervalues: minimising violence, maximisingeconomic well-being, realising social andpolitical justice, and upholding environmentalquality”’ (p. 171).

In Chapter 2, on the other hand, John Keane takesa much more holistic approach. He thinks the trend,beginning with Gramsci, to consider commercial lifeas not part of (global) civil society, has been a mistake.Other authors oscillate between these and otherdefinitions, emphasising different aspects of globalcivil society such as its struggle against unbridledglobal capitalism (Desai and Said, Chapter 3), itsattempts to understand, resist, or democratise a newscience like biotechnology (Osgood, Chapter 4), itsresponses to the challenge of violent conflicts (Kaldor,Chapter 5), its pioneering of information andcommunications technology (Naughton, Chapter 6),and the way it gets funded (Pinter, Chapter 8).

Describing Global Civil Society: The Challenge ofMethodological Nationalism

The concept global civil society is not onlydifficult to define and to fit into conventionalsocial science terminology, it is also difficult to

measure using standard systems of social andeconomic accounts. By and large, all these systemstend to be territorially bounded.

To see how national and international statisticaloffices find it difficult to think about a world that is

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no longer made up of national societies and domesticeconomies as major building blocks,1 let’s consider theeconomic statistics and the System of NationalAccounts (SNA) (United Nations 1993). This exampleillustrates both the problem and the potentialstrategy towards a solution for the purpose ofmeasuring global civil society.

Adding the gross national product of all nationaleconomies of the world’s 180 plus countries wouldyield the approximate monetary value of globaleconomic activity. Yet this value would not be thesame as the size of the globalised economy, norwould it be identical to the value of the totalinternational economy. The national economy wouldbe conceptualised and measured with the help ofthe SNA; the international economy would beindicated, on the assumption that the nationaleconomy is the unit of analysis, by import-exportstatistics and the rest-of-the-world accounts in theSNA. Yet the SNA is of little help when it comes tothe globalised economy, which involves integratedfinance, production, and distribution systems acrossmany countries and spanning different regions andcontinents. Such globalised elements of the economyemerge from the integrated economic activities ofseparate or joined-up businesses across countries,and it is these elements that go unnoticed inconventional economic statistics. Thus, the termglobal economy is outside the SNA’s conceptual andempirical space.

What becomes clear in the case of the SNA couldbe demonstrated with many other statistical systems.It is basically the insight that the sequence ‘national� international � global’ is not a linear extensionof the same data. The sequence contains an importantqualitative difference that escapes internationalstatistical systems—a difference that becomesfundamental once the nation state or the nationaleconomy is no longer the frame of reference forwhat is to be measured. Three very different examplesmight help illustrate the gap in information about theemerging institutional infrastructure and values ofglobal civil society.

1. In recent decades, international NGOs havebecome an important relay in funding flows fromOECD countries to developing countries and thetransition economies in central and eastern Europe(Anheier and Salamon 1998; Smillie 1995; Pinter2001). These funding flows involve bilateral andmultilateral aid in addition to private philanthropicand other non-profit contributions as well as

corporate finance. Yet no international statisticalagency collects systematic information on the fullnetwork in financial intermediation of NGOs,including the role of grant-making foundations(Anheier and List 2000). Data focus on either thecountry origin or the recipient country, leaving theintermediary role of NGOs unspecified (see OECD1997; also Chapter 8 by Frances Pinter). The state-to-state view of statistical reporting prevails, thusignoring the fact that an increasing portion of aidflows via private organisations.

2. The rise and continuing expansion of multi-national corporations, international organisations,and international NGOs brought with it growingnumbers of professionals who increasingly spendlarge parts of their working lives in organisations,working environments, and cultures that may havelittle connection with their specific country of origin.While these ‘international professional migrants’ maybe less numerous than the mass of low-incomeworkers moving from the South to the North, theirnumbers are even less systematically recorded despitetheir immense economic importance and impact onan emerging global culture.

3. The ‘small world’ experiments in sociology haveshown that a randomly selected number of citizensin OECD countries could with some degree ofprobability reach any other randomly selected fellowcitizen in fewer than five steps by going through asequence of personal contacts (Kochen 1989;Wasserman and Faust 1994: 53–4). Numerous otherstudies in social network analysis have demonstratedthe importance and implications of ‘connectedness’for the functioning of local communities, for gettingjobs, for social mobilisation, and for the spread ofinformation and innovations of all kinds (Powell andSmith-Duerr 1994). Increasingly, with greater mobilityand migration, and better and cheaper technology,these contacts reach across borders and people’s lifetakes place in networks that span different countries,cultures, and continents (Castells 1996). Yet thisglobal connectedness, crucial for social cohesion,political mobilisation, the flow of information, and,particularly, economic and cultural change, remainsuncharted by official statistics and only superficiallyexplored by the social sciences.

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1 There are some parallels between today’s situation and thestruggle in the late Middle Ages encountered with the conceptsand imagery of the emerging modern world of the Renaissance,so aptly described by historians like Huizinga (1954) and Crosby(1997) and sociologists such as Elias (1982).

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Although we could add more, these examples shouldsuffice to show the growing awareness about theemergence of an economic, social, political, andcultural sphere above and beyond the confines ofnational economies, societies, polities, states, andcultures. At the same time, this awareness isaccompanied by some unease and sometimes evendefensiveness: many conventional concepts andterminology based on the nation state and nationaleconomy and society fall short in their ability tocapture global civil society. Given the lack ofadequate conceptual development, theories are fewand better explanations continue to be frustrated bya paucity of systematic data and empiricalinformation that can be used as evidence. Simplyput: existing statistical systems are based on thenotion of the nation state—a unit that seems ill-suited for the kinds of data and information neededfor mapping and measuring global civil society.

Once fully developed, however, the informationincluded in the Yearbook is to provide the beginningsof a systematic profile of the contours, composition,and developments of global civil society. It is ourhope that over time the data presented in the variouschapters and the tables and chronology in Part IV,updated annually, will become a central referencepoint for empirical and theoretical work on globalcivil society. We also hope that this information willbe of use to policy-makers and practitioners.

Chapter Conclusions

Apart from the three general conclusions thathave emerged from this book, set out above,some powerful specific conclusions can also

be drawn on the basis of the different chapters.In Chapter 2, John Keane draws attention to the

role of global civil society as an antidote to violenceand hubris. While global civil society can occasionallybe helpless in the face of violence and can behubristic itself, its strength lies in its ability to callpower-holders to account, thus inching the worldtowards greater parity, openness, and humility.

In Chapter 3, Meghnad Desai and Yahia Saiddescribe how formerly marginal anti-capitalistmovements from different regions and with differentpriorities have come together to form a cacophonousbut loud and consistent call of protest. Globalcapitalism must either learn to seriously engage withthese protests and join in the attempt to civilise

globalisation, or prepare for more massive and moreviolent protests ahead.

In Chapter 4, Diane Osgood points out that, in thedebate on plant biotechnology, lack of a commonlanguage and hence of agreed priorities hasprevented trusted leaders from emerging, and thatthis problem is likely to be exacerbated as thetechnology develops. Civil society leaders need to‘speak science’ and scientists need to learn to ‘speaksociety’. A more respectful dialogue must take theplace of the scaremongering on the one side andcontempt on the other, which has characterised toomuch of the debate so far.

In Chapter 5, Mary Kaldor describes how, largelydue to the efforts of global civil society, the notion ofhumanitarian intervention has taken the place of astate-centred ideology in which sovereignty overruledall humanitarian and human rights considerations ininternational relations. She goes on to discuss how, asthe international community blundered its waythrough a number of conflicts in the 1990s, global civilsociety has remained deeply divided over the questionswhether, how, and when military force should be usedfor humanitarian purposes. The most viable form ofhumanitarian intervention in the future may be along-term international presence in conflict-proneareas that includes civil society actors, internationalagencies, and international peace-keeping troops ona much larger scale than has been the case so far,coupled with a readiness to risk the lives of peace-keeping troops to save the lives of others where thisis necessary.

In Chapter 6, John Naughton describes how globalcivil society has taken to the Internet with itslibertarian ethos, its decentralised architecture, andits low operating costs like a duck to water over thelast decade. However, these characteristics of theInternet are not intrinsic: they are man-made andthey can be changed. States are adopting legislationto restrict freedom of expression on the Internet,and corporations are inventing technology toundermine the anonymity of the Internet in theinterests of e-commerce. Global civil society needs towake up to these threats and respond to them in twoways. First, it must begin to consider Internetfreedoms as an advocacy issue instead of as aninstrument it can take for granted. Second, it muststay one step ahead of governments and corporationsin helping to develop and adopt new advances in thetechnology that can reinforce its subversive,liberating character.

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In Chapter 7, Mario Pianta has undertaken a surveyof global civil society’s parallel summits to officialsummits. He draws the following broad conclusion:official summits that are only framing issues are mostlikely to be open to dialogue with global civil societyas represented in the parallel summit; summits incharge of rule making or setting policy will be less so;and summits with enforcing power tend to be closedto civil society influence. Global civil society is notgoing to take such treatment from the second andthird categories lying down, however. It will continueto contest unaccountable decision-makers byconvening parallel summits, if necessary by defyingrestrictions imposed by local authorities or byconvening them in a different place from the officialsummit.

In Chapter 8, Frances Pinter attempts to chart theprimary sources of funding of global civil societyorganisations and the ways in which different typesof bodies get funded. She notes that there is agrowing convergence around a handful of core issuesamong the major donors which can be interpretedvariously as evidence of an emerging culturalcosmopolitan consensus or of a move towards adomesticated, donor-led global civil society that issubservient to the dictates of global capitalism. Shealso concludes, however, that money alone can’t buyyou global civil society: human, social, organisational,and informational resources are at least equallyessential.

These studies are beginning to give us some insightinto what global civil society is concerned about,and how it works. In the second Yearbook, these andother cartographers will be mapping further aspectsof the ‘conceptual island’ that is global civil society.This first Yearbook is just the beginning of a processthat we hope will enable us to understand anddescribe this new phenomenon called ‘global civilsociety’.

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