North American Philosophical Publications

The Limits of Kantian Duty, and BeyondAuthor(s): Richard McCartyReviewed work(s):Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1989), pp. 43-52Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical PublicationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014266 .Accessed: 31/07/2012 21:51

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American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 26, Number 1, January 1989

THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN DUTY, AND BEYOND Richard McCarty

OUPEREROGATION, the moral category for ^actions good to do but not morally obligatory,

raises fundamental problems for Kantian ethical

theory. Any ethical theory which, following the Kantian turn, derives moral goodness from obli?

gation, instead of the other way around,1 precludes in its very foundation the possibility of morally good, non-obligatory actions. Supererogation, then, looms as a threat to the plausibility of the Kantian

program in ethics. In the face of such a threat Kant ians may simply deny the legitimacy of the category of supererogation, regardless of how strongly en? trenched it may appear in common moral thinking.

Or, respecting pretheoretical moral intuitions, they may attempt to include supererogation some? how among the basic moral categories of Kantian ethics.

The object of the present study is to offer reasons why neither of these responses to the problem is ac?

ceptable for Kantians; this will require, among other

things, a summary examination of a few recent discussions of Kantian ethics and supererogation. If neither rejecting the moral significance of super? erogation, nor including it among the basic cate?

gories of Kant's moral theory is acceptable, then Kantian ethics must be rejected, unless a satisfactory non-moral account of supererogation is plausible and consistent with Kantian ethics. To address the

problem of Kantian supererogation, therefore, I

develop below a plausible, "quasi-moral" account of the value of supererogation from Kant's wide

ranging aesthetic theory. I show how the close relation between Kant's ethics and aesthetics, par? ticularly his theory of the sublime, may confer a

"quasi-moral" status upon some actions which are

good in a relevant sense, though not morally obli?

gatory. Provided this "quasi-moral" account of the value of supererogation is generally acceptable, and I think it should be, Kantian ethics can meet the

challenge posed by the problematic moral concept of supererogation.

I. Supererogation

The term, "supererogation" never appears in Kant's writings, though occasionally he uses phrases which suggest he has the concept in mind: He speaks in one place of "super-meritorious" deeds, and else?

where of doing ''more in the way of duty than the law can compel [one] to do."2 The term itself rises out of Catholic moral theology, where its unique role is not easily transferable to philosophical ethics.

A prima facie case may be made, then, for rejecting the notion as spurious and inimical to sound moral

philosophy. Despite its dubious origin, however, the term has found a use in ethical theory, as well as an anchor in common ethical intuitions.

Rejecting supererogation as a philosophical mor? al category has decisive implications for ethical

theory, especially for Kantian ethics. That rejection might entail a moral theory which requires or en?

courages our efforts and sacrifices for good causes

up to certain limits, beyond which we may continue into a "zone of indifference,"3 if we desire, though

without moral incentive or recognition. While this view pushes admirably in the direction of moral equality, it nevertheless makes saints and heroes unremarkable, from a moral standpoint. On a less

grand scale, it cannot distinguish between one who contributes only what he ought, and one who cheer?

fully "goes the second mile." Another possible view entailed by rejecting super?

erogation simply denies any limits to moral impera? tives, except those imposed by our physical capa? cities. On this view, we ought to do all the good we can; there is no "zone of indifference." Every action, therefore, should aim at satisfying one or another

moral imperative: Morality regulates all our steps, pushing all our efforts to the limits of our capacities.

While some may endorse this rigorous view entailed

by rejecting supererogation, Kantians should embrace it with great reluctance. Consider Kant's condemnation of the moral fanaticism he called "fantastic virtue":

43

44 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

But that man can be called fantastically virtuous who

admits nothing morally indifferent (adiaphora) and strews all his steps with duties, as with man?

traps; . . . Fantastic virtue is a micrology which, were

it admitted into the doctrine of virtue, would turn the

sovereignty of virtue into a tyranny.4

The tyranny of such a doctrine of virtue, with its unsatisfiable conscience, is surely too high a

price to pay to evade the problem of supererogation. The fantastically virtuous person rises daily with moral determination, eats with moral discrimina?

tion, organizes all activities toward moral destina? tions, and retires in moral deliberation. Kantian virtue is for imperfect humans who must neverthe? less strive for perfection in order to avoid compla? cency.5 It is part of Kantian virtue, however, to

develop a sound understanding, to know when duty calls and when it is silent, to gauge the limits of one's obligations with good judgment.6 Unless we recognize reasonable limits to moral obligation,

Kantian virtue is "fantastic."7 Admitting such limits, however, entails the possibility of surpas? sing the limits, of acting beyond the call of duty.

II. Supererogation and "Imperfect Duty"

If it is unwise for Kantians to reject the possibility supererogatory actions, then it may be best to try to include supererogation somewhere among the

categories of Kantian ethics. Some may be encour?

aged in this project by a promising passage from Kant's Doctrine of Virtue,

Imperfect duties ... are only duties of virtue. To fulfill them is merit (meritum = +a); but to transgress them is not so much guilt, (demeritum

=

?a) as mere lack of moral worth (=0), unless the agent makes it his principle not to submit to these duties.8

Here, imperfect duties, most of which are "wide duties," in Kant's terminology, enjoin actions which are good to do and not wrong to omit. Thus the category of imperfect duty bears a resemblance to supererogation. Accordingly, some recent dis? cussions of Kantian ethics and supererogation propose to find a solution in these duties of virtue; and to one of these discussions we may now turn.

Thomas E. Hill, Jr. comes close to identifying supererogatory actions with actions in fulfillment

of Kant's wide imperfect duties.9 His identification is not exact, however, since unlike supererogatory actions, some actions in fulfillment of imperfect duties are morally required. It may be recalled from the third and fourth examples in the Groundwork that adopting maxims or policies of forsaking one's talents and of ignoring the needs of others is a

transgression of the categorical imperative.10 These wide imperfect duties may be overlooked on occa? sion, but neglecting them entirely constitutes a serious dereliction of duty.

Consequently, on Hill's view, an action is

supererogatory only if it is "of a sort commended

by a principle of wider imperfect duty" and per? formed by an agent who has "adopted the relevant

principle of wider imperfect duty and has often and

continually acted on that principle." To these neces?

sary conditions Hill adds another which, while

necessary indeed for Kantian ethics, looms as a

stumbling block to any attempt to include superero? gation within the categories of Kantian duty: The action must be "motivated by a sense of duty (or, perhaps, respect for moral reasons)."11 This neces? sary condition, however, is simply inconsistent

with the concept of supererogation. The moral motivation is necessary, since

supererogatory actions are morally good, and a moral motive is necessary for moral goodness, for Kantian moral worth. Yet the moral motive, in Kantian ethics, is the motive to act from duty. The action, then, could not be supererogatory in any

Kantian sense unless the agent recognizes it as a

duty, sees it as objectively practically necessary,12 and performs it on that account. But if the action is morally necessary, if it is the agent's duty, then the action cannot be supererogatory.

Not all actions contributing to the ends enjoined by Kant's wide imperfect duty are objectively prac? tically necessary, to be sure. It is seldom wrong or bad to omit such actions; still, if performing them on some occasion is to have Kantian moral

worth, the agent must regard the action as necessary (obligatory) on that occasion and act out of respect for that necessity (duty). Hill's account, therefore, appears seriously flawed.

Despite this problem, it may not be wise to reject Hill's proposal too quickly, since the common notion of supererogation may after all be consistent

THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN DUTY 45

with acting from duty or from "respect for moral reasons." Let us recall that the project here is to fit the relatively imprecise, intuitive notion of

supererogation into Kantian ethical theory. If this notion does not clearly specify what kind of duty actions

"beyond the call of duty" surpass, then its

vagueness may allow us to count most actions in fulfillment of Kant's wide imperfect duties as

supererogatory. Most of these actions surpass, in some sense, the "hard-and-fast" requirements of

Kant's "narrow," perfect duties, which forbid actions not consistently willable as universal law

(lying, promise-breaking, etc.).13 In Kantian ethics, then, actions are morally good

only if performed from duty; yet from a point of view external to Kantian ethics, dutiful actions in fulfillment of wide imperfect duty may satisfy the

vague requirements of the common, intuitive notion of supererogation. Since the initial challenge to the

plausibility of Kantian ethics arises from the external point of view, Hill's account may easily answer that initial challenge.

Still, the problem, once raised, is not so easily dismissed. From a point of view internal to Kantian ethics, the problem resurfaces when we turn to consider how to classify actions which surpass the reasonable limits of even wide imperfect obliga? tion, of duties of virtue. To see how this problem arises more clearly we must examine these limits of obligation.

III. The Limits of Kantian Duty

In various places Kant speaks as if there are no limits to duties of virtue except those imposed by other obligations.14 To surpass these limits, then, would be to neglect or transgress other important duties. The duty to love one's neighbor, for exam?

ple, may be limited by a duty to one's parents; likewise, it is wrong to sacrifice personal happiness and "true needs" in dutifully promoting another's

happiness. Were the only limits to duties of virtue those

imposed by other, more stringent duties, there could be no genuinely supererogatory actions in

any Kantian sense; but these cannot be the only limits. If the only limits to Kantian duties of virtue are other duties, then we can represent the whole

of practical life by a map on which every district is colored by some kind of duty. In that case, how? ever, duty dogs all our steps and Kantian virtue becomes "fantastic virtue."

In some places where Kant appears to deny any limits to duties of virtue, he denies only that they

have determinate limits, implying that duties of virtue have indeterminate limits.15 On this (highly plausible) view of the limits of imperfect obliga? tions, we cannot say precisely how much one ought to contribute to ends enjoined by duties of virtue.

This does not, however, prevent us from recog? nizing efforts which clearly surpass the limits of those duties. Consequently, determining the exact

point at which one's sacrifices on others' behalf

surpass the limits of obligation is impossible, just as it is impossible to determine the point at which a balding man becomes bald. Yet some heroic actions on others' behalf are clearly well beyond the reasonable limits of imperfect obligation, just as some men are clearly bald.

In Kantian ethics, then, either wide imperfect obligations have at least indeterminate limits, beyond which it is sometimes possible to act without transgressing other duties, or, imperfect obligations are limited only by other duties, and Kantian virtue is fantastic virtue. Rejecting the lat? ter, we conclude, with some textual support, that

Kant's wide imperfect duties have indeterminate and surpassable limits. Surpassing the limits of

imperfect duty, however, can have no Kantian moral worth; for in the remote districts beyond wide imperfect duty, it is impossible to did from duty. One simply cannot have the required moral motivation when his action is not in fulfillment of a duty. Thus, within Kantian ethics the vexing problem of supererogation remains unresolved.

Why should only some sacrifices for others' bene? fits be morally worthy while other extraordinary, clearly permissible sacrifices along those lines lack

moral worth!

IV. Supererogation and Kantian Virtue

Other recent discussions of the Kantian problem of supererogation suggest a solution may be found in a new approach. While Hill addressed the

problem by trying to offer a Kantian account of

46 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

the apparent moral value of supererogatory acts,

perhaps more progress can be made by focusing on the moral value of the virtuous characters from which supererogatory acts spring.16 Marcia Baron, whose view I shall consider principally in this con?

nection, objects to recognizing a special moral cat? egory for supererogation principally because doing so may invite some undesirable attitudes or tenden? cies in moral judgment. She argues that reserving a special moral category for supererogatory acts

may suggest to some that beneficent acts are strictly optional, so that "moral scrutiny of one's omissions of such acts would be inappropriate." Also, it "in? vites the assumption that [extraordinary,] admirable and apparently unselfish acts ... are certain to be

morally unobjectionable,"17 though clearly not all generally "heroic" actions are blameless: Consider the (in)famous American hero, Oliver North.

Though Baron criticizes the traditional view of

supererogation at great length, the problems she finds in assigning a special moral status to superero? gatory acts are reducible to just those mentioned above. These problems, however, are nothing but

mere undesirable attitudes and tendencies in moral

judgment; and they arise only if people misun? derstand the

"special" character of supererogatory acts. These

"problems" are hardly sufficient reasons to reject a traditional moral category. Baron herself admits at one point that "an argument against an abuse of a notion is not a good argument in favor of giving up the notion entirely."18

If we side with Baron and reject a special moral status for supererogatory acts, though, we face those problems mentioned in Section I. Either there is no moral incentive and no moral recognition in

acting beyond the limits of imperfect duty, or there are no limits to imperfect duty. Baron would cer?

tainly reject the first option, since she rejects limits for imperfect duty for reasons which can be extrapo? lated from the problems she worries about above. She is therefore forced to embrace "fantastic vir? tue." My argument against Baron at this point, then, is just that while she raises "problems" for the traditional view (undesirable attitudes and ten? dencies in moral judgment), still the problem which arises from rejecting the traditional view (virtue becomes "fantastic virtue") is much worse.

Even if Baron's view does not make virtue fan

tastic, the same type of objections she raises against the traditional view can now be leveled at hers. It is easy to see how people might mistakenly think that virtue, as she understands it, is fantastic. This

will lead, we may presume, to their neglecting virtue altogether. For these reasons, therefore, Baron's rejection of any special distinction between dutiful and supererogatory acts falters.

Baron's positive contribution to the problem of

supererogation in Kantian ethics is her suggestion that Kantian ethics can account for the moral status of saints and heroes, and other lesser friends of

humanity, by recognizing their virtues, their "re? markable commitment to good causes."19 Thus, Baron concludes that Kant's category of imperfect duty "supplies much of what ethicists have wanted from the category of the supererogatory. The rest ... is much better captured by evaluation of character than by recognizing a special category of actions that go 'beyond' duty."20

Because Baron rejects any distinction between dutiful and supererogatory acts, she also rejects any

moral distinction between the virtuous character of one who does his duty at great sacrifice, and that of one who acts in excess of his duty at great sacrifice.21 Since her rejection of supererogatory acts falters, as I argued above, this traditional distinction in virtuous characters raises a serious problem for her view. In short, Baron's shift from actions to characters

merely relocates the problem of Kantian superero? gation, it does not solve it.

In Kantian ethics, if virtue is to have a moral status, it must be tied to duty; for moral goodness is, in Kant's view, always derived from the moral law. Hence Kant's definition of virtue: "the moral

strength of a man's will in fulfilling his duty, a moral necessitation by his own legislative reason

. . ,"22

Therefore, only the character of the person who sacrifices to fulfill obligations can be assigned a

moral status in Kantian virtue. This is because, again, the moral motive is a necessary condition of virtue, and the moral motive is a motive respecting obligations. The rare hero who surpasses the limits of imperfect duty displays a remarkable, (morally?) praise-worthy character >vhich, given the meta ethical commitments of Kantian morality, cannot be a part of virtue.

Since neither wide imperfect duties nor Kantian

THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN DUTY 47

virtue provide a satisfactory account of admirable heroism beyond the limits of Kant's imperfect duties, therefore, we must recognize a shortcoming in Kantian ethics. Even so, must we reject it for that reason? Only if we assume that ethical theory alone must provide an explanation for every admir? able deed or character. Beginning with that assump? tion, however, leads us to ignore the intuitively evident harmony and mutual support of different realms of value. It leads us to view ethics in isola? tion from other vital human concerns in a way

which, it is clear, Kant himself did not view it. We need not suggest here that morality may be

subordinate to other realms of value, we need not threaten its

"overridingness" to seek a satisfactory extra-moral account of supererogation.

V. Supererogation and Sublimity

Genuinely heroic deeds or saintly characters are

truly inspiring, except perhaps to villains and per? sons devoid of feeling; this much is uncontrover sial. Here we need not distinguish between those saints and heroes who fulfill obligations where most

would fail and those who fit into the supererogatory category by clearly surpassing their obligations.

The inspired response to these deeds and characters, dutiful or not, is a moral feeling, a moral pleasure of varying degree. If moral feelings or moral sen? sibilities offered sound criteria for moral judg?

ments, then there would be little difficulty in

accounting for the moral status of supererogatory deeds or characters and distinguishing them from

extraordinary dutiful deeds or virtuous characters which are hardly less noteworthy.

Because Kantian ethics opposes the moral-sense

school, though, it seems that our moral feelings are not relevant for the problem of Kantian superero? gation, so it seems useless to pursue this avenue. Yet Kantians do not reject moral sense entirely, but only as a determining ground of moral obligation.

Moral feeling plays a very important role in Kantian moral psychology. If practical reason is the "mea?

suring rod" determining what is obligatory, moral

feeling is the "mainspring," "the moral incentive to action" which "lies in the heart."23

Still, it seems that given the metaethical commit? ments of Kantian ethics, a feeling cannot properly

be called "moral" unless it is a response to the moral law, an object of respect (Actung). Even in moral feeling, then, it seems we can find no room for as?

signing a moral status to supererogation. Yet if we consider the moral incentive more closely, we can see how Kant's account of moral feeling expands beyond duty; we can see how moral feelings can be aroused indirectly by non-moral objects.

My objective in this section, then, will be to show how supererogatory actions or characters, which are

technically non-moral objects in Kantian ethics, can excite moral feeling. This will require a discus? sion of both Kant's theory of moral motivation and his aesthetic theory, especially the theory of the sublime. In this discussion I shall display a funda?

mental identity between the moral incentive, the

feeling of respect for the moral law, and the aes? thetic response to sublime natural objects. I shall conclude the section, then, by showing how

supererogatory actions or characters are sublime natural objects which can excite moral feeling.

Human beings, partly noumenal and partly phen? omenal, can act in the sensible world not only according to the intelligible moral law, but also from motives respecting reason's law. Since Kant holds that the human will is moved only by incentives, either incentives of pure practical reason or incen? tives of sense (inclinations), he must show how noumenal reason can incite phenomenal action, ac? tion respecting duty. He cannot, he acknowledges, explain a noumenal causality. He can, however, on the assumption of such causality, explain its effects on our phenomenal nature.24 He calls this human

sensitivity to the law of reason moral feeling.25 Now as is frequently the case in Kant, we can dis?

tinguish between a faculty and a particular activity or determination ofthat faculty.26 Here, then, moral

feeling can name both an internal sensibility and

particular internal sensations or feelings. We can

say that reason's determining the will stimulates the faculty of moral feeling, or we can say that it arouses particular moral feelings: namely, respect or reverence.27 To distinguish the two, therefore, I shall hereafter refer to the faculty of moral feeling in the singular and to particular determinations of the faculty in the plural.

Moral feelings appear to be of two general kinds: we feel unpleasant "humiliation" when the tran

48 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

scendent law of reason checks our natural self-love; but when we recognize the autonomy of the moral

law, that the absolute law is "our" law, we feel self-esteem.28 These negative and positive feelings

merge in Kant's notion of respect (Actung) for the moral law.29 It is proper to call this faculty moral

feeling because such feelings serve as "an incentive to make [the moral law] itself a maxim."30 Kant holds, however, that in addition to being excited

by rational imperatives, moral feeling can also be stimulated by the thought of reason itself, especially the thought of its transcendence of the phenomenal

world. This is an essential element of his theory of the sublime.

The aesthetic experience of the sublime, ac?

cording to Kant, can be either "mathematical" or

"dynamical." In the former, the object of experience is one of sense-defying dimensions; in the latter, it

manifests a frightening degree of power. In each of these cases the object is humbling, even somewhat

painful to behold. Yet in each case there is a move? ment of the mind from finite sensible representations to transcendent reason. Though sensibility (imagin? ation) is exhausted in the face of seemingly infinite objects, reason grasps the infinite in its totality.31 Thus, the pleasure in the sublime is just the discovery of reason's superiority to the magnitude and might of nature. And insofar as reason is "our" reason, this discovery is a thrilling self-discovery, a defiant satisfaction in opposition to the formerly humiliating natural object.32 Technically, then, natural objects are not sublime, they merely occasion the inspiring feeling of the transcendence of reason. Thus, a per? fectly natural "subreption" occurs by which we

speak of the external object as sublime."33 The

"analogy" between the moral feelings and the component feelings of the sublime is striking. In the one case we are humiliated by the law of reason when our selfish inclinations are checked, and in the other case by the sense-defying mag? nitude and might of nature. Yet immediately, in both cases, we are confronted with our transcen? dence of the natural world through reason; in a

word, our freedom. The difference appears to be

only this: that respect for the moral law is combined with an interest in action, the feelings of the sublime are

merely contemplative.34 Whether we should locate this difference in the

quality of the feelings themselves or in the fact that in the former the feelings arise from reason's impera? tives and in the latter the feelings arise from reason's

capacities is perhaps a moot question in our present context. While Kant may not identify moral feelings

with the feelings of the sublime, he thinks reason's

imperatives in moral motivation, just as much as reason's capacities in the experience of the sublime, stimulate moral feeling.35 The relation between

moral feelings and the feelings of the sublime, then, may not be an analogy at all, but an identity.36 In

any case, the same feeling (faculty) is stimulated by both the starry heavens above and the moral law within, whether or not the particular feelings are the

really distinct in character.

Having shown, then, how moral feeling is excited

by considering natural, so-called "sublime" objects no less than by the thought of the moral law, we are in a position to see how supererogatory actions, or

saintly or heroic characters, can stimulate moral

feeling. It only remains to be shown, therefore, how these supererogatory "objects" can be sublime.

Empirical characters, motivations, even affec? tions, are objects of "internal nature," and so they can also be sublime when they exhibit sufficient

magnitude or power. At one point Kant notes that "enthusiasm" may be sublime because of the power of the enthusiast's attraction to the idea of the good; a power far exceeding the attraction to sensible

objects.37 Friendship, love, or sympathy, as natural affections, might therefore also be manifested in sublime degrees by saints and heroes.38 These are

"pathological" forces, to be sure, and thus they must not eclipse the supreme position of duty or of the

"good will." Still, these natural motive forces, if they are sufficient to motivate sacrifices

beyond the call of duty, may arouse moral feeling in disinterested observers.39 As remarkable exam?

ples they may also serve to cultivate our sensitivity to the moral law and to reinforce our commitment to obey the law against more mundane adversities or natural inclinations.

Appealing to pathological incentives, however, is risky business. These incentives cannot be trusted to coincide with the moral law. Consequently, it appears that pathological forces may be exhibited to sublime degrees even in actions contrary to the

moral law. If so, then such immorality will be

THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN DUTY 49

admirable. Yet there is an important qualification to make here. The strength of the pathological forces involved in either morally permissible or immoral acts will give rise to the experience of the sublime in an observer only if she is able to consider the acts

disinterestedly. For disinterestedness is a necessary condition for the experience of the sublime, according to Kant.40

While it may be possible to contemplate the devil's vile character disinterestedly, it seems ex?

tremely difficult, especially for the morally sensi? tive person. On the other hand, the saint's boundless love for the disadvantaged is relatively easy to con?

template disinterestedly. Perhaps the saint's bene? factors may have some difficulty contemplating the

sublimity of his love as it is manifested in his benefi? cence particularly to them, though this difficulty is

easily surmounted as they turn to contemplate the saint's beneficence toward others. Whether actions or characters can be admired in the special sense considered here will depend not only on the actions or characters themselves, but also and especially on the sensitivities and attitudes of the admirers. Thus, some remarkable acts involving relatively minor

moral transgressions may constitute admirable im?

morality, but this should not open up any serious

objections to regarding supererogation as admirable action beyond the call of duty.

VI. Concluding Remarks

I have argued that it is impossible to fit superero? gation into the moral categories of Kantian ethics. In neither imperfect duties nor in Kantian virtue can we make room for actions beyond duty or for the characters of those who act beyond duty. I take

Kantian moral worth quite literally: It is the moral value of actions in fulfillment of duty for duty's sake. Thus, moral worth logically excludes

supererogation. I have also argued that Kantian ethics recognizes at least indeterminate limits of

obligation, beyond which supererogatory action is

possible; Kant rejected "fantastic virtue." The prob? lem, then, is to capture our intuitions that rare

supererogatory actions clearly beyond the limits of

obligation deserve some moral recognition by assigning them a moral status.

The moral status I assign to such actions is based on their effect on our moral sensibilities; they are

morally pleasing, even inspiring. They often bolster our determination to obey the moral law. I take this to be a generally accepted empirical truth and a generally satisfactory basis for assigning some kind of moral status to supererogatory actions or

characters, especially among nonKantians.41 The real problem with this suggestion, it seems to me, is showing how, in this Kantian context, we can

assign a moral status to actions or characters solely on the basis of their effect on feeling or their inspi? rational character. I offer a solution to this problem

which I think should be acceptable to Kantians and nonKantians alike, though Kantians should insist that this "affective" account of the value of

supererogation justifies assigning it perhaps only a "quasi-moral" status.42

I suggest that the "moral" status supererogation enjoys is not Kantian moral worth but, from a Kan? tian viewpoint, it is the "quasi-moral" status of Kan? tian sublimity, an aesthetic category closely related to morality through its stimulation of moral feeling.

Kantians may address the supererogationists' de? mand for a moral status for supererogation, then, by clarifying what a moral status is: by distinguishing the moral status of duty from that of moral feeling, and by suggesting that the latter should satisfy the

supererogationists' demands. The source of positive moral feeling, whether

that aroused by moral imperatives or by the experi? ence of the sublime in nature, is the "transcen? dence" of reason, which excites moral feeling. It is a happy consequence of my account of the moral status of Kantian supererogation that the role of transcendence in the Kantian sublime may also elucidate the frequent tendency to assign superero? gation a religious status, to consider supererogation saintly.43 In contrast, the "moral saint" sometimes characterized as one who has a moral reason for

virtually every step, can be dismissed as a fanatic, as

"fantastically virtuous," in Kant's phrase. Thus another happy consequence is that my account of the moral status of Kantian supererogation allows

assigning a moral value to saintly deeds and charac? ters without making moral sainthood, "fantastic vir? tue," a reasonable moral ideal.44

Kantians will insist that the affective moral value

50 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

of supererogation is no substitute for duty, that moral feeling must not replace moral worth in prac? tical life. But this does not require rejecting super? erogation entirely, but merely insisting that it be

recognized for what it is; insisting that duty must be the focus of our moral thinking and moral education and that care must be taken not to confuse moral

feeling with moral worth. Compare a complaint of Kant himself along these lines:

But I wish [moral educators] would spare [their pupils] examples of so-called noble (super-meritorious) actions, which so fill our sentimental writings, and would refer everything to duty only and the worth which a man can and must give himself in his own

eyes through the consciousness of not having trans? gressed his duty, since whatever runs up into empty

wishes and longings for unattainable perfection pro? duces mere heroes of romance, who, while priding themselves on their feeling or transcendent greatness, release themselves from observing the common and

everyday responsibility as petty and insignificant.45

I take this and many similar46 complaints from Kant

against romanticizing "noble (super-meritorious)" actions, however, as a kind of "back-handed" con? firmation of my account of supererogation's "quasi

moral" status. Were it not so compellingly evident to Kant that these actions or characters excite and

morally inspire us, he would not have felt it neces?

sary, and tried so frequently and emphatically, to turn attention away from these moral feelings to

moral imperatives.47

East Carolina University Received March 31, 1988

NOTES

1. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, tr. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, 1956), pp. 59ff./Ak 57ff. 2. Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, tr. by Mary J. Gregor (New York, 1964), p. 27/Ak 227. See also, Ibid., 158-59/Ak 155,

quoted below.

3. I borrow this phrase from James Fishkin, The Limits of Obligation (New Haven, 1982). 4. Doctrine of Virtue, p. 71/Ak 409.

5. Moral perfection is part of Kantian virtue, since we have an imperfect duty to perfect ourselves morally. This includes,

according to Kant, developing our moral "talents" and moral "sensibilities." It may be thought, then, that this duty ultimately enjoins fantastic virtue, so that Kant's rejection of fantastic virtue is inconsistent with a duty he would not be willing to reject. This apparent inconsistency can be easily resolved, however, by noting that progress in moral perfection is both progress in

understanding what morality demands and progress in one's willingness to meet those demands. If morality does not demand

fantastic virtue, one would be morally imperfect if he thought it did, however willing he was to submit to the tyranny of such a

doctrine of virtue. See Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 97-98n./Ak 433n.

6. Ibid., 61/Ak401.

7. Kant's repudiation of "fantastic virtue" appears inconsistent with the "rigorism" he defends in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. There the rigorism he espouses is the view that no action or character can be "morally indifferent." But this appears to be what he criticizes about fantastic virtue. Careful attention to his characterization of fantastic virtue reveals, however, that

Kant regards it as a conjunction of rigorism and "strewing all one's steps with duties." Kant's rigorism does not entail strewing all one's steps with duties, for when he denies "moral indifference" he means only that every action or character is either morally commanded, morally prohibited or morally permissible. (See Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, tr. by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York, 1960), p. 18n.) The fantastically virtuous man, on the other hand, sees

everything either morally commanded or morally prohibited. Kant's rigorism is consistent with supererogation since supererogatory acts will be a subset of the morally permissible. In this

sense, then, supererogatory acts are not morally indifferent, though this is not sufficient to give them moral worth.

8. Ibid., 49/Ak 390.

9. See Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Kant On Imperfect Duty and Supererogation," Kant-Studien, vol. 62 (1971), pp. 55-76.

THE LIMITS OF KANTIAN DUTY 51

10. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, 1959), pp. 39-42/Ak 421 -24. 11. Hill lists a complete set of necessary conditions (five in all) from which these three are drawn, see Hill, p. 71.

12. I draw this phrase from Doctrine of Virtue, p. 21/Ak 222-23.

13. Onora Nell defends Hill's view in this way, see Acting On Principle (New York, 1975), pp. 94-96.

14. Doctrine of Virtue, p. 49/Ak 390.

15. Ibid., 53/Ak393.

16. See Marcia Baron, "Kantian Ethics and Supererogation," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 84 (1987), pp. 237-62. David Heyd also sees room from supererogation in part of Kantian virtue, see his Supererogation, Its Status in Ethical Theory (New York, 1982), pp. 49-72. 17. Baron, 261. Space does not permit a detailed response to Baron's rich discussion of these problems with the traditional moral

category of supererogation. I have discussed Baron's arguments thoroughly in an as yet unpublished paper, "Kantian Ethics and

Supererogation Reconsidered." Interested readers may write for a copy.

18. Ibid., 248. Baron seems to write like a philosopher worried that philosophical ideas or categories might be misunderstood

and abused by non-philosophers. Thus, she seems to think that because recognizing a special moral category for supererogation will have undesirable consequences for common moral thinking, moral philosophers ought to construct their theories accordingly.

19. Baron, 259.

20. Ibid., 262.

21. Urmson draws this distinction clearly in "Saints and Heroes," see A. I. Melden, Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle, 1958), pp. 200-01.

22. Doctrine of Virtue, p. 66/Ak 404.

23. Immanuel Kant, Lectures On Ethics, tr. by Louis Infield (New York, 1963), p. 36. 24. Critique of Practical Reason, p. 74/Ak 72. See also Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 17n/Ak 401 n. Here there

is a difficult question about the role of moral feelings, respect, in moral action. Kant seems to speak in some places as if reason

determines the will to act directly, while respect is a mere side-effect of this process. In other places he seems to speak as if

respect is a link in the causal chain beginning with reason and ending with phenomenal action. What I say about moral feeling

here, however, is neutral with respect to these interpretations. Moral feeling will do all I require of it so long as it is a concomitant

of our consciousness of transcendent reason, which both interpretations allow.

25. Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 46/Ak 387, 59-61/Ak 399-400.

26. Critique of Practical Reason, p. 83/Ak 80: "the capacity of taking such an interest (or of having respect for the moral law

itself) is really moral feeling" (my emphasis). 27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 84/Ak81.

30. Ibid., 79/Ak 76. At this point in the text Kant asks rhetorically whether "moral feeling" is a good name the this feeling "at

the disposal only of reason." This suggests that moral feeling is essentially a sensitivity to reason, not to morality or to the moral law.

31. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, tr. by James Meredith (Oxford, 1952), pp. 107-09/Ak 258-59.

32. Ibid., 114/Ak264.

33. Ibid., 105-06/Ak 257.

34. Ibid., 123/Ak271.

35. Ibid., 116-20/Ak 266-68.

36. On apparent differences between these moral feelings and the feelings of the sublime see Lewis White Beck, A Commentary On Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago, 1960), pp. 220-21; see also A. Murray MacBeath, "Kant On Moral Feeling," Kant-Studien, vol. 64 (1973), p. 296. On similarities, see Milton C. Nahm, "'Sublimity' and The 'Moral Law' in Kant's

Philosophy," Kant-Studien, vol. 47 (1956), pp. 502-24; see also Allan Lazaroff, "The Kantian Sublime: Aesthetic Judgment and

Religious Feeling," Kant-Studien, vol. 71 (1980), pp. 202-20.

37. Critique of Judgment, p. 124/Ak 271-72.

38. Kant speaks occasionally of such natural inclinations, but usually only to distinguish them from the motive of duty. See

Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 14-16/Ak 398-99. See also Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 62-63/Ak 402.

52 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

39. Here I must acknowledge my agreement with Baron that characters and not acts, per se, are the primary bearers of superero? gation's moral status. This is especially evident when supererogatory sacrifices fail to achieve their intended end.

40. See Critique of Judgment, p. 93/Ak 247.

41. Compare Mill, for example: "and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its

nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it." John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Ch. II.

42. I call this an "affective" account of the value of supererogation, not a "pathological" account. Supererogatory motives as I have described them are

"pathological," Kant would say, but moral feeling is not, since it is the "non-pathological" moral incentive.

43. See Critique of Judgment, p. 113/Ak 263. See also Lazaroff, op. cit.

44. See Susan Wolff, "Moral Saints," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 79 (1982), 419-39. 45. Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 158-59/Ak 155.

46. See especially Ibid., pp. 83-89/Ak 85-92.

47. I wish to acknowledge The National Endowment For The Humanities and James F. Childress for support during a Summer Seminar where I began research for this project in 1986. I presented an earlier version of this paper to the Central Division of the APA in 1986, and to the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, to whom I am very grateful for the honor of the

Richard M. Griffith Memorial Award.

Article Contentsp. 43p. 44p. 45p. 46p. 47p. 48p. 49p. 50p. 51p. 52

Issue Table of ContentsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1989), pp. 1-88Volume InformationAtheological Apologetics [pp. 1-17]Intention, Belief, and Intentional Action [pp. 19-30]Doxastic Freedom: A Compatibilist Alternative [pp. 31-41]The Limits of Kantian Duty, and Beyond [pp. 43-52]Marxism and Rationality [pp. 53-62]A Conception of Metaphysics [pp. 63-71]Are Filial Duties Unfounded? [pp. 73-80]Photographing a Fact? [pp. 81-84]The Editor's Page: Cultural Commonalities [p. 85-85]Books Received [p. 87-87]