2 State Immunity

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CONSTITUTIONAL I

File No. 2

e. Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit Article XVI, Sec. 3, CONSTITUTION

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

Gen. Rule : The State may not be sued without its consent.Basis : Sec. 3, Art. XVI of the Constitution.

Reason : There can be no legal right against the authoritywhich makes the law on which the rightdepends.

When considered a suit against the State:

1. The Republic is sued by name;2. Suits against an un incorporated government agency;3. Suits is against a government official, but is such that ultimate

liability shall devolve on the government:

a. When a public officer acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope ofhis authority, he can be held personally liable for damages.

b. BUT: If he acted pursuant to his official duties, without malice,negligence, or bad faith, he is not personally liable, and thesuit is really one against the State.

Application / Prohibition of the rule:

1. This rule applies not only in favor of the Philippines but also infavor of the foreign states.

2. The rule likewise prohibits a person from filing for interpleader,with the State as one of the defendants being compelled tointerplead.

CASES


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The Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) is part of thegovernment being in fact an office under the office of the Presidentand therefore, cannot be sued without the consent of the State.The consent to be effective must come from the State, actingthrough a duly enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel for

defendant RCA agreed to had no binding force in the government.That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority (Republic vs.Purisima, 78 SCRA 470).

The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damagesthat the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Topermit private respondents claim to prosper would violate thedoctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that theCommissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages itsustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government,it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a

suit against the State. The Bureau of Customs, along with theBureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power ofsovereignty, namely, taxation (Farolan vs. CTA, 217 SCRA 298).

It is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in herprivate or personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond thescope and even beyond her place of official functions, saidcomplaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on thegrounds relied upon by the petitioners because as a consequenceof the hypothetical admission of the truth of the allegations therein,the case falls within the exception to the doctrine of State

immunity (USA vs. Reyes, GR 79233, March 1, 1993).

Feliciano was holding property title to which was evidenced byan informacion posesoria. Proclamation no. 90 of PresidentMagsaysay included it among properties for subdivision anddistribution. Feliciano sued the Republic, represented by the LandAuthority, to recover possession of the land. The plaintiff hasimpleaded the Republic as defendant in an action for recovery ofownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State tocourt just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping apiece of property. The State pleaded immunity from suit. The suitagainst the State which under settled jurisprudence is notpermitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented tobe sued. Informacion posesoria had not been shown to have beenconverted into a record of ownership. It is nothing more than primafacie evidence of possession. Feliciano must pursue to prove title.The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory


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authority. Waiver of State Immunity can only be made by an act oflegislative body (Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424).

Forms of Consent

1. Express consent2. Implied consent

i) express consent

1. When he law expressly grants the authority to sue the Stateor any of its agencies.2. Examples:

a. A law creating a government body expressly

providing that such body may sue or be sued.b. Art 2180 of the Civil Code, which creates liability against the

State when it acts through a special agent.

CASES

Respondent Singson cause of action is a money claim against thegovernment for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost ofspare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways.Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, mandamus is not

remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State,but an ordinary action for specific performance. The suit is againstthe State which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Courtexcept with the consent of the State. The respondent should havefiled his claim with the general auditing office under the provisionof comm..act 327 which prescribe the condition under whichmoney claim against the government may be filed (Sayson vs.Singson, 54 SCRA 282).

By consenting to be sued, the State simply waives its immunityfrom suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff, or

create any cause of action in its favor, or extend its liability to anycause not previously recognized. It merely gives remedy toenforce a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction ofthe court. Subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. TheGovernment of the Philippines is only liable for the acts of itsagents, officers, and employees when they act as special agents. Aspecial agent is one who receives a definite and fix order or


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commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if heis a special official (Meritt vs. Government, 34 Phil 311).

By engaging in business through the instrumentality of acorporation, the government divests itself of its sovereign

character so as to render the corporation subject to the rulesgoverning the private corporations. Garnishment is a properremedy for a prevailing party to proceed against the funds of acorporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government. Itis well settled that when a government enters into commercialbusiness it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treatedjust like any other corporation (PNB vs. CIR, 81 SCRA 314).

Under its charter (RA 1161, Sec. 4K) the SSS can sue and besued. So, if assuming that the SSS enjoys immunity from suit as anentity performing governmental functions by virtue of the explicit

provision of the enabling law, it can be sued. The governmentmust be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS,although it does not thereby concede its liability (SSS vs. CA, 120 SCRA707).

ii) implied consent

1. When the State enters into a private contract. The contract must beentered into by the proper officer and within the scope of hisauthority. UNLESS: the contract is merely incidental to the

performance of a governmental function.

2. When the State enters into a business contract. UNLESS: Theoperation is incidental to the performance of a governmentalfunction (e.g. arrastre services). Thus, when the State conductbusiness operations through GOCC, the latter can be generally besued, even if its charter contains no express sue or be suedclause.

Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may besued (US v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 6440;

Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise ofsovereign functions. No implied consent (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487);

3. When it is a suit against an incorporated government agencyUnincorporateda. Performs governmental functions: not suable without State consenteven is performing proprietary function incidentally.


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b. Performs proprietary functions: suable.

4. When the State files suit against a private party UNLESS: the suit isentered into only to resist a claim..

CASES

When the State files an action, it divests itself of the sovereigncharacter and shed its immunity from suit, descending to the levelof an ordinary litigant (RP vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 85384, February 28,1990).

The claim for damages for the use of property against theintervenor dependant Republic of the Philippines to which it wastransferred cannot be maintained because of the immunity of the

State from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge against,or financial liability to, the Government and consequently cannotbe entertained by the courts except with the consent of thegovernment (Lim vs. Brownell, 107 Phil 344).

When the government enters into a commercial transaction, itabandons its sovereign capacity and it is to be treated like anyother corporation (Malong Vs. PNR, 138 SCRA 63).

National Irrigation Authority is a government agency vested withcorporate personality separate and distinct from the government

(Sec .1, RA 3601), thus is governed by the Corporation Law. UnderSec. 2, PD 552 NIA is allowed to collect fees and other charges asmaybe necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance, andinsurance and to recover the cost of construction, etc. NIA mayalso sue and be sued in court. It is authorized to exercise thepowers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as theyare not inconsistent with the provision of NIA charter (Fontanilla Vs.Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486).

The application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has beenrestricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii).The mantel of State immunity cannot be extended to commercial,private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). If the contract wasentered into the discharge of its governmental functions, thesovereign State cannot be deemed to have waived its immunityfrom suit (JUSMAG vs. NLRC, GR 198813, Dec. 15, 1994).


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Petitioner filed an action in the CFI of Zamboanga City for therevocation of a Deed of Donation which he had his wife had madeto the Bureau of Plant and Industry. He claimed that the doneefailed to comply with the condition of the donation. Ordinarily, asuit of this nature cannot prosper. It would, however, be manifestly

unfair for the government, as donee, which is alleged to haveviolated the condition under which it received gratuitously certainproperty, to invoke its immunity. Since it would be against equityand justice to allow such defense in this case, consent to be suedcould be presumed (Santiago vs. Republic, 87 SCRA 294).

When the government takes any property for public use, which iscondition upon the payment of just compensation, to be judiciallyascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction ofa court. The Court may proceed with the complaint and determinethe compensation to which the petitioner are entitle (Ministerio vs.

CFI, 40 SCRA 464).

iii) Consent to execution

Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution ofjudgment against it. Such execution will require another waiver,because the power of the court ends when the judgment is rendered,since government funds and properties may not be seized under writsof execution or garnishment, unless such disbursement is covered bythe corresponding appropriation as required by law (Republic v. Villasor, 54SCRA 84).

Rules Regarding Garnishment or Levy of Government Funds inGovernment Depository:

General Rule: Government funds deposited with PNB or authorizeddepositories cannot be subject to garnishment.

Exceptions:

1. where law or ordinance has already been enacted appropriating aspecific amount to pay a valid governmental obligation (Municipality of

San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, GR No. L-61744, June 25, 1984).

2. funds belonging to government corporations which can sue and besues that are deposited with a bank (PNB v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595).

Rules Regarding Payment of Interests by Government in MoneyJudgments Against it:


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General Rule: Government cannot be made to pay interests;

Exceptions:

1. eminent domain;

2. erroneous collection of taxes; or3. where government aggress to pay interest pursuant to law.

CASES

When a municipality fails or refuses without justifiable reason toeffect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, theclaimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compelthe enactment and approval of the necessary appropriationordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds

(Municipality of Makati vs. CA, 190 SCRA 206).

The rule is and has always been that all government fundsdeposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of thePhilippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalitiesremain government funds and may not be subject to garnishmentor levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation asrequired by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a statefrom suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when thejudgment is rendered. The functions and public services renderedby the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the

diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,as appropriated by law. However, the rule is not absolute andadmits of a well-defined exception, that it, when there is acorresponding appropriation is required by law. In such a case, themonetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes(City of Caloocan vs. Allarde, GR 107271, Sept. 10, 2003).

iv) Suits against foreignstates / international organizations

CASES

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See thestatus of a foreign sovereign. The privilege of sovereign immunityin this case was sufficiently established by the memorandum andcertification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Where the pleaof immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it


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is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrassthe executive arm of the government in conducting the countrysforeign relations. Pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention onDiplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity fromthe civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over

any real action relating to private immovable property situated inthe territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalfof the sending state for the purposes of the mission (Holy See vs.Rosario, GR 101949, December 1, 1994).

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State frombeing sued in the courts of another State without its consent orwaiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles ofindependence and equality of States. However, the rules ofInternational Law are not petrified; they are constantly developingand evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied,

it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereignand governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial andproprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunitynow extends only to acts jure imperii. A state may be said to havedescended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed tohave tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters intyobusiness contracts. The rule does not apply where the contractrelates to the exercise of its sovereign functions and is not forcommercial or business purposes (USA vs, Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487).

International law is founded largely upon the principles of

reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States whichwere adopted as part of the law of our land under Art. II, Sec. 2 ofthe 1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be suedwithout its consent is necessary consequence of the principles andindependence and equality of States. However, the increasingneed of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activitiesremotely connected with the discharge of their governmentalfunctions brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity.This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that immunity of thesovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jureimperii, but not with regard to private acts or jure gestionis. Is the

foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of business? If theforeign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercialactivity, or if the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or anincident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii (Republic of Indonesia vs.Vinzon, GR 154705, June 25, 2003).

Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by theimmunity agreement because our laws do not allow the


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commission of a crime in the name of official duty. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in hispersonal private capacity for whatever damage he may havecaused by his actdone with malice or in bad faith or beyond thescope of his authority or jurisdiction. Under the Vienna Convention

on Diplomatic Relations, the commission of a crime is not part ofofficial duty (Liang vs. People, GR 125865, January 28, 2002).

3) CITIZENSHIP AND SUFFRAGE

a) Citizenship Article IV, CONSTITUTION

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of theadoption of this Constitution;[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of thePhilippines;[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age ofmajority; and[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens ofthe Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to

acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who electPhilippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired inthe manner provided by law.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shallretain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, theyare deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the nationalinterest and shall be dealt with by law.

i) Concept,distinguished from nationality, kinds

Citizenship is a membership in a political community which ispersonal and more or less permanent in character. It is the status of


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being a citizen, or of owing allegiance to a certain State for theprivilege of being under its protection.

Citizenship is political in character, nationality refers to a racial orethnic relationship.

Who are citizens of the Philippines?

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoptionof the 1987 Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;3. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect

Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

Note: The election must be made within areasonable period

(within 3 yrs.) after reaching the age of majority.

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Caram Rule: Under the 1935 Constitution, those born in thePhilippines of foreign parent, who before the adoption of theConstitution had been elected to public office in the Philippines areconsidered Filipino citizens.

FPJ Disqualification Case: The 1935 Constitution, during whichregime FPJ had seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose

fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children arelegitimate or illegitimate (Tecson vs. Comelec, GR. No. 161434, March 3,2004).

Natural-born citizens:1. Citizens of the Philippines from birth who do not need to perform

any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.2. Those who elect Philippine citizenship under Art. IV, Sec. 1(3) of

1987 Constitution.

CASES

The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime inMarch 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whichprohibits alient to acquire private agricultural lands, save in casesof hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, wasdisqualified to acquire the land in question (Lee vs. Dir. Of Lands, GR128195, October 3, 2001).


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ii) Modes of acquisition

1. By birth

a. Jus Soli acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place of birth.b. Jus Sanguinis acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood

relationship.

2. By naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien andclothing him with the privilege of a native-born citizen.

Effects of naturalization:

1. On the wife:

Vests citizenship on the wife who might herself be lawfullynaturalized. She need not prove her qualifications but only that sheis not disqualified (Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Comm. Of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292).

2. On the minor children:i) if born in the Philippines automatically becomes a citizen;ii) If born abroad before the naturalization of the father

a) residing in RP at the time of naturalization automatically becomes citizens.

b) if not residing in RP at the time of naturalization considered citizen only during minority, unless

begins to reside permanently in the Phils.

iii) If born outside the Philippines after parents naturalizationconsidered Filipino, provided registered as such before any Phil.Consulate within 1 year after attaining majority age and takesoath of allegiance.

3. By marriage:Marriage of Filipino with an alien:General Rule: The Filipino retains Philippine

citizenship.Exception: If, by their act or omission they aredeemed under the law to have renounce it.


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CASES

The term natural-born citizens, is defined to include thosewho are citizen of the Philippines. From birth without having toperform any act to acquire or perfect their Phil. Citizenship.

Through the constitution history, four modes of acquiringcitizenship naturalization, jus soli, res judicata, jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, couldqualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long.With the adoption of the 1935 constitution and the reversal of Roain Tan Chong vs. Sec. of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or bloodrelationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship bybirth (Tecson vs. COMELEC, GR 161434, March 3, 2004).

Under Sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman

marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, become ipso facto aFilipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of thePhilippines under Sec. 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien womanmarried to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here followsthe Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he takes hisoath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from anydisqualifications under said Sec. 4. Ipso Facto as here use doesnot mean that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippinecitizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessary become suchcitizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirementsdo not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for

naturalization in order to acquire such status. Under the secondparagraph of Sec. 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized underthe law, who was born in the Philippine, becomes ipso facto acitizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationshipconcurs with the fact of a citizenship of his parent, and the timewhen child become a citizen does not depend upon the time thathe is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines (Moya Lim Yaovs Commissioner, 41 SCRA 292).

iii) Loss and

Reacquisition

How may one lose citizenship (C.A. No. 63)?

1. By naturalization in a foreign country.2. By express renunciation of citizenship.3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to the laws or constitution

of a foreign country.


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4. By serving in the armed forces of an enemy country.5. By cancellation of certificates of naturalization.6. By being a deserter of the armed forces of ones country.

How may one reacquire citizenship?

1. By direct act of Congress

RA 9225 Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.Approved on August 29, 2003 provides that, on taking the oath ofallegiance to the public:

a. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who have lost theirPhilippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizensof a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired Philippinecitizenship and

b. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after theeffectively of the said RA become citizens of a foreigncountry shall retain their Philippine citizenship.

2. By naturalization

3. By repatriation

By RA 8171 is an act providing for the repatriation of:

a. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by

marriage to aliens and;b. Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine

citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath ofallegiance to the Republic of the Phils. and registration in proper civilregistry and in Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of immigration shallthereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration andissue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to therepatriated citizen. It allows the person to recover or return to hisoriginal status before he lost his Philippine citizenship (Bengzon III v.

HRET, GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001).

Derivative Citizenship The unmarried child, whether legitimate,illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those whore-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of the said RA shall bedeemed citizens of the Philippines.


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CASES

Sec 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualifiedvoter must be among other qualifications, a citizen of thePhilippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage

under Art. 5, Sec.1, of the Constitution. Even if he did lose hisnaturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and couldnot have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in thePhilippines that he had earlier renounce. At best, what might havehappened as a result of a lose of his naturalized citizenship wasthat he became a stateless individual. Qualifications for publicoffice are continuing requirements and must be possessed not onlyat the time of appointment or election or assumption of office butduring the officers entire tenure (Frivaldo vs. Comelec, 174 SCRA 245).

Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act

of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Unlike innaturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry intoPhilippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a formernatural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire hisprevious citizenship. Philippine citizenship is an indispensablerequirement for holding an elective public office, and the purposeof the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that noalien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shallgovern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct frombeing a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first.

It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included asanother qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate theneed for nationality but to require that the official be registered asa voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern. A personmay subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenshipunder any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose (Frivaldovs. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727).

The term residence is to be understood not in its commonacceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather todomicile or legal residence,that is, the place where a party

actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, nomatter where he may be found at any given time, eventuallyintends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile oforigin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the placewhere the childs parents reside and continues until the same isabandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). Inthe case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras bybecoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965.


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From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquiredPhilippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right toreside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may haveallowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. The status ofbeing an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately,

when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiringPhilippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquiresPhilippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain animmigrant visa under Sec 13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thuswaive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he mayacquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473,as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he mayreacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act ofCongress, in which case he waives not only his status as an alienbut also his status as a non-resident alien (Coquilla vs. Comelec, GR

151914, July 31, 2002).

Art. IV, Sec. 1 (4) states that citizens are those whose mothersare citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age ofmajority, elect the Philippine citizenship. A minor who has not hadthe opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship, therefore, is still analien, his father being an alien. It is illogical that Delfin follow therepatriation of his Filipino mother since he was never a Filipino,therefore he could not reacquire it. No rule or right (even right ofmother to retain custody of a minor child) should frustrategovernment's action against violators of immigration laws

(Villahermosa vs. Commissioner, 80 Phil 541).

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2)by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond tothe two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and thenaturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizenof a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "arethose citizens of the Philippines from birth without having toperform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On

the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have becomeFilipino citizens through naturalization, generally underCommonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the RevisedNaturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law(Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, anapplicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications andnone of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipinocitizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes


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executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when thecourt is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicanthas (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawfulcalling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense orviolation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any

act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to anyGovernment announced policies.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may howeverreacquire the same in the manner provided by law. CommonwealthAct No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by whichPhilippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) bynaturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition ofPhilippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine

citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode

for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed byCommonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizenwho wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certainqualifications 17 and none of the disqualifications mentioned inSection 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutesby those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of thearmed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in

World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United Statesat any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and(5) political and economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance tothe Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in theLocal Civil Registry of the place where the person concernedresides or last resided.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories

of, Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1)those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17,1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority,elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were notconsidered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinosat birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because


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they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippinecitizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born ofFilipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and

who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority ageas natural-born. It is apparent from the enumeration of who arecitizens under the present Constitution that there are only twoclasses of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) thosewho are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not anaturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process ofnaturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is anatural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in saidenumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losingPhilippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reasontherefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-

born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of theircitizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for thereacquisition thereof(Bengson vs. HRET, GR 142840. May 7, 2001).

iv) Dual citizenship RA9925, RA 7160 Sec. 40

Distinction between dual citizenship from dual allegiance

Dual Citizenship Dual Allegiance

Arises when as a result of theconcurrent application of thelaws of two or more states, aperson is simultaneouslyconsidered a citizen of thosestates.

Involuntary

Refer to the situation in which aperson simultaneously owes bysome positive act, loyalty totwo or more states.

Is voluntary and illegal.

(Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630)

CASES

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The formerarises when, as a result of the concurrent application of thedifferent laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneouslyconsidered a national by the said states. For instance, such a


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situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of astate which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in astate which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipsofacto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrentlyconsidered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship

clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the followingclasses of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreigncountries which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alienfathers if by the laws of their fathers' country such children arecitizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country

the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omissionthey are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in whicha person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to twoor more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dualallegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Sec. 5 of the Constitutionprovides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the nationalinterest and shall be dealt with by law." The Court held that in

including Sec. 5 Art. IV on citizenship, the concern of theConstitutional Commission was not on dual citizens per se, but withnaturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countriesof origin even after their naturalization. By filing a certificate ofcandidacy when he ran for his present post, Manzano electedPhilippine citizenship and in effect renounced his Americancitizenship. What the law prohibits is dual allegiance, and not dualcitizenship (Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630).

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jussanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship

of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposedto the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality orcitizenship on the basis of place of birth. Private respondentRosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in NapierTerrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, TelesforoYbasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, andTheresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year beforethe 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served


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as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organicacts by which the United States governed the country. These werethe Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Actof August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. Under bothorganic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish

subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including theirchildren were deemed to be Philippine citizens. By virtue of thesame laws, Telesforo's daughter, herein private respondentRosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines (Vallesvs. Comelec, GR 137000, August 9, 2000).

b) Suffrage Article V, CONSTITUTION

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the

Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at leasteighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in thePhilippines for at least one year, and in the place wherein theypropose to vote, for at least six months immediately precedingthe election. No literacy, property, or other substantiverequirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securingthe secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system forabsentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabledand the illiterates to vote without the assistance of otherpersons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote underexisting laws and such rules as the Commission on Electionsmay promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

i) Concept, qualifications, occasions forexercise

Suffrage right to vote in elections.

Qualifications:

1. Citizen of the Philippines2. Not disqualified by law.3. At least 18 years old4. Resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year.


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5. Resident of the place wherein he/she proposes to vote for at least 6months immediately preceding the election.

Residency requirement under Art. V has 2 senses:

1. Domicile this is in reference to the 1 year residency requirementin the Philippines.

The principal elements of domicile physical presence in thecountry and intention to adopt it as ones domicile must concur.

2. Temporary Residence This is in reference to the 6 mos.Residency requirement in the place where one wants or intend tovote. Residence can either mean domicile or temporary residence.

CASES

The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee ofthe utmost significance. It is a right without which the principle ofsovereignty residing in the people becomes nugatory. It is apolitical right enabling every citizen to participate in the process ofgovernment to assure that it derives its power from the consent ofthe governed. The COMELEC is not empowered to decidequestions involving the right to vote. The power to determinewhether or not a person can exercise or precluded from exercisingthe right of suffrage is a judicial question, and the power to resolve

such question has been excluded from the Commission's power tobe judge of election contests (Pungutan vs. Abubakar, GR No. L-33541,

Januray 20, 1972).

If the provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lenditself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could beprohibited, then the challenge of unconstitutionality would bedifficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the Constitutionprohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has beenthe constant holding of the Court that this preferred freedom callsall the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is

the dissemination of information to make more meaningful theequally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, ineffect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil againstwhich this constitutional right is directed. The power of decision ofthe Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions. Itcould not have been otherwise, that respondent Commissioncannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law,and there is no higher law than the Constitution. There could be no


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justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuingfrom respondent Commission, the effect of which would be tonullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech (Mutuc vs.Comelec, 32 SCRA 228).

The right to abstain from voting for a position deserves the same

respect as the exercise of the right to vote. To compel theCOMELEC to conduct a special for the position of congressman asdemanded by petitioners would be to nullify the decisions of thevoters who cast their votes in the May 1992 elections (Caram vs.Comelec, GR No. 1052 14, August 30, 1993).

ii) Absentee voting Republic Act 9189

Sec. 4 of RA 9189 says: Sec. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the

Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law,at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, matvote for president, vice-president, senators and party-listrepresentatives.

This rule applies to those who have not lost their domicile in thePhilippines.

To whom does absentee voting apply?

1. Persons who have the qualifications of a voter but who happen to

be temporarily abroad.2. Qualified voters who are in the Philippines but are temporarily

absent from their voting places.

CASES

Sec. , Art. V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffragemay be exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) nototherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of age, (4)who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the

place where they propose to vote for at least six monthsimmediately preceding the election. Under Sec. 5(d) of RA 9189,one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanentresident who is recognized as such in the host country unlesshe/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resumeactual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not laterthan three years from approval of his/her registration under saidact.


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Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of an executionof an affidavit to qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrant orpermanent residents, to vote. He focuses solely on Section 1,Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to

Sec. 5 (d) of RA 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee voting byFilipinos abroad. It is clear from the discussions of the members ofthe Constitutional Commission that they intended to enfranchise asmuch as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have notabandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intendedto extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whoparents' domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider themqualified as voters for the first time. It is in pursuance of thatintention that the Commission provided for Sec. 2 immediatelyafter the residency requirement of Sec. 1. By the doctrine of

necessary implication in statutory construction, the strategiclocation of Sec. 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commissionprovided for an exception to the actual residency requirement ofSec. 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The samecommission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who arenot in the Philippines may be allowed to vote eventhough they donot satisfy the residency requirement in Sec. 1, Article V of theConstitution (Macalintal vs. Comelec, Gr No. 157013, July 10, 2003).

2 State Immunity

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