2 Garcillano vs. House of Representatives

8/4/2015 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 575

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014ef8afbd75161d3eaf000a0094004f00ee/p/ALA673/?username=Guest 1/80

G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.*

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLICINFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATIONAND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, andSUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.

G.R. No. 179275. December 23, 2008.*

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D.AGCAOILI, petitioners, vs. THE SENATE OF THEREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BYTHE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLEMANUEL VILLAR, respondent.

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitionerinintervention.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C.AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON,LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, andANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondentsintervenors.

Remedial Law; Actions; Legal Standing; Concept of legalstanding or locus standi explained in Tolentino vs COMELEC.—In Tolentino v. COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438 (2004), we explainedthat “ ‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal andsubstantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained orwill sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmentalact x x x,” thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate onlywhen (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actualor threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of thegovernment; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challengedaction; and (3) the injury



_______________

* EN BANC.

171

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 171

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on PublicInformation, Public Order and Safety, National Defense andSecurity, Information and Communications Technology, and

Suffrage and Electoral Reforms

is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The gist of thequestion of standing is whether a party has “alleged such apersonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issuesupon which the court so largely depends for illumination ofdifficult constitutional questions.”

Same; Same; Same; In recent cases, Court has relaxed thestringent direct injury test.—Considering that locus standi is amere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, hasrelaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. MacapagalArroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), articulates that a “liberal policy hasbeen observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress,and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving theconstitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.” Thefairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008), evenpermitted a nonmember of the broadcast media, who failed toallege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, tochallenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the NationalTelecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case,echoed the current policy that “this Court has repeatedly andconsistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impedimentsto its addressing and resolving serious legal questions thatgreatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court’s dutyunder the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not otherbranches of government have kept themselves within the limits ofthe Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused thediscretion given to them.”

Same; Same; Moot and Academic; Court dismissed G.R. No.170338 for being moot and academic; The exercise by the Court ofjudicial power is limited to the determination and resolution ofactual cases and controversies.—The Court, however, dismisses

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014ef8afbd75161d3eaf000a0094004f00ee/p/ALA673/?username=Jeric#body_ftn1



G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedlystressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise bythis Court of judicial power is limited to the determination andresolution of actual cases and controversies. By actual cases, wemean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicialdetermination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise thedecision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. Thepower of judicial inquiry does

172

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED



not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt atabstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legalquestions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case inwhich no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes mootwhen its purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge inacademic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as ajudgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in thenature of things, cannot be enforced.

Constitutional Law; Legislative Inquiry; Senate cannot beallowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislativeinquiry without duly published rules of procedure; The requisite ofpublication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basicrequirements of due process.—As to the petition in G.R. No.179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowedto continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquirywithout duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation ofthe constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House ofRepresentatives, or any of its respective committees may conductinquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its dulypublished rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of therules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height ofinjustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for thetransgression of a law or rule of which he had no noticewhatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes



publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, whichprovides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following thecompletion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or ina newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.” Therespondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and evenon oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure GoverningInquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapersof general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect tothe present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which theterm of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effortwas undertaken for the publication of these rules when they firstopened their session.

173

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 173



Same; Same; The absence of any amendment to the rulescannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguouslanguage of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution; Theconstitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over anycustom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.—Respondents justify their nonobservance of the constitutionallymandated publication by arguing that the rules have never beenamended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published inbooklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to thepublic at the Senate’s internet web page. The Court does notagree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justifythe Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language ofSection 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic lawinstructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees mayconduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with dulypublished rules of procedure, and does not make any distinctionwhether or not these rules have undergone amendments orrevision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rulesprevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by theSenate.

Same; Same; Statutes; Internet; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792,otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, does notmake the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and



regulations.—The invocation by the respondents of the provisionsof R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic CommerceAct of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through theinternet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers anelectronic data message or an electronic document as thefunctional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiarypurposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes theadmissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronicdata messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make theinternet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Same; Same; The recent publication does not cure the infirmity ofthe inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions.—TheSenate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicialnotice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure theinfirmity of the

174




inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar asthe consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigationsubject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondentSenate Committees, because no published rules governed it, inclear contravention of the Constitution.

PUNO, C.J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Legislative Inquiry; A faithful adherenceof the case at bar to the Neri Ruling would yield the conclusionthat the “Garci tapes” investigation may be conducted even withoutthe published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, and thatonly those orders and proceedings that result in the violation of therights of the witnesses may be considered null and void.—It will berecalled that in the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court struckdown not the entire proceedings of the Senateinvestigation on the NBNZTE deal for want of publishedRules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, but only the Orderdated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri incontempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and



detention (January 30 Contempt Order) as stated in thedispositive portion of the Decision. A faithful adherence of thecase at bar to the Neri Ruling would yield the conclusion thatthe “Garci tapes” investigation may be conducted even withoutthe published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, and thatonly those orders and proceedings that result in the violation ofthe rights of the witnesses may be considered null and void. Theponencia did not, however, show which orders or proceedingsresulted in this violation and, instead, made a blanket prohibitionof the conduct of the “Garci tapes” investigation for want ofpublished Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries.

Same; Same; In both the March 25 Neri Decision and theSeptember 4 Neri Resolution, the Court did not invalidate theentire Senate investigation proceedings conducted in accordancewith the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, which were notpublished in the 14th Congress.—In both the March 25 NeriDecision and the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Courtdid not invalidate the entire Senate investigation proceedingsconducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure GoverningInquiries, which were not

175

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 175



published in the 14th Congress. In fact, the Court ruled on theissue of executive privilege raised in said proceedings. It struckdown only the January 30 Contempt Order against thereinpetitioner Neri for failure to comply with Section 18 of the Rulesof Procedure Governing Inquiries, while at the same time holdingthese rules as constitutionally infirm for want of publication.

Same; Same; The continuing effectivity of the Senate Rulesfrom one Congress to the next, which the Court acknowledged in itsSeptember 4 Neri Resolution, evinces the nature of the Senate as acontinuing body governed by its continuing Senate Rules.—Thecontinuing effectivity of the Senate Rules from oneCongress to the next, which the Court acknowledged in itsSeptember 4 Neri Resolution, evinces the nature of theSenate as a continuing body governed by its continuingSenate Rules. If the Senate were not a continuing body, there



would be no reason for the Senate Rules to likewise have acontinuing effect. In contradistinction, the effectivity of the Rulesof Proceedings of the House of Representatives (House Rules)—which is admittedly not a continuing body, as the terms of allcongressmen end at the same time—terminates upon theexpiration of one Congress. Thus, Rule 1, Section 1 of the 14thCongress House Rules adopted on November 20, 2007 reflects thepractice of the House of Representatives of adopting rules ofproceedings on its first meeting and organization upon theopening of a succeeding Congress.

Same; Same; As a general rule, onetime publication sufficesto satisfy the due process requirement to inform the public of a rulethat would govern it and affect its rights.—As a general rule, onetime publication suffices to satisfy the due process requirement toinform the public of a rule that would govern it and affect itsrights. It is not uncommon for laws and rules to provide that theyshall take effect upon a certain date following publication in anewspaper of general circulation without having to state that they“shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed” forthem to have continuing effect. These laws and rules arepublished only once, and yet they continue to be in force. TheCourt itself employs this language in its rules as shown in therecently promulgated Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data and Ruleon the Writ of Amparo.

176




Same; Same; The exception to the general rule that onetimepublication suffices for a law or rule to have continuing effect iswhen there are circumstances or factors that interrupt thiscontinuity.—The exception to the general rule that onetimepublication suffices for a law or rule to have continuing effect iswhen there are circumstances or factors that interrupt thiscontinuity. An example is the discontinuation of the existence ofthe House of Representatives as a legislative body, whichterminates the effectivity of its published Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries and requires the publication of these rules inthe succeeding Congress for them to take effect. As discussed



above and in my Dissents to the March 25 Neri Decision andSeptember 4 Neri Resolution, the Senate, unlike the House ofRepresentatives, is a continuing body. Thus, contrary to theholding of the ponencia, the Senate’s Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries, sans amendment, need not be published bythe Senate of every Congress and need not also state that theyshall “remain in force until they are amended or repealed” forthem to be effective from one Congress to the next. Quite theopposite of the ponencia’s ruling, in the absence of languagestating that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries shall notcontinue in effect from one Congress to the next, these rules shallhave continuing effect.

Same; AntiWiretapping Law; What Republic Act (R.A.) 4200penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting orrecording private communications by means of the devicesenumerated therein.—A private communication is characterizedas such based not on the content of the communication, but on thecontext that it was said in private and not for publicconsumption. That the content or nature of the communicationis immaterial was ruled in Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248SCRA 590 (1995), viz.: ... the nature of the conversations isimmaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of thesame need not be specifically alleged in the information.What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretlyoverhearing, intercepting or recording privatecommunications by means of the devices enumeratedtherein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secretrecording of a private communication by means of a tape recorderwould suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A.4200.

177

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 177



Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 provides forexceptions when wiretapping is allowed by written order of thecourt.—R.A. No. 4200, however, provides for exceptions whenwiretapping is allowed by written order of the court under Section3, viz.: Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall



render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who isauthorized by a written order of the Court, to execute anyof the acts declared to be unlawful in the two precedingsections in cases involving the crimes of treason,espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war,piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy andproposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting tosedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised PenalCode, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,punishing espionage and other offenses against nationalsecurity: Provided, That such written order shall only be issuedor granted upon written application and the examination underoath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he mayproduce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds tobelieve that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has beencommitted or is being committed or is about to be committed:Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses ofrebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting torebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting tosedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proofthat a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, haveactually been or are being committed; (2) that there arereasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtainedessential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of,or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there areno other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 makes illegallywiretapped communications inadmissible in any proceeding.—Tofurther give teeth to the above prohibition, R.A. No. 4200 makesillegally wiretapped communications inadmissible in anyproceeding, viz.: Section 4. Any communication or spoken word,or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaningof the same or any part thereof, or any information thereincontained obtained or se

178






cured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of thisAct shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,quasijudicial, legislative or administrative hearing orinvestigation.

Same; Same; The exception under Section 1 in relation toSection 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 does not include the useof illegally wiretapped communication for purposes of prosecutingviolations of R.A. No. 4200 itself.—The exception under Section 1in relation to Section 3 of R.A. No. 4200 does not include the useof illegally wiretapped communication for purposes of prosecutingviolations of R.A. No. 4200 itself as the Court did in Ramirez.Not reading this exception into the law would impede theprosecution of the acts it prohibits and contradict the verypurpose for adopting the law as clearly stated in its title, “An Actto Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other RelatedViolations of the Privacy of Communication, and for OtherPurposes.” Wellsettled is the rule in statutory construction that“where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoidinconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.” Interpretatio talisin ambiguis semper frienda est, ut evitatur inconveniens etabsurdum. R.A. No. 4200 should be given a sensible construction,so as to give effect to its rationale and intent and thus avoid anunjust or absurd interpretation. The ineluctable conclusion is thatthe use of illegally wiretapped communication must be allowed ina prosecution under R.A. No. 4200 precisely to deter thecommission of illegal wiretapping.

REYES, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Remedial Law; Actions; Moot and Academic; While it is true thatthe Court is not absolutely precluded from resolving issues that areotherwise moot, no compelling circumstance is present here thatwould warrant the exercise of judicial review.—One of therequisites of judicial power is the presence of an actualcontroversy. Courts are prohibited from deciding hypothetical,conjectural or anticipatory questions despite their vast judicialpower. Otherwise, a decision rendered would amount to nothingbut an advisory opinion, which would not augur well with thefunction of courts as arbiters of con

179

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 179

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on PublicInformation, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and



Security, Information and Communications Technology, andSuffrage and Electoral Reforms

troversies. While it is true that the Court is not absolutelyprecluded from resolving issues that are otherwise moot, nocompelling circumstance is present here that would warrant theexercise of judicial review.

Same; Same; Same; When a case is impressed with publicinterest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.—Courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which wouldresult in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are tools crafted tofacilitate, not to frustrate, the attainment of justice. Thus, theirstrict and rigid application, if they result in technicalities thattend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must beeschewed. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigidand technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency.When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of theapplication of the rules is in order. Time and again, this Court hassuspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from theiroperation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.

Constitutional Law; Legislative Inquiry; There is nothing inthe constitutional provision that commands that every newCongress must publish its rules of procedure.—The Constitutionalprovision requiring publication of Senate rules is contained inSection 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which reads: TheSenate or the House of Representatives or any of its respectiveCommittees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation inaccordance with its duly published rules of procedure. Therights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shallbe respected. The above provision only requires a “dulypublished” rule of procedure for inquiries in aid of legislation. Itis silent on republication. There is nothing in the constitutionalprovision that commands that every new Congress must publishits rules of procedure. Implicitly, republication is necessary onlywhen there is an amendment or revision to the rules. This isrequired under the due process clause of the Constitution.

180

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDGarcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees onPublic Information, Public Order and Safety, National

Defense and Security, Information and CommunicationsTechnology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms



SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Eddie U. Tamondong, Tomas A. Garcillano and

Rodolfo G. Palattao for Virgilio O. Garcillano. M.M. Lazaro & Associates for petitioners. Ongkiko, Kalaw, Manhit & Acorda Law Offices for

petitioner in G.R. No. 179275. Leonardo B. Palicte III for public respondents. Gana & Manlangit Law Office for respondents

intervenors.

NACHURA, J.:More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a

wiretapped conversation purportedly between thePresident of the Philippines and a highranking official ofthe Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. Theycaptured unprecedented public attention and thrust thecountry into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of thepresent administration on the line, and resulted in thenearcollapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes,notoriously referred to as the “Hello Garci” tapes, allegedlycontained the President’s instructions to COMELECCommissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in herfavor results of the 2004 presidential elections. Theserecordings were to become the subject of heated legislativehearings conducted separately by committees of bothHouses of Congress.1

_______________

1 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.

181

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 181Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees onPublic Information, Public Order and Safety, National


In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8,2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero


iAnnotate User

Highlight



delivered a privilege speech, “Tale of Two Tapes,” and setin motion a congressional investigation jointly conductedby the Committees on Public Information, Public Order andSafety, National Defense and Security, Information andCommunications Technology, and Suffrage and ElectoralReforms (respondent House Committees). During theinquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversationemerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. AlanPaguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy DirectorSamuel Ong submitted to the respondent HouseCommittees seven alleged “original” tape recordings of thesupposed threehour taped conversation. After prolongedand impassioned debate by the committee members on theadmissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapeswere eventually played in the chambers of the House.2

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committeesdecided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless,they decided to prepare committee reports based on thesaid recordings and the testimonies of the resourcepersons.3

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O.Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition forProhibition and Injunction, with Prayer for TemporaryRestraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4

docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that therespondent House Committees be restrained from usingthese tape recordings of the “illegally obtained” wiretappedconversations in their committee reports and for any otherpurpose. He further implored that the said recordings andany reference thereto be ordered

_______________

2 Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 79.3 Id., at p. 9.4 Id., at pp. 138.

182






iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight



stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondentHouse Committees directed to desist from further using therecordings in any of the House proceedings.5

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussionand debates on the “Garci tapes” abruptly stopped.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator PanfiloLacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilegespeech, “The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness.” In hisdiscourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public“the whole unvarnished truth—the what’s, when’s, where’s,who’s and why’s” of the alleged wiretap, and sought aninquiry into the perceived willingness oftelecommunications providers to participate in nefariouswiretapping activities.

On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, SenatorLacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee onNational Defense and Security, chaired by Senator RodolfoBiazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking toregulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretappingequipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of thePhilippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7

In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, alengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon airedhis concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act(R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislativeinquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, SenatorMiriam DefensorSantiago delivered a privilege speech,articulating her considered view that the Constitutionabsolutely bans the use, pos

_______________

5 Id., at pp. 3638.6 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215220.7 Id., at p. 169.8 An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related

Violations of the Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.

183


Defense and Security, Information and Communications





iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight



Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms

session, replay or communication of the contents of the“Hello Garci” tapes. However, she recommended alegislative investigation into the role of the IntelligenceService of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Policeor other government entities in the alleged illegalwiretapping of public officials.9

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada andOswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals,filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition withPrayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Orderand/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R.No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting itsscheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main thatthe intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 andSection 3, Article III of the Constitution.11

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senateproceeded with its public hearings on the “Hello Garci”tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q.Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G.Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. JambyA.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed theirComment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007.

_______________

9 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169170.10 Id., at pp. 317.11 Id., at pp. 713.12 Id., at p. 24.13 Id., at p. 44.14 Memorandum of RespondentsIntervenors, p. 6.15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 6870.16 Id., at pp. 7190.

184











iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight



The Court subsequently heard the case on oralargument.17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a memberof the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned bythe Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved tointervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18

On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidateG.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19

It may be noted that while both petitions involve the“Hello Garci” recordings, they have different objectives—the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes inthe House and their subsequent inclusion in the committeereports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop theconduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretappedconversation.

The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338,and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.

_______________

17 Id., at p. 62. The Court identified the following issues for discussionin the October 2, 2007 Oral Argument:

1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit.2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate

Committees governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation havebeen published, in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of theConstitution. Corollarily:

(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the

constitutional requirement.3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the socalled “Garci

tapes,” violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or RepublicAct No. 4200. (Id., at p. 66.)

18 Motion for Leave to Intervene and PetitioninIntervention filed onOctober 26, 2007.

19 Resolution dated November 20, 2007.

185






iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight



I Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court

shall first resolve the issue on the parties’ standing, arguedat length in their pleadings.

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that “ ‘[l]egalstanding’ or locus standi refers to a personal andsubstantial interest in a case such that the party hassustained or will sustain direct injury because of thechallenged governmental act x x x,” thus,

“generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he canshow that he has personally suffered some actual or threatenedinjury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3)the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.”21

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has“alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of thecontroversy as to assure that concrete adverseness whichsharpens the presentation of issues upon which the courtso largely depends for illumination of difficultconstitutional questions.”22

However, considering that locus standi is a mereprocedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, hasrelaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v.MacapagalArroyo23 articulates that a “liberal policy hasbeen observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members ofCongress, and civic organizations to prosecute actionsinvolving the constitutionality or

_______________

20 465 Phil. 385, 402; 420 SCRA 438, 452 (2004).21 Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, id.22 Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429

SCRA 736, 755.23 G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and

171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.

186









validity of laws, regulations and rulings.”24 The fairlyrecent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a nonmemberof the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personalstake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge theacts of the Secretary of Justice and the NationalTelecommunications Commission. The majority, in the saidcase, echoed the current policy that “this Court hasrepeatedly and consistently refused to wield proceduralbarriers as impediments to its addressing and resolvingserious legal questions that greatly impact on publicinterest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987Constitution to determine whether or not other branches ofgovernment have kept themselves within the limits of theConstitution and the laws, and that they have not abusedthe discretion given to them.”26

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies hisstanding to initiate the petition by alleging that he is theperson alluded to in the “Hello Garci” tapes. Further, hiswas publicly identified by the members of the respondentcommittees as one of the voices in the recordings.27

Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to bedirectly injured by the House committees’ actions andcharges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes hisstanding to institute the petition for prohibition.

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoilijustify their standing by alleging that they are concernedcitizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are ofthe firm conviction that any attempt to use the “HelloGarci” tapes will further divide the country. They wish tosee the legal and proper use of public funds that willnecessarily be defrayed in

_______________

24 David v. MacapagalArroyo, id., at p. 218.25 G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.26 Id.27 Reply in G.R. No. 170338, pp. 3637.

187









the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by thecontinuous violation of the laws and individual rights, andthe blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processesthrough the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly inaid of legislation.28

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to dueprocess considering that he is summoned to attend theSenate hearings without being apprised not only of hisrights therein through the publication of the Senate Rulesof Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, butalso of the intended legislation which underpins theinvestigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayerbewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of publicfunds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege aninterest in the execution of the laws and that intervenorSagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 theysatisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of thecontroversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The Houseof Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada’sand Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that thecontinuous conduct by the Senate of the questionedlegislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditureof public funds.32 It should be noted that in Francisco,rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of theHouse of Represen

_______________

28 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4.29 PetitioninIntervention, p. 3.30 David v. MacapagalArroyo, supra note 23, at p. 223.31 460 Phil. 830; 415 SCRA 44 (2003).32 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, id., at p. 897; p. 141.

188










tatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitionerstherein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked thevindication of their own rights—as taxpayers, members ofCongress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, andmembers of the bar and of the legal profession—which werealso supposedly violated by the therein assailedunconstitutional acts.33

Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advanceconstitutional issues which deserve the attention of thisCourt in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight asprecedents. The issues are of transcendental andparamount importance not only to the public but also to theBench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidanceof all.34

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and giventhe liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing inthe more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes thelegal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili andintervenor Sagge.

II The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being

moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our priordecisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court ofjudicial power is limited to the determination andresolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actualcases, we mean existing

_______________

33 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 31, at p.895; p. 136.

34 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232SCRA 110, 139.

35 Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 184 Phil. 369, 377; 95 SCRA392, 400 (1980). This case explains the standards that have to be followedin the exercise of the power of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence ofan appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and

189

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 189






Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees onPublic Information, Public Order and Safety, National


conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, notconjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of theCourt will amount to an advisory opinion. The power ofjudicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questionsbecause any attempt at abstraction could only lead todialectics and barren legal questions and to sterileconclusions unrelated to actualities.36 Neither will theCourt determine a moot question in a case in which nopractical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot whenits purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulgein academic discussion of a case presenting a moot questionas a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legaleffect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.38

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores fromthe Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctivewrit to prohibit the respondent House Committees fromplaying the tape recordings and from including the same intheir committee report. He likewise prays that the saidtapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings.But the Court notes that the recordings were alreadyplayed in the House and heard by its members.39 There isalso the widely publicized fact that the committee reportson the “Hello Garci” inquiry were completed and submittedto the House in

_______________

substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the pleathat the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) thenecessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order todecide the case.

36 La BugalB’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860,889890; 441 SCRA 148, 178 (2004).

37 Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, 496SCRA 13, 46.

38 Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454SCRA 130, 138.

39 Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), p. 9.

190









plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having beenovertaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to bedismissed for being moot and academic. After all,prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing ofan act about to be done, and not intended to provide aremedy for an act already accomplished.41

III

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grantsthe same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue withthe conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry withoutduly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of theconstitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitlyprovides that “[t]he Senate or the House ofRepresentatives, or any of its respective committees mayconduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with itsduly published rules of procedure.” The requisite ofpublication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basicrequirements of due process.42 Publication is indeedimperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish orotherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law orrule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even aconstructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set

_______________

40 See news article “Separate findings, no closure” by Michael LimUmbac published in The Philippine Daily Inquirer on March 29, 2006;News item “5 House committees in ‘Garci’ probe file report on Monday”published in The Manila Bulletin on March 25, 2006.

41 Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150,January 5, 1994, 229 SCRA 117, 135136; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil.515, 517 (1949).

42 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary,1996 ed., p. 679.

43 Tañada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 432433; 136 SCRA 27, 38 (1985).





iAnnotate User

Highlight



191



forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that“[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following thecompletion of their publication either in the OfficialGazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in thePhilippines.”44

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in theirpleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rulesof Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation hadbeen published in newspapers of general circulation only in1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate ofthe 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of itsmembers commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort wasundertaken for the publication of these rules when theyfirst opened their session.

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this verysame question. In Neri v. Senate Committee onAccountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 wesaid:

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG thatrespondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VIof the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordancewith the “duly published rules of procedure.” We quote theOSG’s explanation:

The phrase “duly published rules of procedure” requiresthe Senate of every Congress to publish its rules ofprocedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation becauseevery Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years foronehalf of the Sen

_______________

44 As amended on June 18, 1987 by Executive Order No. 200 entitled“Providing for the Publication of Laws Either in the Official Gazette or in aNewspaper of General Circulation in the Philippines as a Requirement for theirEffectivity.”



iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight



45 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 179; Memorandum of RespondentsIntervenors,pp. 910.

46 G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135136.

192

192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDGarcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on PublicInformation, Public Order and Safety, National Defense andSecurity, Information and Communications Technology, and


ate’s membership, the composition of the Senate alsochanges by the end of each term. Each Senate may thusenact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not havingpublished its Rules of Procedure, the subjecthearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14thSenate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting andConcurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with thefollowing rationalization:

“The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer acontinuing legislative body. The present Senate has twentyfourmembers, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a termof six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires everythree years, leaving less than a majority of Senators tocontinue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, likethe 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to‘constitute a quorum to do business.’ Applying the same reasoningin Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution isnot a continuing body because less than majority of the Senatorscontinue into the next Congress. The consequence is that theRules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after everyexpiry of the term of twelve Senators.”47

The subject was explained with greater lucidity in ourResolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in thesame case, viz.:

“On the nature of the Senate as a ‘continuing body,’ this Courtsees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate thatthe Senate as an institution is ‘continuing,’ as it is not dissolvedas an entity with each national election or change in thecomposition of its members. However, in the conduct of its daytoday business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and





independently of the

_______________

47 Id., at pp. 297298.48 Dated September 4, 2008.

193

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 193Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on PublicInformation, Public Order and Safety, National Defense andSecurity, Information and Communications Technology, and


Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itselfconfirms this when it states:

RULE XLIVUNFINISHED BUSINESS

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of thesession shall be taken up at the next session in the samestatus.

All pending matters and proceedings shallterminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress,but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presentfor the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters andproceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislativeinvestigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress areconsidered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress andit is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress totake up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but asif presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of sucha rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of thesucceeding Congress (which will typically have a differentcomposition as that of the previous Congress) should not be boundby the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had nopart. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to theconduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemedterminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as amatter of course, continue into the next Congress with the samestatus.

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institutionand of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business isreflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’smain rules of procedure) states:





RULE LIAMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which theSenators elected in the preceding elections shall begin theirterm of office, the President may endorse the Rules to theappropriate committee for amendment or revision.

194



The Rules may also be amended by means of a motionwhich should be presented at least one day before itsconsideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senatorspresent in the session shall be required for its approval.

RULE LIIDATE OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date oftheir adoption and shall remain in force until they areamended or repealed.

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into accountthe new composition of the Senate after an election and thepossibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the startof each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begintheir term.However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that itsmain rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoptionuntil they are amended or repealed. Such language isconspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state“(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication intwo (2) newspapers of general circulation.” The latter does notexplicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules untilthey are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in thelanguage of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumedthat the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into thenext Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adoptdifferent rules for its legislative inquiries which come within therule on unfinished business.The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitutionrequiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with theduly published rules of procedure is categorical. It isincumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative

iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight



inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rulesclearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequentCongresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficientlyput public on notice.If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules onlegislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, itcould have

195



easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rulesregarding effectivity.”

Respondents justify their nonobservance of theconstitutionally mandated publication by arguing that therules have never been amended since 1995 and, despitethat, they are published in booklet form available toanyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’sinternet web page.49

The Court does not agree. The absence of anyamendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’sdefiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic lawinstructs, without more, that the Senate or its committeesmay conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only inaccordance with duly published rules of procedure, anddoes not make any distinction whether or not these ruleshave undergone amendments or revision. The constitutionalmandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom,practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raisedby the respondents is illuminating:

“The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of theSenate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is notsufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requirespublication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that therules “shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)newspapers of general circulation,” precluding any other form of

iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight



publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatoryto comply with the due process requirement because the Rules ofProcedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates theRules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.”

_______________

49 TSN, Oral Arguments, March 4, 2008, (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 413414.

196



The invocation by the respondents of the provisions ofR.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the ElectronicCommerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of validpublication through the internet is all the more incorrect.R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or anelectronic document as the functional equivalent of awritten document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In otherwords, the law merely recognizes the admissibility inevidence (for their being the original) of electronic datamessages and/or electronic documents.52 It does

_______________

50 Entitled “An Act Providing for the Recognition and Use of ElectronicCommercial and NonCommercial Transactions and Documents, Penaltiesfor Unlawful Use Thereof and For Other Purposes,” approved on June 14,2000.

51 MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R.No. 170633, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 408. (Emphasis supplied.)

52 Sections 6, 7 and 10 of R.A. No. 8792 read:Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages.—Information shall

not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the groundsthat it is in the data message purporting to give rise to such legal effect, orthat it is merely referred to in that electronic data message.

Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents.—Electronicdocuments shall have the legal effect, validity or enforceability as anyother document or legal writing, and—





iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight



(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, thatrequirement is met by an electronic document if the said electronicdocument maintains its integrity and reliability, and can be authenticatedso as to be usable for subsequent reference, in that—

(i) The electronic document has remained complete andunaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and anyauthorized change, or any change which arises in the normal courseof communication, storage and display; and

197



not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rulesand regulations.

_______________

(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of thepurpose for which it was generated and in the light of all therelevant circumstances.

(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in theform of an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences forthe document not being presented or retained in its original form.

(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retainedin its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic document if—

(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of thedocument from the time when it was first generated in its finalform; and

(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the personto whom it is to be presented: Provided, That no provision of thisAct shall apply to vary any and all requirements of existing laws onformalities required in the execution of documents for theirvalidity.

For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be thefunctional equivalent of a written document under existing laws.

This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to theadmissibility of electronic data messages or electronic documents, exceptthe rules relating to authentication and best evidence.

Sec. 10. Original Documents.—(1) Where the law requires

iAnnotate User

Highlight



information to be presented or retained in its original form, thatrequirement is met by an electronic data message or electronic documentif:

(a) The integrity of the information from the time when it wasfirst generated in its final form, as an electronic data message orelectronic document is shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and

(b) Where it is required that information be presented, that theinformation is capable of being displayed to the person to whom itis to be presented.

198



Given this discussion, the respondent SenateCommittees, therefore, could not, in violation of theConstitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislativeinquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct ofinquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to bedeferred until it shall have caused the publication of therules, because it can do so only “in accordance with its dulypublished rules of procedure.”

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of theSenate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid ofLegislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of ManilaBulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of thisfact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity ofthe inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions.Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, thelegislative investigation subject thereof still could not beundertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, becauseno published rules governed it, in clear contravention of theConstitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds itunnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in theconsolidated petitions.

_______________

(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in theform of an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for

iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight



the information not being presented or retained in its original form.(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):

(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether theinformation has remained complete and unaltered, apart from theaddition of any endorsement and any change which arises in thenormal course of communication, storage and display; and

(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in thelight of the purpose for which the information was generated and inthe light of all relevant circumstances.

199



WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 isDISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 isGRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoiningthe Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any ofits committees from conducting any inquiry in aid oflegislation centered on the “Hello Garci” tapes.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga, ChicoNazario, Velasco,Jr., LeonardoDe Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.

Puno (C.J.), Please see Dissent.YnaresSantiago, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of

C.J. Puno.AustriaMartinez, J., I join the C.J. in his Dissent.Azcuna, J., I join the C.J. in his Dissent.Corona, J., On Leave.CarpioMorales, J., I join the Dissent of the Chief

Justice.Reyes, J., See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

PUNO, C.J.:The case at bar takes one to task in distinguishing

between what is apparent and what is real, what is centraland what is peripheral, to get to the core of the issues thatwill decide the controversy at bar.



The facts pertaining to both G.R. No. 170338 and G.R.No. 179275 as narrated in the ponencia are undisputed.Hence, I will go direct to the issues.

200



First, the issues in G.R. No. 179275. These weredelineated in the Oral Argument held on October 2, 2007as follows:

1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit.2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the

Senate Committees governing the conduct of inquiries in aid oflegislation have been published, in accordance with Section 21,Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:

(a) Whether these Rules must be published by everyCongress.

(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with theconstitutional requirement.

3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the socalled“Garci tapes” violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitutionand/or Republic Act No. 4200.1

As I agree with the disquisition of the ponencia on thefirst issue, I shall limit my discussion to the second andthird issues.Publication of Senate Rules Governing Inquiries in Aid of LegislationLet me hark back to the ruling of the Court on thepublication of the “Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiriesin Aid of Legislation” (Rules of Procedure GoverningInquiries) of the Senate in its March 25, 2008 Decision2

(March 25 Neri Decision) and September 4, 2008Resolution3 (September 4

_______________

1 Rollo, G.R. No. 179275, p. 94.2 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and


iAnnotate User

Highlight



Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and SenateCommittee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25,2008, 549 SCRA 77.

3 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers andInvestigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and

201



Neri Resolution). I respectfully submit that the ponenciais not in accord with the ruling of the Court in these Nericases (Neri Ruling). The proper application of the NeriRuling to the case at bar will yield the conclusion that thesubject Senate investigation should be allowed to proceedeven if the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries werenot published in the 14th Congress prior to the subjectinvestigation. Still, I maintain my dissent to the NeriRuling and arrive at this same conclusion through adifferent track.

In the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court ruled, viz.:

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG thatrespondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VIof the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordancewith the “duly published rules of procedure.” We quote theOSG’s explanation:

The phrase ‘duly published rules of procedure’ requiresthe Senate of every Congress to publish its rules ofprocedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation becauseevery Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years foronehalf of the Senate’s membership, the composition of theSenate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senatemay thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit.Not having published its Rules of Procedure, thesubject hearings in aid of legislation conducted bythe 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.4

_______________




iAnnotate User

Highlight



Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643,September 4, 2008, 564 SCRA 152.

4 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers andInvestigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and SenateCommittee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25,2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135136.

202



Subsequently, the Court clarified the above ruling in theSeptember 4 Neri Resolution. I quote the ruling atlength, viz.:

“Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed torespondent Committees’ fourth argument. RespondentCommittees argue that the Senate does not have to publish itsRules because the same was published in 1995 and in 2006.Further, they claim that the Senate is a continuing body; thus, itis not required to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealedor amended.

On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body,” this Courtsees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate thatthe Senate as an institution is “continuing”, as it is notdissolved as an entity with each national election or change in thecomposition of its members. However, in the conduct of its daytoday business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately andindependently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rulesof the Senate itself confirms this when it states:

RULE XLIV UNFINISHED BUSINESS


All pending matters and proceedings shallterminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress,but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presentfor the first time. (emphasis supplied)

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and




proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislativeinvestigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress areconsidered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress andit is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress totake up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but asif presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of sucha rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of thesucceeding Congress (which will typically have a differentcomposition as that of the previous Con

203



gress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of theSenate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuingbody even with respect to the conduct of its business, thenpending matters will not be deemed terminated with theexpiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,continue into the next Congress with the same status.

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institutionand of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business isreflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’smain Rules of Procedure) states:

RULE LIAMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in whichthe Senators elected in the preceding elections shallbegin their term of office, the President may endorsethe Rules to the appropriate committee foramendment or revision.

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motionwhich should be presented at least one day before itsconsideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senatorspresent in the session shall be required for its approval.(emphasis supplied)


SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the dateof their adoption and shall remain in force until theyare amended or repealed. (emphasis supplied)

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into



account the new composition of the Senate after an election andthe possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at thestart of each session in which the newly elected Senators shallbegin their term.

204



However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that itsmain rules are intended to be valid from the date of their adoptionuntil they are amended or repealed. Such language isconspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state“(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication intwo (2) newspapers of general circulation.” (Section 24, Rules ofProcedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation) The latterdoes not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of suchrules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the differencein the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot bepresumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continueinto the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress mayeasily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which comewithin the rule on unfinished business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitutionrequiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with theduly published rules of procedure is categorical. It isincumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislativeinquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rulesclearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequentCongresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficientlyput public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules onlegislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, itcould have easily adopted the same language it had used in itsmain rules regarding effectivity.

Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise bestressed that not all orders issued or proceedingsconducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void.Only those that result in violation of the rights ofwitnesses should be considered null and void, consideringthat the rationale for the publication is to protect therights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of



the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders andproceedings are considered valid and effective.”5 (emphasissupplied)

_______________

5 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers andInvestigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and

205



The ponencia quotes the foregoing ruling in theSeptember 4 Neri Resolution in holding, viz.:

“Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitlyprovides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, orany of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid oflegislation in accordance with its duly published rules ofprocedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended tosatisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication isindeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punishor otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or ruleof which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the CivilCode, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 daysfollowing the completion of their publication either in the OfficialGazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in thePhilippines.”

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadingsand even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published innewspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. Withrespect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, ofwhich the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these ruleswhen they first opened their session.

x x x x x x x x x...the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in

violation of the Constitution, use its rules in the legislative




inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct ofinquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferreduntil it shall have caused the publication of the Rules, because itcan do so only “in accordance with its duly published rules ofprocedure.”

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the SenateRules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation inthe October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. Whilewe

_______________

Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September4, 2008, pp. 4225; p. 231.

206



take judicial notice of the fact, the recent publication does notcure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by theinstant petitions. In so far as the consolidated cases areconcerned, the legislative investigation subject thereofstill could not be undertaken by the respondent SenateCommittees, because no published rules govern it, in clearcontravention of the Constitution.”6 (emphasis supplied)

While the ponencia cites the Neri Ruling to support itsconclusion that the subject investigation cannot beconducted without published rules, I submit that it fails toadhere to the Neri Ruling, as the latter emphasizes that“not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuantto the subject Rules are null and void. Only those thatresult in violation of the rights of witnesses shouldbe considered null and void, considering that therationale for the publication is to protect the rights ofwitnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of theConstitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedingsare considered valid and effective.”

It will be recalled that in the March 25 Neri Decision,the Court struck down not the entire proceedings ofthe Senate investigation on the NBNZTE deal for

iAnnotate User

Highlight



want of published Rules of Procedure GoverningInquiries, but only the Order dated January 30, 2008,citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the SenateCommittees and directing his arrest and detention(January 30 Contempt Order) as stated in the dispositiveportion of the Decision.7 A

_______________

6 Ponencia.7 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and SenateCommittee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25,2008, 549 SCRA 77, 139. The dispositive portion reads, viz.:

207



faithful adherence of the case at bar to the Neri Rulingwould yield the conclusion that the “Garci tapes”investigation may be conducted even without the publishedRules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, and that onlythose orders and proceedings that result in the violation ofthe rights of the witnesses may be considered null and void.The ponencia did not, however, show which orders orproceedings resulted in this violation and, instead, made ablanket prohibition of the conduct of the “Garci tapes”investigation for want of published Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries.

In line with my position in my Dissents to the March 25Neri Decision and the September 4 Neri Resolution, itis my considered view that the subject “Garci tapes”investigation is not constitutionally infirm for beingconducted without the publication of the Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries in the 14th Congress prior to saidinvestigation. In addition to the points raised in my twoDissents, I respectfully submit that the followinginconsistencies and erroneous assumptions in the March25 Neri Decision and September 4 Neri Resolutionmerit a review of the Neri Ruling and a consequent



iAnnotate User

Highlight

iAnnotate User

Highlight



conclusion that the Rules of Procedure GoverningInquiries, sans amendment since its publication in twonewspapers of general circulation on August 24, 1995, neednot be published by the Senate of every Congress.1. The validity of one provision of the Rules of

Procedure Governing Inquiries but invalidity ofthe entire Rules

_______________

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Orderdated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt ofthe Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is herebynullified.

SO ORDERED.

208



In the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court recognizedthe validity and effectivity of the Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries, even without publication in the 14thCongress, by citing Section 18 of said rules and holdingthat the January 30 Contempt Order against thereinpetitioner Romulo Neri was invalid for failing to complywith the majority voting requirement under Section 18. Inthe same breath, however, the Court held that the subjectinvestigation on the NBNZTE deal was procedurallyinfirm for being conducted without valid Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries, as these were not published in the14th Congress. The inconsistency is apparent in the Court’sexplanation of the third and the fourth of the five reasonsfor holding that the therein respondent Senate Committeescommitted grave abuse of discretion in issuing the January30 Contempt Order, viz.:

“Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees’January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of themembers of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was presentduring the deliberation. Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure



Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that:‘The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its

members, may punish for contempt any witness before itwho disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to besworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by theCommittee or any of its members.’

Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the membersof the Committee. Apparently, members who did not actuallyparticipate in the deliberation were made to sign the contemptOrder. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of thecontempt Order dated January 30, 2008...

x x x x x x x x xFourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG thatrespondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VIof the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordancewith the

209



“duly published rules of procedure.” We quote the OSG’sexplanation:

The phrase ‘duly published rules of procedure’ requiresthe Senate of every Congress to publish its rules ofprocedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation becauseevery Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years foronehalf of the Senate’s membership, the composition of theSenate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senatemay thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit.Not having published its Rules of Procedure, thesubject hearings in aid of legislation conducted bythe 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.”8

(emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted)

In the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Courtreiterated its recognition of the validity and effectivity ofSection 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries,viz.:

“In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial



review is warranted because there appears to be a clear abuse ofthe power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees.Section 18 of the Rules provides that:

‘The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members,may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys anyorder of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or toanswer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members.’(Emphasis supplied)

In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubtas to the validity of the contempt order because during thedeliberation of the three (3) respondent Committees, only seven(7) Senators were present. This number could hardly fulfill themajority require

_______________

8 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers andInvestigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committeeon National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 459 SCRA 77,132136.

210



ment needed by respondent Committee on Accountability of PublicOfficers and Investigations which has a membership of seventeen(17) Senators and respondent Committee on National Defense andSecurity which has a membership of eighteen (18) Senators. Withrespect to respondent Committee on Trade and Commerce whichhas a membership of nine (9) Senators, only three (3) memberswere present. These facts prompted us to quote in the Decisionthe exchanges between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano andAquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the former raised the issue of lackof the required majority to deliberate and vote on the contemptorder.”9 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted)

But in the same breath, it assailed the validity of the Rulesof Procedure Governing Inquiries and held that ordersissued and proceedings conducted pursuant to said rules,which result in the violation of rights of witnesses werenull and void, viz.:




“The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitutionrequiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with theduly published rules of procedure is categorical. It isincumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislativeinquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rulesclearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequentCongresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficientlyput the public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules onlegislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, itcould have easily adopted the same language it had used in itsmain rules regarding effectivity.

Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressedthat not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant tothe subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result inviolation of

_______________

9 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers andInvestigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committeeon National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, pp. 4041;pp. 226227.

211



the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void,considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect therights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of theConstitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings areconsidered valid and effective.”10

In sum, in both the March 25 Neri Decision and theSeptember 4 Neri Resolution, the Court did notinvalidate the entire Senate investigation proceedingsconducted in accordance with the Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries, which were not published in the 14thCongress. In fact, the Court ruled on the issue of executiveprivilege raised in said proceedings. It struck down onlythe January 30 Contempt Order against therein petitioner




Neri for failure to comply with Section 18 of the Rules ofProcedure Governing Inquiries, while at the same timeholding these rules as constitutionally infirm for want ofpublication.

Let us proceed to the second set of inconsistencies.2. The continuing nature of the Senate as an

institution and the discontinuing nature of itsbusiness visàvis the continuing nature of theRules of the SenateIn attempting to harmonize the above inconsistency in

the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court, in itsSeptember 4 Neri Resolution, saw fit to “issue aclarification...(o)n the nature of the Senate as a ‘continuingbody’ ” and dichotomized this nature into the “continuity ofthe Senate as an institution” and the “opposite nature ofthe conduct of its business.” This approach, however,spawned its own inconsistencies.

In explaining this dichotomy and holding that the Rulesof Procedure Governing Inquiries could not be givencontinuing

_______________

10 Id., at pp. 4445; pp. 230231.

212



effect from one Congress to the next unless expressly soprovided in said Rules, the Court interpreted Section 136on the “unfinished business” in conjunction with Section137 on the “date of taking effect” of the Rules of the Senate,viz.:

“This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as aninstitution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of itsbusiness is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. theSenate’s main rules of procedure) states:

RULE XLIV UNFINISHED BUSINESS





All pending matters and proceedings shallterminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress,but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as ifpresented for the first time.


SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the dateof their adoption and shall remain in force until theyare amended or repealed. (emphasis supplied)

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes intoaccount the new composition of the Senate after an election andthe possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at thestart of each session in which the newly elected Senators shallbegin their term.However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that itsmain rules are intended to be valid from the date of theiradoption until they are amended or repealed. Suchlanguage is conspicuously absent from the Rules. TheRules simply state “(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7)days after publication in two (2) newspapers of generalcirculation.” The latter does not explicitly provide for thecontinued effectivity

213



of such Rules until they are amended or repealed. In view ofthe difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, itcannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislativeinquiries) would continue into the next Congress. TheSenate of the next Congress may easily adopt differentrules for its legislative inquiries which come within therule on unfinished business.”11 (emphasis supplied) (footnoteomitted)

There is no quarrel—and my Dissent to the September4 Neri Resolution in fact acknowledges—that the Rulesof the Senate (Senate Rules) provide in Section 136 that all



unfinished business or pending matters and proceedings ofthe Senate terminate with the expiration of a Congress.This provision, in conjunction with Section 137, does not,however, lend support to the Court’s ruling that absent aprovision in the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiriesexplicitly stating the “continued effectivity of such rulesuntil they are amended or repealed,” it “cannot bepresumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) wouldcontinue into the next Congress” for the following reasons:

First, in the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Courtinterpreted “pending matters” in Section 136 of the SenateRules to include the Rules of Procedure GoverningInquiries that “may be taken by the succeeding Congressas if presented for the first time.” This posture, however,comes also with the interpretation that the Senate maychoose not to take up the Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries, thereby leaving it without rules toconduct legislative inquiries as the effectivity of the ruleshad terminated with the previous Congress. This is anabsurd interpretation consider

_______________

11 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers andInvestigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and SenateCommittee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September4, 2008, pp. 4344; p. 230.

214



ing that the Senate is fully aware that Article VI, Section21 requires legislative investigations to be conducted inaccordance with duly published Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries.

The September 4 Neri Resolution recognizes that theSenate Rules have continuing effect from one Congress tothe next, because it provides in Section 137 that the SenateRules “shall take effect on the date of their adoption andshall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.”




The Senate Rules unmistakably state that their effectivitycan be interrupted only by amendment or repeal asprovided in Section 137 and not by termination of oneCongress as provided in Section 136. The Rules ofProcedure Governing Inquiries have the same character asthe Senate Rules. Both are not “pending matters andproceedings” that terminate with the expiration ofthe Congress. Pending matters and proceedings includeinvestigations that have not been terminated or bills thathave not completed the legislative process in the Senate ofone Congress.The continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules fromone Congress to the next, which the Courtacknowledged in its September 4 Neri Resolution,evinces the nature of the Senate as a continuingbody governed by its continuing Senate Rules. If theSenate were not a continuing body, there would be noreason for the Senate Rules to likewise have a continuingeffect. In contradistinction, the effectivity of the Rules ofProceedings of the House of Representatives (House Rules)—which is admittedly not a continuing body, as the termsof all congressmen end at the same time—terminates uponthe expiration of one Congress. Thus, Rule 1, Section 1 ofthe 14th Congress House Rules adopted on November 20,2007 reflects the practice of the House of Representativesof adopting rules of proceedings on its first meet

215



ing and organization upon the opening of a succeedingCongress, viz.:

RULE IConvening and Organizing the House

x x x x x x x x xAfter the oathtaking of the newlyelected Speaker, the body

shall proceed to the adoption of the rules of the immediatelypreceding Congress to govern its proceedings until the approvaland adoption of the rules of the current Congress. (emphasis



supplied)

On November 20, 2007, the House of Representatives of the14th Congress, pending the adoption of its own HouseRules, adopted the House Rules of the 13th Congress as itsprovisional rules.12 The House of Representatives of eachCongress adopts its own rules.13

Second, the abovequoted Sections 136 and 137 of theSenate Rules, adopted under the regime of the 1987Constitution, do not depart from the provisions of theSenate Rules adopted under the 1935 Constitution, viz.:

Chapter XLVIUnfinished Business in the Senate

Sec. 108. Unfinished business at the end of one session shallnot be affected by the closing of same, but shall be taken up againat the next session in the same status in which it was.

_______________

12 1 Journal of the House of Representatives, July 23, 2007.13 See 13th Cong. Rules of the House of Representatives, adopted October 27,

2004; 12th Cong. Rules of the House of Representatives, adopted October 22, 2002;11th Cong. Rules of the House of Representatives, adopted August 31, 1999; 10thCong. Rules of the House of Representatives, adopted July 24, 1995.

216



Notwithstanding the provision of the preceding paragraph,matters pending at the expiration of one Congress shall no longerbe acted on.

Chapter LIIISec. 122. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their

adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended orrepealed.”14

Under the 1935 Constitution (and in the 1987 Constitution,as I have consistently maintained in my Dissents), it waswellsettled that the Senate was a continuing body as heldin Arnault v. Nazareno, citing the U.S. case McGrain v.Daugherty.15 The 1935 Constitution provided that two

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000014ef8afbd75161d3eaf000a0094004f00ee/p/ALA673/?username=Jeric#ftn68





thirds, or a majority of the Senate, continued into the nextCongress.16

Contrary to the notion that the Senate is no longer acontinuing body under the 1987 Constitution—as less thana majority continue into the Senate of the succeedingCongress17—the termination of the unfinished business ofthe

_______________

14 Rules of the Senate approved on January 25, 1950, and revised as of1966.

15 273 U.S. 135 (1927).16 1935 Phil. Const., Art. VIII, §3 provides, viz.:

Section 3. The term of office of Senators shall be six years andshall begin on the thirtieth day of December next following theirelection. The first Senators elected under this Constitution shall, inthe manner provided by law, be divided equally into three groups,the Senators of the first group to serve for a term of six years; thoseof the second group, for four years; and those of the third group, fortwo years.

17 1987 Phil. Const., Art. VI, §4 in relation to Art. XVIII, §2 provides,viz.:

Art. VI, Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be sixyears and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by

217



Senate at the expiration of a Congress and the effectivity ofthe Senate Rules until amended or repealed as provided inSections 136 and 137 of the Senate Rules under the 1987Constitution, do not lend support to a departure from theArnault ruling that the Senate is a continuing body.Under both the 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions, theSenate Rules show that a continuing Senate’s unfinishedbusiness terminates at the expiration of one Congress, andits rules remain in effect from one Congress to the next.

As expounded in my Dissent to the September 4 NeriResolution, the Philippine Senate is patterned after the







U.S. Senate, which is a continuing body as ruled by theU.S. Supreme Court in McGrain. The continuing nature ofthe U.S. Senate is also reflected in the Standing Rules ofthe Senate under Rule V(2), viz.:

Rule VSuspension and Amendment of the Rules

x x x x x x x x x2. The rules of the Senate shall continue from one

Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed asprovided in these rules.18 (emphasis supplied)

In sum, the Philippine Senate Rules under both the1935 and the 1987 Constitutions and the Standing Rules ofthe

_______________

law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following theirelection.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 2. x x xOf the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve

obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years andthe remaining twelve for three years.

18 Standing Rules of the Senate, revised to September 14, 2007.

218



U.S. Senate, after which the Philippine Senate waspatterned, reflect the nature of the Senate as acontinuing body. That the Senate is a continuing bodyproceeds from its nature as created by the Framers of theU.S. Constitution and adopted by the 1935 and the 1987Philippine Constitutions. The Senate Rules are not thebases for the continuing nature of the Senate, but theyembody and reflect this nature.

Third, the recognition that the Senate is a continuingbody as reflected in the continuing effect of the SenateRules from one Congress to the next is not consistent with




the holding of the ponencia that the Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries must explicitly provide for thiscontinuing effectivity if such were the intent of the Senate,viz.:

The Rules simply state “(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7)days after publication in two (2) newspapers of generalcirculation.” The latter does not explicitly provide for thecontinued effectivity of such rules until they are amended orrepealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two setsof Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (onlegislative inquiries) would continue into the nextCongress.19 (emphasis supplied)

I reiterate my position in my Dissent to the September4 Neri Resolution that the publication of the Rules ofProcedure Governing Inquiries on August 24, 1995 hassatisfied the requirement under Section 21, Article VI ofthe 1987 Constitution that inquiries in aid of legislation beconducted in accordance with the Senate’s “duly publishedRules of Procedure.” Interpreting Article 2 of the Civil Codeof the Philippines, which states that “(l)aws shall takeeffect after fifteen

_______________

19 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers andInvestigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and SenateCommittee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September4, 2008, p. 44; p. 230.

219



days following completion of their publication in theOfficial Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided x x x,” theCourt ruled in the landmark Tañada v. Tuvera,20 viz.:

“…all statutes, including those of local application and privatelaws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, whichshall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different




effectivity date is fixed by the legislature... Administrative rulesand regulations must also be published if their purpose is toenforce or implement existing law pursuant to a validdelegation.”21

Publication must be made in the Official Gazette22 or anewspaper of general circulation.23

As a general rule, onetime publication suffices to satisfythe due process requirement to inform the public of a rulethat would govern it and affect its rights. It is notuncommon for laws and rules to provide that they shalltake effect upon a certain date following publication in anewspaper of general circulation without having to statethat they “shall remain in force until they are amended orrepealed” for them to have continuing effect. These lawsand rules are published only once, and yet they continue tobe in force. The Court itself employs this language in itsrules as shown in the recently promulgated Rule on theWrit of Habeas Data and Rule on the Writ of Amparo,respectively, viz.:

_______________

20 220 Phil. 422; 136 SCRA 27 (1985); Resolution of Motion forReconsideration, 230 Phil. 528; 146 SCRA 446 (1986).

21 Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 533535; 146 SCRA 446, 453454(1986); See also The Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R.No. 155027, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 526; Umali v. Estanislao, G.R.No. 104037, May 29, 1992, 209 SCRA 446.

22 Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528; 146 SCRA 446 (1986).23 Executive Order No. 200, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino.

220



Section 25. Effectivity.—This Rule shall take effect onFebruary 2, 2008 following its publication in three (3) newspapersof general circulation.

Section 27. Effectivity.—This Rule shall take effect onOctober 24, 2007 following its publication in three (3) newspapers







of general circulation.

The exception to the general rule that onetimepublication suffices for a law or rule to have continuingeffect is when there are circumstances or factors thatinterrupt this continuity. An example is thediscontinuation of the existence of the House ofRepresentatives as a legislative body, which terminates theeffectivity of its published Rules of Procedure GoverningInquiries and requires the publication of these rules in thesucceeding Congress for them to take effect. As discussedabove and in my Dissents to the March 25 Neri Decisionand September 4 Neri Resolution, the Senate, unlikethe House of Representatives, is a continuing body. Thus,contrary to the holding of the ponencia, the Senate’s Rulesof Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans amendment, neednot be published by the Senate of every Congress and neednot also state that they shall “remain in force until they areamended or repealed” for them to be effective from oneCongress to the next. Quite the opposite of the ponencia’sruling, in the absence of language stating that the Rules ofProcedure Governing Inquiries shall not continue in effectfrom one Congress to the next, these rules shall havecontinuing effect.In sum, the above discussion shows that the March 25Neri Decision and September 4 Neri Resolutionthemselves provide bases for concluding that the Senate isa continuing body and that onetime publication of theRules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans amendment,suffices to satisfy the publication requirement underArticle VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution. Irespectfully submit that the Court ought to so conclude inorder to uphold internal consis

221



tency in its ruling with respect to the constitutionalrequirement of publication of the Senate’s Rules ofProcedure Governing Inquiries. In line with my position in

iAnnotate User

Highlight



my Dissents to the Neri Ruling, I submit that thepublication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiriesin the 14th Congress prior to the conduct of the subject“Garci tapes” investigation is not a requirement forconducting such investigation.

Having dispensed with the issue of the constitutionalrequirement of publication of the Rules of ProcedureGoverning Inquiries, let us now proceed to the third issue.The “Garci tapes” in relation toArticle III, Section 3 of the 1987Constitution and R.A. No. 4200

Let me begin the disquisition on the issue of “whetherthe inquiry, which is centered on the socalled ‘Garci tapes’violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/orRepublic Act No. 4200” by stating what the disposition ofthe case at bar is not about and proceed forthwith to whatthe disposition of this case is about. To avoid clutter, let usexcise the fat to get to the lean meat of the controversybefore the Court.

While the 1987 Constitution affords paramountimportance to the policy of transparency, publicaccountability, and informed participation of the citizenryin a democracy, the case at bar is not about balancingbetween the right to privacy of communication underArticle III, Section 324 of the

_______________

24 Article III, Section 3 of the Bill of Rights provides, viz.:Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence

shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or whenpublic safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

222



1987 Constitution and the right to information underArticle III, Section 725 of the charter. The petitioners in thiscase are not suing as citizens demanding information fromthe government.




While the 1987 Constitution unmistakably recognizesthe indispensable role of legislative investigations incrafting sound law and also gives prime recognition to theright to privacy of communication, the case at bar is notabout balancing an asserted right to privacy ofcommunication against the Senate’s exercise of itspower of legislative investigation. This case does notinvolve a situation in which a witness in a legislativeinquiry invokes the right to privacy of communication, butthe Senate compels him, under pain of contempt, todisclose the communication on account of an overridingpublic interest.

The bone of contention in the case at bar iswhether the Senate can use, in its legislativeinvestigation, inadmissible evidence of asurreptitiously and illegally recorded privatecommunication.

The law decisive of the case at bar is R.A. No. 4200 orthe AntiWiretapping Law enacted in 1965. Introducedby Senator Lorenzo Tañada, the explanatory note of the billprovides the background and rationale for the law, viz.:

_______________

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the precedingsection shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

25 Article III, Section 7 of the Bill of Rights provides, viz.:Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of

public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and todocuments, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, ordecisions, as well as to government research data used as basis forpolicy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to suchlimitations as may be provided by law.

223



The privacy of communication and correspondenceis among the fundamental rights of an individual secured and

guaranteed by our Constitution. Thus, Section 1(5) of the Bill of




Rights of the Constitution provides that, “The privacy ofcommunication and correspondence shall be inviolable exceptupon lawful order of the court or when public safety and orderrequire otherwise.”

x x x x x x x x xAt present, the laws penalizing the violation of the privacy of

communication are inadequate to cope with moderndevelopments. As we are all aware of, technology today has so faradvanced, and will inexorably continue to advance, that there isnow an evergrowing array of devices or arrangements foreavesdropping… There could, indeed, be no doubt that thesemodern devices or arrangements, if availed of by any or officers ofthe government, to spy on another, could be the most obnoxiousinstruments of oppression or arbitrary power. Sooner or later wewill have to deal with the danger that these increasingly sensitiveelectronic ears, which are as fantastic as they are alarming, mayannihilate completely the privacy of communication. Anadditional and potent deterrent is obviously called for if we are toguard against what might well be subversive of one of ourcherished personal freedoms which makes life worth living.

x x x x x x x x xConsidering our democratic setup which is founded, among

others on our high regard for the individual’s rights and freedoms,the proposed measure will be but in accord with the principles oflaw and government enshrined in the Bill of Rights of ourConstitution which are designed to protect the feelings andsensibilities of every individual as a human being againstthe incursions of unwelcome intruders.

Put succinctly, R.A. No. 4200 prohibits eavesdroppingor unwelcome intrusions into privatecommunications. Section 1 of the law provides that theseacts are unlawful:

“Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not beingauthorized by all the parties to any privatecommunication

224





or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using anyother device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,intercept, or record such communication or spoken wordby using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraphor walkietalkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant ornot in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, toknowingly possess any tape record, wire record, discrecord, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of anycommunication or spoken word secured either before or afterthe effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law;or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or tocommunicate the contents thereof, either verbally or inwriting, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whethercomplete or partial, to any other person: Provided, Thatthe use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence inany civil, criminal investigation or trial of offensesmentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by thisprohibition.

Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does orwho shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the actsdeclared to be unlawful in the preceding section or whoviolates the provisions of the following section or of anyorder issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes suchviolation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished byimprisonment for not less than six months or more than six yearsand with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolutedisqualification from public office if the offender be a publicofficial at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if theoffender is an alien he shall be subject to deportationproceedings.” (emphases supplied)

A private communication is characterized as such basednot on the content of the communication, but on thecontext that it was said in private and not for publicconsumption. That the content or nature of thecommunication

225





is immaterial was ruled in Ramirez v. Court ofAppeals,26 viz.:

“... the nature of the conversations is immaterial to aviolation of the statute. The substance of the same need notbe specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, interceptingor recording private communications by means of thedevices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that anindividual made a secret recording of a private communication bymeans of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offenseunder Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed outin his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in thesaid law) is it required that before one can be regarded as aviolator, the nature of the conversation, as well as itscommunication to a third person should be professed.” (emphasissupplied) (footnote omitted)

The Senate deliberations on R.A. No. 4200 evince themeaning of private, as opposed to public,communication, viz.:

Senator DIOKNO. Do I understand, Mr. Senator, that underSection 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records apublic speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Becausethe speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.

Senator TAÑADA. Well, that particular aspect is notcontemplated by the bill. It is the communication between oneperson and another person—not between a speaker and apublic.

Senator DIOKNO. The wording of the law is “communicationor spoken word.”

Senator TAÑADA. Yes.Senator DIOKNO. The term “spoken word” would

automatically include speeches, including, Mr. Senator, what weare doing here this morning.

_______________

26 G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995, 248 SCRA 590.

226

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDGarcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public




Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense andSecurity, Information and Communications Technology, and


Senator TAÑADA. As I have said, Your Honor, the purposeof this bill is to prevent the tape recording or interceptionof a communication between one person and another—notbetween a speaker and a public. Because precisely, thespeaker speaks so that the public may know what he hasin mind, what he wants to communicate to the people, and thereshould be no objection to tape recording that speech....”27

(emphases supplied)

R.A. No. 4200, however, provides for exceptions whenwiretapping is allowed by written order of the court underSection 3, viz.:

“Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shallrender it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who isauthorized by a written order of the Court, to execute anyof the acts declared to be unlawful in the two precedingsections in cases involving the crimes of treason,espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war,piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy andproposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting tosedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised PenalCode, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,punishing espionage and other offenses against nationalsecurity: Provided, That such written order shall only be issuedor granted upon written application and the examination underoath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he mayproduce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds tobelieve that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has beencommitted or is being committed or is about to be committed:Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses ofrebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting torebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting tosedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proofthat a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, haveactually been or are being committed; (2) that there arereasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtainedessential to the conviction of any person

_______________

27 III Records of the Senate, March 12, 1964, p. 625.



227



for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of suchcrimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available forobtaining such evidence.” (emphasis supplied)

To further give teeth to the above prohibition, R.A. No.4200 makes illegally wiretapped communicationsinadmissible in any proceeding, viz.:

“Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or theexistence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of thesame or any part thereof, or any information therein containedobtained or secured by any person in violation of the precedingsections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in anyjudicial, quasijudicial, legislative or administrativehearing or investigation.” (emphasis supplied)

Applying these provisions to the case at bar, thewiretapping of the communication recorded in the “Garcitapes” may be held legal only if it was recorded withconsent of the parties to the conversation or upon writtencourt order. As the wiretapping was done in the course ofduty by the witness, Technical Sergeant Vidal Doble, hemay be presumed to have been acting regularly in theperformance of his official duties.28 Doble testified that hepresumed that the order of his superior to him to conduct awiretap was legal, viz.:

Sen. Cayetano (P)... Ngayon itong—noong sinabi sa iyo ito,anong pakiramdam mo? Nagulat ka ba o parang normal lang saiyo na, “Okay, bagong assignment,” may naisip ka bang bakaviolation ito ng isang batas? May naisip ka bang ganon?

_______________

28 People v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA350, 381.

228







Mr. Doble. Ang nasa isip po kasi naming noon since na galingsa military hierarchy ang order, we assume that is a legal order,Your Honor.29

The legislative investigation should precisely be allowed toproceed to establish the circumstances surrounding thewiretapping and determine whether or not the wiretap waslegally done with the consent of the parties or lawful courtorder.

Should it be established, however, that theconversations in the “Garci tapes” were illegallywiretapped, the question that comes to the fore is whetherthe “communication or spoken word (in the tapes), theirexistence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaningof the same or any part thereof, or any information thereincontained” may be used in the subject Senateinvestigations.

In Ramirez, in which the Court found that petitionerRamirez violated R.A. No. 4200 for secretly recording herprivate conversation with therein respondent Garcia, theCourt published in its decision the transcript of theillegally wiretapped conversation as part of the narration ofthe facts of the case. A mechanical and literal reading ofSections 1 and 4 of R.A. No. 4200 would yield the absurdconclusion that the Court violated these provisions for“communicat(ing) the contents thereof (the illegallywiretapped conversation), either verbally or in writing” andusing the inadmissible transcription in its judicialproceedings. It is clear to the eye that this was not theintent of the lawmakers in enacting R.A. No. 4200.“Legislative intent is determined principally from thelanguage of a statute. Where the language of a statute isclear and unambi

_______________

29 Transcript of Senate hearing held by the Joint Committees onNational Defense and Security and the Committees on Accountability ofPublic Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and on ConstitutionalAmendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, September 7, 2007, p. 95.




229



guous, the law is applied according to its express terms,and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literalinterpretation would be either impossible (Pacific Oxygenand Acytelene Co. v. Central Bank, 37 SCRA 685 [1971]) orabsurd or would lead to an injustice. (12 Casela v. Court ofAppeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]).”30 (emphasis supplied)There is thus a need to interpret Sections 1 and 4 of R.A.No. 4200.

Section 1 in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 4200provides an exception to the prohibition on the “use of suchrecord (of wiretapped conversation) or any copies thereof asevidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial ofoffenses mentioned in Section 3...” The offenses underSection 3 which allows wiretapping upon written order ofthe court are as follows: “treason, espionage, provoking warand disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the highseas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commitrebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy tocommit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as definedby the Revised Penal Code, and violations ofCommonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage andother offenses against national security.”

The exception under Section 1 in relation to Section 3 ofR.A. No. 4200 does not include the use of illegallywiretapped communication for purposes of prosecutingviolations of R.A. No. 4200 itself as the Court did inRamirez. Not reading this exception into the law wouldimpede the prosecution of the acts it prohibits andcontradict the very purpose for adopting the law as clearlystated in its title, “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize WireTapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy ofCommunication, and for Other Purposes.” Wellsettled isthe rule in statutory construction that “where there isambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience

_______________



30 Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995,248 SCRA 590.

230



and absurdity is to be adopted.”31 Interpretatio talis inambiguis semper frienda est, ut evitatur inconveniens etabsurdum. R.A. No. 4200 should be given a sensibleconstruction, so as to give effect to its rationale and intentand thus avoid an unjust or absurd interpretation. Theineluctable conclusion is that the use of illegallywiretapped communication must be allowed in aprosecution under R.A. No. 4200 precisely to deter thecommission of illegal wiretapping.

Corollary to this conclusion is that such evidence shouldbe an exception to inadmissible evidence under Section 4 ofthe law. Judges and prosecutors who possess and useillegally wiretapped communications in prosecutions forviolations of R.A. No. 4200 are thus not liable for violatingthis law in the same manner that, by way of exception,they are not liable for illegal possession of firearms wherethe firearm is presented in evidence in a case involving theprosecution of a violation of R.A. No. 8294.32 This is truedespite the absence of such an exception to illegalpossession, in contradistinction to the Intellectual PropertyCode of the Philippines, which explicitly provides thefollowing exception to infringement of copyright underSection 184(l)(k): “Any use made of a work for the purposeof any judicial proceedings or for the giving of professionaladvice by a legal practitioner.”

For similar reasons, another exception that ought to beread into Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No. 4200 is the use and

_______________

31 Lanot, et al. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 164858, November16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114.

32 An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, AsAmended, Entitled “Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession,




Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms,Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture ofFirearms, Ammunitions or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties forCertain Violations Thereof, and for Relevant Purposes.”

231



admissibility of illegally wiretapped communication inlegislative investigations whose particular purposeis precisely to craft or improve laws that will address theevil of illegal wiretapping. Without this exception, theabsurd result would be that legislators cannot at allinvestigate illegal wiretaps as they happen on the groundand plug loopholes in the law, because Section 4 of R.A. No.4200 provides that even the fact of existence of an illegallywiretapped communication is inadmissible in evidence. Tobe sure, this could not have been the intent of the law.

Lest the herein recognized exceptions be misconstruedand open the floodgates to violations of R.A. No. 4200, itmust be emphasized that as a general rule, illegallywiretapped material is inadmissible for any purpose in anyproceeding, including legislative investigations, inaccordance with R.A. No. 4200.33 As a very narrowexception, however, the wiretapped material may be usedand is admitted in a judicial proceeding for prosecution ofviolations of R.A. No. 4200 and, akin to this, in a legislativeinvestigation in aid of legislation whose purpose isprecisely to address the problem of illegal wiretap.

In the case at bar, the focus of the Senate investigationas shown by the transcripts of its hearings34 has been theillegal wiretapping of several personalities including theCommanderinChief and President of the Philippines, thepossible involvement of telecommunication providers in theillegal wiretap, the use of scarce intelligence resources forwire

_______________

33 SalcedoOrtanez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110662, August 4,



1994, 235 SCRA 111 and People v. Olivarez, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 77865,December 4, 1998, 299 SCRA 635.

34 Transcripts of Senate hearings held by the Joint Committees onNational Defense and Security and the Committees on Accountability ofPublic Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and on ConstitutionalAmendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, September 7 and 17, 2007.

232



tapping in connection with the conduct of the 2004Presidential elections, and electoral fraud. The purpose ofthe investigation may also be gleaned from two billspreviously filed in relation thereto by the Chairperson ofthe National Defense and Security Committee, seeking to(1) control and regulate the sale, purchase and use ofwiretapping equipment; and (2) prohibit the Armed Forcesof the Philippines from performing electoral duties.35

Prescinding from the very narrow contours of theexception in using illegally wiretapped communications,the Senate may proceed with the use of the “Garci tapes” ina legislative inquiry in aid of legislation whose purpose isto craft or improve legislation on wiretapping. On the otherhand, the “Garci tapes” are not admissible in evidence inlegislative investigations for a different purpose such as thepunishment of electoral fraud. While electoral fraud is aserious anomaly that erodes the foundation of democracyand should not go unpunished, evidence obtained notthrough illegal wiretap should be presented in proceedingsinvestigating this matter. Resort to illegal wiretapping tocatch perpetrators of electoral fraud will only further erodeour democracy. As Senator Tañada exhorted in theexplanatory note of Senate Bill No. 9, which became theAntiWiretapping Law:

“Considering our democratic setup which is founded,among others on our high regard for the individual’srights and freedoms, the proposed measure will be but inaccord with the principles of law and government enshrined in theBill of Rights of our Constitution which are designed to protect





the feelings and sensibilities of every individual as ahuman being against the incursions of unwelcomeintruders.”

_______________

35 Rollo, pp. 216, 218; Comment of respondent Senate of thePhilippines, p. 2.

233



In conducting legislative inquiries in aid of legislationfor the purpose of crafting or improving laws onwiretapping, the legislature ought to abide by theconstitutional command under Article VI, Section 21 thatin conducting such inquiries, “(t)he rights of personsappearing in or affected by such inquiries shall berespected.” The legislature should thus use mechanismsand procedures available to it, such as executive sessions,in avoiding any further and unnecessary incursion into theright to privacy of communication.

With respect to the question of whether the use of the“Garci tapes” violates Article III, Section 3 of the Bill ofRights, the above disquisition on R.A. No. 4200 sufficientlyaddresses this issue. Under this constitutional provision,the privacy of communication and correspondence shall beinviolable except (1) upon lawful order of the court, or (2)when public safety or order requires otherwise asprescribed by law. There is ostensibly no lawful order of thecourt under the first exception, and any argumentanchored on the second exception will lead to R.A. No.4200, being the only Philippine law on wiretapping.

Anent G.R. No. 170338, it is my considered view that thepetition is moot and academic.36 The petition prays that theCourt issue a Resolution:

a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a TemporaryRestraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunctionrestraining and preventing the House of Representatives




Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,National Defense and Security, Information CommunicationsTechnology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms from making useof the sound recording of the illegally obtained wiretappedconversations in their Report for the

_______________

36 Philippine Airlines v. Joselito Pascua, et al., G.R. No. 143258, August 15,2003, 409 SCRA 195.

234



inquiries conducted relative thereto, or from otherwise makinguse of said recordings for any other purpose.

b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition bycommanding the Respondent Committees to strike off the recordof the proceedings any and all references to the illegally obtainedwiretapped recordings, and to desist from further using the soundrecordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped conversations inany of its proceedings.37

The first prayer is moot and academic, as the “Garci tapes”were already played in the session floor of the House ofRepresentatives on July 5, 2005.38 The second prayer isalso moot and academic, as the subject records ofproceedings and reports belong to the House ofRepresentatives of the Thirteenth Congress, which hasalready been terminated. The House of Representatives notbeing a continuous body, the current House ofRepresentatives of the Fourteenth Congress is differentfrom the House of Representatives of the ThirteenthCongress. Thus, petitioner Garcillano ought to first seekrecourse to the current House of Representatives withrespect to his second prayer.

I vote to dismiss the petitions in G.R. No. 170338 andG.R. No. 179275.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONREYES, R.T., J.:

I concur with the ponencia insofar as it dismisses the




petition in G.R. No. 170338 but dissent insofar as it grantsthe petition in G.R. No. 179275.

_______________

37 Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, pp. 3637.38 Id., at p. 56.

235



I. The petition in G.R. No. 170338 should bedismissed for being moot.

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Virgilio D. Garcillano, viaa petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer fortemporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminaryinjunction, implores the Court to issue a Resolution asfollows:

a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a TemporaryRestraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunctionrestraining and preventing the House of RepresentativesCommittees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety,National Defense and Security, Information CommunicationsTechnology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms from making useof the sound recording of the illegally obtained wiretappedconversations in their Report for the inquiries relative thereto, orfrom otherwise making use of said recordings for any otherpurpose.

b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition bycommanding the Respondent Committees to strike off the recordof the proceedings any and all references to the illegally obtainedwiretapped recordings, and to desist from further using the soundrecordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped conversations inany of its proceedings.1

The Court cannot grant the prayer of petitionerGarcillano because it has been mooted. It is of publicknowledge, a fit subject of judicial notice,2 that the “HelloGarci” tapes were already played in the House of





Representatives and heard by its members.3 Then,separate committee reports on the “Hello

_______________

1 Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, pp. 3637.2 Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 2. Judicial Notice, when discretionary.

—A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of publicknowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to beknown to judges because of their judicial functions.

3 Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, p. 9.

236



Garci” tapes were submitted to then House Speaker Josede Venecia, Jr.4

_______________

4 “Separate findings, no closure on ‘Hello Garci’ scandal” dated March29, 2006 by Michael Lim Ubac in http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/hellogarci/view.php?db=0&article=2006032970909. Thereport partly states:

THE HOUSE of Representatives inquiry has resulted in two “HelloGarci” reports, separate findings, no closure.

At dusk yesterday, the majority and minority blocs came up withseparate committee reports on the wiretapping scandal that nearlyunseated President Gloria MacapagalArroyo last year.

It was the majority bloc represented by the chairs of the Five HouseCommittees that first handed its report to Speaker Jose de Venecia.

De Venecia congratulated the chairs led by North CotabatoRepresentative Emmylou TaliñoSantos for “their wisdom and dedicationto duty.”

The minority report penned by Cavite Representative Gilbert Remullahighlighted the futility of the search for truth behind an oppositionallegation that the recordings showed that Ms. Arroyo phoned ElectionCommissioner Virgilio Garcillano to boost her chances of winning the 2004presidential race.

“It’s likewise undeniable that the Arroyo government, in general, has







shown utter disregard, if not disrespect, towards the inquiry. Thoughmembers of the administration appeared during the public hearings,nothing substantial was presented to help ferret out the truth,” said theminority report.

Lost opportunityThe report said that the 14 public hearings could have “finally be the

moment for Congress to address the lingering problem of electioncheating, but with the way the witnesses conducted themselves, theopportunity was lost.”

The minority report would be “appended” to the main report, saidSantos.

237



Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:

“Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one SupremeCourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice tosettle actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or notthere has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentalityof the Government.”

Thus, one of the requisites of judicial power is thepresence of an actual controversy. Courts are prohibitedfrom deciding hypothetical, conjectural or anticipatoryquestions despite their vast judicial power. Otherwise, adecision rendered would amount to nothing but an advisoryopinion, which would not augur well with the function ofcourts as arbiters of controversies. In La BugalB’laanTribal Association v. Sec. Ramos,5 the Court held:

“An actual case or controversy means an existing case orcontroversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, notconjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court wouldamount to an advisory opinion. The power does not extend tohypothetical ques



_______________

As expected, there was nothing new in the majority’s findings andrecommendations.

The main report did not deviate from the revised draft report it routed tocommittee members on March 13, which admitted the failure of the jointcongressional inquiry to unravel the mystery of the political controversy.

The report said that the hearings “only raised more issues and answered none,”thus Congress should “continue to seek the answers x x x and in particularsubpoena phone records to establish the likelihood or unlikelihood that allegedwiretapping conversations could have taken place.”

5 465 Phil. 860; 421 SCRA 148 (2004).

238



tions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialecticsand barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated toactualities.”6

While it is true that the Court is not absolutelyprecluded from resolving issues that are otherwise moot,7no compelling circumstance is present here that wouldwarrant the exercise of judicial review.

Too, the function of the writ of prohibition is to preventthe execution of an act which is about to be done. It is notintended to provide a remedy for acts alreadyaccomplished.8 The office of prohibition is to arrestproceedings rather than

_______________

6 La BugalB’laan Tribal Association v. Sec. Ramos, id., at pp. 889890;p. 178.

7 Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot, when (1) there is a graveviolation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situationand the paramount public interest involved demand; (3) the constitutionalissue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide thebench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yetevading review. David v. MacapagalArroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409,171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160;




Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756; Provinceof Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736;Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435SCRA 98; Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA577; Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004,277 SCRA 409.

8 Heirs of Eugenia v. Roxas, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.Nos. 67195, 78618 & 7861920, May 29, 1989, 173 SCRA 581; Agustin v.De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515 (1949); Calbanero v. Torres, 61 Phil. 522 (1935).

239



to undo them.9 A preventive remedy, as a rule, does not lieto restrain an act that is already fait accompli.10

II. The petition in G.R. No. 179275 shouldlikewise be dismissed because the Senate need notrepublish its Rules of Procedure GoverningInquiries in Aid of Legislation.

The issues in G.R. No. 179275 are as follows:

1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit.2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the

Senate Committees governing the conduct of inquiries in aid oflegislation have been published, in accordance with Section 21,Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:

(a) Whether these Rules must be published by everyCongress.

(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with theconstitutional requirement?

3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the socalled“Garci tapes” violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitutionand/or Republic Act No. 4200.11

Anent the first issue, I agree with the ponencia and thedissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Reynato Puno thatpetitioners Santiago Javier Ranada and Oswaldo D.Agcaoili, plus intervenor Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, possessthe requisite locus standi to bring the suit.

Courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which



would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are

_______________

9 Ferris, The Law of Extraordinary Remedies, p. 418.10 Montes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006, 489

SCRA 432.11 Rollo, G.R. No. 179275, p. 94.

240



tools crafted to facilitate, not to frustrate, the attainment ofjustice. Thus, their strict and rigid application, if theyresult in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather thanpromote substantial justice, must be eschewed. Substantialrights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technicalapplication of the rules in the altar of expediency. When acase is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of theapplication of the rules is in order.12 Time and again, thisCourt has suspended its own rules and excepted aparticular case from their operation whenever the higherinterests of justice so require.13

There is no question that the issues raised by petitionersRanada and Agcaoili and intervener Sagge are ofparamount importance. Thus, any procedural barrier totheir suit should be put aside.

Now to the second issue—the meat of the secondpetition.

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states:

“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of itsrespective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislationin accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiriesshall be respected.”

The ponencia holds that the Senate investigation onthe “Hello Garci” tapes is infirm because the Senate Rulesof Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had






not been duly published at the time of the legislativeinquiry in question.

_______________

12 Tomawis v. TabaoCaudang, G.R. No. 166547, September 12, 2007,533 SCRA 68.

13 Piczon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 7637881, September 24, 1990,190 SCRA 31, 38.

241



I hold otherwise. On this score, I reiterate my separateopinion on the motion for reconsideration in Senate v.Ermita,14 thus:

“True it is that, as the Constitution mandates, the Senate mayonly conduct an investigation in aid of legislation pursuant to itsduly published rules of procedure. Without publication, theSenate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid ofLegislation is ineffective. Thus, unless and until said publicationis done, the Senate cannot enforce its own rules of procedure,including its power to cite a witness in contempt under Section18.

But the Court can take judicial notice that the Senate Rules ofProcedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation waspublished on August 20 and 21, 1992 in the Philippine DailyInquirer and Philippine Star during the 9th Congress.

The Senate again published its said rules on December 1, 2006in the Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer during the13th Congress. That the Senate published its rules of proceduretwice more than complied with the Constitutional requirement.

I submit that the Senate remains a continuing body under the1987 Constitution. That the Senate is a continuing body ispremised on the staggered terms of its members, the idea being toensure stability of governmental policies. This is evident from thedeliberations of the framers of the Constitution, thus:

“MR. RODRIGO. x x xI would like to state that in the United States Federal





Congress, the term of the members of the Lower House isonly two years. We have been used to a term of four yearshere but I think three years is long enough. But they will beallowed to run for reelection any number of times. In thisway, we remedy the too frequent elections every two years.We will have elections every three years under thescheme and we will have a continuing Senate. Everyelection, 12 of 24 Senators will be elected, so that 12Senators will remain in

_______________

14 G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008.

242



the Senate. In other words, we will have a continuingSenate.15

x x x xMR. DAVIDE. This is just a paragraph of that section thatwill follow what has earlier been approved. It reads: “OFTHE SENATORS ELECTED IN THE ELECTION IN 1992,THE FIRST TWELVE OBTAINING THE HIGHESTNUMBER OF VOTES SHALL SERVE FOR SIX YEARSAND THE REMAINING TWELVE FOR THREE YEARS.”This is to start the staggering of the Senate to conformto the idea of a continuing Senate.THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does theCommittee say?MR. SUAREZ. The Committee accepts the Davideproposal, Mr. Presiding Officer.16

The Senate does not cease to be a continuing body merelybecause only half of its members continue to the next Congress.To my mind, even a lesser number of Senators continuing into thenext Congress will still make the Senate a continuing body. TheSenate must be viewed as a collective body. It is an institutionquite apart from the Senators composing it. The Senate as aninstitution cannot be equated to its present occupants. It isindivisible. It is not the sum total of all sitting Senators at anygiven time. Senators come and go but the very institution of the




Senate remains. It is this indivisible institution which should beviewed as continuing.

The argument that the Senate is not a continuing body becauseit lacks quorum to do business after every midterm orpresidential elections is flawed. It does not take into account thatthe term of office of a Senator is fixed by the Constitution. Thereis no vacancy in the office of outgoing Senators during midterm orpresidential elections. Article VI, Section 4 of the 1987Constitution provides:

_______________

15 Constitutional Commission Record (1986), p. 208.16 Id., at p. 434.

243



The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shallcommence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on thethirtieth day of June next following their election.

The term of a Senator starts at noon of June 30 next followingtheir election and shall end before noon of June 30 six years after.The constitutional provision aims to prevent a vacuum in theoffice of an outgoing Senator during elections, which is fixedunder the Constitution unless changed by law on the secondMonday of May,17 until June 30 when the Senatorselect assumetheir office. There is no vacuum created because at the time anoutgoing Senator’s term ends, the term of a Senatorelect begins.

The same principle holds true for the office of the President. Apresidentelect does not assume office until noon of June 30 nextfollowing a presidential election. An outgoing President does notcease to perform the duties and responsibilities of a Presidentmerely because the people had chosen his/her new successor.Until her term expires, an outgoing President has theconstitutional duty to discharge the powers and functions of aPresident unless restricted18 by the Constitution.

In fine, the Senate is a continuing body as it continues to havea full or at least majority membership19 even during electionsuntil the assumption of office of the Senatorselect. The Senate asan institution does not cease to have a quorum to do business





even during elections. It is to be noted that the Senate is not insession

_______________

17 Constitution (1987), Art. VI, Sec. 8.18 Id., Secs. 14 and 15 provides:Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain

effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from hisassumption or reassumption of office.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential electionsand up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not makeappointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions whencontinued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

19 The Office of a Senator may be vacant for causes such as death or permanentdisability.

244



during an election until the opening of a new Congress forpractical reasons. This does not mean, however, that outgoingSenators cease to perform their duties as Senators of the Republicduring such elections. When the President proclaims martial lawor suspends the writ of habeas corpus, for example, the Congressincluding the outgoing Senators are required to convene if not insession within 24 hours in accordance with its rules without needof call.”20

The Constitutional provision requiring publication of Senaterules is contained in Section 21, Article VI of the 1987Constitution, which reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of itsrespective Committees may conduct inquiries in aid oflegislation in accordance with its duly publishedrules of

_______________

20 Constitution (1987), Art. VII, Sec. 18 provides:The President shall be the CommanderinChief of all armed forces of

the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such







armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martiallaw. Within fortyeight hours from the proclamation of martial law or thesuspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shallsubmit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regularor special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, whichrevocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of thePresident, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend suchproclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twentyfour hours followingsuch proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its ruleswithout need of a call.

245



procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affectedby such inquiries shall be respected.

The above provision only requires a “duly published” rule ofprocedure for inquiries in aid of legislation. It is silent onrepublication. There is nothing in the constitutional provisionthat commands that every new Congress must publish its rules ofprocedure. Implicitly, republication is necessary only when thereis an amendment or revision to the rules. This is required underthe due process clause of the Constitution.

The Senate in the 13th Congress caused the publication of theRules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Thepresent Senate (14th Congress) adopted the same rules ofprocedure in the NBNZTE investigation. It does not need torepublish said rules of procedure because it is not shown that asubstantial amendment or revision was made since its lastpublication that would affect the rights of persons appearingbefore it.

On a more practical note, there is little to be gained inrequiring a new Congress to cause the republication of the rules ofprocedure which has not been amended or revised. The exercise issimply a waste of government funds. Worse, it unduly burdens



and hinders the Senate from discharging its constitutional duties.Publication takes time and during the interregnum, it cannot begainsaid that the Senate is barred or restricted from conductingan investigation in aid of legislation.I agree with the Chief Justice that this Court must be wary of thefarreaching consequences of a case law invalidating the Senaterules of procedure for lack of republication. Our ruling in thispetition will not only affect the NBNZTE investigation, but allother Senate investigations conducted under the 10th, 11th, 12th,and the present 14th Congress, for which no republication of therules has been done. These investigations have been the basis ofseveral bills and laws passed in the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives. Putting a doubt on the authority, effectivity andvalidity of these proceedings is imprudent and unwise. This Courtshould really be cautious in making a jurisprudential ruling thatwill unduly strangle

246



the internal workings of a coequal branch and needlessly burdenthe discharge of its constitutional duty.”21

In addition, let me point out the Philippine Constitution,past and present, were largely influenced by the UnitedStates Constitution. In McGrain v. Daugherty,22 the UnitedStates Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the AmericanSenate is a continuing body. In Arnault v. Nazareno,23 thePhilippine Supreme Court, relying on McGrain, held thatthe Philippine Senate is a continuing body. There is noplausible reason why the rule should be different today.

In view of the foregoing, I find it unnecessary to delve onthe third issue which the ponencia does not also address.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS both petitions in G.R.No. 170338 and G.R. No. 179275.

Petition in G.R. No. 170338 dismissed; while petition inG.R. No. 179275 granted.

Note.—Where the issue has become moot and academic,there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the



resolution of the same of no practical use or value. (Palomavs. Court of Appeals, 415 SCRA 590 [2003])

——o0o——

_______________

21 Senate v. Ermita, supra note 14, at pp. 3035.22 273 US 135 (1927).23 Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).

© Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

2 Garcillano vs. House of Representatives

Documents

Transcript of 2 Garcillano vs. House of Representatives