ADOPTIONJune 3, 1992MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO,petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC,respondents.

FELICIANO,J.:On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is,afterAdelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state the time and place of hearing both motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December 1987.Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition formandamusandcertiorariquestioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were consideredpro formaand hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period.1As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of hearing.2In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As the Court held inGregorio v. Court of Appeals:3Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override, substantial justice. if d technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim would be defeated.42. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action onquasi-delictagainst him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called aquasi-delict. . .Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by aminor childwho lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by theminor children who live in their company.xxx xxx xxxThe responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental authority which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.5The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court inCangco v. Manila Railroad Co.6in the following terms:With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to includeresponsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction,to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected tolimit extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged.This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or inhaving failed to exercise due carein the selection and control of one's agent or servants, orin the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.7(Emphasis Supplied)The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting parentsas of the time of the filing of the petition for adoptionthat is,beforeAdelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code8which reads as follows:Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption,a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was filed.The decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied)The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:xxx xxx xxx(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;xxx xxx xxx(Emphasis supplied)and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authorityin accordance with the civil Code.(Emphasis supplied)Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines9has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated childrenliving in their companyand under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruingat a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:Art. 35. Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courtsa supervised trial custody periodof at least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union.During the period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting parents.(Emphasis supplied)Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody,i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption,precisely because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately executory.SO ORDERED.

July 14, 2003ISABELITA S. LAHOM,petitioner,vs.JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"),respondent.VITUG,J.:The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred "7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.xxx xxx xxx"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.xxx xxx xxx"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year."14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son."15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner."16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation,"1Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations."Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code." (emphasis supplied)Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply,i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 3482of the Civil Code and Article 1923of the Family Code.In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC."On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365)."Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action."Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions of the Family Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed."4Viaa petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following questions;viz:1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family.5The continuity of the adopter's family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted.6Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption.7It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern.8Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding consideration.9In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,10followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child,11were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines12of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code13and then by the Family Code of the Philippines,14gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.VV The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process15that expresses a present fixed interestwhich in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action;16it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.17Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,18absolute, unconditional, and perfect19or fixed and irrefutable.InRepublic vs. Court of Appeals,20a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought byeitherspouse orbothof them. After the trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209),mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the husband. The Court concluded that thejurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in forceat the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,21spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled thatthe controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governingat the time the petition was filed.It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the VV new law,22had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 10023of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that VV a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.24While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.25It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.26Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.27Concomitantly, aright of actiongiven by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.28While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law.Dura lex sed lexwould be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.

June 27, 2006DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGINPetitioner,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein.The AntecedentsOn February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition3for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986;4Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;5and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989.6The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,7the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent8to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written consent9to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioners custody.Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor childrens name follow the family name of petitioner.Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises.10On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition.11The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance12but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf.13Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.14The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings.15The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.16On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following recommendation:In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the following reasons:1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto attached.2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as second parent.3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to look after. As young adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their protection and well being.In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and that close attachments was already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.17Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children.The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were very much concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary guardian.The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need parental love, guidance and support which she could not provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she believes her children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and bright future to her children.18However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and that they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that parent-children relationship has long been established between the children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.SO ORDERED.19The OSG appealed20the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its brief21for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.IITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.IIITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural mother. Moreover, the VV affidavit of consent of the petitioners children could not also be admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.23Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.25Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari26on September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors:1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.27The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.The Courts RulingThe petition is denied for lack of merit.It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,28that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.29However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30the Court also ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Courts position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.31Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latters souse, if any;(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.The VM general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.32Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is VM indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer necessary because when Amelias husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the VM biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties.33The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.34VM Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment.35To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.36In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioners testimony on that matter follows:Q Where is the mother of these three children now?A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she communicated with the family?A None, sir.Q How about with her children?A None, sir.Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?A I do not know, sir.Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.Q From whom did you learn that?A From others who came from Italy, sir.Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:Q Where is your mother now?A In Italy, sir.Q When did your mother left for Italy?A After my father died, sir.Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?A Two years old, sir.Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you?A No, sir.38However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following:IV. Background of the Case:x x x xSince the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have been supporting the minor children financially, even during the time that they were still living with their natural parents. Their VM mother also sends financial support but very minimal.39x x x xV. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:x x x xAs the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt.40x x x xIn their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had continued providing support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support of her husbands relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they are undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she died on November 2000.While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular support.Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of minors up to present.41Thus, VM when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter.42VM It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent.43Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.44Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioners children45was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,46which states:Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements:(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The officer making the authentication shall certify under his official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine.As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.47Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her siblings.48Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited income." VM Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should alsobe carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.According to the Adoption Home Study Report49forwarded by the Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioners main intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the VM ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioners allegation that her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.SO ORDERED.

May 21, 2009IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,MONINA P. LIM,Petitioner.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xIN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,MONINA P. LIM,Petitioner.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.The FactsThe following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The children2were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.3Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5given under Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.7Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.8Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent9for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.10The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.11The Ruling of the Trial CourtOn 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.Hence, the present petition.IssuePetitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.The Courts RulingPetitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.We deny the petition.Joint Adoption by Husband and WifeIt is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption.Dura lex sed lex.The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:SEC. 7.Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees parent;(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals:Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter:Provided, further,That the requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.Husband and wifeshalljointly adopt, except in the following cases:(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:Provided, however,That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.Effects of AdoptionPetitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.13The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.14Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.17However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:ARTICLE VEFFECTS OF ADOPTIONSEC. 16.Parental Authority.- Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).SEC. 17.Legitimacy.- The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.SEC. 18.Succession.- In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.18Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled20such as support21and successional rights.22We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.23But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at bar,for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.WHEREFORE, weDENYthe petition. WeAFFIRMthe Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

SUPPORTG.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999MANUEL DE ASIS,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES,respondents.PURISIMA,J.:Petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's Orders, dated November 25, 1993 and February 4, 1994, respectively, denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C-16107, entitled "Glen Camil Andres de Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis", and the motion for reconsideration.The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows:On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-935 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, alleging that the defendant (respondent) Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot therefore be required to provide support for him.On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent in a manifestation the pertinent portion of which, reads;1. That this proposed Amended Answer, defendant (respondent) (herein petitioner) has made a judicial admission/declaration that "1). defendant (respondent) denies that the said minor child (Glen Camil) is his child 2) he (petitioner) has no obligation to the plaintiff Glen Camil . . .2. That with the aforesaid judicial admission/declarations by the defendant (respondent), it seems futile and a useless exercise to claim support from said defendant (respondent).3. That under the foregoing circumstances it would be more practical that plaintiff withdraws the complains against the defendant (respondent) subject to the condition that the defendant (respondent) should not pursue his counterclaim in the above-entitled case, . . .1By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant (respondent) agreed to move for the dismissal of the case. Acting thereupon, the Regional Trial Courta quoissued the following Order of August 8, 1989, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88-935 with prejudice, to wit:Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos Santos, counsel for the defendant (respondent), that counsel for the plaintiff Atty. Ismael J. Andres has no objection that this case be withdrawn provided that the defendant (respondent) will withdraw the counterclaim, as prayed for, let the case be dismissed with prejudice.SO ORDERED.2On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres. Docketed as Civil Case No. C-16107 before Branch 130 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, the said Complaint prayed, thus:WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant (respondent):1. To pay plaintiff the sum of not less than P2,000.00 per month for every month since June 1, 1987 as support in arrears which defendant (respondent) failed to provide plaintiff shortly after her birth in June 1987 up to present;2. To give plaintiff a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 to be paid in advance on or before the 5th of each and every month.3. To give plaintiff by way of supportpendente litea monthly allowance of P5,000.00 per month, the first monthly allowance to start retroactively from the first day of this month and the subsequent ones to be paid in advance on or before the 5th of each succeeding month.4. To pay the costs of suit.Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable under the premises.3On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground ofres judicata, alleging that Civil Case C-16107 is barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q -88-935.In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled thatres judicatais inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order met the same fate. It was likewise denied.Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition forCertiorari. But on June 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals found that the said Petition devoid of merit and dismissed the same.Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this court via the present petition, posing the question whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court, and holding that an action for support cannot be barred byres judicata.To buttress his submission, petitioner invokes the previous dismissal of the Complaint for maintenance and support, Civil Case Q-88-935, filed by the mother and guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, (the herein private respondent). In said case, the petitioner manifested that because of the defendant (respondent)'s judicial declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor child, it was "futile and a useless exercise to claim support from defendant (respondent)". Because of such manifestation, and respondent therein's assurance that he would not pursue his counterclaim anymore, the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The motion was granted by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, which then dismissed the case with prejudice.Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in effect admitted the lack of filiation between him and the minor child, which admission binds the complainant (petitioner), and since the obligation to give support is based on the existence of paternity and filiation between the child and the putative parent, the lack thereof negates the right to claim for support. Thus, petitioner maintains that the dismissal of the Complaint by the lower court on the basis of the said manifestation bars the present action for support, especially so because the order of the trial court explicitly stated that the dismissal of the case was with prejudice.The petition is not impressed with merit.The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law in point, reads:Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . .Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.Art. 2035,ibid, provides, that:No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:(1) The civil status of persons;(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;(3) Any ground for legal separation(4) Future support;(5) The jurisdiction of courts;(6) Future legitime.The raisond'etrebehind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the right to support is stated, thus:The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.xxx xxx xxxTo allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public policy.4In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for support.The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent's mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in a motion of the husband, in which the latter prayed that his obligation to support be extinguished cannot be considered as an assent to the prayer, and much less, as a waiver of the right to claim for support.5It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be .given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.6Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect ofres judicataon the subsequent case for support. The case ofAdvincula vs. Advincula7comes to the fore. In Advincula, the minor, Manuela Advincula, instituted a case for acknowledgment and support against her putative father, Manuel Advincula. On motion of both parties and for the reason that the"plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer interested in continuing the case against the defendant (respondent) and has no further evidence to introduce in support of the complaint", the case was dismissed. Thereafter, a similar case was instituted by Manuela, which the defendant (respondent) moved to dismiss, theorizing that the dismissal of the first case precluded the filing of the second case.In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art .301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648; 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is indisputable that the present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the previous case filed against the same defendant (respondent) was dismissed. And it also appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has the right to bring an action for support, for it is only then that her cause for action is accrues.. . .xxx xxx xxxIt appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of a persons and future support, cannot be the subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant (respondent). (emphasis supplied).Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case Q-88-935 and the lower court's pronouncement that such dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper.WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

May 28, 2002AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN,petitioner,vs.HON. ANTONIO C. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 61, Baguio City, ALBERT G. TOLENTINO, in his capacity as RTC Sheriff of Baguio City, and FRANCHESKA JOY C. PONDEVIDA, assisted by BERNADETTE C. PONDEVIDA,respondents.BELLOSILLO,J.:Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three (3)-year old daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan1demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for supportpendente lite.2Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. He argued that since Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of support.3His motion, however, was denied by the trial court.4Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. Thus, on 19 January 2000 private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion was granted. In itsOrderdeclaring petitioner in default the trial court noted that petitioner'sMotion to Admit Answerwas filed more than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the reglementary period, and only after private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondentex parte.After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court rendered itsDecisionon 12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her withP20,000.00 every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000. Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated arrears ofP20,000.00 per month from the day she was born,P50,000.00 as attorney's fees andP25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plusP20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as alimonypendente liteshould he desire to pursue further remedies against private respondent.5Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution, citing as reason therefor private respondent's immediate need for schooling.6Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a motor vehicle, a Honda City, with Plate No. UMT 884, registered in the name of "A.B. Leasing & Fin. Corp., Leased to: G & G Trading," and found within the premises of petitioner's warehouse in Caloocan City.7Meanwhile, petitioner appealed theJudgmentto the Court of Appeals.8On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ