1st Cases Agrarian

8/6/2019 1st Cases Agrarian

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NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE MAURO

T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 123,

Kalookan City and SPOUSES RUFINO AND JUANITA MATEO, respondents.

Before the Court is a Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules ofCourt assailing the Order, dated April 8, 1992, of Branch 123 of the Regional Trial

Court of Kalookan City, in Civil Case No. C-15325, which granted the motion of the

herein private respondents for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and theOrder of August 4, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts that matter may be culled as follows:

Lots 836 and 839, registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and

covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 34624 and No. 34627, respectively, were

acquired by the Republic on April 2, 1938 from Philippine Trust Company. Said lots

form part of the Tala Estate in Bagong Silang, Kalookan City, which, on April 26,1971, was reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for, among others, the housing programs

of the National Housing Authority.

According to private respondent Rufino Mateo, he had lived in the disputed lots since

his birth in 1928. In 1959, he started farming and working on a six-hectare portion of

said lots, after the death of his father who had cultivated a thirteen-hectare portion ofthe same lots.

On September 1, 1983, the National Housing Authority notified the respondent

spouses of the scheduled development of the Tala Estate including the lots in question,warning them that it would not be responsible for any damage which may be caused to

the crops planted on the said lots.

In 1989, private respondent Rufino Mateo filed with the Department of Agrarian

Reform a petition for the award to them of subject disputed lots under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

In January 1992, in pursuance of the implementation of Proclamation No. 843,petitioner caused the bulldozing of the ricefields of private respondents, damaging the

dikes and irrigations thereon, in the process.

On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses, relying on their claim that subject lots are

agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP, brought before the respondent

Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary

injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from bulldozing further and making constructions

on the lots under controversy. Petitioner traversed such complaint, contending that the

said lots which were previously reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for housing and

resettlement purposes, are not covered by the CARP as they are not agricultural lands

within the definition and contemplation of Section 3 (c) of R. A. No. 6657.

On April 8, 1992, the respondent Court issued its assailed Order granting private

respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction; opining and ruling thus:

"x x x

The Court, after considering the testimony of herein plaintiff Rufino Mateo as well asthe Agrarian Reform Officer, Danilo San Gil, that the herein plaintiffs have beenoccupying the subject property and actual tillers/farmers of the land owned by the

government and registered in the name of, and administered by, the NHA, the landbeing an agricultural land and is, therefore, covered by the Comprehensive Agrarianreform Program (CARP), is of the opinion that in order to maintain the status quo ofthe subject property that the aforesaid prayer for the issuance of the said writ should

be, as it is hereby, GRANTED.

WHEREFORE, upon the filing by the herein plaintiffs of a bond, in the amount ofP5,000.00 duly approved by this Court, let a writ of preliminary injunction beimmediately issued restraining the defendants herein from bulldozing and making anyconstructions on the land farmed and tilled by plaintiffs located in Phase IX, Bagong

Silang, Kalookan City, designated as lot 836 of the Tala Estate and of dispossessingthem of said land, or until further orders by this Court.

SO ORDERED

Dissatisfied therewith, the petitioner presented a Motion for Reconsideration, pointingout that the preliminary injunction thus issued is a blatant violation of P.D. No. 1818,

which proscribes the issuance of injunctive writs against the execution or

implementation of government infrastructure projects. But on August 4, 1992, the said

motion was denied by respondent Courts second Order under attack.

Undaunted, petitioner found its way to this Court via the Petition under consideration,

theorizing that:

I.

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTINGTO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING HIS ORDER OF APRIL 8, 1992

GRANTING RESPONDENTS SPOUSES APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY

INJUCNTION AND ISSUING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

DATED APRIL 15, 1992, BECAUSE HE HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE IT

AND THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO IT.


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II

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING HIS ORDER OF AUGUST 4, 1992

DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND

ADDENDUM THERETO ON THE FINDING THAT THE GROUNDS RAISED

THEREIN ARE EVIDENCIARY IN NATURE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY

ARE ALL SETTLED LEGAL QUESTIONS.

As a rule, direct recourse to this Court is not allowed unless there are special orimportant grounds for the issuance of extra-ordinary writs. In the case ofGarcia vs.

Burgos, where pure questions of law were raised, this Court, mindful of P.D. No.1818, entertained a direct invocation of its jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs,

realizing the serious consequences of delay in essential government projects. So also,

inRepublic vs. Silverio, a similar case involving government infrastructure projects,the Court Took cognizance of an original action forCertiorari against a Regional Trial

Court.

In light of the foregoing, the Court believes, and so holds, that the present case merits

consideration by the Court. To the end that the prosecution and progress of

government projects vital to the national economy be not disrupted or hampered, this

Court should pass upon and resolve the questions of law raised by the petitioner.

The pivotal issues for resolution here are: 1) Whether or not the Compressive

Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers government lands reserved for specific publicpurposes prior to the effectivity of said law; and 2) Whether or not housing, plants and

resettlements are "infrastructure projects" within the contemplation of P.D. No. 1818.

The petition is impressed with merit.

InNatalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court succinctly heldthat lands reserved for, or converted to, non-agricultural uses by government agencies

other than the Department of Agrarian Reform, prior to the effectivity of Republic Act

No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), are

not considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore, outside the ambit of saidlaw, on the basis of the following disquisition:

"x x x Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall 'cover, regardless oftenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agriculturallands.' As to what constitutes 'agricultural land,' it is referred to as 'lands devoted toagricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,

residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the ConstitutionalCommission confirm this limitation. 'Agricultural lands' are only those lands which

are 'arable and suitable agricultural lands' and 'do not include commercial, industrialand residential lands'

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo HillsSubdivision cannot in any language be considered as 'agricultural lands.' These lotswere intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approvalof their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. x x x"

Thus, since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the disputed lots) was

reserved, inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing programof the National Housing Authority, the same has been categorized as not being devoted

to the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, and is,

therefore, outside the coverage of the CARL. Verily, the assailed Orders of the

respondent Court declaring the lots under controversy as "agricultural land" and

restraining the petitioner from involving the same in its housing project thereon, areevidently bereft of any sustainable basis.

Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818, provides:

SECTION 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue anyrestraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any

case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery,forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any publicutility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for thetransport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibitany person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, orcontinuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of

such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution,implementation or operation (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the aforecited provision of law in point prohibits the Courts of the land from

issuing injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of government

infrastructure projects.

Untenable is private respondents contention that the housing and resettlement projectsat stake are not infrastructure projects within the purview of Presidential Decree No.

1818.

As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the Court stressed inRepublic ofthe Philippines vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction:

The term infrastructure projectsmeans construction, improvement and

rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication


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facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewage systems,shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospitalbuildings, and other related construction projects that form part of the governmentcapital investment.

Applying the principle ejusdem generis, the Court is of the view, and so holds,that thegovernmentprojects involved (2) For the various plants and installations of theNational Housing Corporation, for its future expansion and for its staff and pilothousing development, and (5) For housing, resettlement sites and other uses

necessary and related to an integrated social and economic development of the entireestate and environs, x x x. are infrastructure projects. The various plants and

installations,staff and pilot housing development projects, and resettlement sites

related to an integrated social and economic development of the entire estate are

construction projects forming part of the government capital investment, undertaken incompliance with the mandate of the Constitution for the state to embark upon a

continuing program of urban land reform and housing envisioned to provide ataffordable cost decent housing and basic services to the unprivileged and homeless in

urban centers and resettlement areas.

The questioned Orders of respondent Court (which is bound to follow P.D. No.1818),

enjoining or preventing the implementation of subject housing and resettlement

projects under the administration of the National Housing Authority, are repugnant to

Presidential Decree No. 1818. Well-settled to the point of being elementary is thedoctrine that before a writ of preliminary injunction may issue, there must be a clear

showing by the complaint of a right to be protected and that the acts against which the

writ is to be directed infringe such right. Here, it is decisively clear that the private

respondents have no right to the relief sought for.

Premises studiedly viewed in proper perspective, the Court is of the irresistible finding

and conclusion that the respondent Court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the

challenged Orders in Civil Case No. C-15325.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Orders, dated April 8, 1992 andAugust 4, 1992, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, in Civil

Case No. C-15325 are hereby SET ASIDE;and the writ of preliminary injunctionissued by virtue thereof DISSOLVED. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., in the result.

G.R. No. L-105586 December 15, 1993

REMIGIO ISIDRO,petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH DIVISION) AND NATIVIDAD

GUTIERREZ, respondents.

Joventino A. Cornista for petitioner.

Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private respondent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the respondent Court ofAppeals dated 27 February 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 26671 ordering petitioner to

vacate the land in question and surrender possession thereof to the private respondent;

and its 21 May 1992 resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack

of merit.

The facts which gave rise to this petition are as follows:

Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of

4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia,

sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitionerRemigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned land, consisting

of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's) income to meet his family's

needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject top the condition that

petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land withoutpaying any rentaland converted the same into a fishpond.

In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return

of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming

that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond.

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner

before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija which was docketedas Civil Case No. 4120. Petitioner set up the following defenses: (a) that the complaintwas triggered by his refusal to increase his lease rental; (b) the subject land is a

fishpond and therefore is agricultural land; and (c) that lack of formal demand tovacate exposes the complaint to dismissal for insufficiency of cause of action. 1

Based on an ocular inspection of the subject land, the trial court found that the land in

question is a fishpond 2and, thus, in a decision dated 30 May 1991, the said trial court

dismissed the complaint, ruling that the land is agricultural and therefore the dispute

over it is agrarian which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of


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The petition is devoid of merit. We hold for the private respondent.

It is basic whether or not a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is

determined from the allegations of the complaint. As held in Multinational VillageHomeowners'Association, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.: 9

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the

allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the

plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein a

matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can thejurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made

by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the

rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon

the defendant.

In her complaint before the court a quo, private respondent stated that she is the ownerof a parcel of land situated in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, which petitioner

is illegally occupying; that petitioner has taken advantage of the tolerance of her(private respondent's) sister in allowing him to occupy the land on the condition that

he (petitioner) would vacate the land upon demand. Because of petitioner's refusal to

vacate the land, private respondent's remedy, as owner of said land, was to file an

action for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Trial Court.

In his answer to the complainant, petitioner alleged that the land involved in the

dispute is an agricultural land and hence, the case must be filed with the Court ofAgrarian Relations (not the MTC). Moreover, petitioner contended that it was his

refusal to increase his lease rental (implying tenancy) that prompted the private

respondent to sue him in court. 10

It is well settled jurisprudence that a court does not lose its jurisdiction over an

unlawful detainer case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein

the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. 11The court

continues to have the authority to hear the evidence for the purpose precisely of

determining whether or not it has jurisdiction. And upon such hearing, if tenancy is

shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 12

The MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint primarily on the ground that the

subject land is agricultural and therefore the question at issue is agrarian. In this

connection, it is well to recall that Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of

Procedure, 13provides that the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have

primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate allagrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the

implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic ActNo. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as

amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian

laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,

whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to

agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation

of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms

and conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating tocompensation of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other terms and

conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and otheragrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of

farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor or lessee. 14

It is irrefutable in the case at barthat the subject land which used to be an idle,swampy land was converted by the petitioner into a fishpond. And it is settled that afishpond is an agricultural land. An agricultural land refers to the land devoted to

agricultural activity as defined in Republic Act No. 6657 15 and not classified asmineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. 16 Republic Act No. 6657

defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of

fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm

products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction

with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or judicial. 17

But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case anagrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land

is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant.The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land

being agricultural is only one of

them. 18 The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to atenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned,such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant doesupon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the

understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, providedthese are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important. 19

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the

landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is

consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal

cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties .

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between theparties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a

cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person


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establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor ishe covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing

tenancy laws (Caballes v. DAR, et al., G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988). 20

Furthermore, an agricultural lessee as defined in Sec. 116(2) of Republic Act No.

3844, is a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his

immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another

with the latter's consent for purposes of production,for a price certain in money or inproduce or both. An agricultural lessor, on the other hand, is a natural or judicial

person who, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets orgrants to another the cultivation and use of his land for a price certain. 21

Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a lessee, it is clear that there is no

tenancy or agricultural/leasehold relationship existing between the petitioner and the

private respondent. There was no contract or agreement entered into by thepetitioner with the private respondent nor with the overseer of the private

respondent, for petitioner to cultivate the land for a price certain or to share his

harvests. Petitioner has failed to substantiate his claim that he was paying rent for the

use of the land.

Whether or not private respondent knew of the conversion by petitioner of the idle,

swampy land into a fishpond is immaterial in this case. The fact remains that theexistence of all the requisites of a tenancy relationship was not proven by the

petitioner. And in the absence of a tenancy relationship, the complaint for unlawfuldetainer is properly within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, as provided in

Sec. 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Having established that the occupancy and possession by petitioner of the land in

question is by mere tolerance, private respondent had the legal right to demand upon

petitioner to vacate the land. And as correctly ruled by the respondent appellate court:

. . . . His (petitioner's) lawful possession became illegal when thepetitioner (now private respondent) through her sister made a

demand on him to vacate and he refused to comply with such

demand. Such is the ruling in Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA136, 144, wherein it was held:

While in possession by tolerance is lawful, such

possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate

is made by the owner and the possessor by

tolerance refuses to comply with such demand(Prieto vs. Reyes, 14 SCRA 432; Yu vs. De Lara,

6 SCRA 786, 788; Amis vs. Aragon, L-4684,April 28, 1957). A person who occupies the land

of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,

without any contract between them, is necessarily

bound by an implied promise that he will vacate

upon demand, failing which a summary action for

ejectment is the proper remedy against him (Yu vs.

De Lara,supra)." 22

The present case should be distinguished from the recent case ofBernas vs. TheHonorable Court of Appeals . 23In theBernas case, the land occupant (Bernas) had a

production-sharing agreement with the legal possessor (Benigno Bito-on) while therecords in this case fail to show that herein petitioner (Isidro) was sharing the harvest

or paying rent for his use of the land. Moreover, the agreement between the overseer

(Garcia) and herein petitioner was for petitioner to occupy and use the land by mere

tolerance of the owner. Petitioner Isidro failed to refute that Garcia allowed him to usethe land subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate it upon demand. In the

Bernas case, the petitioner (Bernas) was able to establish the existence of anagricultural tenancy or leasehold relationship between him and the legal possessor.

The evidence in this case, on the other hand, fails to prove that petitioner Isidro, was

an agricultural tenant or lessee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

* Penned by Justice Celso L. Magsino and concurred in by Justices

Serafin E. Camilon and Artemon D. Luna.

1Rollo, pp. 21-22.

2Rollo, p. 21.

3Id., p. 23.

4Id., pp. 28-29.


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5Rollo, p. 35.

6Id., pp. 34-35.

7Rollo, p. 37.

8Id., p. 6.

9 G.R. No. 98023, October 17, 1991, 203 SCRA 104.

10Rollo, pp. 20-21.

11 Fortunato de la Cruz, et al. vs. Hon. Crispin V. Bautista, etc., etal., G.R.

No. L-39695, June 14, 1990, 186 SCRA 517.

12 Lorenzo Ignacio and Magdalena dela Cruz vs. The Hon. Court of

First Instance of Bulacan and Felizardo Lipana, G.R. No. L-27897-

98, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 89.

13 Rules governing the adjudication, arbitration and settlement ofagrarian cases, and the conduct of proceedings before the

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) andits adjudicators.

14 Sec. 3 (d), Chapter I, Republic Act No. 6657.

15 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

16 Sec. 3 (c), Chapter I, Republic Act No. 6657.

17 Sec. 3 (b),Ibid.

18 Anacleto de Jesus vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R.No. 72282,

July 24, 1989, 175 SCRA 559.

19 Lea Paz Tuason vs. The Court of Appeals, Sixth Division and

Conrado Miranda, No. L-44817, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA

484.

20 Prudential Bank vs. Hon. Filomeno Gapultos, etc. and Ramon E.

Saura, G.R.

No. 41835, January 19, 1990, 181 SCRA 159.

21 Sec. 116 (3), Republic Act. No. 3844.

22Rollo, p. 33.

23 G.R. No. 85041, 5 August 1993.

ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, LOLITA T. SUPLICO, ENRIQUE T. SUPLICO, JR.,

and DAVID T. SUPLICO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

FEDERICO ARMADA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VITUG,J.:

For review in the instant petition is the 29th November 1991 decision of the Court ofAppeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 54,

Bacolod City, in CAR Case No. 109, which has declared private respondent Federico

Armada to be a bona fide agricultural lessee, instead of a mere farm laborer, of IsabelD. Tupas in Barangay Taloc, Bago City.

Isabel Tupas was the registered owner of a parcel of rice land, designated Lot No. 901-

B-1, with an area of 120,000 square meters (12 hectares), in Taloc, Bago City, underTCT No. T-26014. On 24 February 1977, she leased her landholding, excluding the

33,438-square-meter portion already tenanted by one Jose Jacinto, for the amount ofP10,000.00 to petitioner Enrique P. Suplico, her brother-in-law, under a contract that

was set to expire on 31 May 1982.

Some time in 1979, Armada started tilling an area of 32,945 square meters, identified

to be Lot No. 901-B-1-D, of the farmland under an agreement with Enrique Suplico.

Armada undertook to till the land while Suplico agreed to provide the farm

implements and work animals. Suplico was to receive from Armada 62 cavans fromthe palay harvest per crop yield by way of rental for the use not only of the land but

also of the work animals and a hand tractor. Private respondent resided with his family

in a farmhouse on the land.


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When, years later, Suplico threatened to eject Armada from the property, Armada

initiated, on 03 May 1982, an action for damages and injunction against Suplico in the

Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in Bacolod City. The complaint averred that

Armada was the tenant-farmer of around 2.5 hectares of the property of Isabel Tupas

having been instituted as such tenant in 1979 by her administrator, herein petitioner

Enrique Suplico, to whom he religiously paid the fixed rental of 62 cavans of palay per

crop yield.

An order was issued by the CAR meanwhile restraining Suplico, his agents and

representatives, from harassing, molesting, threatening, and committing acts ofdispossession against, Armada.

In his answer with counterclaim, Suplico interposed the special defense that Armada

was not a tenant-farmer but a seasonal hired farm laborer with a fixed compensation,

and that his services could be terminated anytime before or, at the worst case, upon theexpiration of their contract in May 1982. Suplico added that Armada unlawfully

appropriated for himself the whole produce of the first yield for the crop year 1982-83.

On 14 February 1983, Isabel Tupas, represented by her attorney-in- fact Lolita T.

Suplico (sister of Isabel and the wife of Enrique P. Suplico), intervened in the case.

She alleged that she had no contractual relationship with Armada nor did she impliedly

tolerate his continued possession of the land. She prayed that Armada be ejected fromher landholding. On even date, Isabel Tupas filed a complaint for ejectment against

Armada and his wife, Leticia, in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bago City.The complaint, however, was dismissed on 15 May 1985 for lack of jurisdiction,

following the certification issued by the Regional Director of the then Ministry of

Agrarian Reform, Region VI, Iloilo City, that the case was not proper for trial and

hearing by the MTC on account of the existence of tenancy over the land involved.

On 28 June 1984, the complaint for damages and injunction was referred by the trial

court to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) for a summary determination of

the relationship of the parties, as well as for a certification on whether or not the case

was proper for trial, in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 29 of the MAR,implementing P.D. No. 316 in conjunction with P.D. No. 27. The trial of the case

resumed after the MAR Director for Region 6, Iloilo City, had certified that the casewas proper for trial and hearing.

On 28 March 1987, Isabel Tupas donated the whole property to her sister, Lolita T.

Suplico, and her nephews, Enrique Suplico, Jr., and David Suplico. On 17 May 1988,

she moved to be dropped as intervenor and asked that her donees of the property beinstead named as substitutes.

Finally, on 18 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision declaring private

respondent a bona fide agricultural lessee. The dispositive portion of the decisionstated:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring plaintiff FEDERICO ARMADA a bona fide agricultural lessee of thelandholding in question with an area of two and a half (2 1/2) hectares more or less

belonging to the intervenors;

2. Permanently enjoining the defendant/intervenors from ejecting or removing

plaintiff from his landholding aforementioned situated in sitio Langka, Brgy. Taloc,

Bago City;

3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant/intervenors two hundred fifty-four

(254) cavans of palay as back rentals or their money equivalent, less whatever amount

may have been paid or deposited with the court after this date; and

4. Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims for damages for lack of and/or

insufficiency of evidence.

So Ordered.

The contending parties all appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, on 29 November 1991, affirmed the decision of the court a quoand considered Armada to be a share tenant.

The instant petition, in main, raises the sole issue of whether or not private respondent

Armada should be held a tenant farmer entitled to security of tenure or a mere hiredfarm laborer.

The Court sees no reason to disturb the findings of both courts below. The facts found

by the appellate court, sustaining the court a quo, readily converge towards oneconclusion, and it is that tenancy did exist between the parties.

Firstly, private respondent was in actual possession of the land, and he there resided,with his family, in a farmhouse just like what a farm tenant normally would. Secondly,private respondent and his wife were personally doing the farm work of plowing,

planting, weeding and harvesting the area. The occasional and temporary hiring ofpersons outside of the immediate household, so long as the tenant himself had control

in the farmwork, was not essentially opposed to the status of tenancy. Thirdly, the


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management of the farm was left entirely to private respondent who defrayed the

cultivation expenses.Fourthly, private respondent shared the harvest of the land,depositing or delivering to petitioner Enrique Suplico the agreed 62 cavans of palay

per crop yield. Jesus Mesias, the licensed ricemiller of Taloc, attested to Suplico's

having received from private respondent the cash value of the rental payments from

the first crop of 1979 and each crop thereafter up to the first crop of 1983, inclusive.

The rental payments made thereafter were received by petitioner Lolita Suplico, courtappointed police officers, or the barangay captain.

Parenthetically, during the pendency of this appeal, the Secretary of Agrarian Reformhas issued an emancipation patent denominated Transfer Certificate of Title No. EP-

2064 in the name of private respondent over 26,622 square meters of Lot No. 901-B-1-

C-2-B, Bsd-06-002040, of the operation land transfer. In a pleading, dated 01

December 1994, petitioners point to anomalies supposedly attending the issuance ofTCT No. EP-2064. Regrettably, these allegations are matters that should first be

ventilated and tried, not here, but in the proper forum.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., took no part.

Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred in by Associate Justices

Manuel C. Herrera and Alfredo L. Benipayo.

Presided by Judge Jesus V. Ramos.

Rollo, p. 179.

Exh. 16, Records, p. 661.

Exh. 15-A; Records, p. 660.

TSN, April 22, 1988, p. 26.

Records, p. 1.

Ibid., p. 14.

Ibid., pp. 19-22.

Ibid., pp. 103-107.

Ibid., pp. 226-227.

Exh. S, Records, p. 692.

The Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch LI, Bacolod City, took overthis case from the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations of Bacolod City (Record, p.

168) in accordance with Sec. 1 of Executive Order No. 864 dated January 17, 1983automatically abolishing Courts of Agrarian Relations in implementation of Sec. 44 of

the Reorganization Act of 1980. Later, on motion of private respondent who was

residing in Bago City, the case was transferred to Branch LIV of the RTC, Bacolod

City. (Records, p. 188.)

P.D. No. 316 prohibited the ejectment of tenant-tillers from their farmholdings

pending the promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

Upon the effectivity of P.D. No. 27, all tenant-farmers of private agricultural lands

primarily devoted to rice and corn production were deemed owners of the land they

were tilling. However, no rules and regulations implementing said decree werepromulgated until the issuance of Executive Order No. 228 and the enactment of

Republic Act No. 6657. The effect was that during said period, the relations between

tenants and landowners were on hold. Thus, agricultural leasehold relationships with

respect to rice and corn lands of less than seven (7) hectares which were not covered

by the operation land transfer were maintained (Barte, LAW ON AGRARIANREFORM WITH COMMENTARIES, 1991 ed., p. 63).

REYNALDO BEJASA AND ERLINDA BEJASA,petitioners, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Special Sixteenth Division, ISABEL

CANDELARIA and JAMIE DINGLASAN, respondents.

This is a petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decisionof the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro and ordering petitionersReynaldo and Erlinda Bejasa (hereinafter referred to as "the Bejasas") to surrender the

possession of the disputed landholdings to respondent Isabel Candelaria ("hereinafter

referred to as Candelaria") and to pay her annual rental from 1986, attorneys fees,

litigation expenses and costs.

Inescapably, the appeal involves the determination of a factual issue. Whether a person

is a tenant is a factual question. The factual conclusions of the trial court and the Courtof Appeals are contradictory and we are constrained to review the same.


10/30

We state the undisputed incidents.

This case involves two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-58191 and TCT No.

T-59172, measuring 16 hectares and 6 hectares more or less, situated in Barangay Del

Pilar, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. The parcels of land are indisputably owned by Isabel

Candelaria.

On October 20, 1974, Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement over the

land with Pio Malabanan (hereinafter referred to as "Malabanan"). In the contract,

Malabanan agreed among other things: "to clear, clean and cultivate the land, topurchase or procure calamansi, citrus and rambutan seeds or seedlings, to attend and

care for whatever plants are thereon existing, to make the necessary harvest of fruits,

etc."

Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it.

The Bejasas claim that they planted citrus, calamansi, rambutan and banana trees onthe land and shouldered all expenses of production.

On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land,modifying their first agreement. As per the agreement, Malabanan was under no

obligation to share the harvests with Candelaria.

Sometime in 1983, Malabanan died.

On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan

(hereinafter referred to as "Jaime) as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of

administration over the disputed land.

On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with

Victoria Dinglasan, Jaimes wife (hereinafter referred to as "Victoria"). The contract

had a term of one year.

On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in

consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term ofone year. The agreement is below quoted:

"Ako si Victoria Dinglasan bilang tagapamahala ni IsabelCandelaria ay ipinaaryendo kay Reynaldo Bejasa ang lupang datingaryendo ni Pio Malabanan sa nasabing Ginang Buhat sa ika-30 ng

Disyembre 1984 hanggang Ika-30 ng Disyembre 1985. Ako aytumanggap sa kanya ng pitong libong piso at ito ay daragdagan paniya ng walong libong piso (P8,000) dito sa katapusan ng buwan ng

Disyembre 1984.

(signed)Reynaldo Bejasa

(signed)Victoria Dinglasan

"Witness

"(unintelligible)

"(unintelligible)"

During the first week of December 1984, the Bejasas paid Victoria P7,000.00 as

agreed. The balance of P8,000.00 was not fully paid. Only the amount of P4,000.00was paid on January 11, 1985.

After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victorias demand to vacate the land, theBejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be

it in the form of rent or a shared harvest.

On April 7, 1987, Candelaria and the Dinglasans again entered into a three-year lease

agreement over the land. The special power of attorney in favor of Jaime was also

renewed by Candelaria on the same date.

On April 30, 1987, Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlementof Land Problems ("COSLAP"), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking ejectment of the

Bejasas.

On May 26, 1987, COSLAP dismissed the complaint.

Sometime in June 1987, Jaime filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court,

Calapan Oriental, Mindoro against the Bejasas for "Recovery of possession with

preliminary mandatory injunction and damages." The case was referred to the

Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR").

On December 28, 1987, the DAR certified that the case was not proper for trial beforethe civil courts.

The trial court dismissed Jaimes complaint, including the Bejasas counterclaim for

leasehold, home lot and damages.

On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan,

Oriental Mindoro a complaint for "confirmation of leasehold and home lot with

recovery of damages." against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan.


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On February 20, 1991, after trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the Bejasas. First,

they reasoned that a tenancy relationship was established. This relationship can be

created by and between a "person who furnishes the landholding as owner, civil law

lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor and the person who personally cultivates the

same." Second, as bona-fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have security of tenure. Thelower court ruled:

"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of theplaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows:

"(1) Ordering the defendants to maintain plaintiffs in the peaceful

possession and cultivation of the lands in question and to respect

plaintiffs security of tenure on the landholdings of Isabel Candelaria

and the home lot presently occupied by them;

"(2) Confirming the leasehold tenancy system between the plaintiffsas the lawful tenant-tillers and the landholder, Isabel Candelaria,

with the same lease rental of P20,000.00 per calendar year for theuse of the lands in question and thereafter, same landholdings be

placed under the operation land transfer pursuant to Republic Act

No. 6657;

"(3) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the

plaintiffs the amount of P115,500.00 representing the sale of

calamansi which were unlawfully gathered by Jaime Dinglasan andhis men for the period July to December, 1987 and which were

supported by receipts and duly proven, with formal written

accounting, plus the sum of P346,500.00 representing the would-be

harvests on citrus, calamansi, rambutan and bananas for the years

1988, 1989 and 1990, with legal rate of interest thereon from the

date of the filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

"(4) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally

the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fee and expenses of

litigation; and

"(5) Authorizing the plaintiffs as tenant-farmers to litigate as pauper

not only in this Court but up to the appellate courts in accordance

with Section 16 of P. D. No. 946.

"SO ORDERED."

On February 20, 1991, respondents filed their notice of appeal.

On February 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the trial

courts ruling. Reasoning: First, not all requisites necessary for a leasehold tenancy

relationship were met. There was no consent given by the landowner. The consent of

former civil law lessee, Malabanan, was not enough to create a tenancy relationship.

Second, when Malabanan engaged the services of the Bejasas, he only constituted

them as mere overseers and did not make them "permanent tenants". Verily, even

Malabanan knew that his contract with Candelaria prohibited sublease. Third, thecontract ("aryenduhan") between the Bejasas and Victoria, by its very terms, expiredafter one year. The contract did not provide for sharing of harvests, means of

production, personal cultivation and the like. Fourth, sharing of harvest was notproven. The testimony of Reynaldo Bejasa on this point is self-serving. Fifth, the

element of personal cultivation was not proven. Reynaldo Bejasa himself admitted that

he hired laborers to clear and cultivate the land. The Court of Appeals disposed of thecase, thus:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed fromis hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The interlocutory order

issued on September 5, 1988 is DISSOLVED and the appellees are

hereby ordered to surrender possession of the disputed landholdings

to appellant Isabel Candelaria and pay her the amount of P15,000.00

in annual rents commencing from 1986 plus attorneys fees and

litigation expenses of P35,000.00 and costs.

"SO ORDERED."

Hence, this appeal filed on March 3, 1993.

The issue raised is whether there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the Bejasas.

The elements of a tenancy relationship are:

(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

(2) the subject is agricultural land;

(3) there is consent;

(4) the purpose is agricultural production;

(5) there is personal cultivation; and

(6) there is sharing of harvests.


12/30

After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that there is no

tenancy relationship between the parties.

Malabanan and the Bejasas. True, Malabanan (as Candelarias usufructuary) allowed

the Bejasas to stay on and cultivate the land.

However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give consent to the creation of

a tenancy relation, still, no such relation existed.

There was no proof that they shared the harvests.

Reynaldo Bejasa testified that as consideration for the possession of the land, he

agreed to deliver the landowners share (1/5 of the harvest) to Malabanan. Only

Reynaldo Bejasas word was presented to prove this. Even this is cast into suspicion.

At one time Reynaldo categorically stated that 25% of the harvest went to him, that

25% was for Malabanan and 50% went to the landowner, Candelaria. Later on he

stated that the landowners share was merely one fifth.

In Chico v. Court of Appeals, we faulted private respondents for failing to prove

sharing of harvests since "no receipt, or any other evidence was presented." We addedthat "Self serving statements ... are inadequate; proof must be adduced."

Candelaria and the Bejasas. Between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria

as landowner never gave her consent.

The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They

acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanans

arrangement with them. True enough Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that theBejasas during Malabanans lease possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim that

this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas for

P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy

agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing.Even assumingthatCandelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement

did not create a tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease.

Dinglasan and the Bejasas.Even assumingthat the Dinglasans had the authority as

civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof thatthey did.

Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between

them is the "aryenduhan", which states in no uncertain terms the monetaryconsideration to be paid, and the term of the contract.

Not all the elements of tenancy being met, we deny the petition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals of February 9,

1993, in toto.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

RODRIGO ALMUETE and ANA ALMUETE,petitioners, vs. MARCELO

ANDRES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

The subject of this controversy is a parcel of agricultural land identified as Lot 8449

Pls-967, located at San Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela, measuring approximately 72,587

square meters. Way back on March 25, 1957, this parcel was awarded by the thenNational Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to petitioner

Rodrigo Almuete. Since then, Rodrigo Almuete exercised exclusive possession of theproperty, cultivating it and planting thereon narra, fruit trees, rice, corn and legumes.

For some twenty-two (22) years, Rodrigo Almuete and his family farmed the subject

property peacefully and exclusively.

However, unknown to Rodrigo Almuete, on August 17, 1979, an Agrarian Reform

Technologist by the name of Leticia Gragasin filed a field investigation and inspection

report stating, among others, that the whereabouts of the original awardee of thesubject property, Rodrigo Almuete, was unknown and that he had waived all his

rights as a NARRA settler due to his poor health beyond his control and financial

hardship. Gragasin also stated therein that the actual occupant of the land is

Marcelo Andres since April 1967 to date. She recommended to the Director of the

Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Tuguegarao, Cagayan that the award in favor

of Rodrigo Almuete be cancelled and that the land be awarded to respondent Marcelo

Andres. Consequently, Marcelo Andres was allowed to file his homestead

application. To further support his application, Marcelo Andres represented to theMAR (now DAR) officials that sometime in 1965, Rodrigo Almuete sold the subject

property to one Victor Masiglat, who gave the former a radiophono set as

consideration therefor. Since Victor Masiglat was disqualified from acquiring the

subject property owing to his also being a NARRA awardee, he transferred the said

property to Marcelo Andres in exchange for one (1) carabao and the sum of Six

Hundred Pesos (P600.00). These successive transfers were not covered by writtencontracts between the parties.


13/30

On the strength of the MAR Regional Directors recommendation and Marcelo

Andres representations, the latter was granted and issued a homestead patent.

In the meantime, unaware that the NARRA award in his favor had been cancelled and

that a homestead patent had been issued to Marcelo Andres, Rodrigo Almuete and his

family, particularly his daughter Ana Almuete, continued to cultivate and farm the

subject property. In 1982, Rodrigo Almuete built a house in Barangay Fortune, Alicia,

Isabela, where he resided while working as a driver for a rice mill. From time to time,he would visit the farm to deliver supplies and pay wages to the laborers who worked

therein.

In 1988, the DAR Regional Director recommended the transfer of ownership over the

subject property to Marcelo Andres. On July 7, 1988, the DAR issued Original

Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-52521 in the name of Marcelo Andres, which

certificate was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Isabela on January 26, 1989.

Shortly thereafter, Marcelo Andres, accompanied by ten (10) other persons armed with

bolos and other bladed implements, entered the subject property, claiming exclusiveright of ownership and possession. They felled the narra trees, converting the same to

lumber, and destroyed the mongos planted by the Almuetes. Marcelo Andres gained

control, and took possession, of approximately half of the subject property.

Rodrigo Almuete wasted no time in complaining to the DAR authorities of Marcelo

Andres encroachment into and occupation of the subject property. It was only then

that he learned that the subject property had been titled in the name of Marcelo Andresand that the award in his favor had been cancelled because he had allegedly abandoned

the subject property. Upon Rodrigo Almuetes inquiry, the records of the local office

of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) showed that he was

still the listed owner of the subject property.

Consequently, Rodrigo Almuete and his daughter, Ana Almuete, filed an action for

reconveyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres with the Regional

Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, docketed as Civil Case No. Br-20-530.

On November 26, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the

defendant Marcelo Andres:

(1) declaring plaintiff Rodrigo Almuete owner of the land in question, now covered by

Original Certificate of Title No. P-52521 in the name of the defendant Marcelo

Andres;

(2) ordering the defendant Marcelo Andres and/or his representatives to vacate the

land in question and deliver the peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiffs;

(3) ordering the defendant Marcelo Andres to reconvey at his expense, the title, OCT

No. P-52521, to the plaintiff Rodrigo Almuete; and

(4) ordering the defendant Marcelo Andres to pay to the plaintiffs P13,000.00 by way

of attorneys fees.

Costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.

The trial court found that Marcelo Andres did not acquire any right over the subject

property when he supposedly bought it from Victor Masiglat because the latter never

acquired ownership from the original owner, Rodrigo Almuete. Besides, defendant

Marcelo Andres could not present any valid document to prove his acquisition of the

said property. It also found that Rodrigo Almuete did not abandon the subjectproperty. Rather, Leticia Gragasin of the MAR made obviously false assertions in her

report, knowingly misleading the Regional Director into cancelling the name ofRodrigo Almuete as an awardee and issuing the homestead patent in the name of

Marcelo Andres. Hence, the cancellation of Rodrigo Almuetes award and theissuance of the homestead patent in favor of Marcelo Andres were perpetrated

through fraud.

Marcelo Andres failed to appeal; thus, the trial courts decision became final and

executory. On February 15, 1994, a writ of execution was issued. Marcelo Andresfiled a motion to quash the writ of execution, but the trial court did not act on it on the

ground that it had no more jurisdiction over the case.

Marcelo Andres filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, stating at

the outset that his counsel had failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration of the

decision or an appeal due to sheer ignorance of the law. In his petition, Andres

assailed the trial courts jurisdiction over the nature as well as the subject matter of thecase. He argued that since the subject property was agricultural land covered by a

homestead patent, exclusive jurisdiction was with the Department of Agrarian ReformAdjudication Board (or DARAB), not with the regular courts. Respondent Andres

also stressed that the original action was for ejectment, which was cognizable by the

municipal trial courts, not by the Regional Trial Courts. Consequently, for want of

jurisdiction, the trial courts decision was null and void; and cannot be enforced by

writ of execution or any other legal means.


14/30

On August 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered the impugned Decision, disposing

as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious, the writ of certiorari prayed for is

GRANTED. Judgment is rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. Br. 20-530 of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cauayan, Isabela and declaring the decision rendered

therein, the order granting the motion for execution and the writ of execution issued

NULL and VOID. In the event the writ of execution has been carried out, respondentCourt is ordered to restore petitioner in possession of the land, to cancel whatever new

title may have been issued to private respondents, to reinstate petitioners OCT P-52521, and the restitution of whatever sums collected from petitioner as expenses of

reconveyance or attorneys fees. Respondent Court is ordered to restore thestatus quobefore the complaint, the decision and the writ of execution.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the decision. On October 6, 1995, the

Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution, denying the motion forreconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition for review, ascribing to the Court of Appeals grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when:

I. it gave due course to the Petition for Certiorari of the respondent Marcelo Andres,

dated June 10, 1994, questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,

Cauayan, Isabela, dated November 26, 1993, clearly seven (7) months after thedecision of the Regional Trial Court;

II. it did not consider and give weight to the contention of petitioners that this case is

not as Agrarian Dispute, hence, it does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, but to the Regional Trial

Court;

III. it did not consider and give weight to the fact that private respondentMarcelo Andres entered into the land allocated to the petitioners by the National

Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), by the use of guns andboloes;

IV. in not awarding, recognizing and honoring the vested interest of the

petitioners on that parcel of land identified as Lot 8449, Pls-967-D (identical with Lot

196, Pls-81 of the NARRA) with an area of 72,587 square meters, awarded to them by

the government thru the NARRA.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was forrecovery of possession

and reconveyance of title. The issue to be resolved was who between petitioner

Rodrigo Almuete and respondent Marcelo Andres has a better right to the subject

property considering that both of them are awardees of the same property. It was thus

a controversy relating to ownership of the farmland, which is beyond the ambit of the

phrase agrarian dispute. No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was allegedbetween petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would so characterize the

relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and respondent were contendingparties for the ownership of the same parcel of land.

Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:

Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. --- The Agrarian ReformAdjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, todetermine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or

incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian ReformProgram under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,

Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other

agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

Agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, as:

(d)Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted toagriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation

of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or

conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act

and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to

farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants

stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant,

or lessor and lessee.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases

involving a tenancy relationship between the parties. The following elements are

indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship (six elements)

(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;

(2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;


15/30

(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;

(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;

(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, gravely erred when it granted the petition forcertiorari and held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the

action between petitioners and respondent. The action filed by petitioners was

cognizable by the regular courts. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of

Cauayan, Isabela was competent to try and decide Civil Case No. 20-530. Its decision

was, thus, valid and can no longer be disturbed, after having attained finality. Nothing

more can be done with the decision except to enforce it.

Respondents contention that the action below was an ejectment suit is untenable.

Basic is the rule that in actions for ejectment, the only issue is possession. This is nottrue as regards the case below, which principally involved the question of ownership,

or more accurately, the validity of the homestead patent awarded to petitioner vis--visthat awarded to respondent.

It is true that the caption of the Amended Complaint includes ejectment in the

description of the nature of the suit. However, it is not the caption of the pleading but

the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action. A close perusal of the

Amended Complaint filed before the court a quo indubitably shows that petitioners, asplaintiffs therein, prayed for the cancellation of the certificate of title in the name ofMarcelo Andres, and that they be declared the absolute owners of the land in dispute.

On a final procedural note, the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the

special civil action forcertiorari. A basic requisite for such action to lie is that there isno appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Certiorari is a remedy of last recourse and is a limited form of review. Its principal

function is to keep inferior tribunals within their jurisdiction.Certiorari

cannot beused as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Respondent lost that remedy by his

failure to appeal.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is

GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. SP No. 34314 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO

RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO SALAMAR,petitioners,

vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M.

REYES and FE M. REYES, respondents.

Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for petitioners.

Leonardo N. Zulueta for Enrique Reyes, et al. Adolfo S. Azcuna for privaterespondents.

Before us is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the respondentCourt of Appeals**on March 3, 1987 affirming the judgment of the court a quo dated

April 29, 1986, the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reading as follows;

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by this Court on November 5,

1982 is hereby reconsidered and a new judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is inapplicable to lands

obtained thru the homestead law,

2. Declaring that the four registered co-owners will cultivate and

operate the farmholding themselves as owners thereof; and

3. Ejecting from the land the so-called tenants, namely; Gabino

Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr., Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente

Ricalde and Rolando Salamar, as the owners would want to cultivate

the farmholding themselves.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (p. 31, Rollo)

The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of

land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homesteadpatent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at

Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.


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Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but

petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and

appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for

short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).

On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against

Hon. Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as

Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for thedeclaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General

Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.

Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.

Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the

defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and

from being issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed theiropposition dated August 4, 1982.

On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District,Branch IV, Pagadian City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch

XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin

the defendants was denied.

On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which

defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.

Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decisionprompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its

Order dated June 6, 1986.

On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment

rendered on March 3, 1987, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error thereof, the decisionappealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. (p. 34, Rollo)

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are

covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.

The question certainly calls for a negative answer.

We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of

tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land

they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to

the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be

invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or

Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,

The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protectionof the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he

may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is

necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other

needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things

necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself.They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become

human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of thepeople's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of

this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)

In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the

homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform

statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which

provides:

Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or

stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the

disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands

of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture,

subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the

rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting

the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of theproperty in question, reading,

Section 6. Retention Limits. ...

... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct

compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of

the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as theycontinue to cultivate said homestead.'


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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals

sustaining the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

LEONARDA L. MONSANTO, petitioner,

vs.JESUS AND TERESITA ZERNA AND COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

PANGANIBAN,J.:

The filing of a criminal action carries with it the civil liability arising from the offense.

However, the trial court cannot adjudge civil matters that are beyond its competence

and powers. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon the criminal liabilityof the accused, it cannot make any civil awards that relate to the agrarian relationship

of the parties because this matter is beyond its jurisdiction.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the

January 12, 2000 Decision1 and the March 16, 2000 Resolution2 of the Court of

Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55440. The decretal portion of the challenged

Decision reads as follows:

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, for lack of jurisdiction, the assailedorder of September 4, 1996 is herebyRECALLED, SET ASIDE and

DECLARED NULL and VOID . The parties, if they so desire, should refertheir dispute before the agrarian authorities. No pronouncement as to costs."4

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

Spouses Jesus and Teresita Zerna (herein private respondents) were charged withqualified theft in Criminal Case No. 5896, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Lanao del Norte, Branch 6. This case was later re-raffled and transferred to Branch4 of the same judicial region. The Information against private respondents was

amended on June 8, 1995. It is reproduced hereunder:

"That on or about February 25, 1995, up to the following month of March,

1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and

mutually helping each other, being then the overseers of some banana plants

on the land owned by one Leonarda Monsanto and principally devoted to

coconut trees, and having access to said land as such, with grave abuse of

confidence reposed [i]n them by the said owner, with intent to gain, did thenand there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, harvest and carry

away coconuts from the premises of the said plantation, which the said

accused then processed into copra with a total value of P6,162.50, belongingto said Leonarda Monsanto, without her consent and against her will, to the

damage and prejudice of said Leonarda Monsanto in the aforesaid sum of

P6,162.50, Philippine Currency."5

After trial on the merits, the RTC acquitted them of the charge on July 24, 1996. It

held as follows:

"x x x [T]he harvest in the land by the [accused] was done, not for the

purpose of stealing the coconuts or the copra, but more to confirm their claim

that they are tenants of the land. In fact the lack of intent to gain is shown by

the fact that they immediately deposited the proceeds with the barangay

captain and did not even claim a share [in] the proceeds of the copra.

x x x x x x x x x

"In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the [accused] are not tenants of

the land and the cash deposit [from] the proceeds of the copra with the

barangay captain belongs to the private complainant, Leonarda Monsanto.

However, considering the lack of intent of the [accused] to gain, no criminal

liability for theft has been committed by them."6

It then disposed of the case in the following manner:

"WHEREFORE, the criminal case for qualified theft against the [accused]

Jesus Zerna and Teresita Zerna is hereby ordered dismissed and their bailbond cancelled. The barangay captain of Buru-un, Iligan City is hereby

ordered to deliver the amount of P5,162.50, representing the proceeds [from

the] copra sold by the [accused] to the private complainant, Leonarda

Monsanto."7

The total proceeds of the copra sale alleged in the Information was P6,262.50.

However, the awarded amount was only P5,162.50 which was deposited by privaterespondents with the barangay secretary of Buru-un8 on March 2, 1995, after


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deducting P340 (harvesting cost) and P760 (labor cost). Thus, petitioner filed a timely

Motion for Reconsideration praying that the remaining sum of P1,100 be returned to

her.9

In its September 4, 1996 Order, the trial court granted the Motion and ordered private

respondents to return the amount of P1,100.10 It ruled thus:

"In his motion for reconsideration, the private prosecutor prays that with

respect to the civil aspect of the case, the accused be made to return the

amount of P1,100.00 which they appropriated for themselves from the grossproceeds of the stolen property.

"Opposing the said motion, counsel for the accused avers that the amount

P1,100.00 was due to the accused as compensation for their labor and equity

demands that they [be] entitled to it.

"The Court has already adjudged that the accused are not guilty of theft andtherefore, they cannot be considered to have stolen the coconuts. But the

motion has raised another issue.

"Are the accused entitled to the amount of P1,100.00 as compensation for

labor in harvesting the coconuts and processing these into copra?

"The accused plead equity in their favor since [there] appears to be no law

applicable to the incident in question. However, for equity to apply, good

faith must exist.

"From the findings of this Court, the harvesting of the coconuts andprocessing of the same into copra were not with the consent of the private

complainant. In fact, if the proper criminal charge were made, which could be

unjust vexation, the accused could have been convicted as their acts certainly

vexed the private complainant by their harvesting the coconuts and selling the

copra. Therefore, without good faith, since the Court found that they did the

acts complained of in an attempt to confirm their tenancy claim, equity waswanting.

"The accused could not be entitled to compensation for their labor donewithout the consent of the private complainant since, obviously, there was no

contract of labor between them for the harvesting of the coconuts and

processing of these into copra.

"Even our laws on quasi-contracts do not allow compensation [for] the

accused.

"Without equity or any law in their favor, the accused are therefore not

entitled to compensation for their vexatious acts."11

After a review of the records and the pleadings of the parties, the CA, on appeal, ruled

that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order private respondents to pay petitioner the

amount of P1,100. Because the dispute involved an agricultural tenancy relationship,

the matter fell within the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department

of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). It added that inasmuch as the RTChad no jurisdiction to rule on the civil aspect of the case ergo, it had no appellate

authority over the matter under a writ of error.

The appellate court thus "recalled, set aside and declared null and void" the September

6, 1996 RTC Order requiring the return of the P1,100 to petitioner.

Hence, this Petition.12

Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court's

consideration:

I

"Is the Regional Trial Court automatically divested of jurisdiction over a

criminal case where an agrarian issue is argued as a defense, no matter how

flimsy?

II

"Does the Court of Appeals have any competence to review an RTC Decisionwhich ha[s] become FINAL as not appealed from, on the basis of a Notice of

Appeal which was SPECIFICALLY and simply directed against an

adscititious ORDER issued subsequent to that Decision?"13

This Court's Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue:DARAB Jurisdiction


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agriculture, including (1) disputes concerning farm workers' associations; or (2)

representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to

arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangement.20

InEstates Development Corporation v. CA ,21 the essential elements of a tenancyrelationship were listed in this wise:

"For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy

relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold

over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elementsto wit: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee 2)

subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land 3) there is consent

between the parties to the relationship 4) that the purpose of the relationship

is to bring about agricultural production 5) there is personal cultivation on the

part of the tenant or agricultural lessee and 6) the harvest is shared betweenthe landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee."

Petitioner claims that private respondents were not her tenants, and that they raised thedefense of tenancy in the criminal case merely to escape prosecution for qualified

theft. On the other hand, private respondents assert that they were petitioner's tenants,

as shown by the evidence adduced by the parties before the RTC.

After a careful review of the records of this case, we hold that an agrarian dispute

existed between the parties. First, the subject of the dispute between them was the

taking of coconuts from the property owned by petitioner. Second, private respondentswere the overseers of the property at the time of the taking of the coconuts, as can be

gleaned from the Kasabutan (or Agreement) executed between them on November 25,

1991, which reads thus:

"I, MRS. LEONARDA L. MONSANTO, am the owner of that land located at

Tonggo, Mimbalot, Buru-un, Iligan City. This JESUS [Z]ERNA, whose wife

is TERESITA ZERNA, had requested that he be allowed to oversee Mrs.

Monsanto's Banana plants under the agreement that he (Jesus Zerna) would

be paid for his labor for each banana plant cut in Tonggo."

"When I (Jesus Zerna) no longer want to oversee or wish to stop overseeing,

Mrs. Leonarda Monsanto cannot force me to continue in the same way that I

cannot force Mrs. Monsanto to hire me if my services are no longer

needed."22

Third, petitioner allowed private respondents to plant coconut, coffee, jackfruit andcacao as shown by the said Agreement, pertinent portions of which are reproducedhereunder:

"And if I (Jesus Zerna) can plant coconut trees [o]n that land, I will be paid

for them according to their ages. I (Jesus Zerna) am also allowed to plant

coffee, jackfruit and cacao, under the same agreement."23

Finally, a tenurial arrangement exists among herein parties as regards the harvesting ofthe agricultural products, as shown by the several remittances made by private

respondents to petitioner. These are substantiated by receipts.24

A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or

impliedly.25 In the present case, undisputed by petitioner is the existence of theKasabutan, which contradicts her contention that private respondents were mereoverseers. In any event, their "being overseers does not foreclose their being also

tenants," as held inRupa v. Court of Appeals.26 Evidently, the resolution of theagrarian dispute between the parties is a matter beyond the legal competence of regular

courts.

To repeat, petitioner is claiming the questioned amount of P1,100 as the balance of the

proceeds from the copra sale, which the RTC awarded her. Private respondentscontend that this P1,100 is their compensation, pursuant to their tenurial arrangement

with her. Since this amount is inextricably intertwined with the resolution of the

agrarian dispute between them, we believe that the Court of Appeals did not commit

any reversible error in holding that it was DARAB that had jurisdiction to pass upon

this civil matter.

Second Issue:Lack of Jurisdiction Not Waived

Petitioner argues that jurisdiction was not raised as an issue in the appeal ergo, the CAshould not have ruled on it.

We disagree. As a general rule, an appeal is limited to a review of the specific legal

issues raised in the petition by the parties. However, even if not raised, an error in

jurisdiction may be taken up.27 Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be

raised at any stage of the proceedings -- even on appeal.28 InDel Rosario v. Mendoza,29

we have ruled as follows:

"Indeed there are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no question may be

raised for the first time on appeal. Though not raised below, the issue of lack

of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be considered by the reviewing

court, as it may be raised at any stage."

The reason is that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law, not by the

courts or the parties themselves. "Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over


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the subject matter or the nature of the action, the invocation of this defense may be

done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that

rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. x x

x."30

In the present case, the RTC had jurisdiction to decide the criminal case against private

respondents; however, it acted beyond its jurisdiction when it effectively ruled on the

agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties. Private respondents had raisedbefore it the issue of tenancy by way of defense, and apparently interwoven with the

agrarian dispute, were the acts complained of by petitioner: the harvesting of thecoconuts, their conversion into copra and, later, the sale thereof. Thus, the RTC should

have confined itself to the determination of whether private respondents were guilty of

qualified theft, instead of automatically awarding the proceeds of the copra sale to

petitioner. Such matter, being an offshoot of the agrarian dispute between the parties,is cognizable exclusively by the DARAB.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision andResolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

FLORENCIA PARIS, petitioner,vs.

DIONISIO A. ALFECHE, JUAN L. ALFECHE, MAXIMO N. PADILLA,

DIONISIO Q. MATILOS, Heirs of GREG A. ALFECHE, DIONISIO W.

MATILO, SIMPLICIO L. ADAYA, TEOFILO M. DE GUZMAN, FRANCISCO

B. DINGLE and MARIFE NAVARO, respondents.

Homesteads are not exempt from the operation of the Land Reform Law. The right to

retain seven hectares of land is subject to the condition that the landowner is actually

cultivating that area or will cultivate it upon the effectivity of the said law.

The Case

The Petition for Review before us assails the June 4, 1999 Decision of the Court of

Appeals1 (CA), in CA-GR SP No. 45738, which affirmed the ruling of the Department

of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The decretal portion of

1st Cases Agrarian

Documents

Transcript of 1st Cases Agrarian