1st Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)

Topic: Nuclear Disarmament

Chair: Natasha Cougoule

“The world is over-armed and peace is underfunded.”

-Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon

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Table of Contents

Chair Introduction 4

Executive Summary 5

About DISEC 7 Mission & Scope 7

Understanding Nuclear Disarmament 8 Current State of Global Nuclear Capabilities 8

Figure 1: World nuclear forces as of January 2018 10 Figure 2: World nuclear forces over time up to January 2018 11 Figure 3: Nuclear free zones as of January 2018 12

Consequences of Nuclear Warfare 13 Humanitarian Impacts 13

Figure 4: Estimated distribution of consequential fatalities and injuries in Washington, D.C. 14

Environmental Impacts 15 Encouraging Disarmament 16

Military Strategies 17 Figure 5: A map of all known nuclear facilities in North Korea 18

Economic Strategies: A Case Study on North Korea and Sanctions 20 Sociopolitical Strategies 22

Case Study: Japan, a Non-nuclear Weapon State against Disarmament 23

Key Past UN Action & Outcomes 25 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1970 25 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1994 27 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) of 2017 29

Conclusion 30

Bibliography 31

Further Reading 34

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Chair Introduction

Hello delegates!

My name is Natasha Cougoule and I will be your chair for the 1st Disarmament and

International Security committee at PacMUN 2018! I’m a recent graduate of UC Berkeley with

degrees in economics and Portuguese and a minor in education. I’m currently working as a

business analyst at Salesforce.com, a software company based in San Francisco, where I also

live. When I’m not working on projects in my office, I like to go on runs, cook meals in my

crockpot, and travel around the world.

I’m excited to discuss nuclear proliferation in DISEC because of its relevance in current

international politics and its storied past as an essential feature of UN policy. The UN was

formed in the wake of WWII, and the use of nuclear weapons by the United States was the

impetus for the very first resolution the UN ever passed, which called for the wholesale ban of

nuclear arms. Clearly, that vision has not been achieved in the 73 years since that first strike, but

this committee will give us a chance to explore the possibilities for change and peace in an

increasingly divided world.

Please take the time to read this synopsis and send me your position papers at

ncougoule@berkeley.edu. Yes, I still use my college email post-grad.

Thanks so much and see you all soon,

Natasha

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Executive Summary

While this background guide will go into greater detail about the nuances of nuclear

proliferation, this section will provide a high-level summary of the important themes and

understandings you should take away from the guide. Also, each section will be followed by a

set of key takeaways.

1st DISEC is the first committee of the UN General Assembly, and was the home of the

first resolution passed by the UN. That first resolution called directly for:

“the ‘control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes,’ and

‘the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major

weapons adaptable to mass destruction.’” (General Assembly resolution 1).

In crafting your resolutions, you should use the same suggestive language common to

MUN resolutions from other conferences. DISEC is not empowered with special capabilities, so

no resolutions should be enforceable or direct action.

Currently, there are eight confirmed states with nuclear weapons. The DPRK’s stockpile

is unconfirmed by external actors. Developing nations have made major strides in recent years to

decrease their large nuclear arsenals, but some smaller emerging economies have expanded and

invested in their nuclear capabilities. Overall, there has been a major decrease in nuclear

stockpiles since the 1970s.

Disarmament is so important because nuclear warfare has major consequences. Direct

deaths and injuries from nuclear weapons can reach the millions of a large, metropolitan area is

targeted. Beyond the immediate impact, nuclear blasts have intergenerational effects on public

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and environmental health. Within the blast radius, animals experience irreversible and

transmittable genetic changes, fetuses in utero are more prone to mental retardation in their

lifetimes, and chronic disease rates skyrocket. The environment around the blast radius becomes

irreparably radiated, causing all water, plants, and animals toxic to consume and unviable for

life.

The goal of this topic is twofold: preventing new states from becoming armed and

encouraging currently armed states to disarm. In preventing proliferation, the implementation of

multilateral agreements and treaties is an effective way for non-nuclear states to align on their

goals for international security and safety. When it comes to encouraging disarmament, there are

a number of levers non-nuclear states and other nuclear states can use to put pressure on nuclear

states. Military, social, economic, and political strategies have all been used, with mixed results,

to deter pre-nuclear states and punish nuclear states. Economic and political sanctions, political

activations of domestic populations, and military actions are all means by which one state can

put pressure on another.

Over the years, states have reached a number of bilateral agreements and the UN itself

has implemented multiple treaties to deter nuclearization and encourage disarmament. The three

key treaties to know are the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1970,

the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1994, and the Treaty on the prohibition

of nuclear weapons of 2017. Each, as their names imply, aimed to limit nuclear proliferation and

encourage disarmament through different means and at different levels of severity. When

thinking about your solutions that you’ll propose, try to avoid redundancies with these

foundational documents as much as possible.

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About DISEC

Remember that the UN was established in the wake of WWII, where multiple travesties

were seen on a global stage for the first time: genocide, long-term conflict, and nuclear attack on

civilians. The international community moved quickly to organize a body which would have the

power and organization to implement meaningful peace measures to prevent a conflict and

casualties at that scale. Because of this, it makes sense that the first committee of the General

Assembly was the Disarmament and International Security Committee, or DISEC as we will

refer to it throughout conference. DISEC, as a committee, has a rather narrow charter but the

same powers as the other five committees in the General Assembly.

Mission & Scope

DISEC was established to focus on “disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace

that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the

international security regime” (“First Committee”). Notice that the focus refers specifically to

challenges to the international security regime, and not to creating improvements upon the

existing regime. One might interpret this as the committee being tasked with maintaining the

current balance of power, and not with presenting new ways to organize militaristic and political

supremacy within the world today. While most of the actions of DISEC have been in support of

the existing power structure, you should not think of yourself as limited by the current balance

when imagining your own solutions to this topic.

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Like in other MUN committees you’ve likely participated in, this committee will only be

able to propose suggestions to the General Assembly and Security Council, and has no ability to

enforce the suggestions that it makes. Throughout this topic synopsis, I will try to highlight

policy areas you can consider for operative clauses or resolution themes, including but not

limited to improvements on existing disarmament and nonproliferation treaties and agreements.

Understanding Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear disarmament is the process by which nuclear weapon states (NWS) reduce and

ultimately eliminate their nuclear stockpiles. This has been a goal of the United Nations since its

founding, as the first ever resolution written by the General Assembly called for the wholesale

elimination of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament, however, has not been achieved since the

founding of the UN for a variety of political, military, and economic reasons. Throughout this

section, we will explore current trends in nuclear weapons stockpiles, the impacts of nuclear

weapons, and means by which states can encourage each other to disarm.

Current State of Global Nuclear Capabilities

The world, as it stands, can be divided into two buckets: NWS and non-nuclear weapons

states (NNWS). While the NNWS group is significantly

larger, the NWS are outstandingly politically,

economically, and militaristically powerful. This poses a

problem for NNWS, as leveraging those factors to

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encourage disarmament puts their economies and political and military alliances at risk.

Interdependency for various types of security will be a recurring theme throughout this

exploration.

Currently, there are nine nuclear weapons states: the United States, Russia, France,

China, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, Israel, and (supposedly) North Korea, in descending

order of their stockpiles. To see the disparities in nuclear capabilities between all states, see

Figure 1 and Table 1 below. All together, these states represent nearly half of the world’s

population, over half of the world’s economy, and six of the top ten military budgets in the

world. Because of this, they make up a bloc of outstandingly powerful countries who are all

misaligned in terms of their political structure and international allegiances.

In an effort to gain nuclear supremacy, these states have been pursuing a number of

worrying strategies to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their nuclear stockpiles. All of

the NWS “are developing new nuclear weapon systems and modernizing their existing systems”

(“Modernization”). Russia and the United States in particular have been turning to this strategy

to create a tense state of strategic deterrence from attack instead of mutually assured

disarmament. Trust is essential to successful disarmament, and the two countries have had a

number of political and militaristic encounters which have damaged trust. Elsewhere in Asia,

India and Pakistan are “both expanding their nuclear weapon stockpiles as well as developing

new land-, sea- and air-based missile delivery systems. China continues to modernize its nuclear

weapon delivery systems and is slowly increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal”

(“Modernization”). While modernization can be valuable in the prevention of accidents,

investments in nuclear technology will discourage nuclear states from disarming, as they’ll see

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their invested money as lost to the international disarmament regime. The figure below illustrates

the distribution of nuclear weapons around the world.

Figure 1: World nuclear forces as of January 2018 Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2018

The good news: nuclear arms are trending downwards over time. Because of the success

of multilateral international agreements which have been been implemented since the end of the

Cold War, nuclear states are streamlining their stockpiles. As Figure 2 demonstrates, most of this

reduction can be attributed to efforts from the United States and Russia to have a less hostile

nuclear posture. At the same time, as was mentioned earlier, those stockpiles are becoming more

powerful and more strategically located.

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Figure 2: World nuclear forces over time up to January 2018 Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2018

Part of every solution implemented by the UN thus far has been the use of peacekeepers,

who are essential to the promotion of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Unfortunately,

the number of personnel deployed with peace operations worldwide continues to fall while the

demand is increasing (“Modernization”). Currently, “63 multilateral peace operations active

during 2017 (one more than in 2016): 25 operations were deployed in Africa, 18 in Europe, 9 in

the Middle East, 6 in Asia and Oceania, and 5 in the Americas. The total number of personnel

deployed in multilateral peace operations decreased by 4.5 per cent during 2017, from 152,822 to

145,911” (“Modernization”). Notice that most of these peacekeeping operations are based in

Africa, which, as Figure 3 demonstrates, is a nuclear free zone. Disarmament peace work is not

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prioritized in the same way that ground-conflict peacekeeping is, mostly because it causes no

immediate death or injury but has the potential to have severe long-term impacts. Nuclear

proliferation is also a risk faced by the international community when a country is in conflict.

States like Syria, Iran, and Iraq have been accused of or suspected of developing nuclear

weapons technology in the midst of conflict with NWS and non-nuclear actors.

Thankfully, the NNWS have formed a series of treaties and agreements that create a set

of nuclear-weapon-free areas, renewing their commitment to the neutralization of the world.

These areas are outlined in Figure 3 below. Currently, three continents are entirely nuclear-free,

as well as the oceans and space. In states with tiered governmental systems, such as the United

States, cities and provinces can designate themselves as nuclear-weapon-free areas. Berkeley,

California is an example of one of these jurisdictions.

Figure 3: Nuclear free zones as of January 2018

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Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2018

Consequences of Nuclear Warfare

To understand why nuclear disarmament is a central goal of the UN and the international

community, it’s important to recognize the long-term ramifications of the use of these

technologies. To be clear: the immediate death toll of nuclear weapons is of course the most

devastating impact, but these weapons also have massive

intergenerational consequences. The health of those who

live in areas exposed to nuclear energy and the

environments of those areas are irreparably damaged for

hundreds of years.

Humanitarian Impacts

Nuclear detonations cause serious damage to individual level health and health

infrastructure in affected areas. Studies on populations exposed to nuclear radiation in

post-WWII Japan and nuclear testing areas in the southern Pacific Ocean have demonstrated

repeatedly that nuclear detonations have severe health and economic impact.

For those exposed to nuclear blast and fallout, the “ionizing radiation, which...has

long-term health consequences, including cancer and genetic damage,” which in the worst cases

can be transmitted to later generations through inherited mutations (ICAN 2, Baly 17).

Additionally, children exposed to radiation while their mothers are pregnant with them are

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significantly more likely to have mental disabilities. For those alive during the blast, they are

severely more likely to have terminal cancers in their life, as well as “hypertension, myocardial

infarction, thyroid disease, cataracts, chronic liver disease and cirrhosis, and, in females, uterine

myoma” (National Research Council 89-91). A nuclear attack is an attack on the wellbeing of a

country or area for hundreds of years, and multiple generations.

Figure 4: Estimated distribution of consequential fatalities and injuries in Washington, D.C. Source: National Research Council

In the immediate term, most health infrastructure is also rendered unusable either due to

annihilation or radiation contamination, if it even existed in the first place. This creates a

significant financial and resource burden on the health systems in affected areas, and strains the

resources of peacekeeping and volunteering organizations that would otherwise have the

capacity to help. And again, this is not a short-term project. The centuries-long recovery from a

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nuclear blast can place “a heavy burden on health systems, if such systems exist at all” (Baly 17).

At the time of World War II, Japan was still developing its healthcare infrastructure, which made

delivery of the help necessary to survivors more difficult.

Another consequence that is rarely explored in the traditional disarmament dialogue is the

potential for nuclear war to cause a refugee crisis. As the International Campaign Against

Nuclear Weapons predicts, “displaced populations from a nuclear war will produce a refugee

crisis that is orders of magnitude larger than any we have ever experienced” (ICAN 2). There are

already over 65 million people experiencing displacement in the world right now. This potential

displacement, like all of the other outcomes of nuclear war, would strain aid systems and render

them ineffective in helping those affected by the actions of state actors. Also, NWS are some of

the most common destinations for refugees. If one of these locations was compromised by a

nuclear detonation, there would be a major disruption to the current refugee management and

relocation system.

Environmental Impacts

Humans are not the only organisms who suffer in the event of a nuclear war. Radioactive

contamination from nuclear war “can devastate the environment and pose significant social,

financial, logistical and scientific challenges” (Yoshida 93). In the most severe imagining of

nuclear war, “less than one percent of the nuclear weapons in the world could disrupt the global

climate and threaten as many as two billion people with starvation in a nuclear famine. The

thousands of nuclear weapons possessed by the US and Russia could bring about a nuclear

winter, destroying the essential ecosystems on which all life depends” (ICAN 2). This would

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reinforce the refugee crisis that was discussed in the earlier humanitarian impact section and

contribute to an already troubling climate future.

When it comes to the animal and plant-level effects, some species of plant and animal

have the same level of radioactive sensitivity as humans, which means that ecosystems that fall

within the blast radius would be subject to profound ecological disruption (National Research

Council 92). Within the one-mile blast radius of a 15 kiloton bomb, such as one of the ones used

in World War II, “the effect on the immediate environment is one of total devastation” (Lemon).

Fallout is also a serious threat to the health of people and the environment in an affected area:

“radioactive particles can travel from the site of an atomic bomb explosion and contaminate

bodies of water, including aquatic life like fish” (Lemon). Long term, “Genetic mutations and

disease in the generations of animals and humans following contamination would also occur.

Animals in Chernobyl’s forests, for example, have high levels of radioactive cesium. Scientists

expect the contamination to remain that way for decades” (Lemon).

Nuclear disarmament is important because the consequences of nuclear warfare have

demonstrated how devastating they would be in nuclear accidents and in past nuclear war.

Compromising the security and health of individuals and the environment in the long term is not

worth securing supposed security in the short term.

Encouraging Disarmament

Before discussing disarmament strategies, it’s important to remember that states and

coalitions are limited in their ability to enforce and encourage disarmament by the preservation

of national sovereignty. At the same time, all states have an incentive to force nuclear states to

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disarm. In order to convince nuclear states to disarm, you have to create an incentive structure

which necessitates disarmament or makes disarmament more valuable than maintaining those

arms. By incentive structure, I mean to describe the military, economic, and political conditions

which make feel states safe to disarm. A state must feel secure in each of those ways in order to

feel secure enough to disarm.

Each of those categories also represents a different way in which one could aim to change

the global environment to make NWS more confident in their safety should they disarm. Military

strategies are highly risky, economic strategies are rather common, and political strategies are

often the most effective. In this section, we will explore past uses of each of these strategies and

aim to understand how they can work in tandem to create a safe environment for disarmament.

Military Strategies

Some of the riskiest but most immediately considered strategies to deter or eliminate

emerging nuclear threats is military intervention. Nuclear weapons are instruments of war, so

naturally the body that represents countries in war has a vested interest in deterring nuclear

proliferation and encouraging disarmament. Disarmament is not achievable without genuine

cooperation “among different parts of the government, but also specialized laboratories,

factories, military facilities, and the legislature” (Rydell

56). As such, militaries are important to consider in your

solutions, but may not be the best means by which to

encourage disarmament. One way to engage the military

without precipitating military action is to “engage military

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personnel: Including retirees (World Veterans Federation; Veterans for Peace) and military

academies (articles in journals, speakers, symposia)” (Rydell 62). In this way, the military can be

both an actor in need of change and an active participant in that change.

There are a number of specific risks that military action poses to true disarmament and

nuclear neutralization. First, military strikes are not likely to be comprehensive, i.e. you can’t

know you’ve destroyed all nuclear test facilities or that they won’t be easily reconstructed.

Below is a map of all known nuclear facilities in North Korea.

Figure 5: A map of all known nuclear facilities in North Korea Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2018

As you can see, their facilities are broadly located in rural areas and population centers

like the capital, Pyongyang. Because of this, military strikes create a severe risk of civilian

casualty and economic destruction. This is not accidental; emerging powers often place their

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stockpiles close to population centers to discourage potential adversaries from executing strikes

on those areas. They also have the most resources available should reconstruction be necessary

post-strike. Because of this, military attacks are unlikely to be effective and comprehensive.

Also, retaliation is a huge risk. If the US were to attack North Korea to discourage

nuclear proliferation, it “would almost guarantee a devastating retaliation by the regime on South

Korea” and compel other countries in alliances with those countries to follow suit (Albert). The

greatest risk posed by a military strategy is World War III.

Last, military budgets make up a significant part of some states’ economy, and contracts

with domestic arms and military supplies producers could explain some countries’ hesitation to

disarm. As was stated earlier, NWS make up six of the ten largest military budgets in the world,

which “is a reflection of political and policy choices, influenced by numerous factors, such as

threat perceptions, the dynamics of the arms industry, international commitments, regional

arrangements and strategic alliances” (Baly 19). Those states with the most anxiety around the

prospects of war invest the most in their militaries, and by consequence enrich those companies

that are able to provide the materials necessary for that expansion. In fact, these companies have

been noted as “major obstacle[s] to disarmament” by experts in this space (Rydell 59).

Additionally, that military spending “affect short-term

prospects for development” (Baly 15). When thinking

about military spending, one must consider what is not

being invested in to account for nuclear arms costs. There

are means by which we can encourage reduced military

spending and therefore investment in nuclear weaponry,

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such as “weapons reduction or collection, confidence-building, adherence to international law,

cooperation in multilateral and regional forums, respect for human rights and fundamental

freedoms, and good governance” (Baly 19).

While military strategies might be tempting in the short term, they can have drastic

consequences when employed incorrectly or frivolously. They can be ineffective in achieving the

goal they set out to achieve, they can cause an outbreak of networked wars and retaliations, and

they can enrich the exact people who benefit from the existence of nuclear weaponry. As such,

when considering a military strategy, it’s important to reflect on its implications.

Economic Strategies: A Case Study on North Korea and Sanctions

One of the most common strategies for punishing new NWS and encouraging

disarmament in existing NWS is economic and financial sanctions on those states. Economic

sanctions are “the withdrawal of customary trade and financial relations for foreign and security

policy purposes. They may be comprehensive, prohibiting commercial activity with regard to an

entire country, like the long-standing U.S. embargo of Cuba, or they may be targeted, blocking

transactions of and with particular businesses, groups, or individuals” (Masters). For example,

you might have heard of economic sanctions being

imposed on certain Russian oligarchs in response to

Russian meddling in the 2016 United States election.

One of the best ways to demonstrate the impact of

economic sanctions is to use a case study: North Korea.

Because of its burgeoning nuclear arms program, North

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Korea has faced major economic retaliation. Since it is fairly diplomatically isolated, “world

powers have continued to rely on economic and financial sanctions to isolate the Kim regime and

draw it back into denuclearization discussions, which fizzled years ago” (Albert). This, however,

is a game of tradeoffs. The Kim regime views nuclear weapons as its “the sole means to

guarantee its survival” (Albert). So far North Korea has seen the following sanctions imposed on

its economy and financial institutions by the United Nations:

● Ban on trade of arms and military equipment, dual-use technology, transport vehicles,

and industrial machinery and metals

● Asset freezes for individuals involved in the country’s nuclear program

● Ban on import of certain luxury goods

● Ban on export of electrical equipment, coal, minerals, seafood, food and agricultural

products, wood, textile, and earth and stones

● Cap on North Korean labor exports

● Cap on oil and all refined petroleum products and ban on natural gas imports

● Restrictions on fishing rights

North Korea also faces additional sanctions from EU, Japan, South Korea, US (Council

on Foreign Relations). These extremely strict sanctions “could stem the flow of up to $1.3 billion

to Pyongyang. The UN ban on textile exports, North Korea’s second-largest industry after coal,

could cost the Kim regime around $800 million annually. Altogether, UN sanctions target 90

percent of Pyongyang’s publicly reported export products” (Albert). These are extreme measures

to take to prevent nuclear proliferation, but because of the extremity of the Kim regime’s

determination, they are seen as necessary.

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All sanctions are subject to the risks of evasion and ineffective distribution of

punishment. Some states choose not to comply with sanctions imposed by the UN because they

are either aligned to or dependent on trade with that country. In the most recent rounds of

sanctions against North Korea, the UN found that “a group of nearly 300 foreign businesses and

individuals, including 215 from China and 39 from Russia, that have allegedly flouted sanctions

by forming prohibited joint ventures with North Koreans” (Lynch). Also, sanctions often impact

the most vulnerable families and not the leadership of dictatorial regimes. In the North Korea

example, the Kim family and top administrators are able to retain the majority of the wealth in

the country while allowing sanctions to hurt factory workers and other unprivileged members of

North Korean society.

While economic sanctions are becoming the tool of choice for foreign affairs leaders,

they may not be targeting the decision makers they need to be targeting and are subject to

evasion by states, companies, and individuals.

Sociopolitical Strategies

Lastly, the most infrequently used strategy but possibly one of the most effective is a

sociopolitical strategy which engages multiple levels of government and citizens within a

society. These strategies require significant investment from non-state actors. One of the leading

experts in nuclear disarmament, Randy Rydell, former Senior Political Affairs Officer in the

Office of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at the UN, suggests that if there is

engagement with the general public, this strategy could win out. He believes that this would

require: “engagement from the general public – the voters, taxpayers, and potential victims,

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like-minded NNWSs, ‘enlightened’ NWSs, and central institutions like the UN” (Rydell 85).

Together, in Rydell’s view, work and pressure from these groups could lead to disarmament if

there is alignment on strategy and messaging.

But first, the public must be engaged and concerned about the potential costs of

maintaining nuclear arms. A UN study found that educating citizens of NWS at the

undergraduate and graduate levels can be immensely impactful in encouraging disarmament. The

report, which was published in 2002, states the global community should “impart knowledge and

skills to individuals to empower them to make their contribution, as national and world citizens,

to the achievement of concrete disarmament and non-proliferation measures and the ultimate

goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control” (Alani 6).

Further, a focus on undergraduate and advanced degree levels to encourage people to enter this

space as their future work. Experts are needed in this area, especially with an education that

“focuses on the process of disarmament itself, the steps to achieve it and the positive effects that

disarmament has on socio-economic development” (Alani 15). If the global community is able to

marry education and activism, it may be able to encourage enough political engagement to force

politicians to enter serious negotiations within the next generation.

Case Study: Japan, a Non-nuclear Weapon State against Disarmament

After World War 2, the United States and Japan signed the Security Treaty, which

established the nuclear protective relationship that the United States has with Japan today. The

treaty also required that Japan follow the three non-nuclear principles imposed by General

Douglas MacArthur during the American occupation of Japan: non-possession, non-production,

and non-introduction of nuclear weapons. Because of the strict, immediate implementation of

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this non-nuclear policy, Japan has never been in possession of a nuclear weapon, despite its

attempts to develop one during World War II.

Being the only state in the world to have experienced a nuclear attack, one would think

that Japan would be at the forefront of nuclear disarmament policy. But because of other security

factors in the region, Japan has been hesitant to support the wholesale disarmament of its allies,

and therefore its enemies. Since it’s under the United States’ nuclear umbrella, it’s a

quasi-nuclear state. That’s to say, if it was to be attacked, the attacker would see retaliation,

though not from Japan directly.

Japan was not a signatory to the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,

which was a landmark move towards international disarmament. According to Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe, no NWS signed on because the treaty “was created without taking into account the

realities of security” (Hurst). What Abe is alluding to in that statement is the very real threats that

Japan faces from hostile neighbors China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as the Japanese

reliance on the protective nuclear capabilities of the United States. While Japan would like to see

China, Russia, and North Korea disarm, they will not until the United States does. The same can

be said for other US nuclear umbrella states like South Korea and Australia. The United States

could disarm, but it considers the threat from its enemies too great and the promise of

disarmament too weak to trust. Japan is simultaneously existentially threatened by and reliant

upon nuclear weapons. As such, one can understand why Japan is hesitant to engage in

disarmament talks and support disarmament initiatives.

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Key Past UN Action & Outcomes

Since disarmament has been such a focus of UN policy and negotiation for so long, it

makes sense that there has been a lot of action in the disarmament space. The UN has taken

measures to prevent the emergence of new NWS, to disarm current NWS, and to limit the

capabilities of those NWS so that they don’t expand their nuclear arsenals. In this section, we

will discuss three keystone treaties in the past fifty years: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons of 1970 (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1994 (CTBT),

and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017). Together, these three treaties

demonstrate the timeline of progress the UN has made, and attitude that the UN has taken to

nuclear weapons thus far,and may suggest the direction in which we are headed in the future.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1970

The first major treaty after Resolution 1 was the NPT. The treaty is not only significant

because “191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More

countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a

testament to the Treaty’s significance,” but because “the NPT has restrained nuclear proliferation

by preventing some key countries – for example, West Germany – from building nuclear bombs”

(UNODA) (Fuhrmann and Lupu). The NPT has been fundamental in preventing large scale

proliferation around the world, though it has been imperfect in the prevention of acquisition of

nuclear power by emerging economies. Some research has suggested that development is

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actually tied to the development of nuclear capabilities, as in the case of India and Pakistan

(Baley). Four states, Belarus, Kazhakstan, South Africa, and Ukraine either inherited nuclear

weapons from NPT sanctioned states or had their own nuclear programs and all denuclearized

after the passing of the NPT.

The NPT is effective “by raising the costs of “going

nuclear” and reducing uncertainty about adversaries’

capabilities and intentions, which together discouraged

proliferation” (Fuhrmann and Lupu). When we discuss

costs, we mean to say not just the monetary costs of

developing and deploying nuclear weapons, but “cost” in a

broader sense; for example, the potential deaths caused by nuclear war is a cost that nuclear

states can expect should they nuclearize. This evaluation also points out the value of certainty;

confidence is essential in feeling secure enough to disarm.

Of course, the NPT has not been perfect, as India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan have

all acquired nuclear weapons since its passing. Also, like any other piece of legislation at any

level, it’s imperfect in its ability to be enforced. States, such as Iraq, “have cheated on their NPT

commitments, suggesting that the treaty is incapable of reining-in determined proliferators”

(Fuhrmann and Lupu). Those who are determined to have nuclear weapons, and those who feel

like their existence is dependent on the ability to deter intervention through the threat of nuclear

war. Notice that most of the states mentioned above have totalitarian or autocratic. Those

regimes which believe that they are vulnerable to intervention by countries with other

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governmental structures often seek that level of weapon because they know that potential

enemies understand the threat those weapons pose.

However, most experts agree that the NPT has been effective in deterring overall

proliferation. Some scholars “question whether NPT members would have proliferated even in

the absence of a treaty commitment. They attribute the slow rate of proliferation to other factors,

such as alliances that provide “nuclear umbrellas.”” (Fuhrmann and Lupu). These nuclear

umbrellas allow for states to be quasi-NWS without actually investing in the resources necessary

to acquire their own personal weapons. In fact, “nothing in the treaty prohibits a nonweapon state

that is party to the treaty from assisting another nonweapon state in manufacturing or otherwise

acquiring the bomb,” so these states, like Japan and South Korea under the United States’

nuclear umbrella, can exist as nuclear without violating the treaty (Weiss). According to a study

in International Studies Quarterly, “states that joined the NPT are considerably less likely to seek

nuclear weapons from 1970 to 2000 than their non-NPT counterparts” (Fuhrmann and Lupu).

This evidence is outstanding for demonstrating the power and adherence to the NPT.

International agreements are strong means by which the international community can be held

accountable.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1994

The next big step in encouraging disarmament came nearly 25 years later with the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1994. This treaty “prohibits ‘any nuclear

weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion’ anywhere in the world. The treaty was

opened for signature in September 1996, and has been signed by 183 nations and ratified by 166”

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(Kimball). Unfortunately for disarmament hopefuls, the treaty “cannot enter into force until it is

ratified by 44 specific nations, eight of which have yet to do so: China, India, Pakistan, North

Korea, Israel, Iran, Egypt, and the United States” (Kimball). One can only guess why those

nations are hesitant to put their names on a paper which would halt all of their nuclear weapons

programs and limit all development.

The treaty aims to verify nuclear stockpiles and prevent tests through an “[international

monitoring system], consultation and clarification, on-site inspections and confidence-building

measures” (Kimball). This international monitoring system (IMS) is a robust, global system

consisting of “seismic monitoring, atmospheric monitoring, satellite surveillance, intelligence

and on-site inspections” (Hawkes). While the system is currenly active, it’s only able to act on

those tests which are executed by states party to the treaty and detect and report nuclear tests by

states not party to the treaty.

The treaty itself is mean to “act as a pragmatic effort to halt vertical proliferation both

qualitatively and quantitatively by preventing the modernisation of nuclear arsenals, especially

by foreclosing the possibility of new low-yield and ‘third-generation’ weapons that could be

used in accordance with a regional nuclear war-fighting doctrine” (Hawkes). The treaty would

have tremendous environmental impacts in conjunction with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

of 1963 which outlawed any nuclear tests not performed below ground. The restriction to

underground testing was good for the air and water, but “has resulted in the release of vast

amounts of dangerous radioactive material into the atmosphere due to leaked or vented

radioactive gases” and soil contamination near nuclear test facilities (Hawkes). Again, we can

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see how people and the environment would both benefit from a wholesale ban on nuclear

weapons and the alignment of nuclear states on disarmament.

The CTBT would be able to fill in major testing and trade gaps that were left by the NPT,

but its ratification is nowhere on the horizon as diplomatic relations between nuclear states

continue to worsen. There is a glimmer of hope, as “U.S. ratification would massively increase

the prospects for the full entry into force of the CTBT. The leadership this would demonstrate is

likely to prompt other key nations to ratify, and put considerable pressure on others” (Hawkes).

However, the current administration has limited the international community’s confidence in the

potential for American agreement to the treaty.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) of 2017

Most recently, and most drastically, the international community made a decision to take

a stand on the issue of disarmament and passed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons (TPNW) of 2017. This treaty was created and put forward by the UN as the first legally

binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. The

initial negotiations of this treaty nearly produced a simple treaty that only banned the use of

nuclear weapons, but “more and more countries gradually came to support a treaty to

comprehensively ban nuclear weapons” (Yoshida 96). Now, with 69 signatories and a broad base

of support from NNWS and citizens and activist groups in NWS, the TPNW has the potential to

bring the world one step closer to nuclear disarmament.

The treaty built in means by which NWS could “pursue multilateral negotiations on

nuclear disarmament in good faith, but, for many NWS, it seems they have forgotten the

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commitment,” as there is no enforcement mechanism (Yoshida 95). Despite multiple summits

between world leaders of NWS, Trump/Putin in July 2018 and Trump/Kim in June 2018, for

example, there has been little progress on securing the signatures of the treaty. The treaty

includes a lot of explicit language which would require NWS to immediately collapse their entire

weapons programs, which is not something that the NWS are willing to do without wholesale

assurance that their counterparts will do the same.

Conclusion

Altogether, this topic is about security: how can we create an environment that feels

secure enough to disarm and trust that their counterparts will disarm as well? What role do

NNWS have to play?

Security is a multifaceted topic, which requires us to consider “not only military but also

political, economic, social, humanitarian, human rights and ecological aspects” (Baly 15). In a

world filled with so much anxiety, this is a concrete and narrow subject that we can tackle and on

which we can hopefully find common ground.

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Further Reading

Coerr, Eleanor. Sadako and the Thousand Paper Cranes. Putnam: New York, 1977.

● A short nonfiction book about a young girl who was in Hiroshima at the time of the

bombing.

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