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RAJESH UPRETY Present Affiliation OIL INDUSTRY SAFETY DIRECTORATE Academic Qualification B.TECH (MECHANICAL), PGDBM (Specialization in Marketing) Area of Specialization PIPE AND COATING Achievements / Awards INSTRUMENTAL IN INTRODUCING DUAL FBE COATING IN INDIA Authors PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT FOR PIGGABLE & NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES Presenting Author Photo

Transcript of 1_R Uprety.pdf

RAJESH UPRETY Present Affiliation OIL INDUSTRY SAFETY DIRECTORATE Academic Qualification B.TECH (MECHANICAL), PGDBM (Specialization in Marketing) Area of Specialization PIPE AND COATING Achievements / Awards INSTRUMENTALININTRODUCINGDUALFBE COATING IN INDIA Authors PIPELINEINTEGRITYMANAGEMENTFOR PIGGABLE & NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES Presenting Author Photo OBJECTIVES OF PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ARE: TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF CROSS COUNTRY PIPELINES. AT ALL TIMES TO ENSURE PUBLIC SAFETY, PROTECT ENVIRONMENT AND ENSURECONTINUOUSAVAILABILITYOFPIPELINEFORTRANSPORTATION WITHOUTINTERRUPTIONS,THEREBYMINIMIZINGTHEBUSINESSRISKSAND THROUGHPUT LOSS. PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM33 PIPE TRIANGLE PIPE PLEASUREPAIN 44 TOTAL PIPELINE NETWORK IN INDIA PIGGABLE PIPELINE: 40,000 KM NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINE: 5000 KM (EXCLUDING GAS/ OIL FLOW LINES) SUB-SEA SPM LINES (SINGLE LINES)

55 Onsite Incidents Trend last three years Number of Onsite Incidents 2011-122012-132013-142014-15 (till date)01020304050607080Ref &GPPPLMOE& PTotal2011-122012-132013-142014-15 (till date)66 Fatalities in Onsite Incidents - Trend * Ref & GPPs : 28 Fatalities in a single Incident in 2013-14** Marketing Operations (MO): 05 Fatalities in a single incident in 2012-13 *** E&P: three children drowned at well site in 2013-14 Number of Fatalities 2011-122012-132013-142014-15 (till051015202530354045Ref & GPPPLMOE& P2011-122012-132013-142014-15 (till date)PIPELINE INTEGRITY EXAMPLE : TWO CASES OF SEAM FAILURE IN ACRUDE PL WITHIN 18 YEARS OF SERVICE(SURGE ANALYSIS,HYDRAULICS,LDS,VALVES, WT) EXAMPLE : FLASH FIRE DURING GRINDING OPERN AT NIGHT IN A TANK FARM (MISSING BOUNDARY PILLARS/TP/TLP, SOP,ESD,CP MONITORING, COATING SUEVEY) EXAMPLE : FIRE & EXPLOSION IN ANATURAL GAS PIPELINE LEADING TO MULTIPLE FATALTIES(PIGGING,COATING) CATAGORIES OF PIGGABLE/ NON-PIGGABLE LINES FROM PIGGING POINT OF VIEW THERE ARE FOUR CATAGORIES OF PIPELINES : 1. PIGGABLELINESINWHICHREGULARCLEANINGPIGGING IS CARRIED OUT. 2. PIGGABLELINESINWHICHCLEANINGPIGGINGISNOT CARRIED OUT. 3. NON-PIGGABLEPIPELINESSUCHASWELLFLOWLINES/ JETTY LINES. 4. SPM / SUB-SEA LINES HAVING NO LOOP. BASIC CONCERN FOR PIGGABLE PIPELINES(PIGGING DONE REGULARLY) 1. PIGGABLE LINES IN WHICH REGULAR CLEANING PIGGING IS CARRIED OUT. PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS IS NOT CARRIED OUT REGULARLY. PROPERSTATISTICALANALYSISISNOTCARRIEDOUTTO ESTABLISH TREND OF INTERNAL CORROSION. BASIC CONCERN FOR PIGGABLE PIPELINES(PIGGING NOT DONE REGULARLY) 2.PIGGABLE LINES IN WHICH CLEANING PIGGING IS NOTCARRIED OUT. BASICDETAILSABOUTTHEHEALTHOFTHEPIPELINE ARE NOT AVAILABLE. PRIODICITYFORMAINTENANCEISNOTFOLLOWEDOR IGNORED. SINCE COMMISSIONING PROPER CLEANING PIGGING HAS NOT BEEN DONE. HIGHAPPREHENSION OF CONDENSATE AND WAX DEPOSITION CANNOT BE OVER RULED. BASIC CONCERN FOR NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES 3. NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES SUCH AS FLOW LINES/ JETTY LINES. THERE IS NO FOCUSSED ATTENTION ON THESE PIPELINES. THEREISNOCATHODICPROTECTIONFORSOMEUNDERGROUND PIPELINES. MONITIORING SYSTEM NOT IN PLACE IN LINE WITH OISD-GDN-233. IN SOME PIPELINES IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED THAT EVEN CORROSION PROBES/ COUPONS ARE NOT USED. CHALLENGES FOR MONITORING INTERNAL CORROSION OF NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES 4. SPM / SUB-SEA LINES HAVING NO LOOP.

FIT FOR PURPOSE SUBJECT TO VARIOUS CONDITIONS IS NOT A SOLUTION. AWARENESSABOUTVARIOUSTECHNIQUESAVAILABLE FOR ASSESSING INTERNAL CORROSION SUCH AS DIRECT ASSESSMENT. EXPLORING POSSIBILITY OF PIGGING THE LINE BY USING MODERN TECHNOLOGY. EXPLORING POSSIBILITY OF CONVERTING THE LINE TO A PIGGABLE LINE. CHALLENGES FOR MONITORING INTERNAL CORROSION OF NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES THREATS IN LACK OF PIGGING

ITMAYRESULTINHEAVYDEPOSITIONOFWAXINCASE OF CRUDE PIPELINES. IT MAY RESULT IN DEPOSITION OF CONDENSATE IN CASE OFNATURALGASPIPELINES,WHICHMAYSPEEDUP INTERNAL CORROSION RATE. OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233 a) INSPECTIONPROCEDUREFORCROSS-COUNTRY PIPELINES : i. INTERNAL INSPECTION ii. PRESSURE TESTING SUCH AS HYDROTESTING iii. COMBINATION OF i) & ii) b) INSPECTIONPROCEDUREFORNON-PIGGABLEPIPELINES : i. EXTERNAL CORROSION DIRECT ASSESSMENT(ECDA) ii. INTERNAL CORROSION DIRECT ASSESSMENT (ICDA) iii.STRESSCORROSIONCRACKINGDIRECTASSESSMENT (SCCDA) OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233

c) INTERNAL CORROSION : a) EFFECTIVENESSOFCORROSIONMITIGATION MEASURESSHOULDBECHECKEDONCEINSIX MONTHSBY ANALYSING CORROSION COUPON. b) ER PROBES/ ECN PROBES/ LPR (LINEAR POLARISATION TECHNIQUE) PROBES SHOULD BE INSTALLED. c) IFRATEOFINTERNALCORROSIONIS>1mpy, CORROSION INHIBITOR SHALL BE USED. d) WHENEVERREPLACEMENTOFPIPELINEISCARRIED OUT,INTERNALVISUALINSPECTIONSHALLBE CARRIED OUT. OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233 d)STRESS CORROSION CRACKING (SCC) : a) PRESENCEOFH2SCANLEADTOSERIOUSSULPHIDE STRESSCRACKINGOFSTEELS,WHICHCAUSES STEPWISECRACKINGINSTEEL.ITSMITIGATIONCAN BEDONEINTWOWAYSBYINJECTINGCHEMICAL INHIBITORS&BYTREATINGSTEELWITHCERTAIN ALLOYINGELEMENTS&CONTROLLINGITS HARDNESS. B) SCCISASELECTIVEEXTERNALCORROSIONATTACK RESULTINGFROMACOMBINATIONOFDISBONDED COATING,TENSILESTRESS,ANDCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS. OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233 e)PIPELINE DATA REQUIRED FOR DIRECT ASSESSMENT : a) HISTORICAL DATA b) PIPELINEMAPS&GEODETAILS(DEPTH,LAND PROFILE ETC.,) c) BASICTECHNICALDATASUCHASPIPEDIA, WT,GRADE,FLOWRATE,DESIGNPRESSURE,COATING TYPE, CP PARAMETERS ETC., d) PRESENCE OF LIQUID WATER e) PRESENCE OF H2S, CO2 OR O2. f) CORROSIONMONITORINGDATAINCLUDINGTYPEOF MONITORING(E.G.,COUPONS,ELECTRICRESISTANCE ETC.,) g) PIPELINESURVEYDATA:SOILRESISTIVITYDATA, COATING SURVEY DATA OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233

f)DIRECT ASSESSMENT (DA) METHOD g)INSPECTIONPROCEDUREFORPIPELINEHAVING EXTERNALCOATINGBUTWITHOUTCATHODIC PROTECTIONSYSTEM(IMPRESSEDCURRENTBASEDOR SACRIFICIAL CURRENT BASED). h)INSPECTIONPROCEDUREFORPIPELINEHAVING EXTERNALCOATINGBUTWITHCATHODICPROTECTION SYSTEM(IMPRESSEDCURRENTBASEDORSACRIFICIAL CURRENT BASED). i)HYDROTESTING FEW CASE STUDIES

(1) CASE-I : THELINEWASCOMMISSIONEDIN1999ANDIPSWAS CARRIED OUT IN THE YEAR 2013.THE IPS REPORT WAS NOTMADEAVAILABLEASITWASINFORMEDTHATTHE SAMEISUNDERREVIEWBYTPI.PIGRESIDUEANALYSIS SHOWEDIRONCONTENTASHIGHAS49%.THEREWAS NO ACTION TAKEN BY THE OPERATOR. FEW CASE STUDIES (2)CASE-II : SUB-SEALINEWASCOMMISSIONEDIN2006,HOWEVER,PIGGING OPERATIONNOTYETCARRIEDOUTASTHEREWASNOSCRAPPER LAUNCHING BARREL OR SCRAPPER RECEIVER BARREL. (3) CASE-III : IN ONE OF THE JETTY LINE, THERE WAS NO CATHODIC PROTECTION IN THE UNDERGROUND PIPELINE EVEN THOUGH EXTERNAL COATING WAS IN PLACE. FEW CASE STUDIES (4) CASE-IV : OFF-SHORECRUDELINEWASCOMMISSIONEDIN2005, HOWEVER, PIGGING OPERATION NOT YET CARRIED OUT. OTHER MAJOR INCIDENTS MAJOR INCIDENTS OCCURRED IN RECENT PAST LOCATION MAP NARMADA SITE SCHEMATIC VIEW OF THE NARMADA RIVER SITE TOTAL NO. OF PIPELINES PASSING THROUGH NARMADA RIVERS.No.Pipeline Operator Pipe SizeRemarks (1)Reliance (RGTIL) Natural Gas 48 OD x 1.000 WT (25.4 mm), API 5L X70 Gr. Line is intact (2) GAIL IndiaNatural Gas 30 OD x 19.1/11.9 mm WT, API 5L X 70 Gr. Snapped & burst (3) Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) Ch. 29.150 KM (NG) Natural Gas 26ODx0.500WT,API5LX60 Gr. Snapped&burst.Pipehasgot stuckinthenearbyelectrical tower (4) RelianceIndustriesLimited (RIL)(NG) Ch. 29.150 KM 24ODx0.500WTAPI5LX60 Gr. Snapped & burst. TOTAL NO. OF PIPELINES PASSING THROUGH NARMADA RIVERS.No.Pipeline Operator Pipe SizeRemarks (5) GujaratStatePetronetLtd.,(GSPL NG) Ch. 17.000 KM 24 OD x 0.688 (17.5 mm) WT, API 5L X 60 Gr. About 100 m pipeline is exposed.(6) ONGC (Ch. 14.200 KM) CRUDE OIL8.625ODx0.375(9.53mm)WT, API 5L X 46 Gr. Leakage in line (7) IOCL (Amod Hazira Pipeline)12.75 OD x 0.219 WT, API 5L X 60 Gr. Line is intact (8) ONGC (OPAL) Naptha 12.75ODx0.25WT,API5LX46 Gr. Under construction ROOT CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT S.NoCAUSE OF THE INCIDENT (1)ITWASANATURALCALAMITY.UNPRECEDENTEDSUDDENFLOODSDUETOHEAVY RAINS AND LARGE QUANTITY OF DISCHARGE OF WATER FROM SARDAR SAROVAR DAM. (2)THE RIVER BANK (SOUTH SIDE) WAS NOT REINFORCED, WHICH RESULTED IN HEAVY SOIL EROSION. (3)REMOVALOFPLANTSANDVEGETATIONDURINGTHECONSTRUCTIONOFELECTRICAL TRANSMISSIONTOWEROFTORRENTPOWERCLOSETOTHERIVERBANK,WHICHHAS RESULTED IN LOOSENING OF THE PARENT SOIL. (4)IRRIGATIONDEPT.DIDNOTPROVIDEANYPRIORWARNINGBEFORERELEASEOF ABRUPT WATER DISCHARGE IN SUCH A LARGE QUANTITY. (5)SOILEROSIONISAGRADUALPROCESS,WHICHTAKESNUMBEROFYEARS.PIPELINE OPERATORSSHOULDCLOSELYMONITORSUCHBEHAVIOROFTHERIVERCOURSEAND THE ADJOINING BANKS ON A REGULAR BASIS. ROOT CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT S.NoCAUSE OF THE INCIDENT (6)ITWASANATURALCALAMITY.UNPRECEDENTEDSUDDENFLOODS DUETOHEAVYRAINSANDLARGEQUANTITYOFDISCHARGEOF WATER FROM SARDAR SAROVAR DAM. (7)BECAUSEOFTHEEROSIONOFTHESOILFROMTHERIVERBANK, PIPE LINE, WHICH WAS BURIED IN THE GROUND BECAME EXPOSED ANDPIPELINEINTHEERODEDPORTIONBECAMEUNSUPPORTED. DUE TO THE FORCE OF WATER ON THIS EXPOSED PORTION OF PIPE LINE, IT STARTED OSCILLATING AND FINALLY ONE OF THE PIPELINES GOTSNAPPEDDUETOHEAVYOSCILLATIONEFFECTINHANGING PIPELINESECTION.THEVELOCITYOFWATERANDTURBULENCEIN THE RIVER WAS EXTREMELY HIGH AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT. 12 NATURAL GAS PIPELINE RIVERBRIDGESV-1 SV-218" (API 5L X-60)

SV-5SV-4/ I P HIGHWAY X-INGSV-3 (PIGGING STATION)(CANAL)POWER PLANT RIVER X-ING SV-6 SV-7 SV-8 ORIGINATING STATIONLeak/Burst siteDate/Time of incident27th June 2014 at about 0545 hours No. of fatalities 22Operating pressure42 to 45 Kg/cm2

Design pressure72 Kg/cm2 Pipeline size and grade18 OD API 5L X60 Grade 34 ANALYSIS / OBSERVATIONS OF THE FIRE INCIDENT CROSSCOUNTRYPIPELINESUPPLYINGNATURALGASTOPOWER PLANT THEPIPELINEWASBEINGOPERATEDATALOWERFLOWRATEAND LOWER PRESSURE W.R.T. THE DESIGN PARAMETERS. PIPELINEWASTRANSPORTINGWETGASWHILEITWASORIGINALLY DESIGNED FOR TRANSPORTING DRY NATURAL GAS. THE GAS CONTAINED CO2 AND SOME TRACES OF SULPHUR. LEAKAGETOOKPLACEATTHELOWESTPOINTWHERETHEPIPELINE WAS CROSSING A CANAL AT 6 OCLOCK POSITION. 35 FURTHER OBSERVATIONS OF THE FIRE INCIDENT ITWASRAININGONTHEDAYOFTHEINCIDENT,SOITISINFERREDTHAT VAPOUR CLOUD FORMED DUE TO HEAVY WEATHER. ATEASTALLOWNER.WHOTURNEDONTHESTOVEINTHEMORNING, POSSIBLY PROVIDED THE SOURCE OF IGNITION. THEREHASBEENAHISTORYOFPREVIOUSLEAKSNEARTHEPLACEOF ACCIDENT. 36 ROOT CAUSE OF THE FIRE INCIDENT LEAKDUETOINTERNALCORROSIONPRESENCEOFCO2LEDTOFORMATION OF H2CO3. DURINGEARLIERREPAIRSEXTERNALCOATINGGOTDAMAGEDRESULTINGIN EXTERNAL CORROSION. IMPROPER PIGGING FOAM PIG USED INSTEAD OF SCRAPPER PIGS. PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS NOT CARRIED OUT. IPSCARRIEDOUTIN2010-MAXIMUMMETALLOSSREPORTEDINIPSIS EQUIVALENT OF 50% OF WALLTHICKNESS. USE OF WET NATURAL GAS INSTEAD OF DRY NATURAL GAS. NOT USING CORROSION INHIBITOR. 37 RECOMMENDATIONS PROPERCLEANINGPIGGINGTOBECARRIEDOUTREGULARLYFOLLOWEDBY PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS. INSTRUMENTEDPIGSURVEYTOBECARRIEDOUTREGULARLYANDTHE ANOMALYRECTIFICATIONTOBECARRIEDOUTASPERTHE RECOMMENDATIONS . PROPER PROCEDURE TO BE MADE FOR REPAIR OF PIPELINE. ANYCHANGEFROMTHEINITIALCHANGESHOULDBEROUTEDTHROUGHA MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE PROCEDURE AFTER PROPER TECHNICAL ANALYSIS. CORROSION INHIBITOR TO BE USED IN THE LINE AS PER REQUIREMENT. INADDITIONTOOFCCOMMUNICATIONTHERESHOULDALSOBEANOTHER STAND BY MODE OF COMMUNICATION. PROPER MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION PRACTICE TO BE FOLLOWED. CHANGINGDESIGNSERVICEWITHOUTPROPERTECHNICALANALYSISOR WITHOUT PROPER MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE PROCESS. NOTLEARNINGFROMPASTFAILURES&NOTCARRYINGOUTPROPERROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS. NOTCARRYINGOUTPROPERCLEANINGPIGGING&INTELLIGENTPIGGING SURVEY; NOT IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF IPS SURVEY IN TIME. HIGH DEPENDENCY ON THIRD PARTY AGENCIES WITHOUT PROPER CONTROL. INADEQUATE LINE-PATROLLING.

MAJOR LAPSES NOTED OF-LATE IN THE PIPELINE INDUSTRY ON THE BASIS OF SOME MAJOR ACCIDENTS LACKOFS.O.P.FORMAJORACTIVITIESLIKEREPAIROFPIPELINE,COLDCUTTING, MUD PLUGGING, PIGGING, HOT-TAPPING ETC., NOT USING CORROSION-COUPONS/ CORROSION INHIBITORS. NON-AVAILABILITY OF A PROPER LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM. MANUAL OPERATION OF SECTIONALIZING VALVES. DIRECTCURRENTVOLTAGEGRADIENT(DCVG)SURVEY/CURRENTATTENUATION TEST(CAT)SURVEY/CPSURVEYNOTCARRIEDOUTREGULARLYFORASSESSING CONDITION OF COATING.

MAJOR LAPSES NOTED OF-LATE IN THE PIPELINE INDUSTRY ON THE BASIS OF SOME MAJOR ACCIDENTSELEMENT OPERATIONS INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM RIGOROUSINTEGRITYMANAGEMENTSYSTEMPROVIDESFRAMEWORKFOR: (1) MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP, COMMITMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2)RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (3)FACILITIES DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION SPECS, CODES, STANDARDS (4)INFORMATION / DOCUMENTATION (5) PERSONNEL & TRAINING (6) OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE (7) MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE (8) THIRD PARTY SERVICES (9)INCIDENTINVESTIGATION& ANALYSIS (10) COMMUNITYAWARENESS& EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (11) OPERATIONSINTEGRITY ASSESSMENTAND IMPROVEMENT THREATS TO OPERATING PIPELINE INTEGRITY

THREATS TO OPERATING PIPELINE INTEGRITY

EFFECTIVE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF AN ASSET COMPRISES OF : 1. DESIGNINTEGRITY(ASSURANCETHATFACILITIESAREDESIGNEDIN ACCORDANCEWITHGOVERNINGSTANDARDSANDMEETSPECIFIED OPERATING REQUIREMENTS), 2. TECHNICALINTEGRITY(APPROPRIATEWORKPROCESSESFOR INSPECTIONANDMAINTENANCESYSTEMSANDDATAMANAGEMENTTO KEEP THE OPERATIONS AVAILABLE) AND 3. OPERATIONALINTEGRITY(APPROPRIATEKNOWLEDGE,EXPERIENCE, SOPS,COMPETENCEANDDECISIONMAKINGTOOPERATETHEPLANTAS INTENDED THROUGHOUT ITS LIFECYCLE.) PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMDESIGN INTEGRITY : DESIGN OF A CROSS-COUNTRY PIPELINE IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF PLANT PIPING SINCE IT IS NOT CONFINED TO A LIMITED AND PROTECTED AREA AND MAY PASS THROUGH DIFFERENT TYPES OF TERRAIN OVER WHICH THE OPERATOR HAS NO CONTROL. THEREFORE,ITSDESIGNHASTOTAKEINTOCONSIDERATIONBOTHNATURALPHENOMENONAS WELL AS HUMAN ACTIVITIES ALONG THE ROUTE AND PROVIDE A SYSTEM ENSURING ITS LONG LIFE, OPERATABILITY AND EASE OF MAINTENANCE. WHILE CONCEPTUALIZING A NEW PIPELINE PROJECT MORE TIME SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO FREEZING DETAILED DESIGN AND ENGINEERING. STRESSANALYSIS,SURGERELIEFANALYSIS,HYDRAULICANALYSIS,NETWORKANALYSISETC., SHOULDBEDONEINTHEINITIALSTAGESANDNECESSARYDESIGNCHANGESTOBECARRIEDOUT REGARDING SELECTION OF PIPE, PIPE FITTINGS, VALVES, LAYOUT, P&ID ETC., PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMSAFETY FACTORS IN DESIGN IS ACHIEVEDBY : APPLICATION OF THE APPROPRIATE CODES AND SYSTEM HARDWARE COMPONENTS (ASME STANDARD & OISD STANDARDS). SELECTIONOFPIPEMATERIALANDITSWALLTHICKNESS,MATERIALOFCONSTRUCTIONFORVALVES AND OTHER PIPE FITTINGS. CONSIDERINGTHELOADS&STRESSESIMPOSEDONTHEPIPELINEBYPHYSICALPRESSURESAND FORCES, SUCH AS INTERNAL PRESSURE, STATIC LOADINGS AND WEIGHT EFFECTS. CONSIDER DYNAMIC LOADING, WHERE APPLICABLE, WIND, WAVES, EARTHQUAKE ETC., IDENTIFYING HIGH CONSEQUENCE AREAS & LOCATION CLASS. SPECIAL PROTECTIONS AT CROSSING LIKE RIVER/CANAL, RAIL, ROAD ETC., DESIGN INTEGRITY SAFETY FACTORS IN DESIGN ACHIEVEDBY: (A) PIPE THICKNESS : THENOMINALWALLTHICKNESSTFORTHESTEELPIPE,SHALLBECALCULATEDINACCORDANCEWITH ASMEB31.4-CONSIDERSLONGITUDINALJOINTFACTORFORTYPEOFPIPELINEMANUFACTURING, FACTORS FOR RAIL, ROADS, RIVER CROSSINGS, PIPES ON BRIDGES, LOCATION CLASSETC. CORROSION ALLOWANCE ADDED TO THE CALCULATED THICKNESS. (B) ALL PIPING JOINTS ARE WELDED (C)THE HAZOP AND RISK ANALYSIS (D) LOCATING SECTIONALIZING VALVES AT IDENTIFIED LOCATIONS FOR ISOLATIONS EASILY APPROACHABLE. SECTIONALIZING VALVES SHALL BE REMOTE OPERATED. DESIGN INTEGRITY SAFETY FACTORS IN DESIGN ACHIEVEDBY: (E) SURGE ANALYSIS TO PREVENT OVER-PRESSURIZATION ON CLOSURE. (F) FEATURE OF DE-PRESSURIZATION, SHUTDOWN & ISOLATION LOGIC AT PUMP STATIONS. (G)METERINGSTATIONSANDSCADASYSTEMSPROVIDECONTINUOUSMONITORINGOVERSIGHTOF PIPELINE OPERATIONS. (H) LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM WITH PROVISION FOR IDENTIFICATION / LOCATION OF LEAK AND ISOLATION OF AFFECTED SECTION. (I) EXTERNAL COATING & CATHODIC PROTECTION FOR EXTERNAL CORROSION CONTROL. (J) INHIBITOR INJECTION FOR INTERNAL CORROSION CONTROL CASE.

DESIGN INTEGRITY INTERNAL HEALTH MONITORING PIPELINEPIGGING-PIGSAREINSERTEDINTOTHEPIPELINEWHILEITIS OPERATIONAL AND ARE CARRIED ALONG BY THE FLUID BEING PUMPED. TECHNICAL INTEGRITY CLEANING PIGS INTERNAL HEALTH MONITORING THEIR BASIC PURPOSE OF PIGGING IS THREEFOLD:(1) CLEANING PIG - PROVIDE A WAY TO CLEAN DEBRIS AND SCALE FROM THE INSIDE OF THE PIPE, (2) INTELLIGENTPIG-INSPECTORMONITORTHECONDITIONOFTHE PIPE,(3) ORACTASAPLUGORSEALTOSEPARATEPRODUCTSINMULTI-PRODUCTCOMMERCIALPIPELINESORTOISOLATEASEGMENTFOR REPAIRWITHOUTDEPRESSURIZINGTHEREMAINDEROFTHE PIPELINE. (4) PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS TO BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY TO MONITOR THE TREND OF INTERNAL CORROSION RATE. TECHNICAL INTEGRITY TECHNICAL INTEGRITY INTERNAL HEALTH MONITORING : INTELLIGENT PIG PIGS THAT MONITOR THE CONDITION OF THE PIPE ARE IN-LINE INSPECTION TOOLS. MONITORING PIGS, ALSO CALLED INSTRUMENT PIGS OR SMART PIGS. GEOMETRYPIGS:CHECKSDEFORMATION,MISALIGNMENTS,BENDS,ELEVATION CHANGES AND DIRECTIONAL CHANGES TO THE PIPE. MAGNETICFLUXLEAKAGEANDULTRASONICTECHNOLOGIES:FORCRACKSDETECTION AND THICKNESS MEASUREMENT, CORROSION DETECTION, LEAK DETECTION. EXTERNALHEALTHMONITORING-PIPELINECOATING&CATHODIC PROTECTION: PROTECTIVECOATING:TOPREVENTDIRECTCONTACTBETWEENTHEPIPE&THE ENVIRONMENT &TO PREVENT ITS PARTICIPATION IN ELECTROCHEMICAL REACTIONS PROPERTIES REQUIRED (A) ELECTRICAL INSULATING PROPERTIES,RESISTANCE TO MOISTURE (B) MECHANICAL- ADHESION, ABRASION RESISTANCE, FLEXIBILITY, IMPACT RESISTANCE (C) STABILITY AGAINST TEMP CHANGE 3LAYERPOLYETHYLENE/POLYPROPYLENEORFUSIONBONDEDEPOXYCOATINGIS PROVIDED TECHNICAL INTEGRITY FOLLOWINGCOATINGSURVEYSAREDONEONUNDERGROUNDPIPELINESONEMONTH AFTER THE COMMISSIONING OF IMPRESSED CURRENT SYSTEM: a. CLOSEINTERVALCOMPUTERIZED[ON&OFF]POTENTIALLOGGING(CIPL)@ EVERY 1M OF PIPELINE ROW. b. PEARSON SURVEY ALONG PIPELINE ROW. c. CAT (CURRENT ATTENUATION TEST) SURVEY @ EVERY 50M OF PIPELINE ROW. d. DCVG(DIRECTCURRENTVOLTAGEGRADIENT)SURVEYATDEFECTLOCATIONS INDICATED BY PEARSON, CIPL, CAT SURVEYS e. COATING CONDUCTANCE SURVEY AT AND MIDWAY BETWEEN CP STATIONS. f. CASING & CARRIER SHORT SURVEYS. TECHNICAL INTEGRITY ALLTHEPIPELINEOPERATORSMUSTHAVEACORPORATEPOLICYTOIMPROVEPIPELINEAND FACILITYINTEGRITYTOPROTECTTHESAFETYOFTHEPUBLIC,THEENVIRONMENTANDITS EMPLOYEES.INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT GOALS SHALL INCLUDE : PROMOTE THE LONG TERM INTEGRITY OF THE PIPELINE SYSTEM CONDUCT BUSINESS IN A SAFE AND ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE MANNER COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS DEMONSTRATECONTINUOUSIMPROVEMENTTHROUGHTHEMONITORINGOF PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND THROUGH ANNUAL RISK ASSESSMENTS ONLYADEQUATELYTRAINED,SKILLEDANDCOMPETENTMANPOWERSHALLBEDEPLOYED FOR PIPELINE OPERATIONS. COMPLY WITH ALL THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY PRESSURESETPOINTSSHOULDBEAPPROPRIATELYDEFINEDANDBUILTINTHE OPERATION PHILOSOPHY. ESD LOGIC (CAUSE AND EFFECT DIAGRAM) SHOULD BE PROPERLY DEFINED. CLEANING PIGGING HAS TO BE CARRIED OUT AS PER OISD GUIDELINES AND PIG-RESIDUEANALYSISSHOULDBECARRIEDOUTREGULARLY.THERESULTSOFTHE PIG-RESIDUEANALYSISSHOULDBEANALYSEDWITHTHEHELPOFSTATISTICAL TECHNIQUES TO WORK OUT THE TREND OFINTERNAL CORROSION RATE. NO SAFETY SYSTEMS SHOULD BE BY-PASSED. OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY ROU INSPECTION INSPECTIONSCANINVOLVEINDIVIDUALSWALKINGTHEROUANDALSOAERIAL SURVEILLANCE.A) NODWELLINGORPERMANENTSTRUCTUREINANYFORMSHALLBEPERMITTED WITHIN THE RIGHT OF USER B) CONTROLLING VEGETATION GROWTH IN THE FORM OF TREES,C) PREVENTING ENCROACHMENT FROM ABOVE AND BELOW GROUND STRUCTURES, D) MAINTAINING VISIBILITY OF PIPELINE MARKERS PATROLLING ( GROUND / AERIAL ) OF ROW / ROU TO BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY (URBAN AREAS AND NON-URBAN AREAS) OBSERVESURFACECONDITIONS,LEAKAGE,CONSTRUCTIONACTIVITY, ENCROACHMENTS, WASHOUTS AND ANY OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE SAFETY AND OPERATION OF THE PIPELINE. OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE MONITORING&REVIEWOFOPERATINGPARAMETERSTOWORKWITHINTHE OPERATING BARRIERS. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) INCLUDING EMERGENCY ISOLATIONS. SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM MONITORING & PROOF TESTS OF ESD SYSTEMS. INTERPRETATION OF CATHODIC MONITORING RESULTS. INTERPRETATION OF PIGGING RESULTS & ACTIONS THERE OF. COATING HEALTH SURVEY & CORRECTIVE MEASURE. OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY ACLASSLOCATIONCANCHANGEASPOPULATIONGROWSANDMOREPEOPLELIVEOR WORK NEAR THE PIPELINE. WHEN A CLASS LOCATION CHANGES, PIPELINE OPERATORS : MUSTEITHERREDUCETHEPIPE'SOPERATINGPRESSURETOREDUCESTRESSLEVELS IN THE PIPE; REPLACETHEEXISTINGPIPEWITHPIPETHATHASTHICKERWALLSORHIGHERYIELD STRENGTHTOYIELDALOWEROPERATINGSTRESSATTHESAMEOPERATING PRESSURE; WHERE THE CLASS IS CHANGING ONLY ONE CLASS RATING, SUCH AS FROM A CLASS 1 TO CLASS 2 LOCATION, CONDUCT A PRESSURE TEST AT A HIGHER PRESSURE CLASS LOCATION OTHERIMPORTANTASPECTSOFTHEPIPELINEINTEGRITYMANAGEMENTSYSTEM ARE : THEINLINEINSPECTION&MAINTENANCEPROCEDURESFORENSURING HEALTH INTEGRITY OF PIPELINES, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, THECONTROLFORMANAGEMENTOFCHANGEINCLUDINGTHEPROCESS SAFETY ASPECTSPIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PIPES LAID UNDERGROUND CANNOT SPEAK, IT IS OUR DUTY TO CARE FOR THE PIPE &GIVEEITHERPAINORPLEASURE.NEEDOFTHEHOURTOISTOHAVEA SENSITIVITY TOWARDS PIPE. PIPELINEINTEGRITYMUSTCONSIDERALLASPECTSOFDESIGN,CONSTRUCTION& OPERATION PHASES. PIPELINEINTEGRITYREQUIRESADOPTINGAFAILURESAREPREVENTABLE MINDSET. ADOPTIONOFCORROSIONMANAGEMENTBESTPRACTICESCANIMPROVE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF PIPELINE OPERATIONS. CONCLUSION