1NC Round Three

N Word Argument“The white gaze returns the black body to itself- as a fixed entity- which denies the lived nature and humanity of the black subject through what we call “N*********” or thingifcation. “

Their use of that term is beyond offensive- as DSRB a PHD in black studies said yesterday during the privilege lecture: discriminatory words are only allowed when you are a part of that community and can identify with that community- you do neither.

Vote neg on their discourse- voting neg is an endorsement of anti-racism.

No reason to vote aff because at best their discourse denies the movement they are trying to create

Calls to alleviate suffering are nothing more than us vampirically draining the life out of the victims, commodifying their pain for the ballotBaudrillard 96 (Jean Baudrillard The Perfect Crime, 1996, pg 133 – 137, CP)Our reality: that is the problem. We have only one, and it has to be saved. `We have to do something . We can't do nothing .' But doing something solely because you can't not do something has never constituted a principle of action or freedom . J ust a form of absolution from one's own impotence and compassion for one's own fate. The people of Sarajevo do not have to face this question. Where they are, there is an absolute need to do what they do, to do what has

to be done. Without illusion as to ends and without compassion towards themselves. That is what being real means, being in the real. And this is not at all the `objective' reality of their misfortune, that reality which `ought not to exist' and for which we feel pity, but the reality which exists as it is -- the reality of an action and a destiny. This is why they

are alive, and we are the ones who are dead. This is why, in our own eyes, we have first and foremost to save the reality of the war and impose that -- compassionate -- reality on those who are suffering from it but who, at the very heart of war and distress, do not really believe in it . To judge by their own statements, the Bosnians do not really believe in the distress which surrounds them. In -- 134 -the end, they find the whole unreal situation senseless, unintelligible. It is a hell, but an almost hyperreal hell, made the more hyperreal by media and humanitarian harassment, since that makes the attitude of the whole world towards them all the more incomprehensible. Thus, they live in a kind of spectrality of war -- and it is a good thing they do, or they could never

bear it. But we know better than they do what reality is, because we have chosen them to embody it. Or simply because it is what we -- and the whole of the West -- most lack. We have to go and retrieve a reality for ourselves where the bleeding is. All these `corridors' we open up to send them our supplies and our `culture' are, in reality, corridors of distress through which we import their force and the energy of their misfortune. Unequal

exchange once again. Whereas they find a kind of additional strength in the thorough stripping-away of the illusions of reality and of our political principles -- the strength to survive what has no meaning -- we go to convince them of the `reality' of their suffering -- by culturalizing it, of course, by theatricalizing it so that it can

serve as a point of reference in the theatre of Western values, one of which is solidarity. This all exemplifies a situation which has

now become general, in which inoffensive and impotent intellectuals exchange their woes for those of the wretched , each supporting the other in a kind of perverse contract -- exactly as the political class and civil society exchange their respective woes today , the one serving up its corruption and scandals, the other its artificial convulsions and inertia. Thus we saw Bourdieu and the Abbé Pierre offering themselves up in televisual

sacrifice, exchanging between them the pathos-laden language and sociological metalanguage of wretchedness. And so, also, our whole society

is embarking on the path of commiseration in the literal sense, under cover of ecumenical pathos. It is almost as though, in a moment of intense repentance among intellectuals and politicians, related to the panic-stricken state of history and the twilight of values, we had to replenish the stocks of values, the referential reserves, by appealing to that lowest -- 135 -common denominator that is human misery , as though we had to restock the hunting grounds with artificial game. A victim society. I suppose all it is doing is expressing its own disappointment and remorse at the impossibility of perpetrating violence upon itself. The New Intellectual

Order everywhere follows the paths opened up by the New World Order. The misfortune , wretchedness and suffering of others have every -- where become the raw material and the primal scene . Victimhood, accompanied by Human Rights as its sole funerary ideology . Those who do not exploit it directly and in their own name do so by proxy. There is no lack of middlemen, who take their financial or symbolic cut in the process. Deficit and misfortune , like the international debt, are traded and sold on in the speculative market -- in this case the politico- intellectual market, which is quite the equal of the late, unlamented military-- industrial complex . Now, all commiseration is part of the logic of misfortune [malheur]. To refer to misfortune , if only to combat it, is to give it a base for its objective reproduction in perpetuity . When fighting anything whatever, we have to start out -- fully aware of what we are doing -- from evil, never from misfortune.

Baudrillard WildersonThe aff is a façade --- they position themselves as liberators of the Black Body entrenched in a simulacrum of change Williams 2k (Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology, professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, “The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice and the ‘Gift’ of the Majority,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 2000, pgs. 321-343)

The impediments to establishing democratic justice in contemporary American society have caused a national paralysis; one that has recklessly spawned an aporetic 1 existence for minorities. 2 The entrenched ideological complexities afflicting under- and nonrepresented groups (e.g., poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, crime) at the hands of political , legal, cultural, and economic power elites have produced counterfeit , perhaps even fraudulent, efforts at reform : Discrimination and inequality in opportunity prevail (e.g., Lynch & Patterson, 1996). The misguided and futile initiatives of the state, in pursuit of transcending this public affairs crisis, have fostered a reification, that is, a reinforcement of divisiveness. This time, however, minority groups compete with one another for recognition, affirmation, and identity in the national collective psyche (Rosenfeld, 1993). What ensues by way of state effort, though, is a contemporaneous sense of equality for all and a near imperceptible endorsement of inequality; a silent conviction that the majority 3 still retains power. 4 The “gift” of equality, procured through state legislative enactments as an emblem of democratic

justice, embodies true (legitimated) power that remains nervously secure in the hands of the majority. 5 The ostensible empowerment of minority groups is a facade ; it is the ruse of the majority gift. What exists , in fact, is a simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1981, 1983) of equality (and by extension, democratic justice): a pseudo-sign image (a hypertext or simulation) of real sociopolitical change.

This narcissistic reinforcement of power turns the caseWilliams 2k (Christopher R. Williams, PhD, forensic psychology, professor and chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice Studies at Bradley University, Bruce A. Arrigo, PhD, administration of justice, professor of criminology, law, and society, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at the University of North Carolina, Faculty Associate in the Center for Professional and Applied Ethics, “The (Im)Possibility of Democratic Justice and the ‘Gift’ of the Majority,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 2000, pgs. 321-343)

Reciprocation on your part is impossible . Even if one day you are able to return our monetary favor twofold, we will always know that it was us who first hosted you; extended to and entrusted in you an opportunity given your time of need. As the initiators of such a charity, we are always in a position of power , and you are always indebted to us . This is where the notion of egoism or conceit assumes a hegemonic role . By giving to you , a supposed act of generosity in the name of furthering your cause, we have not empowered you. Rather, we have empowered ourselves. We have less than subtlely let you know that we have more than you. We have so much more, in fact,

that we can afford to give you some. Our giving becomes, not an act of beneficence, but a show of power, that is, narcissistic hegemony! Thus, we see that the majority gift is a ruse: a simulacrum of movement toward aporetic equality and a simulation of democratic justice. By relying on the legislature (representing the majority) when economic and social opportunities are availed to minority or underrepresented collectives, the process takes on exactly the form of Derrida’s gift. The majority controls the political, economic, legal, and social arena; that is, it is (and always has been) in control of such communities as the employment sector and the educational system. The mandated opportunities that under- or nonrepresented citizens receive as a result of this falsely eudemonic endeavor are gifts and, thus, ultimately constitute an effort to make minority populations feel better. There is a sense of movement toward equality in the name of democratic justice, albeit falsely manufactured. In return for this effort, the majority shows off its long-standing authority (this provides a stark realization to minority groups that power elites are the forces that critically form society as a community), forever indebts under- and nonrepresented classes to the generosity of the majority (after all, minorities groups now have, presumably, a real chance to attain happiness), and, in a more general sense, furthers the narcissism of the majority (its representatives have displayed power and have been generous). Thus, the ruse of the majority gift assumes the form and has the hegemonical effect of empowering the empowered, relegitimating the privileged, and fueling the voracious conceit of the advantaged.

Politics is dead, however paying deference towards those power structures reinforces dead simulated power, granting the state further legitimacy. Baudrillard 77 (Jean Baudrillard. Forget Foucault. Translated by Nicole Dufresne. 1977. Page 50-54)

With Foucault, we always brush against political determination in its last instance. One form dominates and is diffracted into the models characteristic of the prison, the military, the asylum, and disciplinary action. This form is no longer rooted in ordinary relations of production (these, on the contrary are modeled after it); this form seems to find its procedural system within itself and this represents enormous progress

over the illusion of establishing power in a substance of production or of desire. Foucault unmasks all the final or causal illusions concerning power, but he does not tell us anything concerning the simulacrum of power itself . P ower is an irreversible principle of organization because it fabricates the real (always more and more of the real), effecting a quadrature, nomenclature, and dictature without appeal; nowhere does it cancel itself out, become entangled in itself, or

mingle with death. In this sense, even if it has no finality and no last judgment, power returns to its own identity again as a final principle: it is the last term, the irreducible web, the last tale that can be told; it is what structures the indeterminate equation of the word . According to Foucault, this is the come-on that power offers, and it is not simply a

discursive trap. What Foucault does not see is that power is never there and that its institution , like the institution of spatial

perspective versus "real" space in the Renaissance, is only a simulation of perspective-it is no more reality than economic accumulation-and what a tremendous trap that is. Whether of time, value, the subject, etc., the axiom and the myth of a real or possible accumulation govern us everywhere , although we know that nothing is ever amassed and that stockpiles are self-consuming, like modern megalopolis, or like overloaded memories. Any attempt at accumulation is ruined in

advance by the void. * Something in us disaccumulates unto death, undoes, destroys, liquidates, and disconnects so that we can resist the pressure of the real, and live . Something at the bottom of the whole system of production resists the infinite expansion of production-otherwise, we would all be already buried. There is something in power that resists as

well, and we see no difference here between those who enforce it and those who submit to it: this distinction has become meaningless , not because the roles are interchangeable but because power is in its form

reversible, because on one side and the other something holds out against the unilateral exercise and the infinite expansion of power, just as elsewhere against the infinite expansion of production. This resistance is not a "desire" it is what causes power to come undone in exact proportion to its logical and irreversible extension. And it's taking place everywhere today. In fact, the whole analysis of power needs

to be reconsidered. To have power or not, to take it or lose it, to incarnate it or to challenge it: if this were power, it would not even exist . Foucault tells us something else; power is something that functions; " ... power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society" (The History of Sexuality, p. 93). Neither central, nor unilateral, nor dominant, power is distributional ; like a vector, it operates through relays and transmissions. Because it is an immanent, unlimited field of forces , we still do not understand what power runs into and against what it stumbles since it is expansion, pure magnetization. However, if power were this magnetic infiltration ad infinitum of the social field, it would long ago have ceased meeting with

any resistance. Inversely, if it were the one-sidedness of an act of submission, as in the traditional "optic," it would long ago have been overthrown everywhere. It would have collapsed under the pressure of

antagonistic forces. Yet this has never happened , apart from a few "historical" exceptions. For "materialist" thinking, this can

only appear to be an internally insoluble problem: why don't "dominated" masses immediately overthrow power? Why fascism? Against this unilateral theory (but we understand why it survives, particularly among "revolutionaries" –they would really like power

for themselves), against this native vision, but also against Foucault's functional vision in terms of relays and transmissions, we must say that power is something that is exchanged . Not in the economical sense, but in the sense that power is executed according to a reversible cycle of seduction, challenge, and ruse (neither axis nor indefinite

relay, but a cycle). And if power cannot be exchanged in this sense, it simply disappears. We must say that power seduces, but not in the vulgar sense of a complicit form of desire on the part of those who are dominated- this comes down to basing it in the desire of others, which is really going overboard in taking people for idiots-no, power seduces by that reversibility which haunts it, and upon which a minimal symbolic cycle is set up. Dominators and dominated exist no more than victims and executioners. (While exploiters and exploited do in fact exist, they are on different sides because there is no reversibility in production, which is precisely the point:

nothing essential happens at that level) With power there are no antagonistic positions: it is carried out according to a cycle of seduction. The one-sidedness of a force relation never exists, a one-sidedness upon which a power "structure" might be

established, or a form of "reality" for power and its perpetual movement, which is linear and final in the traditional vision but radiating and spiraling in Foucault. Unilateral or segmentary: this is the dream of power imposed on us by reason . But nothing yearns to be that way; everything seeks its own death, including power. Or rather-but this is the same thing-everything wants to be exchanged, reversed, or abolished in a cycle (this is in fact why neither repression nor the unconscious exists: reversibility is always already there). That alone is what seduces deep down, and that alone constitutes pure jouissance, while power only

satisfies a particular form of hegemonic logic belonging to reason. Seduction is elsewhere. Seduction is stronger than power because it is a reversible and mortal process, while power wants to be irreversible like value, as well as cumulative and immortal like value. Power shares all the illusions of the real and of production; it wants to belong to the order of the real and so falls over into the imaginary

and into self superstition (helped by theories which analyze it even if only to challenge it). Seduction, however, does not partake of the real order. It never belongs to the order of force or to force relations. It is precisely for this reason that seduction envelops the whole real process of power , as well as the whole real order of production, with this never-ending reversibility and disaccumulation-without which neither power nor production would even exist . Behind power, or at the very heart of power and of production, there is a void which gives them today a last glimmer of reality. Without that which

reverses them, cancels them, and seduces them, they would never have attained reality. Besides, the real has never interested anyone. It is the locus of disenchantment par excellence, the locus of simulacrum of accumulation against death. Nothing could

be worse. It is the imaginary catastrophe standing behind them that sometimes makes reality and the truth fascinating. Do you think that power, economy, sex-all the real's big numbers-would have stood up one single instant without a fascination to support them which originates precisely in the inversed mirror where they are reflected and continually reversed, and

where their imaginary catastrophe generates a tangible and immanent gratification? Today especially, the real is no more than a stockpile of dead matter, dead bodies, and dead language. It still makes us feel secure today to evaluate this stock of what is real (let's not talk about energy: the ecological complaint hides the fact that it is not material energy which is disappearing on the species' horizon but the energy of the real, the reality of the real and of every serious possibility, capitalistic or

revolutionary, of managing the real). If the horizon of production has vanished, then the horizon of speech , sexuality, or desire can still carry on; there will always be something to liberate, to enjoy, and to exchange with others through

words: now that's real, that's substantial , that's prospective stock. That's power .

Their revolution as already failed, being absorbed into the system without any affect - reject the mass consumerism that integrated every instance of radical alterity into the coherent mentality of the western settler. They are both carnival and cannibal. Baudrillard ’10 (Jean, “Carnival and Cannibal: The Play of Global Antagonism”, Seagull Books 2010, translated by Chris Turner, pp. 6-12) But we may ask ourselves whether these Whites - the employer, the cop and the general: the ‘native-born’ Whites - are not already figures in a masquerade; we may ask whether they are not already caricatures of themselves, characters taking themselves for their own masks. The Whites may thus said to have carnivalized -

and hence cannibalized - themselves long before exporting all this to the whole world . We have here the great parade of a culture in the grip of a profusion of resources and offering itself for its own consumption, with mass consumerism and the consumption of all possible goods merely providing the most current form of this self-

devouring. And to this farce is added that other dimension Walter Benjamin spoke of, through which today’s humanity succeeds in turning its worst alienation into an aesthetic, spectacular delight. It is all a great collective spectacle, in which the West decks itself out not only in the spoils of all the other cultures - in its museums, fashions and art - but also in the spoils of its own culture. And, indeed, art fully plays its role in this turn of events: Picasso annexes the best of a ‘primitive’ art and the African artist today copies Picasso as part of an international aesthetic. If all the peoples decked out in the signs of whiteness and with all the exotic technologies are at the same time the living parody of these things, a deriding of

them, this is because these things are quite simply laughable, but w e can no longer see it. It is when they extend to the global level that universal values are revealed as swindle. If there was an original - historical and Western

event of modernity, we have exhausted all its consequences and it has taken a fatal, farcical turn for us ourselves. But the logic of modernity demanded that we impose it on the entire world, demanded that the f

atum of the Whites should be that of the race of Cain, and that no one should escape this homogenization,

this mystification of the species. When the Blacks attempt to whiten themselves, they are merely the distorted mirror of the negrification of the Whites, self-mystified from the outset by their own mastery.

So the whole décor of modern multiracial civilization is merely a t rompe-l’oeil universe in which al l particularities of race, sex and culture can be said to have been falsified to the point of being parodies of themselves . To such a degree that it is

the entire species which, through colonization and decolonization, parodies itself and destroys itself in a gigantic dispositif of simulation and mimetic violence, in which indigenous cultures are worn as threadbare as Western culture. For Western culture does not, in any sense, triumph: it long ago lost its soul in the effort (Hélé Béji). It has carnivalized itself, super-adding to this the absurdity of setting up, at enormous expense, the global museum of the cheap finery of all

cultures. Perhaps we should go back to Borges’s profound parable, ‘Fauna of Mirrors’, in which the defeated , consigned to the other side of the mirror, are reduced to resemblance, to being merely the reflected image of their conquerors . However, says Borges, the defeated gradually being to resemble their conquerors less and less and will, one day, pass back through the mirror and put an end to the Empire’s hegemony … If we consider what

is really happening in this planetary confrontation, we see that the subjugated peoples, from the depths of their slavery, far from resembling their masters less and less and taking their liberatory revenge , have begun to resemble them more and more, have begun to mimic their model grotesquely, piling on thick the marks of their servitude - which is the other way of taking one’s revenge - a fatal strategy which we cannot term ‘victorious’ since it is lethal for both. It is the whole of whiteness that buries blackness beneath the features of Carnival. And it is the whole of blackness that absorbs whiteness beneath the features of the Cannibal. Cannibalization against carnivalization - it seems as though the entire species has, by an immense anthropological sideslip, strayed off into this masquerade. This is the paradox of universal values: all the social movements in Black society, this whole caricature of power and countervailing power, all these legacies of a Western bourgeoisie which might almost be said, in its ‘historical’ coherence, to amount to an original event. Ultimately, modern Western vulture should never have stepped outside its own

order where it constituted a kind of singularity. But that was not an option; it could not escape this violent extrapolation

because it already bore its own denial - and, at the same time, its own universal assertion within itself. We are now see ing the backwash of this immense development in the form of an accelerated decomposition of the universal.

And globalization is merely the theatre of this decomposition - of this farce consecutive upon history .

The necessity of revolt reinstates a norm principle. Even if it is not one that conforms to a metanarratival structure. This addiction to moralism becomes a vacuous compulsion to act that collapses into nihilism and hatred of life. Brown 01 (Wendy Brown 2001, politics out of history, p. 23-4)From this account, moralism would appear to be a kind of temporal trace, a remnant of a discourse whose heritage and legitimacy it claims while in fact inverting that discourse’s sense and sensibility . At the extreme, moralism may be seen as a kind of posture or pose taken up in the ruins of morality by its faithful adherents ; it is thus at once a “fall” from morality, a “reversal” of morality, and an impoverished substitute for, or reaction to, the evisceration of a sustaining moral vision. As an “addiction,” the compulsive quality of moralism stands opposed to measured, difficult, and deliberate action that implicates rather than simply enacts the self; as “religion reduced to merely moral practice,” it consists of precepts and remonstrances whose spiritual incitation and inflection is lost to history, and whose secular enactment becomes ritualistic—and, not incidentally, often punitive . The element of punishment arises because moralism appears to be, in the Nietzschean sense, a reaction (or, more precisely, a compulsive rep roach) to a certain kind of action or power and thus a recrimination against the life force that action or power represents. To continue briefly in a Nietzschean vein, moralism, considered as an effect or consequence of weakened life forces, strikes at what appears to subordinate or humiliate it (but which has actually produced it): expressions of life forces or power . As a codification of disappointment or dissent raiment, it seeks to make a world in its own self-image and thus reproves everything tainted with power. In this way, a strange breed of

nihilism — opposition to life itself— disguises itself in the clothing of its opposite: righteous political principle .

Black Market CPCP TEXT: Embrace the unregulated exchange of the undercommons.

The Aff’s regulated exchange is coopted–the only resistance is underneath it- that resisting that logic is the undercommons which combats the war against a logic of capital. El Kilombo Intergaláctico 2007 [A people of color collective made up of students, migrants, and other community members in Durham, NC that has met with and connected their cause with that of the Zapatistas and the global anti-capitalist movement, “kilombo” is a Kimbundu (a Bantu dialect) term that has rhizomatically become the basis for the Brazillian term for encampment or commune “quilombo” built and utilized by marooned communities of Afro-Brazillians as a form of resistance from slavery, translation would be “intergalactic commune,” such that it references the many layers of meanings of Afro-Futurism, Pan-Americanism and Anti-Globalization, Beyond Resistance: Everything: An Interview With Subcommandante Marcos, p. 2-3/AK47]In presenting this premise, the first and most obvious question that arises is, what is wrong with the world today that the EZLN and others might want to change it? According to the Zapatistas, our current global condition is

characterized by the fact that today humanity suffers the consequences of the world’s first truly TOTAL

war, what the EZLN has aptly named the Fourth World War.5 The nature of this war is best understood by contrasting those World Wars that have preceded it. Taking for granted that the nature of the First and Second World Wars are well known (i.e. Allied Powers vs. Central Powers and Allied Powers vs. Axis Powers), we will turn to the immediately preceding world war—though it is rarely understood as such—the Third World War. The Third

World War (or the Cold War) was characterized by the fact that nation-states faced down other nation-states (most typically the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its allies in the Warsaw Pact) for the control of discrete territories around the

globe (most specifically Central Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central America). At the height of this conflict, the guerrilla style tactics adopted by each side made it appear, as General Nguyen Van Giap noted, that “the front today is everywhere.”6 And yet, most anyone would agree that like the previous World Wars, the Third World War ended with the conquest of specific territories and the ultimate defeat of an externally identifiable enemy (the U.S.S.R.). In contrast, what the EZLN has identified as the Fourth World War is a war between what the EZLN

has termed the “Empire of Money”7 and humanity. The main objectives of this war are : first, the capture of territory and labor for the expansion and construction of new markets; second, the extortion of profit; and third, the globalization of exploitation . Significantly then, for the first time, we are in the midst of a World War that is not fought between nations or even between a nation and an externally identifiable enemy. It is instead a war for the

imposition of a logic and a practice, the logic and practice of capital, and therefore everything that is human and

opposes capital is the enemy; we are all at all times potentially the enemy ,8 thus requiring an omniscient and

omnipotent social policing . As the EZLN explains, this qualifies the Fourth World War as the first truly TOTAL war because, unlike even the Third World War, this is not a war on all fronts; it is the first world war with NO front.

The black market takes flight from dominant norms of exchange. In this undercommons we strategize a politics of freedom, escape, break --- stealing away the information that is foreclosed or ignored in normative framings of the topic Harney 04’. Stefano Harney 2004.Pg.51Addressing these questions demands some attempt to discover¶ how blackness operates as the modality of life’s constant escape and¶ takes the form, the held and errant pattern, of flight. So we’ve been¶ trying to find out how the commons cuts common sense – the necessarily¶ failed administrative accounting of the incalculable – that is the¶ object/ive of enlightenment self-control; and trying to get with that¶

undercommon sensuality, that radical occupied-elsewhere, that utopic¶ commonunderground of this dystopia, the funked-up here and now¶ of this anacentric particularity that we occupy and with which we are¶ preoccupied. It must be that in exploring the black market underside ¶ of this constant economy of misrecognition, this misery cognition,¶ it will be possible to discover the informal, form- giving pleasures of¶ the content economy: because we’re in love with the way the beat of¶ this slum- like deictic circle flies off the handle; how event music, f ull¶ of color, blows up the event horizon ; how the soundwaves from this¶ black hole carry flavorful pictures to touch; how the only way to get¶ with them is to sense them . This information can never be lost , only¶ irrevocably given in transit. We could never provide a whole bunch of¶ smooth transitions for this order of ditches and hidden spans. There’s¶

just this open seriality of terminals in off transcription. Some people¶ want to run things, other things want to run. If they ask you, tell them¶ we were flying . Knowledge of freedom is (in) the invention of escape ,¶ stealing away in the confines, in the form, of a break. This is held close¶ in the open song of the ones who are supposed to be silent.

The only way to solve for sexism and racism is by embracing the undercommonsHarvey 04’ [pg 10 & 11. “The undercommons” Harvey. ] (Gender Paraphrased) The mission then for the denizens of the undercommons is to recognize¶ that when you seek to make things better, you are not just doing¶ it for the Other, you must also be do ing it for yourself . While men¶ may think they are being “sensitive” by turning to feminism, while¶ white people may think they are being right on by opposing racism,¶ no one will r eally be able to embrace the mission of tearing “this shit¶ down” until they realize that the structures they oppose are not only¶ bad for some of us, they are bad for all of us. Gender hierarchies are¶ bad for men as well as women and they are really bad for the rest of us.¶ Racial hierarchies are not rational and ordered, they are chaotic and¶ nonsensical and must be opposed by precisely all those who benefit¶ in any way from them . Or, as Moten puts it: “The coalition emerges¶ out of your recognition that it’s [f’d] up for you, in the same way¶ that we’ve already recognized that it’s fucked up for us. I don’t need¶ your help. I just need you to recognize that this shit is killing you, too,¶ however much more softly, you stupid motherfucker, you know?”¶ The coalition unites us in the recognition that we must change things¶ or die. All of us . We must all change the things that are fucked up and¶ change cannot come in the form that we think of as “revolutionary” – not as a masculinist surge or an armed confrontatio n. Revolution¶ will come in a form we cannot yet imagine. Moten and Harney propose¶ that we prepare now for what will come by entering into study.¶ Study, a mode of thinking with others separate from the thinking that¶ the institution requires of you, prepares us to be embedded in what¶ Harney calls “the with and for” and allows you to spend less time antagonized¶ and antagonizing.

FWA. Interpretation: Affirmatives must defend only the implementation of plan with a stable plan text.

1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forumArmy Officer School ’04 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement

For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

B. Violation: They claim solvency off of their discursive endorsement of movements.

C. Standards

1. Ground: PText is key to disadvantages, kritik links, and counterplan competition.

2. Education: Plan texts are key to debating the affirmative in a productive manner – we need to find a stasis point in the debate to be able to have competition and good debates

3. Extra-Topicality: Allowing them to claim solvency or advantages off of personal discourse is extra topical and a voting issue for fairness: it allows them to shift their advocacy in the 2AC and moot predictable 1NC ground.

D. Framework is a voting issue for fairness and education.

CaseThe First DA is the Agony Tale

The 1ac presents a rhetorical device known as an agony tale, where they highlight marginalization in real, specific instances to elicit affective response. This unwittingly reinforces worldviews that render mundane prejudice and privilege invisible. Vote neg to universalize the praxis of the 1ac absent the particular taleFan, ‘97 [Copyright (c) 1997 The Columbia Law Review Columbia Law Review May, 1997 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1202 LENGTH: 17247 words SYMPOSIUM: TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW: UNSCRAMBLING THE SIGNALS, UNBUNDLING THE LAW: NOTE: IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE PROMISE OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY: OPENING THE ACADEMY TO THE VOICES OF ALIENS AND IMMIGRANTS NAME: Stephen Shie-Wei Fan]

While the narratives of all critical race theorists bear the same purpose of bringing to the surface the perceptions of those outside of the

societal mainstream, these narratives present themselves in a number of different formats. The most well-known narratives of critical race theorists fall into two primary types: the "agony tale" and the "counterstory." n51 1. Agony Tales. -

The agony tale is often described as a "first-person account, usually of some outrage the author suffered," n52

although these tales may also encompass experiences related by legal writers on behalf of [*1213] third parties. n53

While such narratives usually do not rise to the level of severity suggested by their name, they nevertheless describe occurrences

that sufficiently deviate from socially-accepted norms to elicit disapproval, if not outright anger. Patricia Williams's "Benetton story" typifies the agony tale: I was shopping in Soho and saw in a store window a sweater that I wanted to buy for my mother. I pressed my round brown face to the window and my finger to the buzzer, seeking admittance. A narrow-eyed, white teenager wearing running shoes and feasting on bubble gum glared out, evaluating me for signs that would pit me against the limits of his social understanding. After about five seconds, he mouthed "We're closed," and blew pink rubber at me. It was two Saturdays before Christmas, at one o'clock in the afternoon; there were several white people in the store who appeared to be shopping for things for their mothers. I was enraged... In the flicker of his judgmental gray eyes, that saleschild had transformed my brightly sentimental, joy-to-the-world, pre-Christmas spree to a shambles. He snuffed my sense of humanitarian catholicity, and there was nothing I could do to snuff his ... n54 Agony tales are often embraced by their readers for being "so poignant, so moving, so authentic, so true. [Readers] accept them immediately and call them poetic

and soulful" n55 by virtue of their immediate and vivid format. It is precisely because the subject matter of agony tales is frequently shocking that the tales can be accepted so completely: n56 overt and obvious racial discrimination elicits easy empathy. n57 Such discrimination fits comfortably into a majoritarian world view n58 in which discrimination still [*1214] exists , but only in lingering , discrete, and highly specific harms to individuals , n59 which civil rights jurisprudence seeks to cure, at least whenever such discrimination falls within the purview of the law's corrective scope. n60

The generally receptive reactions that greet this variety of agony tale often belie the very problems which , from the point of view of critical race theorists, pervade a societal understanding of race and race relations in the United States.

Delgado has noted that an article of his - the subject matter of which rendered it in "some respects ... a classic agony tale " n61 -

garnered expressions of sympathy from the academy , but little substantive suppor t, precisely because it

underscored, by contradistinction, the cherished order and sanctity of the American legal system: [Law professors] could empathize with the black subjected to the vicious racial slur. They could say how terrible it is that our legal system doesn't provide redress. They sincerely felt that way. Indeed, I think it allowed them to say to themselves how much

they loved the First Amendment. They loved it so much that they had to sacrifice these unfortunate Negroes and Mexicans, for which they were genuinely sorry and apologetic. n62 Though frequently graphic enough to elicit genuine outrage, the agony tale often fails to go beyond merely engendering a passive sense of identification from sympathetic listeners.

The Second DA is Black Ops

The critical pessimism of the 1ac is complicit with an aesthetic equation of Black and ugly -- we should rather be optimistic about blackness as the condition of possibility for radical politics. If they equate blackness with the immutability of slavery, we affirm against it the becoming in the figure of the runaway.

Voting negative is an escape from the ontological prisonhouse of the 1AC depiction of Blackness

The net benefit is that there is no value in their nihilist project -- vote neg to affirm the joy of becoming in Black StudiesMoten 7 Fred, Professor of English and African American Studies, Duke University "black optimism/black operation", Chicago -- working text for "Black Op" Source: PMLA, Volume 123, Number 5, October 2008, pp. 1743–1747 (5)http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CDQQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Flucian.uchicago.edu%2Fblogs%2Fpoliticalfeeling%2Ffiles%2F2007%2F12%2Fmoten-black-optimism.doc&ei=1fE2UO65KuG8yAHpiIHYCg&usg=AFQjCNE8N66fQjQ7TP0PkJ0eYZDI6cNLvA&sig2=BUrcwC5Cfz5Ero2I14PBsg

My field is black studies. In that field, I’m trying to hoe the hard row of beautiful things. I try to study them and I also try to make them.

Elizabeth Alexander says “look for color everywhere.” For me, color + beauty = blackness which is not but nothing other than who, and deeper still, where I am. This shell, this inhabitation, this space , this garment— that I carry with me on the various stages of my flight from the conditions of its making—is a zone of chromatic saturation troubling any ascription of impoverishment of any kind however much it is of, which is to say in emergence from, poverty (which is, in turn, to say in emergence from or as an aesthetics or a poetics of poverty). The highly cultivated nature of this situated volatility, this emergent poetics of the emergency, is the open secret that has been the preoccupation of black studies. But it must be said now—and I’ll do so by way of a cool kind of accident that has been afforded us by the danger and saving power that is power point—that

there is a strain of black studies that strains against black studies and its object, the critique of western civilization, precisely insofar as it disavows its aim (blackness or the thinking of blackness, which must be understood in what some not so strange combination of Nahum Chandler and Martin Heidegger might call its paraontological distinction from black people). There was a moment in Rebecca’s presentation when the image of a black saxophonist (I think, but am not sure, that it was the great Chicago musician Fred Anderson) is given to us as a representative, or better yet a denizen (as opposed to citizen), of the “space of the imagination.” What’s cool here, and what is also precisely the kind of thing that makes practitioners of what might be called the new black studies really mad, is this racialization of the imagination which only comes fully into its own when it is seen in opposition, say, to that set of faces or folks who constituted what I know is just a part of Lauren’s tradition of Marxist historiographical critique. That racialization has a long history and begins to get codified in a certain Kantian discourse, one in which the imagination is understood to “produce nothing but nonsense,” a condition that requires that “its wings be severely clipped by the imagination.” What I’m interested in, but which I can only give a bare outline of, is a two-fold black operation—one in which Kant moves toward something like a thinking of the imagination as blackness that fully recognizes the irreducible desire for this formative and deformative, necessarily supplemental necessity; one in which black studies ends up being unable to avoid a certain sense of itself as a Kantian, which is to say anti-Kantian and ante-Kantian, endeavor. The new black studies, or to be more precise, the old-new black studies, since every iteration has had this ambivalence at its heart, can’t help but get pissed at the terrible irony of its irreducible Kantianness precisely because it works so justifiably hard at critiquing that racialization of the imagination and the racialized opposition of imagination (in its lawless, nonsense producing freedom)

and critique that turns out to be the condition of possibility of the critical philosophical project. There is a voraciously instrumental anti-essentialism, powered in an intense and terrible way by good intentions , that is the intellectual platform from which black studies’ disavowal of its object and aim is launched , even when that disavowal comes in something which also thinks itself to be moving in the direction of that object and aim. I’m trying to move by way of a kind of resistance to that anti-essentialism, one that requires a paleonymic relation to blackness; I’m trying to own a certain dispossession, the underprivilege of being-sentenced to this gift of constantly escaping and to standing in for the fugitivity (to echo Natahaniel Mackey, Daphne Brooks and Michel Foucault) (of the imagination) that is an irreducible property of life, persisting in and against every disciplinary technique while constituting and instantiating not just the thought but that actuality of the outside that is what/where blackness is—as space or spacing of the

imagination, as condition of possibility and constant troubling of critique. It’s annoying to perform what you oppose, but I just want you to know that I ain’t mad . I loved these presentations, partly because I think they loved me

or at least my space, but mostly because they were beautiful. I love Kant, too, by the way, though he doesn’t love me, because I think he’s beautiful too and , as you know, a thing of beauty is a joy forever . But even though I’m not mad, I’m not disavowing that strain of black studies that strains against the weight or burden, the refrain, the strain of being-imaginative and not-being-critical that is called blackness and that black people have had to carry. Black Studies strains against a burden

that, even when it is thought musically, is inseparable from constraint. But my optimism, black optimism, is bound up with what it is to claim blackness and the appositional, runaway black operations that have been thrust upon it. The burden, the constraint, is the aim, the paradoxically aleatory goal that animates escape in and the possibility of escape from. Here is one such black op—a specific, a capella instantiation of strain, of resistance to constraint and instrumentalization, of the propelling and constraining force of the refrain, that will allow me to get to a little something concerning the temporal paradox of, and the irruption of ecstatic temporality in, optimism, which is to say black optimism, which is to say blackness. I play this in appreciation for being in Chicago, which is everybody’s sweet home, everybody’s land of California, as Robert Johnson puts it. This is music from a Head Start program in Mississippi in the mid-sixties and as you all know Chicago is a city in Mississippi, Mississippi a (fugue) state of mind

in Chicago. “Da Da Da Da,” The Child Development Group of Mississippi, Smithsonian Folkways Records, FW02690 1967 The temporal paradox of optimism—that it is , on the one hand, necessarily futurial so that optimism is an attitude we take towards that which is to come; but that it is, on the other hand, in its proper Leibnizian formulation, an assertion not only of the necessity but also of the rightness and the essential timelessness of the always already existing, resonates in this recording. It is infused with that same impetus that drives a certain movement, in Monadology, from the immutability of monads to that enveloping of the moral world in the natural world that Leibniz calls, in Augustinian echo/revision, “the City of God.” With respect to C. L. R. James and José (Muñoz), and a little respectful disrespect to Lee Edelman, these children are the voices of the future in the past, the

voices of the future in our present. In this recording, this remainder, their fugitivity, remains , for me, in the intensity of their refrain, of their straining against constraint , cause for the optimism they perform. That optimism always lives, which is to say escapes, in the assertion of a right to refuse , which is, as Gayatri Spivak says, the first right: an instantiation of a collective negative tendency to differ, to resist the regulative powers that resistance, that differing, call into being. To think resistance as originary is to say, in a sense, that we have what we need, that we can get there from here, that there’s nothing wrong with us or even , in this regard, with here, even as it requires us still to think about why it is that difference calls the same, that resistance calls regulative power, into existence, thereby securing the vast, empty brutality that characterizes here and now. Nevertheless, however much I keep trouble in mind, and therefore, in the interest of making as much trouble as possible, I remain hopeful insofar as I will have been in this very collective negative tendency, this little school within and beneath school that we gather together to be. For a bunch of little whiles, this is our field (i.e., black studies), our commons or undercommons or

underground or outskirts and it will remain so as long as it claims its fugitive proximity to blackness , which I will claim, with

ridiculousness boldness, is the condition of possibility of politics .