DAVID BLOOR

SOME DETERMINANTS OF COGNITIVE STYLE IN SCIENCE

I want to examine the difficult and rather obscure idea of a style of thought (Denkstil) as it occurs in Fleck's book on the Genesis and Development of a Scientific FactI and his paper 'Zur Krise der "Wirklichkeit" '.2 I shall try to break down this idea and isolate some of its components. I can see at least some ways of building a bridge between what Fleck says about thought-styles and the detailed work in the history of science that Shapin has outlined for us. If I am right then it should prove possible to define some of the causes of thought-styles and to relate them, in the way that Fleck would have wanted, to facts about the social structure of the Denkkollektiv.

Fleck wanted us to join him in building a comparative and social theory of knowledge. 3 Let me begin by examining the requirement that our theory be a social one, and then the demand that it be comparative.

One of Fleck's central claims is that in science complexity and trouble are endless. By means of a single example with which he had first-hand experience - the development of the Wassermann test - he illustrates the remorseless need to impose a pattern on the complexity of experience. He confronts us with the perpetual possibility of the breakdown of cognitive order. Every classification that we accomplish is precarious, essentially incom-plete and under threat.4 The world is too complex for us. "Out of the almost infmite multitude of possibilities" says Fleck "every way of knowing selects different questions, connects them according to different rules and to dif-ferent purposes". 5 That there are stable conceptions of reality with stable styles of thought is therefore deeply problematic. It means that the illusion of simplicity that frequently possesses us must be something that we artfully accomplish. Order must be the result of ceaseless effort. It depends on what Fleck calls 'work' - "serious, continual work by large groups and great men".6

II

If this explains (at least in part) what Fleck meant by a social epistemology, what of its comparative aspects? Here, it seems to me, Fleck's ideas were less

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R. S. Cohen and T. Schnelle (eds.), Cognition and Fact - Materials on Ludwik Fleck, 387-397. 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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developed. Recall what he offers on this question. Basically he gives three examples which point to a comparative treatment of knowledge. First, he contrasts ancient with more modern conceptions of an illness such as syphilis. The ancient conception stressed the moral significance of disease, the modern conception tends to be morally neutral. Nevertheless the modern understand-ing is still based on a whole variety of assumptions that could in principle be challenged. Thus the boundaries of the organism are conceived in a certain way and metaphors of invasion and defence are rife.7 Secondly, Fleck con-trasts the inner and outer circle of knowers - the esoteric and exoteric regions and forms of knowledge. The certainty and rigidity of knowledge, he suggests, is a function of social distance from the confused circumstances of its crea-tion.8 Thirdly, and perhaps most interesting of all, Fleck referred to what he called the 'classical period' in the development of a theory. He defined this as the period when its limitations tend to be ignored and when its adherents most confidently proclaim its truth and finality. Fleck treats this as a typical phase in the life of a scientific theory, before it becomes overwhelmed with anomalies. 9

These three ideas certainly represent the beginnings of a comparative approach. But they are only beginnings. We must unfold and develop these hints. Fleck himself provides a clue which shows how this may be done. Recall that he describes certain factors that are present in every cognition. There is tradition, and there is education and finally there is what he calls 'the sequence of acts of cognition'. 10 I want to concentrate on this sequence of acts of cognition. What are these acts? Fleck said that they are things like the following:

(i) acts of judgement in which 'small divergences are not taken into account'. 11

(ii) judgements that a rule or law still holds despite 'exceptions' or 're-strictions' .12

(iii) judgements of importance and relevance as when a troublesome ex-perimental outcome or observation is dismissed as 'accidental' or 'unessential' .13

(iv) judgements that a law should be 'supplemented' by means of more or less ad hoc complications or additions. 14

There is a lot that could be said about this interesting list of cognitive acts. The exercise of discretion to which they refer has been explored in detail by a number of writers. IS For my purposes, however, the thing that stands out is that this sequence of acts is a sequence of responses to anomaly. They are ways of responding to potential counter-examples to the established or

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'traditional' body of knowledge. The 'work' of sustaining cognitive order is broken down by Fleck into an endless sequence of responses to anomaly.

Here I think we have isolated at least one of the determinants of cognitive style. The style of a body of knowledge (if it has a determinate style) might be created by the systematic application of a particular strategy for dealing with counter-examples and anomalies. If all the judgements that constitute Fleck's 'sequence of cognitive acts' are biassed in a particular way, then the cumulative effect would be to give the resulting system of belief a recognisable physiognomy or style. I do not say that this is the whole story. It isn't, and later I shall explain why it isn't the whole story - but it may be a crucial part of it. This is certainly how Fleck construed the 'classical' phase of a theory. Here a simple, useful picture of nature is protected by a 'thousand cunning devices'.16

A very interesting question can now be posed. Are there an infinite number of ways of responding to anomaly? Or are there perhaps a finite, or even a very small and limited, number of possible responses? If there are an infinite number of ways then a comparative exercise becomes too complicated. At best we can merely describe one style after another. Suppose, however, that we can discern a small number of recurring strategies. Then we can put some order into cultural complexity.17 The same kinds of response will occur again and again in the historical record and illuminating regularities and patterns might be found. We will have a 'space' of different strategies and a space of different styles of thought - with the hope of discerning their underlying causes and connections. I speak of the underlying cause here because it is important to notice that on the present approach style is the outcome of Fleck's 'sequence of acts'. It is not itself the explanation of that sequence. For the explanation we must look elsewhere.

III

I think that a good case can be made out for saying that the number of strategies for responding to anomaly is not indefinitely large, but is in fact very small. Indeed I think that there are only about four or five different strategies. So there ought to be only about four or five different styles of thought - at least as far as this mechanism of generation is concerned.

I cannot argue this claim fully here, but two considerations may help to make it plausible. Most of you will be familiar with Imre Lakatos's brilliant book Proofs and Refutations. 1s You will recall that he studied a mathe-matical debate that lasted for about one hundred and fifty years. The debate

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concerned the validity of a theorem of Euler's about the relation between the number of edges, faces and vertices of a polyhedron. He found that just four or five methods of responding to counter-examples had been used in its entire course. Lakatos gave these strategies amusing but revealing names: 'monster-barring', 'exception-barring', 'monster-adjusting', 'primitive exception barring', and finally the 'dialectical' strategy - this being the one that he favoured. The important point, though, is that the same moves appeared time after time and generated recognisable kinds of mathematical work. 19

Another clue which shows that there may only be a small number of strategies is this. Think of the number of ways that a social group might react to a stranger. There might be outright rejection, or strangers may be made welcome. Again, they might be subjected to various kinds of assimilation so that they are treated not as strangers (whether welcome or unwelcome) but as members of the group. They could be slotted into existing categories or given a special status within the society. Again, notice how limited are the possibilities - just four basic kinds of response are available.

Drawing an analogy between strangers and potential anomalies is not as far-fetched as it may sound. Strangers, like anomalies, occasion both oppor-tunities and threats. They need to have a meaning assigned to them and some act is called for to articulate their relation to established practices and social categories. The very components that Fleck described (tradition, education and cognitive 'work') must be brought mto play in these cases too. Further-more, as anthropologists have noted, the response to classificatory anomalies in the natural world is often a symbolic way of responding to strangers in the social world.20

Every strategy, whether applied to the natural or the social world, has its dangers. It has its costs as well as its benefits. Too much consistency (that is, too much rejection) causes what Fleck called 'one-sidedness'. An overly protective attitude can produce a narrowly defined body of knowledge that misses opportunities that others may exploit. On the other hand too little effort to protect existing accomplishments (that is, too much criticism or too much welcome to strangers) leads to what Fleck calls 'sterility'.21 He might have better called this state one of 'chaos' or 'anarchy'. But if every strategy has its dangers, they are not dangers that can be avoided. These strategies are not merely open to us, the choice of one or the other is a necessity im-posed upon us at every moment in scientific work. There is always work to be done because, as Fleck put it, the 'horizon' always moves away from us. There is, says Fleck, "no law without exceptions". 22

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IV

We must now connect together the comparative and social considerations in order to get a theory that is truly comparative and social. The connection is this. We must look at the social meaning of anomalies. We must follow the anthropologist by looking at the various ways in which anomalies may be put to work, exploited or resisted by the members of a Denkkollektiv. Do they pose a threat and, if so, to whom are they a threat? Do they provide welcome opportunities, and, if so, by whom are they welcomed? What are the purposes, goals and interests that impinge on any given cogni-tive act? The crucial thing to realise, however, is that the use and the mean-ing of an anomaly are not matters of individual volition or choice. They are subject to social constraints. An anomaly will only have a certain mean-ing if the collectivity endow it with credibility. An anomaly can only be put to a certain use if the social circumstances make that use possible and sustain it.

Let me illustrate and justify this claim by a simple example. Suppose that you have a closed and bounded group all committed to a single theory. For example, suppose that there is only a single recognised academy or centre of learning - the community of men of knowledge is clearly bounded, and dissidents can be banished. Under these circumstances it is possible to sustain a theory or a law by casting out potential counter-examples as 'irrelevant' or spurious or the result of incompetence. By a suitable definition of terms or by an expedient piece of reclassification a counter-example can be cast out and declared to be an abomination. Here, I think, we have the social circum-stances necessary for Lakatos's strategy of monster-barring to fmd a successful application. The counter-example is not a real counter-example. It is some-thing unnatural and we should turn our backs on it. "No", said the defenders of Euler's theorem: "two tetrahedra joined at a vertex do not refute the the-orem that, for all polyhedra the vertices (V) , edges (E) and faces (F) are related by the formula V - E + F = 2". And why not? Because the twin tetrahedron is not a real or true polyhedron. It is a monster. The defenders then produced an ingenious new definition of a polyhedron in order to prove their point.

Clearly this method can only work if it is possible to expel any supporters of the potential counter-example. It is not the world itself that makes trouble for our system of belief, it is other believers. If there is nowhere for the supporters of a counter-example to seek refuge then those able to muster support have a very effective threat available to them. Conversely, for a group

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with the kind of structure that I am imagining it is easy to see why an anomaly should be deemed monstrous. There is a clear sense in which it may pose a monstrous threat. It may be seized upon by dissident, disaffected or peri-pheral members of the group and made into an excuse for a scientific revolu-tion, or a radical change in theory and practice.23

The picture that I have painted is obviously very simple and idealised. But something not too unlike this occurred in some of the cases from the history of science that Shapin mentioned. Consider for example the initial outright rejection of the wave theory of light by the Paris Academy, and then the palace revolution that brought the work of Fresnel, the outsider, into the foreground. 24 Or again, consider the rejection by Pasteur of the 'incompetent' experiments by Pouchet which seemed to contradict the orthodox separation of living and non-living matter. 25 Or recall the analysis of the debate between Pearson and Yule over the measure of association of nominal variables.26 When Yule produced a measure of association that did not serve the Eugenic interests of Pearson's dominant group it was met with hostility and rejection. It was said to be 'dangerous'.27 If Pearson's influence in the statistical com-munity had been absolute rather than merely very great, then Yule's Q-coefficient would have been relegated to the status of a mere arithmetical oddity.

Now let us imagine slightly more complicated circumstances. Rather than the relevant community being a single, bounded group let us suppose that the supporters of a counter-example have a power-base of their own. Suppose there are rival academies. Anomalies and complicating factors cannot be so easily dismissed because their supporters cannot be banished. Compromise will be necessary. For example, an anomaly might be accepted as a 'restric-tion' on the 'scope' of a theory or law. Alternatively the anaomaly may have to be taken seriously but redescribed and reinterpreted so that it leaves exist-ing accomplishments intact.

This is what happened in another of the cases that Shapin mentioned in passing - the reception of non-Euclidean geometry in late nineteenth-century England.28 By reinterpreting non-Euclidean geometry as the projective geometry of curved surfaces within a Euclidean space a threat was removed. What was that threat? It was a social threat posed by the supporters of non-Euclidean geometry. They were using it to make propaganda for a radical, empiricist theory of knowledge. Its supporters were to be found amongst a group known as the 'scientific naturalists' of whom the mathematician W. K. Clifford was a prominent member. The naturalists quite explicitly claimed that empirical science was the only form of knowledge and that scientists

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where the only genuine men of knowledge. This propaganda by the militant wing of the scientific profession deeply worried more conservative scientists who were willing to compromise with the Church. For them Euclidean geome-try was a symbol of non-empirical, transcendental certainty; hence the im-portance attached to neutralising and re-interpreting non-Euclidean geometry.

V

You will have seen that what I am doing is distributing Fleck's sequence of cognitive acts across a space of social structures. By imagining simple models for the structure of a Denkkollektiv I am trying to locate the circumstances under which different strategies of responding to counter-examples will be credible and attractive. What historical work shows is how important it is to look at the precise determinants operating upon each of the sequence of cognitive acts that make up the work of science. If we are to take Fleck's model seriously we must resist the temptation to assume that a tradition (or style) of scientific work will unfold itself. It contains no inherent implications that 'determine our Reason' or guide our understanding. To think of a theory, a tradition or a style, in science as if it contains an immanent line of develop-ment is to forget the importance of Fleck's 'sequence of cognitive acts'.29 For an adherent to a truly comparative and social epistemology each act is some-thing to be explained. At each point we must ask: what interests are at stake? - whether these be broadly conceived interests or narrowly profeSSional interests. We must ask: what purposes are being served and who is benefitting? We must ask: what is being risked, and who will be blamed?

These may sound simple-minded questions, but they are not. It may be granted that they are not elevated and uplifting in tone, but they get us a surprisingly long way in answering the question of why specific acts of cogni-tion take the form they do. 30

VI

I do not wish to pretend that strategies of responding to anomalies are the only determinants of scientific style. Even though the concept of style awaits a more precise definition it has a sufficiently clear, intuitive meaning to see that there are other determinants. One obvious candidate for explaining different styles is the use of different models and metaphors in the original formulation of the theory. In particular we may notice that just as there are recognisably different styles of life in different social structures, so recognis-

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ably different styles of knowledge would result if the basic picture of nature were modelled on a social form. 31

Historical work that has been done on the corpuscular philosophy of Boyle and Newton suggests that metaphors of hierarchy derived from the social structure have played a surprisingly important role in its development. For Boyle and Newton it was vital to stress that matter was passive not active. Matter depended for its motion on active principles and spiritual forces. It appears that a crucial consideration behind this principle was that it allowed nature to be given a certain social meaning. It made it useful as an object lesson because of the universal assumption of the time that the 'world politick' and the 'world natural' would be closely analogous. 32 For 'matter' read 'people'; for 'active principle' read 'church'. Properly understood this histori-cal example is of profound interest to the sociologist of knowledge. 33 Notice, however, that it complements rather than contradicts what I have said about anomalies. Both the choice of basic metaphor and the response to anomaly can be illuminated in terms of the idea that nature is being put to a social use. But whatever the ultimate relationship between the different determinants of scientific style the claim that I want to draw attention to is this: studying the structures of power and interest behind responses to anomaly provides one important method for clarifying the intriguing phenomenon of Denkstil.

NOTES

1 Ludwik Fleck in T. J. Trenn and R. K. Merton (eds.): Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1979. (First published in 1935.) 2 Ludwik Fleck: 'Zur Krise der Wirklichkeit', Naturwissenschaften 17 (1929),425-30. From the translation by G. H. Schalit and Y. Elkana, in this volume, pp. 47 -58. 3 Genesis, pp. 43,51,64. 4 Genesis, especially pp. 18 and 19; also p. 95. Science "has no demonstrable beginning and is open ended". For an account of the interconnected character of factual statements and the limitless effects of the changes that may be wrought on any particular part of the system, see p. 102. See also the beautiful description on p. 114 of the circularities that attend practical reasoning in science cf. pp. 18, 19 and 114. These attest to the subtlety and depth of the constructive work which goes into apparently simple matters of fact. 5 'Crisis', p. 49 in this volume. 6 'Crisis', p. 50. 7 Genesis, pp. 59-62. 8 GeneSis, pp. 105-106, 114-115. 9 Genesis, pp. 93-94.

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10 'Crisis', p. 47. 11 'Crisis', p. 51. 12 'Crisis', p. 51. 13 'Crisis', p. 51. 14 'Crisis', pp. 51-52. 15 For example, T. S. Kuhn: 'The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Sci-ence', Isis 52 (1961), 161-90; M. B. Hesse: The Structure of Scientific Influence, Mac-millan, London, 1974, chs. 1 and 2; and H. Collins: 'The Seven Sexes: a Study in the Sociology of a Phenomenon, or the Replication of Experiments in Physics', Sociology 9 (1975),205-24. 16 'Crisis', p. 54. 17 The reader who is familiar with the work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas will recognise at once the extent to which my approach is based on her work. Indeed the thesis of my paper could be expressed in the following terms: that one valuable develop-ment of Fleck's position is to be found by equating what Douglas calls 'cultural bias' with Fleck's 'styles of thought'. It is perhaps significant that Douglas's work belongs to the tradition of Emile Durkheim, and Durkheim is one of the relatively small number of sources quoted by Fleck. The works of Mary Douglas that are most relevant to the present discussion are: M. Douglas: Purity and Danger: an Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, Routl-

edge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966. M. Douglas: Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology Penguin, Harmondsworth,

1973. M. Douglas: Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology, Routledge & Kegan Paul,

London, 1975. M. Douglas: Cultural Bias, Occasional Paper no. 34 of the Royal Anthropological Society

of Great Britain and Ireland, 1978. 18 Imre Lakatos, in J. Worrall and E. Zahar (eds.): Proofs and Refutations: the Logic of Mathematical Discovery, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976. 19 For a sociological reading of Lakatos's case study designed to bring out the parallels between responses to anomaly in mathematics and Douglas's anthropological studies of category violation, see D. Bloor: 'Polyhedra and the Abominations of Leviticus', British Journal for the History of Science 11 (1978), 245-72: reprinted in M. Douglas (ed.): Essays in the Sociology of Perception, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1982. 20 See the works of Douglas referred to in note 17. 21 'Crisis', p. 52. 22 'Crisis', p. 55. Fleck's theory of the ever-receding-horizon and the never-to-be-perfected-law represents his version of what has been called the 'symmetry' postulate of the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge: cf. D. Bloor: Knowledge and Sociallmagery, Ch.l, 'The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge', Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976. 23 This approach provides an answer to a long-standing problem in Kuhn's theory of paradigm change. What is it that turns an anomaly into a crisis-provoking anomaly? On the present approach it would not be an intrinsic property but an imputed property. It would be a comment on the use to which some or all members of the scientific com-munity chose to put it. The circumstances behind this use then become the subject matter for particular case studies.

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24 E. Frankel: 'Corpuscular Optics and the Wave Theory of Light: the Science and Politics of a Revolution in Physics', Social Studies of Science 6 (1976), 141-84. 25 J. Farley and G. L. Geison: 'Science, Politics and Spontaneous Generation in Nine-teenth-Century France: the Pasteur-Pouchet Debate', Bulletin of the History of Medicine 48 (1974), 161-98. 26 D. MacKenzie: Statistics in Britain, 1865-1930: the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1981: especially Ch. 7, 'The Politics of the Contingency Table'. 27 Ibid., p. 161. 28 J. Richards: 'The Reception of a Mathematical Theory: non-Euclidean Geometry in England, 1868-1883', in B. Barnes and S. Shapin (eds.): Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture, Sage, Beverly Hills/London, 1979, Ch. 6. 29 Karl Mannheim spoke of the inner logic of a theory or system of belief and was content to see the sociology of knowledge deal with deviations. See for example Ideology and Utopia, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1936, pp. 239-40. A similar position is to be found more recently in the later work of Lakatos on the relation between internal and external history: I. Lakatos: 'History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions', Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (1971), 91-135. Fleck's stress on the sequence of cognitive acts makes him much more radical. For this is precisely a device for fragmenting the flow of 'natural' or 'logical' implications or the smooth guidance of 'meanings'. In fact Fleck's theory is much more like that of Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. He shares with Wittgenstein a commitment to what may be called a 'finitist' theory of meaning. Meanings are created in the specific, local context of use and are strictly confined to that context. Each and every extension of usage is problematic. Other similarities with the later Wittgenstein are, for example, their sense of the fluid relation of symptom and criteria, and something like a family resemblance theory of all classificatory predicates. 30 See particularly the items in Shapin's bibliography under the headings 'Professional vested interests and sociological explanation' and 'Interests and the boundaries of the scientific community'. For a discussion of how responses to anomaly and scientific styles can be related to the socially determined concepts of 'mistake' and 'blame' see C. Bloor and D. Bloor: 'Twenty Industrial Scientists: a Preliminary Report', in M. Douglas (ed.): Essays in the Sociology of Perception, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1982. 31 A particularly simple example would be, say, theories which appeal to metaphors of fragmentation and atomisation in contrast to theories which appeal to metaphors of organic unity. See for instance: S. Shapin: 'Phrenological Knowledge and the Social Structure of Early Nineteenth-

Century Edinburgh' ,Annals of Science 32 (1975), 219-43; and S. Shapin: 'The Politics of Observation: Cerebral Anatomy and Social Interests in the

Edinburgh Phrenology Disputes', in R. Wallis (ed.): On the Margins of Science: the Social Construction of Rejected Knowledge, Sociological Review Monographs 27 (1979),139-178.

S. Shapin: 'Homo Phrenologicus: Anthropological Perspectives on an Historical Problem' in B. Barnes and S. Shapin (eds.): Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture, Sage Beverly Hills and London, 1979, pp. 41-71.

Not only specific theories within science but also general and philosophical theories of knowledge can be based on social metaphors. It is, for instance, revealing to look at the

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Kuhn-Popper debate in the light of their two underlying models of society. This stylistic conflict in the theory of knowledge then becomes another symptom of a clash between two long-standing social ideologies - the Romantic (or Conservative) stance and En-lightenment individualism: cf. D. Bloor: Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976, Ch. 4. 32 See particularly the work by J. R. and M. C. Jacob in Section IV(b) of Shapin's bibliography. 33 The significance of this example is discussed and the literature summarised in S. Shapin: 'Social Uses of Science', in G. S. Rousseau and R. Porter (eds.): The Ferment of Knowledge: Studies in the Historiography of Eighteenth-Century Science, C.U.P., Cambridge, 1980, pp. 93-139; and D. Bloor: 'Klassifikation und Wissenssoziologie: Durkheirn und Mauss neu betrachtet', in N. Stehr and V. Meja (Hersg.): Wissenssoziologie-Studien und Materialen, Sonderheft 27 der Kainer Zeitschrift fUr Soziologie und Sozial-psychologie, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1980. An English version appears in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 13 (1932), no. 4, 267-297.