MIDDLEBURYCOllEGE

AUG 1 5 1997

S~ 1116

EditorGary BumsAssociate EditorWilliam L. SchurkAudio Review EditorGeorge H. LewisBook Review EditorTimothy E. ScheurerConference EditorPolly E. McLeanCurrent Bibliography EditorRobert Pruter

Discography EditorGeorge M. Plasketes

Film, Video, & Software Review EditorDavid Sanjek

Managing EditorPat Browne

Asst. Managing EditorBarbara Solosy

Editorial AssistantsJudy Amend

Kathy Rogers HokeKatharine Ross

Karen Wiechman

V-el. 20.2

THE FLOATING WORLD OF KARAOKE IN JAPANChristine Yano

SUBCULTURAL POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE:ALTERNATIVE MUSIC IN POSTCOMMUNIST HUNGARY

Anna SzemereAdvisory

Howard S. Becker, U of WashingtonChuck Berg, U of KansasRob Bowman, York UBarbara Bradby, Trinity College DublinRay B. Browne, Bowling Green State UB. Lee Cooper, U of Great FallsReebee Garofalo, U of MassachusettsAndrew Goodwin, U of San FranciscoJoe Gow, Alfred UJoyce Marie Jackson, Louisiana State UBrenda Johnson-Grau, StronR Sounding

Thought PressGeorge H. Lewis, U of the PacificGeorge Lipsitz, U of California, San DiegoPolly E. McLean, U of ColoradoDeborah Pacini Hernandez, U of FloridaRichard A. Peterson, Vanderbilt U

Editors

David Pichaske, Southwest State UGeorge M. Plasketes, Auburn U

Robert Pruter, Standard Educational Corp,Robin Roberts, Louisiana State U

Jerome Rodnitzky, U of Texas at ArlingtonWilliam D. Romanowski, Calvin College

David Sanjek, 8MI ArchivesRobert Santelli, Rock and Roll Hall

of Fame and MuseumTimothy E. Scheurer, Franklin U

Marsha Siefert, Central European URobynn J. Stilwell, U of Southampton

Cecelia Tichi, Vanderbilt URobert Walser, U of California, Los Angeles

Mel van Elteren, Tilburg UAlan Wells, Temple U

ROCK SONGS AS MESSAGES: ISSUES OF HEALTHAND LIFESTYLE IN CENTRAL AUSTRALIANABORIGINAL COMMUNITIES

Peter Dunbar-Hall

THE GHOST OF HiSTORYBRUCE SPRI~~GSTEEN,WOODY GUTHRIE,AND THE HURT SONG

Bryan Garman

GENDER OR GENRE? EMOTION MODELSIN COMMERCIAL RAP AND COUNTRY MUSIC

John Ryan, Legare H. Calhoun III,and William M. Wentworth

Popular Music and Society is published quarterly. Manuscripts that deal with all kinds ofrescarch in the area of music arc invited. There are no limits on musical genres. Address articles toGary Bums, Departmcnt of Communication, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115 USA.For each manuscript, fom blind copies should be submitted, with author identified only on adctachable title page. Manuscripts must be double-spaced, carry notes at the end, follow MLAHandbook for style, and include a stamped return business envelope. If the manuscript is accepted,thc author must provide a diskette. Book reviews should be sent to Timothy E. Scheurer, HumanitiesProgram, Franklin Univcrsity, Columbus, OH 43215; audio revicws to George H. Lewis, SociologyDepartmcnt, Univcrsity of the Pacific, Stockton, CA 95211; film, video, and software reviews toDavid Sanjek, BMI Archives, 320 W. 57th St., New York, NY 10019; discographies to Gcorge M.Plasketes, Communication, Auburn University, Auburn Univcrsity, AL 36849.

Subscriptions should be sent to Popular Music and Society, Bowling Green State University:opular Press, Bowling G:een, OH 43403. Individual subscriptions are $25.00 pcr year;inStitutIOnal, $30.00 per year. SUbscriptions outside the Unitcd States must include an additional$4,00 per year for postagc. Publication of articles is limited to subscribers.

':Pev' lnlde;~~ iCn~RSC !ournal (Current Bibliography), Arts and Humanities Citation Index, Book'~<~, ./ew nu=, hzldren s Book Review Ide '. Ab C• '" 0 k'" 'h . . n ex, ommUlllcatlOn stracts, urrent Contents, Indexo "evzews In t e Humallltles M . I d ' RIL .

,.'. . uS/c n ex, M Abstracts, Suge Family Studies Abstracts.I1tc:>1997 by BOWling Gre S U· ,

.~f; en tatc nlverslty Popular Press.

A GENERIC APPROACH TO ROCK FILMJon Radwan

MUSIC VIDEO CARTEL: A SURVEY OF ANTI-COMPETITIVEPRACTICES BY MTV AND MAJOR RECORD COMPANIES

Jack Banks

REVIEW ESSAYSB, Lee Cooper

PopThe Wonder Team

The True Story of theIncomparable 1927New York Yankees

Leo Trachtenberg

Go! Fight! Win!Cheerleading in

American CultureKathleen Cregory Klein,

editor

Chocolate,Strawberry,and Vanilla

A History ofAmerican Ice Cream

Anne Cooper Funderburg

Music Video Cartel:A Survey of Anti-Competitive Practicesby MTV and Major Record Companies

A chronicle of the year the New YorkYankees became the Wonder Team ofRuth, Gehrig, and the other greatballplayers. Includes participants' back-grounds, personalities, skills, records,hijinks on and off the field, how playerswere viewed by fans and the press, howcareers flourished and culminated in the1927 World Series.

678-4 $13.95 paper • 677-6 $29.95 cloth

MTV has become an immensely influential force in U.S. popularmusic. Major record companies consider MTV an essential form of pro-motion, relying on MTV to play their artists' music clips. Artists featuredon the channel receive national publicity that draws people's attention totheir music and often boosts sales of the act's compact discs and cas-settes. The channel's programming of music clips, concerts, and offbeatshows like the animated Beavis and Butt-head attracts a young audiencebetween 12 and 34 years old who are major consumers of recordedmusic. MTV is a service of MTV Networks (MTVN), owner of the othermusic channel VH1 in the U.S. and several regional versions includingMTV Europe and MTV Latino. MTVN is itself a subsidiary of Viacom,a growing media giant with extensive holdings in cable and broadcasttelevision, and now theatrical film, having recently acquired ParamountCommunications. MTV Networks' pervasive influence over music oncable television and its prominent role within popular culture raise ques-tions about its degree of monopolistic control in the music video fieldand its collusion with record companies that are explored using a politi-cal economic approach.

A detailed overview of the metamorpho-sis of cheerleading: the changingpatterns of social class, age, race, andgender of participants; the relation ofmass media entertainment and advertis-ing; the evolution of its style and content;and the meanings, values, and symbolismassociated with cheerleading in Americanculture.

680-6 $14.95 paper· 679-2 $29.95 cloth

Howa borrowed European elite consum-able evolved through entrepreneurialismand demand in America into a democra-tized treat for all classes. Simultaneouslyreflects and reveals changes in socialcustoms, diet and nutrition, class distinc-tions, leisure activities, and everyday life.

692-x $18.95 paper· 691-1 $37.95 cloth

Trends in Media OwnershipA primary objective of political economic research is to depict cur-

rent trends in the ownership of the mass media and examine the potentialconsequences of these economic developments for democratic commu-nication within society. These studies often assess the horizontal integra-tion within a media market, which is a measure of ownership concentra-tion in a particular medium. Murdock and Golding (213) explain that

Bowling Green State UniversityBowling Green~OR 43403to order: 1·800.515.5118

this integration takes place "where firms acquire additional units at thesame level of production."

Studies often report increasing concentration of media ownership.Gomery (55) reiterates the contention of media critics who claim, "Themajor film, newspaper and television companies number so few thattheir power is concentrated in the hands of a small number of owners."Bagdikian says that by 1992, twenty corporations owned the majority ofall major U.S. media (ix-x), a dramatic drop from fifty firms in 1981. By1992, a majority interest was held by eleven corporations in daily news-papers, two firms in magazine publishing, three in commercial televi-sion, four in theatrical film, and five in book publishing. Media concen-tration has greatly intensified over time: 80% of daily newspapers in theU.S. were independently owned in the late 1940s, but by 1989 this samepercentage of papers was now owned by large chains like Gannett.

Concentration of media ownership is criticized for curtailing free-dom of expression because this centralized control suppresses the pre-sentation of a broad marketplace of ideas within society. Bagdikianargues that small, independent media outlets that historically have pre-sented a robust range of political, social, and cultural views andenhanced diversity within the media gradually have been acquired orundermined by huge conglomerates. He derides these corporations as "anew Private Ministry of Information and Culture" that as a group tendsto present similar, homogenized views and ideas in their media outlets,omitting alternative perspectives (xxviii). Critical theorists contend thatcentralized media ownership represents increasing control by the capital-ist class of the means of ideological production in society (Garnham).

Vertical integration is another trend, which Gomery defines as "theexpansion of a business enterprise in gaining control of operations fromthe acquisition of fundamental raw materials through the sale of the finalproduct" (48). According to a Federal Communications Commissionreport, "vertical integration exists when an exchange that might haveoccurred by market transaction in a buyer/seller setting is handledadministratively within a single 'firm'" (54). In media industries, thisintegration occurs when a single company controls more than one stagein the production, distribution, and exhibition of a cultural product suchas a film or record. Vertical integration can take place through directownership when a company owns subsidiaries at different stages orthrough a contractual agreement between companies with interests at

various levels of production, such as affiliation contracts between cableoperators and program services.

Vertical integration is sought in part because it provides a companywith market control through guaranteed distribution and exhibition of aproduct. Such integration is criticized because of the potential for anti-competitive practices. A firm with operations at different stages of pro-duction can take actions to undermine its competitors and enhance itsdominance in a particular market. For example, a parent companyowning cable systems and program services can exclude competing ser-vices from access to its own systems and provide its own programmingwith the most desirable channel positions. Vertical integration in cultureindustries may also restrict freedom of expression and inhibit diversity inthe media because integrated companies have an incentive to exhibittheir own productions while excluding creative works by others. Forinstance, a major film studio that owns a theater chain may feature itsown films at its theaters at the expense of productions by independentfilmmakers that remain ignored.

This study iTlvestigates the extent to '\vhich these established trendsin media ownership are evident in the emerging market for music video.To what degree is the music video business horizontally integrated at thelevels of production, distribution, and exhibition? Of crucial importancehere is the major record companies' control of music video productionand MTV Networks' dominance in exhibition media for music clips.Vertical integration at the various stages of the music video industry isassessed, as well as whether companies took advantage of this integra-tion by engaging in anticompetitive practices. The cooperation betweenmajor record labels and MTV that created a form of vertical integrationthrough contractual agreement is examined, along with plans by thelabels to create their own programming, which would establish moredirect integration. Paramount in this survey of trends is an analysis ofwhether these economic developments have diminished the potential fordiversity and freedom of artistic expression in music video.

MTV Exclusivity Agreements with Record CompaniesMTV's premiere in 1981 prompted growing public interest in music

video and was considered partially responsible for sparking a resurgencein the mid-1980s of the record business, which had recently undergone aprolonged recession. MTV's play of provocative, playful videos by a

range of artists like Cyndi Lauper, Culture Club, Duran Duran, andMadonna helped create an audience for their music. The channel's dis-tinctive, frenetic style of rapid cuts, swirling visual images, and pulsingrock beat filtered into much of conventional television as well as beingimitated in commercials and shows like Miami Vice. As the popularity ofmusic video and MTV grew, several other television shows emerged thatfeatured music clips, such as NBC's Friday Night Videos. Other compa-nies planned to launch full-fledged cable music channels like the CableMusic Channel (CMC), owned by Turner Broadcasting; Hit Video USA,from Wodlinger Broadcasting; the Discovery Music Network (DMN),proposed by the founders of the Financial News Network; and the Box,partially owned by Newhouse Broadcasting. Other cable channels fea-tured certain genres of music-for example, Black EntertainmentTelevision's (BET) focus on black artists and The Nashville Network's(TNN) emphasis on country music. Music on cable became increasinglypervasIve.

MTV responded to this burgeoning diversity of music programmingby adopting anticompetitive policies to undermine these new servicesand to regain monopoly control over the market for music video pro-gramming. MTV's systematic plans to exert dominance over this fieldare examined in this study. MTV's primary means to achieve this controlwere through contractual agreements with the producers of music clips(the major record companies) and with the cable companies that presentthe programming on their systems. This survey of MTV's policies illus-trates the tendency of media companies to seek forms of vertical integra-tion between production, distribution, and exhibition of media programsto maintain control over a particular media market and undermine possi-ble competition, suppressing the diversity of available program content.

As several potential competitors to MTV emerged, MTV executivesworried about protecting the channel's dominance in the market forvideo music programming. In a confidential memo written in 1983,MTV executive Bob Pittman proposed a corporate strategy designed toundermine competing video music services and to consolidate MTV'smonopolistic control. In his memo, Pittman depicted MTV as a productdistributor serving as the intermediary between a producer (the recordcompanies) and a retailer (the cable systems). He explained that "the tra-ditional solution for the distributor to protect his business is to lock upthe shelf space and/ or lock up the supply of the product" (Dannen,

"MTV's Great" 47). Pittman planned to do both by encouraging cableoperators to carry only MTV's music service and by negotiating con-tracts with record companies giving MTV exclusive rights to the mostpopular music videos, denying these to MTV's competitors.

MTV sought these exclusive rights during negotiations with recordcompanies about proposed license fees for videos (Denisoff, Inside MTV150-58). In June 1984, MTV announced that it had reached agreementswith four major record companies: CBS, RCA, MCA, and Geffen(Seideman, "Four Labels Ink"; Terry, "MTV Claims"). Additional agree-ments were signed soon thereafter with Warner, Atlantic, Asylum,Polygram, and Capitol Records (Goodman; Sippel). Viera reports thatMTV's objective was to sign these contracts with record labels that pro-vided 70% of its programming.

MTV provided limited information about the agreements in officialcorporate documents. In a 1984 stock prospectus, MTV estimated itwould pay $4,575,000 for the year for exclusive access to some clipsfrom the original four companies signed to exclusivity agreements, anamount likely doubled by later agreements (Terry, "Pittman Sez"). InMTV Networks' 1984 (4) Form lO-K to the Securities and ExchangeCommission (SEC), MTV said the agreements would "assure MTV thatthe videos are not available for any other television exhibition earlierthan their availability to MTV and provide some videos for exclusiveperiods on MTY." MTV Networks acknowledged having agreementswith eight record companies in 1985, but in later years refused to dis-close the number of agreements (Viacom International, Inc. 1985 and1987 Form 10-K). Viacom, which purchased MTV Networks in 1985,revealed in its 1991 Form lO-K that certain contract provisions extendedto MTV's sister services VHl, MTV Europe, and Nickelodeon (Viacom,Inc.).

Trade journals reported more specific information about theseagreements. According to Billboard, CBS, which produced about 200video clips a year, received $8 million from MTV over a two-yearperiod, fully covering CBS's expenses for video clip production(Seideman, "Four Labels Ink"). The CBS Records agreement was typi-cal of the other labels' contracts (Terry, "MTV's Exclusivity"). Underthe CBS deal, MTV could choose 20% of the company's annual videoclip production for its exclusive use. CBS had the right to place another10% of its own videos on MTV's playlist in either light or medium rota-

tion. These percentages were standard provisions of the contracts. Themutually beneficial arrangement allowed MTV to pick video clips fea-turing hit singles and major recording stars for its exclusive use thatwould likely increase its ratings, while record companies could get guar-anteed exposure for their new artists who might not otherwise receiveairplay.

MTV usually has exclusive use of clips for at least 30 days, and, insome cases, from six months to one year. These videos cannot be airedon competing music video networks for six months to a year after pre-miere on MTY. The longer exclusivity periods applied to services thatprogrammed more than 12 hours of music videos each day, includingmany of MTV's potential competitors, such as Discovery MusicNetwork, Cable Music Channel, and Hit Video USA. This provisionraised charges that MTV's objective in these agreements was not simplyto reserve popular videos for itself but to undermine any direct competi-tion.

The record companies' ability to grant MTV exclusive access tovideos was limited in some instances by the labels' contracts with theirartists. The labels could not control video clips by artists whose contractsgrant them ownership rights to their video clips. However, Billboardnoted that artists who own their own clips were under "considerablepressure" from their labels to grant MTV exclusivity (Seideman, "FourLabels Ink"). Major stars such as Bruce Springsteen, the Rolling Stones,and Madonna insisted that the period of MTV exclusivity for theirvideos be limited to 30 days.

Vertical Integration Between MTV and Record LabelsMTV and the record labels publicly acknowledged that a primary

objective of these accords was to jointly control the emerging distribu-tion system for clips. These agreements created a degree of vertical inte-gration through contractual agreement by forging links between the pro-duction of clips (commissioned by labels) and the distribution of clipsthrough exposure media (MTV). The integration let the labels and MTVdecide the primary means of distribution for about 30% of the video clipproduction by the record companies. This 30% portion was especiallyimportant because it included the clips featuring recording artists consid-ered to be most popular (MTV's 20%) and most promising (the labels'10%). The contracts allowed the labels and MTV to provide exposure

for any label's video clip that they wanted without any say from thepublic. These companies wanted to establish an integrated system thatclearly avoided the laissez-faire distribution system, developed earlier inthe music business, in which commercial radio and record labels wererelatively independent from each other. Bob Pittman said that MTVwanted to make sure music video did not repeat the patterns of distribu-tion of that market, which had no clear mechanism to provide guaranteedairplay of the labels' product (Seideman, "MTV Plan"). The labelsdepend upon radio for exposure, but radio would not always play newartists' material unless it suited radio's own separate interests, whichhinged upon presenting music that would increase audience ratings.

These contracts were a way record companies could get exposurefor their artists while also insuring the stability and strength of MTV.The contract provisions requiring MTV to play certain videos selectedby the labels led Peter Hall of the Village Voice to question whetherMTV would become "Monopoly TV, a powerful promotional tool that iscontractually obligated to roll whatever product the [labels'] A&Rdepa-rtments favor, regardless of whether the audience agrees" (48).

These agreements created a formal structure for a type of "payola"arrangement in which media outlets agreed to play certain artistsrequested by the record companies in exchange for certain favors, muchlike illegal payola in radio. Underground payola was common in the1950s, when labels would covertly pay radio station disc jockeys a sumof money or goods or services to play records of new artists that thelabel wanted to promote. Such covert transactions were condemned andultimately prohibited by Congress in its adoption of Section 508 of the1934 Communications Act (Kahn).

Although payola schemes in radio were outlawed following highlypublicized scandals in the 1950s, critics allege that the major and inde-pendent record labels remain involved in illegal payola to get commer-cial radio stations to play their artists. Fredric Dannen's Hit Men:Power Brokers and Fast Money Inside the Music Business provides ascathing indictment of the industry, claiming that the major record com-panies rely on a group of unscrupulous and criminal independent pro-moters. Dannen claims a loose confederation of large promoters called"The Network" colluded to divide the nation into geographic areas witheach organization granted an exclusive franchise for a certain area(Dannen; Byron). The major labels paid these promoters more than $10

million a year to get exposure for their artists on radio. To achieve thisgoal these illicit promoters allegedly bribed radio station program direc-tors and executives with cash, prostitutes, and cocaine and other drugsto play specific new releases by record label artists. Although the majorrecord labels proclaimed their innocence and ignorance of illegal activ-ity by promoters, Dannen claims that they benefited by getting invalu-able exposure for their artists and shutting out smaller independentrecord companies unable to afford the large fees of these promoters,thus consolidating the majors' hold over the industry.

With the increasing popularity of music video in the 1980s, therecord labels wanted to develop a legitimate and legal form of "payola"with MTV to give the labels guaranteed access for their videos. Thelabels and MTV came to adopt a practice whereby MTV played specificclips requested by the labels in exchange for the benefits of exclusiveplay of other clips that would, MTV hoped, boost the video network'sratings and increase advertising revenues (not to mention preclude directcompetition). The labels and MTV could formally adopt such payola-like agreements because the Communications Act's Section 508 onlyapplied to broadcast outlets and not to cable, a prime example of unevenregulatory policies. Radio and television broadcasting outlets arerequired by government regulation to operate in the public interest,which, as defined by the Communications Act, precluded this kind ofcollusion with record companies. This was clearly demonstrated whenRichard Benjamin, producer of NBC's Friday Night Videos, stated thathis show could not sign MTV-like exclusivity agreements because theFCC would consider such deals payola and NBC affiliates would be indanger of losing their licenses (Denisoff, Inside MTV 157). The cableindustry's relatively unregulated status allowed the music network tomake these more structured arrangements with the record companies.

The cooperation between MTV and the major record labels encour-ages a top-down popular culture in which companies controlling the pro-duction, distribution, and exhibition of music clips collaborate to shapeand direct popular tastes in music in a manner that promotes their ownrespective economic interests. Through its collusion, MTV plays videosthat promote major label artists and cultivate audience interest in thestyles and genres of music primarily distributed by these record compa-nies. In this sweetheart deal, considering the preferences and wishes ofthe public becomes less important than the project of shaping demand

for cultural products in ways intended by the major labels and theirparent conglomerates.

Moreover, this collusion squeezes out alternative styles of musicand recording artists since most of the exclusivity pacts were with majorrecord labels that focus on conventional, mainstream music. Smaller,independent record labels that cultivate and nurture new, offbeat musicstyles and acts are largely ignored. On occasion, MTV will play videoclips by artists affiliated with independents. MTV's play of a music clipfor the band Offspring, signed to the independent label Epitaph, was anotable exception to its "majors only" policy, which led to their album'scommercial success. However, representatives of independent labels saythat in general MTV rarely plays their videos (Zimmerman; Buckley andNewman).

The pacts between MTV and the record labels were consistent withthe historical attempts of companies in cultural production to becomevertically integrated to assure their products' guaranteed access to majorexhibition outlets. In the 1920s and 1930s, major film studios boughttheaters for guaranteed exhibition of their films. While Hollywood pro-duction companies were forced to divest their theater holdings in theParamount decree in 1948, these companies restored large-scale verticalintegration in the 1980s by acquisition of theater chains and alternativeoutlets for distribution such as television stations and cable systems.Television producers similarly enter into long-term contracts with com-mercial networks in order to ensure exhibition of their shows. Recordcompany integration with programming services extends this establishedcorporate practice. The record companies were prone to adopt strategiessimilar to those in related media sectors given that the labels' parentcompanies were entertainment conglomerates with holdings in theseother culture industries with long traditions of vertical integration.

Reaction of Television Shows to ContractsMTV's competitors criticized the exclusivity pacts as an attempt by

the channel to strengthen its monopoly over video music exposuremedia. David Benjamin, producer of NBC's Friday Night Videos,claimed that "MTV wants to end competition .... [It] wants to own rockand roll" (Denisoff, Inside MTV 155). "MTV is cutting us and all othermusic programs off from the superstars," said Dain Eric, program direc-tor for the ill-fated Discovery Music Network, "and that makes it very

182 Popular Music and Society

hard to compete" (Spillman 105). Mike Green, general manager of theregional Video Music Channel, added that the pact "smacks of restraintof trade" and was an attack on all long-form program services competingwith MTV.

Video music program services took several actions in response tothe exclusivity pacts. The shows were forced to alter their programmingto compensate for the loss of the exclusive videos. For example,WTBS's defunct Night Tracks decided to play videos of songs rankedlower on the record charts that were still available to all services. BETmade a much more aggressive response. In August 1986, it announcedplans to ban all videos by certain record labels in retaliation for exclu-sives granted to MTV for videos by popular black artists (George andDupler). BET's action was prompted by MTV exclusivity on then-cur-rent video clips by Profile's Run-D.M.C. and A&M's Janet Jackson.BET protested the 30-day exclusive period on these clips by immedi-ately dropping all videos by Profile artists and threatening to do the samefor A&M artists. BET took action once again in the spring of 1991 whenit dropped all Columbia label artists from its channel for two weeks inreprisal for MTV's exclusive of C&C Music Factory's video "ThingsThat Make You Go Hmm." The following summer BET boycotted MCARecords for 12 days over an MTV exclusive for a Heavy D & the Boysvideo (Newman and McAdams). BET's goal was to break MTV's lockon videos. "We will not tolerate their use of monopoly power," saidBET's president, Robert Johnson (Shiver Fl). Each of these boycotts,threatened or carried out, was called off when the respective label agreedto consider BET's needs for videos by black artists featured on the chan-nel.

The Box's Les Garland has complained about contracts that denythe channel certain videos for up to six months. He argues that thesecontracts are not fair to the Box because his network nurtures and devel-ops new acts by playing their videos while they are still unknown(Garland). But once these acts gain a wider audience as a result of theBox's efforts, MTV decides to use its arrangement with the record com-panies to take future videos by these artists exclusively.

Garland raises the disturbing possibility that MTV's true goal is tocreate a "monopoly" over music video by combining these record labelpacts with an ambitious plan for expansion. MTV sought to expand tothree separate channels in the U.S. by the end of 1994: the original MTV

Music Video Cartel 183

and two new channels each featuring a specific genre of music, onechannel rumored to play black urban videos (Lippman; "MTVAnnounces"; "Freston May"). Garland claims that these three channelsalong with VH1's adult contemporary format, would give MTVNetv.:0:ks an.impressive degree of control over music video presented onteleVISIon.Smce MTV gets exclusive rights to major label videos, MTVwou~d be in the position to extend its "monopoly" over a wider range ofmUSICpresented on television and determine what acts get extensiveplay. Current videos by popular artists of any popular music genre mightonly be seen on an MTV channel, enhancing MTVN's role as a culturalg~tekeeper. Aspiring artists might also find it difficult to get played inthISbrave new MTV-world of choices, since the original MTV and VH1both tend to ignore new artists in favor of familiar faces and establishedhit songs. For these artists, Garland suggests, the MTV "monopoly" maybecome a "roadblock." Although MTV delayed its plans to split intothree channels because cable systems did not have the room for addi-tional services, the company may return to this plan in the future as morec:.\l<:tPn1C C'rT'o-Jotl"'l' ""'''"pand .-1-. :_ 1-....., 1 ·t~J UWH'U 6'~U"J '-'A 1 LllCU cuanne capacI y.

The severe decline in video clip shows in the late 1980s vindicatedcritics' predictions that the exclusivity contracts would contribute tost~engthened MTV dominance of the market for video music program-mm~. The pacts' most devastating impact was upon full-fledged videomUSICprogram services that planned to compete directly with MTV. TedTurner's Cable Music Channel only lasted about a month and eventuallywas absorbed within MTV Networks, despite Turner's condemnation ofthe gratuitous sex and violence depicted in music clips shown on MTV(Denisoff, "Ted Turner's"). The acquisition helped MTV Networksbecome even more firmly entrenched as the unchallenaed leader ofnational video music programming and facilitated the ex;ansion of thecompany's 0tt:erings through VHl. Other major challengers also disap-peared: the DIscovery Music Network never premiered, and Hit VideoUSA ceased operation by 1990.

Antitrust Action Against MTVN, Inc.!he exclusivity contracts as well as other alleged monopolistic

~rach~es ?y MTV have been subject to numerous legal challenges andmveStlgatlOn~ that examined whether MTV violated applicable antitrustlaws. The fust such challenge was mounted by Discovery Music

184 Popular Music and Society

Network, which filed a federal lawsuit in 1984 (Girard). DMN's repre-sentatives argued that MTV arranged the exclusivity deals to stop directcompetition from Discovery or any other long-form music service, thusprotecting MTV's monopoly. Discovery accused MTV of "pernicio~s,predatory and anti-competitive" activities that restrained trade by trylllgto prevent DMN and others from access to current clips released bymajor record companies (Hedegaard 61). The Discovery suit chargedthat "music video clips involving major recording superstars from themusic industry will not be available to plaintiff and other competito~s"during the six-month period MTV gets exclusive rights to the clIps(Girard 110). Discovery claimed it would be unable to run a successfulprogram service without these current music videos. . . .

Discovery charged that MTV took advantage of Its establIshed pOSI-tion in the music programming field and of its influence with recordlabels to undermine any competitors. Eric said DMN filed suit because"we felt that MTV was trying to lock out any full-time competition ....MTV saw full-time competition coming, and they wanted to preventthat" (Potts Cl). MTV a.T1d Discovery agreed to an out-of-court settle-ment in January 1988 in which MTV paid what it described as a "nomi-nal fee" to Discovery, but the contracts were not affected (Dupler,"Settlement").

Wodlinger Broadcasting, owner of another full-fledged competitor,Hit Video USA and local Houston outlet TV5, filed a second antitrustsuit against MTV and its parent company at the time, Warner Amex, in1985 seeking $205 million in damages for economic harm caused byMTV's monopolistic practices (Denisoff, "Wodlinger"; Guterman). TheWodlinger action reiterated the central charge of the Discovery suit,claiming that MTV's exclusivity contracts with record labels constitutedunlawful restraint of trade prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Actsas well as Texas antitrust laws. The suit charged that the pacts "denycompetitors access to vital, unique, and otherwise unavailable materials,namely the choicest music video clips of most major record companies"(Dupler, "Settlement" 71). The suit also charged that MTV negotiatedcontracts with cable operators that discouraged access for competitors byincluding "tie-in" provisions stating that if a cable company wished toadd a second music service, the new service had to be MTV's VHl.Warner Amex was accused of refusing to offer TV5 or Hit Video USAon its own cable systems in the Houston area and coercing other systems

to reject the services. MTV characterized the suit as "absolutely withoutmerit" (Guterman 16). The Wodlingers settled with MTV out of court inFebruary 1989, shortly before Hit Video was shut down (Benedict;Newman, "Hit Video").

The Wodlingers' allegations also prompted investigations by theFederal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal CommunicationsCommission (FCC). In March 1987, five U.S. Senators and a HoustonCongressman requested that the FTC investigate whether MTV usedillegal means to obstruct the Wodlingers' service ("U.S. Senators"). TheFTC complaint recycled the major charges developed in the Wodlingers'suit. The FCC's separate investigation was terminated in May 1987 "forlack of a basis to proceed further" (Dannen, "MTV's Great" 47). TheAntitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice also launched acivil investigation of MTV's exclusivity pacts in August 1984 to deter-mine whether MTV and the record labels had violated federal antitrustlaws (Potts). The Justice Department's preliminary action was termed an"informal inquiry" and never led to a suit against MTV and the labels.Moreover, none of these legal challenges and investigations had anyeffect on MTV's contracts with the record companies.

In 1991, all major record labels had exclusive contracts with MTVNetworks, Inc., except Virgin, Mercury, and PLG, with MTV makingtotal annual payments from $10to $15 million (Newman andMcAdams). By 1994, RCA and MCA discontinued their exclusiveagreements with MTV, but other labels including Island, Elektra,Atlantic, Virgin, and Geffen still had MTV-only videos. Some recordcompanies dropped the MTV contracts because of plans to launch theirown program service described below.

Label Payola Agreements with Other Music ProgramsMore recently, record companies have been making payola-like

deals with other music program services besides MTV to get guaranteedexposure for their artists. For instance, labels pay a fee between $550and $650 for each clip they want played on College Music Video, amonthly, three-hour program that features alternative and hip hop musicand which was seen on about 190 stations nationally in 1995. The presi-dent of the service, Robert Artura, openly admits that "the music mix isdictated by the labels who buy the time" (Russell 48). Record labelsespecially seek play on the Box channel because of its impressive suc-

186 Popular Music and Society

cess in establishing new artists like Mary J. Blige and R. Kelly. To makesure their artists are played, record companies take advantage of thechannel's pay-per-video system by flooding the Box's phone lines withrequests for current clips by these acts. The labels hire teams of callers torequest certain videos they want shown, a practice called "jackin' theBox" inside the industry. The more calls that the Box receives for a clip,the more likely it will be played, perhaps creating a buzz about the fea-tured artist. This is a very expensive promotional strategy, since each callto the 900 number charges $2 to $3 to the caller's phone bill (Roberts).

The practice is a form of payola since the revenues from these callsgo directly to the Box, so that in essence, record labels are paying theprogram service to play their videos. The Box is fully aware of therecord labels' actions and actually encourages the practice by sellingcards to label executives that allow a certain number of 900 numbercalls. The channel also offers special package deals through which thelabel pays a certain fee to receive guaranteed play of videos that it wantsshown during a two-week period, along with commercials for the label'slatest videos.

While this payola provides advantages for both the record labelsand the Box, the Box's viewers are shortchanged and deceived. The Boxpresents itself as a program service that lets its viewers select whatvideos are played through their calls. The slogan of the Box is "MusicTelevision You Control." Yet the collusion between the Box and recordlabels suggest that the amount of control viewers actually exert over thechannel is quite limited. Record labels are greatly. influencing the musicthat gets played on the channel-much as they do on other services likeMTY.

Music Video Cartel 187

labels developed plans to start their own global music video service thatwould directly challenge MTV (Jeffrey and Pride). The original backersfor this proposed channel were Time Warner, Sony, Polygram, and EMIMusic, companies that collectively supply 63% of the music videosshown on MTV (Landler).

The prototype for this operation was to be Viva, a cable music pro-gram service in Germany that began in December 1993 (Weinert). Fourmajor labels and Frank Otto, a businessman with holdings in Germanradio, are all equal partners in this venture. If Viva is successful, thelabels hope to expand the channel to other parts of Europe and Asia.Ultimately, if Viva's partners proceed with their plans to develop aglobal s~rvice, it will directly challenge MTV's empire. In early 1995,four major labels purchased one-half ownership of Star TV's music ser-vice Cha~nel V, available throughout Asia, which will compete withMTV ASIa and MTV Mandarin. These companies announced plans in1994 to compete with the original American MTV by launching a musicchannel in the U.S. With the addition of Bertelsmann Music Group, theGerman media conglomerate which owns ReA Records, to the consor-tium of major labels in June 1994, this new music service would bejointly owned by five record labels that together dominate the interna-tional recording industry, controlling 80% of the $11 billion globalmarket in 1994 (Landler; Jeffrey; "Bertelsmann").

The major labels have several possible reasons for announcingthese plans. Some see the disclosure of these ambitious ventures as athinly veiled threat to MTV to encourage the channel to be more compli-ant anli to yield to demands for better financial terms in their deals withthe network (Jeffrey and Pride). The labels want to be paid substantiallymore for rights to their videos, especially since MTV has become moresuccessful and profitable. The labels also may seek to become partowners to share in MTV's wealth and more directly shape its program-ming to promote their own acts. The record companies may believe thatthreats of a new global competitor would intimidate MTV and Viacominto considering these proposals.

The major labels also are considering global ventures because theyare dissatisfied with the current degree of vertical integration in the~usic video market. The MTV deals and other types of collusion pro-VIde the companies with certain integration through contractual agree-ment whereby MTV provides some guaranteed access for their produc-

Major Labels Create Their Own Music Video ChannelThe major labels' cooperative relationship with MTV in the past

decade clearly provided these record companies with a reliable nationalforum for hawking their artists' music. Indeed, MTV's emphasis on actssigned to major record companies is so extensive that many independentlabels deride MTV as a "major label only" channel that rarely playsvideos by their bands (Zimmerman 85). Yet, recently the majors indi-cated that they are unsatisfied with their current degree of control overmusic video programming and are taking various steps to own their ownmusic shows around the world. In early 1994, four of the six major

tions. Yet this type of integration is imperfect: MTV is not completelysubmissive to the labels' wishes and has certain economic interests thatdiverge from these companies. For instance, MTV's need for high audi-ence ratings to satisfy advertisers has led MTV to adopt policies thatweaken the record labels' promotional strategies to some extent. MTV'saudience ratings dropped severely in 1985 and stagnated for the rest ofthe decade, leading the channel to alter its programming to recaptureviewer interest. MTV moved away from Bob Pittman's original concep-tion of MTV as a nonnarrative, continuous flow of programming andtoward more conventional television programming with shows of certaindefined lengths. MTV presented more programs without video clips thatwere mutations of traditional television genres (such as news, sitcoms,talk shows, and game shows) that captured MTV's hip and irreverentstyle.

Television shows with a certain length and a structured beginning,middle, and end were also more attractive for advertising since theseprograms generally draw viewers for the entire length of the show. Incontrast, l'v1T\"s original programming, consisting of fu~ endless streamof video clips, encouraged viewer "grazing" habits, so that one wouldwatch a few video clips and then switch to another channel. As MTVcontinued to introduce new programs, the record companies worried thatit was decreasing the network's emphasis on music video and thusdiminishing the promotional value of the clips for the labels.

A tension also exists between program services like MTV andrecord labels concerning the choice of artists featured in music videos.This grows out of the companies' respective economic objectives. MTVneeds programming that will get high audience ratings to increase adver-tising revenues, whereas the record companies seek public exposure fortheir acts. The conflicting nature of these objectives is most pronouncedfor music videos by unknown and emerging artists. MTV is often reluc-tant to play videos by new artists because these clips are unlikely toimmediately attract a large audience. This aversion to new music createsa perennial predicament for the labels, which seek to provide their newartists with opportunities for exposure. The exclusivity pacts between therecord labels and MTV provide the record companies with a partialremedy for this lack of exposure, because MTV must play some videosby artists specified by the labels. Yet despite these contracts, the labelshave limited control over exposure media for video music. The contract

provisions only require MTV to playa limited number of videos selectedby the record companies, generally 10% of the label's annual videooutput. Further, MTV often provides relatively light airplay of theserequired videos. The lack of control may be the underlying reason whythe labels developed plans to launch their own music channels. Therethey could completely control the choice of videos presented and aSSurea program schedule that is dominated by music clips rather than non-video shows.

By creating their own worldwide music video channels, the labelsa~hieve .complete v.ertical integration through ownership, producing theVIdeo clIps and exhIbiting them on their own program service. This givesthe labels direct control to promote their acts however they wish, withoutthe autonomy of an independently owned service. The plan is somewhatanalogous to the Hollywood film studios' purchase of theater chains toshow their own films, and even more similar to the studios' abortedattempt to launch the pay-TV movie channel Premiere to provide ashowcase for their productions on cable. As with other instances of verti-ca! integratio!! in media industries, a label-o\vned video music channelraises the possibility of anti-competitive practices that may diminishdiversity in music. The Viva-like channel may only air the music videosof artists affiliated with these companies, excluding music by acts signedto other labels, especially independent record companies with limitedclout and resources.

Moreover, apprehension about free competition and diversity iseven more warranted because five of six major transnational recordlabels intended to cooperate on this global project. A global music chan-nel owned by these companies could also be consciously used to culti-vate and craft worldwide interest in their labels' acts, at the expense ofemerging musicians not fortunate enough to be signed to one of thesetransnational conglomerates. MTV's Torn Freston raises a disturbincrpossibility, suggesting that "you've got to wonder whether this is goin~to become the OPEC of the music industry" (although his self-servingcomment is rather hypocritical since MTV actively collaborated withthese companies in agreements blasted as equally anti-competitive)(Landler 38).

The potential for collusion among major record companiesprompted the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Justice Department to launcha preliminary investigation into the proposed venture in July 1994 to

determine whether the label-owned channel would lead to "anti-competi-tive practices in the music-video industry" (Robins 24). The JusticeDepartment wanted to know whether the record labels would use theircontrol over the supply of programming to undermine competitors,notably MTV (Patterson and Duff). MTV is worried that the labelsacting in unison might decide to either raise the license fees for rights totheir videos or just deny MTV access to the videos altogether.

The record companies pushed back the launch of the channel to1995, attributing the delay to the government probe and a lack of avail-able space on cable systems. Some executives had second thoughtsabout the project, dreading a protracted and expensive legal battle. Inearly 1995, the labels were enmeshed in an internal debate over the bestform of vertical integration to ensure guaranteed access for their videosand promotion for their artists: they may either go ahead with direct inte-gration through ownership by having their own channel that can focuson their own artists, or the labels may abandon the project and return to aform of collusion with MTV, working out some deal to get their artistsfeatured proIT'jnently on a regular basis. In the U.S., the labels seem to

MTV instituted license fees, the company negotiated franchise agree-ments with cable operators offering discount rates for long term commit-ments to their service (Denisoff, Inside MTV 181). Pittman establishedmultiyear contracts with large cable system operators like TCI and ATCbecause he predicted that MTV would "be most vulnerable to competitionfrom new entrants over the next five years" (Dannen, "MTV's Great" 47).These contracts allegedly had provisions requiring cable companies tooffer MTV Networks' VH1 if the operator wanted to offer a second musicvideo channel, making cable system access difficult for potential competi-tors. Constance Wodlinger claimed that these contracts prevented HitVideo USA "from doing business with 80% of the nation's cable systems"and forced the channel to shut down in 1990 (Dupler, "Hit Video" 80).

While MTV never confirmed the presence of this mandatory provi-sion, the contracts were widely acknowledged to offer VH1 free to cablesystems carrying MTY. This provided a strong incentive for the operatorto add this service over a competitor. This vigorous promotion of VH 1 infranchise agreements was perceived as a direct attempt to deny cableaccess to MTV's expected full-fledged competitors-Discovery, CMC,and Hit Video USA-all of which tried and failed to offer "adult con-temporary" music formats similar to that of VH1. As a result, MTV andVH1 are the only two full-fledged program services on many cable sys-tems playing clips of popular music.

Finally, MTV could always rely on its direct vertical integrationwith cable systems owned by its parent companies. Since its inception,MTV was a subsidiary of a media conglomerate that also owned cablesystems offering program services like MTV and VH 1 to their sub-scribers. This ownership of both programming and cable systems pro-vided MTV and VH1 with guaranteed access to the systems owned bythe parent firm. Within the cable industry, this cooperation between acompany's media "software" (programming) and "hardware" (distribu-tion system) is a common practice, as explained by Peter Falco, a mediaanalyst for Merrill Lynch: "It is clear ... that big cable system operatorsfrom Time on down to second-rung operators like Cable vision areincreasingly using their cable systems as preserves for programming ser-vices in which they have an interest" (Gay 3). This common ownershipallows the firm to give preferential treatment to its own programming onits systems while ignoring program channels not owned by the companyand which directly compete with its own offerings.

be moving toward the latter option. In July 1995 the companies decidedto drop plans for a music video channel in the U.S. However, most of theparticipants in the abandoned project, including Warner, EMI, andPolygram, may be developing alternate plans to launch a U.S. musicvideo network (Atwood). Polygram's joint ownership with MTV of itsAsia services in 1995 demonstrates that some record labels are still will-ing to collaborate with MTV Networks. Either way, the major labelswith or without MTV will be able to shape and direct the flow of musicon television to nurture audience interest in popular music however theywant, likely leaving smaller, independent record labels out in the cold.

MTV Attempts to Control Access to Cable SystemsMTV's monopolistic practices extended to attempts to control

access to cable systems. MTV sought to establish entrenched verticalintegration through contractual agreement "downstream" with cableoperators as well as "upstream" with record labels and artists in order toestablish its guaranteed access to all stages of production and distribu-tion of video music.

MTV's Pittman sought to lock up the "shelf space" for programmingon cable systems through contracts with cable companies. In 1984, when

MTV has always been affiliated with large cable multiple systemoperators (MSOs) throughout its history. From 1981 to 1985, MTV wasowned by Warner Amex Satellite Entertainment Company (WASEC),whose parent companies Warner Communications, Inc., and AmericanExpress also owned Warner Amex cable, which was the sixth largestMSO in 1984, with 1.2 million subscribers (Warner Communications,Inc.). This vertical integration provided MTV with an important base ofguaranteed subscribers during its fledgling years. From 1985 until thepresent, MTV has been owned by Viacorn and is the flagship servicewithin the subsidiary MTV Networks, Inc., which also owns VB1, MTVEurope, and Nickelodeon. The parent firm also owned cable systemsunder its division Viacom Cable Television, which was the 15th largestMSO in the U.S., with about 1,087,000 subscribers, at the end of 1991(Viacom, Inc.).

Viacom took advantage of its integration by carrying its numerousprogram services on its own cable systems, while ignoring competitors'offerings. In March 1991, Viacom had not put the Box on any of its 14cable systems, which appeared to be more than a coincidence(Newcomb). Viacom seemed to reserve its channel capacity for programservices like MTV, which it owned, excluding services like the Box withsimilar formats, no matter how intriguing, adventurous, or cutting-edgetheir programming might be. Viacom abandoned this type of verticalintegration by selling its cable systems to Tele-Communications, Inc.,(TCl), a major MSO, in 1995. Viacom will likely rely more heavily on apolicy of collusion through contractual agreement with major MSOs likeTCI to get guaranteed access for its programming. This strategy seemslikely given the increasing cooperation between Viacom and TCI on pro-posed joint ventures. In May 1994 Viacom's chief executive at the time,Frank Biondi, disclosed that the company was negotiating a series of dif-ferent links between the two companies ("Music Channel").

without these clips. In its dealings with multiple system operators, MTVuses its contracts as a weapon by stipulating provisions discouragingcable systems from carrying music shows not owned by MTV Networks.And despite numerous lawsuits and government inquiries, MTV's anti-competitive practices continue. These policies raise disturbing concernsabout the unrivaled degree of control MTV has over popular music pre-sented on cable television, because aspiring artists might be excludedfrom cable television altogether if they are not featured on an MTV pro-gram service. The major record labels benefited from these deals withMTV because they received guaranteed exposure for their acts on MTVthrough a legal form of payola. The labels' attempts to develop their ownmusic services to strengthen vertical integration shows that this cozyarrangement may be deteriorating. However, what seems certain is that,either separately or in collusion, the record companies and MTVNetworks will act as gatekeepers, largely deciding which musicians arefeatured on cable television-and which artists are excluded.

This article is an expanded version of a chapter from Jack Banks's bookMonopoly Television: MTV's Quest to Control the Music (Boulder, CO:Westview,1996).

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Jack Banks, School of Communication, University of Hartford, West Hartford,CT.

j<,

I

Speech Communication AssociationSan Diego, November 23-26, 1997

"Rock the Hegemony: Ideological Criticism of the Rock and Roll Hallof Fame Museum." Laura K. Hahn, Ohio State University.

"Rap Music as African American Cultural Expression: An Exploration ofEuropean American Youth Perceptions." Kory T. Wilcoxson, OhioUniversity; Mark P. Orbe, Indiana University Southeast; Carolyn L.K£hrrTIOn, Ohio University.

"Call-response in Selected Calypsos of Political Commentary from theRepublic of Trinidad and Tobago." Gail-Ann Greaves, Long IslandUniversity, Brooklyn.

"It's an Age Thing: A Comparison of High School and College Students'Perceptions of Rap Music." Kory T. Wilcoxson, Ohio University; MarkP. Orbe, Indiana University Southeast; Carolyn L. Karmon, OhioUniversity.

"Wo/men's Music." Stacy Holman Jones, California State University,Sacramento.

"Feminist Beginnings Among 'The Women of Country': A Theory ofDevelopmental Feminism." Julie A. Haynes, Penn State University.

"(W)Rap-around Text: Female Rap Artists Bridging the Gap BetweenDiscourses on Feminity and Adolescence." Elizabeth D. Walters,University of Texas Austin.