(1983) the Measurement and Meaning of Trust in Government

8/10/2019 (1983) the Measurement and Meaning of Trust in Government

1/15

Society for Political ethodology

The Measurement and Meaning of Trust in GovernmentAuthor(s): Stanley FeldmanSource: Political Methodology, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1983), pp. 341-354Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the Society for Political Methodology

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2/15

The

Measurement

and

Meaning

of

Trust

in

Government

Stanley

Feldman

Perhaps

the

most well documented

trend In

political

attitudes

over

the

past

20

years

has

been

the

sharp

increase

in

political

cynicism.

Research

in

the

1950s

and

early

1960s

found

Americans

loyal

and

highly

trusting

of

political

authorities

(Almond and

Verba,

1963;

Lane,

1965). Since

the

mid-1960s,

a

large

number of

studies

using

a

number of

different

indicators

have

shown

substantial

declines

in

political

trust,

confidence,

and

public

evaluations

of

both

political and nonpolitical Institutions and leaders (Miller,

1974a;

Hill

and

Luttbeg,

1980;

Ladd,

1976-77;

House and

Mason,

1975;

Wright,

1976).

Despite

the

large body

of

evi

dence

on

the

decline

of

political

trust,

major

questions

still

remain about

the

meaning,

causes,

and

consequences

of

the

observed

trends.

Although

the

significance

of these

trends

in

political

attitudes remains

unclear,

a

major

issue

that

needs

to be

addressed is

the

meaning

of

responses

to the

items used

to document

these trends.

A good example of the problems surrounding the meaning

of such

social and

political

indicators

is

the

popular

trust

in-government

scale that has

been

included in

a

long

series

of

SRC/CPS

National Election

surveys.

These

items

have

become

popular

measures

of

political

trust/cynicism

and

have

been

Included In

other

large-scale

surveys,

but

consid

erable

conflict has

developed

over

their

precise

meaning.

The

interpretation

issue

revolves around

the

problem

of

diffuse

support

(Easton,

1975):

general feelings

of

alle

giance

and

support

for

the

political regime.

Miller

(1974a,

1974b)

made the case most

strongly

for

interpreting

the

AUTHOR'S NOTE:

The

data used

in this

analysis

were

collected

by

the

Center for

Political

Studies

and

made available

by

the

Interuniversity

Consortium for Political

and Social

Research,

neither

of

which bears

any

responsibility

for

the

results

or

interpretations

reported

here.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/15

342

Political

Methodology

political

trust

items

as

measures

of

diffuse

support,

arguing

that mistrust

is in

large

part

a

consequence

of

fundamental

social and political conflict and has potentially significant

consequences

for

the

political

system.

Miller,

Goldenberg,

and

Erbring

(1979:79)

have

more

recently

argued

that

cynicism

reflects

general

dissatisfaction with

government

perfor

mance

and

may

be considered

a

'leading*

Indicator of

dif

fuse

support.

An

alternative

interpretation

is that

the

trust-in

government

items,

because of their

reference to the

govern

ment in

Washington

and

the

people

in

Washington,

tend

to

reflect attitudes toward the incumbent authorities rather

than

toward the

political

system

more

generally.

Citrin

(1974)

argued

for

the

latter

interpretation,

in

part

because

he

found that

expressions

of

cynicism

were

often

accompanied

by feelings

of

pride

in

the

political

system.

Muller

and

Jukam's

(1977)

data

from

a

German

survey

show

a

clear dis

tinction

between

attitudes

toward

political

incumbents

and

toward the

political

system.

They

argue

that

political

trust

is

more

related

to incumbent affect than to

system

support.

Most

recently, Muller, Jukam,

and

Seligson

(1982)

have

shown

that

the

political

trust

measure

does

not

relate

to

anti-system

behavior

in

the

way

that

a

measure

of

diffuse

political

support

should.

The

key

issue in this debate

is

the

seemingly

ambiguous

meaning

of

government

in

the

trust

items:

do

people

interpret

this to

mean

the

specific

leaders

in

power

at

the

time

or

the

more

established

governmental

institutions

from

which

long-term

legitimacy

derives

(Hill,

1981)?

One

data set

may

offer

some

answers

to

this

question.

In the 1978 National Election study, four new questions were

included with

the

five

trust-in-government questions.

Using

the

same

wording

as

the

do-what-is-right

and

few

big

interests

items

of

the

trust-in-government

scale,

two items

were

changed

to

refer to President

Carter

and the

Carter

administration,

while

two others

specify

the

U.S.

Congress.

(See

the

appendix

for the

wording

of these

questions.)

The

more

specific

referents

of

these

questions

make it

possible

to examine the

relationship

between

the

general

trust items

and trust in both the President and Congress, and thus to

gain

a

better

understanding

of

the

meaning

of trust

in

gov

ernment.

Two

problems

stand in

the

way

of

a

simple

Interpretation

of

the

relationships

among

the

three

sets

of

trust

items,

however.

First,

as

Abramson

and Finifter

(1981)

recognized

in their

analysis

of

these

data,

the

use

of

identical

ques

tion

wording

across

the

three

referents introduces

the

possibility

of

contamination

because of

common

methods



4/15

Stanley

Feldman

343

variance.

Thus,

a

correlation

between, say,

trust

in

govern

ment

and

trust

in

Congress

could reflect

the

covariance

gen

erated by people reacting to the common question wording.

Abramson and

Finifter's (1981)

analysis

of

these

items

showed

that

common

method

variance

is

a

potential

problem,

at least

for the

few-big-interests questions.

Even with

this

source

of

bias

recognized,

however,

Abramson and

Finifter

found

substantial

relationships

between

the

original

trust

measure

and

the

new

measures

of

trust in Carter

and

Congress.

Despite

their

awareness

of

the

question

wording

problem

and

their

careful

attempts

to

deal with

it,

their

methods

(examining

the

effects

of

dropping

items

from

scales

while

correcting

for

changes

in scale

reliability)

fall

short in

two

respects:

they

are

able to detect

only

quite

large

methods effects

and

they

cannot

accurately

estimate either

the

magnitude

of

those

effects

or

the true

correlations

among

the

trust

measures

with methods effects

removed.

In

addition,

any

analysis

that

attempts

to

estimate

unbiased

parameters

among

attitudinal constructs must take into

account both

systematic

and

random

error

components

in

the

measured

variables

(Blalock,

1968).

The second problem that must be dealt with before these

new

trust items

can

be

used

to

assess

the

meaning

of

the

trust-in-government

scale

is

the

causal

nature

of

the

observed

relationships.

Plausible theoretical

arguments

can

be

used to

defend

three different

interpretations

of

a

correlation between

the

general

trust

scale and trust in

Carter

or

Congress.

First,

as

Miller

(1979)

argues,

there

may

be

a

spillover

effect

in which

general

distrust of

political

authorities results

in

increasing

distrust

of

the

specific institutions of the government or the occupants of

those

institutions.

Alternatively,

the

direction

of

causal

influence

could

be

reversed,

with

generalized

distrust

of

political

authorities

being

a

consequence

of

distrust

of

the

President

and

Congress:

distrust of

the

major

political

institutions

and

incumbents

builds

up

and

leads

to

a

more

diffuse

sense

of

distrust

of

politics

and

the

political

system.

Another,

less

substantive,

interpretation

of this

causal flow is

that,

when

asked

about trust

in

government

or

the

people

in

Washington, people respond

on

the

basis

of

the

most

salient

features

of

the

national

government:

the

President

and

Congress.

Finally,

observed

correlations

among

the

several

trust

measures

could

simply

be

spurious.

Feelings

that

the

government

has

not

solved

important prob

lems

or

is

generally

unresponsive

to

people's

opinions

may

lead

to

distrust

of

various

aspects

of

the

government

simul

taneously.

Thus,

correlations

among

the three

measures

of

political

trust

do

not

necessarily

demonstrate

direct

causal

relationships

among

them.



5/15

344

Political

Methodology

In

this

paper,

I

estimate

more

precisely

the

relation

ships

between

the

general

trust

in

government

items and the

new

items

measuring

trust in

President Carter

and the

Con

gress.

Only

by

dealing

with the issues of

systematic

and

random measurement

error

and

the

structure

of causal

effects

can

the

new

trust

items

provide

useful information

for

understanding

the

meaning

and

significance

of

political

trust.

DATA AND METHODS

This

paper

uses

the

same 1978

CPS

National Election

Data employed

by

Abramson and Finifter (1981). As noted

earlier,

in

addition

to

the

standard five

trust

items,

four

new

items

were

included.

The

new

items

duplicate

the

word

ing

of

two

of

the

standard

items,

changing

the

referents

first

to

President Carter

and

the Carter

administration

and

then to the

Congress.

Because

the

other

three

trust

items

were

not

repeated

in

the

new

form,

they

will

not be

included

in this

analysis:

question wording

effects

cannot

be

estimated

with

a

single

item.

The

analysis

will

thus

consider the relationships among six trust items represent

ing

three

substantive

constructs (trust in

government,

Carter,

and

Congress)

and

two methods effects

(question

wording).

The

hypothesized

model

underlying

these six

items

is

shown

in

Figure

1.

In

this

model,

the measured

variables

are

enclosed in

rectangles

and

the

unobserved

constructs in

circles.

Variation in

each

item

may

result

from

three

dis

tinct

influences:

a

substantive factor

representing

the

specific

dimension

of

political

trust

(government, Carter,

and

Congress),

a

question wording

effect,

or a

random

error

term.

The

estimates

of

the

correlations

among

the three

trust factors

are

thus free of

the

effects of

both

system

atic and random

measurement

error.

In addition to

the

mea

surement model shown in

Figure

1,

six

exogenous

variables

were

included

in

the

analysis

as

predictors

of

the

three

trust

factors. This

was

done

both to

aid in

the

identifica

tion

of

the

model and to

provide

evidence

of discriminant

validity

among

the

three

estimated factors.

The six

vari

ables are:

respondents'

ratings

of the

job

performance

of

Carter and

Congress, approval

of

the

government's

handling

of

the

economy

and

the

respondents'

self-identIfied

most

important

problem,

an

index

of

government responsiveness,

and

party

identification.1

The

entire

model,

with

the

six

trust

indicators and

six

exogenous

variables,

was

estimated

using

LISREL

(Joreskog

and

Sorbom,

1978),

which

provides

fuI

I-Information,

maximum



6/15

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DOHATSEWIGOHATSEWIGOHATSEWIG

RIGHT--NTERESTS-IGHT-NTERESTS-IGHT-NTERESTS

GOVERNMENTOVERNMENTARTERARTERONGRESSONGRESS

?R.GHT^RESW

Figure.actortructurefheoliticalrusttems



7/15

346

Political

Methodology

likelihood

estimates for identified

models with

unobserved

constructs.

Two

means

are

provided

for

assessing

goodness

of-fit:

standard

errors

of

the

parameter

estimates

and

the

likelihood ratio

value.

The

standard

errors can

be used to

compute

t-values and

test each

parameter

for

statistical

significance.

In

large

samples,

the

likelihood ratio value

is

distributed

as

a

chi-square

distribution

and

provides

a

goodness-of-fit

test

for

the

entire

model.

In

contrast

to

most

inferential

statistics,

a

large chi-square

value indi

cates

that

the

model

does

not

fit

the

data.

One

drawback

of

this

test is

that the

likelihood

ratio

value

is

a

direct

function

of

sample

size,

making

it

unlikely

that

any

non

trivial model will

produce

a small

chi-square

value with a

data

set

from

a

large

sample.

In

this

case,

a

more

useful

strategy

is

to examine

the

chi-square

to

degrees

of

freedom

ratio. As

a

rough

guide,

ratios

of

under

five

are

consid

ered

evidence

of

good

fit

for

a

sample

of

the

size used

here.

RESULTS

Table 1 provides the LISREL estimate of the basic mea

surement

model

and

the

effects

of

the

six

exogenous

varia

bles

on

the

three trust constructs.

All

coefficients

have

been

standardized.

The

chi-square/degrees

of

freedom

ratio

is

3.58,

a

very

good

fit for

a

sample

size

of

over

2000.2

The

estimates

show,

first,

that

in

all

three

cases

the

two

items

are

equally

good

indicators of

political

trust.

On

the

other

hand,

in

all

six

cases

question

wording

effects

and

random

error

account

for

more

than

half

of

the

variance

in

the

indicator.

On

the

average,

the

underlying

trust

construct

determines

only

42

percent

of

the variance

in

these

indicators.

It

is

thus

clear

that

any

estimates

of

the

relationships

among

the

three trust

measures

will be

badly

biased

unless both

sources

of

error

variance

are

con

trol

led for.

As

Abramson

and Finifter

concluded,

the

impact

of

question wording

varies

significantly

across

the

items,

allowing

us

to

see

more

precisely

how each of

the

six

trust

items is

affected

by

response

to

question wording.

The

estimates show a substantial and consistent

question

word

ing

effect

for

the

few-big-interests questions.

These

large

effects

are

consistent

with

Abramson

and

Finifterfs

finding

of

response

set

effects

for

these items.

The three

do-what-is-right

items

are

not

completely

free of

question

wording

effects,

however. For two

forms of this

item,

the

government

and

Carter,

the

question

wording

effect

is

slight

and thus results

in

little

correlation

between

pairs



8/15

Stanley

Feldman

347

TABLE

1

PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF

THE POLITICAL

TRUST MODEL

A:

Estimates of

the

Measurement

Model

Trust Factors

Indicator

Government?

Do

what is

right

Government?

Few

big interests

Carter?Do

what is

right

Carter?Few

big

Interests

Congress?Do

what is

right

Congress^?Few

big interests

Govern

ment

.66

Wording

Factors

Do what

Few

big

Carter

Congress

is

right

Interests

Error

,63

.66

.65

.67

.68

.20

.21

.51

.42

.42

,52

.53

.41

.52

.40

.30

.26

Note:

All

coefficients

are

significant

at

the

.01 level.

B:

Impact

of

Exogenous

Variables

on

Trust Factor

_Exogenous

Variables_

Trust

Factor

Rating

Rating

of of

Carter

Congress

Economy

Government

.09**

.17** .16**

Carter

.48**

-.01

.06*

Congress

.06 .3.5** .12**

*

=

significant

at

the

.05

level.

**

=

significant

at

the .01

level.

chi-square

=64.5

degrees

of

freedom

=

18

chisquare/df

=

3.58

Most

Handling

Important

Prob

I m

Government

Party

.15**

.15**

.13**

Responsiveness

I

enti

f

icat

ion

.34**

-.05

.30**

.06*

.38**

-.04



9/15


10/15

Stanley

Feldman

349

both

trust

in

Carter

and trust

In

Congress.

The

newly

specified

model

was

estimated

with the

LISREL

program.

The

fit

of this

model

is somewhat

better

than

the

first, reflect

ing

the

elimination of

nonsignificant

causal

paths

between

the

exogenous

variables and the

three

trust

constructs

(chi

square/df

=

3.35).

The

estimates of

the

measurement

compo

nent

of

the

model

remained

virtually

unchanged.

The

esti

mates

for

the

three

trust constructs

are

(all

coefficients

are

significant

at

the

.05

level):

TRUST

IN

GOVERNMENT

=

.53TRUST IN

CONGRESS

+ .20TRUST IN CARTER + .11 GOVERNMENT

HANDLING

OF

ECONOMY

+

.09RESP0NSIVENESS

-.08PARTY

IDENTIFICATION

TRUST IN CARTER

=

.17TRUST IN GOVERNMENT

+.46RATING

OF

CARTER

+

.15M0ST

IMPORTANT

PROBLEM

+

.24RESP0NSIVENESS

+

.09PARTY

IDENTIFICATION

TRUST IN CONGRESS

=

.18TRUST

IN

GOVERNMENT

+

.31

RATING OF CONGRESS

+

.09G0VERNMENT

HANDLING OF ECONOMY

+

.13M0ST IMPORTANT

PROBLEM

+

.31

RESPONSIVENESS

Looking

first

at

the

determinants

of

trust

in

govern

ment,

we

see

that the

dominant influence

is

trust

in

Congress.

The

standardized coefficient

for this

construct

is

more

than

two and

a

half

times

larger

than

the

next

largest

coefficient,

for

trust

in Carter. With trust

in

Congress

and Carter

held

constant,

the

government's handling

of the

economy,

govern

ment

responsiveness,

and

party

identification have

only

marginal

effects

on

trust

in

government.

It

seems

clear,

then,

that

when

people

are

asked to

express

their level of

trust in

the

federal

government they

are

responding primarily

on

the

basis of

their

trust in

Congress.

Trust in Carter

and

Congress,

on

the other

hand,

are

only

somewhat

influenced

by

trust

in

government

more

gener

ally.

Although

there is

some

tendency

for

distrust

to



11/15

350

Political

Methodology

spill

over

from

the

government

to

the

institutions

of

government,

the

effect

is

not

nearly

as

pronounced

as

the

effect of trust in Congress on trust in government. Beyond

this,

the

determinants of

trust in Carter and

Congress

are

very

similar to the

previous

analysis.

Specifically,

trust

in

Carter

is

more

responsive

to

job performance

ratings

than is

trust

in

Congress

(.46

vs.

.31),

while

the

reverse

is

true

of the

impact

of

government

responsiveness

(.31

vs.

.24).

CONCLUSIONS

Although

this

analysis

cannot

answer

all the

questions

relevant

to

the

meaning

of

trust

in

government,

some

impor

tant conclusions

can

be drawn.

First,

the

analysis

has

shown

very

clearly

that

at least two of

the

items

(and

pre

sumably

all)

making

up

the

popular

trust-in-government

scale

are

contaminated

by

both

random and

systematic

(question

wording)

measurement

error.

Overall,

more

than half

of

the

variance

in the

items reflects

sources

of

error

rather

than

the

substantive

underlying

construct of

political

trust.

Second,

the effects of

question wording

are

quite

evident,

especially

for

the

few-big-interests

questions.

Thus,

for

this

question,

and

to

a

somewhat

lesser

extent the

do-what

is-right

items,

people's

responses

reflect not

only

their

feelings

of trust but

also

their

tendency

to

respond

in

consistent

ways

to

certain

types

of

questions.

As Abramson

and

Finifter (1981)

recognized,

this

is

clearly

a

problem

when the

referents

of

the

trust-in-government

scale

are

changed.

Some

of

the

observed

covariation

will

be

a

result

of methods variance rather than substantive relationships.

Third,

although question

wording

inflates

the

correla

tions

between

the

trust

constructs,

random

measurement

sig

nificantly

depresses

them. Estimated

correlations

among

the

three,

controlling

for both

sources

of

error,

are

very

large,

especially

between trust

in

government

and

trust

in

Congress.

These

correlations

suggest

that either members

of

the

public

do not

distinguish

clearly

between

the

gov

ernment,

the

incumbent

President,

and

the

Congress

in

their

feelings of trust or cynicism, or that the sources of mis

trust in

all

three

are

quite

similar.

Fourth,

estimates

from

a

nonrecursive

model

show that

the

dominant

causal

relationship

underlying

these

correla

tions is

the

effect

of

trust in

Congress

oni

trust

in

govern

ment.

The

other

three

causal

relationships

(trust

in

Carter

on

government,

and

trust in

government

on

the other

two),

while

statistically significant,

are

much

less

important

than the

first.

Thus,

when

people report

that

they



12/15

Stanley

Feldman

351

(mis)trust

the

government,

they

are

in

large

measure

saying

that

they

(mis)trust

Congress.

Finally,

there is also

some

evidence that trust in the President is based more on the

job

performance

of

the

incumbent,

while

trust

in

Congress

is

more

institutionally

based

(as

reflected

in

perceptions

of

responsiveness).

What does all

of

this

mean

for

the

interpretation

of

the

trust-in-government

scale?

Clearly,

the

key

finding

is

the

strong

causal

link

between trust

in

Congress

and

trust

in

government.

An

initial

question

asks

why

this relation

ship

is

so

much

stronger

than

that of

trust

in

Carter

on

trust

in

government.

One

plausible

answer

is

that both

the

government

and

Congress

are

understood

by

the

public

in

institutional

terms,

while

the

reference

to

President

Carter

is in

very

personal

terms.

Thus,

it

is

easier

to

separate

evaluations

of

the

President

from

the

institutions

of

the

government.

This still

leaves

the

problem

of how

to

inter

pret

the

impact

of

trust

in

Congress

on

trust

in

government.

On

the

one

hand,

this

may

indicate

the

operation

of

a

process

by

which

people develop

trust

(or

cynicism)

in

the

government

as a

whole

on

the

basis

of

their

evaluations

of the

perfor

mance of

specific

governmental

institutions (Miller, 1979).

However,

an

alternative

explanation

is

that,

when

asked

to

express

their trust

in

government,

people

respond

on

the

basis

of

particularly

salient

information,

in

this

case

on

the

basis

of

their

evaluation

of

Congress

(Hill,

1981).

This

linkage

may

be

created

in

large

part

by people's

eval

uations of

Congress

as an

institution.

Evidence

shows

that

people

clearly

distinguish

between

evaluations

of Con

gress

and evaluations

of

their

own

representative.

If

this

explanation is correct, it suggests that the trust-in

government

scale

may

not

be

measuring

actual

levels

of

support

for

the

political regime,

but

may

reflect

evalua

tions of

specific

governmental

institutions.

The

data

in

this

analysis

cannot

distinguish

between

these

two

explana

tions;

this should

be

a

primary

goal

of

future

research.

APPENDIX

The following are the six political trust

items

used

in

the

analysis

reported

here.

Trust in

government:

How

much

of

the time do

you

think

you

can

trust

the

government

in

Washington

to do what

is

right?just

about

always,

most

of

the

time,

or

only

some

of

the time?

Would

you

say

the

government

is

pretty

much

run

by

a

few

big

interests

looking

out

for

themselves

or

that

it is

run

for

the

benefit

of

a

I

I the

people?



13/15

352

Political

Methodology

Trust in Carter:

How much

of the

time

do

you

think

you

can

trust

President Carter to do what is right?just about always,

most of

the

time,

or

only

some

of

the

time?

Would

you

say

that

the

Carter administration is

pretty

much

run

by

a

few

big

interests

looking

out for

themselves

or

that

it

is

run

for the

benefit

of all

the

people?

Trust in

Congress:

How

much

of

the

time do

you

think

you

can

trust

the

U.S.

Congress

to do

what

is

right?just

about

always,

most

of the time, or only some of the time?

Would

you

say

that

the

U.S.

Congress

is

pretty

much

run

by

a

few

big

interests

looking

out for

themselves

or

that it is

run

for

the

benefit

of

all the

people?

NOTES

1.

Evaluations of

the

job

performance

of President

Carter

and

the

Congress

were

obtained

from

five-point

scales,

from

very

good

to

very

poor.

Approval

of

the

government's

handling

of the

economy

was constructed from

separate

ques

tions

dealing

with

unemployment

and inflation.

Those items

and

one

measuring

approval

of the

government's

handling

of

the

respondents'

most

important problem

had

response

alternatives

of

good

job, only

fair,

and

poor

job.

The

government

responsiveness

scale

was

constructed

from

three

items

asking

whether

the

government

pays

attention

to

what

people

think;

whether

parties

make

the

government

listen;

and whether elections make

the

government

listen.

High scores indicate high trust, approval of government

performance,

government

responsiveness,

and Democratic

party

identification.

2. To

minimize

the

problem

of

shrinking sample

size,

pairwise

deletion of

missing

values

was

employed

in

the

calculation

of the

correlation

matrix.

There

were

only

minor differences

between this matrix and

one

based

on

listwise

deletion of

missing

values.

3.

It

is

possible

that the

two

question wording

fac

tors

also

tap

a more

general

level

of

political

trust in

addition to methods

variance.

Two

pieces

of

evidence

sug

gest

that

this is

unlikely.

First,

there

is

virtually

no

correlation

between

the

two factors.

Second,

there

is

no

indication

that the

exogenous

variables

have

any

effect

on

the

do-what-is-right

factor,

while

they

may

have

a

slight

impact

on

the

few-big-interests

factor.

This line

of



14/15

Stanley

Feldman

353

analysis

cannot

be

pursued

too

far,

however,

because of

identification

problems.

4. To

Identify

the

model,

certain

exogenous

variables

were

excluded

from

each

equation.

These

deletions reflect

both

substantive

considerations

(i.e.,

no

direct

effect

of

ratings

of

Carter

on

trust

in

Congress,

and

no

direct

con

nection

between trust

in

Congress

and

trust in

Carter) and

inspection

of

the

estimates

from

the

initial model.

Finally,

all

nonsignificant

terms

were

dropped

from

the

equations

and

the

model

was

reestimated. Several other

specifications

were

tried and

the

estimates of the

relationships

among

the

trust factors

proved

to be

very

robust.

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Paul

R.

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Ada W.

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1981

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Jack.

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David

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R.

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(1983) the Measurement and Meaning of Trust in Government

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Transcript of (1983) the Measurement and Meaning of Trust in Government