CHAPTER I

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

DOMESTIC COMPULSIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY

The study of foreign policy has witnessed remark able

advances during the last few decades. The proliferation

of theories, exploration of competing models, frameworks and

hypothese:J, generation of data, identification of diverse

variables and founding of courses and text~books for the study

of foreign policy clearly demonstrated the emergence of foreign

policy analysis as a distinct inquiry by the 1970s. This

search has on the one 'hand, widened the divergence of views as

regards the proper road to comprehensicn of a country's foreign

policy, and on the other, facilitated the emergence of a few

core ass~ptions in this regard, which are generally accepted

by scholars. One of the results of this is that now there is

no division of opinion among the analysts in this field

regarding the fact that foreign policy being a dependable

variable is shaped by a combination of a large number of factors

or variables. 1 Among such mixed determinants of foreign policy,

l For an attempt to systematically examine and order such vnriables, see, for example, Patrie J. McGowan and Howard Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policl: A Survey of Scientific Findings (Beverly, Hills, Calif. 1973 ; Michael Brecher, .ed., The Foreign Polic) System of Israel (London, 1972), pp. 1-4 as also hi.s and others, A Frarne'M:>rk for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour," Journal of Conflict Resolution (Michigan), vol. 3 , no.1, March 1969, pp. · 75-101;

1 David 0. Wilkinson,

Comparative Fore! n Relations: Framework and Methods (Belmont Calif; 1969 ; J.N~ Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R.· Barry Farrell, ed., A~~roaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, 19: ), pp. 27-92; J. Wlkenfeld, et al, fo.reign Policy Behavio~ (Beverly Hill, 1980).

2

domestic compulsions are particularly important. Though a

state's ex.ternal behaviour may be conditioned by the inter-

national system, yet the range of choices and emphasis within <

these limits 1s wide, with the result that the goals, content

and conduct of that behaviour are to a significant extent . 2

shaped by the domestic context out of which it arises o

The problem that baffles an analyst is how to conceive

of the domestic structure in such a way that would lend itself

to a systematic comprehension of the impact of its major varia-

bles·on the external behaviour of a state. Indeed, the

domestic sources of foreign policy are so numerous that the

task of tracing the way in which they guide that policy

constitutes a prfound theoretical challenge. It requires

nothing ·less than the applicati.on of a comprehensive, multi-

disciplinary approach to know how the domestic physical, socio-

cultural, political and econom1c structures and processes of a

country mould its foreign policy. In this chapter, we intend

to make a modest attempt to propose a framework through which

domestic compulsions in India's foreign policy in general, and

its u.s. policy in particular, can be understood within the

constraints of time and resources o But before proceeding

further it seems us2ful to understand the broad meaning of the

t errn foreign policy.

2J.N. Rosenau, The Scientific ~tudy of Foreiqq Policy (New York, 1971), P•399.

3

II FOREIGN POLICY: MEANir-Ki AND NATURE

r't is remarkable that experts on foreign policy analysis

have been unable to arrive at a consensus on what foreign

policy is as it lacks a self-evident meaning. 3 Thus Hugh Gibson

defines foreign policy as: "A well rounded comprehensive Elan

based on knowledge and experience for conducting the business

of government with rest of the world. It is aimed at promoting

and prote'cting the interests of ·the nation. This calls for a

clear unders~anding of what those interests, are a.nd how far we

can hope to go with the means at our disposal. Anything less

than this falls short of being a national foreign policy. •4 On

the other hand, George lrbdelski has defined foreign policy as

the system of activities evolved by communities for changing

the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own acti-

vities to the international environment. 5 Joseph Frankel

writes that foreign policy "Consists of decisions and actions

which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one

State and other.•6

3 K. J. Ho lsti, International Politics: A Frame'l.()rk of Analysis (New Delhi, 1978), p.360.

4Hugh Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy (New York, 1944), p.9, emphasis added.

5George M:>delski, A Theory of Foreign Policy (London, 1962) pp. 6-7, emphasis added.

6 Joseph Frankel, The sis of Decision Making (Lond_o_n-,~~~--~~--~--~~~~--~~~~

4

A close look at the aforesaid definitions c:learly

reveals the fact that while authors like Gibson stress ideas

(the plan of actlon) prior to action, others like Modelski,

emphasize the action, i.E'ot policy as executed; still others

like Frankel highlight the both. Therefore, in order to avoid

the loose use of the term foreign policy, it is necessary to

see it in a sequence form. Three conceptions in the sequence

or phases of behaviour of foreign policy elites through which

they link their states to events and situations abroad demand

our attention. They are: (a) the general attitude, conceptions

or orientations, (b) content, that is, concrete plans and

commitments and (c) implement atian or acti viti es.

The foreign policy elites get guidance regarr.ling

external behaviour of their states from the generalized oriente-

tions which include value, perceptions, norms, beliefs and

attitudes. As they do not respond to the world scenes randomly

or capriciously, the relevancE:: of these orientations as a source

of their behavio.ur can hardly be gainsaid o The translation of

generalised orientations or reactions to the imnediate situational

context are operationalised in the plans and commitments by these

elites, which form the content of foreign policy. And, the activi-

ties represent the empiricai phase in the sequence of foreign

policy, in which, the specific commitments, goals or content of the

foreign policy usually formulated in accordance with generalised

5

7 orientations, are implemented. It is in. this way, that foreign

policy represents the external aspect of a country's public

policy. An understand! ng of this should help us thus to avoid

the obfuscation and the ambiguity created by the loose use of

the term foreign policy.

A perusal of the definitions of foreign policy cited

earlier, .however, reveals that whether foreign policy is

defined in terms of plans or activities, it has not been made

clear by the/ said writers that whose plans or activities

constitute foreign policy. While Gibson has totally ignored

this question, others have merely indicated abstract, entities

like communities (M:>delski), or state (Frankel) without bother-

ing to define them. It is this failure to point out the concrete

individuals, i.e., foreign policy elites who make plans or

engage in activities in international arena on behalf of these that

entities,Lhas led them to ignore the fact (as will be discussed

later on) that the foreign policy of a country may also be

designed to address the parochial needs of these elites in

domestic politics which may converge or diverge with the overall

7 J. N. Rosen au has also visualized three conceptions in the sequence of foreign policy behaviour. But we differ with him at thA point.where he believes that planes and commitments are conspicuous and observable because of their articulation in formal declaration, press conferences or diplomatic channel of commumication. In our view,this is \not always true. On many occasions~foreign policy elites declare something but intend to do other. The clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons capability by countries like Pakistan, Israel,despite their public declarations not to do so may be cited in support of this contentio:1. For Rosenau's view,see his, •The Study of Foreign Policy" in J.N@ Rosenau, K.W. Thompson 8. Gavin Boyd, eds., World Politics: An Introduction (New York, 1976), p.l6.

6

national interest or may be neutral to it. In addition,

scholars lik-e Frankel have erroneously conceived foreign policy

merely in terms of a country's behaviour towards other states.

But in fact, the term foreign policy implies not only those

principles and practices that a country applies in its dealings

with other st'ates but also with international institutions like

the UN or the World Bank, etc.

Foreign policy should not, however, be misunderstood merely

as a sum total of 'foreign policies' or 'foreign relations•. The

use of term 'foreign policy' to cover both •foreign policy' and

'foreign policies', as attempted in the definition given by

the Brookings Institution, 8 gi vf15 rise to avoidable confusion.

In our view,it will be useful to use two terms, foreign policy

and foreign relations to cover the whole range of relations of

a state with other states.

Thus,foreign policy describes the attitudes, doctrines,

objectives and courses of action that a government adopts in

its relations towards other states, international institutions

and areas abroad._ To put it more precisely, foreign policy is

the sum total of principles and objectives that foreign policy

elites of a state formulate and implement for shaping the

behaviour pattern of a state while dealing with the international

environment to protect and further the •vi tal interests •.

8 See Ma or Problems of United States Foreign Policy 1952-53 (Washington, D.C., 1952 , pp. 37:3-75.

7

The principles are the codes of right conduct which are

considered desirable in themselves such as non-interference in

internal affairs of other states and respect for sovereignty

and integrity of other states. Objectives are the more or less

precis ely delimited interests, formulated in the ci rc lJJlstanc es

in which relations with other states or international institu-

tions are conducted. 9 One of India's objectives in its relations

with Pakistan in 1971, for example, was to create conditions in

the then East Pakistan conducive to the return of ten mi !lion

refugees from that country to their homes in safety and freedomo

As the objectives of foreign policy are suppOsed to be

designed by foreign policy elites oi a country in a manner that

may protect and further the interests of that country, in any

study of foreign policy, one m·ay find a reference to a general,

vague, .ambiguous term such as the n3tional interest. 10 It is

the national interest, which is supposed to reflect the foreign

policy objectives of a country but it is so difficult to define

this concept that some critics have declared it as not only a

9scholars like Wend zel and Lowell have categorized foreign policy objectives into fundamental objectives such as sur,vival of the people, sovereignty, integrity, core values and prestige of a state; middle range objectives such as social welfare, .development of economic-military capabilities, self extension of territories, etc., and finally, specific immediate objectives which the policy makers would like to achieve as the need arisese But they have failed to pistinguish between national interests and foreign policy objectives. This is why, we have regarded only the last category as foreign policy objectives. See R.L. Wendzel, International Relations; A Policy Maker'} Focus (New York, 1977), ppe 44-8; John P. Lowell, Foreign Po icy_ in Perspec-tive: Strategy, Adaptation and Decision Makinq (New York, 1970). See also, KoJ. Holstip International Politics; A Framework for Analysis (New Jersey, 1967}, pp.l24-54o

1°Fred A. Sondermann, "The Concept of the National Interest", Orbis(Philadelphia, Pa.)$ vol.21, no.l, Spring 1977, pp.l27-28o

8

vague and meaningless formula but also as a pseudo theory. 11

In fact, an element of subjectivity is necessarily inherent

in the determination of national interest not only because

there may be significant differences among stat,esmen, political

parties or thinkers,etc.,regarding the components of national

interest but also because this task involves a delicate balan-

cing of several important and sometimes c:onf licting considera-

tions!2 Therefore, in attempting to compreho~d national interest

a descriptive and analytical approach seems to be rational than

a definitive approach.

As a preliminary descriptive statement/it may be said

that the contents of national interest are both general and ' ~ particular. Every state hasAstake in its survival and develop-

ment that interalia includesterritorial integrity, improvement

•in living standards and maintenance of its chosen way of life.

The particularist element in national interest-~of different

nations, and even of the same nation at different times--stems

primarily from the stage of its development and the degree of

the capabilities which it has acquired. One of the particular

interests of an affluent and a Superpower country like the u.s. is to preserve its global influence. On the other hand, the

particula1: interest of a developing country like India having

11 . Raymond Aaron,as cited in Joseph Frankel, National

Interest (London, 1970), p.18.

12For details, see J. Bandyopadh~aya, The Making of

India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1979), revised edn., pp.4-19.

.·

9

the potentialities of being a, great power is not only to

accelerate the pace of its development but also to protect

its independence of voice in international relations and

prevent it from being dominated by external powers.

But as indicated earlier, the foreign policy elites,

i.e. , the makers of foreign policy such as the President or

Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, etc., may also use foreign

policy for the furtherance of their own interests of sustenance

and survival in the guise of pursuing national interest. 13

In our elaboration of the meaning of the term foreign policy,

we have, therefore,used the word "vital interests) so that

elements of. national as well as parochial interests of these

elites in foreign policy of a country may be identified, '

analys~d and contrasted.

Now coming to the term 'foreign relations•, it constitutes

the great ma~s of heterogeneous contacts of a country which its

individuals, groups and the government have with their counter-

parts in other states. A student of foreign re1ations investi-

gates not only th~ motives and determinants of a country's

policy towards other states and the process of that policy 1 s

formulation and implementation, but also the underlying motives

and compulsions behind the formation-execution of policies of

13 See W.H. Wriggins, Rulers• Im erative: Strate ies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa N~w York, 19 9 , pp.221-38; F.B. Weinstein, Indonesia Abandons Confrontation; An In~uiry into the Functions ·of Indonesian Foreiqn PoHSY_ {Ithaca: 19 9)o See also his, "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries", World Politics (Princeton), vol. 24;. no.3, April 1972, pp.356-81; Nalini Kant Jha, International Crisis and Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy (Patna, 1985).

10

other states towards the state whose foreign relations are to

be studied.

In its broadest sense, an analysis· of foreign policy may

include a description of underlying principles which shape

policy objectives, an investigation of imperatives that

condition the formulation of policy, the policy making and

planning processes, the techniques utilized in policy execution

and ,finally, the prediction of future policies on the basis of 14 past trends. As cur study is on domestic compulsions in

India's foreign policy, particularly its U..S.policy and not on

foreign relations, we shall take into account,only those aspects

of the United State's policy towards India during the period

under review1which had a bearing on domestic compulsions in

India's foreign policy.

Before we pass on to the domestic influences on the making

of foreign policy1 the distinction between domestic and foreign

policy shot~ld also be understood .. This is necessary in view of

increasingly expressed belief by both statesmen and political

theoristso Th\:ls, Senator JoW. Fulbright wrote in 1959: "If

ever the line between domestic and foreign affairs could be drawn,

it is now wholly er~sed. 1115 Likewise,Hans J. M:>rgenthau wrote in

14David. 0. Wilkinson has stressed three tasks for an ana-

lyst of foreign relations,viz., to describe, to explain and to project. In our view,an analyst of foreign policy in general, should also do these tasks but within the boundaries of foreign policy analysis explained by us. See. Wilkinson, n.l, p. xiii. See also,Felis Gross, Foreign Policy Analysis (New York, 1954), p.51,- who has stressed three elements in forei~n policy studies: (1) ideologies and objectives, (2) factor and (3) policies.

15 The Rewrter vol.20,no.l0, 14 May 1959, p.l9.

his book,

11

Politics Among Nations in 1960: "The traditional /

distinction between foreign and domestic policies tends to break

down. One might be tempted to say that there are no longer any

purely domestic affairs." 16

But the aforesaid views are, in fact, exaggerated. There

is certainly increasing interdependence between domestic and

foreign affairs, and therefore,between domestic and foreign

policies. Thus, for example, the economic development of India,

essentially a matter of domestic concern, is tied up with seek-

i 1 ' h 17 ing foreign cap tal and foreign technica know- ow. So do

foreign affairs impinge on domestic affairs. The well being of

domestic curren~y--the earliest, and in some respects,sti11 the

hallmark of the nation-state--is affected by foreign affairs such

as international banking, trade, finance and many other organiza-

tions. The defeat of India by China in 1962 has had a powerful

impact on modernization of defence forces in India. 18

16 Hans J. Norgenthau, Politics Amonrz,Nations (New York, 1960), p.148. See also, views expressed by nnan Hi 11, International Politics (New York, 1963), p.198; E.L. Norse, •the Transformation of Foreign Policies: /mdernization, Inter-dependence and Externalization", World Politics, vole· 22, no.3, Apri 1 1970, pp. 371, 374; and c. J. Fri edricfi, '!nternational Politics and Foreign Policy in Developed (Western) System,• in Farrell, ed., n.1, pp. 97-119.

17This necessarily implies that the realm of foreign policy is seen as secondary -to the sphere of domestic politics, and the international consequences of the actions that a govern-ment takes are seen as of less direct importance to itself than those consequences that most nearly to~ch its citizens.

18Peter Calvert, The Foreign Policy of New States (Brighton, Sussex, 1986), p.l4.

12

Nevertheless, foreign policy can be analytically

distinguished from domestic pOlicy. While foreign policy

resembles any other activity, like maintaining educational

or medical services, it differs from these examples in that

it is, at a minimum, manifestly oriented to some actual or

potential sphere ext~rnal to a country, i.e., to some sphere

outside the jurisdiction or control of that country. Domestic

policy, according to Roscoe Pound, is social control through

law. 19 Domestic policy is often embodied in legislation and

administrative regulations which citizens .are obliged to obey.

Foreign. policy, on· the other hand, is executed through

negotiation, persuasion, compromise or in some cases coercion;

and.foreign states or international organizations have no

obligation to collaborate except as their own interests or

rules dictate. Foreign policy may be addressed principally to

domestic interest group; but so . long as it carries some minimum

intention and recognition of an external orientation,it may be

considered foreign policy.

The dividing line between the two policies, thus, is the

question: is a modification of the behaviour of a foreign

governm~nt c.alled for in dealing with it '] The true answer

seems to be that the internationalization of domestic affairs--

and, therefore, the blurring of the distinction between domEstic

policy and foreign policy--depends on the extent to which the

19Roscoe Pound 1 as quoted in F.S. Northedge, edo,

The Foreign Policies of Powers (london, 1974), edn.2, p.ll.

13

needs, security and welfare of the people of a state are satis-

fied from the human and non-human resources available within

the state. The basic distinction between foreign policy and

domestic policy stands. 2C

III DON£STIC COMPULSIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE INCREASING FOCUS

The intimacy of link ages between a country's domestic

structure-processes and its foreign policy has been commented

upon by scholars since the beginning. Plato in his writings in

as early as 400 8. C. 1 visualized the link age between the prod uc-

tion of too much wealth within a country and that country's

involvement in foreign wars. 21 Aristotle advised a ruler facing

internal revolution to wage a war with another country. In his

writings in the early Nineteenth Cent ury1

Clausewi t z also

commented upon domestic compulsions in foreign policy. 22 The

ancient Indian theorists like Manu, Brihaspathi, Sukra and

Kautilya were also not oblivious of relationship between a

country's domestic situation and foreign policy. It is evident

from their ad vices to kings to make peace with their external

20 ' A. Appadorai, The Domestic Roots of India's Foreign

Policy, 1947-72 (Delhi, 1981), p.o.

21see Nichael Hass, ",Societal Development and Interna-

tional Confli-ct• in Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ed. Conflict Behaviour and i1nkage Politics (New York, 1973), p.l91.

But as against Plato's thinking;most of the wars in the mid Twentieth Century have been fought by poor countries of Asia and Africa. See Bruce M. Russet ~rnational Regions .a.n~d_.t.h~e_.I.n~t~e~r~n~a~t~i~o~n~a~l~S~y~s~t~e~m (Chicago, 1967), p.l97.

22see J .N. Rosenau et al, eds. ,, I.he Analysis of Interna-

tional Politics (New York, 19721, p. 2.

14

adversaries,if they lack necessary strength due to domestic 23 socio-economic military weaknesses.

But the main purpose of the aforesaid authors was not

so much to provide an analysis of a country's foreign policy

as to offer an advice regarding the most effective forms of

statecraft. Though in the late 1930s scholars like Harold and

Margaret Sprout underscored the ties between domestic milieu

and foreign policy in their writings, yet the emphasis was 24 again lost during much of the next two decades. It was,

indeed, not before the 1960s that these linkages were stressed

with significant force. Since then, it has almost become a

given datum for an analyst of foreign policy to proceed on the

basis of these linkages. 25 Alexander Dallin has rightly remarked:

23For Manu, See R.C. Gupta, Great Political Thinkers (Agra, 1970), p.90, for Brihaspati, see his,B~rhas~attyasDtras I, ~0-31, 46-48; For Sukra, see Gustav Oppert, ed., Ukrarttti lMadras, 1822), Chap. IVt and for Kautilya1 see his Artha~astra, trans. by R. Shama Sastry {Bangalore, 1915). Also see, UN Ghos hal, A History of Hindu Political Theories (Madras, 1927).

24The Sprouts initially p~rsued this linkage perspective in the publication of their first major book: The Rise of American Naval,· 1776-1918 (Princeton, 1939).

25 For instance, see views expressed by Henry A. Kissinger, •Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy: in Stanley Hoffman, ed., Conditions of World Order .(Boston, 1968), p.l64; L. Jensen, •Postwar Democratic Politics: National-International Linkages in the Defence of the Defeated States: in J.N. Rosenau

1·ed.,

Lirika e Politics: Essa s on'the Conver ence of Nationa-Internationa System New York, 19 9 , pp. 304-231 J.N. Rosenau, DOmestic Sources of Foreign Policy(New York, 1967?; Stanley Hoffmann, ed., Contem ra Theo in International Relations (New Delhi, 1964 , p.4; R.H. Dawson, The Decision to Aid Russia, 1241: Fo_£eign Policy and Domestic Politics (Pall Hill, N.G. 1959), p.xi.

15

"f.he domestic sources of foreign policy behaviour have, indeed,

e;ome to attract the attention uf various analysts, observers

and actors in international affairs.•26

The reason for this growing pre-occupation with linkages

between domestic. and international politics and hence between

domestic and foreign policies are varied. It may be seen in

part, as a reaction against the earlier "realist" stress on the

international system and also against the conventional view

that foreign policy is conducted essentially in insulation from

the vagaries of domestic pressures and politics, whose role is--

and ought to be--ultimately trivial in the pursuit of national

interests and for the outcome of international interactions~7

27 :ibid., p. 340;as also,Wilkenfeld, n.2l, p.l. One may not fully share Dallin and Wilkenfeld's views that growing focus on domestic policy-foreign policy linkages is thE'? result of reactio.n against the realist school in view of its leading proponent,Morgenthau's statement cited earlier (see n.l6) and ~lso in view of the fact that the chief focus of this school/ vi-z •. power of a country essentially depends upon domes-tic factors like economy, military, geography, etc. Neverthe-less, they are correct to the extent that despite realist theorists' recognition of this linkage in theory, the way in which they operational! ze their thinking and foe us exclusively on international systerr., domestic compulsions in foreign policy in generaliand,ocio-cultural-historical roots of foreign policy in particu ar, are overlooked by them.

16

The most important r~ason for a general shift from this

view is the increasingly shrinking world due to technological

developmentse It is now a truism of international relations 28 that states no longer fo nn isolated sovereign entities. Not

only do they interact with each other much more freely than

ever before, but they are interpenetrated by organizational,

trade and linkages to_ an extent which makes it extremely

difficult to distinguish in some respects between the domestic

and foreign spheres. The emergence of these non-state actors

(in addition to traditional state actors), 29 and their

influences· on the policies at national as well international

levels have made the boundaries between domestic and interna-

tional politics non-adamant. 30 That is why,the "billiard ball"

paradigm which is essentially a state-centric approach to

international politics,has come under severe criticisms. 31

28 John H. Herz, International PoJ...itics in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1959), p.64.

29 ' See Oran R. Young, "The Actors in World Politics", in

Rosenau,n. 22, pp. 125-44.

30some authors have attempted to analyse this phenomenon in terms of isomorphic character of domestic and international systems. For concerned literature see Chadwick F. Alger, •Comparison of Internal and Int€rnational Politics •, American Political Science Review (Wisconsin), vol. 57, no.2, June 1963, pp. 406-18; Fred W. Riggs, "International Relations as a Pris-matic System~ World Politics, vol.14, no.l, October 1961, pp.l44-81; Bruce M. Russet, "Towards a model of Competitive International Politics~ in RosenauL ed. ·,International Politics and Foreign Polic :A Reader in nesearch and TheoiY (New York, 19o1), pp.ll9-31; R.D. Masters, "Word Po itics as a Primitive Political System", World Politics, vol.16, no.4, July 1964, pp. 595-619. But the main drawback of this approach is that it finds complete parallelism between the processes of international and domestic politics so much so that it puts aside the notion, how one system affects and being affected by other and vice-versa.

31 See Richard w. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, In Search

.Q.f__ 'Theon:': A New ParadiQrr. for Global Politics(New York,l98l),p.7.

17

Instead several streams of thoughts have emerged that have found ';!")

expression in various alternative models.w'

Among these alternative models, Rosenau's linkage concept

is particularly important. The term ~inkage politics"was coined

by him in 1969 in an effort to provide a systematic testing of

connections between national and international political of states

behaviour Land to connect the two spheres of research,viz.

research on national and international politics and thereby to

end the conceptual separation between political science and

international relations. 33 To facilitate the convergence of the

two fields, he proposes that "linkage" should serve as the basic

unit of analysis and define1$ •linkage" as "any recurrent sequence

of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in

another.~4 In order to distinguish between the initial and

terminal stages of link age, he defines the former as output and

the latter as input for the national or international system in

32For instance • John Burton has advocated the replacement of "billiard ball model" with what he calls a •cob-web model•o In his vieWJ. the world consists of millions of cob-webs in forrr: of institutions· spread over various levels--which are not restricted by geo-political boundaries. See his, Systems Stat_es, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge, l968);and World Society (Cambridge, 1972). See also, J. Henk. Leurdijk, "From Interna-tional to Transnational Politics: A Change of Paradigms?• International Social Science Journal (Paris), vol. 26, n.l, 1974, pp. 53-69; J.N. fiO~enau "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited"-,in Wilkenf£ld, ed., n.2l, pp. 30-35.

33 See Rosenau, Linkare Politics,n.25, pp. 3-7; "Theorizing Across Systems",ibidt pp. 3, 42. Se~ also his, Of Bridges and Boundaries: A Report on a Conference on the Interdependencies of National and International Political Systems, Research Nnnograph no.27, {Princeton, N.J., 1967).

34 Rosenau, Linkage Politics, n.25, p.45.

18

which the sequence of behaviour either originated or culminated~5

Connections between outputs and inputs create reciprocal feed-

back network between national and international political

systems whereby output33 of one system are inputs for the other

and vice-versa.

Before proceeding further to examine how far and

' ' to what extent the aforesaid linkage as also other concepts are useful for probing domestic compulsions in foreign policy, it

would not be out of context to get acquainted with some of the

available literature on domestic conflict and foreign policy

linkages. One can identify three main approaches to conflict

linkage: 36 the socio-psychological, the traditional, and the

quantitatlve.

Many researchers i.n sociology and psychology have dealt

with the relationship between domestic and external conflicts.

Simmel and Coser 1 s wor~ are particularly relevant. 37 While

reformulating Simmel's contention, Coser states: "Rigidly

organized struggle groups may actually search for enemies with

deliberate purpose of maintaining unity ••• imaginary threats

35 . In defining the term linkage, it was in fact possible

to di.stinguish three stages instead of two: the preliminary stage (when the event comes into being).. the stage of arrival (crossing the .boundary between the natiohal political systems); and the stage of events taking effect on the other political system.

36While 'linkage politics' as a concept is meant to encompass all areas of linkages between domestic and international behavi-our, the "Conflict linkage" is limited aspect of the relation-ship between conflicts within national and international systems. The scope of the present endeavour is still more limited to point out some of the literature, portraying domestic conflicts or problems as an input to foreign conflict behaviour of a country.

37~ ( "'eorg Sirr.mel, Conflict, trans. Kurt H. Wolff Glencoe, 1955), Lewis Coser, Ib.e Euria·u:ons of Social Conflict(New York, 1~6). -

19

38 h~ve the same group integrating function as real threat.

When applied to state and international behaviour, the socio-

psychological approach holds that when a political elite or

leadership faces domestic difficulty, it may focus upon a

circle of external conflict in order to s_ecure domestic calm.

Like socio-psychological approach, traditional school

in international relations, assumes that in circumstances of

internal po~itical instability, the ruling elites of a country

tend to divert the attention of its population to the external

political arena either by initiating an external conflict or

stressing the pressures of thE! external environment. Quincy

Wright, for example, argues that it is common for states to

indulge in foreign war as a diversion f.rom domestic ills. 39

"Democratic constitutional- leaders", writes Barry Farrell,

"may also find it useful to stress international question in

ord~r to divert attention from- internal political problems. •40

Henry Kissinger agrees that such a tendency exists, adding:

11 If domestic structures are reasonably stable, tempt at ions to use

38 Coser, ibid., p. 110.

39Quincy Wright, A Studi: of War (Chicago, 1964), abridged edn. See also his,, "Warli', Encycloeaedia Britannic a (Chicago), vol.23, 1970, p.l92.

4°Farrell, "Foreign Policies of Open and Closed Political

Societie~• in his, ed., n.l, p.185.

20

an adventurous foreign policy to achieve domestic cohesion are 41

at a minimum."

This tendency to use foreign policy for domestic purposes

is widely assumed to be more acute among leaders of developing

countries vis-a-vis developed countries. As new states have not

developed a consistent and long term perspective on their

interests, it has been argued that one can expect a certain

fluidity 1 n foreign policies of these countries. And this

flexibility is exploited by leaders who usually begin the formu-

lation of national security policies with jtldgements of what is

necessary and possible to protect the physical safety and politi-

cal tenure of o political leader and his regime. 42 Rosenau

41Kissinger, n.25, p.164. Similar views have been expressed by scholars ~ike Wriggins, n.13, p.235; Ernest B. Hass and Allen S. Whiting, ~namics of International Relations (New York, 1956), p.62; R.C. Good, •state Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy of New States", in L. Martin, ed., Neutralism and Non-Alignment: The New States i~ World Affairs (New York, 1962), pp. 5--7; Selig Herr!soh, "'Troubled India and Her Neighbours", Foreig,!l Affairs (New York), vol. 43, n.2, January 1965, p.320. See also, Karl Von Voryas, Political Development in Pgkistan (Princeton, N.J., 196 5 ) ' p. 17 0.

There are; however, a few traditional scholars who disapprove the scapegoat theory and its assumption that rulers facing internal troubles often start a foreign conflict. See,for example, Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of Wat (New York, 1973), p.248;and his, "The Scapegoat Theory of Internal War•, Historical Studies (Canberra), vol. 15, no.57, 1971, pp. 73-74; Sa 1adia Touval, "The Sources of Status quo and Irrendentist Policies", in African Sound ary Prohlems (Upps ala, 1970), p. 118. For a critic a 1 survey of literature on how leaders use foreign policy for domestic purposes, see Jha, n.13, pp. 9-12.

42John J. Stremlau, "The Foreign Policies of Developing Countries in the 1980", in his, ed., Foreign Policy Priorities of Third World States (Boulder, Colorado, 1982), p. 2. See alsop Pablo GOnzales Casanova, "Internal and External Politics of Under-developed Countries",in Farrel.~ ed., n.l.

THESIS 327.54073

J559 Do 2 l IIIII III/III/III/IIIII Ill

TH3550

states: •(An) example ••• is providea oy ~..,.-=- ... .,. __ .ers of under-

developed countries who often seem to be better able to over-

come domestic strife and inertia by citing the hostility of

external environment than by stressing the need for hard work

and patience at horne. In effect they attempt to solve domestic

issues by re-defining them as falling in the foreign areas.•43

Edward Shills also observes about the new states: •Foreign policy

is primarily a policy of 'public relations' designed not as in

advanced countries to sustain the security of the state or enhance

its power among other states, but to improve the reputation of

the.nation to make others heed its voice, to make them pay atten-

tion to it and to respect it.•44

A few writers on foreign policy of developing countries

tr:::::J have alluded to the role of interest groups, political parties, .1) \1) parliaments, public opinion, governments and economic structures t0

l in constraining a leader to shape the foreign policy of his ..,-

)..::- country in accordance with his own self-interest or whims and 45 fancies. Several writers emphasize the size and loe~tion,

\t-J r ________ \/_) ~ 4~ ,q 73 N I

43 N° Rosenau, Domestic Sources, n.25, p.25. 44Edward Shills, "The Intellectuals in the Poli tic.al

Development of the New States", in John H. Kautsky, ed., Politi-cal Chan e in Underdevelo ed Countries: Nationalism and Communism

New York, 19 2 , p. 211.

45 See, for example, I. William Zartman, International Relations in the New Africa (Englewood .Cliffs, 1966}; domestic politics has been emphasized in, Claude s. Phillips, Jr., The Develoemer.t of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston, 1964) and imperatives of economi~ development have been highlighted in, Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the bilemma of Deeendence: From Suk arno to Soenarto (Lindon, 1976 J.

22

historical-cultural background, industrial-military capabilities

and ideology. 46 But most of these authors' primary interest is

often in showing how foreign adventures are being under-

taken as a "distraction" from domestic difficulties or as a '

means of fostering a hightened, if illusory·, sense of national

solidarity. 47 A recent work on foreign policy of developing

countries again confirms this trend in which though the author

touches the political, governmental, socio-economic structures

and public opinion as sources of foreign policy, yet his chief

concern is to suggest how the decision makers of new states

are "playing the game" of foreign policy. 4l3

46 For example, William C. Johnstone, Burma's Foreign Polica: 'A Study of Neutralism (Cambridge, 1963); Roger M. Smith, eombo i a Is Foreign Po Hey (Ithaca, 1965) and Phillips. ibid .• Rooert Curtis, *Malaysia and Indonesia", New Left Review( London), vol. 28, November-December 1964, pp. 5-32; and G. MeT. Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia", Pacific Affairs (Richmond, V.A.), vol. 37, Fall 1964, PPe 253-70, combine analysis of historical and sociological factors with discussion of domestic political consi-derations. Ideology has been discussed in, Donald B. Weatherbee, Ideo lo j n Indo ne si a: Suk arno 's Indonesian Revolution (New Haven, 1

47For one of the best statements of this thesis, see Donald Hindley,. "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives", Asian Surver (Berkaley, Calif.), vol. 4, June 1964, pp. 904-13. See also, Daniel Lerner's discussion of Nasser in The Passin of Traditional Societ • Modernizin the NJ.ddle East ew York, 1958 , pp. 247-48, and I. Wi iam Zartman's contention that leaders of newly liberated countries cast their foz·eign policies in an anti-Western mould to create temporary solidarity experienced befofe the independence in his, "National Interest and Ideology", in Vernon Mckay, ad., African Diplomacx:: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy (New York, 1966}.

48 Calvert, n. 18, pp. 154-71.

23

Mbst of the Western scholars thus often perceive foreign

policy of developing countries as basically an instrument for

sustenance and survival of ruling elitese They,therefore,

usually do not appreciate it as a positive instrument in the

promotion of a nation's development and the welfare of its

people. It is also due to this reason that most of these

writers, usually ignore the role of public opinion in promoting

er restraining the conflict behaviour of a country. This is

true not only for thnse (such as Bueno de Mesquita)who boldly

argue that all decision makers can be treated as the same rational

calculators regardless of the domestic political context,49 but

also for those who treat domestic factors primarily in structural

terms. 50 We shall come back to this shortce>ming of the traditional

view later on, it is suffice here to point out that most of the

traditional researchers contend that domestic factors may provide I

for adequate explanation for a country's foreign conflict behavi-

our.

As against the traditional approach to domestic politics

and foreign conflict link ages, scholars of the quantitative

school of int~rnational relations have confirmed little or no

relationship between domestic and foreign conflicts. 51 The first

49s. Bueno de Mesquit~, The War Trap (New Haven Conn, 1981)-50Naz1i Choucry and R.C. North, Nations in Conflict;

National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco, 1974).

51The scholars of the quantitative school begin by accept-ing the theoretical assumptions of the traditional scholars, but give greater emphasis on empirical examination of the hypotheses put forward by the tradi U.ona1 school.

24

researcher to come to this conclusion was Rummel, who published

a study in 1963. His major finding based on data for seventy

seven nations in the mid 1950s was. that fOreign conflict

behaviour is generally completely unrelated to domestic conflict

behaviour.•52 This initial finding was further substantiated in

two subsequent studies. 53

Why this discrepancy between the diversion-encapsulation

hypothesis developed by the tradi tiona! scholars and empirical

findings of quantitative studies? Wilkenfeld attempted to

answer this question by arguing for the first time that it is

unrealistic to search for generalizations covering such a large

number of countries without first differentiating among them.

Taking inspiration from Rummel's another study investigating the

possible linkages between various national attributes and foreign

conflict behaviour, 54 Wi lkenf eld differentiated between various

types of nations,viz. 'personalist', 'centrist', 'polyarchic',

and types of ci vi 1 war and foreign conflict behaviours as well-

52R.J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations•, in Wilkenfeld, ed., n.21, p. 100.

"'3 ' ... R.J. Rummel, "Testing Some Possible Predictors of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations•, Peace Research Society Papers, vel. 1, 1963, pp. 101-2; Raymond Tanter, "Dimen-sions of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations; 1958-1960", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 10, March 1964, pp. 41-64.

54RoJ. Rummel, "The Relationship between National Attri-butes and Foreign Conflict Behaviour", in J.D. Singer, ed.,

ant1t t ~e International Politics: Ihsi ht and Evidence New Yo~k, 19 7 •

25

as he determined specific time-lags between domestic and foreign

conflictso He found only a limited relationship between domestic

""5 conflict and foreign conflict behaviour.- In his another study,

Wilkenfeld focussed on four states in the W.ddle East but once

""6 again he found minimum relationship between the two conflicts o-

Leo Hazlewood has also tried to -pro be the reasons for the

contradiction between traditional theory of externalization of

domestic conflict and empirical findings of quantitative studies.

He identified three types of domestic conflict, viz. mass protest,

elite instability and structure war as also'three types of

foreign conflict, viz. disputes, conflicts and hostilities. But

in this study of 75 countries for 1954-19651 he failed to arrive

at any clear cut conclusion. 57

The traditional assumption of externalization of domestic

problems has also been re-examined by Michael Hass. In his study

of ten Western states for the years 1900-1960, he found no

55J. Wilkenfeld, "Introduction", in his, ed., n.21, pp.4-24. See also his, "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behaviour of Nations", in D.D~ Coplin and C.W. Kegley, eds., A Multi Method Introduction ~o Political Science (Chicago, 1971), pp. 200-10; "An Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behaviour of Nations", in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York, 1971), pp. 167-213.

56J. Wilkenfeld, "A Time Series Perspective on Conflict Behaviour in the Ndddle East~, in P.Jo McGowan, ed. Sage Year-book of Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills, 1975~, vol.3, pp. 177-212.

57 Leo Hazlewood, "Diversion Mechanisms and Encapsulation Processes: The Domestic Conflict- Foreign Conflict Hypothesis Reconsidered", in ibid., pp. 238-40. See also his, "Externalizing Systemic Stress: International Conflict as Adaptive Behaviour", in Wilkenfeld, ed., n.21, pp. 148-90 and Charles W. ~egley, Jr., Nei 1 R. Richard son, and Gunter Richter, "Conflict at Home and Abroad: An Empirical Exten~ion ",Journal of Politics (Florida), vol. 40, no.3, August 1978, pp.742-52.

26

s 1 gni f i cant link age between unemployment, suicides, homicides,

alcoholism and foreign conflicts. 58 Likewise, David Singer did

no~ find any relationship between population explosion and

foreign conflict behaviour. 59 Unlike previous studies, Burrowes

and Spector attempted to examine conflict linkage in a single

country,viz. Syria in which he 1 too,found no connections between 60 conflicts in two arenas. Burrowes in his further study with

another scholar once again did not find any relationship between

the two conflicts. 61 There are, of course, a few scholars like

Fierabend, Collins and Lio who have found clear linkages between

domestic and foreign conflicts o 62 Yet, researchers of the

quantitative school, on the whole, have pointed to only a limited

or no relationship between the two kinds of conflicts.

58 Michael Has s, "Socia 1 Change and National Aggressiveness, 1900-1960", in Singer, ed •• n.54,J=P215-44.

59J.D. Singer, •The Correlates of War Project: Interim Report and Rationale", World Politics, vol. 24, no.2, January 1972, pp. 243-70.

60 Robert Burrowes and Bertram Spector, "The Strength and Directi0n of Relationship between Domestic Conflict and External Conflict and Co-operation: Syria, 1961-1967 11 , in Wilkenfe1d, ed., n.21, p.315.

61Robert Burrowes and Gerald Demaid, "Domestic/External Linkages: Syria, 1961-1967", Comparative Polit~cal Studies (London), voJ. 7, no.4, January 1975, pp. 495- •

62rvo Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend, •Levels of Development in Int~rnational Behaviour•, in R. Buttwell, ed., ForeiJn Polict and Developing Nations (Lexington, 1969), pp. 150, 163; ohn N. ollins, ''Foreign COnflict .Behaviour and Domestic Disorder in Africa", in Wilkenfeld, ed., n.2l, pp. 286-7; Kuang-Sheng Liao, "Linkage Politics in China: International Wobilization and Articulated External Hostility in Cultural Revolution, 1967-1969", World Politics, vol. 28, no.4, July 1976, pp. 590-610.

27

IV A CRITIQUE AND A SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNAnVE

wa do not p~pose to discuss further the foregoing findings that would be beyond the scope of this work which is not on the

theory of foreign policy or on conflict linkage. These have been

cited merely to indicate some of the burgeoning 11 terature on

domestic politics- foreign policy linkages. In addition, the

quantitative approach to international relations and particularly

to conflict linkage has already been subjected to severe criticisms

by scholars.63 Nevertheless, in order to begin our search for a

framework for studying domestic compulsions in India's foreign

policy, it is 'NOrthwhile to mention two interesting phenomena

that emerge from the review of 11 terature on domestic poll tics-

foreign policy linkages and conflict linkages. The first is

conflicting views regarding the role of national interest vis-a-

vis regime's interests in the foreign policy-making and the second

is the clear distinction between theory and empiricism.

National Interest vs, Regime's Interest

A review of stu;:iies on foreign policy analysis and

particularly domestic politics-foreign policy linkages brings

63Th~ areas of data, methodology and theory correspond to the major thrust of criticisms against the quantitative approach. See for a critical examination of this school, Yaacov Bar-Simon-Tov, Unka Polit c n t Middl E t• Betw n Domestic and Ex rn n c ou er, Co orado, 1983 , pp.2l-35. See a so, Andrew Mac, •Numbers are not Enough", Comparative PoM·tics (New York), vol.7, no.4, July 19751 pp.597-6I8; Joseph M. colri!ck, •An Appraisal of Studies of the Linkage between Domestic and International Conflict•, Cod§paRdtive Political stygitR, vol.6, no.4, January 1974, pp.485-5 a J. David singer, • eorists and Empiricists: The Two Culture Problems in International Politics •, in Rosenau, ed., n.22, pp.S0-95.

28

into relief tw6 approaches regarding goals and orientations of

foreign policy. Firstly, as pointed out earlier, scholars like

Abrgenthau, Gibson, Modelski, Northedge, Appadorai, Hass and

Whiting,etc.,seem to believe that the foreign policy is

support! ve of national interest of the policy making nation. 64

Implied in this assumption is the belief that foreign policy is

beyond the partisan politics of a country and it equally serves

the various segments of the society. Rosenau's view that foreign

policy is an adaptive behaviour typically represents this belief.65

Although the concept of adaptation advanced by Michael K.

66 O'Leary apparently seems to be different from Rosen~u's theory

64For A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan's opinion, see their, India's Foreign Policy and Relations (New Delhi, 1985), pp. 2-7. For E.B. Hass and A.S. Whiting's view, Qynamics of International Relations (New York 1956), pp. 59-70. ·

65see J.N. Rosenau, MComparing Foreign Policies: Why, What, How 1" in his, ed., Comparing ForeiJn Policy: Theories, Findinrs and Methods (Beverly Hills, 1974 , p.4. See also his, "Adapt ve Strategies for Research and Practice in Foreign Policy", in F.W. Riggs, ed., Design for International Studies: Sco~e 1 Objectives and Methods {Philadelphia, 1971), pp. 2l8-S5;Adaptive Politics in an Interdependent World", Orbis, vol.16, no.1, Spring 1972, pp. 153-73; "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage Politics Revisited", in Wilkenfeld, ed., n.21, p.2. For a summary of Rosenau's belief in this regard, see P.J. McGowan, "Problems in the Construction of Positive Foreign Policy Theory",in Rosenau, ed., Comearing Foreign Policies, ibid., pp. 27-32.

In addition to Rosenau, other scholars who have sought to elaborate the adaptive perspective include: P.J. McGowan, •Toward a Dynamic Theo_ry of Foreign Po !icy", mimeographed (Syracuse, 1971); S.J. Thorson, "National Political Adaptation", in Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies, ibid., pp. 71-114 •

. 66 See M.K. O'Leary, "Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic

Adaptation", in Rosenau, ed., ComR_aring Foreign Policy, ibid., PP• 55-70.

29

and similar to the ideas of Allison and Halperin. 67 For, he

begins with criticizing Rosenau and other scholars who overlook the

role of the regime's interest in the making of foreign policy.

Yet, in fact, he too, ends with the same rhetoric of national

interest as he concludes that nations seek friends in the inter-

national enVironment strictly on the basis of power and common 68 interests. Thus like Rosenau, O'Leary too, does not go beyond

the sterile rhetoric of national survival or national interest goal

of foreign policy postulated by the pre-behavioural (traditional)

school of international relations. But as explained earlier,

foreign policy of a country is also influenced by the regime's

interest.· We shall, therefore, not use the perspective of O'Leary

or of those spho lars who think that foreign po !icy of a country

always tends to serve the national interest of that country.

At the same.time, we have serious reservations in applying

the perspectives of those analysts as well, who conceive foreign-

policy of developing countries as having peculiar irrelevance

to the real concerns of these countries or who regard foreign

policy of these countries as little more than a game played by an

67Graham T. Allison, Esience of Decision; Expl~ning the Cuban ssile Crisis (Boston, 971); M.H. Halperin, i y Bureau-crats P ay ames , o ei n lie (New Yon), vol.50, 1971, pp.70-90; and G.T. A son an M.H. Halperin, •a~reaucratic Politics! A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications•, in R. Tanter and R.H. Ulman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton 1972).

Allison has put forward two alternative models to the traditional view of foreign policy. The essence of both the models is that policy is made not according to an overall concep-tion of national interest but according to the conflicting views of the differing interests of those making foreign policy.

68o•Leary, n.66, p.62.

30

individual or a small group at the expense of the nation's real

interests. These analysts ignore the fact that a leader's scope

for using foreign policy for his own sustenance and survival is

conditioned by factors like a state's strategic location, history,

cultural-religious habits, racial composition, political

structure, pattern and urgency of external environment and so on.

It is due to this overlooking of the parameters set by these

constraints on a leader's scope for shaping foreign policy, that

the manr.er in which foreign policy choices are defined and

circumscribed-by socio~economic-political conditions peculiar

to developing countries remain an unanswered and, for the most

part, unasked question.

It is true that scholars like Weinstein have adopted more

balanced approach regarding the relative significance of

national vs. regime's interests in foreign policy making vis-a-

vis those scholars who overstress any one of these goals of

foreign policy. This is clear by Weinstein's 'central organising

concept--the uses of foreign policy', by which he means the

functions that foreign policy performs whether internationally

or at home, for the nation as a whole, and for sectional interest~?

His this proposal was, in fact, built on Robert Good's argument

a decade before that foreign policy was being 'recruited to the

state-building task' •. Good ~onsidered that foreign policy often

served four purposes: to continue the revolution against colonial

69weinstein, "Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia", n. 13, p.366o

31

rule; to establish the identity of new states; to keep an in

· d t d f i ~ fl at home. 70 group 1n power; an o re uce ore gn ~n uence

But the problem with these propositi. ons is that the idea of

'uses' d.istracts us from the various environmental constraints

on leaders' role in foreign policy making in general and

domestic constraints like public opinion, domestic cultural

values, etc., in particular.

It is, therefore, held that while foreign policy elites

_may use foreign policy for the furtherence of their own interests

or the i n'teres ts of those groups close to them even at the cost

of national interest (in the case of conflict between national

and regime's interests), their freedbm in this regard is circumsc-

ribed by the domestic structures and processes of the country,

they represent. In fact, even a leader of an authoritarian

political system is not totally free to shape foreign policy in

accordance with his whims and fancies. We doubt the wisdom in

sweeping remarks like: "If even a nation's foreign policy was

mad~ by one man1 that nation was Germany, and the man was Bismark." 71

No doubt, idiosyncratic factors have some influence on policy

formation and especially on its implementation. Yet, few leaders

who care about their domestic political future will express

personal eccentricities which run counter to dominant attitudes

and political realities. Th~refore, only those idiosyncracies

which neither violate dominant attitudes nor radically alter the

70Good, 41 5 n. , P. •

71 E.M. Carroll, Germany and the Great Powers, 1866-1914 (New York, 1938), p .1.

32

domestic political configuration are likely to influence the

making of foreign policy. 72 Hence, in this work, compulsions

in fo'reign policy arising out from the domestic strategic,

socio-cultural, politico-economic structures would be focussed

rather than the personal idiosyncracies of top leadership in the

determination of foreign policy. 73

The Distinction between Theca and EmRiricism

The second interesting phenomenon that emerges from a

review of various studies on domestic policy-foreign policy linka-

ges in general, and conflict linkages in particular, is the

distinction between theory and empiricism. The distinction is

between most of the traditional attempts to develop a theory with-

out testing it empirically and attempts at empirical testing of

a theory without any effort to develop that theoryo

While the traditional propositions are hardly more than

tentative .and general, the quantitative school on the other hand,

has accepted and tested these propositions without attempting to

identify the relevant variables or to examine the theoretical

nature of links that exist between domestic problems and foreign

72on the limited capacity of a dictator to convert whim into foreign policy, see Werner Levi, "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy", International Studies Quarterly_ (London), vol.l4, March 1970o p.26.

73Many writers have exaggerated the role of idiosyncratic factors as SOLlrce of foreign policy. See, for example, Rosenau, ".Pre -theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", n.l, p.48; Werner Levi, The Challenge of World Politics in South and Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), pp. 13-14; Zartman, n.45; pp 47, 53; Frederick P. Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965", Indonesia (Bombay), vol.2, October 1966, pp. 37-76; w. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-66 (Princeton, 1969); Appad9rai, n.20, PP• 215-30o

33

74 l policy. Thus, for instance, most of the quantitative scho ars

who have been thoughtlessly identified with the behavioural

school in po'litical science, have not bothered to find out why

there is or not linkage, what affects the direction of the links,

what accounts for the existence or absence of the links, etc.

But searching for empirical generalization, as Oran Young has

remarked, "o•• does not offer a rewarding prospect from the point

of view of theory building ••• treated as an end in itself and

without careful incorporation into one or more theoretical

formulations, the identification of empirical regularities does

to facilitate the explanation for inter-relationships among

75 variables.• We, therefore, intend to incorporate our findings

made on the basis of our empirical investigation of domestic

compulsions in India's forejgn policy, particularly its u.s. policy during the period under review into one or more theoretical

74This is one of the central criticisms against quantita-tive approach. See Robert T. Holt and John M. Richardson Jr., •competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics", in Robert T. Holt and John G. Turner, eds., The Methodology of ComQarative Research (New York, 1970), p. 68; Robert Burrowes lfheory Si Data No ! : A Decade of Cross National Political Research•, World Politics,

voL25, no.l, October 1972, ppo 133-41; Mack, n.63, p.613; Scolnick,n.63, pp. 499-503; Karl Deutsch, "Towards an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics•, in H.K. Jacobson and William Zimmerman, eds., The Sharing of Foreign Policy (New York, 1969), po82. Scholars like Haz ewood have, however, made attempts to identify variables. See his, no57, pp. 213-44.

75.oran R. Young, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor", World Politics, vol.2l, noo3, April1969, p~491.

34

formulations. This raises the question as to how far do some

of the attempted generalizations in foreign policy assist in

scrutinising domestic compulsions in foreign policy. In the

following section, an attempt is made to examine these theories.

(a) Powe·r Approach and Capability Analysis:

To begin with, one of the most widely known explanations ' 76 of foreign policy in a generalised form, is power. But thrcugh

out the course of history, the perceptions of power many a time

have turned out to be the "misleading and fleeting" to the states-

men and analysts alike. 77 One can discern, however, two major

perspective on power, viz. one which regards it as a possession

or norm and ·the qther whJ ch views it as an out come of trans actio nal

relationships, as more modern theorists have seen it. 78 While

the space precludes a full scale discussion of this burning

concept, suffice is to say here that the first perspective which

perceives power as possession and norm that forms the core

76 Some of the renowned power theorists are Morgenthau, n.l6;

Fredrick Schuman, International Politics (New York, 1958); Inse Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York, 1962).

77• ' Stanley Hoffmann,"Notes on Inclusiveness of Nodern

Power•, International Journal (Toronto, Ont.), vol. 30, no.25, SpriJ!lg 1975, ,pp. 183-205.

78For the traditionalist and behavioural perspectives, see

Charles A. McClelland, Theory and International System (New York, 1967), chapter 3. See also, Rosenau et al, eds., n.22, p.4.

35

philosophy of the realist school is hardly useful in analysing

domestic compulsions in foreign policy in view of : (a) its

ove!'-en1phasis on power, neglecting all other factors playing

significant role in the foreign policy making and (b) its

t 1 b . . t. 79 concep ua am 1gu1 1es.

Recently, however, recourse to a more refined elaboration

of this concept has gained currency and has generally come to be

known as capability analysis. 80 The scholars who prefer the

term capability instead of power may differ in details but many

of them agree on the point that in order to' conceive power in

all-inclusive sense and as essentially a behavioural relationship

between nations, the term capability is more appropriate than

power. Thus, for instance, using the term power in truly nor~

normative sense of capability analysis, Harold and Margaret Sprout

have conceived of power in terms of behavioural relationship and

viewed political relations of states as basically a problem of

79For details, see Raymond Aron, "What is a Theory of International Relations ?" in John Farrell and Asa Smith, eds., Theory and Reality in International Relations (New York, 1967), pp. 1-23. See also, William H. Ricker "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power", Amer,ican Political Science Review, val. 58, no. 2, June 1964, pp. 341-49; Harold and Margaret Sprout, Found a-t ions of International Politics (New York, 1963), pp. 13~77; McClelland) ibid., pp. 63-73.

8 ~See Harold and Marg~ret Sprout, Foundations of National Power (Princeton, 1945)~ as also their, ibid., ~hapter 4; Rosenau, n.2, pp. 197-237· Robert A. Dahl Modern Political Analysis (New Delhi, 1965 ~; J.D. Singer, "International Influence: A Formal Nodel", American Political Science Review, vol. 57, no.3; September 1963; McClelland, ibid., Wilkinson, n.l, pp.32-7l; Klaus Knorr, "Notes on the Analysis of National Capabilities", in Rosenau et al, eds., n.22, pp. 175-85; Holsti, n.9, pp. 198-200.

36

81 interactions between states.

Conceiving of capability in terms of behavioural

relations between states leades us to make distinction between

(a) the potential capacity (b) its mobilised capacity and

activation of its potential and mobilised capacities to affect

the behaviour of other states in desired direction. Potential

capacity includes those sources of a state's strength which

remain dormant or unexploited. When that capacity is mobilized

for instance, into an army, it may be regarded as constituting

the mobilized capacity of that stat8. Tho~gh capacities either

potential or mobilized enable a state to influence the behaviour

of other states,i.e, to wield capability, but they themselves

do not amount to capability. It is only when these capacities

are activated by a state to influence the behaviour of other

states in desired directions that state may be regarded as

having the capability. In this sense a country's domestic capa-

cities may be viewed as base of its foreign policy capability. 82

In the light of the aforesaid linkages between domestic

capacities and foreign policy capability we may propose two

hypotheses in this context. First, states with lower levels of

capacity to act will interact more with states having higher

81sprout and Sprout, Foundations of National Power, ibid • t P• 158 0

82Nuni~rous attempts have been made to list these capaci-ties~ To quote just a few: HolEti n.9, chapter 7; Klaus Knorr, IVlilitag Potential and Pov-1er (Boston, 1970); Wilkinson, n.l, C'hapter 3; Karl w •. Deutsch,"On the Concepts of Politics and Power•, in Rosenau, ed., n.30, pp. 225-60; Wendzel, n.9, chapter 3; Hill, n.l6, PI?• 276-82; RoLert A Dhal, 1Nho Governs ? (New Haven, 1961).

37

levels of capacity: the havenots will interact with haves in

trying to acquire valued goods and services. Secondly, in the

case of imbaiances between domestic capacities and foreign

policy objectives, i.e., lack of domestic capacities for foreign

policy objectives of a country, that country will be forced to

retrenchjpostpone (even abandon) foreign policy objective and/or

to adopt a new domestic capacity policy as also, if possible,

to make shift in foreign relations designed to correct the

imbalance by achieving adequate domestic capacities. ·

(b) Input-Output N~odel of Foreign Policy Decision-N:akinSll,

Some scholars have attempted to analyse foreign policy

within the framework of input-output model of foreign policy

decision making, who have more or less taken into account the

internal setting. George Modelski's input-output model was the

first rigorous conceptual frc.mework in this regard. Following

Talcot Parsons, 1\i;odelski defined foreign policy as a system of

action and he provided four parameters of foreign policy for

analysis--power input, power output, interests and objectives. 23

Richard Snyder and associates produced a very elaborate model of

foreign policy decision-m&king. 84 In this model, 'the internal

setting' and the 'dec-ision-making process' represented a

hitherto neglected intra-state dimension to the explanation of

83fvbdelski, n.5.

to the Stud of

38

foreign policy. But this model was too complex to be workable.

There were problems about finding information to fill many

boxes in Snyder's deci.sion-making model. In a single framework

almost everything was treated as variable without any specifica-

tion of constants. 85

Therefore, Joseph Frankel came forward with a relatively

manageable framework of foreign policy analysis. Following the

distinction between psychological and operational environments

visualized by Sprout and Sprout, he put forward a scheme of

foreign policy analysis that laid emphasis 6n decision makers'

perception of actual environment in which foreign policy is made.86

It is due to this emphasis on decision makers' perception (what

he calls 'psychological environment'), which may not necessarily

reflect the real environment (or what he calls 'operational

environment'), that this model tends to ignore actual domestic

or external environrr.ent in which foreign policy is made. There-

fore, this model is hardly useful for our purposes.

Michael Brecher,too,stresses the psychological environment.

But unlike Frankel and Snyder, etc., he introduced (under the

influence of Karl Deutch's communication theory), the notion that

the feedback on policy output is also an important input in

foreign policy decision-making. Thus, while explaining the

environmental inputs into foreign policy making, Brecher also

S5Herbert McClosky, "Concerning Strategies for a Science of International' Politics•_,in ibid., p.2. Also see, Weinstein, "The Vses of ?oreign Policy in Indonesia", n.l3, pp. 356-82.

86Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Man-Nd.lieu Relationship

Hypothesis in the Context of International Politics", as cited in Frankel, n.6, pp. l-4.

39

visualized two types of environment - operational and psycholo-

gical. The operational environment was further divided into

two - the external and internal. The psychological environment

was also divided irito tvvo main categories: 'The attitudinal

prism •· of the decision makers as individuals and 'images of the

elite', i.e., the difference between the perceptions the elites

f th ld d •t l't 87

have o e wor ·an ~ s rea ~ y.

·Although Brecher's framework identifies domestic political

actors as main variables, it suffers in general, and from the

point of view of analysing domestic compulsions in foreign policy

in particular, from various shortcomings. Firstly, by overstress-

ing psychological environment like Snyder and Frankel, Brecher,

to'o, not only encourages tendency to ignore operational variables

but also complicates the problem of data accessibility in foreign

policy analysis and particularly in analysing the foreign policies

of the Third World countries. For, detailed answers to complex

psychological questions related to decision makers' perceptions,

stress and coping are very difficult to obtain. Specific empiri-

cal research projects have found that key decision makers are, not

surprisingly, unable to even recall how they felt at key moments

of crisis situation, even when they were apparently willing to do

87 ' Brecher, ed., The ForeiQO policy System of Israel, n.l,

pp. ll-12. See also, Brecher et. a 1, • A Framework for Research on Foreig.n Policy Behaviour", n.l, p~.75-102; Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (London 1974) and Crisis Decision Making: Israel 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley, California, 1980).

40

so. 88 In addition, Breacher's fralT:e\NOrk is intended only to

present the relevant variables and not the system of interactions

between the~ or to assess the relative importance of domestic

variabl~s as compared to international variables in the making

of foreign policy. Even his scheme of variables is defective

but that is a different matter to which we shall turn later on.

Here it is suffice to bring home the point that Brecher's model

has not addressed to the central question, how to identify

conditions or circumstances under which domestic political

variables become predominant in the f ormu latio n of foreign policy.

(c) Linkage Politics:

An attempt to answer the aforesaid question assumes added

significance in view of the fact that Rosenau's concept of linkage

politics is also si.Lent over this question. Noreover, this

concept raises the que~ti~n as to what should be the level of

in~estigatio.n whil~ probing domestic determinants of foreign

policy.: For, Rosenau has not clearly distinguished between

linkage polltics as a foreign policy theory, i.e., linkages

between foreign policy and domestic politics and as a system

theory, that is, linkages between domestic system and the larger

international system.

In order to answer the former question we proceed on the

basis of the assumption that the relative significance of domestic

188shag.at Korany, "Foreign Policy in the Third World: An

Introdu~tion," International Political Science Review (Beverly Hills), vol.5, no.l, January 1984, pp. 7-20. See also his, "Foreign Policy Nlodels and Their Empirical Relevance: A Critique and an Alternative",. International Social Science Journal, vol.26, no.l, Jant13ry 1974, pp. 70-94.

41

vis-a-vis international set of variables in the shaping of foreign

policy can change according to the type of decision and in diffe-

rent domestic or international structures or different circumstan-

ces. A hypothesis may be proposed to tentatively identify the

conditions under which domestic political variables tend to be

predominant in foreign policy formation thus: In circumstances

where the ruling elites' retention of power depends upon its

response to foreign policy demands of the competing elites, or

various interest groups, or of those political entities on whose

support its retention of power depends; the influence of internal

constraints may become predominant in the shaping of foreign policy.

These circunstances tend to exist in situations where the ratio of

political (and sometimes military) strength tends to favour politi-

cal rivals, or the basis of public support for the regime is

relatively limited.

As re~ards the second question, i.e., the ap~ropriate

level of analysis for probing domestic compulsions in foreign

policy, one must understand the distinction between the idea of

linkage politics as a foreign policy concept and as a system

concept. An important aim of Rosenau (without saying so explicitly)

while developing. the idea of link age politics was to extend this

concept to two research levels of international relations, that

of the state and of the system. 89 On the state level, linkage

concept focusses on identifying the connections between variables

w1 thin the internal and external political environments of a given

international actor, when the variables within the internal

political environment predominate in the shaping of foreign policy.

89 Bar-Simon-Tov, n.63, pp.lO, 38.

42

On the system level, Rosenau tries to identify how interactions

between actors in internal political environment affect inter-

actions b:etweenactors (i.e. states) in international system

and vice-versa - that is how interactions : between actors in

the international system affect the internal political environ-

ment of any of the actors.

Needless to add, we are not going to focus the said

linkages at the system level as this study is not on linkages I

between national and international system but on domestic

imperatives in foreign policy of a particular state. Therefore,

any student of this subject must be concerned with analysing

foreig1;1 policy at the state level and while doing so, adopt

nation•state's perspective. 9Q But this is not enough. Even

while choosing to analyse domestic politics - foreign policy

linkages at the state level, it must be recognised that while

Rosenau's linkage politics mainly focuses on political factors,

a country's strategic, socio-cultural and economic attributes,

in fact, also condition its foreign policy. In this respect,

our analytical framework must, therefore, be wider than the

concept of linkage politics at the state level.

It should not, however, be as wider as to include an

examinati0n of the impact of foreign interactions on domestic '

interactions. This caveat is necessary in view of the fact that

many writers have tried to probe the impact of foreign policy on

90 M.M. Sharma and S.K. Sharma, "Domestic Determinants and Foreign Policy Analysis: Need for a Framework •, Journal of Political Studies (Jalandhar), vol.25, no.l, February 1987, pp.l-12.

43

domestic politics. One view treats foreign policy as a direct

impetus for domestic political development, when foreign aid is

provided for that purpose. 91 Some scholars like Karl Von Voryas,

have hinted more indirect connection. External aggression has

been seen by him as an input for internal instability or conversely,

a~ incentive for greater national integration by posing a threat

to the country. 92 These approaches are interesting but in the

present w6rk, we intend instead to study mainly that aspect of

the concept of linkage politics which deals with domestic compul-

sions as an impetus to external policy.

Before proceeding further it seems pertinent to point out

here that the idea of integrated linkage theory 93 advanced by

Rosenau in.order to m0re precisely define the linkage concept

(firstly coined by him in 1969) raises more questions than it

answers. To i'llustrate. the contours of this theory he uses East

Asia and behaviour of four national societies,viz China, Japan,

the u.s. and the U.S.S.R. towards it as an example. The each society is assumed to have primary goals in East Asia, the pursuit

of which is measurabl~ on a five point intensity scale ranging

from vigorous to half hearted. He believes that through this

framework one can develop propositions about how the degree of

91This aspect of question has produced several works.

See, for i!'lstance, Richard J. 'Daleski, "Foreign Assistance and Political Development", (Ph.D. thesis, University of Denver, 1971); Virginia Anne McMurty, "Foreign Aid and Political Development: The American Experience in West Africa" . (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Mc.dison, 1974)o

92 Voryas, n.41, pp. 162-72. 93

See Rosenau, n.32, pp.53-56.

44

stability of the East Asian system will affect each society's

domestic life and structure and how domestic life and structure

will affect the degree of vigour with which each society pursues '

its external goals thereby affecting the nature and structure

0f the East Asian system.

A perusal of the aforesaid framework makes it clear that

even in this revised version of the linkage politics, Rosenau has

not cared to distinguish between linkage politics as a foreign

policy ·and as a system concept. M:>reover, this framework can

only enable a researcher to answer how or to which extent

a country pursues its foreign policy goal but not to answer as

to why that country chooses a particular goal. To cap it all,

the inadequacy> of an important assumption of this theory that

foreign i policy goals as also domestic life and structure of a

country can be redu~ed to a single dimension, needs no elaboration.

It seems that Rosenau has chosen only a particular dimension of

foreign policy and domestic life in order to calculate the possible

permutations and combinations of the impact of the degree of

stability of the East Asian system on each society's domestic

structure and the vice-versa on the basis of the five-point scales

devised by him for measuring the degree of pursuit of foreign

policy by the four countries as also for measuring the degree of

central dimension of their domestic structure with the aid of a

compwter. 94

94 Ibid. , p. 55.

45

Rosenau's attempt to calculate the said permutations

and combinations perhaps stems from his being an adherent of

95 the scie~tific approach. The adherents of this school in

their attempt to make the prediction in international relations

as accurate as in natural sciences, usually forget to see the

divergences between the social science of which international

relations and foreign policy analysis is a part and natural

sciences. It may also be argued that in view of India's long

and glorious historical-cultural heritage, which has influenced

its foreign policy, the scientific approach, that gives to these

factors relatively subordin2.te position and lays a greater

emphasis on the present would be less reliable as a guide to

academic activity in the realm of our foreign policy than it has

been in the realm of foreign policies of countries with shorter

and lesser history and tradition. 96 This is not to suggest a

wholesale rejection of the new approaches but only to point out

that while using them for understanding foreign policy of countries

like India one should be very careful. 97

95A host of new approaches like systems analysis, decision-making, bargaini"ng, communication theory or linkage politics, etc., . that have emerged after the 2nd World War are broadly called s-cieAtific approach to international relations and foreign policy.

96K.P. Misra, "Introduction•, in his, ed., Janta's Foreign Pollex (New Delhi, 1979), p.xii.

97 . ' An-eminent Indian scholar, J. Bandyopadhyaya, has

expressed the view that new Western theories and models are merely an attempt to rationalize the imperatives of the u.s. foreign policy. See his, •International Relatio~s Theory: The Problem of Relevance•, a paper presented in a seminar at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1979. While one may not wholly agree with this view, it certainly shows that one should be very cautious while applying Western theories to countries like India.

46

(d) Marxist Approac)l

The classical Marxist conception regards the state as

merely an instrument of oppression at the hands of a society's

ruling class in a capitalist society. The theory, therefore,

argues th3t foreign policy of such a state, which is essenti~lly

an imperialist state will merely express the monopolists'

interests in gaining access to markets, fields of investments

and raw materials. It is thus a simple theory of foreign policy

that attempts to explain how foreign policy behaviour varies with

changes in domestic class relations and stages of economic

developmeqt.

Needl~ss te add, this theory completely ignores the role

of dome~tic socio-cultural, political and strategic structures

in the making of foreign policy. Because of the blunders created

by the model of foreign policy as an expression of class struggle,

the Marxist analysts are at a loss to explain or account for many

important aspects of the reality. For instanc~, the conflict

between western countries and Iran over passing of the death

sent~nce against Salman Rushdie by the Iranian leader, Ayatullah

Khwnaini, can hardly be explained by the theory of class struggle. 98

~8As against the Marxist predictions and European experiences, cleavages between~ich andj'poor seem to be, in practice, less significant a factor vis-a-vis cultural differences perceived to exist by the'parties concerned as regards domestic conflicts as well in most of the Third World countries. The experiences of Lebanon, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan1 etc. may be. cited in support of this contention. In these cases economic super-ordination may be an element, yet driving f6rce in conflict concerned has been ethnic. For illustration of some of these and other cases, see Calvert, n.l8, pp. 137-140.

47

In the empirical analysis of domestic compulsions in

foreign policy, concepts of class structure and mode of production

are, thus, largely irrelevant except in so far as they are

reflected in organized demands on the system--e.g., the working

class through trade union pressures on foreign policy, or capita-

listic interests through business lobbies seeking to influence '

the conduct of foreign economic policy. (Of course, there is

also a negative argument that class stratification, and what it

im